FEDERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: BUDGETING AND PRIORITY-SETTING, 1993-2000

CRS Report for Congress
Federal Research and Development:
Budgeting and Priority-Setting, 1993-2000
March 14, 2001
Genevieve J. Knezo
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

Congressional Research Service The Library of Congress

Federal Research and Development:
Budgeting and Priority-Setting, 1993-2000
Summary
During his two Administrations, President Clinton linked research and
development (R&D) to economic growth and sought partnerships between govern-
ment and business in research and innovation. In contrast to the two previous
Administrations which increased defense R&D relative to civilian R&D, the Clinton
Administration sought to reduce defense R&D funding and to increase funding for
civilian R&D, including at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National
Science Foundation (NSF), and for environmental research. The Republican majority^th^th
priorities during the 104 to 106 Congresses stressed, in large part, deficit reduction,
deregulation and tax incentives to foster market-driven innovation, and support for
civilian basic research and defense R&D as governmental functions.
Both President Clinton’s and Congress’s R&D priorities reflected moves to
balance the budget. As a result, in terms of constant dollars (that is, inflation-adjusted
dollars) of budget authority, federal R&D was funded below the previous high
funding level (FY1992) for each year from FY1993 to FY1999. During this period,
pressures mounted to raise funding for R&D programs. As budget surpluses started
to grow (beginning in 1997), Congress circumvented or raised caps imposed on the
discretionary portion of the federal budget, and as a result, major R&D funding
increases were made in the FY1998 to FY2001 budget cycles. In constant dollars,
FY2001 funding for nondefense R&D was 28% higher than for FY1993, while
FY2001 defense R&D was 6% less than for FY1993. Civilian R&D increases were
led by NIH whose R&D budget grew 72% in constant dollars between these two
years, followed by increases for R&D at NSF, at 40%; the Commerce Department,

22%; the Environmental Protection Agency, 20%; the Agriculture Department, 16%;

and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2%. Between FY1993 and
FY2001, the Energy Department’s R&D budget was cut 7% in constant dollars.
FY2001 appropriations action funded defense and non-defense R&D at about the
same dollar amount for the first time since 1977.
Debates about priority-setting for R&D included increasing R&D in non-health
related fields to the same extent as in the health sciences fields; coordinating federal
agency R&D budgets to promote national needs as well as support of cutting-edge
science; and ensuring accountability for R&D spending. Special studies and caucuses
dealing with science policy were initiated in the House and Senate. In 1998, the
House passed a resolution endorsing the science policy study conducted by
Congressman Vernon Ehlers. The Senate passed a bill that would have increased
future R&D by specified minimum percentages, required the President to develop a
coordinated R&D budget, and enhanced R&D accountability.
Potential issues during the 107^th Congress could include whether R&D funding
increases will be maintained in the face of potential tax cuts and economic slowdown,
funding levels for defense R&D and nondefense energy-related R&D, the funding
priority accorded areas of civilian R&D other than health research, and funding levels
for federal technology development programs.

Contents
Introduction ................................................... 1
Presidential Priority-setting........................................1
R&D Budgeting in the Context of Deficit Reduction.................3
Federal R&D Is a Decreasing Part of National R&D Spending..........6
Detailed Summaries of R&D Budgeting From FY1996 to FY2001.........10
Fiscal Year 1996...........................................10
Fiscal Year 1997...........................................11
Fiscal Year 1998...........................................12
Fiscal Year 1999...........................................13
Fiscal Year 2000...........................................16
Fiscal Year 2001...........................................17
Other Issues Relating to Priority-Setting.............................19
Congressional Earmarking of Specific R&D Projects................19
Coordination of R&D Priority-Setting...........................22
Funding for Large Research Projects............................24
Priorities for Critical Technologies..............................25
The “Ehlers” Report........................................26
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.................27
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC).................29
Potential Issues for the 107^th Congress...............................30
List of Figures
Figure 1. Federal Spending on Defense and Nondefense R&D,
FY1949-FY2001, Line Graph^a.................................2
Figure 2. Federal Spending on Defense and Nondefense R&D,
FY1949-FY2001, Bar Graph...................................3
Figure 3. Trends in Nondefense R&D Funding by Budget Function,
FY1953-FY2001 ............................................ 4
Figure 4. Trends in R&D Funding, By Agency, From FY1993 to FY2001,^a
Percentage Change in Constant Dollars of Budget Authority..........5
Figure 5. R&D Funding as a Percentage of Discretionary Spending,
FY1962-FY2001 ............................................ 8
Figure 6. R&D as a Percentage of Gross, Domestic Product (GDP).........9
List of Tables
Table 1. Budget for R&D, FY1994 to FY2001, est.....................31
Table 2. Historical Data on Federal R&D, FY1976-2001................37

Federal Research and Development:
Budgeting and Priority-Setting, 1993-2000
Introduction
This report describes executive and legislative activities relating to research and
development (R&D) budgets and priority-setting that occurred primarily during
FY1993 to FY2001, the period of the two Clinton Administrations. It includes
detailed summaries of presidential priorities and congressional appropriations^th^th
activities for R&D in the 104 to 106 Congresses. In addition, the report
summarizes other salient issues discussed during this period relating to congressional
earmarking of R&D projects, activities to coordinate R&D priority-setting, priorities
for critical technologies, implementation of the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993 in R&D agencies, and priority-setting activities of the National Science
and Technology Council (NSTC). This report is based in part on CRS Issue Brief
94009, which chronicled R&D budgeting and priority-setting activities from 1994 to

2000.

Presidential Priority-setting
Since it started funding large amounts of R&D after World War II, the federal
government has always supported core fields of science, but the focus in R&D
budgets has changed in response to policy shifts, congressional concerns, and
presidential prerogatives. During the 1970s, interest focused on space R&D, growth
in energy and health research and reductions in defense R&D (R&D in the
Department of Defense (DOD) and defense R&D in the Department of Energy
(DOE)). In FY1978, non-federal sources, largely industry, started to eclipse the
federal government as a source of R&D funding. Support for defense R&D and for
basic research became prominent during the 1980s, with the Administrations of
Presidents Ronald Reagan and President George Bush.¹ Energy research and space
research funding declined. In FY1989, near the end of the Reagan Administration,
about 65% of federal R&D funding went to defense R&D (R&D in DOD and defense
R&D in DOE), and near the end of the Bush Administration in FY1993, defense R&D
received about 57% of federal R&D funding. (For details, see Figures 1 and 2 and
Table 2.)

¹Following the precedent used by the National Archives and Records Administration, the Bush
Administration, 1989-1993, is cited as the Administration of George Bush. The Bush
Administration, beginning in 2001, is cited as the Administration of George W. Bush. These
forms are used in this report.

Figure 1. Federal Spending on Defense and Nondefense R&D,
FY1949-FY2001, Line Graph^a
Federal Spending on Defense and Nondefense R&D
^{Outlays for the conduct of R&D, FY 1949-2001, billions of constant FY 2000 dollars}
⁶⁰
⁵⁰
⁴⁰
³⁰
²⁰
¹⁰
⁰
¹⁹⁴⁹¹⁹⁵⁴¹⁹⁵⁹¹⁹⁶⁴¹⁹⁶⁹¹⁹⁷⁴¹⁹⁷⁹¹⁹⁸⁴¹⁹⁸⁹¹⁹⁹⁴¹⁹⁹⁹
^{Defense R&D}^{Nondefense R&D}
^{Source: OMB Historical Tables. FY 2001 is the President's request.}^{FEB. '00 © 2000 AAAS}
a Source: American Association for the Advancement of Science, AAAS, at
[http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/rd/guihist.htm]. This source is used for all AAAS figures that
are in this CRS report.
Partly in response to the end of the Cold War, but also influenced by policy
inclinations, President Clinton sought to change these priorities — primarily to reduce
defense R&D in DOD and in DOE and to increase civilian research, technology
investment and development, basic research, computer networking, and
commercialization of R&D.² This shift was intended to ensure federal support of
R&D to promote economic growth, a basic policy objective of the Clinton
Administration.³ See Figure 2.

²For historical information, see: Genevieve J. Knezo, “Policies on Science and Technology
Topics Proposed By the Clinton Campaign: A List,” CRS Report 93-96 SPR, January 27,
1993, 6 p. See also Glenn McLoughlin and Wendy Schacht, “Technology Policy Initiatives
in the Clinton-Gore Administration,” CRS Report 93-357 SPR, Mar. 18, 1993. 48 p.
³The 1995 Economic Report of the President and the Council of Economic Advisors’ (CEA)
October 1995 report, Supporting R&D to Promote Economic Growth: The Federal
Government’s Role, reported that the estimated social rate of return to R&D averages 50%,
which, the CEA said, is significantly higher than returns on other investments. This finding
(continued...)

Figure 2. Federal Spending on Defense and Nondefense R&D,
FY1949-FY2001, Bar Graph
Federal Spending on Defense and Nondefense R&D
^{Outlays for the conduct of R&D, FY 1949-2001, billions of constant FY 2000 dollars}
⁸⁰
⁷⁰
⁶⁰
⁵⁰
⁴⁰
³⁰
²⁰
¹⁰
⁰
¹⁹⁴⁹¹⁹⁵⁴¹⁹⁵⁹¹⁹⁶⁴¹⁹⁶⁹¹⁹⁷⁴¹⁹⁷⁹¹⁹⁸⁴¹⁹⁸⁹¹⁹⁹⁴¹⁹⁹⁹
^{Defense R&D}^{Nondefense R&D}
^{Source: OMB Historical Tables. FY 2001 is the President's request.}^{FEB. '00 © 2000 AAAS}
R&D Budgeting in the Context of Deficit Reduction
R&D budgeting during the period 1993-2001 occurred amid activities^r^d
undertaken to halt deficit spending and to balance the budget. The 103 Congress
imposed, beginning in 1993, limits on discretionary spending—the part of the budget
from which most R&D is funded. Later, in 1997, the President and Congress agreed
on a balanced budget bill that capped discretionary spending through FY2002.
Because of the spending caps imposed by Congress, R&D programs increasingly
competed with funding for other discretionary programs as discretionary spending
was projected to decline from 37% of total outlays in FY1999 to about 30% in
FY2002. Thus R&D funding vied even more than it had in the past with programs
for public infrastructure, housing, discretionary social services programs, and
transportation, even as funding for these programs overall was projected to decline.
During the first Clinton Administration, 1993 to the beginning of 1997, funding
for many R&D programs was reduced in constant dollar (inflation-adjusted) terms,

³(...continued)
is not without controversy. For instance, The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, by
Terence Kealey, 1996, disputed a link between government support of S&T and economic
growth and endorsed a smaller governmental role in R&D.

especially for space, energy, defense, and environment (in EPA and the Interior
Department). See Figure 3 and Tables 1 and 2. Appropriations in the 104^t^h, 105^th
and 106^th Congresses were subject to caps, which continued to be applied, even as the
economy started to rebound and budgetary surpluses started to grow (beginning
Figure 3. Trends in Nondefense R&D Funding by Budget Function,
FY1953-FY2001
Trends in Nondefense R&D by Function, FY 1953-2001
^outla^{ys for the conduct of R&D, billions of constant FY 2000 dollars}
⁴⁰
³⁰
²⁰
¹⁰
⁰⁼
¹⁹⁵³¹⁹⁵⁸¹⁹⁶³¹⁹⁶⁸¹⁹⁷³¹⁹⁷⁸¹⁹⁸³¹⁹⁸⁸¹⁹⁹³¹⁹⁹⁸
^Health^{Gen. Science}^Environ.^Other^Energy^Space
^{Source: AAAS, based on OMB Historical Tables in}^{Budget of the United States}
^{Government FY 2001.}^{Constant dollar conversion based on GDP deflators. FY}
^{2001 is the President's request.}^{Note: Some Energy programs shifted to General Science beginning in FY 1998.}
^{FEB. '00 © 2000 AAAS}
in 1997). Because of wide congressional support for R&D, starting in 1996,
Congress, despite the pressure of caps, began to give R&D funding a higher priority.
In 1996, Congress appropriated 1.8% more for FY1997 R&D than the President had
requested. This pattern of congressional increases continued in succeeding years. In
addition, R&D funding started to increase over each previous year in terms of
constant dollars, beginning with FY1997. For FY1999 and FY2000, Congress used
emergency spending authority to circumvent budget caps in many areas, and, as one
result, federal R&D appropriations were increased.
For FY2001, Congress, utilizing CBO forecasts of additional surpluses, raised
the discretionary caps to about $100 billion above the existing cap and above what the
President had requested, paving the way for major increases in R&D appropriations.
For FY2001, Congress substantially increased R&D funding to $91 billion, 9.1%
more than in FY2000. R&D in every federal agency was funded at more than in
FY2000. R&D funding in all agencies, except the National Science Foundation

(NSF), Commerce, Transportation, the Smithsonian, and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), was appropriated at levels higher than requested. Defense
and non-defense R&D funding was equalized, for the first time since the late 1970s.
In constant dollars, health R&D funding (which had received about 14% of total R&D
funding at the end of the George Bush Administration) received about 21% of total
FY2001 R&D appropriations, and about 43% of the civilian R&D budget.
Over the period FY1993 to FY2001, as shown in figure 4, funding was increased
almost 60% in constant dollar terms for R&D in the National Institutes of Health
(NIH); for the National Science Foundation (NSF), 35%; for R&D in the Department
of Commerce and EPA, over 20%; and for the Agriculture Department,
Figure 4. Trends in R&D Funding, By Agency, From FY1993 to FY2001, Percentage
Change in Constant Dollars of Budget Authority^a
Source: AAAS Reports, based on OMB and agency R&D budget data, and on AAAS
estimates of R&D in FY2001 appropriations. Includes conduct of R&D and R&D facilities.
Constant dollar conversions based on OMB’s GDP deflators. Based on millions of constant
FY2000 dollars. Original source was prepared by AAAS in 2000, as “Historical Table 2,”
from [http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/rd/ca01main.htm].
about 15%). Large increases were made for research in computer and information
sciences, for nanotechnology, and for technology initiatives in the Department of
Commerce. R&D funding decreased in terms of constant dollars for NASA, and for
DOE and DOD R&D, by about 5% each. Basic research funding was increased by
about $5 billion in constant dollars from FY1993 to FY2001. The emphasis,
however, was on NIH basic research which increased about $3.5 billion in constant
dollars, while non-NIH basic research increased by a smaller amount, about $1.5

billion constant dollars. Considerable pressure was applied by non-biomedical
scientists and their supporters during the FY1999 to FY2001 appropriation cycles to
balance funding among fields of science and among R&D agencies while increasing
funding. Specifically, they sought to increase funding for non-health civilian R&D to
keep pace with the steady and substantial increases that had been made in health
R&D.
The Clinton Administration’s success at reducing defense R&D and increasing
civilian technology-oriented funding altered federal R&D priorities. For instance,
defense R&D spending declined in constant dollars by 18.2% between FY1987, the
peak year of funding for defense R&D and FY2001. The percentage decline since the
FY1993 budget (the last Bush budget) and FY2001, the last Clinton budget, was
6.3%. Civilian R&D spending increased about 28% in constant dollars between the
FY1993 and FY2001, with the focus largely on biomedical research at NIH.
The last Democratic majority 103rd Congress had reoriented some R&D
programs to focus more on projects which would generate economic benefits or
contribute to “strategic” programs – to solve a problem or contribute to industrial
capability. This was reflected in large increases for technology transfer and
development at NIST and for clean car technology and high-performance computing
programs. The NSF and the NIH emphasized “strategic,” i.e., applications-oriented
research. Attempts were made by some leaders of the succeeding Republican-led
Congresses, beginning with the 104^th Congress, to halt technology development and
applications-oriented research and to abolish some technology-oriented programs and
agencies, such as DOE and the Commerce Department. Funding for basic research
and especially for health research in NIH typically has received considerable
congressional priority.
Federal R&D Is a Decreasing Part of National R&D Spending
In FY2000, Federal R&D funding was estimated to be higher in constant dollars
of budget authority for the first time since the previous peak in FY1992, a peak which
was due largely to the Reagan and previous Bush Administrations’ defense R&D
buildups. In terms of outlays, the previous peak was in FY1990, which was estimated
to have been surpassed for the first time since then in FY2001. Despite these
increases, R&D funding decreased from about 12% of total federal outlays in 1965,
during the buildup for the space program, to about 4.4% today, and from about 16%
of budget authority in 1966 to about 12.9% in 2001.⁴ Federal R&D funding has also

⁴ Based on data in tables 5.4 and 9.7 in Office of Management and Budget, Historical
Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2001. The OMB data in these
tables report outlays for each fiscal year. Outlays, according to the Congressional
Quarterly’s American Congressional Dictionary, are “Amounts of government spending.
They consist of payments, usually by check or in cash, to liquidate obligations incurred in
prior fiscal years as well as in the current year, including the net lending of funds under budget
authority. In federal budget accounting, net outlays are calculated by subtracting the amounts
of refunds and various kinds of reimbursements to the government from actual spending.
(continued...)

decreased as a percentage of discretionary outlays, from about 17% of total
discretionary outlays in FY1965 to about 12% today. See Figure 5.

⁴(...continued)
Much of the data used in this report, which come from the data series and analyses of
the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), report R&D funding in
terms of budget authority, which “is the authority provided in law to enter into obligations
that will result in immediate or future outlays of Government funds. Government officials
may obligate the Government to make outlays only to the extent they have been granted
budget authority. The budget records budget authority as a dollar amount in the year when
it first becomes available.” (Office of Management and Budget, The Budget Systems and
Concepts, Fiscal Year 2001, p. 9.) AAAS budget authority data, which were used to develop
Tables 1 and 2 in this report, show that the previous constant dollar high for R&D spending
occurred in 1992 (not 1990 as OMB reports, using outlay data). This was during the George
Bush Administration. OMB data, like AAAS data show that in terms of constant dollars,
R&D funding fell below this 1992 level for every succeeding year until FY2000. The OMB
data show that the FY1990 OMB high year was not exceeded until FY2001, estimated.
While budget authority and outlays are not equal, they provide internally consistent trend
comparisons; historical trends of outlays and budget authority provide similar conclusions.
Note: according to the Congressional Quarterly’s American Congressional Dictionary,
obligations are defined as: “A binding agreement by a government agency to pay for goods,
products, services, studies, and the like, either immediately or in the future. When an agency
enters into such an agreement, it incurs an obligation. As the agency makes the required
payments, it liquidates the obligation. Appropriation laws usually make funds available for
obligation for one or more fiscal years but do not require agencies to spend their funds during
those specific years. The actual outlays can occur years after the appropriation is obligated;
for example, a contract for payment for a submarine when it is delivered in the future. Such
obligated funds are often said to be “in the pipeline.” Under these circumstances, an agency’s
outlays in a particular year can come from appropriations obligated in previous years as well
as from its current-year appropriation. Consequently, the money Congress appropriates for
a fiscal year rarely coincides with the total amount of appropriated money the government
will actually spend in that year.”

Figure 5. R&D Funding as a Percentage of Discretionary Spending,
FY1962-FY2001
R&D as Percent of Discretionary Spending:
^{FY 1962-2001, in outlays}
^25%
^20%
^15%
^10%
^5%
^0%
¹⁹⁶²¹⁹⁶⁸¹⁹⁷⁴¹⁹⁸⁰¹⁹⁸⁶¹⁹⁹²¹⁹⁹⁸
^{Nondefense R&D / Nondefense discretionary}
^{Total R&D / Total discretionary}
^{Source: AAAS, based on Budget of the U.S. Government FY 2001}^{Historical Tables}
^{FEB. '00 © 2000 AAAS}
In addition, Federal R&D funding, expressed in terms of outlays, also dropped
relative to total national economic performance, from an annual average of its peak
of 2.1 % of GDP in 1964 to 0. 8% estimated for FY2001.⁵ See Figure 6.
Overall federal R&D funding has increased over time even as it dropped as a
percentage of federal discretionary spending. But because private sector R&D has
increased even faster, federal R&D funding has continued to decrease as a percentage
of total national R&D funding. The federal share of support first fell below 50% of
the national R&D total in 1979 and it has been declining ever since.⁶ The National
Science Foundation (NSF) projected that total U.S. R&D would rise to about $264
billion in FY2000 (preliminary data), due largely to significant rises in industry-funded
R&D, resulting from growth in the economy. Industry-funded R&D was expected
to increase to $179 billion, or about 68% of total national funding for R&D, in
FY2000 (preliminary data). The government’s share has declined to 27% of the total.
Most industrial R&D support goes to applied research and to development. Based on
national expenditure data from NSF, preliminary data for FY2000 show that 31% of

⁵These data are from OMB, Historical Tables, op. cit.
⁶See Tables 1B and 2B, In National Patterns of R&D Resources: 2000 Data Update.
Available at: [http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/nsf01309/start.htm].

federal government R&D expenditures⁷ went to support basic research, compared
with 8% of industry-funded R&D. During that same year, the federal government
funded 49% of total national expenditures for basic research, while industry funded⁸

31%.

Figure 6. R&D as a Percentage of Gross, Domestic Product (GDP)
The federal government is the major national supporter of basic research, which
generates much of the knowledge that industry uses for innovative R&D. Most
industry-funded research typically is applied or development-oriented, geared to
product development. As a result, some observers in and outside of Congress have
expressed concern that federal support for research, especially for basic research,
should be sustained at high levels as a public good to enhance the U.S. ability to
advance scientifically and technologically and to broaden the knowledge base that
industry uses.

⁷NSF surveys performers and supporters of research to collect data about R&D expenditures.
Apparently those who report information are given latitude in defining what an expenditure
is. See NSF, National Patterns, 1998, “General Notes,” pp. 2-3. Expenditures do not equal
outlays or budget authority.
⁸ Table 2 b, NSF, National Patterns of R&D Resources: 2000.Data Update.

Detailed Summaries of R&D Budgeting From
FY1996 to FY2001
Presented next is summary discussion, for each of the fiscal years 1996 to 2000,
of presidential R&D budget priorities, congressional R&D appropriations activities,
and representative efforts made to modify R&D priorities. The objective of these
summaries is to give a snapshot of each year’s R&D budgeting highlights. The
summaries also give illustrations and examples of some of the priorities and trends
described above. Unless otherwise noted, the funding data in this section is expressed
in terms of budget authority. See Table l for specific details of agency budgets. See
Table 2 for funding levels expressed in terms of constant, inflation-adjusted dollars.
Fiscal Year 1996
For FY1996, the Clinton Administration proposed an R&D budget totaling
$72.6 billion. The Administration’s priorities were similar to FY1995, when cuts
were made in defense and energy research (the Superconducting Super Collider and
nuclear weapons), and funding was increased in applied technology programs in
NIST, in NSF (for basic research, facilities and instrumentation), and in NIH. During
1995, congressional scrutiny of R&D increased in response to budget pressures, and
efforts were made to de-emphasize the government’s role in civilian
applications-oriented R&D and to focus more attention on basic research. The
Republican-majority 104th Congress attempted to reduce programs of civilian
technology development, which many Republicans traditionally oppose on the
grounds that the private sector, not the government, should make market-related
choices and share the risks and rewards. P.L. 104-6 and P.L. 104-19, emergency
supplemental appropriations acts, rescinded an additional $2.43 billion in R&D for
FY1995 and FY1996.
Each year Congress passes a budget resolution, which sets spending levels, or
caps, for total spending and for each budget function that appropriations committees
use in setting discretionary spending allocations (called 302b allocations) for each
appropriations subcommittee. The resolution also gives out-year projections based
on current budget and economic assumptions and recommends priorities for spending.
The accompanying legislative report may include explanations of the amounts to be
allocated by the committees that have jurisdiction over the programs in each budget
function.⁹
The Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1996, (H.Rept.
104-159), reflected serious budget pressures that would affect R&D funding. The
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) calculated, based on
information in the budget resolution, that civilian R&D would be cut, in constant
dollars, to about 66% of its 1995 level by FY2002.

⁹For additional information, see OMB, Budget Systems and Concepts of the United States
Government, published annually.

However, FY1996 congressional appropriations action reduced R&D less than
projected (4% below the constant dollar FY1995 level) and R&D was increased in
NIH, and in DOD and DOE, in the latter two agencies primarily for nuclear weapons
and ballistic missile defense. Congress reduced funding for civilian energy R&D,
transportation R&D, the Advanced Technology Program (ATP), and R&D in the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), in the Department of
Commerce.
Fiscal Year 1997
President Clinton proposed an R&D budget of $72.7 billion for FY1997, a
decrease of about 1.5% in constant dollars from FY1996. Using the President’s
Mid-Session Review of the FY1997 Budget, adjusted for the latest economic data,
AAAS estimated that non-defense R&D would be reduced 19% in constant dollar
terms by FY2002 if the budget were enacted as requested. The President sought
increases for NSF, NIH and for the Advanced Technology Program and the
Manufacturing Extension Program in the Commerce Department. Increases were also
requested for environmental R&D, energy efficiency and pollution prevention, the
new generation of vehicles partnership, and Mission to Planet Earth. H.Con.Res. 178,
the budget resolution for FY1997 that both the House and the Senate passed,
recommended reducing non-defense R&D 6% by 1997 and included projections of
a 23% constant dollar reduction for non-defense R&D by 2002. It proposed cutting
basic research less than in the Administration’s budget plan, but recommended cutting
R&D funding below requested levels for NASA, DOE, the Agriculture Department
(USDA), Commerce, Transportation, and EPA–primarily for reductions in applied
research and technology. The budget resolution recommended that space shuttle
operations be contracted out and that programs for energy supply R&D, fossil energy,
and conservation be reduced substantially. It recommended that NOAA refocus on
core missions; that R&D be cut in the Interior Department for the Geological Survey,
National Biological Services, and Bureau of Mines; that agricultural research and
extension be cut; and that in the Department of Commerce, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology’s (NIST) science and technological activities be increased,
and that ATP programs be eliminated.
Objections to R&D reductions were raised by the Administration and in
Democratic staff documents. The National Science Board, the governing policy body
of the National Science Foundation, released a statement, “On Federal Investments
in Science and Engineering,” NSF Press Release, January 25, 1996, calling for more
R&D funding. The views of the Democratic membership of the House Science
Committee were contained in comments on the “Omnibus Civilian Science
Authorization Act of 1996,” April 30, 1996. Eventually the FY1997 appropriations
enactments raised R&D funding 3.7% above the FY1996 level, with increases for
R&D in DOD and NIH and reductions for R&D in NASA, DOE, Agriculture,
Interior, Transportation, Commerce, and Education. The ATP program was not
eliminated. Basic research was funded at 8.2% above FY1999, a net gain of 1.9%
in constant dollars.

Fiscal Year 1998
The President’s FY1998 $74 billion R&D budget proposed to reduce overall
funding in constant dollars, by increasing non-defense R&D and basic research, while
reducing defense R&D. AAAS projected that this budget would reduce non-defense
R&D funding by 9.4% in constant dollars by FY2002 and defense R&D funding by

17.8%.

By 1997, when the FY1998 budget was under consideration, federal R&D
funding had been below the previous high funding level for six years in terms of
constant dollars of budget authority. See Table 2. As a result, pressures were
mounting from the research community and within Congress to raise federal R&D
spending to help sustain the Nation’s R&D infrastructure and to support R&D to
enhance innovation and knowledge growth. Congressional differences with the
President’s budget proposals were embodied in several pieces of legislation, none of
which was enacted. S. 124, the “National Research Investment Act of 1997,” would
have doubled funding authorization for non-defense R&D over the next 10 years,
specifically doubling NIH’s budget. The “National Research Investment Act of
1998,” S. 1305, would have doubled the federal S&T budget between 1999 and

2009.¹⁰

S. Res. 15 would have expressed the sense of the Senate to double NIH funding
over the next 5 years. Senator Arlen Specter, chairman of the Senate Appropriations
subcommittee that deals with NIH, announced a commitment to a 7.5% increase in
the NIH budget. In 1998, the Senate passed S. Amdt. 2272 to S.Con.Res. 86, the
Senate Budget resolution, that the Senate passed. The amendment expressed the sense
of the Senate that the NIH budget should be doubled within the next five years.
The House Science Committee, in “Views and Estimates for FY1998”
recommended an increase of 3% above FY1997 for the S&T programs within the
committee’s jurisdiction. This goal, it said, could be met within the framework of a
balanced budget. Representative George Brown, ranking Democrat on the Science
Committee, testified to the House Budget Committee that funding should be increased
for R&D, capital infrastructure, and education and training by $70 billion over the
next 5 years, using the $135 billion surplus estimated by CBO. Pressure to increase
funding came also from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Panel on Federal
S&T Analyses;¹¹ the AAAS, in a March 24, 1997 analysis; and from the presidents of
four scientific societies, who, at a March 4 press conference, recommended a 7%
increase in funding. In contrast, a CATO Institute meeting in early February 1997
discussed The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, by Terence Kealey, which
disputed a link between government support of S&T and economic growth and
endorsed a smaller governmental role in R&D.
About $468 million worth of R&D rescissions were included in a supplemental
appropriations bill for FY1997, with reductions for DOD R&D and for a NASA wind

¹⁰ Introduction of the bill followed a conference on “A Decade of Investment,” attended by
more than 100 scientific and engineering societies.
¹¹At: http://www.nas.edu/fsrd/fsrd.html.

tunnel. As the year progressed, a healthy economy and increased tax receipts led to
forecasts of budget surpluses and elimination of deficits in 1998. For FY1998, final
congressional appropriations action raised federal R&D funding 4.2% above the
FY1997 level and 1.8% above the President’s request. All major R&D agencies
except the Department of Transportation (DOT) and USDA received increases ahead
of the expected 2.5% inflation rate, including: DOD, 2.8%; USDA, 0.6%; DOE,
3.1%; NSF, 6.1%; EPA, 14.2%; and NASA, 5.3%. The Research and
Experimentation Tax Credit for industry was extended retroactively and to June 30,

1998 in P.L. 105-34.

Fiscal Year 1999
The Administration sought $78 billion for R&D in FY1999, 2.6% more than for
FY1998, including an increase of 5.8% for non-defense R&D and a decrease of 0.3%
for defense R&D. The President’s budget gave priority to R&D in NIH, NSF, and
DOE (for greenhouse gas emissions reduction technology and for DOE defense
R&D). Reductions were proposed overall for R&D at DOD, but with increases in
basic and applied research; for NASA, NOAA, EPA, and DOT; and for most
agencies’ support for R&D facilities, except for DOE’s Spallation Neutron Source.
Basic research was to be increased by about 7.7% overall. AAAS said, “the programs
slated for increases show the priority the Administration is placing on fundamental
science, biomedical research, energy research in support of reducing U.S. greenhouse
gas emissions, industrial technology, and science in support of a Comprehensive Test
Ban treaty....”¹² $27.1 billion of the non-defense R&D budget would have been
funded from discretionary funds. The rest (about $4 billion), “essentially representing
all of the requested increases for non-defense R&D in NIH, NSF, DOE and other key
agencies, would come from new offsetting revenues outside the cap,”¹³ would have
been funded from a special “Research Fund for America,” which excluded the Space
Station and other programs. About $3.6 billion of this approximately $4 billion
would have come from a proposed controversial tobacco settlement (S. 1415), that
Congress did not approve.
The Senate budget resolution for FY1999 (S.Con.Res. 86) called for cuts in non-
defense research to 2003, but expressed non-binding language to support increases
for funding at NIH and for basic research. The House budget resolution (H.Con.Res.
284), which passed in the Senate in an amended form, endorsed increasing NIH
funding by about 10% for 5 years, but would have reduced other civilian R&D
budgets. Using assumptions in the budget resolution, AAAS made out-year
projections that defense R&D funding would decrease by 4.5% between FY1998 and

2003 and non-defense funding would increase by 21%.

Although it represented an increase over FY1998 in current dollars (not adjusted
for inflation), the FY1999 request was about 2% less than FY1998 in constant,
inflation-adjusted dollars. The House Science Committee in its Views and Estimates
for FY1999 proposed sustained increases at or above requested levels. The Science

¹²AAAS, Preliminary Analysis of R&D in the FY1999 Budget, March 5, 1998, p. 5
¹³AAAS, Preliminary Analysis of R&D in the FY1999 Budget, p. 2.

Committee’s criteria stressed funding long-term, high-risk, well-managed R&D;
agency-relevant research; exclusion of “marketing and commercialization” projects;
full leveraging of international, industry, and state science partnerships; and¹⁴
prioritizing of infrastructure necessary for program requirements. Both President
Clinton and House Speaker Gingrich spoke publicly about the importance of R&D to
the economy and pledged to seek additional R&D funding.¹⁵ OMB Director Franklin
Raines called for scientists to give more attention to priority-setting, measuring
performance, and avoiding special pleading for pet projects in order to increase
federal support of R&D.¹⁶
Congress approved $80.2 billion for R&D, about 3.1% above the presidential
request and 5.3% more than for FY1998. All major R&D agencies except NASA
received increases above the expected 2.0% rate of inflation. Congress increased
funding by using some of the $70 billion federal surplus and by allocating $21 billion
in emergency “off-budget” spending, freeing up funding for some programs which
would have been restricted by budget caps. In relation to FY1998, basic research
funding was increased 11.3%. The largest R&D appropriations increase went to NIH,
at 15% over FY1998. DOE’s R&D appropriation was 11.4% higher than FY1998,
with increases in R&D in solar and other renewables, fossil energy and energy
conservation, and basic energy. Total defense R&D was increased 3.5%; NASA’s
R&D budget was cut by 1.6%, reducing funds for the International Space Station, but
increasing funding for space sciences and for life and microgravity sciences and
applications. NSF’s R&D was increased 8.4%; increases were made for NIST
laboratories, the Advanced Technology programs and NOAA; USDA’s budget was
increased 6.6%; funding for the U.S. Geological Survey’s biological research was
increased; in EPA, R&D appropriations were 3% higher than in FY1998, with an
increase in funding for particulate matter research.
Authorizing legislation which had been introduced first in 1997 generated
considerable attention, although it was not enacted: S. 1305, the “National Research
Investment Act of 1998,” (introduced in 1997) would have doubled R&D funding
within 10 years. It was not supported by some members of the academic community
or by some appropriations committee members. Its out-year projections would have
funded R&D about $12 billion more than the budget resolution in 2003. House
Science Committee analysis concluded the bill would reduce non-defense R&D by
more than $3.5 billion from current levels between 1999 and 2003 and that it
disproportionately favored NIH.¹⁷ The succeeding bill introduced in 1998, S. 2217,
the “Federal Research Investment Act,” (H.R. 3121 in the House), whose principal
sponsor was Senator Bill Frist, one of the leaders of the Senate Caucus on Science
and Technology that had been created in 1996, passed in the Senate. The bill
mandated federal funding levels for fundamental, scientific, and pre-competitive
engineering research to be increased to equal approximately 2.6% of the total federal

¹⁴Science Committee Calls for Increase in Research Funding, press release, March 20, 1998.
¹⁵“The Reappropriator,” Washington Post, June 18, 1998, A23; and American Institute of
Physics, 1998, FYI #91 and #96.
¹⁶Science, June 12, 1998, p. 1671.
¹⁷Washington Fax, April 22, 1998

budget. It also required a presidential report on R&D, and study and actions dealing
with improving measures of research performance by agencies, and termination of
research programs that were not performing successfully. It passed the Senate in
October 1998. No action was taken in the House.
P.L. 105-277 extended the research and experimentation tax credit for industry
for one year retroactively to July 1998, allowed full funding of $335 million without
incorporation into a block grant for the Eisenhower Professional Development
Program to improve training for teachers in math and science, and, in a move which
generated controversy, extended the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act
to extramural grants (the Shelby amendment). This was later narrowed by OMB
interpretation to selected research data used or cited in federal actions having the
force and effect of law.¹⁸

¹⁸The FY1999 omnibus appropriations bill (P.L. 105-277) required OMB to establish
procedures for the public to obtain access to data from federally funded research, through
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. This was a major change from traditional
practice. While permitted, federal agencies typically have not required grantees to submit
research data, and pursuant to a 1980 Supreme Court decision, agencies, under FOIA, did not
have to give the public access to research data not part of agency records.
There was considerable debate about this legislation. Opponents said that FOIA is an
inappropriate vehicle to allow wider public access. They said that using it would harm the
traditional process of scientific research--human subjects would refuse to participate in
scientific research, believing that the federal government might obtain access to confidential
information; researchers would have to spend additional time and money preparing data for
submission to the government, thereby interfering with ongoing research; and government/
university/industry partnerships would be jeopardized because data funded jointly would be
made available under FOIA. Proponents of the amendment said that “accountability” and
“transparency” were paramount: the public should have a right to review scientific data
underlying research funded by government taxpayers and used in making policy or setting
regulations. OMB released final revisions to Circular A-110, as directed by law, on
September 30, 1999. After considerable public comment, OMB limited access under FOIA
to selected research data that the federal government cites or uses in actions having the force
and effect of law. Legislation was introduced in the 106^th Congress (H.R. 88) to repeal the
law and hearings were held, but the bill did not pass.
Court challenges may be raised to the circular. (See: Public Access to Data from
Federally Funded Research: OMB Circular A-110 and Issues for Congress. By Eric A.
Fischer and Genevieve J. Knezo, CRS Report RL30376, Nov. 18, 1999. 37 p. ) Reportedly,
William L. Kovacs, vice president of environmental and regulatory affairs for the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and a major supporter of the legislation, predicted that the OMB
regulations, which some see as being too narrow in allowing access to research data, could
be revisited by the new Bush Administration. Court challenges to the amendment, he was
reported to have said, probably would wait until the government sought to issue controversial
new regulations “based on unavailable research data.” (Victoria Slind-Flor, “Law Applies
Act to Information if U.S. Funds Are Involved,” The National Law Journal, October 30,
2000.) The National Academies held a conference on this topic, entitled, “Seeking Access to
Research Data in the 21st Century: An Ongoing Dialogue Among Interested Parties,” part
of the Science, Technology, and Law Program, in Washington, D.C., on March 12, 2001.

Fiscal Year 2000
The President’s budget request for R&D included an increase of 2.9%, which
was above the inflationary level of 2% for non-defense R&D, making it 51% of the
R&D budget request. Defense R&D was slated to decline 5.3% from FY1999 due
to cuts in weapons development and applied research. Within the defense R&D
category, only DOD basic research was proposed to be increased, by about $6 million
more than in FY1999. The Administration sought a $336 million initiative in
“Information Technology for the 21^s^t Century,” with increases in long-term
fundamental research funding in NSF, DOE and DOD, representing a 28% increase
in the then current level of funding for information technology. The President
requested 8.6% more than in FY1999 for DOE’s R&D in renewable energy
technology and energy conservation; transportation R&D was proposed to be
increased 11.6%. Basic research would increase 4.2% over FY1999, continuing the
pattern of recent increases. NSF’s R&D budget would be increased by 7.8%; DOE’s
non-defense R&D budget would increase 6.4%. NIH’s budget was proposed to
increase by 2.0%. The President sought to increase NASA’s R&D to $9.8 billion,
primarily for the International Space station, up 7.7%. Commerce’s R&D budget
included an 18% increase for the NIST Advanced Technology program and would
have provided $283 million to NOAA for research related to climate change and
associated subjects. The Administration proposed a “21^st Century Research Fund,”
to highlight important R&D programs. For the long-term, the President’s budget
showed all agencies’ R&D budgets’ declining in constant dollar terms between
FY2000 and FY2004, with the largest declines in NIH.
Final congressional action funded FY2000 R&D at about $83 billion, about 5%
over FY1999 and 7% over the President’s request. The largest increases were in NIH
and DOD, followed by NSF, DOE, and USDA. Excluding NIH, R&D funding for
nondefense R&D increased 2.4%. Because of the large projected budget surplus
($123 billion), there was pressure to circumvent caps in the appropriations process,
as was done in 1998 for the FY1999 budget. While sticking to mandatory budget
caps, Congress allowed appropriations for discretionary programs to exceed capped
levels by designating up to $14 billion above the caps as emergency spending,
mandating a 0.38% across the board cut, delaying some spending to FY2001, and
using offsets. The increases for R&D exceeded those proposed by the President for
NIH, NASA, DOD S&T, defense R&D, and basic research. Congressional action
resulted in R&D funding at levels less than the President proposed for NSF, DOE,
and USDA, and for information technology programs.
H.R. 2086, a Science Committee bill on networking and information technology
that passed the House in 2000, would have increased funding over the following five
years for information technology. The House Science Committee’s calls for
increasing R&D budgets appeared in its “Analysis and Review” of the FY2000 R&D
budget.¹⁹ Its bipartisan FY2000 Views and Estimates Report endorsed a 3% increase
for R&D programs under its jurisdiction. Non-biomedical scientists and others

¹⁹ Appearing at: [http://www.house.gov/science/welcome.htm].

continued to criticize the emphasis given to biomedical research and sought to
rebalance the federal R&D funding portfolio to support lagging fields of science.²⁰
H.R. 1180, enacted as P.L. 106-170, the “Work Incentives Improvement Act,”
contained a 5-year extension of the research and experimentation tax credit for
industry. (See CRS Issue Brief IB92039.) S. 296, the “Federal Research Investment
Act,” (H.R. 3121 in the House), the successor to S. 2217, 105^t^h Congress, passed the
Senate on July 26, 1999. The bill would have doubled R&D funding within 11 years,
at a 2.5% annual increase above the rate of inflation for all fields of science in major
agencies. It also mandated a separate detailed budget presentation on R&D;
addressed better accountability, effectiveness and efficiency in federal R&D funding;
required an NAS study and OMB guidance on performance measures for research;
and established a process to terminate unsuccessful research programs. No action
was taken in the House on the bill in 1999.
Fiscal Year 2001
With the FY2001 budget submission, President Clinton proposed to raise budget
caps, permitting a 5.2% increase in total discretionary spending. He also sought to
ensure greater funding balance among R&D agencies and fields, given the recent large
increases for health R&D. However, funding for most other fields had decreased,
remained stable, or increased less. The President also sought to raise the federal R&D
budget 3% over FY2000 to $85.3 billion, with the largest increases for non-defense
R&D, at 6.2%; and to reduce defense R&D by about 0.2%. The FY2001 budget
proposed larger increases for R&D in non-life sciences disciplines than for life
sciences research. R&D increases, in descending order, were proposed for DOT,

25%; NSF, 19%; DOE, 8%, the Commerce Department, 7%; NIH, 6%; and EPA,

5%. NSF’s increase would go to support the agency as the lead for interagency
initiatives in nanotechnoloy, information technology, and biocomplexity research.
Projections for the budget showed that between FY2000 to FY2005, non-defense
R&D would increase by 14.2% (3% in constant dollars); defense R&D would
decrease by 4.7% (a 14.6% decrease in constant dollars).
The FY2001 congressional budget resolution, H.Con.Res. 290, approved April
13, did not include detailed recommendations for federal support of R&D, but it
developed targets for budget functions and appropriations that support R&D. AAAS
projected that the resolution would permit increases in non-defense R&D in FY2001,
but, nonetheless, would reduce R&D spending 7.8% in inflation-adjusted dollars by
2005. R&D would be reduced in constant dollars in all agencies, except for NSF and
DOT. Because the plan proposed tax cuts and would not allow use of the Social
Security surplus, funding levels would be lower than those projected in the President’s
budget. Defense R&D was projected to decline 13.7% in inflation-adjusted dollars
by 2005.
For FY2001, Congress, utilizing CBO forecasts of additional surpluses, raised
the caps on discretionary spending to about $100 billion above the existing cap and

²⁰ “Balancing the Federal Research Portfolio: Who’s Deciding and Why?” Science, August

11, 1999.

above what the President had requested, paving the way for major increases in R&D
appropriations. During the FY2001 appropriations process, Congress substantially
increased R&D funding to $91 billion, 9.1% more than FY2000. R&D in every
agency was increased over FY2000 and R&D in most agencies, except NSF, DOT,
EPA, the Commerce Department, and the Smithsonian, was funded higher than
requested. The largest increases were for NIH and the Defense Department. Funding
levels for defense and non-defense R&D were about equal, for the first time since the
late 1970s. There was an 8.9% increase in funding for non-defense research,
excluding NIH. This was smaller than the NIH increase of 15%, but reversed recent
trends of declining or stable funding for non-health sciences. The increase in DOD
research support resulted in increases for physical sciences and engineering research.
Nanotechnology research was increased 55% over FY2000 (but NSF’s lead role was
scaled down); NSF’s support for information technology R&D was more than
doubled; basic research support was increased by about 11.8% overall. Substantial
increases in NIH’s R&D budget were made during the 1990s, so that its funding totals
about the same as all other non-defense agencies’ R&D funding combined. The
FY2001 increases for civilian R&D agencies, excluding NIH, raised their funding
levels to about what they were in the early 1990s in terms of inflation-adjusted dollars.
See Table 2.
Considerable effort was made during congressional deliberations to increase
funding for federal R&D. The House Science Committee in its Views and
Estimates...for Fiscal Year 2001, noted that “...out-year budgets are either flat or
actually decline. The President’s budget fails to meet the stable and sustainable
funding criteria needed for science and technology programs in the out-years” (p. 2).
Rep. Vernon Ehlers sought support from colleagues “... to sign a letter to the
chairman and senior Democratic member of the House Appropriations Committee,”
urging that high priority be given to basic scientific research in the FY2001
appropriations process ((302b) allocations).²¹ In part in an effort to explain the
importance of R&D to the public, the President’s Committee of Advisors on Science
and Technology released a report, Wellspring of Prosperity, Science and Technology
in the U.S. Economy, How Investments in Discovery Are Making Our Lives Better,
Spring 2000. An Office of Science and Technology (OSTP) report sought to
demonstrate the economic benefits of federal R&D: Discovery and Innovation:
Federal Research and Development activities in the Fifty States...., 2000, 650 pp.
S. 296, the “Federal Research Investment Act” that was passed the Senate first
in 1999 as S. 2217, passed again in the Senate in 2000 as Title I of the “Next
Generation Internet Act,” S. 2046, amended. It authorized increases for civilian R&D
funding at set amounts, with the goal of investing 10% of the discretionary budget in
civilian R&D by 2011. It also included provisions to measure research performance
and accountability. House Science Committee Chairman James Sensenbrenner
opposed it because, he said, it would weaken the authorizations process.²² The House
did not pass the bill.

²¹ The American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Science Policy News, no. 33, March 23,

2000. A copy of the letter is included in the article.

²²“The Bombs Bursting in Air,” What’s New, Sept. 29, 2000, <Whatsnew@aps.org>.

Other Issues Relating to Priority-Setting
Several other issues relating to priority-setting were prominent between 1993
and 2000, including criticism of so-called earmarking, coordination of R&D priority-
setting, priorities for critical technologies, the “Ehlers” report, implications for R&D
of the Government Performance and Results Act, and the role of the National Science
and Technology Council.
Congressional Earmarking of Specific R&D Projects
There has been considerable controversy about congressional earmarking for
R&D. Earmarking may be defined as the practice of Congress, in report language or
law, directing that appropriated funds go to a specific performer to conduct a project
or designating awards for certain types of performers or in certain geographic²³
locations. Typically an agency has not included these awards in its budget request

²³This definition accords with common standard definitions. See, for instance, (1) from the
Congressional Quarterly American Congressional Dictionary: “Earmark - To set aside
funds for a specific purpose, use, or recipient. Generally speaking, virtually every
appropriation is earmarked, and so are certain revenue sources credited to trust funds. In
common usage, however, the term is often applied as an epithet for funds set aside for such
purposes as research projects, demonstration projects, parks, laboratories, academic grants,
and contracts in particular congressional districts or states or for certain specified universities
or other organizations.” [Http://www.crs.gov/products/guides/newformat/
Glossary/e.html]; (2) OMB Circular A-11, (Revised 2000), defines the following as
“Research Performed at Congressional Direction: Intramural and extramural research
programs where funded activities are awarded to a single performer or collection of
performers with limited or no competitive selection or with competitive selection but outside
of the agency’s primary mission, based on direction from the Congress in law, in report
language, or by other direction. Funded activities may be merit-reviewed prior to award,”
p.282; and (3) The CRS report, Fact Sheet on House Budget Process, 98-518 GOV, by
Sandy Streeter, Updated Feb. 11, 1999, defines “Earmarks and Limitation in Appropriations
Bills,” as “An annual appropriations act is generally made up of separate paragraphs, each
of which provides funding for specific agencies and programs. Generally, each paragraph
corresponds to a unique account and provides appropriations for multiple projects and
purposes as a single lump sum. Earmarks and limitations are two devices regularly used in
annual appropriations acts to restrict, or more precisely direct, the availability of funds for
specific projects or purposes of an account. Sometimes an earmark or a limitation may
generate more interest or controversy than the total appropriation. ...An earmark refers to
funds set aside within an account for a specified purpose. Sometimes earmark refers to any
congressional set-aside for a specified program, project, activity, institution, or location. At
other times, the term more narrowly refers to set-asides for individual projects, locations, or
institutions. For example, an appropriations bill including $100 million for a construction
account may set aside $10 million of the construction funds for a particular project. In
addition to setting aside funds, the earmark might also provide spending floors by stating that
not less than $10 million must be used for the specified project. Some earmarks are included
in the text of appropriations measures, floor amendments, and conference reports to such
measures. If enacted, these earmarks are legally binding. Most earmarks, however, are
included in the Senate and House Appropriations Committees’ reports explaining a measure
as reported. Earmarks are also frequently included in the managers’ joint explanatory
(continued...)

and often such awards may be made without prior competitive peer review.
Opponents believe that the practice forces agencies to fund projects that they normally
would not have funded. Critics believe that earmarking undermines the authorization
process and distorts agency R&D priorities. In addition, many earmarks establish new
centers or institutions, which might require federal support in the future. Supporters
of earmarking believe the practice helps to develop R&D capability in a wider variety
of institutions, that it compensates for reduced federal programs for instrumentation
and facilities renewal, and that it generates economic benefits in targeted regions
because R&D capacity generates industrial growth. The enactment of legislation to
give the President a line-item veto was expected to reduce earmarking if the earmarks
were specified as line-items in relevant enactments (P.L. 104-130). Subsequently, the
Supreme Court struck down the line-item veto.
There is scant federally collected data about earmarking and these data differ
from that collected by others. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)
reported that for FY1993, Congress had earmarked about $1,712 million for R&D
and research facilities (71% more than for FY1992), including $442 million for
universities (22% more than for FY1992).²⁴ The Chronicle of Higher Education
reported that congressional earmarks for academia, which consist largely of R&D²⁵
projects, totaled $763 million for FY1993. OSTP has not released any similar data
since then. President Clinton’s chief of staff, John Podesta, said in a speech on
September 1, 1999 at the National Press Club, that Congress earmarked about $1
billion for R&D for FY2000.²⁶ The Chronicle of Higher Education (July 28, 2000),
which has been collecting data on congressional earmarks to colleges and universities
for several years, reported that such language, largely for R&D, totaled $1.044 billion
for FY2000, an increase of 31% over FY1999, continuing an upward trend begun for
FY1997, after 3 years of decline following the previous peak of $763 million in
FY1993.
There have been attempts to limit earmarking for R&D. In 1993, the late
George E. Brown, chairman of the House Science Committee, sought to limit the
ability of appropriations committees to earmark R&D funding for specific projects,

²³(...continued)
statement (or managers’ statement) that accompanies the conference report. Committee reports
and managers’ statements do not have statutory force; departments and agencies are not
legally bound by their declarations. These documents do, however, explain congressional
intent and frequently have effect because departments and agencies must justify their budget
requests annually to the Appropriations Committees.”
²⁴“Congressional Earmarks in the FY1993 Appropriations,” Memorandum for J. Thomas
Ratchford From Willis H. Shapley, December 8, 1992, attached to Letter from D. Allan
Bromley, The Assistant to the President for Science and Technology to Honorable George
Brown, U.S. House of Representatives, December 10, 1992.
²⁵Colleen Cordes and Katherine McCarron, “Academe Gets $763 million in Year From
Congressional Pork Barrel,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, June 16, 1993, pp. A21-
A26.
²⁶Speech before National Press Club, discussed in American Institute of Physics Bulletin of
Science Policy News, no. 79, July 5, 2000.

because he said it undermined the authorizations process.²⁷ Proposals have also been
made to limit the dollar amount that could be spent on earmarked capital projects and
to subject all grants to competitive review. The Clinton-Gore technology policy
document, Technology for America’s Economic Growth, February 1993, stated that
the Administration would “work closely with Congress to prevent ‘earmarking’ of
funds for science and technology.” The Final Report of the House Members of the
Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, December 1993, recommended
that committee reports list all earmarked funds below the appropriations account
level.²⁸ Aspects of earmarking and indirect costs were scrutinized in a GAO report,
Department of Transportation: University Research Activities Need Greater
Oversight.²⁹ Sec. 7203 of P.L. 103-355, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of
1994, was expected to encourage merit-based selection procedures and to discourage
earmarks. However, the law does not appear to be applicable to report language,
where many earmarks appear.³⁰ In 1997, several FY1998 authorization bills passed
by the House (for NSF, NASA, NIST, and other agencies) would have limited agency
funding for R&D beginning in FY1998 only to persons who received funds from any
federal agency after FY1997 by means of a competitive, merit-based process. The
ban would have lasted for 5 years. This provision was not enacted into law.
OMB categorizes federal agency R&D awards into five categories, whose
spectrum ranges from earmarks (called “research performed at congressional
direction”) to rigorously merit-reviewed, competitively selected research.³¹ The
categories are
!Research performed at congressional direction,
!Inherently unique research,
!Merit-reviewed research with limited competitive selection,
!Merit-reviewed research with competitive selection and internal (program)
evaluation,
!Merit-reviewed research with competitive selection and external (peer)
evaluation.
Although in some cases congressionally-directed funds may be merit-reviewed
prior to award, they are not competitively selected as is much merit-reviewed R&D,
and as such are considered a distinct category from merit-reviewed research. The
Clinton Administration announced in 1995 that increasing the amount of merit- (peer)

²⁷“Brown Sees Gains in His Battle Against Academic Earmarks,” Congressional Quarterly,
December 4, 1993, 3307-3310.
²⁸H. Rept. 103-413, vol 1, p. 11.
²⁹RCED-94-175, May 1994.
³⁰For technical information on earmarking as part of the legislative process, see The
Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction, by Sandy Streeter, CRS Report

97-684 GOV, Updated Sept. 29, 2000, 33 p.

³¹OMB Circular A-11, revised 2000, pp. 282-283.

reviewed R&D programs would constitute one of its performance goals.³² Merit-
reviewed R&D programs constituted “almost 40%” of the proposed R&D budget for
FY1996.³³ In the FY2001 proposed budget, merit-reviewed programs were reported³⁴
to constitute about 37% of the proposed R&D budget.
Other efforts were made by the Clinton Administration to increase merit-
reviewed research, and, it seems, to decrease earmarking. President Clinton’s
FY2001 budget proposal noted that as result of a recommendation made in a NSTC
report on the Government-University Partnership, “..agencies have reported the
amount of funding that was awarded through...Congressional direction. The
Administration is in the process of developing consistent measures across Federal³⁵
agencies for [this type of award] in order to publish the data in the 2002 budget.”
The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)³⁶ report, Renewing the
Federal Government-University Research Partnership for the 21^s^t Century, April
1999, issued by the NSTC in response to Presidential Review Directive - 4, endorsed
the need for merit-review in funding federal research projects (Chaps. 4 and 5). It
said the NSTC “supports OMB’s effort to refine the definition of merit-review in its
annual revision of the terms in OMB Circular-11, Preparation and Submission of
Budget Estimates (part 1).” It also said the NSTC would seek ways to decrease
practices of awarding research funds that bypass merit-review processes (chap. 5).
Coordination of R&D Priority-Setting
Some observers recommend more centralized priority-setting for R&D in
Congress and in the Executive branch. They cite the disadvantages of not having a
single mechanism in the executive branch to determine a unified and explicit R&D
budget or to evaluate the total government R&D portfolio in terms of progress
toward meeting national objectives. They also argue that congressional jurisdiction
for R&D is split among a number of committees and subcommittees preventing
examination of the R&D budget as a whole. This, they say, means that R&D funding
can serve particular local or program interests, but may not be appropriate for a
national R&D agenda. Opponents see value in a decentralized system in which
budgets are developed, authorized, and appropriated separately by those most familiar
with the needs of specific fields of R&D—the department or agency head and the
specific authorizing and appropriations subcommittees with jurisdiction for the
agency.
Several recommendations were made during the period FY1993 to FY2000 to
improve coordination of R&D priority-setting and budget-making. For instance, in the

³²Chapter 7 of President’s FY1996 Budget entitled “Investing in Science and Technology”
³³Ibid.
³⁴Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2001, p. 99.
³⁵Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2001, p. 183.
³⁶Created by President Clinton by Executive Order 12881 on November 23, 1993 with
cabinet-level status.

biomedical area, in October 1997, House Speaker Gingrich announced he would
appoint a group, including Members of Congress, to assess how NIH sets research
priorities.³⁷ The Institute of Medicine produced Scientific Opportunities and Public
Needs: Improving Priority Setting and Public Input at the National Institutes of
Health, 1998. NIH held public meetings on priority-setting, in response to the report.
Outside of Congress, a 1996 report by the Council on Competitiveness, “Endless
Frontier, Limited Resources,” recommended new partnerships between governmental
and non-governmental sectors to keep U.S. R&D vital. Considerable attention was
given to emphasizing the need for federal support of basic research (not technology
development) as a priority.³⁸ In December 1997, the National Science Board, part of
the governing body of the National Science Foundation, released a report,
“Government Funding of Scientific Research,” calling for mandatory priority-setting
and coordination of federal R&D. This followed its August 1997 announcement that
it would try to play a bigger role in setting national S&T priorities and policy. A
series of 1997 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) reports, Preparing for the 21st
Century, identified priorities for support to maintain U.S. research strength, social and
environmental quality, and economic growth. The 1999 NAS Committee on Science,
Engineering and Public Policy (COSEPUP) report, Evaluating Federal Research
Programs, recommended better coordination of federal research priorities and
designation of lead agencies in instances when similar R&D was conducted by
different federal agencies.
In 1991, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), an agency of Congress
(since disbanded), reported that R&D priorities should be explicit, in order to evaluate
R&D projects against such national goals as national prestige, political needs,
scientific merit, education, building regional capacity, geographic distribution, and³⁹
training. In 1995, as NAS report, Allocating Federal Funds for Science and
Technology, 1995, recommended that the President present to Congress, and that the
Congress consider, the R&D budget as a unified whole before the separate parts of
the budget were considered by individual congressional committees. It also
recommended that it be reconstituted from an R&D budget to a science and
technology (S&T) budget, excluding development activities, to connote the function
of creating new knowledge. Objections to this concept were raised by the American
Physical Society at hearings held by the House Science Committee in February 1996.⁴⁰
S. Amdt. 2235 (Bingaman and Lieberman) to the Senate Budget Resolution
(S.Con.Res. 86) for FY1999 endorsed the views of the 1995 Academy Report, and
expressed the sense of the Senate that for fiscal years 2000 to 2004, all federal civilian
S&T program spending should be classified under budget function 250, which now

³⁷COSSA Washington Update, June 29, 1998, 6.
³⁸ Committee for Economic Development, America’s Basic Research: Prosperity Through
Discovery, 1998.
³⁹Federally Funded Research: Decisions for a Decade, 1991.
⁴⁰“House Science Committee Holds Hearing on the “Press Report.” What’s New, American
Physical Society, March 1, 1996.

encompasses science and technology,⁴¹ and that the President should classify these
programs, which cross all federal civilian departments and agencies, in function 250.
The resolution passed the Senate on April 2, 1998.
As for Administration activity, a presidential report, Science in the National
Interest, 1994, outlined the Administration’s goals to support both long-range
research and research aimed at meeting shorter term “strategic goals,” to increase
support for civilian research to establish interagency initiatives on topics the
Administration considered priority issues, and applied research and proposed actions
to meet five broad goals for U.S. global leadership in S&T. National R&D
investment, it said, should be increased to 3% of GDP. The President’s priorities
appeared in Science and Technology Shaping the 21st Century, Report to Congress,
1997, and in a 1995 white paper, “Technology and Economic Growth: Producing
Real Results for the American People,” which stressed applied R&D. In 1997, the
White House and the National Governors Association established a mechanism to
promote coordinated federal and state technology efforts.
Pressure to coordinate priority-setting for R&D could continue in the new
George W. Bush Administration, especially if physical, natural sciences, and social
sciences researchers continue to press for more funding in the face of continuous
increases for health sciences research. In addition, Congress could enforce tight
discretionary caps depending upon FY2002 budget projections and outyear
assumptions. This could increase pressure to set priorities for federal R&D more
systematically and to ensure that it receives what supporters consider an appropriate
share of federal discretionary spending.
Funding for Large Research Projects
Megaprojects, or “big” science projects, like the space station, require long-term,
large capital investments or long-term funding commitments for individual researchers
working toward a research goal, such as the Human Genome Project. They may
necessitate building new large facilities or instruments, which require commitment of
large amounts of annual operating funds that can limit long-term flexibility of federal
R&D funding. Critics say that as funding for big science increases and large amounts
of financial support are committed to one R&D topic, less money is likely to be
available for smaller research projects which might be riskier, and, as a result,
opportunities for “frontier” creative science could diminish.
Funding for U.S. megaprojects decreased and the composition of megaprojects
priorities has changed considerably since FY1992, with decreases for defense, and
some slight increases for civilian megaprojects, despite the cancellation of the

⁴¹According to OMB Circular A-11, Exhibit 79 b, p. 178, Circular A-11, revised (2000),
function 250, GENERAL SCIENCE, SPACE AND TECHNOLOGY includes the
subfunctions of 251, General science and basic research, and 252, Space flight, research and
supporting activities. NSF reports, however, that “Not all federally sponsored basic research
is categorized in function 251, ... some basic research is included in the remaining 19
functional categories,(Federal R&D Funding by Budget Function, Fiscal Years 1998-2000,
p. 2).

Superconducting Super Collider and the scaling back of the space station. Cutbacks
occurred because of perceived waste resulting from failures, budgetary pressures,
lack of foreign contributions, and pressures from other fields of science.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCED) science
ministers, in September 1992, adopted a U.S.-initiated proposal to establish a formal
body to promote cooperation and priority selection for megaprojects, called the
Megascience Forum. Its mandate was renewed for three years in 1995 and, in April
1999, the forum was given a new mandate for five years and renamed the OECD
Global Science Forum, with the goals of promoting collaboration, removing barriers
to effective international scientific cooperation and preserving funding resources.⁴²
Recent activities focus on international cooperation in structural genomics,
high-tensity proton beam facilities, biological informatics, nuclear physics, radio
astronomy, neutron sources, and neutron scattering facilities in the OECD countries
and in Russia.
Priorities for Critical Technologies
The 1989 enactment of P.L. 101-189, a national defense authorization act for
FY1990 and FY1991, authorized the director of OSTP to prepare biennial reports for
the President and Congress to identify no more than 30 national critical dual-use
technologies “essential for the United States to develop to further the long-term
national security and economic prosperity of the United States.” The list is meant to
help guide priority setting for R&D. OSTP produced four reports under this
mandate. The third, National Critical Technologies Report, 1995, covered 27
technologies and compared the current U.S. competitive position relative to Japan
and Europe. The fourth and most recent report produced under these mandates, New
Forces at Work: Industry Views Critical Technologies, 1998, identified the most
often cited essential technologies as: software, microelectronics and
telecommunications technologies, new materials, and sensor and imaging
technologies, and emphasized the importance of finding enough skilled people to
work in these areas.
In one of its final actions, the Clinton Administration’s National Science and
Technology Council, in January 2001, released the executive summary of a
forthcoming report, New Foundations for Growth: The U.S. Innovation System Today
and Tomorrow.⁴³ The report provides a blueprint for establishing priorities and
enhancing the effectiveness of federal policies that facilitate technological innovation
in the private and public sectors. It was prepared by the RAND Corporation’s
Science and Technology Policy Institute (a successor to the Critical Technologies
Institute created by OSTP in part to fulfill the mandate of the law), a federally funded
research and development center (FFRDC) serving as the policy research arm of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy. The report made recommendations for
both private and public sector initiatives. Among the many recommendations were:
improve the portfolio of public research by assessing priorities and providing balance

⁴²Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/s_t/ms/index.htm.
⁴³Available at: http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1338.0/.

across fields; make the Research and Experimentation tax credit permanent; clarify
intellectual property rights policy; examine federal investment priorities in
“infratechnologies”—data, measurement and testing methods, and standard practices
and techniques; evaluate policy guidelines for R&D partnerships; raise the awareness
of federal agencies to issues affecting the national innovation system; and work on
ways to improve methods to measure performance of research investments.
P.L. 100-456, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1989 required the
DOD to report annually to the congressional defense committees a plan for
developing the 20 technologies considered by the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Energy to be the technologies most essential to develop in order to
ensure the long-term qualitative superiority of U.S. weapon systems. The law required
both product and process technologies to be considered in selecting the technologies
to be included in such a plan. The DOD’s first report responsive to this requirement
was Critical Technologies Plan, 1989. During 1992, the DOD released its Defense
Science and Technology Strategy report, the first in the department’s series of science
and technology reports responsive to the law. The names and types of reports DOD
prepares in response to the law have evolved over time. Currently the department’s
objectives, plans and priorities for science and technology appear in the reports
entitled Defense Science and Technology Strategy, 2000, 2000 Defense Technology
Objectives, 1999 Defense Technology Area Plan, and in 2000 Joint Warfighting
Science and Technology Plan (JWSTP). In addition, the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, part of DOD, maintains and continuously updates a publication entitled
Militarily Critical Technologies, of which “Part III: Developing Critical Technologies
(DCT),” describes critical technology in 20 areas, ranging from aeronautics, through
information technologies, to weapons effects technologies. The document lists U.S.
and worldwide technologies that would produce increasingly superior performance
of military systems or maintain a superior capability more affordably. DOD develops
the list in cooperation with other U.S. government agencies, U.S. industry, and
academia, through the militarily critical technologies list process in response to the
Export Administration Act of 1979. The documents are available from the Defense
Technical Information Center (DTIC).
The “Ehlers” Report
In 1997, Representative Vernon Ehlers was tasked by the House leadership to
head a special study on science policy. Following a series of hearings, a report
entitled Unlocking Our Future was released on September 24, 1998. On October 8,
1998, the House passed H.Res. 578, declaring “it is the sense of the
House...that...[the report] should serve as a framework for future deliberations on
congressional science policy and funding.” The academic community generally
praised the report, although some criticized it as not supporting the social sciences,
not addressing all major issues critical to future applications of science, and not
proposing major changes in funding patterns or mechanisms. On the whole, it
generated considerable discussion about future policies for U.S. science support.⁴⁴

⁴⁴“Congress Ratifies Ehlers Science Policy Report,” Washington Fax, October 15, 1998;
“Seeing the Ehlers Report as a Republican R&D Manifesto, Rather Than a National Science
(continued...)

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
The Government Performance and Results Act, P.L. 103-62, is related to the
issue of priority-setting since the law requires agencies to define long-term goals, set
specific annual performance targets, and report annually on performance. The law is
intended to ensure accountability for federal investments and to develop processes
which ensure that an agency’s programs and priorities meet its goals. The law allows
the use of qualitative measurement alternatives if quantitative methods can not be
used. This is especially salient to agencies that fund R&D since, they say, it is
difficult to define goals and priorities for many basic research programs and to
measure the results quantitatively , since research outcomes often can not be defined
well in advance and accomplishments take a long time to demonstrate and document.
The NSTC Committee on Fundamental Science in Assessing Fundamental Science,
July 1996, and the Federal Research Roundtable, an informal interagency group now
terminated, developed guidance for R&D performance measures. Also, GAO
produced Measuring Performance: Strengths and Limitations of Research
Indicators, RCED-97-91. The National Research Council in a February 1999 report,
Evaluating Federal Research Programs: Research and the Government Performance
and Results Act, recommended that federal agencies use performance measures for
research and issued “benchmarking” reports comparing the status of U.S. science to
other countries for mathematics, materials science and engineering, and immunology.
Federal agencies submitted GPRA-related strategic plans to Congress in
September 1997 and delivered their first annual performance plans with FY1999
budget justifications. A House Majority Leader report rated the FY1999 plans. The
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and the Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs held hearings on implementation. The House Science
Committee held hearings in 1996 and 1997 on implementation in the science agencies
and, in 1997, announced that research performance measurement would be an
oversight target. Several congressional committees asked agencies to link FY1999
and FY2000 budget requests to goals expressed in their strategic and performance
plans. The agencies’ first performance reports, for FY1999, were delivered to the
Congress during 2000.⁴⁵ During 2001 agencies will submit FY2000 performance
reports and FY2002 performance plans.
S. 296, the Federal Research Investment Act, an amendment to S. 2046 that
passed the Senate in 2000,⁴⁶ would have required the OSTP director to enter into an
agreement with the NAS to conduct a comprehensive study to develop methods for

⁴⁴(...continued)
Policy, Is Not a Bad Thing...,” Washington Fax, October 21, 1998; and Richard E. Scolve,
“For U.S. Science Policy, It’s Time for a Reality Check, Chronicle of Higher Education,
October 23, 1998, pp. B4-B5. The NAS endorsed specific follow-up in its Science and^t^h
Technology for the Nation: Issues and Priorities for the 106 Congress: Views...on
“Unlocking Our Future...,”December 16, 1998.
⁴⁵For additional details on this issue, see: Genevieve J. Knezo, Government Performance and
Results Act: Brief History and Implementation Activities, CRS Report RS20257, 6 p.
⁴⁶Passed in the Senate on September 21, 2000.

evaluating federally-funded R&D programs and would have required the OMB
director, based on study results, to promulgate one or more alternative forms for
federal R&D performance. It also would have set in motion a process to terminate
“unsuccessful” federal research programs. Versions of these provisions appeared in
the 105^th Congress in S. 2217. Also in the 105^t^h Congress, the Senate report on the
FY1999 VA/HUD appropriations bill that was enacted as P.L. 105-276, called on
NSF to identify quantifiable goals for research and gave OSTP and OMB authority^t^h
to seek the NAS study, as listed in S. 2217, 105 Congress, (predecessor to S. 2046,

106^th Congress). However, no funds were appropriated for the NAS study.

During 2000, the National Academies’ Committee on Science, Engineering and
Public Policy, (COSEPUP), with endorsement by the OSTP, the leadership of the
House Science Committee, and the major sponsors of the Senate legislation,
conducted a study to examine the processes R&D agencies use to prepare their
GPRA documents in an effort to ensure agency responsiveness to the GPRA
mandates. The final report is expected in Summer 2001.
In a 1993 report, Science, Technology, and the Federal Government: National
Goals for a New Era, the Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy⁴⁷
(COSEPUP) of the National Academies recommended that in order to determine
priorities for funding basic research, two main goals be used: (1) “the United States
should be among the world leaders in all major areas of science;” and (2) “the United
States should maintain clear leadership in some major areas of science.” Subsequently
the group examined the status of U.S. R&D in relation to other nations, using a
technique called international benchmarking. U.S. R&D status was examined in three
fields—mathematics, immunology, and materials science and engineering.
In March, 2000, a report that assessed U.S. status vis a vis other nations, using
benchmarking methodology was released, entitled Experiments in International
Benchmarking of US Research Fields. The Subcommittee on Basic Research of the
House Science Committee held a hearing on this topic on October 4, 2000, entitled
“Benchmarking U.S. Science: What Can It Tell Us?” The purpose of the hearing was
to examine the NAS report and benchmarking as a method to evaluate research
performance from an international comparative perspective.⁴⁸
Requirements for agencies to give precise goals for research and statements of
performance outcomes could become more salient because of congressional actions
taken in 2000 and 2001. P.L. 106-531, the “Reports Consolidation Act of 2000,”
permits agencies to combine annual GPRA performance reports with financial reports
required under the Chief Financial Officers Act, to be called a “Performance and
Accountability Report.” The agency head is required to assess the completeness and
reliability of the performance data that agencies use and to include a summary of the
performance report in the accountability report if the two reports are not combined.
In addition, with the passage of H.Res. 5, the House Rules Committee adopted a rule

⁴⁷64 pages; available online at [http://books.nap.edu/catalog/9481.html].
⁴⁸U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science, Subcommittee on Basic Research,
Benchmarking U.S. Science: What Can It Tell Us?, Hearing, 106^th Congress, 2^nd Session,
October 4, 2000, 56 pp.

requiring that all “committee reports include a statement of general performance goals
and objectives, including outcome-related goals and objectives for which the measure
authorizes funding.” These requirements are intended to make performance measures
more precise.
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)
Executive Order 12881, issued by President Clinton on November 23, 1993,
established NSTC with cabinet-level status. It was a successor to the previous
Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology (FCCSET).
Among NSTC’s functions were recommending federal agency R&D budgets that
would help accomplish national objectives, advising OMB on federal agency R&D
budgets, and helping to coordinate presidential interagency R&D initiatives. In a
1997 report, Science and Technology and the President: A Report to the Next
Administration, the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government
criticized the breadth of these activities. It recommended “fine-tuning” NSTC to
concentrate on its role as a policy council and to allocate “its resources on a small
number of priority policy issues of concern to the President and reduce...its emphasis⁴⁹
on detailed R&D program development and coordination.” There is no evidence
that the NSTC reoriented its work in response to this recommendation.
Beginning in 1995, with the FY1996 budget request, NSTC started to identify
major Administration R&D priorities and submitted budget requests that identified
these as cross-cutting budget initiatives whose R&D activities were coordinated by
NSTC interagency committees. The FY2001 initiatives, which represented major
Administration priorities, whose funding was highlighted in the President’s budget^st
under the heading of the “21 Century Research Fund, included: the “National
Nanotechnology Initiative; Change Technology; U.S. Global Change Research;
Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles; Integrated Science for Ecosystem
Challenges; Fundamental Health Research; Weapons of Mass Destruction;
Preparedness and Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D; and Education Technology
and the Interagency Education Research Initiative.” NSTC said had it established
performance measures for these areas. These were not published with the budget.

⁴⁹Available at [http://www.carnegie.org/sub/pubs/science_tech/nextadm.htm].

Potential Issues for the 107^th Congress
President Bush released a preliminary budget outline in February 200l, that gives
summary information about funding.⁵⁰ But discussion of detailed R&D budget issues
that will confront the 107^t^h Congress must await the release of the President’s full
budget. Candidate George W. Bush’s views on science were inventoried before the
election in Science magazine,⁵¹ among other places. Among issues that could be
raised in the 107^th Congress are such questions as
!whether R&D funding increases should continue, given predictions of a
possible slowdown in the economy, tax cuts, and increases in social services
spending, which may increase pressure to maintain congressional discretionary
spending caps in the outyears;
!whether the George W. Bush Administration will maintain the technology
policy initiatives favored by the Clinton Administration; and
!whether the George W. Bush Administration will restore the emphasis given
to defense R&D by previous Republican Administrations and implied by
President George W. Bush’s support for enhanced missile defense systems.
Debates are likely to continue on topics that were prominent during the last few
years, including earmarking, the appropriate balance between health research and
other fields of science, research priority-setting and accountability under the
Government Performance and Results Act, the emphasis to be given to energy R&D,
and coordination of priority-setting in the executive and legislative branches.

⁵⁰A Blueprint for New Beginnings -- A Responsible Budget for America’s Priorities,
February 2001.
⁵¹“Gore and Bush Offer Their Views on Science,” Science, Oct. 13, 2000, pp. 262-269..

CRS-31
Table 1. Budget for R&D, FY1994 to FY2001, est.
(Millions of dollars budget authority)
on information prepared by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (R&D Budget and Policy Project), which appears electronically at
. Data are from AAAS, as described in the footnote. These AAAS data include conduct of R&D and R&D facilities. R&D is a line-item
some agency budgets. Thus reported R&D funding data for specific programs vary depending upon the judgment of researchers, agency sources, assumptions
definitions of R&D, and a determination of whether science education is included and so forth. Alternative CRS data for R&D agencies, FY1996-FY2001 that
Research and Development Funding: Fiscal Year 2001, CRS Issue Brief IB10051.
R&D,^AR&DR&D ^BR&D^CR&DR&DR&DR&DR&D FY2001,
FY1994FY1995FY1996, FY1997, FY1998FY1999FY2000FY2001, est.
AAAS, est.request, est.
by AAAS
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL30905}^1* [550]10,459$10,762$11,443$12,217$13,097$14,971$17,102$18,094$19,597
^g/w141 135659690
^s^.or³ 100 168 209 229
^le^ak¹
¹ 203 318 323 346 358 438 477 518 585
^://wiki ³195 170170173159104135146140
^h^ttp² 86 77 50 50 50 61 55 139
²107414 1799914412562151241513147141
HHS R&D11,16911,47612,07712,91213,80915,75018,0821916820,879
^1* 2,089 2,064 2,137 2,254 2,366 2,516 2,649 3,183 3,343
100118000
¹ 52100 12688 7093 8090 10993 90108 94121 139110 121118
[250] 2,240 2,396 2,401 2,424 2,568 2,714 2,863 3,431 3,240

CRS-32
R&D,^AR&DR&D ^BR&D^CR&DR&DR&DR&DR&D FY2001,
FY1994FY1995FY1996, FY1997, FY1998FY1999FY2000FY2001, est.
AAAS, est.request, est.
by AAAS
⁴ 1,971 1,902 1,876 2,180 2,500 2,272 2,333 2,135 2,130
5,803 5,917 5,929 5,453 5,680 4,885 5,585 5,929 6,177
⁴] [250][489][2,020]2,1932,3992,483
[219]275302314
⁴] 1,443 1,406 1,483
⁴]1,714[1,422]1,7901,8621,976 1,991
¹ 1,6881,6401,612in SAT1,7047691,1251,1931,241
1,491545629657
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL30905}9,462 9,459 9,416 9,352 9,884 9,715 9,777 10,040 10,298^1*
^g/w [250]966959 972986
^s^.or¹ 2,2282,6512,6382,9693,001
^le^ak 20892,2451,8111,746550
373364468444
^://wiki¹ [270]341327333274276
^h^ttp¹ 295328293339
342357309324356
⁶ 225 3727-2-101400431465458
[270]3.43.0-400
² 230 61554055

3,9663,9323,4553,3283,3093,740 3,8164,2344,297

CRS-33
R&D,^AR&DR&D ^BR&D^CR&DR&DR&DR&DR&D FY2001,
FY1994FY1995FY1996, FY1997, FY1998FY1999FY2000FY2001, est.
AAAS, est.request, est.
by AAAS
¹ + 367367Total =391402267365388543
^1* 167 152 516 138 0 162 137 151
1061065600
¹ 6 21 31 25 11 13
20121221 3434313131
088 1067
0223133
²01
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL30905} [300]167366876225912 4723649940573590597
^g/w^1*⁶⁶
^s^.or^1* 707 722 724 732 760 811 853 917 920
^le^ak 33 30 69 79 56 53 39 74
429
^://wiki³ 418406405413462538523559
^h^ttp³ 54 61 58 62 0
55 54 53 53 72 63 64 55 67
444433444
³11981198118111831 1911211121112371237
33 29 32 36 35 31 44 42 91
[350] 1,513 1,487 1,489 1,556 1,553 1,638 1,763 1,824 1,953

CRS-34
R&D,^AR&DR&D ^BR&D^CR&DR&DR&DR&DR&D FY2001,
FY1994FY1995FY1996, FY1997, FY1998FY1999FY2000FY2001, est.
AAAS, est.request, est.
by AAAS
² 243 240 256 289 504 258 257 314 272
² 16 25 16 16 23 17 17 14 14

2 3 0 — — —

^1* 21 28 30 23 21 22 25 29 28
^1* 298 299 233 253 242 226 226 284 292
5876771311
^1* 23 20 18 19 19 15 20 23 22
25403841519558
² 42 43 3 50 9 509 5 53 3
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL30905} [400]636666602650859603606778701
^g/w¹
^s^.or561= NOAA558=536=22580 =353537638-all NOAA
^le^ak¹totalNOAA totalNOAA total535NOAA 565556557
6total0
^://wiki²¹436= NIST198208257
^h^ttp¹¹ Total 318 208 225 227 233 236 269 128
and IIIP³0.535[31]20317017811519235
100.50.5-16 9557107361
¹1,00791,118119321918 17123156521,111
[370] 964 1,081 1,075 1,073 1,148
EPA R&D^1* [250]536619528595636669647673686
Educ.R&D⁵ [500]175165185209224233271263
AID R&D¹ [150]314223169150164142114124
VA R&D¹* [700]297263588608674655655684
NRC R&D¹ [270]8271626149535353
Smithsn R&D¹135138142146138113122119
TVA R&D²89525237353332

CRS-35
R&D,^AR&DR&D ^BR&D^CR&DR&DR&DR&DR&D FY2001,
FY1994FY1995FY1996, FY1997, FY1998FY1999FY2000FY2001, est.
AAAS, est.request, est.
by AAAS
CrpsEngrs R&D¹ 55444442405342
Labor R&D²62373571707142
HUD R&D³41343437484562
Treasury R&D²N.A.N.A.13.131366
Justice R&D²4865717774
Other R&D²971227188
32,500 33,115 32,667 33,886 35,697 38,073 40,751 43,446 45,348
^1,4 [050]35,60335,34935,84237,430 37,56837,97539,34438,57641,846
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL30905}^2,3
^g/w [050]2,8132,4842,6022,9792,9793,2343,3013,4053,697
^s^.or 38,400 37,833 38,444 39,801 40,409 41,208 42,583 41,981 45,543
^le^ak
^://wiki for data consists of tables and analyses that may be found at the AAAS websites [http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/rd/fy01.htm] and
^h^ttp AAAS analysis for FY2000-FY2005 “AAAS Analysis. Outyear Projections for Nondefense R&D in the FY2001 Budget
Outyear Projections for Defense R&D in the FY2001 Budget,” March 10, 2000, Available via [http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/rd/prev01p.htm]. “Data from Budget
United States Government for Fiscal Year 2001” Public Budget Database table “Budget Authority and Offsetting receipts, 1976-2005,” and Analytical

CRS-36
Report XXV: Research and Development FY2001.
on specific outyear projections for account in Public Budget Database, assuming R&D as percent of account remains constant at the proposed FY2001 ratio.
defense R&D:”Data from Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 2001, Public Budget Database table “Budget Authority and offsetting receipts,
and Analytical Perspectives Table 25. Percentage changes in right column adjusted for inflation according to GDP deflators.”
Report XXV: Research and Development FY2001.
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL30905}
^g/w
^s^.or
^le^ak
^://wiki to Budget Functions: 150 International Affairs; 270 Energy; 350 Agriculture 400 Transportation; 550 Health; 250 General Science, Space, and Technology
^h^ttpNote: Some NASA work reported as 250, includes non-R&D activities; 300 Natural Resources and Environment; 370 Commerce and Housing Credit; 500

Table 2. Historical Data on Federal R&D, FY1976-2001
(Budget authority in billions of CONSTANT FY2000 dollars)
on AAAS Table, “Historical Table 2. Total R&D by Agency, FY 1976-2001 DEC. ‘00, Revised.” Source: AAAS at [http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/rd/guihist.htm].

¹⁹⁷⁶¹⁹⁷⁷¹⁹⁷⁸¹⁹⁷⁹¹⁹⁸⁰¹⁹⁸¹¹⁹⁸²¹⁹⁸³¹⁹⁸⁴¹⁹⁸⁵¹⁹⁸⁶¹⁹⁸⁷¹⁹⁸⁸¹⁹⁸⁹¹⁹⁹⁰¹⁹⁹¹¹⁹⁹²¹⁹⁹³¹⁹⁹⁴¹⁹⁹⁵¹⁹⁹⁶¹⁹⁹⁷¹⁹⁹⁸¹⁹⁹⁹²⁰⁰⁰²⁰⁰¹
^25.51^26.98^26.29^26.46^26.36^29.78^33.47^36.37^41.37^45.87^49.04^50.69^50.42^49.12^46.45^44.01^43.68^43.80^39.14^38.16^37.89^38.78^38.63^39.47^39.28^41.02
^8.94^8.92^8.89^9.31^9.86^9.47^7.37^4.20^4.43^5.11^5.22^5.91^6.20^7.54^8.72^9.61^9.88^9.94^10.37^10.21^9.99^9.74^10.03^9.86^9.78^10.10
^7.78^9.76^11.12^11.11^10.85^10.56^8.69^7.94^8.35^8.58^7.76^7.40^7.76^7.96^8.57^8.68^9.40^8.39^7.46^6.92^6.64^6.47^6.53^7.07^7.12^7.84
^5.74^5.84^6.25^6.58^6.48^6.12^5.93^6.23^6.85^7.55^7.58^8.74^9.15^9.61^9.94^10.62^11.13^11.15^11.54^11.62^12.10^12.72^13.48^15.22^17.10^19.21
^1.69^1.70^1.74^1.71^1.72^1.64^1.56^1.63^1.85^2.03^1.96^2.08^2.10^2.24^2.12^2.24^2.28^2.27^2.47^2.59^2.53^2.53^2.57^2.71^2.86^3.18
^1.31^1.28^1.39^1.46^1.34^1.40^1.33^1.36^1.45^1.44^1.34^1.49^1.48^1.45^1.50^1.64^1.76^1.65^1.69^1.61^1.57^1.62^1.61^1.67^1.76^1.92
^.82^.77^.79^.84^.77^.71^.62^.59^.54^.56^.54^.56^.56^.61^.65^.73^.74^.73^.78^.72^.61^.62^.55^.51^.57^.59
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL30905}^.82^.78^.82^.72^.75^.69^.50^.57^.72^.63^.53^.42^.42^.42^.43^.49^.72^.70^.71^.72^.64^.64^.61^.62^.61^.69
^g/w^.69^.69^.83^.78^.64^.64^.46^.36^.37^.44^.45^.47^.49^.51^.52^.54^.57^.56^.65^.59^.51^.62^.66^.68^.65^.67
^s^.or^.59^.59^.62^.68^.67^.59^.49^.49^.54^.56^.55^.57^.54^.54^.56^.64^.67^.89^1.13^1.21^1.02^1.00^1.12^1.10^1.07^1.09
^le^ak
^1.99^2.09^2.36^2.53^2.69^2.41^1.77^1.77^1.67^1.44^1.54^1.71^1.66^1.85^2.03^2.11^2.35^2.13^2.41^2.24^1.90^2.25^2.31^2.47^2.53^2.81
^://wiki^55.89^59.41^61.12^62.18^62.13^64.03^62.19^61.53^68.14^74.22^76.53^80.05^80.71^81.84^81.50^81.32^83.17^82.23^78.34^76.58^75.41^76.99^78.08^81.37^83.33^89.11
^h^ttp
^28.04^29.33^29.18^29.20^29.01^32.63^36.76^39.41^45.17^49.80^52.75^54.37^54.18^52.94^50.26^47.76^47.67^47.48^42.21^40.84^40.73^41.70^41.71^42.72^42.58^44.65
^27.85^30.07^31.93^32.98^33.12^31.39^25.43^22.12^22.97^24.42^23.79^25.68^26.53^28.91^31.24^33.56^35.50^34.75^36.13^35.74^34.67^35.29^36.37^38.65^40.75^44.46
^6.26^6.79^8.76^9.17^9.61^8.76^8.73^9.59^10.46^11.18^11.44^12.30^12.57^13.52^13.83^14.68^14.96^15.16^15.09^14.87^15.29^15.58^15.96^17.69^18.97^20.79
^in:^AAAS^Reports^I^through^XXV,^based^on^OMB^and^agency^R&D^budget^data.^Includes^conduct^of^R&D^and^R&D^facilities.^Figuresⁱⁿ^bold^represent^peak^funding^levelsⁱⁿ^{constant-dollar}^terms.^{Constant dollar conversions based}