Refugee and Asylum-Seeker Inflows in the United States and Other OECD Member States

Refugee and Asylum-Seeker Inflows in the
United States and Other OECD Member
States
Chad C. Haddal
Analyst in Immigration Policy
January 6, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40133


CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress


Summary
A refugee is a person fleeing his or her country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. Asylum-seekers are individuals that claim to be refugees and apply for
sanctuary from within a potential host country, but whose claim for refugee status has not yet
been evaluated and determined. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
collects data on the millions of refugees and asylum-seekers worldwide and their inflows to the
United States and other countries, including Member States of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). The recent economic downturn could lead to an escalation
in the worldwide supply of refugees and asylum-seekers. Thus, a potential issue for Congress is
whether the United States should increase admissions of asylum-seekers and refugees during a
worldwide economic downturn, maintain current admission levels, or whether the economic
circumstances warrant diverting refugee resources to other concerns.
In terms of refugee populations, the United States is one of 13 OECD countries that participates
in large-scale resettlement of refugees. Its leadership role in refugee resettlement is substantial.
For every year since 1994, the total UNHCR-registered refugee resettlements to the United States
have exceeded the cumulative total for all other OECD Member States. Resettlement levels
relative to the rest of the OECD, however, have declined since the mid-1990s.
Because of security concerns and political sensitivities over immigration, numerous OECD
countries have moved to restrict the inflows of asylum-seekers through unilateral measures or
multilateral agreements, particularly in countries that are members of the European Union (EU).
In the United States, numerous measures for inflow control have been implemented, some of
which other OECD countries have mirrored. Efforts such as the safe third-country agreements
and various cost control programs—as well as forthcoming security-based efforts in the European
Union—have lowered asylum-seeker inflow rates in the major receiving OECD countries in
recent years. The United States’ proportion of asylum-seeker inflows in 2007 registered at 17% of
the OECD cumulative total. Germany, France, Canada, and the United Kingdom each received
approximately 6%-9% of the asylum-seeker inflows.
The data in this report show that there is no uniform inflow trend across OECD countries relating
to refugees or asylum-seekers. One of the main observations is that several OECD countries with
historically greater numbers of asylum-seekers (such as the United States) have had the levels of
their asylum-seeker inflows converge with each other. Moreover, the level at which these asylum-
seeker levels have converged is in most cases markedly lower than asylum-seeker inflows during
the 1990s. Other OECD countries—mainly those on the periphery of the EU—have recently
experienced an upward trend in asylum-seeker inflows. This pattern is likely due to safe third
country provisions and their geographic proximity to non-European Union countries.
One set of comparative measures frequently employed is the relative burdens for countries
hosting refugees. When placed in the context of national income, the United States, on average,
took on a larger refugee hosting burden than almost every other OECD country from 2002 to

2006. Only Germany had a higher relative burden than the United States. The United States’


average relative burden was lower than that of 14 other OECD countries between 2002 and 2006.
This report will be updated as necessary.


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Contents
Intr oduct ion ................................................................................................................................ 1
Concepts and Definitional/Contextual Background......................................................................2
U.S. Context.........................................................................................................................3
UNHCR’s Global Context.....................................................................................................4
Overview: UNHCR’s Population of Concern...............................................................................5
Refugee Resettlement in OECD Member States..........................................................................7
Resettlement Inflows.............................................................................................................8
Migration Concerns and Political Values.....................................................................................9
Asylum Policy Shifts, Cost Control, and Security Mechanisms..................................................10
Inflow Control....................................................................................................................11
Asylum-Seekers in the United States.............................................................................11
Safe Third Country.......................................................................................................12
Deterrence Mechanisms......................................................................................................14
Voucher Program..........................................................................................................15
Dispersal Actions..........................................................................................................16
The Effects of New Asylum-Seeker Policies..............................................................................17
Convergence and Increases.................................................................................................17
Convergence of Asylum-Seeker Inflows........................................................................17
Escalating Asylum-Seeker Inflows................................................................................18
Asylum Decisions...............................................................................................................19
Sanctuary Capacity and Contributions of OECD Countries........................................................23
Conclus ion ..................................................................................................................... ........... 27
Figures
Figure 1. UNHCR Populations of Concern, 1998-2007................................................................6
Figure 2. UNHCR Population of Concern, by Region of Origin...................................................7
Figure 3. Refugee Resettlement Inflows and Ratios for the United States and Other
OECD Countries......................................................................................................................9
Figure 4. Convergence of Asylum-Seeker Inflows in Select OECD Countries............................18
Figure 5. Escalating Asylum-Seeker Inflows in Select OECD Countries....................................19
Figure 6. Average Annual Percentage of Positive Decisions for All Asylum-Seeker Cases
Where a Decision is Taken, by OECD Country.......................................................................21
Figure 7. Cumulative Refugee Population to GDP (PPP) Per Capita..........................................24
Figure 8. Cumulative Refugee Population to 1,000 Inhabitants..................................................26
Tables
Table A-1. Inflows of Asylum-Seekers into OECD and EU Countries........................................28


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Table A-2. Index of Refugee and Asylum-Seeker Inflows into OECD and EU Countries...........30
Appendixes
Appendix. Asylum-Seeker Flows..............................................................................................28
Contacts
Author Contact Information......................................................................................................32


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Introduction
Worldwide there are millions of people that flee their homes and cross international borders due
to threatening circumstances, including refugees and asylum-seekers. A refugee is a person
fleeing his or her country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Asylum-seekers are individuals that claim to be refugees and apply for sanctuary from within a
potential host country, but whose claim for refugee status have not yet been evaluated and
determined. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)—an agency
mandated to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee
problems worldwide—attempts to register and assist as much of this population as possible.
UNHCR contributes to a statistical database that allows for the tracking and analysis of what it
describes as “populations of concern,” that includes asylum-seekers and refugees. Specifically,
this database allows for the comparison of refugee and asylum-seeker inflows and populations in
the United States and other countries, such as Member States of the Organisation for Economic 1
Co-operation and Development (OECD). UNHCR data generally show that the United States 2
ranks among the highest recipients of refugees and asylum-seekers in the OECD.
While the refugee and asylum-seeker situation has been of concern to policymakers for many
years, the recent economic downturn may hold implications for the worldwide population of
concern. International slowdowns in the availability of capital, as well as the accompanying
unemployment, means that resources shortages are developing due to tightening government
revenues. Some countries may develop shortages of vital food and agricultural imports, which
could lead to food-based migration and displacement. Resource shortages have historically also
served as the basis for conflict, which could mean an escalation in the worldwide supply of
refugees and asylum-seekers. Yet, the United States is also being severely impacted by the
economic downturn, and the demand for government assistance is growing. Thus, a potential
issue for Congress is whether the United States should increase its admissions of asylum-seekers
and refugees during a worldwide economic downturn, maintain current admission levels, or
whether the economic circumstances warrant diverting refugee resources to other concerns.
Providing a comparative and historical analysis of refugee and asylum-seeker inflows to the 3
United States is of particular informational value, especially relative to other OECD countries.
Such information informs Members of Congress as to how policies in the United States and the
rest of the OECD are impacting refugee and asylum-seeker inflows and populations. Other CRS
1
Historically, the OECD has served as a consortium of advanced industrial countries. The OECD has as its mission to
promote democracy and market economies by providing a forum where “governments compare policy experiences,
seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and coordinate domestic and international policies. (OECD,
“About OECD, online at [http://www.oecd.org/]) It has a process by which countries may be invited for membership
and be included in the reports and analyses, so long as they meet certain accession criteria (e.g., democracy, rule of law,
human rights). Thus, membership in the OECD may be used as a proxy for countries with economies in more advanced
stages of development.
2 Although the OECD publishes some of its own analysis of refugee and asylum-seeker flows to OECD countries, the
data employed in these publications stems from the UNHCR database. OECD findings are generally published in
International Migration Outlook (also known as SOPEMI), published annually by the OECD.
3 There are currently 30 full members of the OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States.


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products provide extensive discussion of United States refugee and asylum policy.4 The aim of
this report, however, is to provide Members of Congress with a comparative data context. Various
patterns will be extracted from the data and the inflows to the United States will be analyzed in
comparison to other OECD Member States. The policy analysis will provide some discussions
regarding policy developments in OECD countries that may impact their respective inflows of
refugees and asylum-seekers. The vast majority of these policies relate to the flows of asylum-
seekers, since this group tends to foster less political support in the OECD.
The data in this report shows that there is no uniform inflow trend across OECD countries
relating to refugees or asylum-seekers. One of the main findings is that several OECD countries
with historically greater numbers of asylum-seekers (such as the United States) have had the 5
levels of their asylum-seeker inflows converge. Moreover, the level at which these asylum-
seeker levels have converged is in most cases markedly lower than asylum-seeker inflows during
the 1990s. Other OECD countries—mainly those on the periphery of the EU—have recently
experienced an upward trend in the asylum-seeker inflows. This pattern is likely due to their
geographic proximity to non-EU countries and the existence of safe third country provisions (a
concept discussed later in this report). Additionally, refugee data demonstrates that the United
States continues to be the main host country of resettled refugees, both in the OECD and
worldwide. Despite lower numbers of refugee resettlements in the United States from a decade
ago, the number of refugee resettlements in other OECD countries has also declined. Therefore,
the resettlement burden of the United States as compared to other OECD countries has remained
consistent.
Concepts and Definitional/Contextual Background
Refugee policy in the United States and other OECD countries is rooted in a post-World War II
context. As state parties to the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and the 6
subsequent 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, all Member States of the OECD
have committed themselves to admitting an unspecified number of individuals fleeing
persecution. The intent of the Convention was to end an ad hoc approach to refugee admissions
and resettlement that had previously characterized refugee policy. The United States has adopted 7
the principles of the convention in statute. After a state officially grants sanctuary to an
individual under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, the state is obligated to provide law-
abiding admitted refugees with many of the same rights and privileges that citizens enjoy, such as
access to courts, the right to pursue gainful employment, public education, medical access, artistic
expression, and the like. These rights and privileges do not necessarily extend to individuals that
have not been officially granted protective status. Yet, under the principal of nonrefoulment—
which prohibits the expulsion or involuntary return of a refugee or a person seeking asylum to a
4
For background on the international context see CRS Report RL31689, U.S. International Refugee Assistance: Issues
for Congress, by Rhoda Margesson and CRS Report RL31690, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), by Rhoda Margesson and Johanna Bockman.
5 The term “converge” is used throughout this report in reference to the range of various country inflows becoming
smaller. Thus, countries with converging levels are witnessing increasingly similar inflow levels.
6 These agreements are more commonly referred to as the1951 Convention” and the1967 Protocol(or, in some
cases, the “New York Protocol). United Nations, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva,
Switzerland: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2006). Hereafter cited as United Nations, Convention
and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
7 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), §207-209.


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territory where his/her life or freedom would be threatened—all parties to the 1951 Convention or
1967 Protocol must provide some evaluation of claims for sanctuary from persons within its
jurisdiction. In OECD countries, sanctuary is normally offered on a permanent basis.
U.S. Context
For the United States, two historical elements were essential in shaping current U.S. law: (1) the
conflicts in South and Central America in the 1970s and 1980s; and (2) the collapse of the former
Soviet Union. Each of these factors compelled policymakers to examine the mechanisms for
dealing with displaced populations seeking admission. These events caused policymakers to
conclude that the previous ad hoc refugee efforts were inadequate for dealing with such
populations, and in the late 1970s steps were taken by Congress towards codifying such measures
into statute that eventually became part of current law.
The admission of refugees to the United States and their resettlement are authorized by the 8
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980. The 1980 Act
had the dual purposes of providing a uniform procedure for refugee admissions and authorizing
federal assistance to resettle refugees and promote their self-sufficiency. Under the INA, a refugee
is a person who is outside his or her country and who is unable or unwilling to return because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Refugees are processed and 9
admitted to the United States from abroad.
In addition to refugees, the INA also employs the notion of “asylees.” Aliens present in the United
States may apply for asylum with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Bureau
(USCIS) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) after arrival into the country, or they
may seek asylum before the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR) during removal proceedings. Aliens arriving at a U.S. port who lack proper immigration
documents or who engage in fraud or misrepresentation are placed in expedited removal;
however, if they express a fear of persecution, they receive a “credible fear” review with an
USCIS asylum officer and—if found credible—are referred to an EOIR immigration judge for a 10
hearing.
U.S. law also specifically addresses certain populations. When civil unrest, violence, or natural
disasters erupt in spots around the world, concerns arise over the safety of nationals from these
troubled places who are in the United States. Humanitarian provisions exist in the INA to offer 11
temporary protected status (TPS) or relief from removal under specified circumstances. The 12
INA also contains other ongoing provisions for certain country nationals.
8
The INA is Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. The Refugee Act is P.L.
96-212, March 17, 1980.
9 For discussion of refugee policy in the United States, see CRS Report RL31269, Refugee Admissions and
Resettlement Policy, by Andorra Bruno.
10 Asylum policy in the United States is discussed in CRS Report RL32621, U.S. Immigration Policy on Asylum
Seekers, by Ruth Ellen Wasem, and CRS Report RL34587, Female Genital Mutilation as Persecution: When Can It
Constitute a Basis for Asylum and Withholding of Removal?, by Yule Kim.
11 CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem
and Karma Ester.
12 For admissions policies regarding Cuban and Haitian nationals, see CRS Report RS20468, Cuban Migration Policy
(continued...)


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UNHCR’s Global Context
UNHCR Terms and Definitions
Refugee: under the 1951 Convention, a refugee is legally defined as a person fleeing his or her country because of
persecution orowing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside of the country of his nationality and is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.
Asylum-seeker: a person who has made a claim that he or she is a refugee, but whose claim for refugee status has not
yet been evaluated and determined.
Internally Displaced Person (IDP): a person who has been forced to move from his of her home, but remains inside the
country of his or her nationality.
Population of Concern: an overarching term used by the UNHCR to cumulatively describe refugees, asylum-seekers,
IDPs, stateless persons, and other victims who have been displaced or are in need of protection.
Migrant: according to UNHCR, “a wide-ranging term that concerns most people who move to a foreign country for a
variety of reasons and for a certain length of time.
Immigrant: a person who takes up permanent residence in a country other than his or her homeland.
Economic Migrant: a person who leaves his/her country for financial/economic reasons (rather than refugee reasons).
While the U.S. approach to refugee issues is anchored in the INA, the UNHCR approach for
dealing with refugee issues is rooted in a global context. Refugees and asylum-seekers are a
subset of a larger population that UNHCR refers to as “populations of concern.” This larger
population can also include such individuals as internally displaced persons (IDPs), stateless
individuals, or other victims who have been displaced or are in need of protection. While both
asylum-seekers and refugees claim to have been persecuted or fear they could become victims of
persecution under UNHCR’s definition, they are distinct populations for classification purposes.
Before their request for asylum has been granted, however, these individuals are classified as
“asylum-seekers.” For classification purposes, UNHCR categorizes most people fleeing their
home country as refugees if they have not specifically applied for sanctuary from the host
country.
Refugees and asylum-seekers that are registered as part of the UNHCR population of concern
undergo a “status determination.” These status determinations are a set of evaluation procedures
used to determine their eligibility for sanctuary in a host country. While the 1951 Convention and
1967 Protocol establish a standard by which to evaluate claims for sanctuary, individual states
receiving applications retain the right to determine their own procedures for recognizing and
granting protective status. Evaluations of refugees and asylum-seekers are usually conducted by a 13 14
national government-sponsored program, through a program administered by UNHCR, or

(...continued)
and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem, and CRS Report RS21349, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, by Ruth
Ellen Wasem.
13 When an individual applies for sanctuary in a given country, that country is normally responsible for determining
whether the individual is to be granted official refugee status. In OECD countries, such status determinations occur
mostly with asylum-seekers, although for some countries, it may involve refugee resettlement populations as well.
These obligations usually exist within the countrys national legislation and derive from the 1951 Convention. Some
OECD countries will also conduct their own efforts to identify refugees for resettlement concurrent to UNHCR. The
United States is one of the few OECD countries with concurrent national program resettlement identification efforts
(although referrals from UNHCR are the norm). The United States accepts resettlement referrals from several sources:
(1) UNHCR, (2) U.S. embassies, and (3) designated voluntary agencies that provide assistance to refugees overseas. It
is U.S. policy to admit at least half of the refugees referred by UNHCR for resettlement each year, depending on the
(continued...)


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through a jointly operated program15 shared by UNHCR and the respective national 16
government. Yet, despite the existence of UNHCR evaluation programs, the potential host
country has the final authority to grant sanctuary within its borders.
Overview: UNHCR’s Population of Concern
As mentioned above, the UNHCR tracks official data worldwide on groups and individuals
labeled as “UNHCR populations of concern”—a classification that includes several categories
such as refugees, asylum-seekers, IDPs, and other populations of concern. In 2007, the worldwide
population of concern was approximately 31.7 million. Of this population, approximately 36%
were refugees, 2% were asylum-seekers (with pending cases), 43% were internally displaced
persons, and the remaining 19% were other populations of concern (e.g., stateless persons). Note
that these figures represent those registered with UNHCR, but do not represent the full total
worldwide (as many are not registered).
As shown in Figure 1, the period between 1998 and 2007 witnessed a shift within the UNHCR’s
population of concern. For most of the time period there was a downward trend in the refugee
population. Yet in 2007, the year-over-year growth number of refugees rose by 15% to 17
approximately 11.4 million, due mainly to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Asylum-seekers
experienced declining numbers during the latter half of the 10-year period. Asylum-seekers
dropped from a peak in 2001 of 1.1 million asylum-seekers to roughly 740,000 at the end of
2007, a decline of 32%. Persons categorized as “other populations of concern” increased notably
in recent years before declining in 2007 to 5.7 million. Yet, the population that has undergone the
largest absolute change in the previous few years has been the worldwide population of IDPs. At
the end of 2007, UNHCR-registered population of IDPs had grown to nearly 13.7 million
persons—an approximately twofold increase since 2005.

(...continued)
availability of funding (U.S. Department of State, “Refugee Resettlement Policy, 9 F.A.M. Appendix O, 100 Refugee
Resettlement Policy).
14 UNHCR often assists states that are not parties to the 1951 Convention. UNHCR may also be involved if a states
status determination procedure is non-functioning, or its determination procedure does not meet the minimum standards
of fairness set out by the UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2006 UNHCR Statistical
Yearbook: Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions, p. 43.
15 In some countries with long-standing status determination experience, such as the United States and Canada,
UNHCR has in place strategic partnerships that allow the agency to draw on the expertise and resources of those
countries, including the deployment of national government experts to UNHCR field operations. In the United States,
the State Department is responsible for overseas processing of refugees. Generally, it arranges for an overseas
processing entity to conduct pre-screening interviews of prospective refugees and prepare cases for submission to the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which handles refugee adjudications. By law, the annual number
of refugee admissions and the allocation of these numbers by region of the world are set by the President after
consultation with Congress. For more information on refugee policies and procedures in the United States, see CRS
Report RL31269, Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy, by Andorra Bruno.
16 UNHCR statistics for 2006 show that, for countries where data were available, 92 countries (61%) conducted their
own status determination programs, 43 countries (28%) used UNHCR-administered programs, and 16 countries (11%)
had jointly-administered status determination programs between the national government and UNHCR.
17 CRS Report RL33936, Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis?, by
Rhoda Margesson, Jeremy M. Sharp, and Andorra Bruno, and CRS Report RL33851, Afghan Refugees: Current Status
and Future Prospects, by Rhoda Margesson.


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Figure 1. UNHCR Populations of Concern, 1998-2007
Population in Millions
MillionsRefugeesAsylum-seekersInternally Displaced PersonsOthers of Concern
35
30
25
s ons
20Per

of
15b er
u m
10N
5
-
1998 199 9 20 00 2 001 2002 200 3 20 04 2 005 2006 200 7
Year
Source: CRS presentation of data from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Statistical Yearbook, 2007: Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions (Geneva: UNHCR, 2008).
Notes: The category labeledothers of concern” is composed of stateless persons, and other victims who have
been displaced or are in need of protection.
The regions of origin for the populations of concern are predominantly Africa and Asia, as shown
in Figure 2. The people from Asia and Africa constituted 38% and 35% of this population in
2007, respectively. The third-largest contributing region during the same year was Latin America
and the Caribbean, which was responsible for producing 12% of the population of concern. The
persons of concern originating from Europe represented 4% of the estimated total population.
North America’s population (excluding Mexico and the Caribbean) represented less than 1% of
the total population—similar to persons of concern from Oceania. The category of other
populations such as stateless persons (labeled “various” in Figure 2) accounted for 11% of the
worldwide population.


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Figure 2. UNHCR Population of Concern, by Region of Origin
Data for 2007
Ocean ia
2,306 Various
North America (0%) 3,333,482 (11%)
3,8 80
(0 % )
Latin America and the
Caribbean Africa
3,737,214 10, 986,052
(12%) (35%)
Eu ro pe
1,139, 981
(4%)
Asia
12,474,748
(38% )
Source: CRS presentation of data from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Statistical Yearbook, 2007: Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions (Geneva: UNHCR, 2008).
Notes: The “various category consists mainly of stateless persons. The total population of the chart is
31,677,661.
Refugee Resettlement in OECD Member States
As mentioned above, those refugees determined by the UNHCR to be most at risk are eligible to
be screened and processed for permanent resettlement in a country with an existing resettlement
agreement. Mandated by the UNHCR’s charter, resettlements are used as a protection tool and
durable solution for resettled individuals. Among OECD countries, the United States is somewhat
unique in its continued participation in large-scale resettlement of refugees. The majority of
OECD countries do not participate at all in refugee resettlement and fulfill 1951 Convention
terms by processing asylum-seekers that arrive within their borders. In the past decade, only 12 18
other OECD Member States have participated in refugee resettlement, and one of those
countries—Japan—has not resettled any refugees since 2001. By contrast, countries such as
Australia, Canada, and the United States have consistently resettled thousands of refugees on an
18
The other countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.


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annual basis, thereby constituting the states most involved in refugee resettlement over the past

10 years.


Resettlement Inflows
The depiction of refugee resettlement in industrialized countries in Figure 3 below reveals the
large refugee resettlement inflows into the United States relative to other OECD countries. For
every year since 1994, the total inflows to the United States have exceeded the cumulative total
for all other OECD Member States. Although the inflow level was multiple times higher than the
remaining OECD countries during the mid-1990s, the two levels nearly converged in 2002 and
2003. This trend toward convergence was mostly due to declining inflows into the United States
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. U.S. refugee inflow levels dropped by
approximately 76% from 1994 to 2002. Since 2002, the United States has experienced a general
upward trend, and in 2007 the United States resettled over 48,000 refugees. Comparatively, the
cumulative total for other OECD countries has remained more consistent, fluctuating in a range
between 22,000-32,000 resettlements annually from 1996 to 2007.
Another notable aspect of Figure 3 is the depiction of refugee resettlement to the United States 19
and other OECD countries in relation to UNHCR’s worldwide refugee population total. While
the OECD as a whole has annually resettled at least 50,000 refugees, since 1994 these inflows
have not exceeded 1% of the worldwide refugee population for a given year. Because the process
for refugee resettlement is challenging and resource-intensive, relatively few refugees are chosen
(or even eligible) for resettlement. According to UNHCR, “the selectivity of resettlement ... must
remain focused on protecting refugees who are at risk.” In addition, refugee resettlement requires
close coordination with national governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
These agencies frequently work with UNHCR in the identification and screening of resettlement
candidates, and facilitating such interaction can be both time- and resource-intensive. Although
some observers argue that the 1% proportion indicates that more refugees could be resettled in
industrialized countries, the numbers in Figure 3 speak equally to the significant size of the
refugee population in the world.
What is more apparent from Figure 3 is that the fluctuations in the proportion of refugees
resettled to the worldwide refugee total could be largely attributed to the changes in inflows to the
United States. From 1994 through 2001, the contribution of the United States to refugee
resettlement in all OECD countries hovered between 73% and 77%. Consequently, the ratio of the
worldwide population being resettled in other OECD countries largely mirrored the resettlement
pattern to the United States. This mirroring pattern continued when this same ratio experienced a
large drop in 2002. Since 2003, the mirroring pattern has continued, although the relatively large
change in the ratio is likely more attributable to worldwide decline in the refugee population
during this period than due to changes in United States inflows. Also, the share of refugee inflows
to the United States as a percentage of total OECD refugee resettlement inflows ranged between
58%-67% from 2003 to 2007. Consequently, while the United States still accounts for roughly
two-thirds of refugee resettlements in OECD countries, its share has diminished somewhat since
the mid-1990s.
19
This worldwide refugee population total does not include the other categories included under UNHCRs populations
of concern, such as asylum-seekers.


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Figure 3. Refugee Resettlement Inflows and Ratios for the United States and Other
OECD Countries
Data for 1994-2007
United StatesOther OECD CountriesOECD Resettlement Ratio

120 ,000 1.20 %
ide
100 ,000 1.00 % ldw
or
low of W
80,000t Inf0.80%geion
en enta l a t
160, 000ttlem 0.60 % erc opu
2,98974esee P
11,76s Rw as Pfuge
99 91 81 ,0ee flo e
,7,27676,185,143,92540,000fug0.40%t InR
74 69 72 68 68 13Re en
,8 53,8 77 ,28191 tlm
52 ,2 48,7 343 35 1120, 000 0.20 %
,839 28,422 4138 34, ,321 724 ,561 ,120 ,152 ,619 ,732 ,166 31,7 ,798 30,3 ,832 Reset
2627 22, 26 26 26 23 23 27 26 26
0 0.00 %
19 94 1995 19 96 199 7 19 98 1999 2 000 200 1 2 002 200 3 2 004 20 05 2 006 200 7
Ye a r
Source: CRS presentation of data from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Statistical Yearbook, 2006: Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions (Geneva: UNHCR, 2007) and Statistical
Yearbook, 2007: Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions (Geneva: UNHCR, 2008).
Migration Concerns and Political Values
The policy approaches that countries have taken towards refugees and asylum-seekers has been
largely intertwined with the political value countries have placed on immigration in general.
While countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia have traditionally had relatively
proactive immigration policies, many European countries have not historically accepted many
immigrants and have practiced highly restrictive legal immigration policies. These divergent
immigrant experiences are partly reflected in the United States’ willingness to accept hundreds of
thousands of permanent immigrants annually. Consequently, refugees have constituted a smaller 20
share of permanent inflows into the United States. By comparison, most European countries
tend to prefer admitting foreign nationals on a temporary basis, and in many European countries
asylum has become a main avenue for entry and a perceived “loophole” for immigration.
The sizable inflows of asylum-seekers to many European countries has led to a perception in a
number of states that their asylum systems are overburdened. In many countries, the expenditure
of resources towards special accommodations, financial assistance, and providing temporary
20
In FY2008, the ceiling for refugee admissions was 80,000, compared to 70,000 from the previous six fiscal years.


Congressional Research Service 9


employment, has led to dissatisfaction with the asylum system. Additionally, the wave of
migrants that arrived in Western Europe with the collapse of the Soviet Union and Communist
control over Eastern Europe placed a burden on public resources that many European
policymakers are not eager to see repeated. Thus, many of the restrictive policy trends that are
noted in subsequent sections have emerged out of these political developments in Europe over the
last two decades. Moreover, the lack of geographic barriers make travel to Europe less strenuous,
and, as a result, make some countries on the European periphery especially susceptible to asylum-
seeker inflows.
An additional development affecting asylum-seeker and refugee policies in European OECD
Member States has been the expanded number of Member States in the European Union (EU).
For EU Member States, their nationals may freely travel, settle, and seek employment in other
Member States. While such an arrangement should benefit the economic development of the
entire EU area in the long term, political and cultural concerns have been raised about the impact
this openness may have on various countries. Moreover, since countries cannot restrict flows
from within the EU area, they have shown a greater eagerness to restrict unwanted flows from
outside. Thus, asylum-seekers have become a prominent target for certain proponents of
immigration restriction. EU countries are increasingly attempting to coordinate immigration and 21
asylum-seeker policies, such as the recently passed European Pact on Immigration and Asylum.
The inflow of large numbers of unauthorized immigrants has prompted security concerns
amongst policymakers in Europe (as it has in the United States). The new European security-
based provisions are likely to impact asylum-seekers since the proposed changes to EU policy
will be based upon the concept of “country reception capacity”—thereby suggesting that inflows 22
to each country beyond the level of “reception capacity” constitutes a security risk.
For many OECD countries, however, the most confounding factor is illegal migration. The
difficulty for many countries is separating illegal economic migrants from actual asylum-seekers
that have migrated inside their borders. Moreover, asylum-seekers may have economic
considerations when migrating to a destination country. Although less than 1% of UNHCR
populations of concern are admitted into OECD countries, these countries are frequently desirable
destinations for asylum-seekers because of the stronger performing economies and potential for
social and economic upward mobility. Thus, the question for many OECD policymakers has been
how to develop adequate inflow control measures without excluding genuine asylum-seekers.
Asylum Policy Shifts, Cost Control, and Security
Mechanisms
Empirically, OECD countries with strongly performing economies are likely to be recipients of 23
relatively higher rates of asylum applications. Strong economies serve as an incentive for
21
Jim Brunsden, “EU Agrees Wide-ranging Immigration Plans, European Voice, October 16, 2008, online at
[http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2008/10/eu-agrees-wide-ranging-immigration-plans/62739.aspx].
22 According to reports, the “reception capacity of individual countries will be based upon their abilities to provide
employment, housing, education, health and social services. (Renata Goldirova, “EU to Rubber-stamp Common
Immigration and Asylum Rules, EU Observer, October 15, 2008, online at [http://euobserver.com/22/26924].
23 Asylum-seekers have commonly been treated as a distinct category under the immigration policies of most OECD
countries, often because of the forced nature of the migration combined with the geographic location from which their
application is submitted. Partly, the distinct categorization arises because the potential host country does not have the
(continued...)


Congressional Research Service 10


economic migrants to travel to these states (in either an authorized or unauthorized manner), but
not necessarily for asylum-seekers. More recent asylum-seeker policies throughout the OECD,
however, have seemingly been based upon the assumption that asylum-seekers are economically
rational actors, similar to many illegal immigrants. The response in the United States and
throughout other OECD states has been to develop proactive measures to control the flows of
asylum-seekers, by way of unilateral measures or via multilateral agreements. Efforts such as safe
third-country agreements and various cost control programs have been the likely cause of the
convergence of asylum-seeker inflow levels in certain OECD countries with historically higher
inflow rates (a convergence that is depicted in Figure 4).
Inflow Control
A number of efforts to control the inflow of asylum-seekers embrace a concept that political
scientists refer to as “beggar thy neighbor.” Commonly used to refer to protectionist trade
barriers, the term describes a policy whereby the objective or benefit sought by one country is
achieved at the expense of others. In the case of asylum flows, a number of OECD countries have
employed mechanisms and advocated policies that transfer the asylum-hosting obligations (and
costs) to other countries. While some advocates view this shift as avoiding obligations, others
contend that it constitutes an equitable distribution of cost in sheltering asylum-seekers and
refugees. A few of these policy mechanisms—discussed in the sections below—are employed in
the United States, while others are more unique to other OECD member states.
Asylum-Seekers in the United States
Controlling the mass inflow of asylum-seekers has been a concern of U.S. policymakers for 24
decades. Prior to 1996, aliens arriving at a port of entry to the United States without proper
immigration documents were eligible for a hearing before an immigration judge to determine
whether the aliens were admissible. Aliens lacking proper documents could request asylum in the
United States at that time. If the alien received an unfavorable decision from the immigration
judge, he or she also could seek administrative and judicial review of the case. Critics of this
policy argued that illegal aliens were arriving without proper documents, filing frivolous asylum
claims, and obtaining work authorizations while their asylum cases stalled in lengthy backlogs.
The Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)25 made
substantial changes to the asylum process, including establishing expedited removal proceedings;
codifying many regulatory changes; adding time limits on filing claims; and limiting judicial
review in certain circumstances, but it did not alter the numerical limits on asylee adjustments.
Foreign nationals arriving without proper documents who express to the immigration officer a
fear of being returned home must be kept in detention while their “credible fear” cases are

(...continued)
opportunity to screen candidates from outside its borders. Yet, academic analysis of asylum-seeker behavior has
suggested that once compelled to flee their country of origin, asylum-seekers may undergo similar cost/benefit
calculations as economic migrants. In addition to employment considerations, the cost/benefit calculations of asylum-
seekers tend to account for such factors as cultural adjustments, the pre-existing family or group ties, linguistic barriers,
and public benefits made available (Wayne A. Cornelius and Marc R. Rosenblum, “Immigration and Politics, Annual
Review of Political Science, vol. 8 (June 2005), pp. 99-119).
24 CRS Report RL32621, U.S. Immigration Policy on Asylum Seekers, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
25 P.L. 104-208.


Congressional Research Service 11


pending.26 Moreover, the reforms established serious consequences for aliens who file frivolous
asylum applications.
IIRIRA also codified many regulatory revisions of the asylum process that the former George
H.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations made. Most notably, aliens are statutorily prohibited
from immediately receiving work authorization at the same time as the filing of their asylum
application. Now the asylum applicant is required to wait 150 days after the USCIS receives 27
his/her complete asylum application before applying for work authorization. The USCIS then
has 30 days to grant or deny the request. IIRIRA also added a provision that enabled refugees or
asylees to request asylum on the basis of persecution resulting from resistance to coercive
population control policies, but the number of aliens eligible to receive asylum under this
provision was limited to 1,000 each year.
Safe Third Country
One form of cost shift and inflow control in the OECD has been through “safe third country”
provisions. A safe third country is a country the asylum-seeker has passed through en route to the
receiving country and with which the receiving country has a reciprocal agreement. Under a safe
third-country agreement, the receiving country can refuse to make an asylum determination, if the
safe third country (the country an asylum-seeker passed through) is technically responsible for 28
examining the application. These types of arrangements are most common among the OECD
states that belong to the EU. Major recipients of refugee flows in the EU have generally
advocated such agreements between the EU Member States, as it allows these countries to shift
some asylum determination responsibilities to other countries without violating the direct terms of
the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol. The UNHCR has stated that responsibility-sharing
agreements between states can, when appropriate safeguards are in place, enhance the
international protection of refugees by ensuring the orderly handling of asylum applications.
The United States has only one similar arrangement in place: the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country 29
Agreement. Effective since December 29, 2004, the program is run through a cooperative
agreement between Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and three U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) agencies: Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and 30
Immigration Services (USCIS), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). As part of
the agreement, UNHCR independently monitors and reviews the implementation of the program
and offers recommendations for improvement and compliance. The impact, however, has been
small. In the United States, during the first year of implementation, there were 66 such claims at
26
For background and analysis on detention policy under the Immigration and Nationality Act, see CRS Report
RL32369, Immigration-Related Detention: Current Legislative Issues, by Alison Siskin.
27 8 C.F.R. §208.7.
28 The concept of safe third country has been described as follows:An asylum-seeker is denied access to substantive
refugee determination procedures in a particular [country] on the ground that he or she already enjoyed, could or should
have requested and, if qualified, would actually have been granted refugee protection in another country” (Eva
Kjaergaard, “The Concept ofSafe Third Country in Contemporary European Refugee Law, International Journal of
Refugee Law, vol. 6, no. 4 (1994): p. 651).
29 INA §208(a)(2)(A) and (C).
30 CBP is responsible for identifying individuals subject to the agreement, USCIS is responsible for conducting a
threshold screening determination to determine if an exception to the agreement applies, and ICE is responsible for the
physical custody of individuals subject to the agreement, as well as the return to Canada of individuals who fail to
establish an exception to the agreement.


Congressional Research Service 12


land border points of entry (POE).31 Of those 66 claimants, 62 were subject to the agreement. The 32
other four claimants were Canadian citizens, who are not subject to the agreement. During the
same time period, Canadian authorities returned 303 individuals to the United States as a result of 33
the application of the agreement.
The concept of a safe third-country mechanism first emerged in 1990 as part of the so-called 34
Dublin Convention of EU Member States. The objective of this convention was to determine
which Member State would be responsible for examining an application for asylum—a matter not 35
explicitly declared in the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol. The parties agreed to abide by the
order of responsibility laid out in the Dublin Convention, and subsequent agreements included
conditions for accepting third country asylum-seekers. Critics, however, have contended that
adequate safeguards are sometimes not in place.
One of the main concerns about the concept of safe third countries for asylum-seekers has been
its potential for unilateral application by a receiving country. Without a bilateral agreement,
removing asylum-seekers from a receiving country to a third country could result in a refusal by
the third country to accept the asylum-seeker. Critics have referred to such a phenomenon as
“refugees-in-orbit,” wherein the asylum-seeker is deported from country to country until a
government chooses to accept the asylum-seeker. In the EU, third country responsibilities are
required between Member States, but the same requirements are not applicable to non-Member 36
States. EU countries have historically attempted to make arrangements with countries that are
31
Between 2000 and 2004, there was an average of 58 asylum claims from individuals arriving at a Canada and U.S.
land border POE each year. Asylum claims from individuals arriving at a Canada and U.S. land border port of entry
during fiscal years 2000 to 2004 were as follows: 2000 (72), 2001 (68), 2002 (64), 2003 (32), and 2004 (54). The 66
cases during the first year of implementation stem from calendar year 2005 rather than fiscal year.
32 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and Citizenship and Immigration Canada, U.S.-Canada Safe Third
Country Agreement, Assessment Report (Washington, D.C., November 16, 2006).
33 Ibid.
34Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the
Member States of the European Communities - Dublin Convention, Official Journal of the European Union, C254
(August 19, 1997): 1-12. As is commonly the case with agreements between European states, the agreement signed in
Dublin, Ireland, on June 15, 1990, was named after the location where the diplomatic relations occurred. The original
12 signatories to the Dublin Convention were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Prior to the Member States recognizing each
other as safe third countries, the notion had been based on the unilateral decisions of individuals states. By 1998, the
agreement had been extended to Austria, Finland, and Sweden.
35 The 1990 Dublin Convention addressed these issues by explicitly setting out rules for determining which countries
had adjudication responsibility under a number of potential asylum-seeking scenarios. The agreement took effect on
September 1, 1997, and was subsequently adopted by later parties to the agreement. In 2003, the agreement was
replaced by the so-called Dublin II Regulations.
The 2003 regulations were intended to build on the asylum-seeker determination responsibilities provisions of the
Dublin Convention by preventing unauthorized immigration and “visa shoppingby applicants through different
Member States. The original Dublin Convention had, among other things, been criticized for laying vague burdens of
proof for determining illegal entry into a Member State (Agnes Hurwitz, “The 1990 Dublin Convention: A
Comprehensive Assessment, International Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 11, no. 4 (1999): 646-677). The Dublin II
Regulations aim to prevent such behavior through information sharing in the European Automated Fingerprint
Recognition System (EURODAC), as well as forcing the responsible state to accept the return of an asylum-seeker
(within a limited and specified time period) who is residing illegally in another member state.
36 Under the London Resolutions of 1992, in cases where an asylum-seeker has traveled through a non-Member State
before arriving in the receiving country, that Member State can remove the asylum-seeker to the third country
provided the third country complies with the 1951 Convention. Agreements with Norway, Iceland and Switzerland
have extended the Dublin Convention terms to those three non-Member States.


Congressional Research Service 13


frequently stopovers before a final European destination.37 But the bilateral approach to safe third
country agreements has resulted in numerous EU Member States having mismatched lists of safe
third countries (presumably because of different interpretations of what constitutes compliance 38
with the 1951 Convention). Since 1999, the EU has been working toward harmonizing
minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, 39
including creating an EU list of third countries as safe countries of origin. Several other OECD
countries outside the European Union have set up their own bilateral safe third country
provisions.
Safe third-country provisions have likely caused some shift in the distribution of asylum-seekers
among OECD countries with high inflow rates, such as the United Kingdom. As a country located
in the northeastern region of Europe—and thus effectively containing a buffer zone from many
asylum-seeker countries of origin—one would expect to see a notable number of asylum-seekers
categorized as “not subject to asylum consideration” because of the availability of a safe third
country. Cumulatively from 1996 through 2007, the United Kingdom refused consideration to
roughly 20,200 principal applicants, but annually it never accounted for more than 8% of all 40
asylum applications during that time period.
Deterrence Mechanisms
A notable cause of shifting burdens of asylum-seeker inflows in some OECD countries has been
policy mechanisms designed to control flow rates and deter fraud and abuse. Working on the
belief that asylum-seekers are economically rational, numerous governments and immigration
critics across the OECD area have argued that some migrants engage in so-called “asylum
shopping”—the practice of applying for asylum in several countries in order to maximize the
likelihood of a positive asylum determination and/or receiving the most generous public benefits.
The United States has implemented deterrence mechanisms, among other ways, through the
previously discussed expedited removal mechanism, as well as the ongoing efforts to implement 41
the provisions of the REAL ID Act. Several tactics have been attempted or implemented in
various other OECD countries. Most widespread has been the development of shared databases
on asylum-seekers. The inclusion of fingerprints and other biometric identifiers in systems like 4243
Eurodac, as well as the issuance in some cases of special identification cards, provides
governments with improved tools for tracking asylum-seekers to ensure that they do not migrate
from the first country of asylum to claim improved public benefits. The European Pact passed by
the EU in October 2008 requires that Member States should start issuing biometric visas from
37
Eva Kjaergaard, “The Concept ofSafe Third Country in Contemporary European Refugee Law,” International
Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 6, no. 4 (1994), p. 653.
38 Member States undertook to set up a common European asylum system based on the full and inclusive application of
the 1951 Convention at the Tampere European Council in October 1999.
39 European Union,Future Common European Asylum System, Europa: Activities of the European Union, July 30,
2008, at [http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l14561.htm].
40 Based on CRS analysis of statistics from the United Kingdom Home Office, Asylum Statistics: United Kingdom,
London: H.M.S.O., 1997-2008.
41 P.L. 109-13.
42 Eurodac is a large database of fingerprints of applicants for asylum and illegal immigrants found within the EU that
complies with provisions in the Dublin Convention on handling claims for asylum.
43 “Asylum-seekers given smart ID cards,BBC, January 31, 2002, sec. UK Politics, at
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/1793151.stm].


Congressional Research Service 14


January 1, 2012, establish an EU-wide electronic entry/exit system to record the movement of 44
people, and only regularize the status of unauthorized individuals on a “case-by-case” basis.
Voucher Program
The United Kingdom, which has been a vocal advocate of asylum policy reforms in the European 45
Union, introduced two programs in the past decade that some observers believe were designed 46
specifically to prevent asylum shopping. Officially, these programs were aimed at preventing
asylum fraud, illegal immigration, and human smuggling. The first of these efforts was a voucher
program for asylum-seekers that was implemented in place of cash-based social security benefits.
Although small cash allowances were also received, asylum-seekers were required to collect
vouchers for most purchases at the post office and use the voucher in place of cash or credit at
businesses. A review of the program by the UK Home Office found that the voucher scheme had
encountered a number of operational problems such as business owners refusing to accept
vouchers. Moreover, complaints from asylum-seekers and advocates claimed that the program
was causing a further stigmatization of asylum-seekers and that many users suffered 47
embarrassment. The UK government eventually did away with the voucher program in 2002,
and instead instituted “smart card” identification requirements, including biometric identifiers 48
such as fingerprints. In the United States, such a voucher program has not been attempted as the
INA bans asylum-seekers from receiving any public benefits until they become legal permanent 49
residents.
44
Jim Brunsden, “EU Agrees Wide-ranging Immigration Plans, European Voice, October 16, 2008, online at
[http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2008/10/eu-agrees-wide-ranging-immigration-plans/62739.aspx].
45 In 2003, the United Kingdom advocated large scale reforms to the European Union asylum policy, including efforts
to combat illegal immigration and asylum shopping. Much of this proposal was based on the former restrictive policies
of the Australian government. After criticism from asylum advocacy groups, these proposals were rejected by the
European Union. However, on June 19, 2008, European Union lawmakers voted to allow undocumented migrants to be
held in detention centers for up to 18 months and banned from European Union territory for five years. The EU
countries came to an agreement on October 16, 2008 known as the European Pact that would institute greater border
controls in the EU area and institute a common immigration and asylum policy in an effort to stem the inflow of
unauthorized immigrants. According to UNHCR, this measure could affect potential asylum-seekers that opt for illegal
entry to Europe because of a lack of legal channels. (Tony Blair to Costas Simitis, “New International Approaches to
Asylum Processing and Protection, letter, March 10, 2003; European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Statement of
the European Council on Refugees and Exiles on the European Council Meeting, 21 and 22 March 2003, press release
(London, UK, March 17, 2003); Human Rights Watch, “An Unjust “Vision” for Europe’s Refugees: Human Rights
Watch Commentary on the U.K.s “New VisionProposal for the Establishment of Refugee Processing Centers
Abroad, June 17, 2003; Joanne van Selm and Eleni Tsolakis, “The Enlargement of anArea of Freedom, Security and
Justice’: Managing Migration in a European Union of 25 Members,Policy Brief (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy
Institute, May 2004); Caroline Brothers, “E.U. Passes Tough Migrant Measure, The New York Times, June 19, 2008,
sec. International/Europe).
46 Both programs were intended only for asylum-seekers. If an asylum-seekers application was approved, these
restrictions would be lifted.
47 Home Office, Report of the Operational Reviews of the Voucher and Dispersal Schemes of the National Asylum
Support Service (London, UK: Home Office, October 2001), p. 5.
48 “Asylum-seekers given smart ID cards,BBC, January 31, 2002, sec. UK Politics, at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/politics/1793151.stm], visited May 19, 2008.
49 For more information, see CRS Report RL33809, Noncitizen Eligibility for Federal Public Assistance: Policy
Overview and Trends, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.


Congressional Research Service 15


Dispersal Actions
The second program associated with preventing asylum shopping in the United Kingdom has 50
been the government’s effort to disperse asylum-seekers. Following the Immigration and
Asylum Act of 1996 and its mandate that local authorities be responsible for the care of asylum-
seekers, a few local governments began their own dispersal actions (through private contracts)
and lobbied for greater burden sharing. Subsequently, the government implemented the
Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999, which included a dispersal scheme to send asylum-seekers
throughout the United Kingdom with the objective of controlling asylum-seeker inflows. The
national government has maintained that dispersion has been necessary to more widely distribute 51
service costs among municipalities, yet some observers believe the policy has been “unduly 52
harsh.” In addition, news reports have sometimes linked the dispersal policy with increased 53
incidences of racism, harassment, and violence against refugees and asylum-seekers. Studies
have suggested that improved communication efforts between local authorities, national
government, and refugee groups could potentially improve the tensions between asylum-seekers 54
and local populations.
Whether or not these mechanisms effectively deterred asylum remains unclear. From 1996 to
2002, new asylum applications in the United Kingdom increased by 248% to 103,080
applications in 2002. Yet, in subsequent years, the levels dropped by 73%, to a level of 27,905 in 55
2007. Because of the cluster of asylum flow control measures being implemented in both the
United Kingdom and European Union during this time period, multiple factors likely contributed
to the downturn in applications. For advocacy groups, however, the introduction of programs
partially aimed at controlling asylum flows raises numerous normative questions about asylum
policy in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Thus, despite the recent reduction in new asylum
applications, tensions surrounding deterrence mechanisms and asylum-seekers remain a catalyst 56
for political and social divisions.
50
Concentration of asylum-seekers in sectors of major urban areas has occurred in a number of European cities. As
such, both Sweden and the Netherlands also have programs for dispersing asylum-seekers into municipalities across the
country. (Vaughan Robinson, “Defining theProblem, in Spreading theBurden?: A Review of Policies to Disperse
Asylum-seekers and Refugees, ed. Vaughan Robinson, Roger Andersson, and Sako Musterd (Bristol, UK: The Policy
Press, 2003), p. 8.)
51 In 1998-99, a total of £475 million was being spent in the United Kingdom on supporting asylum-seekers. Yet,
because of the concentration of the recipients, the support was only being funded by, or channeled through, a few
localities. (Robinson,Defining the ‘Problem,’” p. 8.)
52 Vaughan Robinson et al., Dispersal Policies in the UK ,” in Spreading theBurden’?: A Review of Policies to
Disperse Asylum-seekers and Refugees (Bristol, UK: The Policy Press, 2003), p. 127.
53 Nigel Morris, “Dispersal policyput asylum-seekers at risk, The Independent, March 16, 2007,
[http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/dispersal-policy-put-asylumseekers-at-risk-440442.html].
54 Allen Anie et al., An exploration of factors affecting the successful dispersal of asylum-seekers, Home Office Online
Report (London: United Kingdom Home Office, 2005), p. 3.
55 Piotr Juchno, Asylum applications in the European Union, Statistics in Focus 110, Population and Social
Conditions (August 30, 2007), p. 3.
56 One victory for opponents of deterrence policies came in May 2008 with the government of Australias decision to
offer asylum-seekers permanent sanctuary rather than temporary visas. In 1999, the government had begun issuing
asylum-seekers temporary protection visas, which were good for only three years, if they entered the country without
authorization to apply for sanctuary. Refugees who had applied from abroad were given permanent visas only if their
applications were accepted. (Australia praised for new refugee policy,The Washington Post, May 14, 2008).


Congressional Research Service 16


The Effects of New Asylum-Seeker Policies
The “beggar thy neighbor” policy approach within the European Union has elevated concerns
among numerous observers, causing some advocates and academics to label the EU as “Fortress 57
Europe.” While empirical data do not support the implication that the EU Member States (nor
other OECD countries for that matter) are closing off asylum-seeker inflows entirely, statistics do
indicate that there have been marked inflow level shifts downward in several traditionally larger
receiving countries for asylum-seekers. Asylum-seekers represent the largest inflow population
into OECD countries. Table A-1 in Appendix shows that the inflows of asylum-seekers into
OECD countries has declined in recent years (the table also includes information for EU
countries). In total, the OECD took in 638,539 asylum-seekers in 2001, while in 2005 this
number had been reduced to 319,050, a drop of 50%. The corresponding drop in the worldwide 58
asylum-seeker population was 29%. Although these trends are likely the results of inflow
control policies implemented by the various countries, other factors such as regional stability
cannot be ruled out as causal variables.
Convergence and Increases
Within the OECD, data shows that the larger states have begun converging in the number of
asylum-seeker admissions. The convergence point sits at a lower inflow level than during the
previous decade for most of the countries. In other countries, however, a pattern of increasing
inflows has emerged. Overall, asylum-seeker inflows to the OECD still exceed historical lows
from the past two decades.
Convergence of Asylum-Seeker Inflows
To illustrate the aforementioned convergence pattern, Figure 4 below maps out the asylum-
seekers from 1996 to 2007 of five recipient countries in the OECD with historically large inflow
levels: the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada. From the
illustration, the convergence trend of these five countries becomes evident. While these countries
still vary in their respective annual refugee admissions, the range of these admissions in 1996 was
2.8 times greater than in 2007. This convergence has been driven by both decreases in some
countries and increases in others. For example, the United States’ inflow rate dropped by 35%
from 1995 to 2007. By 2001, Germany and the United Kingdom were each experiencing higher
asylum-seeker inflows than any other OECD Member States. Although the five major recipient
countries included in Figure 4 witnessed fluctuations in their annual inflow levels over the entire
interval, all the countries exhibited a downward trend beginning around 2002. Consequently,
asylum-seeker inflows have been more evenly distributed among major OECD recipient states.
57
For a discussion of the perceived move towards asylum restrictions in Europe, see Andrew Geddes, Immigration and
European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe? (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000).
58 In order to capture the trends of asylum-seeker inflows, Table A-2 in Appendix compiles an index for inflows to
OECD countries. Using 2000 as a baseline year (with an index value of 100), the table shows how inflows have
changed in prior and subsequent years. Of the countries included in the Table 2, 10 experienced higher levels of
asylum-seeker inflows in 2007 compared with 2000 levels, while the other 20 experienced lower levels.


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Figure 4. Convergence of Asylum-Seeker Inflows in Select OECD Countries
Data for 1996-2007
United StatesUnited KingdomGermanyFranceCanada
1 40, 00 0
1 20, 00 0
1 00, 00 0ers
ek
Se
80,000um
syl
60,000f A
s o
ow
40, 00 0Infl
20, 00 0
0
196197 198199 200201202203204205206207
Ye ar
Source: CRS presentation of data from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Statistical Yearbook, 2007: Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions (Geneva: UNHCR, 2008) and International
Migration Outlook: SOPEMI 2007 Edition (Paris: OECD, 2007).
The plotted lines in Figure 4 stem from data presented in Table A-1 of Appendix. These data
indicate that since 1996, the United States has been one of the main recipients of asylum-seeker
inflows among OECD countries. From 2002 to 2007, the U.S. share of OECD asylum-seeker
inflows fluctuated between 13% and 19% annually. This proportion represents an increase from
1999, when the United States received 9% of the OECD asylum-seeker inflows. The proportion
of asylum-seeker inflows in 2007 registered at 17% of the OECD cumulative total. Germany,
France, Canada, and the United Kingdom each received approximately 6-9% of the asylum-
seeker inflows in 2007. During this same time period, other OECD countries accounted for shares
of asylum-seeker inflows that ranged from a low of 26% in 1996 to a high of 51% in 2007.
Escalating Asylum-Seeker Inflows
A development that may be partially attributed to the third-country policies in the European
Union is the significant increase in asylum-seeker inflows in certain smaller Member States.
These countries generally border non-EU states and serve as either land- or sea-based access
points to the EU. Unlike certain OECD states that are geographically prohibitive for refugees to
reach other than by expensive and restrictive air travel (such as Australia, New Zealand, or
Japan), European states are easily accessible by land and sea, making certain countries especially
subject to asylum-seeker inflows and third-country asylum application responsibilities. Figure 5


Congressional Research Service 18


below depicts three of the states that have experienced increases in their asylum-seeker inflows:
Greece, Poland, and Sweden.
Figure 5. Escalating Asylum-Seeker Inflows in Select OECD Countries
Data for 1996-2007
S wed en Greec e Po l a n d
40,000
35,000
30,000
ers
ek
25,000 Se
um
20,000syl
f A
15,000s o
flow
10,000In
5, 0 00
0
19 96 1 997 1 99 8 199 9 200 0 20 01 20 02 2 00 3 2 00 4 200 5 20 06 20 07
Ye ar
Source: CRS presentation of data from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Statistical Yearbook, 2007: Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions (Geneva: UNHCR, 2008) and International
Migration Outlook: SOPEMI 2007 Edition (Paris: OECD, 2007).
As the plots in Figure 5 show, all three countries experienced upward trends in asylum-seeker
inflows from 1996 to 2007. The largest of these increases in absolute terms was the inflow to
Sweden. Its annual inflows numbered less than 6,000 in 1996, but by 2007 this number had
climbed to over 36,000—a more than sixfold increase. The same observation holds true for
Poland and Greece. The inflow rate in Poland increased by over threefold over the same time
period, from a level of 3,211 in 1996 to an inflow of 10,047 in 2007. Greece had the highest
relative increase of the three countries, increasing over 15-fold, from 1,643 asylum-seekers in
1996 to 25,113 in 2007. Several other European “portal countries” have also witnessed increases
over the same span, although most did not exhibit similar sized shifts in their relative inflow rates.
Asylum Decisions
In countries with relatively high inflow levels of asylum-seekers, anti-immigrant groups have
criticized their respective governments for being “too permissive” in their admissions policies—a
factor that is in some cases cited as attracting more asylum-seekers. In response, governments
have focused their efforts on reducing incentives for asylum-seekers with respect to public


Congressional Research Service 19


benefits, as those discussed above. Yet, for some critics the question remains whether higher rates
of positive asylum decisions could create higher asylum-seeker inflows (a causal relationship that
could lend credence to the assumption of informed asylum-seekers conducting rationalized
“asylum shopping”). If such a relationship did exist, one would reasonably expect that the
countries with higher positive decision rates should demonstrate higher asylum-seeker inflow
rates.
The average annual rate of positive decisions for asylum applications where a decision was taken
(shown in Figure 6) indicates a markedly large range between OECD countries from 2004 to 59
2007. On the one hand, Turkey had an annual positive decision rate of roughly 78%, the highest
of all OECD countries. By contrast, Greece granted positive asylum decisions in 1% of cases
where a decision was taken. This disparity in the decision rate occurred despite the inflows of
thousands of asylum-seekers annually to each country. In the United States, the average positive
decision rate for 2004-2007 was higher than the majority of OECD countries. The OECD average
for this time period was 28%, 7% below that of the United States. Moreover, these figures do not
account for the additional number of asylum-seekers that are granted asylum on appeal.
The main analytical conclusion that may be drawn from Figure 6 is that the positive decision data
demonstrate almost no relation to the inflow levels of asylum-seekers during the given time
period. For example, in spite of different trends shown in Figure 4 from Figure 5, Canada and
Poland have similar average positive asylum decision rates. Greece has one of the highest rates of
increase in asylum-seeker inflows in the OECD from 2004 to 2007, while simultaneously
accounting for the lowest positive decision rate. Statistical analysis performed by CRS confirms 60
these visual observations. Therefore, while so-called “asylum shopping” might occur based on
the public benefits a country offers, the evidence suggests that the recent rates of positive asylum
decisions have been of little consequence for such behavior on asylum-seeker inflow levels in
general. More likely, the driving factors behind asylum-seekers are the accessibility of a country,
cultural and linguistic ties, the existence of a diaspora or family members, and similar
considerations.
59
In many countries, an initial rejection of an asylum application can be appealed or granted some form of
administrative review. The statistical figures on positive decisions in this report do not include administrative review
data or rates on appeals.
60 A simple Pearson Correlation of average rate of positive decisions to average inflow level of asylum-seekers was .05
for 2004-2007, meaning there was virtually no statistical correlation between these two measures. In other words, a
change in the positive decision rate showed effectively no relationship to any changes in inflows. In statistics, a
correlation indicates the strength and direction of a linear relationship between two random variables. The Pearson
Correlation represents one way to calculate this relationship. The correlation is 1 in the case of an increasing linear
relationship, -1 in the case of a decreasing linear relationship, and some value in between in all other cases. These
values indicate the degree of linear dependence between the variables. The closer the coefficient is to either -1 or 1, the
stronger the correlation between the variables. In the cases where the variables are independent then the correlation is 0.


Congressional Research Service 20


Figure 6. Average Annual Percentage of Positive Decisions for All Asylum-Seeker Cases Where a Decision is Taken, by OECD
Country
Average is for 2004-2007
90%
78%80%
70%o n s
si
60% Deci
%u m
52 51% 50% 49% %syl
49 48%50%
iki/CRS-R4011746%%tive A
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28 28% 2730%t a g
://wiki 24% 24% 23%
http 21% 20% 19% 18%20%e r cen
16% 15% 14%P
12% 11%
8%10%
4% 3%
1%0%
ey Italy and tria land and way g xico es * o t a l ium lia* r e a and * e y ark any n and i c and akia e
rk inl s anada er ol lands r bour e t at lg rtugal tra o eden ranc nm apan* rm Spai rel el ov reec
TuFAuCitzPherNoemMCD TBePous of KSw ZealingdomFHungareJeIepublIcSlG
tted SEAicwDGh R
SwNeLuxONeted Kec
Uni epubl n i C z
R U


CRS-21


Source: CRS presentation of data from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Statistical Yearbook, 2007: Trends in Displacement, Protection and
Solutions (Geneva: UNHCR, 2007), as well as previous annual editions.
Note: The population of cases includes all types of cases reported to UNHCR, such as first instance cases, administrative review, and judicial review. In countries with
more than one level in the procedure (first instance, appeal, etc.), the figures for both procedures have been added up. As a result, appeal cases might have been counted
more than once (once at first instance and once on appeal). These data allow analysts to monitor the number of positive decisions taken, but they are not indicative of the
final outcome of the procedure for negative decisions. The decisions taken in these cases may include (1) recognition under the 1951 Convention, (2) a complementary
form of protection, or (3) a rejection. The positive decision percentage is calculated by adding the 1951 Convention recognition decisions and the complementary
protection decision, and subsequently dividing this sum by the total number of decisions taken. Cases that are pending, withdrawn or otherwise closed are not included in
the calculations.
* Country data refers to number of cases or mix of persons and cases.


iki/CRS-R40117
g/w
s.or
leak
://wiki
http
CRS-22


Sanctuary Capacity and Contributions of OECD
Countries
The preceding data analysis has largely been based on inflow levels. While such analysis is both
informative and valid in an overview of capacity for and contributions towards these populations,
it does not fully address the relative costs that countries experience from such inflows. Employing
additional economic and demographic indicators would provide a fuller view of refugee inflows
in OECD Member States. Therefore, this section attempts to place these inflows into a
comparative context that emphasizes the relative burden of refugee populations in terms of
economic costs and population size.
One approach to contextualizing inflows in OECD countries is to analyze a country’s existing
refugee population relative to the size of the national income and productivity. The map shown in 61
Figure 7 shows these data and uses gross domestic product (GDP) adjusted for purchasing 62
power parity (PPP) to account for a given country’s potential, relative financial burden.
Specifically, Figure 7 maps out the average number of refugees per $1 GDP (PPP) per capita
from 2002 to 2006, thereby adjusting national income to both exchange rates and the size of the
population. This measure makes no assumption about the long-term net cost/benefit of refugee
because such factors are entirely dependent on how economically integrated into the host country
this population becomes.
The map in Figure 7 demonstrates that when placed in the context of national income, the United
States has taken on a larger refugee hosting burden than almost every other OECD country. Only
Germany, with 26.3 refugees per $1 GDP (PPP) per capita, had a higher relative burden than the
United States (10.9). On a worldwide basis, both the United States and Germany ranked in the top
35 for this same measure. Moreover, the map shows that the majority of OECD countries had an
average population of one refugee per $1 GDP (PPP) per capita or less. Consequently, the United
States had an average burden at least 11 times greater than most OECD countries for the 2002-
2006 time period relative to national income. The lowest-ranked country in the OECD for this
measure was Iceland, which had over 100 times fewer refugees than the United States relative to
national income.
61
The gross domestic product (GDP) is one of the measures of national income and output for a given countrys
economy. GDP is defined as the total market value of all final goods and services produced within the country in a
given period of time (usually a calendar year).
62 Purchasing power parity (PPP) is an economic technique used when attempting to determine the relative values of
two currencies. It is useful because often the amount of goods a currency can purchase within two nations varies
drastically, based on availability of goods, demand for the goods, and a number of other, difficult to determine factors.
Purchasing power parity solves this problem by taking some international measure and determining the cost for that
measure in each of the two currencies, then comparing that amount. In terms of the cost of country-based activities,
using PPP allows for a more accurate comparison by adjusting for some factors that affect cost variations. Thus, PPP
gives a more accurate measure of a countrys “ability to pay.


Congressional Research Service 23


Figure 7. Cumulative Refugee Population to GDP (PPP) Per Capita
Average Population for 2002-2006
iki/CRS-R40117
g/w
s.or
leak
://wiki
http
Source: CRS presentation of data from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Statistical Yearbook, 2006: Trends in Displacement, Protection and
Solutions (Geneva: UNHCR, 2007).


CRS-24


Another way to contextualize burden sharing worldwide is to consider a given country’s existing
population. Such an approach removes economic conditions and considers refugees in terms of
the number of residents in a country. This measure serves as one type of indicator for the
demographic impact of refugee inflows. Depicted in Figure 8 is a world map showing the 2002-
2006 average cumulative number of refugees to every 1,000 inhabitants in each country. Unlike
the measure for national income, the United States—with 1.7 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants—
figured more toward the median of OECD countries for this demographic measure. Overall, the th
ratio for the United States was lower than that of 14 other OECD countries and ranked 56
worldwide. The highest ratios among OECD countries were for Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and th
Norway. Sweden’s ratio ranked 11 worldwide. Thus, the top 10 hosting countries for refugees 63
per 1,000 inhabitants worldwide were all outside the OECD. A plurality of OECD countries 64
averaged 1.0 or fewer refugees per 1,000 inhabitants from 2002 to 2006.
63
The top ten countries for this measure were: Armenia (70.9), Djibouti (35.6), Serbia and Montenegro (21.6), Congo
(21.1), Chad (20.2), Jordan (17.1), Zambia (16.1), Tanzania (15.9), Iran (15.4), and Guinea (12.4).
64 A third way to measure the hosting contribution of countries is to measure the refugee population relative to the
geographic area. This ratio can be useful to highlight the potential population density burden of additional inflows on
smaller countries. However, as an indicator, this ratio becomes problematic because of the built-assumptions that are
not adjusted for. For example, a country such as Canada may have large areas of land and a low aggregate population
density, but much of the area is either undeveloped or uninhabitable. Similarly, such large countries may have areas
which are protected from development. Thus, without any adjustments, conclusions drawn from this measure could
bias results to be lower for countries with large areas of land but fewer effectively inhabitable areas.


Congressional Research Service 25


Figure 8. Cumulative Refugee Population to 1,000 Inhabitants
Average Population for 2002-2006
iki/CRS-R40117
g/w
s.or
leak
://wiki
http
Source: CRS presentation of data from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Statistical Yearbook, 2006: Trends in Displacement, Protection and
Solutions (Geneva: UNHCR, 2007).


CRS-26


Overall, refugees constitute the costliest recipients of public benefits on a per person basis in the
United States. Yet, as advocates will note, the costs either presented or implied in the figures
above do not convey the benefits of hosting refugee (or asylum-seeker) populations. Many
benefits cannot be quantified in monetary terms, but nonetheless have affected host countries
enormously. In the United States, for example, refugee populations frequently contribute to
multicultural diversity and global awareness in the population. Moreover, some refugees that
chose to remain have become successful entrepreneurs and strong contributors to economic
development. Historically, recipient countries have benefitted from the human capital that refugee
populations have represented by using that human capital for intellectual and technological
advancement. In this regard, notable refugees to the United States include Nobel Prize winner and
scientist Albert Einstein and former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. While costs of refugee
resettlement and asylum-seeker programs are necessary considerations for any government, these
costs must also be weighed against the many contributions to the political, economic, cultural,
and religious life that these populations make in OECD countries.
Conclusion
The findings of this report indicate that currently the United States resettles more refugees and
has a higher inflow rate of asylum-seekers than any other OECD country, despite having
numerous deterrence mechanisms in place. Additionally, the rate of positive asylum decisions
(when a decision is taken) is above the OECD average. But the data also indicate that there are
millions of refugees and other populations of concern worldwide, and in recent years these
populations have grown. And with the worldwide economic downturn occurring, these
populations are likely to increase. Yet, the United States is also being severely impacted by the
economic downturn, and the demand for government assistance is growing. Thus, balancing the
availability of resources against the demand for refugee assistance will likely continue.


Congressional Research Service 27


Appendix. Asylum-Seeker Flows
Table A-1. Inflows of Asylum-Seekers into OECD and EU Countries
Data for 1996-2007
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Australia 9,758 9,312 8,156 9,451 13,065 12,366 5,863 4,295 3,201 3,204 3,515 3,980
Austria 6,991 6,719 13,805 20,096 18,284 30,135 39,354 32,359 24,634 22,461 13,349 11,921
Belgium 12,433 11,788 21,965 35,780 42,691 24,549 18,805 16,940 15,357 15,957 11,587 11,115
Bulgaria 302 429 833 1,331 1,755 2,428 2,888 1,549 1,127 822 639 975
Canada 26,120 22,584 23,838 29,393 34,252 44,038 39,498 31,937 25,750 20,786 22,868 27,865
Czech Rep. 2,211 2,109 4,085 7,220 8,788 18,094 8,484 11,396 5,459 4,160 3,016 1,878
Denmark 5,893 5,092 9,370 12,331 12,200 12,512 6,068 4,593 3,235 2,260 1,918 1,852
iki/CRS-R40117Estonia 0 0 23 21 3 12 9 14 14 11 7 14
g/w
s.orFinland 711 973 1,272 3,106 3,170 1,651 3,443 3,221 3,861 3,574 2,331 1,434
leakFrance 17,405 21,416 22,375 30,907 38,747 54,291 58,971 59,768 58,545 49,733 30,748 29,387
://wikiGermany 116,367 104,353 98,644 95,113 78,564 88,287 71,127 50,563 35,607 28,914 21,029 19,164
httpGreece 1,643 4,376 2,953 1,528 3,083 5,499 5,664 8,178 4,469 9,050 12,267 25,113
Hungary 152 209 7,097 11,499 7,801 9,554 6,412 2,401 1,600 1,609 2,117 3,425
Iceland 4 6 19 17 24 52 117 80 76 88 39 42
Ireland 1,179 3,883 4,626 7,724 10,938 10,325 11,634 7,900 4,769 4,324 4,314 3,988
Italy 675 1,858 11,122 33,364 15,564 9,620 16,015 13,455 9,722 9,548 10,348 14,053
Japan 147 242 133 223 216 353 250 336 426 384 954 816
Korea 1 44 17 4 43 39 37 86 145 412 278 717
Latvia 0 0 58 19 4 14 30 5 7 20 8 34
Lithuania 0 320 163 133 199 256 294 183 167 118 139 125
Luxembourg 263 431 1,709 2,921 621 687 1,043 1,549 1,577 802 523 426
Mexico 158 145 125 252 277 415 257 275 404 687 480 374


CRS-28


Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Netherlands 22,170 34,443 45,217 42,733 43,895 32,579 18,667 13,402 9,782 12,347 14,465 7,102
New Zealand 1,317 1,495 1,972 1,528 1,551 1,601 997 841 580 348 276 245
Norway 1,778 2,271 8,373 10,160 10,842 14,782 17,480 15,959 7,945 5,402 5,320 6,528
Poland 3,211 3,533 3,373 2,955 4,589 4,529 5,170 6,909 8,079 6,860 4,430 10,047
Portugal 270 297 365 307 224 234 245 88 113 114 128 224
Romania 588 1,425 1,236 1,670 1,366 2,431 1,151 1,077 662 594 460 659
Slovak Rep. 415 645 506 1,320 1,556 8,151 9,700 10,358 11,391 3,549 2,871 2,643
Spain 4,730 4,975 6,654 8,405 7,926 9,489 6,309 5,918 5,535 5,254 5,297 7,662
Sweden 5,753 9,662 12,844 11,231 16,303 23,515 33,016 31,348 23,161 17,530 24,317 36,370
Switzerland 18,001 23,982 41,302 46,068 17,611 20,633 26,125 20,806 14,248 10,061 10,537 10,387
Turkey 4,183 5,053 6,838 6,606 5,685 5,041 3,795 3,952 3,908 3,921 4,553 7,646
iki/CRS-R40117United 37,000 41,500 58,500 91,200 98,900 91,600 103,080 60,050 40,620 30,840 28,320 27,905
g/wKingdom
s.orOECD (non-300,939 323,396 417,255 523,442 497,410 534,621 517,626 418,963 324,199 274,179 242,195 274,309
leakU.S.)
://wikiEU-25, Norway and 259,251 284,835 376,401 476,141 442,503 470,998 467,145 377,363 289,897 244,498 209,386 232,797
httpSwitzerland
United a84,293 85,239 72,080 54,820 51,898 61,880 74,654 67,268 57,672 53,160 55,654 54,957
States
INS/USCIS 42,416 34,602 43,836 55,138 47,221 39,120 36,095 37,747 39,629
EOIR 12,404 17,296 18,044 19,516 20,047 18,552 17,065 17,907 15,328
Source: CRS presentation of data from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Statistical Yearbook, 2007: Trends in Displacement, Protection and
Solutions (Geneva: UNHCR, 2008).
a. The data listed is on the number of cases received and are for fiscal years rather than calendar years. The data come from U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office
of Immigration Review, Statistical Yearbook, for FY2004 and FY2007. The INS/USCIS data are for “affirmative” applications received by the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services and formerly by the Immigration and Naturalization Services, and the EOIR data are for defensive applications received by the Executive Office of
Immigration Review. Data on affirmative and defensive applications are only published for applications received for FY1999-FY2007. The data do not included the
handful of cases that were listed each fiscal year asunknown in terms of being affirmative or defensive.


CRS-29


Table A-2. Index of Refugee and Asylum-Seeker Inflows into OECD and EU Countries
Data for 1996-2007
Index: Year 2000 = 100
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Australia 75 71 62 72 100 95 45 33 25 25 27 30
Austria 38 37 76 110 100 165 215 177 135 123 73 65
Belgium 29 28 51 84 100 58 44 40 36 37 27 26
Bulgaria 17 24 47 76 100 138 165 88 64 47 36 56
Canada 76 66 70 86 100 129 115 93 75 61 67 81
Czech Rep. 25 24 46 82 100 206 97 130 62 47 34 21
Denmark 48 42 77 101 100 103 50 38 27 19 16 15
Estonia 0 0 767 700 100 400 300 467 467 367 233 467
iki/CRS-R40117Finland 22 31 40 98 100 52 109 102 122 113 74 45
g/wFrance 45 55 58 80 100 140 152 154 151 128 79 76
s.or
leakGermany 148 133 126 121 100 112 91 64 45 37 27 24
Greece 53 142 96 50 100 178 184 265 145 294 398 815
://wiki
httpHungary 2 3 91 147 100 122 82 31 21 21 27 44
Iceland 17 25 79 71 100 217 488 333 317 367 163 175
Ireland 11 36 42 71 100 94 106 72 44 40 39 36
Italy 4 12 71 214 100 62 103 86 62 61 66 90
Japan 68 112 62 103 100 163 116 156 197 178 442 378
Korea 2 102 40 9 100 91 86 200 337 958 647 1667
Latvia 0 0 1450 475 100 350 750 125 175 500 200 850
Lithuania 0 161 82 67 100 129 148 92 84 59 70 63
Luxembourg 42 69 275 470 100 111 168 249 254 129 84 69
Mexico 57 52 45 91 100 150 93 99 146 248 173 135
Netherlands 51 78 103 97 100 74 43 31 22 28 33 16
New Zealand 85 96 127 99 100 103 64 54 37 22 18 16


CRS-30


Index: Year 2000 = 100
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Norway 16 21 77 94 100 136 161 147 73 50 49 60
Poland 70 77 74 64 100 99 113 151 176 149 97 219
Portugal 121 133 163 137 100 104 109 39 50 51 57 100
Romania 43 104 90 122 100 178 84 79 48 43 34 48
Slovak Rep. 27 41 33 85 100 524 623 666 732 228 185 170
Spain 60 63 84 106 100 120 80 75 70 66 67 97
Sweden 35 59 79 69 100 144 203 192 142 108 149 223
Switzerland 102 136 235 262 100 117 148 118 81 57 60 59
Turkey 74 89 120 116 100 89 67 70 69 69 80 134
United Kingdom 37 42 59 92 100 93 104 61 41 31 29 28
iki/CRS-R40117OECD (non-U.S.) 61 65 84 105 100 107 104 84 65 55 49 55
g/wEU-25, Norway 59 64 85 108 100 106 106 85 66 55 47 53
s.orand Switzerland
leak
United Statesa 162 164 139 106 100 119 144 130 111 102 107 106
://wikiINS/USCIS 0 0 0 123 100 127 159 136 113 104 109 115
httpEOIR 0 0 0 72 100 104 113 116 107 99 104 89
Source: CRS presentation of analysis based upon data from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Statistical Yearbook, 2007: Trends in
Displacement, Protection and Solutions (Geneva: UNHCR, 2008).
a. The data used for analysis is on the number of cases received and are for fiscal years rather than calendar years. The data come from U.S. Department of Justice,
Executive Office of Immigration Review, Statistical Yearbook, for FY2004 and FY2007. The INS/USCIS data are foraffirmative applications received by the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services and formerly by the Immigration and Naturalization Services, and the EOIR data are for defensive applications received by the
Executive Office of Immigration Review. Data on affirmative and defensive applications are only published for applications received for FY1999-FY2007. The data do
not included the handful of cases that were listed each fiscal year asunknown in terms of being affirmative or defensive.


CRS-31



Author Contact Information
Chad C. Haddal
Analyst in Immigration Policy
chaddal@crs.loc.gov, 7-3701


Congressional Research Service 32