Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008-2009)

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

On December 27, 2008, Israel launched a major military campaign dubbed “Operation Cast
Lead” against the Palestinian Islamist militant group Hamas in the Gaza Strip in order to counter
Palestinian rocket fire and, more broadly, to significantly weaken all aspects of Hamas rule in
Gaza. On January 3, 2009, Israel began a ground offensive into Gaza likely intended to eliminate
Hamas’s willingness or capability to launch rockets at Israeli towns and cities. As of January 5,
Israeli bombings and ground forces had reportedly killed over 530 Palestinians, while five Israelis
had been killed by Palestinian rockets and attempts to counter the ground invasion.
Some Israeli observers have suggested that neither toppling the Hamas regime nor permanently
ending all rocket attacks is a realistic goal. Nevertheless, by temporarily disabling Hamas’s
military capacity, Israel could ease the frequency and intensity of Hamas attacks in the months
ahead as it prepares to deploy new, more sophisticated anti-rocket defense systems. One
complicating factor for Israel is time: the longer Operation Cast Lead runs without a definitive
outcome in Israel’s favor, the more pressure will grow for a cessation of hostilities.
The unraveling of the six-month tahdiya or temporary cease-fire between Israel and Hamas that
led to the December 2008 outbreak of violence in and around the Gaza Strip can be linked to
several factors—some tactical, some more deeply-rooted. Some commentators have said that
giving up on the cease-fire was in both sides’ interests.
The world response to the Gaza crisis has been characterized by consistent calls for an end to the
violence and by concern over the humanitarian situation in Gaza. The crisis also has exacerbated
tensions between countries in the region with a relatively pro-Western orientation—like Egypt,
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia—and other countries and non-state actors—like Iran, Syria, and
Hezbollah.The more that the Israeli offensive is perceived to target Gaza’s largely impoverished
1.5 million residents, the greater the possibility that Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank could
decide to rise up in opposition. Another intifada could have wide-ranging consequences for
Israelis and Palestinians and significantly hamper chances for reprising the peace process.
U.S. President-elect Barack Obama will likely be compelled to address the Gaza situation directly ^th
at the outset of his administration. The incoming 111 Congress may be called upon to increase
various forms of assistance to Israel, to the Palestinian Authority headed by President Mahmoud
Abbas, and to Palestinian civilians in order to support a sustainable post-conflict order that
guarantees Israel’s security and attends to the needs of the Palestinian humanitarian situation.
The Gaza crisis constitutes a conundrum for all involved. Israel would like to avoid a drawn-out
invasion and occupation of Gaza, but at the same time does not want to abandon the military
operation prematurely for fear of having to go back into Gaza at a later date. Although the ground
attack might endanger its rule in Gaza, Hamas may welcome it in the hopes of miring Israeli
forces in close-quarters combat to strip away their advantages in technology and firepower and in
hopes of heightening perceptions that Palestinians are being victimized. Linking the cessation of
violence in and around Gaza with international enforcement of a truce or a broader regional
security initiative may be possible, but, at present, no proposed solution appears straightforward.
This report will be updated as necessary to reflect further developments.

Introduction: Israel’s 2008-2009 Gaza Campaign...........................................................................1
Overview: Outbreak of Conflict................................................................................................1
Can Israel Achieve Its Goals?...................................................................................................4
Strategic Goals....................................................................................................................4
Tactical Goals......................................................................................................................5
Long-Term Challenges........................................................................................................5
The Unraveling of the Israel-Hamas Cease-Fire.............................................................................6
Background of Hamas in the Gaza Strip...................................................................................6
The Cease-Fire and Its End.......................................................................................................6
Regional and International Response..............................................................................................7
Middle East...............................................................................................................................8
International Community..........................................................................................................8
United States.......................................................................................................................8
Europe ......................................................................................................................... ........ 9
United Nations....................................................................................................................9
Humanitarian Aid Response......................................................................................................9
Possible Consequences of the Gaza Campaign.............................................................................10
Effect on the Arab-Israeli Peace Process.................................................................................10
In General.........................................................................................................................10
A Syria-Israel Peace Deal: Still in the Cards?...................................................................10
Mounting Pressure on Egypt....................................................................................................11
A Third Intifada?.....................................................................................................................12
Why, Where, and How Could an Uprising Occur?...........................................................12
What Might the PA Security Forces Do?..........................................................................13
Implications for U.S. Policy and the 111^th Congress.....................................................................14
The Incoming Obama Administration.....................................................................................14
From Proactive to Reactive...............................................................................................14
Public Diplomacy Challenges...........................................................................................14 ^th
Possible Options for the Incoming 111 Congress.................................................................15
Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense Programs....................15
Humanitarian Aid (UNRWA) and Other Economic Assistance........................................17
U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority......................................................18
Conclusion: Addressing the Gaza Conundrum..............................................................................18
Various Problems....................................................................................................................18
Possible Ways of Reaching and Sustaining a Truce................................................................19
Figure 1. Range of Selected Rockets and Mortars Fired from the Gaza Strip................................4

Table 1. Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Short-Range Missile Defense:
FY2006-FY2009 ........................................................................................................................ 16
Table 2. U.S. Appropriated Funds Directed to Palestinians (June 2007-December 2008)...........17
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................20

On December 27, 2008, Israel launched an extensive military campaign dubbed “Operation Cast
Lead” against the Palestinian Islamist militant group Hamas in the Gaza Strip in order to counter
Palestinian rocket fire and, more broadly, to significantly weaken all aspects of Hamas rule in
Gaza. Initially, coordinated Israeli air strikes against pre-selected targets took Hamas by surprise,
as the operation was timed to coincide with a meeting of its leadership as well as a graduation
ceremony of hundreds of new Hamas police cadets. In addition to Hamas weapons caches and
military facilities, Israel has targeted other symbols of Hamas’s infrastructure that it believes have
been used to advance military objectives, including a mosque, the Islamic University of Gaza,
Hamas’s Al Aqsa television station, and a network of smugglers’ tunnels along the border with
Egypt. Israeli air strikes have killed senior Hamas militants, including Shaykh Nizar Rayyan,
described by Israeli media sources as one of Hamas’s top-five decision-makers and its top clerical
authority—both the religious leader of Hamas’s military wing (the Izz al Din al Qassam Brigades)
and its liaison with Hamas’s political wing.
On January 3, 2009, Israel expanded its operations by beginning a ground offensive in Gaza—
sending thousands of troops over Gaza’s northern border, along with tanks, armored personnel
carriers, and artillery divisions. As of January 5, approximately 4,000 Israeli troops were in Gaza,
reportedly seeking to take control of sites used for military purposes by Hamas and its allies.
They have reportedly positioned themselves around Gaza City after taking control of Gaza’s main
north-south highway, and there have been reports of fighting within Gaza City itself. Some
observers believe that, by cutting off northward access, Israeli forces are seeking to choke off
Hamas’s supply lines, preventing them from supplying their fighters with weapons and food
smuggled into the south through tunnels from Egypt. As of January 5, Israeli air and naval strikes
and ground forces had reportedly killed over 530 Palestinians (and wounded approximately 2,600
others), including hundreds of Hamas gunmen and over 100 Palestinian civilians, while five
Israelis had been killed by Palestinian rockets and attempts to counter the ground invasion (and
approximately 50 others had been wounded). Israeli officials also have said that several Hamas
fighters have been taken into Israeli custody.
According to Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Mark Regev, spokesman for Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert, Israel’s attacks are intended to deal Hamas a “severe blow,” ending its
willingness and capability to launch rockets at Israeli towns and cities. Following the
commencement of ground operations, Barak said, “This will not be easy or short. But we are
determined.” Some speculate that Israel’s real goal may be to oust Hamas from Gaza completely,
citing statements from leaders such as the following one made on January 2 by Vice Premier
Haim Ramon on Israeli television: “What I think we need to do is to reach a situation in which we ²
do not allow Hamas to govern.” Palestinian rocket attacks on southern Israel have continued, and
Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal has pledged that “a dark fate will await” the Israelis as a
result of their ground invasion. A senior Israeli military official said that the terrain in Gaza would
¹
^T^h^{is se}^c^{tion w}^a^s^w^r^itte^{n by}^Je^re^m^y^{M. Sha}^r^p,^Spe^cⁱ^a^listⁱⁿ^Mid^d^l^e^Ea^ste^r^{n Aff}^a^{irs a}^{nd A}^c^ting^Re^s^e^a^r^c^h^Ma^na^g^e^r,
^Mⁱ^d^d^l^e^E^a^st^an^{d A}^f^ri^{ca S}^ectⁱ^oⁿ^.
²^E^t^h^a^{n Bron}ⁿ^e^r,^{“Is t}^h^{e Real}^T^a^rg^et^Ha^m^a^{s Ru}^l^e?”^{New Yo}^{rk Times}^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^{3, 20}⁰⁹^.

be challenging because of obstacles and guerrilla tactics Hamas has prepared based on methods
used by Hezbollah (the Lebanese Shia militant group whose summer 2006 war with Israel is ³
regularly compared by observers to the conflict in Gaza).
The intensification of Israeli military operations has led to heightened international pressure for
an end to hostilities or a temporary cease-fire. Attention has also been called by some to what ⁴
they characterize as a worsening humanitarian situation for the people of Gaza, although Israel
insists that it is not targeting Gaza’s population at large—only Hamas—and that it plans to
continue to allow Gazan civilians to receive necessary subsistence and medical care.
Prior to the start of Israel’s campaign, experts had warned that a full-scale resumption of Israeli-
Palestinian violence was imminent, as Egyptian mediation failed to extend the six-month cease-
fire (tahdiya or calm) that expired on December 19, 2008. Each party felt as though the other was
violating the terms of the original cease-fire. Hamas demanded—unsuccessfully—that Israel lift
its economic blockade of Gaza, while Israel demanded—also unsuccessfully—a full end to rocket
fire and progress on the release of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli corporal who has been in Hamas’s
captivity for more than two years.
Violence had already resumed in the waning days of the cease-fire. After an Israeli raid on
November 4 (ostensibly aimed at preventing Hamas’s use of tunnels to abduct Israeli soldiers),
Palestinian rocket fire on Israel resumed with greater intensity. Some analysts speculated that the
cross-border skirmishes and rocket fire that continued into December represented jockeying by
both parties for more favorable renegotiating positions as the cease-fire’s December 19 expiration ⁵^th
approached. On the 19, Hamas issued a statement on its website that “The cease-fire is over and
there will not be a renewal because the Zionist enemy has not respected its conditions.” On
December 24, approximately 60 rockets were fired into southern Israel from Gaza. The
magnitude of this violation of Israeli airspace and territory—although it did not cause
casualties—apparently prompted the Israeli leadership’s decision to launch the December 27 air
strike and larger offensive.
Although it appears that the timing of the conflict’s outbreak was driven primarily by the end of
the cease-fire, the fact that it occurred during the U.S. presidential transition and on the eve of
Israeli elections scheduled for February 2009 (not to mention just two weeks before the possible, ⁶
although disputed, expiration of Abbas’s PA presidential term on January 9, 2009) has led some
observers to speculate that these political factors had at least partial influence on Israel’s and
Hamas’s actions. In any event, it now appears likely that the fighting in and around Gaza could ⁷
impact near-term political developments.
³
^S^u^d^a^rsan^Ragh^avan^,^“Israelⁱ^F^o^{rces P}^u^s^h^Deep^{er i}ⁿ^t^o^G^{aza S}^t^ri^p^,^”^Wa^sh^ing^t^on^P^o^st^,^Janu^ar^y⁵^,²⁰⁰⁹^.
⁴^Ch^ri^st^op^h^e^{r G}^uⁿⁿ^ess,^{a sp}^o^k^esman^f^o^{r t}^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^ed^Natⁱ^oⁿ^s^Relⁱ^e^f^an^d^W^o^{rks A}^g^en^c^y^f^o^{r P}^a^l^e^stⁱⁿ^{e R}^e^f^u^g^{ees i}ⁿ^t^h^e
^N^e^a^r^Ea^s^t⁽^U^N^R^WA⁾^,^ha^s^w^a^rⁿ^e^d^of^c^u^r^r^e^{nt or}^im^mⁱ^ne^{nt s}^hor^ta^g^e^s^of^w^h^e^a^t^f^l^our^{, w}^a^te^r^,^e^l^e^c^t^rⁱ^cⁱ^t^y^,^a^{nd f}^u^e^l^.
^Ragh^avan^,^“Israelⁱ^F^o^{rces P}^u^s^h^D^eep^{er i}ⁿ^t^o^G^{aza S}^t^ri^p^,^{” op}^.^ci^t^.
⁵^Se^e^K^a^rⁱ^{n L}^a^{ub, “}^A^na^l^y^sⁱ^s^:^H^a^m^a^s^,^I^s^r^a^e^l^T^r^yⁱ^ng^{to R}^e^w^r^ite^T^r^uc^e,”^A^sso^ci^a^t^ed^P^r^ess^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r¹⁷^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶^{See “M}^id^d^l^{e East}^P^o^litics:^P^r^o^l^oⁿ^gⁱⁿ^g^A^b^u^M^azen^,”^Ec^on^{omist I}ⁿ^te^lligeⁿ^c^e^Unit^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^28,²⁰^08.
⁷^Th^e^{New Yo}^{rk Times}^ha^{s w}^r^itte^{n: “}^M^aⁿ^y^Middle^Ea^{st e}^x^pe^{rts sa}^y^I^s^ra^e^l^tim^e^d^{its m}^o^v^e^a^g^aⁱ^{nst Ha}^m^a^{s, w}^h^ic^{h be}^g^aⁿ
^w^{ith a}ⁱ^r^s^tr^ik^e^s^{on D}^e^c^.^27,²⁴^da^y^s^be^f^o^r^e^Mr^{. B}^u^s^h^le^a^v^e^s^of^fⁱ^c^e^,^w^{ith the}^e^x^pe^c^t^a^tion^of^[^t^he^B^u^s^h^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tion’^s^]
^b^ackiⁿ^{g i}ⁿ^W^a^shⁱⁿ^gt^oⁿ^.^Israelⁱ^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^{s co}^u^l^d^no^t^b^e^cert^aⁱⁿ^t^h^at^P^r^esi^d^en^t^-^el^ect^{Barack Ob}^a^m^a,^d^e^spⁱ^t^e^p^a^st^st^at^em^en^t^s
^of^sy^m^p^a^t^h^y^f^o^r^I^s^r^a^e^l^’^s^rⁱ^g^h^{t of}^s^e^lf^-^d^ef^eⁿ^s^e^,^w^{ould m}^a^tc^{h the}^B^u^s^h^a^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tion’^s^uⁿ^c^oⁿ^d^iti^ona^l^e^ndor^s^e^m^e^nt.”
^S^c^o^t^t^S^h^an^e,^“Israel^S^t^ri^{kes Bef}^o^{re an}^A^l^l^y^Dep^a^rt^s,^”^{New Yo}^{rk Times}^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^{29, 20}⁰⁸^.

Palestinian Rocket Attacks from Gaza: Threat Assessment and Israeli Responses¹¹
^{Since 20}^{01, seve}^{ral Palestinian terrorist groups}^{based in t}^he^Gaza^{Strip have attacked comm}^unities^{in souther}^{n a}^nd
^{coastal areas of Israel with t}^hous^{ands of indiscriminately fired rockets and mortars. Du}^{ring the}^sec^{ond Palestinian}
^intifada^{or uprising in}²⁰^{01, Hama}^{s militia members and other}^{s fire}^{d homemade mortars at}^{Israeli se}^{ttlements in}
^{the Gaza Strip a}^{nd launc}^{hed the}^f^{irst locally produced “Qassam” r}^{ockets, named after t}^{he early}^20t^{h cent}^ury
^{militant leader Shaykh Izz al Din al Qassam. Widely-ava}^{ilable household ingredients, such as}^{fertilizer, sugar,}
^{alcohol, and fuel oi}^{l, serve as pro}^{pellants for the}^{low-cost Qassam rockets, which ar}^{e fab}^{ricated locally from scrap}
^{metal and pipes a}^{nd armed with}^s^{muggled explosives. Teams of en}^{gineers, chemists, and ma}^chinists^{have improved}
^{the ra}^{nge and}^{payload of the Qas}^{sam series rockets ove}^{r time, an}^{d several individuals and facilities}^{associated with}
^{rocket researc}^{h a}^{nd production}^{operations have}^been^{targeted in}^{Israeli military raids.}
^{Since 20}^{06, longer-range}¹^22mm^{Grad rockets a}^{nd 1}^22mm^Grad-s^{tyle copies, often refer}^{red to as}^{Katyushas, ha}^ve
^expa^{nded the ra}^{nge of Ha}^{mas an}^{d its all}^{ies beyond relatively small Israeli communities nea}^{r the}^Gaz^{a border, suc}^h
^{as the town of Sderot (pop}^{ulation est. 2}^4,00^{0), to the larger coast}^{al cities of Ashqelon (population}^est.120,0⁰⁰⁾
^{and Ashdod (population est. 2}^00,^{000) a}^{nd to the}^{Negev city of Be}^{ersheva (}^{population est. 1}^85,0⁰⁰⁾^{. Simi}^{lar mid-}
^{range rockets}^have^bee^{n fired by}^{Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Al Quds series) and the}^{Popular Resistan}^{ce Committees}
^{(Nasser se}^{ries). A map showing t}^{he ap}^{proximate ra}^{nge of va}^rious^{Gaza-based rockets a}^{nd mortars}^appears^as
^{Figure 1}^{on the n}^ext^page.
^{Press report}^{s allege that some 1}²^{2mm rockets}^{fired against Is}^{rael have be}^en^{Grad-style copies mad}^{e in Iran, w}^hile
^{others hav}^{e bee}^{n Ea}^stern-^{bloc editions modif}^{ied to expand their}^r^{ange and lethality. The longer ra}ⁿ^{ge Grad}
^{rockets are}^{believed to be smugg}^{led into the Gaza Strip via tu}^nnel^{s from Egy}^{pt. The a}^pproximately^7,00^{0 rockets}
^{and mortars fired}^{by Palestinians}^{since 2}⁰⁰¹^have^{killed at least 18}^{Israelis and wounded dozens, whi}^{le the}
^persistent^threat^{of rocket fire}^ha^{s had a b}^{roader negative}^psyc^{hological effect on Israelis living in targeted}
^communities.⁸^{Some observers es}^{timate that Hamas a}^{nd other}^Gaz^{a-based groups}^may^{have as ma}^ny^{as 10,0}⁰⁰
^{rockets at their disposal, up to a}^{third of which ma}^{y be}^Grad-style^rockets.
^{In res}^{ponse to ongoing rocket}^att^{acks, Israel has in}^{vested millions of dollars in both passive and acti}^{ve defense}
^{measures, including a}ⁿ^advan^{ce w}^{arning alert sy}^{stem k}^{nown as ‘Color Red’}^{, safe room construction}^{programs in}
^{residential areas near}^{Gaza, and t}^{he deployment of a}^{new co}^unter-^{rocket defense}^{system k}^{nown as}^{‘Iron Dome’.}
^{In Decem}^ber²⁰^{08, the}^{Israeli ca}^{binet issued final a}^{pproval for a t}^hree-stage^{plan to b}^{uild reinforced security}
^{rooms in all 8,500}^housing^units^{within 2.8 miles of the}^{Gaza Strip}^{. The cost of the}^{program is esti}^{mated to be}⁹
^{over $2}^{00 million.}^{Reports s}^ugge^{st that Is}^{rael has}^{budgeted $}²³⁰^mill^{ion for the development a}^nd^procure^{ment of}
^{the Iron}^{Dome system; its rocket}^interceptor^{costs are estimated}^{at $4}^5,00^{0 each, with a}^{total ann}^{ual system}
^{deployment cost in areas}^around^{Gaza estimated at $2}^{5 million. S}^{ome Israeli military officia}^{ls and p}^{ublic figures}
^{reportedly favor th}^{e deployment}^{of a less mobile, but potentially more cost effective directed lase}^{r system, bas}^ed
^{on the work of t}^{he joint Israeli-U.S. Tact}^{ical High Energy}^{Laser (T}^{HEL) res}^earch^progra^{m that wa}^s^{terminated in}¹⁰
²⁰⁰^4.^{For more detailed}^{information on Israeli rocket defense}^mea^{sures, see “Defe}^{nse B}^{udget Ap}^pr^opriations
^{for U.S.-Israeli Missi}^{le Defense Programs” below.}

⁸
^T^oⁿⁱ^O'L^o^u^g^h^lⁱⁿ^aⁿ^d^Hazem^Bal^o^u^s^h^a^,^“News:^Aⁱ^{r S}^t^ri^{kes o}ⁿ^G^a^z^a^,^”^T^h^{e Ob}^server^(U^K⁾^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r²⁸^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{; D}^a^vⁱ^d
^Isb^y^,^“E^ff^ectⁱ^v^{e an}^tⁱ^-^Qassa^m^d^e^f^eⁿ^{ce co}^u^l^d^b^e^m^o^{re t}^h^an^si^{x y}^ears^awa^y^,^”^Jaⁿ^e^'^s^Mi^ssi^l^e^{s a}ⁿ^d^R^o^cket^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^01,
²⁰⁰^7.
⁹^He^{rb Ke}^inoⁿ^aⁿ^{d Ya}^a^k^ov^Ka^tz^{, “}^C^a^b^ine^t^ok^a^y^s^roc^k^e^t^-prote^c^{tion f}^o^{r c}^o^m^m^unitie^{s w}^{ithin ra}^ng^e^,^”^Jeru^s^a^l^{em P}^o^st^,
^Dece^m^b^{er 8}^,²⁰⁰⁸^;^Yaako^v^L^a^p^pⁱⁿ^an^{d Dan}^Izen^b^e^rg,^“Barak^w^aⁿ^t^{s go}^vern^m^eⁿ^t^{'s o}^k^a^y^t^o^hⁱ^t^G^{aza r}^e^si^d^eⁿ^tⁱ^a^l^areas,^”
^Jeru^s^a^l^{em P}^o^st^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^10,²⁰^08.
¹⁰^S^{ee A}^l^oⁿ^Ben^-^Davi^d^,^“Iron^Do^m^e^ad^van^{ces t}^o^m^e^et^Qassa^m^t^h^reat^,^”^Jaⁿ^e^'^s^Def^eⁿ^{ce Weekl}^y^{, Ma}^r^c^{h 17,}²⁰⁰⁸^.
¹¹^T^h^{is inse}^{t se}^c^tion^w^a^s^w^r^itte^{n by}^Christo^phe^{r M}^.^Blaⁿ^c^h^a^r^{d, A}ⁿ^a^l^y^s^{t in M}ⁱ^d^d^le^Ea^ste^r^{n A}^f^f^a^irs.

Figure 1. Range of Selected Rockets and Mortars Fired from the Gaza Strip
^Source:^Ma^{p Resources, adapt}^e^d^{by CRS. Data based on re}^{porting by}^Jane’^{s Mis}^{siles and Ro}^ckets^a^{nd Israeli}
^government^stateme^{nts to inter}ⁿ^{ational media outlets.}
^Notes:^Al^{l ranges listed for weapons are a}^p^p^{roximate and ma}^{y v}^{ary based on la}^unc^{h sites and t}^h^e
^{characteristics of individual rockets, most of which are locally produced and some of w}^{hich ar}^{e modified from}
^{their original foreign designs.}
Operation Cast Lead appears to have been planned well in advance. Some Israeli observers have
suggested that although the military has unleashed a devastating series of bombings, neither
toppling the Hamas regime nor permanently ending all rocket attacks is a realistic goal—even
with the ground forces that have been inserted. Instead, observers suggest that Operation Cast

Lead seeks to severely cripple all aspects of Hamas’s presence in Gaza—military, economic, and
cultural—so that it would take several years of rebuilding for Hamas to return to its pre-
December 2008 strength. By temporarily disabling Hamas’s military capacity, Israel could
substantially ease the frequency and intensity of Hamas attacks in the months ahead as it prepares
to deploy new, more sophisticated anti-rocket defense systems. With Gaza blockaded by land and
sea, Israel has calculated that it would take Hamas significantly longer to rebuild than it took for
Hezbollah after its war with Israel in 2006. A weakened Hamas may also be more susceptible to
accepting terms of reconciliation offered by its Palestinian rival Fatah (the political movement
currently headed by Mahmoud Abbas, who is both President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)), which
has been bolstered by international assistance and Israeli engagement over the past year.
In order to exhaust Hamas, Israel may have to sustain its bombardment of Gaza and ground
operations for several weeks. Some military experts have suggested that survival is Hamas’s main
goal, as the organization may try to retain some rocket capability until the fighting wanes. In
anticipation of the Israeli ground incursion, there has been much speculation over the size and
capabilities of Hamas’s guerrilla army in Gaza. Experts have warned that if Hamas, like
Hezbollah, possess a network of underground bunkers, anti-tank missiles, and shoulder-fired anti-
aircraft missiles, it may be a formidable opponent for Israeli ground forces. Hezbollah has
benefitted, however, from significant Iranian and Syrian weaponry and training; it is unclear
whether Hamas has had the same level of external assistance, though Israel routinely accuses Iran
of supplying Hamas weaponry. To date, Israeli ground forces do not appear to have met
formidable resistance from Hamas fighters or prepared positions.
One complicating factor for Israel is time: the longer Operation Cast Lead runs without a
definitive outcome in Israel’s favor, the more pressure, both internal and external, will grow for a
cessation of hostilities. Furthermore, the risk of unintended regional escalation, though it remains
low, is always a possibility, as Palestinians in the West Bank or Hezbollah in Lebanon could
respond to further Arab civilian casualties.
While Israel may seek to take advantage of the time that it might take for a weakened Hamas to
reconstitute its strength, the underlying political fundamentals may not change favorably in the
aftermath of the current violence. Gaza’s 1.5 million residents remain dependent on assistance
and imports for their survival, and Israeli concessions to a weakened Hamas regarding the
opening of border crossings might be interpreted as symbols of Hamas effectiveness in outlasting
attacks to achieve Palestinian ends. The prospects for reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah,
which many believe to be integral to effective peace negotiations, may be undermined by the
selective targeting of Hamas and the passive acceptance of the Israeli offensive by Fatah, the PA, ¹²
and the PLO (which is apparent despite their token opposition).
¹²
^A^Wa^shⁱⁿ^g^t^on^P^o^st^co^l^u^mⁿ^h^a^{s assert}^ed^t^h^at^A^b^b^a^{s’s ad}^vi^{ser Ni}^m^r^Ha^mm^ad^t^o^l^d^t^h^{e L}^e^b^aⁿ^e^{se d}^aⁱ^l^y^Al-^A^k^h^bar^:
^“^T^he^one^re^s^ponsⁱ^b^le^f^o^{r the}^m^a^s^s^a^c^r^e^s^is^H^a^m^a^s^,^a^{nd n}^o^{t t}^h^e^Zioⁿⁱ^s^{t e}ⁿ^tity^{, w}^h^ic^{h in its}^ow^{n v}ⁱ^ew^rea^c^t^e^d^{to t}^h^e^fⁱ^ring
^of^P^a^le^s^tinia^{n m}ⁱ^s^s^ile^s^.^”^R^obe^r^t^J^.^Lⁱ^e^b^e^r^{, “}^H^a^r^{d T}^r^uths^A^{bout t}^h^e^C^onf^lic^t,”^W^a^s^hⁱⁿ^gt^{on P}^o^s^t^{, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{1, 20}⁰⁹^.

The unraveling of the tahdiya or temporary cease-fire between Israel and Hamas that led to the
December 2008 outbreak of violence in and around the Gaza Strip was not only a result of short-
term tactical considerations by Israel and Hamas (see “Overview: Outbreak of Conflict” above),
but reflective of the deeply-rooted dilemma posed by Hamas’s steady rise in influence over
Israeli-Palestinian relations during the last 20 years and more recently in Gaza proper. Because of
its militant, anti-Israel ideology and its acts of terrorism, Hamas has been politically and
financially isolated by Israel, the United States, and other international actors—making any
engagement with the organization, even through third parties, extremely difficult. Israel has
repeatedly asserted that Hamas will remain in isolation until it renounces violence and, more
importantly, recognizes Israel’s right to exist as a nation-state.
Since Hamas’s inception, it has maintained its primary base of support and particularly strong
influence in the Gaza Strip, even though its current political headquarters is in Damascus, Syria.
Hamas’s politicization and militarization can be traced to the intifada (“uprising” or “shaking
off”) that began in the Gaza Strip in 1987 in resistance to the Israeli occupation. Hamas refuses to
recognize the right of Israel to exist, refuses to renounce the use of violence, and refuses to
consider itself bound by previous agreements reached by the PLO with Israel. For these reasons,
the United States designated it as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1997, and U.S. aid to
Palestinians has been tailored to bypass Hamas and Hamas-controlled entities.
Hamas’s victory in January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections set in motion a chain of events
that has led to the current crisis. The refusal of the United States, the European Union, and much
of the rest of the world to have direct dealings with or to give financial assistance to a Hamas-
dominated PA cabinet led to a tense standoff that was only temporarily averted by a February
2007 Hamas-Fatah “unity agreement” brokered by Saudi Arabia. These tensions contributed to
the factional fighting between Hamas and Fatah that led to Hamas’s forcible takeover of the Gaza
Strip in June 2007. In response to the Hamas takeover, PA President Abbas dissolved the Hamas-
led cabinet and appointed a “caretaker” technocratic PA government in the West Bank, leading to
renewed U.S. and international assistance for the PA in the West Bank that prompted Hamas to
tighten its grip on Gaza even further.
As the vulnerability of Israeli cities and towns near the Gaza border to mortar and rocket fire
from an Hamas-controlled Gaza became clearer, Israel and Hamas indirectly agreed (via Egyptian
mediation) to the six-month cease-fire in June 2008. In return for a moratorium on attacks, Hamas
understood that Israel would open the Gaza border crossings to allow a flow of workers and
goods. One ostensible aim of the cease-fire was to facilitate a prisoner exchange agreement—
Israel’s release of a number of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Hamas’s release of Israeli
corporal Gilad Shalit. Yet, as discussed earlier in this report (see “Overview: Outbreak of
Conflict” above), no such agreement was achieved.
¹³
^T^h^{is se}^c^{tion w}^a^s^w^r^itte^{n by}^Ji^m^Za^notti^{, A}ⁿ^a^l^y^s^{t in Mi}^ddle^Ea^ste^r^{n A}^ffa^irs.

For the first five months, the cease-fire held relatively well. Some rockets were fired into Israel,
but most were attributed to non-Hamas militant groups, and, progressively, Hamas appeared
increasingly able and willing to suppress even these attacks. No casualties were reported (only
minor property damage was incurred), and Israel refrained from retaliation.
Nevertheless, Israel cited the sporadic rocket fire as justification for keeping the border crossings
and Gaza’s seaport closed to nearly everything but basic humanitarian supplies. Hamas, other
Arab leaders, and international organizations involved in aiding Gazan civilians complained that
Israel was reneging on its promises under the agreement. Some in Israel believed that the pressure
applied through a blockade on Gaza could squeeze Hamas from power by turning Gazans against
the Islamist group, even though other observers asserted the exact opposite—that confining
economically desperate people in Gaza would likely increase their dependence on Hamas. The ¹⁴
nearly complete shutdown of the highly export-dependent Gazan economy left Israel and its
supporters open to charges that they were knowingly worsening the already-precarious situation
of Gaza’s population—one of the most densely concentrated (Gaza’s 1.5 million people live
within the territory’s 146 square miles) and poorest in the world. The United Nations estimates
that at least 70% of Gazans live below the poverty line.
Many believe that, all along, both sides considered the temporary cease-fire to be merely an
opportunity to prepare more fully for eventual conflict. Accounts of Hamas’s military buildup and
its use of tunnels from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula for smuggling weapons, and reports describing
how Israel devised plans for the Gaza offensive, support this argument. Some commentators have
said that giving up on the cease-fire was in both sides’ interests—asserting that Hamas wanted to
reclaim the mantle of “heroic resister” in order to reverse recent erosions in its popularity among
Palestinians since its takeover of Gaza, while Israeli leaders wanted to prove their ability to ¹⁵
defend Israeli citizens on the eve of national elections.

The world response to the Gaza crisis has been characterized by consistent calls for an end to the
violence and by concern over the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Protests broke out in numerous
Middle Eastern capitals, and the Arab media has continuously aired footage of casualties in Gaza.
The crisis also has exacerbated existing tensions between countries in the region with a relatively
pro-Western orientation—like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia—and other countries and non-
state actors—like Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. European and other Western countries have
generally faulted Hamas for starting the current crisis but some, like France, also have criticized
the Israeli response as disproportionate.
¹⁴
^T^h^e^P^a^le^s^tiniaⁿ^Fe^de^r^a^tioⁿ^of^Iⁿ^dus^tr^ie^s^e^s^tim^a^t^e^s^tha^t^98%^of^G^a^z^a^’^s^indus^tr^ia^l^ope^r^a^ti^ons^a^r^eⁿ^o^w^ina^c^tiv^e^.^Se^e^T^h^e
^W^o^r^l^{d B}^a^nk^,^Pa^le^s^tini^an^Ec^on^om^ic^Pr^os^pe^c^t^s^:^Aid^,^Ac^c^e^s^s^an^{d Re}^f^o^r^m^:^Ec^on^om^ic^M^oni^torⁱ^{ng Re}^po^r^t^{to t}^h^e^Ad^H^o^c
^Liaiso^{n C}^o^mmitte^e^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r²²^{, 20}⁰⁸^.¹⁵
^Dao^u^d^Ku^t^t^a^b,^{“Has Israel}^Revi^v^e^d^Hamas?”^W^a^s^h^ingt^on^Pos^t^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^30,²⁰^08.
¹⁶^T^h^{is se}^c^{tion w}^a^s^w^r^itte^{n by}^Ca^se^y^L^.^A^{ddis, A}ⁿ^a^l^y^s^{t in Mi}^ddle^Ea^ste^r^{n Aff}^a^irs.

Regional responses to the conflict have consistently condemned the Israeli air campaign and
ground invasion as “disproportionate” and tantamount to a “massacre” of Palestinians in Gaza.
Governments as well as other regional leaders have issued statements criticizing the attack. For
example, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani, the prominent Iraqi Shia cleric, condemned the attacks
as “barbaric.” Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Syrian President Bashar al Asad ¹⁷
called the Israeli campaign “outrageous aggression.”
There were more moderate reactions. In a joint press conference, the Egyptian and Turkish
foreign ministers urged both parties to stop attacks and called for Palestinian reconciliation. They
also focused attention on humanitarian needs in Gaza. Contrary to the views of its own citizenry
and some of its parliament members, the Jordanian government also has taken a more tempered
position, though King Abdullah II has condemned the attacks and called on Israel to halt all
military actions in Gaza.
In addition to condemning Israel, some regional voices are criticizing certain Arab governments.
These criticisms reflect existing intra-Arab and Sunni-Shia fault-lines. As protests have broken
out across the region and as Arab media outlets have run footage from Gaza, Hezbollah, Syria,
and Iran have charged moderate Arab governments of complicity in the attacks because of their
inaction. In particular, the Egyptian government faces increasing criticism for its refusal to open
the Rafah border crossing (which links Egypt with Gaza) for humanitarian aid. See “Mounting ¹⁸
Pressure on Egypt” for a more detailed discussion of the criticism against Egypt.
The international community outside the Middle East has expressed concerns about the
humanitarian situation in Gaza but has generally placed the blame for the current violence
squarely with Hamas. Nevertheless, all parties have called for an end to or, at the very least, a de-
escalation of the violence.
The United States has joined the international community in calls for a cease-fire but maintains
that Israel is justified in retaliating against Hamas’s attacks. In a State Department press release,
Secretary Condoleezza Rice said that the United States “strongly condemns” rocket attacks
against Israel and “holds Hamas responsible” for breaking the truce and for the renewal of
violence. The statement also called upon all concerned to address the humanitarian needs of the
people in Gaza.
¹⁷
^U.^S^.^Op^eⁿ^S^o^u^r^{ce Cen}^t^{er (OS}^C⁾^Do^cu^m^eⁿ^t^—^G^M^P²⁰⁰⁸¹²²⁹⁹⁵⁰⁰⁷⁵^—^“W^o^r^l^d^L^ead^{ers Cal}^l^f^o^{r Cal}^mⁱⁿ^Gaza
^Coⁿ^f^lⁱ^c^t^,^{” Dece}^m^b^{er 2}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
¹⁸^U.^S^.^Op^eⁿ^S^o^u^r^{ce Cen}^t^{er (OS}^C⁾^Do^cu^m^eⁿ^t^—^G^M^P²⁰⁰⁸¹²²⁹⁸⁶⁹⁰⁰¹^—^“S^audⁱ^Cl^eri^c^{s Urge S}^u^pp^o^r^t^f^o^{r G}^a^zan^s,
^E^g^y^p^t^t^o^Keep^Raf^a^h^Cro^ssiⁿ^g^Op^en^,^”^Decem^b^e^{r 2}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁸^.

The European Commission called for an “immediate halt to military hostilities” and demanded ¹⁹
that Hamas stop firing rockets into Israel. Among European Union (EU) member states,
however, the responses have been somewhat varied. As 2008 was ending, France held the rotating
EU presidency, and, as mentioned above, lamented both Hamas’s rocket attacks and the
magnitude of Israel’s response. French President Nicolas Sarkozy expressed “grave concern” and
urged an immediate end to the fighting. He also unsuccessfully called for a 48-hour humanitarian
cease-fire to facilitate the movement of aid into Gaza. Yet, the new year brought the Czech
Republic into the EU presidency, and Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg has more
explicitly supported Israel’s right to defend itself. Among other prominent EU member states,
Germany “clearly and exclusively” blamed Hamas, called for a political solution and de-
escalation of the conflict, and admonished Israel to avoid civilian casualties. As the week of
January 5 began, Sarkozy and a delegation led by Schwarzenberg and EU foreign policy chief
Javier Solana were in the region in an attempt to find a diplomatic solution to the violence.
Libya, a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) member, called for a special session of the
UNSC after the Israeli air strikes began. The UNSC met on December 28 and issued a statement
expressing “serious concern” over the situation in Gaza and calling for an “immediate halt to all
violence.” Commentators have called the statement “weak” and “bland,” speculating that the
threat of veto from one or more of the five permanent members of the UNSC prevented the ²⁰
language from being stronger. The statement also included a call for expanded humanitarian
assistance to the people in Gaza. Libya also has called for a UNSC session to consider a formal
resolution calling for an end to the fighting. According to the Washington Post, a stronger UNSC ²¹
statement urging an immediate cease-fire was blocked on January 4 by the United States.
On December 28, the Kerem Shalom crossing from Israel into Gaza was opened solely to allow
the transport of food and medical supplies. A situation update from the Israeli Embassy on
December 29 stated that Israel permits the entry of humanitarian assistance into Gaza and will ²²
continue to do so. According to Israeli reporting, about 180 trucks bearing medical supplies,
basic food commodities and other humanitarian goods from Jordan, Egypt and other countries, as
well as 10 ambulances, were transferred into the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom crossing
from December 28 to December 30. The United States announced an additional contribution to
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA) on December 30 (see “Humanitarian Aid (UNRWA) and Other Economic Assistance”
¹⁹
^G^rⁱ^f^f^W^itte^a^{nd Suda}^rsaⁿ^Ra^g^h^a^v^aⁿ^{, “}^I^sra^e^l^Re^je^c^t^{s T}^r^uc^e^,^P^r^e^sse^{s on W}^ith^G^a^z^a^Strik^e^s,”^W^a^s^h^ingt^{on P}^o^s^t^,
^Dece^m^b^{er 3}⁰^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
²⁰^T^h^a^lif^D^e^eⁿ^{, “}^S^e^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^il^Mildly^R^e^buk^e^s^I^s^r^a^e^l^’^s^G^a^za^A^t^t^a^c^k^s^,^”^In^{ter Press S}^e^rvic^{e News A}^g^en^cy^,^Dece^m^b^er
^{30, 20}⁰⁸^.
²¹^Ragh^avan^,^“Israelⁱ^F^o^{rces P}^u^s^h^Deep^{er In}^t^o^G^{aza S}^t^ri^p^,^{” op}^.^ci^t^.
²²^Em^a^{il upda}^te^f^r^om^E^m^ba^s^s^y^o^f^I^s^r^a^e^l^{, W}^a^s^h^ing^t^{on, D}^C^—^“^H^u^m^a^nita^rⁱ^aⁿ^Aⁱ^{d to G}^aza,^{” Dec}^e^m^b^e^{r 2}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁸^.

below).²³ France and the European Union have also pledged to increase humanitarian aid to ²⁴
Gaza.

Some observers maintain that the impact of the fighting in and around Gaza and the resulting
casualties, damage to infrastructure, loss of goodwill, and regional uncertainty could completely
change the dynamics on which the Arab-Israeli peace process have been based, making progress ²⁶
at best unpredictable and at worst unattainable for months or years. Although the Israeli-PLO
negotiations formally initiated by the U.S.-sponsored Annapolis Conference in November 2007
did not lead to a peace agreement by the end of 2008, prior to the outbreak of violence many
observers speculated that the incoming administration of Barack Obama might seek to capitalize
on the momentum from Annapolis to encourage further Israeli peace negotiations with both the
PLO and Syria. Among the determinants of the amenability of a post-conflict situation to a reprise
of the peace process, the most important may be: how long the conflict lasts and how it ends, its
intensity, the degree to which the respective parties are characterized as aggressors, and the
positions of various regional and international actors both during and after the conflict.

Over the past year, speculation has been widespread over the prospect of a renewed Syria-Israel
peace track, though it would appear that the latest round of fighting has tempered expectations for
the short term. Syria has said that Israel’s December attack “closed the door on the Syrian-Israeli ²⁸
indirect talks,” which had been brokered by Turkey over the last several months. With an
incoming Obama Administration perceived as amenable to sponsoring Syria-Israel peace talks,
some observers had hoped for a resumption in direct bilateral negotiations in 2009. Outgoing
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had recently traveled to Turkey to discuss the Syria track and, during
Olmert’s trip, Syrian President Bashar al Asad held a press conference where he stated that Syria
and Israel are “now laying the foundations” for peace through their indirect talks. Nonetheless,
most observers believe that, ultimately, the results of Israel’s February elections will determine
the direction of Syria-Israel peace talks. Should the more hawkish Likud party score a decisive
²³
^“^U^{.S. Sa}^y^s^W^ill^Gⁱ^v^e^{$85 Milli}^oⁿ^to^H^e^lp^P^a^le^s^tⁱⁿ^ia^ns^,”^Re^u^t^e^r^s^,^Dece^m^b^{er 3}⁰^,²⁰⁰⁸
²⁴^Eth^aⁿ^Broⁿⁿ^e^{r an}^d^T^a^g^h^reed^El-Ko^d^a^ry^{, “On}^th^{e Fo}^u^r^th^Day^o^f^th^{e Gaza Battle, No}^En^dⁱⁿ^Sig^h^t,”^{New Yo}^{rk Times,}
^Dece^m^b^{er 3}¹^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
²⁵^T^h^{is se}^c^{tion w}^a^s^w^r^itte^{n by}^Ji^m^Za^notti^{, A}ⁿ^a^l^y^s^{t in Mi}^ddle^Ea^ste^r^{n A}^ffa^{irs, e}^x^c^e^{pt w}^h^e^r^e^othe^rw^ise^spe^cⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^.
²⁶^F^o^{r m}^o^{re i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^on^t^h^{e A}^r^ab^-Israelⁱ^coⁿ^f^lⁱ^c^t^an^d^p^{eace p}^r^o^cess,^{see CRS}^Rep^o^r^t^RL³³⁵³⁰^,^Isr^a^e^li-Ara^b
^Ne^gotia^tio^{ns: B}^a^c^k^g^rouⁿ^d^,^Co^nfli^c^t^{s, an}^{d U.S}^.^P^o^lic^y^{, by}^C^a^r^o^{l Mi}^g^d^a^l^ov^itz^{; a}^{nd C}^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}⁴⁰⁰^92,^Isra^el^an^d^t^h^e
^Pale^s^tini^ans^:^Pr^os^pe^c^t^s^f^o^r^{a Tw}^o^-^State^Sol^uti^oⁿ^{, by}^Jim^Za^notti.
²⁷^T^h^{is subse}^c^tion^w^a^s^w^r^itte^{n by}^J^e^re^m^y^{M. Sha}^r^{p, S}^p^e^cⁱ^a^lis^{t in}^Mi^ddle^Ea^ste^r^{n A}^f^f^a^{irs a}^{nd A}^c^ting^R^e^se^a^r^c^h^Ma^na^g^e^r,
^Mⁱ^d^d^l^e^E^a^st^an^{d A}^f^ri^{ca S}^ectⁱ^oⁿ^.
²⁸^S^o^m^e^exp^e^rt^{s n}^o^t^{e t}^h^at^t^h^o^s^{e t}^a^l^k^{s h}^a^d^al^read^y^b^een^su^sp^end^e^dⁱⁿ^aⁿ^tⁱ^cⁱ^p^atⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^Israelⁱ^el^ectⁱ^oⁿ^s^an^{d a n}^e^w^U.^S^.
^a^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tion.

victory in February, its rise to power and the tense climate over Gaza may combine to stall
negotiations for the near term.

Outside the immediate theater of war, the Gaza conflict has posed a challenge for Egypt’s policy
toward Hamas. Egypt’s northern Rafah border crossing to Gaza remains mostly sealed, thereby
directly reinforcing Israel’s own closure of the Gaza Strip. As mentioned briefly earlier in this
report (see the “Middle East” subsection under “Regional and International Response” above),
Palestinians, the wider Arab world, and Egyptian citizens themselves all have accused the
Mubarak government of colluding with Israel to the detriment of Palestinian civilians. On
December 28, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah said:
^W^e^{are f}^aciⁿ^g^{a part}ⁿ^e^rs^{hip [}^w^ith^I^s^{rael a}ⁿ^{d t}^h^{e US}^A^]^b^y^s^o^me^A^r^{ab s}^t^ate^s^{, a}ⁿ^{d co}^m^p^licit^y
^by^s^o^m^e^oth^e^r^A^r^{ab s}^t^ates^co^ncernⁱ^ng^t^h^{e ev}^eⁿ^tsⁱⁿ^ou^{r reg}ⁱ^oⁿ^{.... g}^o^ou^{t to th}^{e s}^t^reets^...open
^th^is^[Egy^p^t^-^G^{aza] cros}^sⁱⁿ^g^[at^R^a^f^a^h^]^wⁱ^th^y^o^u^r^{bare ch}^es^t^s^{.... I a}^m^f^o^{r t}^h^{e g}^eⁿ^e^rals^an^{d t}^h^e
^o^f^fⁱ^cer^{s to}^g^o^to^th^{e p}^o^{litical lead}^er^sh^ip^{, sa}^yⁱⁿ^g^{: th}^{e h}^oⁿ^o^r^o^f^o^u^r^m^ilitar^y^un^if^or^m^{.... does n}^o^t³⁰
^allo^w^u^s^{to s}^{ee ou}^{r kins}^f^o^l^kⁱⁿ^{Gaza bein}^g^s^l^aⁱⁿ^w^h^ile^w^e^g^u^{ard th}^{e borde}^rs^wⁱ^t^h^Is^rael.”
The Egyptian government has responded by asserting that Hamas itself is to blame for the failed
cease-fire, as one pro-government editorial suggested that “If you can't kill the wolf, don't pull its ³¹
tail.” Although Egypt has officially called on Israel to stop, not to widen, its military operations,
President Hosni Mubarak stated that the Rafah border will remain closed until Palestinian
Authority forces loyal to PA President Mahmoud Abbas, not Hamas, can be deployed along the
Egypt-Gaza border. Egypt’s state-owned media have responded vigorously to the charges of
collusion with Israel, simultaneously condemning Israel for its attacks and chastising Hamas for ³²
irrationality and for the death of an Egyptian border guard in armed clashes with Palestinians.
Since Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, Egypt has been placed in a difficult position vis-à-
vis Hamas. On the one hand, it has attempted to serve as an intermediary between Hamas and
Israel and to broker Hamas-Fatah unity negotiations. On the other hand, the Mubarak
government, unlike many of its own citizens, does not sympathize with Hamas and wants to keep
it isolated but, because of domestic political considerations, is sensitive to accusations that
Egyptian policy is tantamount to the collective punishment of Gazan civilians. In addition, the
secular Mubarak regime is opposed to Islamists wielding real political power, and it fears that
Hamas could serve as a model for Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood activists who may yearn for an
Iranian-style revolution in Egypt.
²⁹
^T^h^{is subse}^c^tion^w^a^s^w^r^itte^{n by}^J^e^re^m^y^{M. Sha}^r^{p, S}^p^e^cⁱ^a^lis^{t in}^Mi^ddle^Ea^ste^r^{n A}^f^f^a^{irs a}^{nd A}^c^ting^R^e^se^a^r^c^h^Ma^na^g^e^r,
^Mⁱ^d^d^l^e^E^a^st^an^{d A}^f^ri^{ca S}^ectⁱ^oⁿ^.
³⁰^Cav^e^rsh^a^m^{BBC Mo}ⁿ^ito^rⁱⁿ^g^{, “E}^g^y^p^tian^s^Coⁿ^d^emⁿ^Hezb^o^lla^h^L^e^a^d^{er as ‘L}^{ittle Ay}^ato^llah^’^Ov^{er Ga}^{za Re}^m^a^r^k^s,”
^Op^en^So^u^r^{ce Cen}^t^er^,^Decem^b^e^{r 3}⁰^,²⁰⁰⁸^,^D^o^cu^m^eⁿ^t^ID#^G^M^P²⁰⁰⁸¹²³⁰⁹⁵⁰⁰⁹¹^.
³¹^"^E^gy^ptia^{n pa}^pe^r^:^H^a^m^a^s^lea^d^e^r^s^pa^r^tia^lly^r^e^s^pons^ible^f^o^r^G^{aza a}^s^s^a^u^l^t^,^"^Ha'^a^retz^,^Decem^b^e^{r 2}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
³²^N^ona^e^l^H^eⁿⁿ^a^w^y^,^“^E^gy^{pt: U}^nde^r^a^tor^r^e^nt^of^G^a^za^aⁿ^g^e^r^,^C^a^ir^{o d}^e^f^e^nds^its^e^l^f^,^”^L^o^s^Aⁿ^g^e^le^s^Tⁱ^m^e^{s O}ⁿ^line^,
^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^{30, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{. A}^v^a^ila^ble^a^{t: htt}^p^://la^tim^e^s^blog^s^.^la^tim^es^.c^om^/b^a^b^y^l^onbe^y^ond/20^08/¹²^/e^gy^pt-m^edia^-c^am^.htm^l

The more that the Israeli offensive is perceived to target Gaza’s population, rather than focusing
solely on extinguishing the threat Israel faces from Hamas and other Palestinian militants, the
greater the possibility that Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank might decide to rise up in
opposition. Another intifada has been called for by Damascus-based Hamas political chief Khaled
Meshaal and endorsed by Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. It could have wide-
ranging consequences for Israelis and Palestinians and for prospects of Arab-Israeli peace, with
possible ripple effects throughout the Middle East. On the other hand, it is possible that West
Bank Palestinians may calculate that they have more to gain from remaining on the sidelines.
Given the complex and in some sense inextricable relationship between Hamas and the general
population of Gaza (Hamas uses several social and charitable organizations for support and
civilian cover) and the difficulties of precision warfare within Gaza’s densely-populated urban
geography, narrowing the focus of Israeli strikes to avoid popular Palestinian condemnation may
not have been possible in any event. Israeli air strikes have killed dozens of civilians (including
young children) in such places as the Jabalya refugee camp and a bus stop just outside a United ³³
Nations training center for youth, and have caused extensive damage to mosques and to the
Islamic University in Gaza City (which Israeli officials claim have been used to advance Hamas
military goals). Widespread outrage over Gazan civilian casualties and damage to cultural
institutions, which may exacerbate Palestinians’ existing resentment of the perceived injustice and
futility of their situation, could provoke angry and possibly violent responses—ranging from
political demonstrations and civil disobedience to suicide and rocket attacks—from Palestinians,
even those not directly targeted or affiliated with militant groups. A drawn-out invasion and
occupation, which could be the end result of the ground attack, might lead to still greater
Palestinian willingness to retaliate.
A step-up in Israeli security measures over recent years—including the construction of a
separation barrier (still ongoing) that roughly tracks the 1949 “Green Line” separating Israel from
the West Bank (even though it cuts deeply into the West Bank at various points—claiming 8-10%
of West Bank territory)—might make it harder for Palestinians to carry out sophisticated, large-
scale attacks within Israel. Yet, Israeli Arabs and Palestinian Jerusalemites have shown that
impromptu knife attacks and vehicular hit-and-runs can also create fear and anxiety among
Israelis.
A new wave of popular Palestinian resistance could have the opposite effect from the one Israel
ostensibly intended when it launched the Gaza offensive—possibly strengthening rather than
weakening Hamas and other Islamist militant groups (such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ),
another U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization) relative to Fatah not only in Gaza, but
also in the West Bank. The dismantlement of Fatah-affiliated militias, such as the Al Aqsa
Martyrs’ Brigades in the West Bank, over the past year and a half (in association with various PA
amnesty and reform programs) could lead to a surge in Hamas and PIJ (which have apparently
resisted dismantlement by lowering their profiles) membership in the West Bank, as angry
³³
^H^o^w^e^ve^r^,^G^e^or^g^e^towⁿ^pr^of^e^s^s^o^r^of^inte^rn^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^af^fai^r^{s Ro}^b^e^rt^J.^Lⁱ^eb^{er assert}^{s t}^h^at^t^h^{e casu}^a^l^t^y^ratⁱ^o^(app^aren^t^l^y
^m^o^re^thaⁿ^{80 H}^a^m^a^s^s^e^c^u^rit^y^pe^rs^onne^l^k^ille^{d f}^o^{r e}^v^e^r^y^{20 c}ⁱ^v^ilia^ns^k^ille^{d) “}^m^ig^{ht c}^o^m^p^a^r^e^fa^v^o^ra^bly^w^{ith the}^us^e^of
^f^o^r^c^e^b^y^U^.^{S. a}^{nd N}^A^T^O^tr^oopsⁱⁿ^A^f^g^h^aⁿ^is^ta^n.”^Lⁱ^e^b^e^r^{, op.}^c^it.

Palestinians searching for outlets for retaliation against Israel are less likely to find realistic
secular alternatives.
If the clamor for resistance against Israel grows, pressure could build on Abbas and other Fatah,
PA, and PLO leaders to support it or be branded as collaborators with Israel. After all they have
invested in peaceful engagement with Israel and the international community, though, it seems
unlikely that Abbas and his associates would back a new intifada. Doing so would risk destroying
their opportunity to pursue a peace process once the fighting ends. This “no-win situation” for
Abbas gives Hamas an opportunity to broaden its appeal by insisting to Palestinians that both the
Gaza offensive and the failure to reach peace with Israel within the timeline set at Annapolis
show that the PA strategy of peaceful engagement plays into the hands of an Israel that seeks to ³⁴
weaken the Palestinians by sowing division through the false hope of a future state.
How might the Palestinian Authority’s security forces in the West Bank respond to an onset of
popular resistance? Could there be a repeat of what happened during the second intifada, when
many Palestinian security force personnel turned their guns on Israel and helped lead armed
attacks? Or might the current PA forces—whose recruitment, training, reform, protection, and
deployment have been supported by the United States, the European Union, and other
international sponsors—provide a decisive check against having the resentment fueled by the
current violence escalate in the West Bank, despite charges from their fellow Palestinians that
they are Israeli collaborators? The PA forces are being put to the test right now, as they are being
tasked with making sure that West Bank demonstrations in response to the violence in and around
Gaza do not spiral out of control.
Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton, the U.S. Security Coordinator for the West Bank, says that the
transformation and professionalization of the PA security forces—marked by months of rigorous
training for special “gendarmerie-style” battalions and their leaders—have made them far less ³⁵
likely to slip into factional conflict than their predecessors. There is nearly universal
consensus—in Israeli, Palestinian, and international circles—that the level of competence and
professionalism of these newly-trained PA forces far outpaces that of their predecessors,
particularly those from the bygone era of Yasser Arafat.
Yet, some observers question whether the improvements are sufficiently decisive. It is possible
that undisciplined elements in the security forces could contribute to one or more incidents that
fan the flames of conflict. Thus far, however, the discipline of the PA security forces in the West
Bank has held. A senior Western official in the region has told CRS that the forces “have
performed exceptionally. They have been tough while still allowing non-violent rallies and
demonstrations.”
³⁴
^{“Gaza Rai}^d^{s Bo}^o^s^t^Ham^a^s,^Un^d^e^rmⁱⁿ^e^A^b^b^a^{s o}ⁿ^P^a^l^e^stⁱⁿⁱ^aⁿ^S^t^reet^,^”^A^g^en^{ce F}^r^an^{ce P}^r^esse^(w^{ith the}^D^a^ily^St^ar
^(Bei^ru^t^)),^Janu^ary¹^,²⁰⁰⁹^.^A^Ha^{mas sp}^o^k^es^m^aⁿ^h^a^{s even}^ac^cu^sed^A^b^b^a^{s o}^f^“h^aviⁿ^g^f^o^rmed^{a secre}^t^cel^l^o^f^F^a^t^a^h
^su^p^p^o^r^t^e^{rs i}ⁿ^G^{aza t}^o^co^l^l^ectⁱⁿ^f^o^rmatⁱ^oⁿ^on^t^h^{e w}^h^erea^bouts^of^H^a^m^a^s^le^a^d^e^r^s^,^”^w^{ith the}ⁱⁿ^te^nti^on^o^f^gⁱ^vⁱ^ng^this
^inf^o^rm^a^{tion to t}^h^e^Isra^e^{li m}^ilita^r^y^.^G^rⁱ^f^f^W^itte^{, “}^I^sra^e^{l’s A}^tta^c^k^{s on G}^a^z^a^De^e^p^eⁿ^P^a^le^stiniaⁿ^Rif^t^,”^W^a^s^hⁱⁿ^gt^{on Pos}^t^,
^J^a^nua^r^y^{1, 200}^9.
³⁵^Inte^rv^ie^w^of^L^t^{. Ge}^{n. Ke}^{ith Da}^y^t^on^by^Da^vⁱ^{d Horov}^itz^{, “}^T^{his T}ⁱ^m^e^{, It W}^{ill Be}^Dif^f^e^r^eⁿ^t,”^Jeru^s^a^l^{em P}^o^st^,^Decem^b^e^r
^{11, 20}⁰⁸^.

Despite signs of greater unit cohesion and national (as opposed to factional) loyalty among the PA
forces than before, some argue that the forces’ future actions are likely to depend at least partly on
how they are used. Although they might currently be motivated to follow orders and to perform
their jobs professionally, if the forces perceive that they are being asked to serve as “Israel’s
cops” or to advance some other individual, factional, regional, or international power agenda,
instead of to serve as key building blocks for a future Palestinian state, their loyalties could
change.

During his campaign and presidential transition, U.S. President-elect Barack Obama and his
foreign policy advisors have indicated an interest in proactively engaging in the Arab-Israeli
peace process as part of a strategy to advance U.S. interests and improve stability throughout the
Middle East. The Israeli offensive in Gaza, however, could put Obama’s incoming administration
in a more reactive position.
Obama and his advisors will likely be compelled to address the Gaza situation directly, either in
connection with efforts to bring an end to the violence or to provide a sustainable post-conflict
order that guarantees Israel’s security, deals with Palestinian political realities (including the role
of Hamas), and attends to the needs of the population in Gaza. Possible approaches to this
situation are discussed below (see “Conclusion: Addressing the Gaza Conundrum”).
Many have anticipated that Obama’s skills at communicating could help improve the U.S.’s
image abroad, particularly among Middle Eastern Muslims. One of Obama’s much-noted plans is
to give a speech in the Muslim world early in his presidency to—in his words—“reboot” U.S. ³⁷
relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds by speaking of shared interests and values.
The fighting in and around Gaza, however, may have preempted Obama’s public diplomacy plans
to some degree. Veteran U.S. Middle East peace negotiator Aaron David Miller has asserted that
the “violence would speak louder to many Muslims about the United States ‘than any words ³⁸
Obama could utter.’” Moreover, the Israeli leadership has used Obama’s own words to imply
approval of Israel’s actions. While describing the objectives of the Gaza offensive in a December
29 address before the Knesset, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak reminded his listeners that
during Obama’s campaign trip to the southern Israeli city of Sderot—one of the prime targets for
³⁶
^T^h^{is se}^c^{tion w}^a^s^w^r^itte^{n by}^Ji^m^Za^notti^{, A}ⁿ^a^l^y^s^{t in Mi}^ddle^Ea^ste^r^{n A}^ffa^irs.
³⁷^Ho^w^a^rd^L^a^F^r^an^chⁱ^,^“Ob^a^{ma P}^l^aⁿ^{s M}^a^j^o^r^S^p^eechⁱⁿ^Mu^slⁱ^m^W^o^rl^d^t^o^‘Reb^oo^t^’^A^m^eri^{ca’s I}^m^a^g^e^Ab^ro^ad^,^”^C^h^ristian
^Sc^ie^nc^e^M^onit^o^r^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^11,²⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁸^P^a^u^l^Ri^cht^e^r,^“W^h^a^t^No^w^f^o^{r Ob}^a^m^{a’s P}^{eace P}^l^an^?”^C^h^ic^ag^{o Tr}ⁱ^b^une^,^Decem^b^e^{r 2}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁸^.

rockets from Gaza—he said that “if rockets were being fired at his home while his two daughters
were sleeping, he would do everything he could to prevent it.”
Despite possible difficulties posed for U.S. public diplomacy, the worldwide attention the Gaza
conflict has attracted could present an opportunity for President-elect Obama at the outset of his
administration to rally support for his desired approach to Israeli-Palestinian issues. In his first
weeks and months in office, Obama will probably deliver at least three speeches of potential
worldwide import (his inaugural, his first State of the Union, and the Muslim world address) in
which he may clarify U.S. intentions regarding the situation and frame his approach. Obama’s
challenge will be to enunciate his approach clearly and to make the larger case that the approach
is in the best interests of the American public and other interested stakeholders in the Middle East
and worldwide. Doing so might compel Obama to explain the interests he seeks to prioritize and
the assumptions underlying his priorities. On the other hand, President-elect Obama might choose
to downgrade the peace process entirely, calculating that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is too
intractable for his incoming administration to overcome.

Although Israel’s Operation Cast Lead is designed to thwart Palestinian rocket fire, over the long
term, Israel has recognized that it will require new missile defense systems capable of knocking
out short range projectiles. The Israeli government has sought U.S. assistance not only in
countering long-range ballistic missile threats, but also in co-developing short-range missile
defense systems to thwart rockets fired by non-state groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah.
Congress and successive administrations have shown strong support for joint U.S.-Israeli missile
defense projects. U.S.-Israeli missile defense cooperation has perennially been authorized and
appropriated in the defense authorization and appropriations bills. P.L. 110-329, the FY2009
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, provides a total
of $177.2 million for U.S.-Israeli missile defense programs, a $58 million increase over the
President’s FY2009 request.
As mentioned earlier, Israel is currently developing a short-range system, dubbed “Iron Dome,” ⁴¹
to destroy crude, Palestinian-made rockets fired by Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip. Iron
³⁹
^T^h^{is se}^c^{tion w}^a^s^w^r^itte^{n by}^Ji^m^Za^notti^{, A}ⁿ^a^l^y^s^{t in Mi}^ddle^Ea^ste^r^{n A}^ffa^{irs, e}^x^c^e^{pt w}^h^e^r^e^othe^rw^ise^spe^cⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^.
⁴⁰^T^h^{is subse}^c^tion^w^a^s^w^r^itte^{n by}^J^e^re^m^y^{M. Sha}^r^{p, S}^p^e^cⁱ^a^lis^{t in}^Mi^ddle^Ea^ste^r^{n A}^f^f^a^{irs a}^{nd A}^c^ting^R^e^se^a^r^c^h^Ma^na^g^e^r,
^Mⁱ^d^d^l^e^E^a^st^an^{d A}^f^ri^{ca S}^ectⁱ^oⁿ^.
⁴¹^W^{ithin t}^h^e^Isra^e^{li de}^f^e^nse^e^s^ta^blishm^eⁿ^{t, the}^r^e^{is de}^ba^te^ov^e^r^h^o^w^e^ffe^c^tiv^e^the^{Iron Dom}^e^s^y^ste^m^{will be}ⁱⁿ
^p^r^o^t^ectin^g^{Israeli cities an}^d^t^o^wⁿ^{s f}^r^o^m^Qassa^{m an}^d^G^r^ad^-st^y^{le Kat}^y^u^s^h^a^ro^ck^{et attac}^k^s^fⁱ^red^f^r^o^m^th^{e Gaza Strip}^.
^Som^e^Isra^e^{li de}^f^e^nse^e^x^pe^{rts a}^s^se^{rt tha}^t^Ir^{on D}^o^m^e^kⁱ^ne^ticⁱⁿ^te^rc^e^p^{tors w}^{ill ta}^k^e^{too l}^ong^t^o^de^str^o^y^c^r^ude^roc^k^e^t^{s f}ⁱ^re^d
^f^r^o^m^clo^s^{e ran}^g^{e to}^{Israeli to}^wⁿ^{s su}^ch^{as Sd}^er^o^t^{. Reu}^v^en^P^e^d^azu^r,^an^{Israeli ex}^p^e^{rt in}^b^a^{llistic m}ⁱ^{ssiles, clai}^m^s^th^{at each}
^T^a^mⁱ^r^mⁱ^s^s^ile^fⁱ^re^d^f^r^om^the^Iron^Dom^e^s^y^ste^m^w^{ill c}^o^{st $10}^0,⁰⁰^0,^w^h^ile^a^s^y^ste^m^ba^se^{d on la}^se^{r be}^a^m^inte^rc^e^p^tion,
^w^{ould c}^o^s^t^be^tw^e^eⁿ^$1,0⁰⁰^a^nd^$³^,0⁰⁰^pe^r^s^t^rⁱ^k^e^{. N}^e^v^e^r^t^he^le^s^s^,^I^s^r^a^e^{li of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^a^r^g^u^e^tha^t^s^o^{lid la}^s^e^r^te^c^hnol^og^y^ne^e^d^s
^m^o^re^ti^m^e^{to de}^v^e^{lop. Se}^e^,^“^R^oc^k^e^{t, Missile}^S^h^ie^{lds i}ⁿ^W^o^rks;^Iro^{n Do}^m^e^,^Da^vi^d^'^{s S}^lⁱⁿ^{g eye at}^t^ack^{s f}^r^o^m^G^a^z^a^,
^L^e^ba^{non, I}^r^aⁿ^,^”^W^a^s^hⁱ^ngt^{on Tim}^e^s^,^A^u^gu^st⁸^,²⁰⁰⁸^.^A^cco^rdⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^on^{e so}^u^r^ce,^“Nei^t^h^{er t}^h^{e m}ⁱ^ssi^l^eⁱⁿ^t^e^rcep^t^o^{rs n}^o^r^t^h^e
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Dome, which is expected to be deployed in 2010 at a development cost of $215 million, is
designed to intercept very short-range threats up to 40 kilometers in all-weather situations. It is
being developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems.
Reportedly, the Israeli government may be seeking U.S. assistance in financing the Iron Dome
system. According to one Israeli defense official, “We're not just looking for funding assistance,
although that is extremely important for us. We've offered the Americans to join as full
participants and to use the system to defend their troops and assets around the world.... We're
hopeful that after careful examination of the data and the system's capabilities, that they'll decide ⁴²
to join the program.”
David’s Sling (a.k.a. Magic Wand) is a short/medium-range system designed to counter long-
range rockets and cruise missiles, such as those possessed by Hezbollah in Lebanon, fired at
ranges from 40 km to 300 km. It is being jointly developed by Israel's Rafael Advanced Defense
Systems and Raytheon. The system is expected to be operable by 2010. P.L. 110-329 provides
$72.8 million for a short-range missile defense program.
In August 2008, Israel and the United States officially signed a “project agreement” to co-develop
the David’s Sling system. According to Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, director of the U.S. Missile
Defense Agency, “We wanted a truly co-managed program because the United States will be very
interested in this for our own purposes.... The agreement we just signed allows us to work through ⁴³
specific cost-sharing arrangements and other program parameters.”
Table 1. Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Short-Range Missile Defense:
FY2006-FY2009
^{$ in mill}^ions
^Progr^am^FY20⁰⁶^FY20^{07 FY20}^{08 FY20}⁰⁹^Total
^David’s^S^ling^$10.0^{$20.4 $37.0 $72.8}⁹⁵^$14^0.29⁵

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^la^se^rs^w^{ill prov}^ide¹⁰^0-pe^rc^eⁿ^{t c}^o^v^e^ra^g^e^,^w^h^ic^{h is w}^h^y^the^y^w^{ill ha}^v^e^{to bo}^th^beⁱⁿ^use^.^”^Se^e^,^“^D^e^f^eⁿ^se^Offⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s V}ⁱ^e^w
^L^a^se^r^a^s^Futur^e^of^Aⁿ^ti-^Mis^s^ile^T^e^c^hnol^og^y^,^Ha^’a^retz^{, Ma}^r^c^{h 24}^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸
⁴²^"^U^{.S. Ey}^e^s^{Joint A}ⁿ^ti-Roc^k^e^t^E^ffo^{rt W}^ith^{Israel; M}^u^lls^$²⁰⁰^{M In}^v^e^st^m^eⁿ^t^T^o^Sp^eed^Iroⁿ^Do^m^e^,"^A^g^en^{ce F}^r^aⁿ^ce
^Presse^{, J}^une^9,²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁴³^"^U^.S.-Isra^e^l^T^o^De^v^e^{lop Da}^vⁱ^d'^s^Sling^Missile^De^f^e^nse^,^"^Def^eⁿ^s^eN^ews.^co^m^,^A^u^gu^st⁷^,²⁰⁰⁸^.

The United States is the largest single-state donor to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which provides food, shelter, medical care,
and education for many of the original refugees from the 1947-1949 Arab-Israeli war and their
families—now comprising approximately one million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and three
million other Palestinians in the West Bank, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. In response to the
fighting in Gaza, the State Department announced on December 30 that it was contributing $85
million in emergency
assistance to UNRWA—$60
million to the general fund, Table 2. U.S. Appropriated Funds Directed to
$25 million to a special Palestinians (June 2007-December 2008)
“emergency appeal” fund for ^{$ in mill}^ions
the West Bank and Gaza—on ^B^u^dg^e^t^a^r^{y A}ⁱ^d^t^o^P^a^l^e^s^tⁱⁿⁱ^aⁿ^A^u^th^orⁱ^t^y^$300.0
top of the approximately $185
million the United States had ^{Other Eco}^{nomic & Devel}^opmeⁿ^{t As}^sistance^$267.5
already contributed to ^{Security A}^s^sistaⁿ^{ce to}^PA^Force^s^$161.3
UNRWA in 2008.
^TOTAL^$728.8
Depending on the damage ^Source:^{U.S. Department of Stat}^e.
incurred from the fighting in ^Notes: ^{Amounts used for sec}^uri^{ty assistance we}^{re ap}^prop^{riated or}
Gaza, Congress could face ^{reprogrammed to t}^{he I}^nter^{national Narcotics Control and Law}
additional requests for ^Enforce^{ment ac}^{count; all other a}^{mounts we}^{re ap}^{propriated to th}^e^{Economic Sup}^{port Fund a}^ccount;^{contributions to UNRWA (whic}^{h come}
FY2009 appropriations to the ^{from the}^{Migration and Refugee}^{Assistance and}^Emerge^{ncy Ref}^ug^{ee and}
State Department accounts ^{Migration Assistance accou}^{nts) ar}^{e not included; all amounts are}
from which UNRWA ^approximate.

contributions are made to
accommodate the humanitarian needs of the refugee-heavy Gaza population. A proposal for
continued or increased aid to UNRWA could meet with increased scrutiny if there is a perception
that resources from UNRWA or other international organizations were used (with or without ⁴⁵
organizational complicity) to strengthen Hamas or to repel Israeli military operations in Gaza.
Independent from its UNRWA contributions, the United States has provided substantial economic
and development assistance to the West Bank and Gaza (approximately $239.5 million in
FY2008), and it could be asked to increase such assistance as a supplement or substitute to its
UNRWA contributions and to aid post-conflict reconstruction and development in Gaza (and/or to
the West Bank if fighting erupts there). Currently, economic assistance to the West Bank and
Gaza is subject to prohibitions on aid to Hamas or Hamas-affiliated organizations.
⁴⁴
^{For m}^o^re^inf^o^rm^a^{tion o}ⁿ^a^{ll U.S}^.^a^ssistaⁿ^c^e^fⁱ^g^u^re^{s liste}^{d in t}^h^{is su}^bse^c^{tion (i}^nc^lu^dingⁱⁿ^Ta^b^l^{e 2}⁾^a^{nd t}^h^e^ne^x^t
^s^ubs^e^c^tion^,^s^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^S²²⁹⁶⁷^,^U.^{S. F}^o^re^ign^Ai^{d to}^the^P^a^le^stinia^ns^,^b^y^Ji^m^Zan^o^{tti. See also}^“P^A^Receiv^e^s
^$15⁰^Milli^{on f}^r^om^US,”^jpos^t^.^c^o^m^,^O^c^tobe^r^{22, 20}⁰⁸^.
⁴⁵^Se^e^H^.^{R. 2}⁷¹²^(Uⁿ^ite^{d N}^a^tio^ns^T^r^aⁿ^s^p^a^r^eⁿ^c^y^,^A^c^c^ounta^bⁱ^lity^{, a}^nd^Re^f^o^r^m^A^c^{t of}^{2007) f}^r^om^the¹¹⁰^th^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,
^Se^c^.³⁰^{9 (}^“^Lⁱ^m^ita^tions^{on U}ⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^C^ontrⁱ^bu^tio^ns^to^U^N^R^WA^”)^{, a}^s^aⁿ^e^x^am^ple^of^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^{tion tha}^t^ha^s^be^eⁿ
^pr^o^pos^e^d^t^o^lⁱ^m^{it c}^ontrⁱ^b^u^ti^ons^t^o^U^N^R^WA⁽^R^ef^e^r^r^e^{d to H}^o^us^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on Fo}^r^e^ig^{n A}^f^f^a^ir^s^,^J^une^14,²⁰⁰⁷⁾^.^Se^e^a^l^s^o
^H^.^C^on.R^e^s^.⁴²^{8: “}^E^x^p^r^e^s^sⁱ^ng^the^s^e^ns^e^of^C^ong^r^e^s^s^tha^t^the^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^N^a^tions^s^h^ou^ld^ta^k^e^im^m^e^dia^t^e^s^t^e^p^s^{to im}^pr^ov^e^the
^tr^aⁿ^s^p^a^r^eⁿ^c^y^a^{nd a}^c^c^ounta^b^il^ity^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d N}^a^tio^ns^R^e^lie^f^a^nd^W^o^r^k^s^A^g^eⁿ^cy^f^o^r^P^a^le^s^tⁱⁿ^ia^{n R}^e^f^u^g^e^e^s⁽^U^N^R^WA⁾
^{in t}^h^e^N^e^a^r^Ea^s^t^{to e}ⁿ^s^u^r^e^tha^tⁱ^tⁱ^s^not^pr^ovⁱ^d^ing^f^uⁿ^d^ing^,^e^m^ploy^m^e^{nt, or}^othe^r^s^u^p^por^t^to^te^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^s^”⁽^R^ef^e^r^r^e^{d to}
^H^ous^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on F}^o^r^e^ig^{n A}^f^f^a^ir^s^,^Se^pte^m^be^r^24,²⁰⁰⁸⁾^;^aⁿ^d^H^.^R^e^s^.⁹³⁹^{: “}^C^o^nde^mⁿ^ing^the^g^l^or^if^ic^a^tion^of
^te^rrorism^a^{nd the}^c^o^ntin^ui^ng^aⁿ^ti-^Isra^e^l^a^{nd a}ⁿ^ti-Se^m^itic^rh^e^t^oric^a^t^the^Unite^d^Na^tio^ns”^(Re^f^e^rre^{d to House}^Com^m^itte^e
^on^For^e^ig^{n A}^f^f^a^ir^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^{23, 2}⁰⁰⁸⁾^.

Additionally, the United States has transferred $300 million directly to the West Bank-based
Palestinian Authority in the past calendar year in order to help the PA meet its budgetary
obligations to pay employee salaries—the primary engine for an economy that boasts of little
private sector activity or foreign investment. Current law forbids the PA to use U.S. budgetary
transfers for the payment of PA salaries in Gaza. If the PA regains control over Gaza in the
aftermath of the current conflict, however, there might be calls for Congress to lift this restriction
and perhaps increase direct budgetary aid to the PA to accommodate the increased expenses the
PA may incur as it reestablishes itself in Gaza. Conversely, if the PA’s control slips in the West
Bank or it is seen as participating in or endorsing violence from the West Bank against Israel as a
result of popular discontent from the current fighting in and around Gaza, there could be calls for
Congress to cut or cease aid to the PA and further limit economic assistance to the West Bank and
Gaza.
The outcome of the fighting in and around Gaza could be crucial in determining the future of
current U.S.- and internationally-sponsored programs to help recruit, train, equip, house, manage,
and reform PA security forces. Congress might ask whether the assumptions that justified security
assistance to the PA in the West Bank before the conflict remain operative in its aftermath. How
the PA security forces perform throughout the conflict (whether they handle their crowd control
and public order duties competently and professionally and refrain from aggravating factional
conflict and from attacking Israelis) could be particularly relevant, as could the words and actions
of Abbas and other PA leaders.
Another important factor could be whether the Israelis remain open to the concept of gradually
increasing the PA forces’ freedoms of movement and of action that appear to be pivotal to the
forces’ continued development and assumption of responsibility over Palestinian-administered
areas. If the conflict leads to renewed Israeli distrust of the PA forces, expectations for what is
achievable with the forces could diminish from the earlier levels that led to $161.3 million in U.S.
appropriations since mid-2007. On the other hand, if the PA forces acquit themselves well during
the Gaza conflict and/or find themselves entrusted with establishing and/or improving security in
Gaza as well as in the West Bank, support from Israel and the Obama Administration for
significantly expanded appropriations for the U.S. security assistance program could be
forthcoming.

A major challenge for all parties will be to bring the conflict to an end and to reconstruct a
sustainable order in its aftermath. This would have implications for Gaza’s population and
infrastructure, Israel’s security, and Palestinian political realities (including the role of Hamas).
The Gaza crisis constitutes a conundrum for all involved. The desperate economic circumstances
and living conditions of Gaza’s 1.5 million residents—exacerbated by the sealing of all border
⁴⁶
^T^h^{is se}^c^{tion w}^a^s^w^r^itte^{n by}^Ji^m^Za^notti^{, A}ⁿ^a^l^y^s^{t in Mi}^ddle^Ea^ste^r^{n A}^ffa^irs.

crossings and the seaport blockade—have arguably provided a fertile breeding ground for Hamas
and its militant anti-Israel ideology. Israel felt compelled to launch Operation Cast Lead to
squelch or minimize the threat from Hamas. Although the ground attack might endanger its rule
in Gaza, Hamas may welcome it in hopes of miring Israeli forces in close-quarters combat to strip
away Israeli advantages in technology and firepower and in hopes of heightening perceptions that
Palestinians are being victimized.
Israel would like to avoid a drawn-out invasion and occupation of Gaza, but at the same time does
not want to abandon the military operation without achieving its objectives for fear of having to
go back into Gaza at a later date—perhaps under less favorable circumstances. Israel is also loath
to accept a cease-fire or truce that gives Hamas the “victory” of having border crossings opened,
even though some believe that if the crossings do not open (thereby facilitating commercial
opportunities for Gazans), the devastation in Gaza is only likely to increase its people’s
dependence on Hamas and decrease the chances that a long-term end to hostilities could be ⁴⁷
achieved.
Questions have arisen and still linger. Can Israel reduce or eliminate Hamas’s capability and/or
motivation to conduct attacks and to smuggle weapons and contraband? Is Israel likely to stop at
this objective or might it seek Hamas’s ouster in Gaza? If Israel ousts Hamas, who will take
over—Israel, the PA, some internationally-mandated authority? Assuming Israel does not wipe
out Hamas, how do the two reach accommodation with the other while each saving face? How
can Gaza’s economy be restored without enabling Hamas?
The most problematic issue is how various actors (particularly Israel, the Quartet, the PA, and
other Arab/Muslim states) might deal with Hamas without conferring state-like legitimacy upon it
and thus undermining the PA and Abbas. Thus far, leaders in the United States and Europe have
favored isolating Hamas instead of engaging it, which has led Israel to seek third-party
Arab/Muslim state brokers to help it reach indirect coexistence arrangements with Hamas.
Hamas’s relationship with Egypt has deteriorated considerably in connection with the Gaza
conflict and the November 2008 collapse of Hamas-Fatah unity talks. Other Western-allied Arab
states, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, appear wary of getting too involved for fear of being
double-crossed and of losing credibility with the “Arab street.” The emergence of Turkey and
Qatar as regional interlocutors and the desire of France and other Europeans to become more
active present some options going forward. The BBC reported on January 5 that an Hamas ⁴⁸
delegation might head to Egypt for talks.
Linking the cessation of violence in and around Gaza with international enforcement of a truce is
possible. Depending on the status of Hamas when the conflict ends, an all-Arab/Muslim or other
international peacekeeping force might be proposed to preside over Gaza in the conflict’s ⁴⁹
aftermath. There are, however, concerns over the practicality of such a proposal.
⁴⁷
^Se^e^G^rⁱ^f^f^W^itte^a^{nd Suda}^rsaⁿ^Ra^g^h^a^v^aⁿ^{, “}^‘^A^{ll-Out W}^a^{r’ De}^c^l^a^r^e^d^{on Ha}^m^a^s,”^W^a^s^h^ingt^{on P}^o^s^t^,^D^ece^m^b^{er 3}⁰^,
²⁰⁰^8.
⁴⁸^“Eⁿ^v^o^y^{s Rac}^e^t^o^Hal^t^G^{aza V}ⁱ^o^l^en^ce,^”^{BBC News On}^lin^e^{, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{5, 200}^{9. A}^c^c^e^s^sⁱ^ble^a^t
^http:^//ne^w^s.bbc^.c^o.^uk^/2/^h^i/m^iddle^_^e^a^s^t/78¹⁰⁹⁴⁵^.stm
⁴⁹^Som^e^obse^r^v^e^{rs be}^lie^v^e^tha^t^A^r^a^b^c^o^uⁿ^trie^s,^pa^rtic^ula^r^ly^Eg^y^p^{t, will n}^o^{t w}^a^{nt to g}^e^{t t}^o^o^inv^o^lv^e^dⁱⁿ^G^a^z^a^f^o^{r f}^e^a^r^of
^ultim^a^t^e^l^y^be^c^o^mⁱ^ng^re^s^pons^ible^f^o^{r the}^te^rritory^a^{nd its}^re^sⁱ^de^nts^,^a^{nd t}^h^a^t^Is^ra^e^l^mⁱ^g^h^{t not t}^r^us^{t t}^h^e^p^r^e^s^eⁿ^c^e^of^A^r^a^b
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Organizing a broader regional security initiative to promote or enforce peace between the
conflicting parties is also possible. This approach (which could involve the participation of a U.S.
special envoy for Arab-Israeli peace) could call for a conference or dialogue among all relevant
actors to handle the functional issues of reconstructing a post-conflict order. Whether such a
forum includes Hamas, or at least certain Hamas political leaders based in Gaza (possibly
including former PA prime minister Ismail Haniyeh) whom some believe might be willing to
depart from Hamas orthodoxy under certain circumstances, could be a subject of debate among
the United States, Israel, the PA, and the forum’s other organizers.
^Jⁱ^m^Z^aⁿ^o^tti,^Co^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^to^r ^Ca^se^{y L}^.^A^d^dⁱ^s
^An^al^y^s^{t i}ⁿ^{Middle Eas}^t^ern^Affairs^An^al^y^s^{t i}ⁿ^{Middle Eas}^t^ern^Affairs
^j^zan^o^tti@cr^s.lo^c.g^o^v^{, 7-}¹⁴⁴¹^caddi^s^@^crs^.^l^o^c.g^o^v^,^7-⁰⁸⁴⁶
^Je^re^m^y^M^.^S^h^a^r^p ^C^h^ri^s^t^oph^{er M. B}^l^an^ch^ard
^A^c^tiⁿ^g^Sectioⁿ^Resear^c^h^Man^a^g^e^r^An^al^y^s^{t i}ⁿ^{Middle Eas}^t^ern^Affairs
^j^s^h^a^rp@^c^rs^.l^oc.g^ov^{, 7-}⁸⁶⁸⁷^cbl^aⁿ^c^h^a^rd@^c^rs^.l^oc.^g^ov^{, 7-}⁰⁴²⁸

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^or^M^u^s^lim^tr^oops^s^o^ne^a^r^its^bor^d^e^r^s^{; w}^h^e^r^ea^s^,^H^a^m^a^s^mⁱ^g^h^{t not a}^c^c^e^p^{t the}^pr^e^s^eⁿ^c^e^of^W^e^s^t^e^r^{n tr}^oo^ps^{in G}^aza.^S^ee
^Herb^Keiⁿ^on^an^{d Yaako}^v^Kat^z^,^“^Lⁱ^vⁿⁱ^t^o^Di^scu^{ss Cease-F}ⁱ^{re w}ⁱ^t^h^S^a^rko^z^y^,^”^jpos^t.c^o^m^{, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{1, 2}⁰⁰⁹^.