DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986: PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING THE JOINT OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
CRS Report for Congress
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986: Proposals for Reforming the Joint Officer
Personnel Management Program
July 18, 2000
Katherine Lemay Brown
National Defense Fellow
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization Act of 1986:
Proposals for Reforming the Joint Officer Personnel
Management Program
Summary
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of
1986, commonly called the Goldwater-Nichols Act, is considered landmark legislation
as it reorganized the Department of Defense (DoD) to a more unified military
structure. Joint personnel officer management (organizing, directing, educating and
evaluating military members of two or more military departments to accomplish an
assigned mission) was established as a major aspect of GNA’s design to improve
war-fighting capabilities. The objective was to improve the quality of officers
assigned to joint organizations, increase educational and experience levels of these
officers, and expand the interaction among the military services’ officers corps by
addressing inter-service issues.
While many experts believe the GNA has been a success, the passage of time, the
constraining provisions of the law, and some implementation issues have led some to
believe the GNA joint officer personnel management program could benefit from
reexamination and possible revision. Indeed, the original framers of the GNA
predicted that change would be necessary as the DoD evolved into a more joint-
oriented military force. Reinforcing this view, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff has indicated a need for joint officer personnel management change.
A major problem is that the current provisions of the law for joint officer
personnel management are so specific that the DoD predicts it can not continue to
meet the requirements. This is in part because the DoD has drawn down its military
personnel strength by nearly 40% while operational requirements have increased.
Further, the law does not allow all officers to be credited with all their joint
experience. And, technological advances in distributive and distance learning can not
be utilized to fulfill joint education requirements for the officers assigned to these
positions.
This report covers the background and intent of the GNA, as well as the present
joint officer personnel management program. The DoD has proposed options for its
revision, to Congress; they include replacing the joint specialty officer designation
with a special duty identifier, decoupling promotion comparisons, and employing
distributive and distance learning for joint professional military education. The Senate
version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, S. 2549,
introduced language concerning joint officer personnel management which is
consistent with the DoD proposal, with two exceptions. The first difference is noted
in the area of promotion comparisons and the second is in Joint Professional Military
Education. Other potential options include forming a commission or special
committee, conducting hearings, or mandating a study to further assess the program.
Changes to joint officer personnel management would require legislative changes to
the GNA.
Contents
Introduction and Background......................................1
Introduction ................................................ 1
Background on the GNA......................................2
Joint Officer Personnel Management Under the GNA....................5
Specific GNA Joint Officer Personnel Management Directives..........5
Understanding Joint Officer Personnel Management in Relation to the GNA...8
Joint Duty Assignment Listing (JDAL), Joint Specialty Officer (JSO)
and Critical Occupational Specialty (COS).....................8
Joint Duty Assignment Listing (JDAL)........................8
Joint Specialty Officer (JSO)...............................9
Critical Occupational Specialty (COS)........................9
Assignments and Joint Tour Lengths............................12
Promotions ...............................................12
Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).....................14
Joint Waivers..............................................16
Reserve Officer Personnel Management..........................16
DoD Compliance Reports to Congress..............................17
Unintended Developments of the GNA for Joint Officer Personnel
Management .............................................. 18
Joint Specialty Officers......................................18
Career Management.....................................18
Promotions ............................................... 20
Critical Occupational Specialty.................................21
Careerism ................................................ 21
The Current DoD View..........................................22
Legislation in the 106th Congress, Second Session.....................27
Options for Congress............................................28
Options for Congressional Action..............................28
Continue the Status Quo.................................28
Adjust the GNA........................................28
Pursue Other Options: Commission, Hearing, Special Committee,
Study ............................................ 30
The GNA in Relation to the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act.....30
Appendix A: Historical Timeline...................................31
Appendix B: Abbreviation/Acronyms...............................34
Appendix C: Definitions.........................................35
Appendix D: DoD Compliance with the GNA.........................38
Appendix E: For Additional Reading/Bibliography.....................46
Books ................................................... 46
Journals/Articles/On-line Sources/Other..........................48
List of Figures
Figure 1. Typical Officer Career Path................................19
List of Tables
Table 1. Joint Duty Position Distribution by Service .....................9
Table 2. Critical Occupational Specialties............................10
Table 3. Summary of Joint Specialty Officers (JSO).....................17
Table 4. Summary of Critical Positions..............................38
Table 5. Average Length of Tour of Duty in Joint Duty Assignments.......39
Table 6. GO/FO Joint Equivalency Waivers..........................39
Table 7. Summary of COS Officers.................................40
Table 8. JSO with COS Who Are Serving in Second Joint Assignment......41
Table 9. Army Promotion Comparisons.............................41
Table 10. Air Force Promotion Comparisons.........................42
Table 11. Marine Corps Promotion Comparisons......................44
Table 12. Navy Promotion Comparisons.............................45
Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization
Act of 1986: Proposals for Reforming the Joint
Officer Personnel Management Program
Introduction and Background
Introduction
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
(GNA),1 also called the Goldwater-Nichols Act, changed the Department of Defense
(DoD) joint officer personnel management, setting in law a course for more
interaction among the U.S. military services. Prior to the enactment of the law, each
service existed independently of, and in relative isolation to, the other services; they
were not “joint”2 oriented. Training, missions, equipment, etc., tended to be “service-
specific”, thereby limiting service interoperability and joint operations. The GNA
brought the services closer and most experts believe that this has resulted in more
coordinated military operations, and increased the war fighting capabilities of the
DoD.3 However, over time a number of factors, such as changes in the strategic
environment, the implementation of the specific provisions of the law, and the nearly
40% downsizing of military personnel strength, have changed, and, in the view of
many experts, may have made revisiting the GNA necessary. One aspect of the GNA
which some, including General Hugh Shelton, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
have singled out specifically is joint officer personnel management. Any changes
would be subject to congressional oversight.
Due to the complexity of joint officer personnel management, this report is
divided into eight primary sections: (1) the background section provides a description
1 Public Law 99-433, October 1, 1986; 100 Stat. 992, et. seq.
2 The law, PL 99-433, section 668, does not define “joint”. However, it defines “joint
matters” as matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces,
including matters relating to (1) national military strategy; (2) strategic planning and
contingency planning; and, (3) command and control of combat operations under unified
command. The DoD Dictionary of Military Terms defines joint as activities, operations,
organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more military departments participate. (for
additional DoD joint definitions see the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms,
[http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/]). Throughout this report “joint duty, jointness, joint
assignments” and like references apply to officers who are assigned or who have previously
been assigned to a joint duty assignment in the Joint Staff, joint agencies or other joint
activities. See Appendix B for abbreviations/acronyms; Appendix C for definitions.
3 The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective. Edited by
Dennis J. Quinn. Washington DC, National Defense University Press, 1999.
of the situations that preceded the GNA and the provisions of the law, (2) the “joint
officer personnel management under the GNA” section examines officer personnel
management provisions and administrative changes of the law, (3) this section,
understanding joint officer personnel management in relation to the GNA, describes
specific terms and concepts of joint officer personnel management in relation to the
law, (4) the DoD compliance reports to Congress section examines the current
compliance by the DoD and a shortfall in reporting requirements, (5) unintended
developments of the GNA are reviewed, (6) this section outlines the DoD proposal,
which was submitted in the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omnibus in early 2000,
to address perceived problems with the GNA, (7) the section on Legislation in the
106th Congress, 2nd Session, examines the differences in the DoD proposal and the
proposed legislation, and (8) finally, some congressional options are addressed in the
last section.
This report does not provide a general discussion of overall officer personnel
management issues outside the boundaries of the GNA, particularly those governed
by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA).4 Broader aspects of
DOPMA, which established the basic parameters of overall officer personnel
management for the U.S. armed forces and not joint management, are briefly analyzed
at the end of this report to clarify some specific joint officer personnel management
points.
Background on the GNA
An Act to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority
in the Department of Defense, to improve the military advice provided to the
President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, to place
clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant
commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and
ensure that the authority of those commanders is fully commensurate with that
responsibility, to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to
contingency planning, to provide for more efficient use of defense resources, to
improve joint officer management policies, otherwise to enhance the effectiveness
of military operations and improve the management and administration of the
Department of Defense, and for other purposes.
- Opening Statement, Goldwater-Nichols Department
of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
Congressional authority over the organization of the military establishment, with
regard to the rules and regulations of the land and naval forces, is found in the
Constitution of the United States (art 1, sec 8). After World War II, the Cabinet-level
Departments of War and Navy, and a newly independent Department of the Air
Force, were brought under considerable central control of a new Department of
Defense, via the National Security Act of 1947, and the 1949 Amendments to the
military departments, independently administered, yet unified in effort and subject to
a more centralized supervision under the Secretary of Defense. However, the Act
allowed the services to maintain their respective identities and missions. Indeed, some
4 Public Law 96-513, December 12, 1980; 94 Stat 2835, et. seq.
have noted that this structure encouraged the services to compete for limited
resources. In some cases, such competition encouraged independence and self-
sufficiency, and in others discouraged interoperability or mutual support.
The DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 increased the subordination of the military
departments to the central authority of the Secretary of Defense. The 1958 Act also
clarified that the military departments were to be separately organized versus
separately administered, continuing a trend of steadily reducing the independence of
the military departments. This amendment also established the chain of command
from the President, through the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to
the unified/specified commands which controlled the operational forces of the DoD
around the world.
From 1958 until the early 1980s, there was little relevant congressional action
concerning the organization of the DoD. Then, as a result of interoperability
problems and shortcomings during significant military operations – the 1980 Iran
hostage rescue attempt, the 1982 destruction of the U.S. Embassy and Marine
Barracks in Beirut, and the 1983 invasion of Grenada – the need for defense
reorganization became apparent. Experts highlighted the lack of cross-service
communications, interoperability and imbalances in service/joint,
centralization/decentralization, functional/geographic, and specialist/generalist
tensions as inherit shortcomings of the pre-GNA structure.
The services had evolved with their own unique identities, missions,
languages/jargons, personnel systems, etc. There were real concerns and some
evidence that senior military leaders lacked an understanding and appreciation of joint
operations as well as the other services’ capabilities. The services did not value joint
operations or staffs – they had no desire to “waste” their most talented officers in a
joint assignment. Officers were rewarded and promoted for working within their
respective services. Assignments outside the service, while necessary, were often
shunned and viewed as “career ending” tours. To some extent, specific service
practices seemed almost foreign to members of the other services.
The senior uniformed leadership of the services was virtually unanimous in
opposing the GNA and arguing that the then - current joint operational architecture
needed major fixing. One conspicuous dissenter from this mind-set, however, was
General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), who appeared
before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on February 3, 1982 and
testified that, “It is not sufficient to have just resources, dollars, and weapon systems;
we must also have an organization which will allow us to develop the proper strategy,
necessary planning and the full war-fighting capability....We do not have an adequate
organizational structure today.”5 His call for defense reform set into motion four
years and 241 days of discussions and debates resulting in the passage of the GNA.6
The effect was to move away from the service chiefs responding first and foremost
to service-specific parochial interests and to move toward a more centralized
5 The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective. p. 13.
6 See Appendix A for a Historical Timeline detailing defense reorganization.
decision-making structure involving greater mutual support and interoperability
among the services.
The GNA passed by Congress in 1986 contained the following objectives:
!Enhance civilian authority within DoD by increasing the Secretary’s
authority and control over program planning and contingency
planning.
!Improve the military advice provided to the President, the National
Security Council and the Secretary of Defense by vesting the duties
and staff resources of the entire body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) in the CJCS, and creating a Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (VCJCS) to assist the newly empowered CJCS with his
duties.
!Ensure the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified
commanders-in-chief (CINCs) is fully commensurate with the
responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of
assigned missions, by giving them command authority along with the
right to convene courts martial.
!Provide more efficient use of defense resources by requiring the
CJCS to solicit budgetary requirements from the CINCs, to evaluate
the requirements and to establish prioritization of the requirements.
The VCJCS was given the lead of oversight – chairing the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).7 Furthermore, the CJCS
was charged with establishing a uniform system for evaluating the
readiness of each CINC to meet mission requirements.
!Improve joint officer management policies. The GNA specifically
addresses the policies, procedures and practices for the management
of active duty officers in relation to joint duty. (This report deals in
depth with this area.)
The main objective of the GNA was to enhance jointness8 without damaging the
positive aspects of the services’ identities. The idea was to pull the best service
aspects into integrated operations both “in the field” and at the headquarters level.
Joint officer personnel management was a significant aspect utilized to facilitate the
7 Formed in 1984, renamed the JROC in 1986, it is comprised of the Services’ Vice Chiefs
of Staff and operates as a clearinghouse of information for independent service weapons. The
JROC accounts for the CINC’s warfighting needs and seeks to accommodate the CINC’s
requirements and the services’ financial constraints to attain the best balance for DoD. In
addition, they review future weapons systems in relation to joint warfighting potentials. (For
additional information, see CRS Report 97-346F, Defense Budget: Role of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, March 12, 1997)
8 Jointness - a unified direction of the armed forces governed by joint doctrine and policies
for the employment of multi-service military forces and the efficient use of defense resources.
integration and to add support for the general effort to ensure a higher level of joint
interaction.
Joint Officer Personnel Management Under the GNA
Joint officer personnel management was designed to improve the quality of
officers assigned to joint positions, to increase both educational and experience levels
of the assigned officers, and to expand jointness of officers via increased exposure to9
joint matters. The GNA established the joint specialty officer (JSO) and the critical
occupational specialty (COS),10 defined the specific educational and experience11
requirements for an officer to be designated as a JSO, requested a career path for
such an officer, and set promotion objectives for officers assigned to joint duty. The
GNA contained specific requirements to ensure the quality of the officers assigned to
joint duty was equivalent to the quality of the officers assigned to the specific service
headquarters. The GNA also set specifically defined joint duty tour lengths and
established a minimum requirement of one joint duty assignment (JDA) for all officers
promoted to general officer/Navy flag officer (GO/FO).
Specific GNA Joint Officer Personnel Management Directives
The joint officer personnel management directives of the GNA are listed below:12
!Establish a joint specialty occupational category (designation) for the
management of officers specifically trained in and oriented toward
joint matters. This applies to field grade officers – pay grades 0-4,
0-5, 0-6 or rank of major, lieutenant colonel and colonel/Navy
lieutenant commander, commander and captain. The GNA also sets
some joint duty requirements for promotion to brigadier
general/Navy rear admiral (lower half).
9 Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) - an officer who is specifically trained in and oriented toward
joint matters; eligibility includes completion of Joint Professional Military Education, and
completion of a full Joint Duty Assignment, in order. There are four basic methods for the
services to produce JSOs/JSO-nominees: (a) The officer attends JPME, serves a joint tour
as a JSO-nominee, and is eventually designated a JSO. The majority of officers adhere to this
method. (b) A critical occupational specialty (COS) (see note 7) officer can serve a joint tour
and then complete joint professional military education (JPME). (c) A COS officer can serve
a joint tour, additional tours, and then complete JPME (SecDef waiver required for JSO
status). (d) An officer can complete two joint tours without attending JPME (SecDef waiver
required for JSO status).
10 Critical Occupational Specialty (COS) - a joint military occupational specialty officer from
among the combat arms of the military departments; specialties engaged in the operational art
to attain strategic goals in a theatre of conflict through the design, organization, and conduct
of campaigns and major operations.
11 Members of the active duty armed services are eligible for retirement following the
completion of 20 years of honorable service.
12 Public Law 99-443, Sec 401.
!JSOs will be selected by the Secretary of Defense from nominations
submitted by the secretaries of the military departments.
!An officer cannot be selected as a JSO until a defined program of
joint professional military education (JPME) and a full joint tour are
completed (exception: can be a JSO after two full JDAs without
JPME).
!Requires that at least 50% of JDAs be filled by officers nominated for
or selected as JSOs.
!Directed the Secretary of Defense to designate a set number of joint
military positions as critical joint duty assignments which must
always be filled by JSOs.
!Requires the Secretary of Defense to establish career guidelines for
JSOs.
!Prescribes specific tour lengths required for consideration of a full
joint tour of duty.
!Precludes the inclusion of joint training assignments and assignments
within a specific military department to be included as a JDA.
!Establishes promotion board processes:
!Requires the Secretary of Defense to provide the secretaries of
the military departments guidelines to ensure appropriate
consideration is given to joint duty performance by all
promotion boards.
!Directs the CJCS to review all promotion board reports before
they are forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.
!Authorizes the secretaries of the military departments to return
the promotion board report to the board/convene a special
promotion board if it is determinated that board did not act in
accordance with the Secretary of Defense guidance concerning
joint duty performance.
!Directs the Secretary of Defense to act on any unresolved
disagreements concerning promotions between the secretaries
of the military departments and the CJCS.
!Requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure the quality of the
officers assigned to joint duty are such that specific promotion rates
are comparable to like service promotion rates.
!Requires that an officer cannot be promoted to GO/FO unless the
officer has served in a JDA.
!Requires that all officers promoted to GO/FO rank must attend a
specific GO/FO joint educational course known as CAPSTONE. 13
!Requires the CJCS to evaluate the joint duty performance of all
officers recommended for the GO/FO grades of 0-9 and O-10
(lieutenant general/Navy vice admiral and general/Navy admiral).
!Requires the Secretary of Defense to advise the president of the
specific joint qualifications required of officers to serve in the grades
of 0-9 and O-10.
In early 1987, the DoD suggested some modification of the GNA joint officer
personnel management based upon complications with implementing the directives.
As a result, in the fiscal year (FY) 1988 and FY1989 National Defense Authorization
Acts, Congress altered the law to allow waivers in education and experience
requirements, to give authority to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for designating
joint specialists, and to allow cumulative credit toward joint tour length requirements.
In addition, although not suggested by the DoD, Congress made changes to
restricting career specialties which could be designated COS.
In 1993, recognizing the changing environment of employing troops, Congress
made another change to allow joint duty credit for Operations DESERT SHIELD and
DESERT STORM.14 With the assignment of JPME graduates, a minimum of at least
50% mandated to joint duty, Congress also afforded the military services the
opportunity to assign JPME graduates to joint positions in either their primary or
secondary assignment.15
13 The CAPSTONE course is a six-week course consisting of seminars, case studies, informal
discussions, and visits to key U.S. military commands, with the objective of making attendees
more effective in planning and employing joint and combined operations. The curriculum
examines major issues affecting national security decision making, military strategy,
joint/combined doctrine, interoperability and key allied nation issues. Created in 1982, as a
voluntary participation course for GO/FOs, in 1986 the GNA mandated that all newly selected
GO/FOs attend. [http://www.ndu/edu/ndu/capstone]
14 Kathleen van Trees Medlock, “A Critical Analysis of the Impact of the Defense
Reorganization Act on American Officership” (Public Law 100-180, section 1301),
unpublished doctoral dissertation, George Mason University, 1993, p. 67.
15 Public Law 103-357, sections 932-933.
Understanding Joint Officer Personnel Management in
Relation to the GNA
Although very detailed and sometimes very tedious, it is essential to examine the
intended goals and the specific aspects of joint officer personnel management in order
to understand possible future change. The specific aspects to be examined include
the establishment of the JDAL, JSO, and COS, and the restrictions set forth for
assignments, joint tour lengths, promotions and JPME. Joint waivers and reserve
component officer personnel management in relation to the Act are also covered.
Joint Duty Assignment Listing (JDAL), Joint Specialty Officer (JSO)
and Critical Occupational Specialty (COS)
The GNA created a number of new provisions with regard to personnel
management. Specifically, these include JDAL, JSO and COS. In addition, specific
requirements were created with regard to these. However, for a number of reasons
explained later, the services have sometimes fallen short of meeting all the
requirements established under the GNA.
The following describes JDAL, JSO and COS. These are described in terms of
how they were designed under the GNA. In addition, the manner in which they have
evolved is considered.
Joint Duty Assignment Listing (JDAL). Under the GNA, the Secretary of
Defense is required to establish a JDAL. The JDAL is a listing of military positions
involving joint duty that satisfies the requirements of the GNA. This list includes
military positions in multi-service/multi-national commands or activities involved with
the integrated employment or support of the land, sea and air forces of at least two
of the three military departments. Designated military positions are those which
include involvement in matters related to national military strategy, joint doctrine and
policy, strategic planning, strategic and contingency planning, and command/control
of combat operations.16 Not all military positions in a multi-service environment are
designated as JDA and included in the JDAL. In addition, this list explicitly details
the requirements of each position. For example, the JDAL contains the rank and
primary specialty of the officer to serve in a particular position. Although a position
may be “filled” by an officer who has been designated to carry out the particular
duties of the position, the officer may not be of the required rank. Thus, the position
is occupied, but the specific requirements of the designation is not viewed as being in
compliance with the GNA. Initially in 1987, the Secretary of Defense designated
8,000+ JDA positions for inclusion in the JDAL. Of the 8,000+ JDAs, GNA
mandated that 1,000 of them would further be designated as COS positions. Today
the JDAL consists of 9,100+ joint positions and 850+ of those are designated as COS
military positions.17 Table 1 details the positions of the JDAL by service and
assignment.
16 10 United States Code, Chapter 38, sec 668 (a)(1-3).
17 Major Marilyn Howe, “The Future of Officer Management,” JCS/J-1 Briefing, 7 January
Table 1. Joint Duty Position Distribution by Service
(as of Sep 30, 99)
USA USAF USMC USN Total
Joint Staff (JCS)27828067228853
Other Joint Duty2,9003,1534881,7688,309
Total Joint Duty3,1783,4335551,9969,162
% of Total Joint34.7%37.5%6.1%21.8%100%
% of Total Officers (note)29.8%36.8%9.0%24.3%100%
Note: total commissioned officers: 0-3 through 0-10 minus professional categories
* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”
[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]
Joint Specialty Officer (JSO). By law, the DoD was mandated to create the
occupational category JSO. As noted in the introduction and background section, in
order to be designated a JSO, an officer is required to have JPME (such as
satisfactory completion of the National War College), to be in a qualifying joint duty
assignment (such as antiterrorism action officer on the Joint Staff) which is included
in the JDAL, and to be nominated by the secretary of the service and so designated
by the Secretary of Defense. Merely being assigned in a joint arena or attending a
joint war college is insufficient to receive designation as a JSO.
The services have utilized two methods to produce JSOs. The first method was
employed from 1987 to 1989. During this period, the established requirements of the
law were so new that it was reasonable to acknowledge that few military officers
could satisfy the criteria. Nevertheless, in order to fulfill the requirements of the law,
Congress provided the DoD with the authority to designate individuals as JSOs via
“transition boards.” Individuals so designed by these transitional boards were not
subject to all the educational and assignment requisites of the law. In other words,
this original period provided DoD with the flexibility to “jump start” the personnel
requirements in order to have a sufficient number of officers designated as JSOs. As
a result of this designation method, by FY1990, more than 12,000+ officers were
designated as JSOs.
In 1990, the GNA had been in place for a sufficient period for officers to have
had the opportunity to meet the established criteria of the JPME, JDA and Secretary
of Defense designation. Therefore, in FY1990, the GNA required that all the
requirements of the law to be designated a JSO be met. Currently there are about
Critical Occupational Specialty (COS). Within the JSO designations, the law
created the COS. COS officers are those JSOs who are trained and educated
primarily in joint operational war skills. Table 1 lists these war skills by service. In
creating COSs, Title IV of the GNA gives some special considerations to this group
of officers who were identified as having a need to concentrate on developing,
maintaining and then passing on to other officers very specific war-fighting skills. It
was noted that excessive time away from the operational military position/specialty
would result in quick deterioration of the skills; thus, this category of officers has less
stringent timing requirements for JPME and usually serves shorter tour lengths.
Currently there are 850+ COS positions, with a fill rate of 81%, designated within the
JDAL.
Table 2. Critical Occupational Specialties
USAUSAFUSMCUSN
Infantry Pilot Infantry Surface
Armor Navigator Tanks/AAV ** Submarine
Artillery Command/Control Artillery Aviation
Operations
Air DefenseSpace/MissileAir Control/SEALS***
ArtilleryOperationsAir Support
AviationAnti-Air WarfareSpecial
Operations
SpecialAviation
Operations
CombatEngineers
Engineers
* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”
[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]
** AAV - amphibious assault vehicles (personnel carriers)
*** SEALS - sea, air and land special warfare teams (counterinsurgency force for offensive
operations)
Currently there is no definitive analytical study which specifically notes the
optimum number of JSOs/COSs, either for the current force or on a per capita basis
which would hold no matter the size of the force.18 Two views as to why there has
been no determination of the optimum number: (1) some consider the optimum JSO
and COS numbers to be a moot point since the law sets the numbers and others have
18 In 1996, RAND released a study which analyzed supportability of assignments and careers,
promotion objectives and JPME allocations; and in a second 1996 study RAND released
algorithm results for ranking joint military positions to determine a potential JDAL size. But,
neither study addressed the optimum number of JSOs for the current force or for a per capita
basis. [Margaret C. Harrell, John F. Schank, Harry Thie, Clifford Graf, Paul Steinberg,
How Many Can Be Joint? Supporting Joint Duty Assignments. RAND: MR-593-JS, 1996.
John F. Schank, Harry Thie, Jennifer Kawata, Margaret C. Harrell, Clifford Graf, Paul
Steinberg. Who Is Joint? Reevaluating the Joint Duty Assignment List. RAND: Mr-574,
difficulty embracing a study of the optimum number since the determination might not
result in a change to the numbers designated in the law; (2) still others have found this
determination to be in the “too hard to do” category since the ever-changing missions
of the services and world strategic situations should drive the JDAL numbers –
defining the optimum number today would likely be obsolete tomorrow.
Despite the goals in establishing the JDAL as well as the JSO and COS, various
forces have modified how they were originally implemented and/or how they have
since evolved. Beginning first with the JDAL, it is interesting to note that since the
end of the Gulf War, the size of the military has decreased by nearly 40%. In other
words, the DoD now has just over one-third fewer military personnel in uniform.
However, the list of positions on the JDAL has not been reduced to reflect this
decrease.
There is continually a lag between what is reflected in the JDAL and the actual
joint requirements. Based upon the joint activities being dynamic organizations –
changing organizational structures, areas of responsibility and mission priorities are
a constant – requirements change. Therefore, ever-changing future needs of the joint
community may well be different from what is produced by the JSO program or is
reflected in the JDAL. It takes the services a minimum of four years to produce the
inventory to meet the requirements. The actual length of time required to reflect joint
mission changes in the JDAL, coupled with the time the services require to
produce/train/educate the officers of specific specialties necessary for joint duty, falls
short of real-time mission changes. The time lag between mission changes appearing
in the JDAL and the reality of joint mission requirements is primarily an
administratively driven lag. And, this lag is even more evident in critical military
positions.
Turning next to the management of JSOs, following the end of the “transition
board” and the beginning of the stricter adherence to the GNA requirements in
FY1990, the number of officers designated as JSOs has decreased. This decrease
occurred for various reasons. First, as noted above, the number of officers has
decreased as a result of the number of JSO-designated officers who left the service
following the Gulf War. Second, the more rigid adherence to the requirements has
meant that fewer officers qualify as JSOs.
The original concept of the law was to produce a JSO who would follow a joint-
dominated career path, but JSO careers have not evolved in this manner. The CINCs
and joint agencies (Defense Intelligence Agency, Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization, Defense Logistics Agency, etc.) continually express a need for officers
with a high degree of expertise in their designated career specialities for their
respective services. Officers with this current service expertise, rotating in and out
of the joint arena, have become the nucleus of the joint environment, rather than a
JSO for whom joint duty assignments are more common than assignments in their
service. Apparently the CINCs and directors of joint agencies believe that previous
joint experience can be of value, but it does not outweigh the CINCs’/joint activities’
perceived need for officers current in the most recent development in their specialty
and service doctrine. Likewise, the continual cross flow of officers with both joint
and service expertise is perceived as valuable to the services by creating linkage
between the operational world and the joint environment. As it has evolved, it would
appear that the original concept of a joint-dominated career path JSO does not meet
the needs of either the joint arena or the services.
As a result of the above issues, the JSO population has fallen from 12,000+
officers in 1990 to approximately 6,000 today. By FY2005, it is anticipated that this
number will fall below 4,000. This shrinking JSO population will eventually lead the
DoD to report non-compliance with the GNA.19 The DoD will be forced to not fill
military positions of the JDAL and report non-compliance in maintaining the end-
strength of the JDAL. Or conversely, the DoD could maintain the end strength of the
JDAL with personnel who do not meet the promotion criteria of the Act, thus
reporting non-compliance with promotion expectations.
Assignments and Joint Tour Lengths
Specific assignments and tour lengths were established to provide stability within
the joint community and to ensure officers obtained a credible level of joint
experience. The GNA requires that of all military positions in the JDAL, at least 50%
must be filled by officers who have been nominated or selected as a JSO. All COS
positions must be filled by designated JSOs. All JSOs and at least 50% plus one
officer, of all officers attending a JPME school, must be assigned to joint duty within
the first or second assignment following JPME.
The law sets minimum tour lengths for joint military positions at 36 months for
field grade officers and 24 months for general/flag officers. The law does allow for
a restricted number of waivers of these time minimums in relation to all joint military
positions. Joint policy further states that the tour length shall not exceed 48 months
without Secretary of Defense approval.
The law specifies that to become a GO/FO, one must have served in a joint duty
assignment in the grades of 04-06. A specific JPME course, CAPSTONE, is also
required for all newly selected general officers/flag officers.
Promotions
The GNA contains numerous requirements and restrictions concerning the
promotion of officers in relation to joint duty so as to ensure that the JSOs and Joint
Staff officers being assigned to the joint arena were equal in quality to, and were
promoted at least at the same rates as, the officers being assigned to service-specific
headquarters staffs. They thus mandated that specific promotion statistics be
maintained for officers assigned to joint positions above the grade of captain/Navy
lieutenant. 20
19 The DoD utilizes the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS)
to track JSOs/JSO-nominees with joint experience in compliance with the GNA. The
JDAMIS tracking number assigned to each eligible officer is independent of the service
position number to which the individual is assigned and these differing numbers can contribute
to administrative tracking burdens of the GNA.
20 The multiple comparisons require a very detailed understanding of promotion data and
require a substantial amount of time to assess. In a 1996 RAND study (Margaret C. Harrell,
The promotion statistics by which joint officers are measured against depends
upon the type of joint position or organization to which an officer is assigned and
whether an officer has received the JSO designation. Three categories were
established within the law: Joint Staff, JSO and other joint. The Joint Staff category
is for current and previously assigned officers who serve with the Joint Staff. The
JSO category is for officers who have been designated as a JSO by the Secretary of
Defense. Officers can be counted in both of these two latter categories. The other
joint category is for all others, not counted as Joint Staff or JSO, who are currently
or who were previously assigned to a joint military position listed in the JDAL.
Officers coded Joint Staff or JSO are not included in the other joint category.
Promotion rates for officers of the Joint Staff and JSO categories are compared to
promotion rates of officers of the service-specific headquarters staffs; promotion rates
for officers in the other joint category are compared to the promotion rates for the
service-specific averages. The promotion rates for each category are compared for
every field grade promotion board. These assessments are further calculated for
officers competing for promotion in-the-promotion zone (IPZ), above-the-promotion
zone (APZ), and below-the-promotion zone (BPZ).21 Within each assessment, the
promotion rates are also compared for officers currently serving joint and for those
having served joint previously in their first post joint promotion cycle. In total, there
are 40+ promotion categories tracked: five grades, three promotion zones, three joint
categories and two assignment categories.
The intent of monitoring promotions within GNA was to first increase and then
to maintain quality of officers placed in joint assignments. The “serving in” and “have
served in” comparison standards were designed to raise the quality of officers
assigned within the joint arena, and to ensure those serving in the joint arena were not
discriminated in the service-specific arena for having served joint. The GNA provides
that the quality of officers serving in the joint environment will be
competitive/comparable to the officers serving in service-specific headquarters staffs.
The intent was not, however, for joint officers to be promoted at an increased rate or
before any other officer who was better qualified for promotion.
John F. Schank, Harry Thie, Clifford Graf, Paul Steinberg, How Many Can Be Joint?
Supporting Joint Duty Assignments. RAND: MR-593-JS, 1996.), “How Many Can Be
Joint?”, the authors noted that the promotion comparisons are complicated and oblique, and
do not necessarily reflect or measure the actual objectives established by Goldwater-Nichols.
Many find that the utility of these comparisons has been lost in the tracking efforts.
21 CRS Report 96-824. Robert L. Goldich, Defense Officer Personnel Management: The
‘Up-or-Out’ System. October 11, 1996. “Officers being considered for promotion to pay
grades 0-3 to 0-8 are promoted on a ‘best qualified’ basis. The ‘best qualified’ method of
promotion generally requires that those officers judged best qualified for promotion against
a specified maximum number of officers that can be promoted be selected for
promotion...eligibility for consideration for promotion is not rigidly tied to a particular cohort
or cohort-related group of officers. Officers can be promoted ‘above the zone’ (i.e., after
having been previously considered, along with their regular cohort, for promotion, and failing
of selection). ‘A small number of promotions also go to officers who have demonstrated
outstanding potential and are selected before the majority of their cohort.’ These are know as
‘below-the-zone’ promotions.” (Most pertinent statutes are in chapter 36, title 10, 10 USC
Many analysts and personnel involved in the tracking and reporting of the
multiple comparisons believe that the process has become bureaucratic and
burdensome, and offers minimum value. In addition, many assert that the tracking
process has become an inhibitor to assigning the right person to a specific, defined
requirement due to the overarching requirement to meet promotion standards. The
mandated promotion targets have become the priority. The result of the long-term,
higher standards for JSOs has been a relatively small pool of highly
qualified/promotable personnel which does not allow for matching the best qualified
officer to the joint requirement. The small pool appears to be counter to the original
intent of GNA to expand the population to ensure all joint qualified officers were
identified for/available to meet joint requirements.
Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)
Joint education has its origins in the GNA and the House Armed Services
Committee Panel on Military Education of 1989 (known as the Skelton Panel for its
chairman, Representative Ike Skelton).22 It was intended that a joint perspective be
ensured by immersion of officers into a multi-service environment of academics,
sports and living accommodations in which the student body and faculty are
proportionally representative of all military departments. Becoming a joint team
player, communicating with members of other services, and understanding the
services’ capabilities and limitations for mission accomplishment are goals of the
JPME programs.
GNA authorized statutory Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)
requirements for officers to be designated as JSOs. As noted earlier, to be designated
a JSO, an officer must have completed an “appropriate program at a joint professional
military education school” (10USC 663). This can be accomplished in two ways.
First, an officer can graduate from the National War College (NWC) or the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) at the National Defense University in
Washington, DC (these are the only two joint senior service schools -“war colleges”
– with an academic year-long curriculum for officers in the grades of lieutenant
colonel/Navy commander or colonel/Navy captain; NWC and ICAF produce about
300 graduates a year). Second, an officer can also fulfill the JSO JPME requirement
by graduating from (1) either a service-specific senior service school (“war college”
with an academic-year curriculum for officers in the grades of lieutenant colonel or
colonel/Navy commander or captain) or intermediate service school (“staff college”
with an academic-year curriculum for officers in the grades of major/Navy lieutenant
commander) by residence, seminar or correspondence programs, and (2) by
graduating from the 12-week course of the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) in
Norfolk, Virginia – another joint school.
The second method, referenced above, is the primary tool for most officers to
obtain JSO status. The educational focus is upon the joint operational art of war,
although the largest number of graduates fill strategic level JDAs within the Joint Staff
or on CINC headquarter staffs. The annual graduates number around 900. In
22 Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress of the Committee
on Armed Services, 101st Congress, first Session, April 21, 1989.
addition, each course must contain a balanced student body from the three service
departments.
An issue arises in relation to the timing of the AFSC courses. Given that the
course dates and reassignment timings do not necessarily align, most students report
to the JDA and then return on temporary duty (TDY) to AFSC for the required
course. For example, the AFSC course begins the first duty Monday in March and
the assigned officer had a reporting date of 10 January to the CINC’s staff in the
Hawaii Pacific Command. The officer reports to the new assignment in Hawaii by 10
January and works for about 40 days prior to being sent back to Virginia for 12 weeks
to complete the AFSC course. During the time at the course, the officer’s duties in
Hawaii either go undone or must be completed by other officers who have their own
duties. In addition, the military must pay for the officer’s return travel expenses and
pay per diem, living expenses, for the duration of the course. While this officer is in
Virginia, the family has possibly been left to settle the household and themselves into
a completely new environment. The impact of the TDY and return JPME completion
results in the temporary assignment/loss of primary duty performance of an equivalent
of 210 officers per year.23
With the limited seating currently offered in JPME, a substantial number of
military members serving in JDAs are never formally educated in joint matters. The
total JPME production today is around 1200 graduates annually. With a JDAL of
9400 based upon a 36-month average tour length. It is not feasible for the DoD to
produce enough JSOs under the current laws to fulfill requirements. To further
compound the issue, many joint positions are currently filled or augmented by reserve
component officers;24 yet, today’s JPME virtually never reaches these officers.25
Given scheduling, career requirements, manpower needs and availability, as well
as operational contingencies (some being emergency deployments which can not be
anticipated), it is very difficult to produce sufficient numbers of qualified JSOs under
the current legislative requirements of the GNA. JPME is one limiting factor, based
upon seat availability, for the services in producing JSOs. Couple the JPME
requirements with those of the assignment process, and it becomes clear that the DoD
can not succeed under the current provisions.
23 Colonel Frank H. Ayers, Jr., “JPME 2010," JCS/J-7 Briefing, February 4, 2000.
24 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), RSC: DD-RA(M)
1147/1148, FY1998. “The Ready Reserve (reserve components) is comprised of military
members of the Reserve and National Guard, organized in units or as individuals, liable for
recall to active duty to augment the active components in time of war or national emergency.”
25 The provisions of the GNA are not specifically applied to the reserve components (see
Reserve Officer Personnel Management section below). With the active duty services actively
seeking JPME assignments for their eligible officers and with the GNA currently not applying
to reservists, seats are virtually non-existent their attendance.
Joint Waivers
Virtually every aspect of the GNA joint officer personnel management can be
waived for some reason, at some level. During the early years following enactment
of the law, the services commonly utilized every available waiver. Under the
oversight of Congress and within the spirit of the law, the services have steadily
declined the utilization of, but by no means eliminated, joint waivers as joint officer
personnel management has evolved. Utilization of waivers varies by service, but the
bottom line is that there are multiple ways, consistent with the law, to bypass the
requirements. For example, it is not uncommon for a 36-month joint tour length
requirement to be waived to 24 months, and full credit for the tour rendered in order
for an officer to move to a needed command position. From grade designation to
JPME to mandatory JSO-designees in COS military positions, waivers can be and are
granted. Although permissible, these waivers are a reflection of requirements in the
law and implementation of personnel management issues which arguably do not
support sound joint officer personnel management.
Reserve Officer Personnel Management
The provisions of the GNA are not specifically extended to the reserve
components. Nevertheless, the reserve components are mandated to apply the GNA
active duty joint officer personnel management parameters to the “extent possible”.
Currently, these are not applied and the reserve components lack procedures to
identify/track positions which provide reserve officers with the knowledge and
experience that come from working with other services and from joint operations.
Given the demands of today’s environment, coupled with the military drawdown,
the reserve components are included in most every mission – from disaster relief
within the continental United States to ongoing operations in Iraq, Bosnia and
Kosovo. Effective utilization of the Total Force, the active and reserve components
combined, is viewed as critical to continued success in joint operations.
Realizing the importance of the reserve components and the importance of
capturing reserve component joint utilization, a working group, co-chaired by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, and the Assistant Chairman, Joint
Chief of Staff, Reserve Matters, has been established to determine the application of
joint officer personnel management for the reserve components. The charter of the
working group includes: (1) defining reserve component positions which yield joint
experience using the broadest possible definition of joint; (2) establishing DoD policy
to provide guidance to the services concerning joint officer personnel management for
reserve components; (3) assisting the services in creating processes to track reserve
components’ members joint experiences; (4) advising reserve component leaders on
implementing career tracks for the best and brightest officers to gain joint experience;
and (5) encouraging joint duty as a career enhancer for reserve component members.
The working group is targeting the June 2000 reserve component senior leadership
conference to present their findings.
DoD Compliance Reports to Congress
The Secretary of Defense is required to report to Congress each year the
services’ compliance with the personnel requirements of the GNA. The report
contains limited narrative and detailed data charts which supposedly denotes the
DoD’s progress in compliance or non-compliance with the directives of the GNA.
However, in reality, the report provides detailed data which presents a snap shot in
time, and many of the required charts do not demonstrate any specific compliance.
In addition, the report does not cover trend analysis or year-to-year comparisons
which would further demonstrate progression or non-compliance.
For example, in the latest report, DoD covers compliance utilizing FY1999, and
provides a summary of JSOs as specifically required in the GNA:
Table 3. Summary of Joint Specialty Officers (JSO)
USA USAF USMC USN Total
Designated as JSOs36222370203858
Designated as JSO
Nominees 714 814 173 574 2,275
JSO Nominees
Designated Under COS
Provisions 368 365 101 316 1,150
* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”
[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]
The DoD reported that 858 officers had been designated as JSOs, that 2,275 officers
had been designated as JSO nominees and that 1,150 JSO nominees were designated
under COS provisions. In addition, the total numbers are reported by service. As
noted earlier, there has never been an optimum JSO number determination. However,
this summary does not demonstrate any specific level of compliance, it merely
provides factual data (a more complete view of the FY1999 compliance charts of the
annual report can be found in Appendix D).
Although DoD has made progress with compliance in accordance with the GNA,
the annual report does not always reflect the magnitude of progress or document
long-term areas of concern. For example, the report (Appendix D, Table 12) shows
that the Navy did not meet the 0-6 promotion objective in the “other joint” category
in FY1999. But, the Joint Staff office, which tracks compliance, has found that the
Navy consistently fails, from year to year, to meet the 0-6 promotion objectives in the
“other joint” category. Thus, a requirement for a multi-year, long-term trend
analysis, versus one-year information, could provide a better understanding of DoD
compliance with the GNA.
Unintended Developments of the GNA for Joint Officer
Personnel Management
There are several joint officer personnel management unintended developments
since GNA’s enactment, which have developed over time. The first development is
that the JSOs did not necessarily evolve as envisioned by the original framers and
COS has become a misnomer. In addition, the time demands upon an officer has
made, not only joint officer personnel management, but all personnel management, a
difficult and precise balancing act to ensure an officer can meet all requirements. The
second development concerns the application of the promotion standards. When
applied they allow for some of the best officers to avoid joint duty until they are
selected for promotion to brigadier general/Navy real admiral lower half. The third
development, compliance reporting, has led to the promotion criteria, rather than
sound personnel management, being a primary factor in joint duty. And, very few
officers serve a second tour in the joint arena. These unintended and unforseen
developments indicate why the DoD predicts significant non-compliance in the near
future and why the DoD has made proposals which follow this section.
Joint Specialty Officers
The JSO career path, as discussed earlier, did not necessarily evolve as
envisioned. The very nature of the skills and expertise which contribute to the joint
culture is possibly a two-edged sword in the management of personnel and in an
individual’s career goals. In addition to joint duty outside the specific career
specialty, the officer must maintain specialty expertise in his/her primary specialization
area (i.e., pilot, submariner, infantryman). Officers need service expertise to be
promoted, and serving in joint duty assignments competes with time available in an
average career to acquire service expertise. It is precisely this expertise which is
most value-added in the joint arena. Thus, there can be a negative effect upon the
officer’s career progress, as well as negative effects for utilization within the service
and within the joint arena.
Career Management. It was never intended in the original concept of the JSO,
that placing an officer in a joint tour for a specified time would create difficulties in
career management. In the course of a twenty-year career, an exceptional officer
often spends one year in primary specialty training followed by three years of primary
specialty duty, two years in-residence professional military education, two to four
years in command and three years on a headquarters staff. This allows for seven years
of a typical career to be devoted to advanced specialty training, JPME, joint duty and
pursuit of higher education.26 Kathleen van Trees Medlock, a noted student of
military personnel management, studied a typical Army officer and found that from
26 An advanced specialty course is designed to provide advanced education in the specific
corps specialty such as aircraft investigation qualification or senior security police
management. The command course offers specific training in issues necessary for
commanding units, i.e., legal, environmental, public affairs. PME provides individual military
members with the skills, knowledge, understanding, appreciation which enables them to make
sound decisions in progressively more demanding positions within the national security
environment; it focuses on service-specific, joint and leadership issues.
the time of eligibility to begin the JSO process, a typical Army officer has twelve years
to become a JSO and prepare for competition for promotion to Brigadier General.
During those twelve years the officer must complete assignments in command, service
headquarters staffs, and two service school rotations as well as devoting three to four
years to JSO qualifications.27 Given this timing, currently only 29% of officers
designated as JSOs return to joint duty once; less than 10% return to joint duty twice.
28 Align these numbers with the end of the Cold War, current
OPTEMPO/deployments and downsizing of the military forces, and a typical career
officer must have extraordinarily precise personnel management to succeed within the
current system – anything which “derails” this progression will throw a career off
track. Plus, it is even more difficult to work joint assignments into the careers of
officers who are promoted below-the-zone.
Figure 1. Typical Officer Career Path
As the services express concern over assigning officers to complete JPME and
serve in joint military positions in order to be designated as a JSO, they are implicitly
relating that it is extremely difficult to fit both the joint experiences and the service
experiences, which they consider equally important, into a typical career path.
Another unintended JSO consequence is related to the initial implementation of
the GNA which allowed for the transitional JSO. The transitional method afforded an
oversized pool of JSOs from which to draw the expertise needed to meet joint
27 Kathleen van Trees Medlock, “A Critical Analysis of the Impact of the Defense
Reorganization Act on American Officership”, unpublished doctoral dissertation, George
Mason University, 1993, p. 67.
28 Major Marilyn Howe, “The Future of Joint Officer Management,” JCS/J-1 Briefing,
requirements. As noted, the transitional JSO pool, which is 46% of JSOs today, is
rapidly shrinking as this group of officers reaches retirement eligibility, and as it is
nearly impossible for the services to replenish the pool with “by-law” JSOs. The
transitional losses, coupled with the “by-law” losses, are two times the production
rate for JSOs. The pool of eligible JSOs has been on the decline since the high of
12,000+ in 1990 and is projected to be below 4,000 by 2005.29 The ever-shrinking
pool is making it more and more difficult to fill all military positions.
Also unforeseen when enacted, but noted by many, is the concern that the
services are – have to be, by law – meeting the JSO requirements and expectations of
the law at the expense of sound joint officer personnel management. For example,
officers with good records and the potential for promotion to make the grade of
colonel/Navy captain often meet the requirements and are designated as JSOs without
regard for the specialty being required within the JDAL. Likewise, an officer with
high potential for promotion, who has completed PME in residence, who has held a
command and served in a JDA, is likely to be designated a JSO regardless of the
existence of requirements for the officer’s specialty/grade on the JDAL or promotion
potential for GO/FO. Also, the assignment of an officer graduating from the National
Defense University (NDU) is often more influenced by the statutory requirement to
place at least 50% plus one member of each NDU graduating class into an approved
JDA than it is driven by where the individual officer can best be utilized. This desire
to comply with law has developed a gap between the JDAL requirements and the JSO
inventory. In other words, the internal composition of the skills/specialties of the
JSOs are not necessarily the composition required to fill the JDAL. The fact that only
29% of officers having been designated as JSOs ever serve in a JDA following JSO
designation highlights this consequence.
Promotions
As with the case of JSOs, when the promotability standards are applied,
unintended developments appear. Some of the best qualified officers in specific
specialities never serve in joint assignments while other quality officers are denied the
opportunity to serve joint. Compliance with the promotion standards affect today’s
joint officer personnel management.
With the services seeking to promote officers who have the highest potential for
command, leadership and continued promotion, it is not difficult for the best officers
to bypass joint. The law as written, and the current promotion system, allows the
services to “groom/grow” officers without joint experience until they reach the grade
of brigadier general /Navy rear admiral lower half. This pool of officers is usually the
very best of the best.
In addition, promotion standards by design also exclude some excellent officers
from serving in joint positions due to their lack of promotability to colonel/Navy
captain. For example, an officer’s career which has centered around a specific area
of expertise, such as Russia, may not possess the qualities sought for promotion to 0-
29 Major Marilyn Howe, “The Future of Joint Officer Management,” JCS/J-1 Briefing,
January 7, 2000.
6; considered an expert, this officer might be the perfect 0-5 to serve as a desk officer
in the Joint Staff. Paradoxically though, the demand to reserve JDA positions for
promotable officers could preclude service in the joint arena. Promotion standards
were envisioned as ensuring improved the quality of officers assigned within the joint
arena; however, it also eliminates some of the most experienced, best qualified officers
from utilization in the joint arena.
As with JSO assignments, to ensure compliance with the law, promotability
potential has become a top priority when nominating/designating officers as JSOs.
The requirement for a sufficiently large pool of JSOs to meet requirements is often
countered by the promotability issues. The end result is a relatively small, carefully
selected, highly qualified/promotable JSO pool which will not meet JDAL
requirements in the near future. Although not counter productive to efforts to
maintain a highly promotable pool of JSOs, it currently contributes to the gap between
the number of JSOs and the specialty requirements mentioned earlier.
To measure the quality of joint personnel on a narrow continuum of a single
promotion board, for a specific grade and category, does not present the whole
picture of the officer, of the officer’s career or of the officer’s future potential or
utilization. Since officers are promoted based upon their immediate future potential,
a single board only measures performance at the time of eligibility. In essence, the
current promotion comparisons/narrow views do not allow for the distribution of
quality over time to be measured. Thus, it is a misleading measure of long-term
quality. For example, the services could be meeting quality targets over time if an
aggregate were measured, and yet not be meeting every specific board target.
Critical Occupational Specialty
“Critical position” has become a misnomer; within today’s JDAL it is often the
least critical positions which carry the COS designation. When the joint officer
personnel management program cannot deliver the intended COS officer, the
CINCs/joint activities: (1) accept officers who meet the legal requirements, but not
necessarily the mission needs; (2) live with a vacancy because a COS officer to fill the
critical military position is not available; (3) process a waiver for a non-JSO to be
assigned to the critical military position; or (4) move the critical military position
designation to another military position so they can acquire an officer to meet the
mission needs. In all cases, but especially in the case of moving the critical military
position designation, the original intent of the law is manipulated to meet mission
needs. The end result is that the least critical of the military positions, the ones which
can be left vacant or can be filled by a non-JSO, are the ones designated as the critical
military positions. This evolution has developed a system in which it is impracticable
to determine the future COS needs of the joint world and to properly plan/prepare in
advance for the future needs. The process does not allow for keeping pace with real-
world, real-time needs.
Careerism
Another significant consequence is the shift from a service to joint orientation,
and in some cases preference. At the time of GNA enactment, the services were
experiencing some “careerism”30 within the officer corps. The services have never
promoted careerism, nor do their core values allow for careerism. At the time of the
GNA, the services were gaining momentum in cataloging careerism as opprobrium.
But today, following the requirements of GNA and the services’ embracement of joint
duty, “joint careerism,” (i.e., jockeying for a Joint Staff or Unified Command position)
is surfacing within the officer corps.31 “Today, personnel from all the services seek
joint assignments, which has become a prerequisite for promotion to general or flag32
officer” This has the potential to serve as a “positive” consequence when viewed
from the perspective of having the best and brightest officers serve in joint positions.
Or, on the other hand, it can be a “negative” consequence if it grows to counter one
of the armed forces’ strong core values – service before self.
The Current DoD View
In 1996, ten years after the GNA was enacted, one of the initial framers of the
legislation, former Senate staffer James R. Locher noted, “Congress had hoped that
the department, after several years of implementing title IV, would conceptualize a
better approach to joint officer management. That has not occurred. The Goldwater-
Nichols objective of improving joint officer management has been achieved, but DoD
still lacks a vision of its needs for joint officers and how to prepare and reward33
them.” Three years later, Secretary Cohen shared the current DoD view in his
January 2000 Report to the President, “...the Department and the Joint Staff are
currently completing an extensive review of both the law and policy governing joint
officer management. The recommendations from this review promise to uphold the
fundamental tenets of Goldwater-Nichols while streamlining the processes that will
allow the Department to continue to meet the challenges of the 21st century.”34 The
DoD believes it has evolved to the point that “joint” is normal, although it has not
evolved to the exact letter of the law.
The DoD has studied and designed a proposal concerning several aspects of the
law governing joint officer personnel management. Their proposal includes replacing
the JSO with a special duty identifier, deleting the COS, separating promotion
comparisons and JSO designations, redesigning promotion comparisons, realigning
joint tour lengths with standard service tours lengths, redesigning and expanding
JPME, and redefining the annual report to Congress. The proposal has been
30 Careerism - positioning to enhance individual prospects for promotion, key assignment
selections, etc. for the betterment of the one without regard for the betterment of the service
31 Colonel Mackubin T. Owens, Jr., USMCR (Ret), “Goldwater-Nichols: A Ten-Year
Retrospective,” Marine Corps Gazette, December 1998: 48-53.
32 John M. Shalikashvilli, “A Word from the Chairman,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn
33 James R. Locher III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” Joint Forces Quarterly,
Autumn 1996: 10-14.
34 William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to the President and the
Congress,” February 2000: E-1.
approved by the CJCS and presented to some key congressional members and
staffers.
The first and overarching aspect of the proposal is to replace the JSO
designation with a special duty identifier. The GNA focused on a specialist career
track for the JSO which has not evolved within the services, and the DoD proposes
replacing the JSO with a JSO “special duty identifier”. The DoD sees this change as
a means of placing emphasis on building a larger pool of officers with joint expertise
and education. The JSO duty identifier would allow for the automatic granting of
JSO status to every officer who completes the required joint education and joint duty
assignment (there would be no required order of education/assignment as currently
exists in the law). The JSO designation board which selects JSO nominees based
upon meeting criteria and promotion potential would no longer be necessary. This
new designation process would allow for “ever-current” identification of all joint
qualified personnel, thus allowing immediate identification of eligible officers required
to meet ever-changing, immediate joint requirements. The intent is to expand the JSO
pool to include all qualified officers and to provide a greater variety of grades and
specialties. Having the right officer who meets the requirements is the highest priority
of the joint environment, and the expansion of identifying all joint trained/qualified
officers meets this key need.
With the JSO special duty identifier being utilized, the COS would be deleted.
The CINC/joint agency, owners of the joint military positions, would establish all
requirements through the officer requisition process currently utilized by the services
and there would be no requirement for the COS. The DoD proposal to delete the
COS would, supposedly, offer the joint activities the flexibility to determine
requirements and to requisition qualified officers to meet them. With the deletion of
the COS, and the associated restrictions for filling COS military positions, the ability
to quickly locate officers with the desired expertise to fill time-/mission-critical
requirements would, according to the DoD, be enhanced. The DoD envisions the
multiple JDAL fill-rate tracking requirements ceasing as all joint military positions
would be created equal.
The proposal also includes decoupling promotion comparisons from JSO
designation. This delinking will allow identification of all officers who are joint
qualified versus identifying only those select officers who would enhance the statistics
by meeting promotion standards. Although delinked, promotion standards would
continue as a quality indicator for officers assigned to joint military positions.
To ensure the quality of officers assigned to JDAs, promotion comparisons
would be redesigned. The DoD proposal is designed to continue a comparison, but
would delete much of the administrative criteria currently required. It proposes to
compare those currently assigned in the joint staff to those currently serving in the
service headquarters staffs and compare those assigned in the joint agencies to the
service average. The proposal would delete the requirements for comparing those
who have previously served joint and JSO-designees specifically. The DoD believes
its proposal would continue to measure the quality of the officers without allowing
the reporting requirements to become more important than matching the correct
person to the requirement. Thus, an officer’s special background/expertise would be
the driving factor in assignments. The DoD proposal would continue with the current
service quality screening process before an officer could be assigned to a JDA.
The DoD believes that joint tour lengths should be aligned with standard
service tour lengths.35 The current provisions for tour lengths, with its many
exceptions and waivers, can be confusing, and the tracking process requires extensive
oversight. The DoD proposal is designed to advance the intent of the GNA
concerning joint tour stability, yet provide a more simplified process. This proposal
would grant the Secretary of Defense additional authority in determining full joint
credit for a tour of duty and would allow the Secretary of Defense more discretion in
deeming which assignments/situations grant valuable joint experience.
A joint tour of 36 months, like the majority of standard tour lengths, would
remain the standard for most joint duty. However, for example, a joint tour in Korea
would be aligned to the current assignment standard for a short tour – 12 to 18
months. These short tour locations sustain high OPTEMPO, and the joint experience
in this type arena is commensurate to that of officers serving longer tours in less
strained environments. In addition, serving in a Joint Task Force (JTF)36
Headquarters is considered valuable joint duty. The proposal would allow for full
joint credit to officers who amass 365 days in JTF Headquarters when deployed via
90-day+ rotations. The current cumulative credit authorization enacted in 1996 for
credit after 36 months would be deleted. The proposed credit for short tours in
remote areas and for JTF service would recognize valuable joint experience which
otherwise goes unnoticed and uncredited to the individual officer today.
The DoD proposal would support the original legislation which recognizes there
are legitimate reasons for curtailment of a 36-month tour. And, it would retain 24
months as the minimum service for joint tour credit in most cases. In addition, the
proposal establishes a provision for the owning joint activity to agree to the early
release of an officer; if the owning activity does not agree, the officer will not be
moved prior to completion of the joint tour. The proposal deletes the use of
cumulative credit for partial tours as known today – officers either complete the joint
tour to receive full credit or leave early and receive no credit (an automatic incentive
to enhance stability in tour lengths). If an officer is moved from one joint position to
35 Every authorized military position has an assigned tour length. A most common
length/standard length for a tour is 36 months. However, for military positions authorized
within very intense/demanding areas of operations, tour lengths vary from 12 months to 24
months. A 12 month tour is commonly referred to as a short tour. There are no short tour
authorizations within the continental United States. For example, an assignment in Korea,
specifically in close proximity to the North and South border, would be classified as a short
tour. The area of operation experiences an intense OPTEMPO in a significantly dangerous
area thus affording the uniformed member experience above/beyond that of a uniformed
member performing similar duties in a headquarters/within the United States.
36 A Joint Task Force is a temporary operation which is created to handle a specific mission
for which there are no permanent military positions authorized and for which there is no intent
to authorize permanent military positions. Although the duty is joint and hosts considerable
joint experience of value to CINCs, joint credit is seldom authorized due to the lack of
permanent military positions.
another joint position, joint credit between consecutive joint duty would be
recognized. The tour length proposal is drastically simplified as compared to today’s
requirements. The firm tour length standards, to be rigorously implemented, meet the
requirements of the joint arena and mirror the way the forces operate today.
The DoD believes that the career focus should be a broad joint education and
recommends expanding the capabilities of joint education, as well as opening joint
education to a much greater number of officers. However, to accommodate this
expansion, education must first be delinked from assignments, thus allowing for
the expansion of education and allowing the education to reach a significantly higher
number of officers.
The DoD proposal focuses upon “one stop”, strategic-level JPME which will
delete the TDY and return issues, expand JPME to a much larger Total Force
audience, at a reasonable price, as it deepens and broadens the JPME content. The
proposal includes an elective course design at the current senior service schools,
distributed JPME via joint seminar formats, distance JPME to the individual officer
on-line, and allows for AFSC to be expanded into a joint operations school.
Extending an AFSC exported curriculum (and faculty if requested) as an elective
course at the current senior service schools would meet the joint requirements and
eliminate an extensive number of TDY and return losses as noted earlier. This would
allow joint education within a currently established school (AFSC in-residence
outreach). The expected audience would be approximately 650 officers per year.
The second aspect of distributed JPME would consist of an AFSC exported
curriculum into the joint arena. The program would be taught in seminar format (one
session per week for six months) at the CINC headquarters. This proposal would also
delete TDY and return losses, as well as delivering JPME to officers who currently
have no opportunity for JPME. In addition to the basic curriculum from AFSC,
CINC-specific concerns, issues and topics could be incorporated into the program.
It is estimated that this proposal could reach an additional 600 officers who currently
receive no education in joint matters.
The third aspect employs distance learning by exporting the AFSC curriculum
directly to individual officers on their home/office personal computers. This is
envisioned to be a six month course, using off the shelf technology and “virtual”
seminars. This aspect would greatly expand JPME to the Total Force by providing
“anywhere/anytime” JPME capability. The annual audience could reach 2,500 officers
who currently receive no JPME.
In addition to reaching an expanded officer pool at the strategic JPME level, it
is proposed that the expansion of the current AFSC to a 10-month, 100 student
joint operational school. This residence program would qualify as intermediate
service school and fulfill the requirement of JPME. AFSC would also establish a two-
month summer course which would cover the requirements which are currently in
place as AFSC. This program would reach approximately 100 students annually and
The DoD proposal would increase the number of officers currently educated in
joint matters annually from 1,200 to approximately 4,350 without significantly
increasing JPME expenses above current spending levels. The DoD proposes
expanding the intent of the GNA by educating additional students for a one-time
investment in advanced distributed learning. The design would allow for all officers
destined for joint duty the opportunity to receive joint education commensurate with
rank and responsibilities. In addition, the DoD sees this proposal as recasting JPME
as an educational component of a continuum of lifelong joint learning.
The entire DoD proposal of the GNA maintains the standards for the Secretary
of Defense to monitor the state of joint officer personnel management and redefines
the measurements which would continue to be reported to Congress in the annual
defense reports. To satisfy the concerns of those who might interpret the DoD
proposal as cutting away too many of the aspects which have enhanced “jointness”,
the DoD would report: (1) JSO special duty identified officers by
grade/service/specialty; (2) analysis of how well the service secretaries are assigning
personnel to joint positions; (3) number of “good of the service” waivers for GO/FO
selected; (4) percent of officers departing from joint duty before earning full joint tour
credit; (5) percent of NDU class seats filled, by course; (6) listing of JTF headquarters
currently approved for joint duty credit; (7) promotion comparisons; and (8)
significant information as determined by the Secretary of Defense. Although
extensive in nature, the DoD believes the proposed reporting will convey the
continued progress of “jointness” without allowing the reporting constraints to
adversely affect personnel utilization/joint officer personnel management.
In sum, the proposal maintains a JDAL of assignments in which officers gain
significant experience in joint matters. But, in doing so, it would delete many of the
current waiver options. Critical military positions would be deleted, the JSO pool
would be greatly expanded and there would be no quota for at least 50% of JDAL
military positions to be manned by JSO nominees. Promotion comparisons would be
for officers currently serving joint. General officers/flag officers would continue to
require joint duty prior to promotion to 0-7 and completion of CAPSTONE. The
sequence rules for JPME prior to JDA would not be required and JPME would be
redesigned to afford a greater number of officers, including Guardsmen and
Reservists, the opportunity to complete joint education. Assignment requirements of
50% plus one would be dropped for NDU graduates. And, the annual report to
Congress would be updated to ensure reported information focused on meeting the
joint arena requirements by reporting what matters to Congress in their oversight role.
With the intent of staying within the GNA provisions of the law, the proposed
changes are suggested to offer more flexibility in joint officer personnel management
and to afford a greater chance of getting the correct officers with the appropriate
skills/education matched to real-world requirements – the proposal synchronizes the
joint management process with the services’ personnel management processes.
In his most recent posture statement,37 General Shelton, CJCS, assured Congress
he is not seeking to weaken jointness, but to improve it, “to champion it”. Just as is
supported by “Joint Vision 2020",38 he is seeking the flexibility in personnel
management to fulfill the strategic concept of decisive force, power projection,
overseas presence and strategic agility. The DoD’s goal is to transform joint
personnel management, balanced with the performance of missions in a dynamic
environment, to maximize JSO production, as early as possible in a career, for better
personnel utilization.
The new DoD proposal is not without controversy. Some find the proposal to
be too far-reaching in lifting the GNA joint officer personnel management constraints
and reporting aspects of the Act. Concerns of this nature focus on the fact that the
proposal gives additional authority to the Secretary of Defense and JCS which could
fall short of the original intent of the GNA. Given the DoD’s reluctance to seek
jointness at the time of its enactment, some hold a distrustful view of the DoD’s
ability to self-manage joint officer personnel. Still others have expressed
disappointment in the DoD view; they have described it as making administrative and
mechanical change to ease the burden of reporting and have found that the proposal
lacks innovation and major redesign for the future of joint officer personnel
management. The proponents of the DoD proposal believe it will streamline the
process, while maintaining the original intent of the GNA, and will allow for sound
joint officer personnel management.
Legislation in the 106th Congress, Second Session
The Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001, S. 2549 (Subtitle B, Joint Officer Management, Sec. 521-528), provides the
following language concerning joint officer personnel management:39
The committee recommends a series of provisions that would streamline the
designation and management of joint speciality officers. The recommended
provisions would simplify the requirements to be designated as a joint speciality
officer, would require that Joint Professional Military Training be conducted in
residence, would establish the promotion objectives for joint speciality officers as
a group to be equal to or greater than the rate of officers of the same armed force
in the same grade and competitive category serving on the headquarters staff of
that armed force, would establish the minimum tour length to qualify for joint tour,
and would modify the required contents of the annual report to comply with the40
simplified management requirements.
37 “CJCS 2000 Posture Statement to Congress,” Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
38 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, Joint Chiefs of Staff , 2000.
[http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020]
39 106th Congress, 2nd Session, S.Rept. 106-292, May 12, 2000.
40 Ibid, p. 298. As used speciality refers to specialty and Joint Professional Military Training
refers to Joint Professional Military Education.
This legislative language from S.2549 is consistent with the DoD proposal with
two major exceptions. First, section 522 of the bill would alter promotion
comparisons to compare all officers serving in and having previously served in a joint
duty assignment, to officers of the same armed force, in the same grade and
competitive category who are serving on the headquarters staff of that armed force;
whereas the DoD proposal, would discontinue the comparison of officers having
previously served. In addition, the DoD proposal called for comparing Joint Staff
assigned officers to headquarters staffs and all other officers in joint duty assignments
outside the Joint Staff to the service average. As a result, the Senate language would
increase non-compliance reporting, because it raises the promotion criteria standards
above what is currently expected. If the Army and Air Force placed every promotion
allocation toward joint officer (none toward the Service), most likely they could not
meet the criteria set by the Senate language. The second major exception is that there
were no significant changes to Joint Professional Military Education in the legislative
language. Specifically, there was no change to allow the utilization of current
technology, specifically distributive or distance learning, for accomplishing joint
education.
Options for Congress
Framers of the GNA wrote of a need for congressional oversight and
congressional fine-tuning of the law to ensure the continual progression set in motion
by the original legislation. As already mentioned, the DoD has made a proposal to
make changes in the joint personnel officer management program. In early February
2000, General Shelton, CJCS, submitted these suggested program changes in the
GNA to Congress in the posture statement to the House and Senate Committees on
Armed Services. This and other congressional options are presented below.
Options for Congressional Action
Continue the Status Quo. There are those who believe DoD did not originally
embrace “jointness” and that more effort should be made to make it work on its own
terms before altering it. If this option is elected, the DoD believes a dilemma is
quickly approaching under the rules of the current law. The DoD will have the option
to produce additional JSOs to meet requirements, but doing so will draw the DoD
into a situation where the promotion targets are not met. Or, the DoD could maintain
the current promotion standards and fail to fill the requisite number of JDAL military
positions, thus creating an impact on joint operations which has yet to be defined.
Either DoD choice would lead to reporting non-compliance to Congress. In addition,
maintaining the status quo will not allow the DoD the utilization of current
technological advances to expand JPME within the current active force and to
introduce JPME to the reserve components.
Adjust the GNA. Congress could accept the pledge of the DoD to progress
with the original intent of the GNA and allow flexibility concerning how to best
proceed. Proponents of the DoD proposal believe it will allow the DoD to grow and
groom the required airmen/soldiers/sailors/Marines with an appropriate joint view to
meet the ever-expanding, future needs of both joint operations and the military
departments.
Congress could modify the GNA by accepting only select aspects of the
proposal:
!Establishment of JSO duty identifiers to expand the JSO
population
!Deletion of critical positions
!Decoupling of promotion comparisons from JSO designations
!Redesigned promotion comparisons
!Adjusted tour lengths
!Delinking of JPME and the assignment process
!Redesigned JPME
Or, Congress could modify the DoD proposal by adding additional aspects:
!Solicit CINC-specific and service-specific Chiefs of Personnel
opinions of and suggestions concerning the overall DoD proposal
(DoD did solicit in 1997 prior to proposal formulation of their
current proposal)
!Offer joint credit to all officers regardless of grade when serving
joint; offer joint credit to all 0-3s when serving joint41
!Require complete review/deletion of duplication of effort within the
offices of the Secretary of Defense and JCS concerning joint officer
personnel management
!Require a complete DoD business plan defining the future joint
officer – exactly how many/what specialty are required prior to
proceeding with any proposal – and, requiring a recruitment business
plan to meet requirements
41 With consideration to allowing joint credit for additional grades, a couple of significant
points surface: a) joint agencies and CINC staffs would be allowed greater personnel
management flexibility based upon the number of 0-3s assigned (the joint Staff and OSD
would experience little impact based upon the small number of 0-3 assignees); b) expanding
the eligibility criteria to include 0-3s would expand the JSO pool, increasing the number of
GO/FO eligible officers, and would offer relief for the 50% assignment rules; and c)
expanding the eligibility could also negatively affect the promotion targets based upon the
difficulty to predict 0-3 promotion potential at such a young career point and it could increase
the assignment gap between serving joint and GO/FO promotion.
Furthermore, Congress could adjust the GNA as presented in the Senate committee's
report (S.Rept. 106-292). Congress might accept the language in S. 2549 and doing
so will enhance some aspects of joint officer personnel management, such as allowing
joint duty identifiers to track all joint experience. But, the language concerning
promotion criteria will intensify the non-compliance reporting predicted by the DoD,
and it will not allow for the expansion of joint education by utilizing available
technologies.
Pursue Other Options: Commission, Hearing, Special Committee, Study.
Congress could elect to establish a commission, hold hearings, appoint a special
committee or mandate a study to further investigate the DoD’s proposal. Such action
would allow Congress to seek opinions from academics, senior current/retired
military, and other experts before determining a course of action. Choosing the
correct mix of persons to participate in a commission, hearing, special committees,
or study is important because of the intricacies of the GNA.
The GNA in Relation to the Defense Officer Personnel
Management Act
Although the focus of this report is joint officer personnel management in
relation to the GNA, Congress may also want to consider military personnel
management in relation to the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act
(DOPMA).42 As the GNA focused on the DoD organization and manning for joint
operations, DOPMA created uniform laws for the military services with the intent to
allow for the recruitment and retention of an appropriate number of quality officers,
and to afford all officers consistent career opportunities. DOPMA addresses grade
tables, authority to manage the officer force, field-grade allocations, promotion
procedures/opportunities/timelines, provisions for career expectations/appointment
of regular officers, competitive categories, and tenure issues. A change in the
DOPMA could have residual effects on joint officer personnel management, but it
probably would not change the challenges presented in this report.
Some believe that an extension of the retirement eligibility of 20 years could
resolve the joint officer personnel management issues. They profess that extending
the years required in a career would allow for additional time for the fulfillment of
joint requirements. Although adding man-years by any means, whether it be via
extending career lengths or expanding authorized end-strengths, could have a positive
effect – decrease OPTEMPO, increase quality of life, etc. – it would not address the
joint officer personnel challenges faced today, such as bureaucratic complexity, the
prospect on non-compliance reporting, and other issues discussed above. In addition,
many believe that the negative effects – if not grandfathered, a view of a broken
promise or decreased retention, etc. – could far outweigh any net gain. To increase
effectiveness and efficiency of joint officer personnel management, change must be
addressed within the governing laws of the GNA.
42 Public Law 96-513, December 12, 1980. At the time of its enactment, DOPMA was the
first comprehensive change in officer personnel management laws since 1947.
Appendix A:
Historical Timeline
July 1947National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253
August 1949Amended National Security Act of 1949, Public Law 216
May 1954Officer Grade Limitation Act (OGLA), PL 83-349
August 1958Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Public Law
85-599
January 1968North Korea seizes USS Pueblo, U.S. Navy intelligence ship, in
Sea of Japan
March 1973End of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam via Peace Accord
May 1975Khmer Rouge seize Mayaguez, U.S. freighter, off coast of
Cambodia; Marines attempt crew rescue
April 1980Unsuccessful attempt to rescue U.S. embassy employees taken
hostage in Tehran
November 1980Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), PL 96-
513
January 1982General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
criticizes the JCS structure and speaks out for reorganization
Spring 1982House Armed Services Committee, Investigations
Subcommittee, began five months of “JCS reform” hearings
August 1982House passes the JCS reform bill introduced by the
Investigations Subcommittee. Senate Armed Services
Committee elects not to entertain the House bill which
disappears at the end of the session
June 1983Chairman, Armed Services Committee, Senator John Tower (R-
Tex), begins a series of hearings on defense management, not
limited to but including JCS reform
August 1983Again the House passes the JCS reform bill introduced by the
Investigations Subcommittee, chaired by Bill Nichols (D-AL)
and again the Senate Armed Services Committee elects not to
consider the bill
Fall 1983Senator John Tower appoints staffer James Locher to conduct a
reorganization study
October 1983Terrorist bombing of Marines barracks in Beirut
Invasion of Grenada, Operation Urgent Fury
Summer 1984In an effort to engage Senate consideration of the House JCS
reform efforts, Representative Nichols introduces legislation
which resulted in a multi-listing of questions forwarded to
Department of Defense by the Senate Armed Services
Committee
January 1985Following the retirement of Senator John Tower, Senator Barry
Goldwater (R-Ariz) becomes Chairman, Armed Services
Committee and encourages James Locher to complete the
reorganization study charged in mid-1984
March 1985The Department of Defense, led by Secretary Casper
Weinberger, responds to the Senate Armed Service Committee
inquiries; DoD opposes reorganization
May 1985Senate calls for the establishment of the Blue Ribbon Panel on
Defense Management
July 1985The President creates a Presidential Commission on Defense
Management chaired by David Packard (Packard Commission,
A Quest for Excellence)
October 1985Staffer James Locher reorganization staff study to the
Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, S. Prt. 99-
the study calls for significant reform
With strong involvement by Congressman Les Aspin (D-Wis), a
bill was introduced and passed in the House in late 1985
NovemberThe Senate Armed Services Committee hosts extensive
- December 1985JCS reform hearings
December 1985The Senate Armed Services Committee staff draft their
- January 1986version of JCS reform bill
February 1986The interim Packard Commission report is released; it supports
the reform arguments heard in the Senate Armed Services
Committee hearings
March 1986Following extensive debate and more than 85 amendments, the
Senate Armed Services Committee approves the JCS reform bill
on March 6, The Barry Goldwater Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986
The House Armed Services Committee embarks on a series of
hearings concerning the general issue of Defense Management
April 1986President Reagan directs the Department of Defense to
implement virtually all the recommendations from the interim
Packard Commission report
April - May 1986The William Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act,
calling for more extensive reform than the Senate bill, is passed
from the House Armed Services Committee in late June
May 1986The Senate unanimously approves the Barry Goldwater
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
July 1986Final version of the Packard Commission report, A Quest for
Excellence, is published
AugustThe House-Senate Conference confers on the William
- September 1986Nichols/Barry Goldwater Department of Defense Reorganization
Acts of 1986
October 1986Public Law 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986
December 1989Operation Just Cause, invasion of Panama
August 1990Operation Desert Shield, Kuwait
January 1991Operation Desert Storm, Kuwait
December 1992Operation Restore Hope, Somalia
September 1994Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti
December 1995NATO-led multinational force, Bosnia-Herzegovina
March 1999Operation Allied Forces, Kosova
Appendix B:
Abbreviation/Acronyms
APZ: Above the Promotion (Primary) Zone
BPZ: Below the Promotion (Primary) Zone
CINC: Commander-in-Chief/Commander-in-Charge
CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CNO: Chief of Naval Operations
COS: Critical Occupational Specialty
CSA: Chief of Staff, Army
CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force
DA: Department of the Army
DoD: Department of Defense
DoDD: Department of Defense Directives
FITREP: Fitness Report
FO: Flag Officer
FY: Fiscal year
GAO: Government Accounting Office
GO: General Officer
GNA: Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, 1986
HASC: House Armed Services Committee
ICAF: Industrial College of the Armed Forces
IPZ: In the Promotion (Primary) Zone
ISS: Intermediate Service School
JDA: Joint Duty Assignment
JDAL: Joint Duty Assignment Listing
JPME: Joint Professional Military Education
JROC: Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JSO: Joint Specialty Officer
JCS: Joint Chief of Staffs
NDU: National Defense University
NWC: National War College
OPTEMPO: Operating Tempo
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense
OUSD: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
PERSTEMPO: Personnel Tempo
PME: Professional Military Education
POC: Point of Contact
PL: Public Law
SASC: Senate Armed Services Committee
SecDef: Secretary of Defense
SSS: Senior Service School
USA: United States Army
USAF: United States Air Force
USD: Under Secretary of Defense
USMC: United States Marine Corps
USN: United States Navy
VCJCS: Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Appendix C:
Definitions
CAPSTONE - A course is a six-week course consisting of seminars, case studies,
informal discussions, and visits to key U.S. military commands, with the objective of
making attendees more effective in planning and employing joint and combined
operations. The curriculum examines major issues affecting national security decision
making, military strategy, joint/combined doctrine, interoperability and key allied
nation issues. Created in 1982, as a voluntary participation course for GO/FOs, in
Combatant Commander - A commander-in-chief of one of the unified or specified
combatant commands established by the President.
Critical Occupational Specialty (COS) - A military occupational specialty selected
from among the combat arms of the Military Departments. Military specialities are
those engaged in the operational art to attain strategic goals in a theatre of conflict
through the design, organization, and conduct campaigns and major operations.
Critical Joint Duty Assignment, Military Position - A joint duty assignment position
for which, considering the duties and responsibilities of the position, it is highly
important that the assigned officer be particularly trained in, and oriented toward,
joint matters. Critical military positions are selected by heads of joint organizations,
approved by the Secretary of Defense and documented in the Joint Duty Assignment
List.
Cross-Department Joint Duty Assignment - An assignment in which an officer serves
full-time duties with another Military Department or with the armed forces of a
foreign nation.
Dual Hat Joint Duty Assignment - An assignment in which the officer has
responsibilities to both a parent Service and to a joint activity.
Field Grade - An officer serving in the grade of 0-4 (Major or Lieutenant
Commander) through 0-6 (Colonel or Navy Captain)
Joint - Activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more
military departments participate.
Joint Doctrine - Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two
or more services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is promulgated
by the CJCS in coordination with the CINCs, services and joint staff.
Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) - An assignment to a designated position in a multi-
service, joint or multinational command or activity that is involved in the integrated
employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three
military departments. Such involvement includes, but is not limited to, matters
relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine and policy, strategic planning,
contingency planning and command and control of combat operations under a unified
or specified command.
Joint Duty Assignment Listing (JDAL)- A consolidated listing of all field grade
positions designated as joint duty assignments as approved by the Secretary of
Defense and maintained by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Joint Force - A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements,
assigned or attached, of tow or more military department, operating under a single
joint force commander.
Joint Force Commander - A general term applied to a combatant commander,
subunified commander or joint task for commander authorized to exercise combatant
command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force.
Joint Matters - The law, PL 99-33, section 668, defines “joint matters” as matters
relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters
relating to (1) national military strategy; (2) strategic planning and contingency
planning; and, (3) command and control of combat operations under unified
command.
Joint Operations - a general term to describe military actions conducted by joint
forces, or by service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority),
which, of themselves do not create joint forces.
Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) - Resident professional military
education programs of the National Defense University and other programs as
designated by the Secretary of Defense. The National War College, The Industrial
College of the Armed Forces and the Armed Forces Staff College are designated as
institutions of JPME.
Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) - An officer on the active duty list who is particularly
trained in and oriented toward joint matters. In order to be eligible to become a JSO,
an officer must complete Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), and then
complete a full Joint Duty Assignment (JDA).
Joint Specialty officer Nominee - An officer who has completed a program of joint
professional military education or an officer who has a critical occupational specialty
tour. In either instance, the officer has been designated as a joint specialty officer
nominee by the concerned military service.
Joint Staff - The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate
unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component which
includes members from two or more of the military departments. Included in this
definition is the staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Joint Task Force (JTF) - A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the
Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an
existing joint task force commander. (A temporary operation which is created to
handle a specific mission for which there are no permanent military positions
authorized and for which there is no intent to authorize permanent military positions)
Joint Vision 2010 - A publication originally released by General John M. Shalikashvili
(USA Retired), Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, which provides an operationally based
template for the evolution of the armed forces for a challenging and uncertain future.
Joint Vision 2020 - An updated version of JV 2010 released by General Henry H.
Shelton, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in June 2000, which extends the original
concepts of JV 2010 out to the year 2020 and continues to focus of a fully joint force
which will be dominant across a full spectrum of military operations.
Jointness - a unified direction of the armed forces governed by joint doctrine and
policies for the employment of multi-service military forces and the efficient use of
defense resources
Personnel - Those individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to
accomplish the assigned mission.
Professional Military Education - Provides individual military members with the skills,
knowledge, understanding, appreciation which enables them to make sound decision
in progressively more demanding positions within the national security environment.
*NOTE - unless stated other wise, these definitions refer to words and/or phrases as
defined by the DoD. [Http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/]
Appendix D:
DoD Compliance with the GNA
The DoD compliance with the GNA depicted in the following tables, is based
upon FY1999 data extracted from the SecDef’s annual report to the President and
Congress:
Table 4. Summary of Critical Positions
USA USAF USMC USN Total
Critical Positions34731956155877
Vacant Critical
Positions 52 78 11 26 167
% Critical Positions
Filled 86% 78% 80% 83% 81%
Critical Positions filled
by JSOs2041871068469
Critical Positions filled
by non-JSOs39543561241
* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.
[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]
DoD reported that there were 877 COS positions with 81% of these positions
filled. Various reasons exist as to why the critical positions are filled by officers who
are not JSOs: (1) the positions could have been filled by a non-JSO before it was
designated on the JDAL; (2) the positions are being converted from critical to non-
critical, or being deleted; or, (3) a JSO was not available and, the best qualified
officers assigned to these positions were not JSOs. Mission changes drive
redesignations of critical positions and can affect the percentage of fill.
Table 5. Average Length of Tour of Duty in Joint Duty Assignments
(In months)
General/Flag OfficersUSAUSAFUSMCUSNTotal
Joint Staff (JCS)24.024.524.522.023.8
Other Joint25.327.925.331.827.3
Joint Total (note1)25.027.324.829.326.5
Field Grade OfficersUSAUSAFUSMCUSNTotal
Joint Staff (JCS)35.734.841.536.035.7
Other Joint37.638.338.338.838.1
Joint Total (note 2)37.537.938.538.537.9
Note 1: GNA requires a tour length of 24 months
Note 2: GNA requires a tour length of 36 months
* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”
[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]
Tour lengths, as reported in Table 5, are not tracked by JSO, JSO nominee and
non-JSO categories, but rather, at the request of Congress, the reporting is by the
assignment categories of Joint Staff, other joint and total. In 1999, only the
compliance within the joint staff fell short of the designated 24 months for GO/FO and
36 months for field grade officers. Navy tour lengths are the primary reason that the
GO/FO statistics fell short, and both the Army and the Air Force tour lengths are
highlighted as the reason the field grade officers, joint staff, did not meet the
requirements. In addition, there are numerous reasons for tour length exclusion:
retirement; separation; suspension from duty; compassionate/medical reassignment;
assignment to other joint duty following promotion; reorganization; joint overseas
short tours; second tours; joint accumulation; and, reassignment to another critical
specialty officer military position.
Table 6. GO/FO Joint Equivalency Waivers
USA USAF USMC USN Total
Officers Selected for 0-740401535130
Officers Joint Qualified32341524105
Percent Joint Qualified80%85%100%69%81%
Joint Equivalency
Waivers Used00000
* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”
[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]
In early year assessments of GO/FO compliance, it was fairly routine for the
DoD to fall short of expectations. The DoD cites a significant reduction in the
number of joint duty, “good of the service”,43 waivers over any previous year for
officers attaining GO/FO rank as a positive indicator of their commitment to the GNA
(see Table 6). The narrative of the SecDef Annual report states that there were a total
of 102 GO/FO waivers granted in FY1999.
Table 7. Summary of COS Officers
USA USAF USMC USN Total
Completed JPME1,5392,0745251,4525,590
Designated as JSO9771,1683988883,431
JSO-nominees 2,227 2,951 573 2,332 8,083
JSO-nominees without
JPME 1,627 1,988 422 1,764 5,801
JSO-nominees serving
in JDA1,0751,2452441,0173,581
JSO-nominees
completed JDA
currently attending
JPME61101128
* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”
[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]
Congress requires reports related specifically to COS officers as shown above
in Table 7. A positive highlight, but not visible in the above chart, is the increase in
JPME completion by COS officers. In addition, the narrative of the SecDef report
notes that the number of officers who have completed Phase I JPME by
correspondence or seminar is increasing.
43 “Good of the Service” waivers allow SecDef to waive the requirement for joint duty prior
to promotion to 0-7. The number of waivers is unlimited and the language in the law does not
require the service to give defined/logical reason as to why the officer did not serve a joint
tour.
Table 8. JSO with COS Who Are Serving in Second Joint Assignment
Field GradeUSAUSAFUSMCUSNTotal
Have Served255(94)282(112)30(15)88(41)655(262)
Are Serving123(54)153(62)19(5)68(21)363(142)
GO/FO USA USAF USMC USN Total
Have Served14(6)37(10)11(7)13(6)75(29)
Are Serving17(7)29(13)3(3)3(1)52(24)
NOTE: Number in parenthesis indicates number of second joint assignments which were to a critical
joint military position
* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”
[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]
The DoD continues to see an increase in number of COS officers filling JDA
assignments twice. Many proponents of GNA note this increase as another positive
step in the evolution of the Act.
The narrative of the SecDef report reveals that a total of 284 field grade waivers:
18 JSO sequence, 32 JSO two-tour, 5 JDA assignment and 229 JDA tour length
waivers were utilized in FY1999.
The following charts provide promotion comparisons of joint officers in relation
to service officers. These comparisons were intended to offer a view of the quality of
the officers assigned to joint positions.
Table 9. Army Promotion Comparisons
Are Serving InHave Served InTotal in Zone
Grade Category In Below Above In Below Above
Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone
% % % % % % Con Sel %
0-8Joint Staff100N/AN/A80N/AN/A8788
JSO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 23 10 44
Service HQ67N/AN/A60N/AN/A11764
Other Joint80N/AN/A40N/AN/A15853
Board AvgN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A623252
0-7Joint Staff9N/AN/A0N/AN/A8645
JSO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 730 13 2
Service HQ5N/AN/A1N/AN/A19474
Other Joint5N/AN/A3N/AN/A272135
Board AveN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A1725402
0-6Joint Staff63087450453169
JSO 38 0 4 65 4 0 125 74 60
Service HQ372258301849652
Other Joint560419132469137
Board Avg4223422380634142
0-5Joint Staff92220N/A0N/A121192
JSO 100 0 0 86 0 N/A 7 6 86
Service HQ7250841301148877
Other Joint8165522731723374
Board Avg69436943138695469
0-4Joint StaffN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A000
JSO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0
Service HQ7800N/AN/AN/A9776
Other Joint75000N/AN/A5360
Board Avg78419784191732135378
NOTE: Con = considered; Sel = selected
* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”
[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]
Table 10. Air Force Promotion Comparisons
Are Serving InHave Served InTotal in Zone
Grade Category InZone BelowZone AboveZone InZone BelowZone AboveZone
% % % % % % Con Sel %
0-8Joint Staff33N/AN/A0N/AN/A9111
JSO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 61 19 31
Service HQ29N/AN/A13N/AN/A21524
Other Joint0N/AN/A0N/AN/A500
Board AvgN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A932830
0-7Joint Staff10N/AN/A3N/AN/A5136
JSO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 565 26 5
Service HQ7N/AN/A2N/AN/A14486
Other Joint1N/AN/A3N/AN/A22942
Board AvgN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A1615403
0-6Joint Staff8612255540473472
JSO 61 0 5 57 2 0 125 71 57
Service HQ532661601508959
Other Joint4724342172048441
Board Avg4121412179833041
0-5Joint Staff9550N/A00191895
JSO N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0
Service HQ8099819018314780
Other Joint7146592438626268
Board Avg654365431817117965
0-4Joint StaffN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A000
JSO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0
Service HQ96N/A100100N/AN/A313097
Other Joint86N/A10080N/A0272385
Board Avg86N/A1386N/A131953168987
NOTE: Con = considered; Sel = selected
* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”
[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]
Table 11. Marine Corps Promotion Comparisons
Are Serving InHave Served InTotal in Zone
Grade Category InZone% BelowZone% AboveZone% InZone% BelowZone% AboveZone% Con Sel %
0-8Joint Staff0N/AN/A50N/AN/A3133
JSO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 17 9 53
Service HQ22N/AN/A100N/AN/A12542
Other JointN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A
Board AvgN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A221046
0-7Joint Staff13N/AN/A11N/AN/A35411
JSO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 200 9 5
Service HQ4N/AN/A0N/AN/A6723
Other Joint6N/AN/A3N/AN/A7634
Board AvgN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A490153
0-6Joint Staff53001000N/A181161
JSO 40 0 0 50 0 0 31 13 42
Service HQ25005000381540
Other Joint55002100411946
Board Avg44004400.012079244
0-5Joint Staff570N/A0N/AN/A8450
JSO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0
Service HQ77007300.04957175
Other Joint81077800786381
Board Avg68056800.0556338168
0-4Joint StaffN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A000
JSO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0
Service HQ9105000N/A121083
Other Joint100N/AN/AN/AN/AN/A44100
Board Avg840128400.1278865884
NOTE: Con = considered; Sel = selected
* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”
[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]
Table 12. Navy Promotion Comparisons
Are Serving InHave Served InTotal in Zone
Grade Category InZone% BelowZone% AboveZone% InZone% BelowZone% AboveZone% Con Sel %
0-8Joint Staff0N/AN/A50N/AN/A16744
JSO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 22 7 32
Service HQ22N/AN/A67N/AN/A18844
Other Joint40N/AN/A50N/AN/A14750
Board AvgN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A462248
0-7Joint Staff22N/AN/A6N/AN/A110109
JSO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 411 11 3
Service HQ7N/AN/A1N/AN/A260125
Other Joint3N/AN/A3N/AN/A24773
Board AvgN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A1249353
0-6Joint Staff930507300483879
JSO 25 0 0 69 0 13 110 67 61
Service HQ56314641111156153
Other Joint380441101667042
Board Avg471114711179237547
0-5Joint Staff8880670011982
JSO N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0
Service HQ89087610725881
Other Joint71397614016412073
Board Avg65166516116475965
0-4Joint StaffN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A000
JSO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0
Service HQ6003310000161275
Other Joint69009100423174
Board Avg6914196914191706117869
NOTE: Con = considered; Sel = selected
* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”
[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]
As detailed earlier and as can be noted in Tables 9-12, promotion comparisons
are complex.
Appendix E:
For Additional Reading/Bibliography
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