Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

Qatar, a small peninsular country in the Persian Gulf, has emerged as an important ally of the
United States since the late 1990s and currently serves as host to major U.S. military facilities for
command, basing, and equipment pre-positioning. Qatar holds the third largest proven natural gas
reserves in the world, and its small population enjoys the highest per capita income of any Middle
Eastern country. The Emir of Qatar, Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, has embarked upon a
limited course of political liberalization since replacing his father in a bloodless palace coup in
1995. The Emir also has undertaken several projects to diversify Qatar’s economy and improve
educational opportunities for Qatari citizens. As part of Qatar’s liberalization experiment, the
Qatari monarchy founded Al Jazeera, the Arab world’s first all-news satellite television network,
in 1995. In an April 2003 referendum, Qatari voters approved a new constitution that officially
granted women the right to vote and run for national office. The latest elections for Qatar’s
Central Municipal Council were held in April 2007. Preparations for national elections for the
new Advisory Council established by the constitution are underway.
Following joint military operations during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Qatar and the United
States concluded a Defense Cooperation Agreement that has been subsequently expanded. In
April 2003, the U.S. Combat Air Operations Center for the Middle East moved from Prince
Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia to Qatar’s Al Udeid airbase south of Doha, the Qatari capital. Al
Udeid serves as a logistics hub for U.S. operations in Afghanistan as well as a key command and
basing center for ongoing operations in Iraq. Nearby Camp As Sayliyah is the largest pre-
positioning facility of U.S. military equipment in the world.
In spite of serving as the host to a large U.S. military presence and supporting U.S. regional
initiatives, Qatar has remained relatively secure. A shooting attack took place at Al Udeid airbase
in November 2000, and on March 19, 2005, an Egyptian national carried out a suicide car bomb
attack at a theater popular with Western expatriates on the outskirts of Doha. The car bombing,
the first terrorist attack in Qatar to target civilians, killed one British citizen and wounded twelve
others. Recent terrorist statements indicate that U.S. facilities and energy infrastructure in Qatar
remain potential targets.
U.S. officials have described Qatar’s counterterrorism cooperation since 9/11 as significant;
however, some observers have raised questions about possible support for Al Qaeda by some
Qatari citizens, including members of Qatar’s large ruling family. According to the 9/11
Commission Report, Qatar’s current Interior Minister provided safe haven to 9/11 mastermind
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed during the mid-1990s, and press reports indicate other terrorists may
have received financial support or safe haven in Qatar after September 11, 2001.
This report was originally written by Jeremy Sharp, and has been revised and will be updated by
Christopher Blanchard to reflect significant developments.

Political Profile................................................................................................................................1
Structure of Government...........................................................................................................2
Political Reform and Elections..................................................................................................2
Human Rights and Social Issues...............................................................................................3
Human Rights.....................................................................................................................3
Islam and Religious Freedom.............................................................................................4
Al Jazeera and the Qatari Media.........................................................................................5
Education ............................................................................................................................ 5
Economic Overview........................................................................................................................6
Oil and Natural Gas Production................................................................................................6
U.S.-Qatari Relations......................................................................................................................7
Defense, Security, and Terrorism..............................................................................................9
U.S.-Qatar Defense Cooperation........................................................................................9
Internal Security..................................................................................................................9
Terrorism Concerns...........................................................................................................10
Counterterrorism Support..................................................................................................11
Assassination of Chechen Terrorist Financier in Doha......................................................11
Trade and Economic Relations................................................................................................12
Qatari Foreign Policy....................................................................................................................12
Persian Gulf States..................................................................................................................13
Bahrai n ........................................................................................................................ ...... 13
Saudi Arabia......................................................................................................................13
Ir aq ........................................................................................................................... ......... 14
Ir an ........................................................................................................................... ......... 15
Arab-Israeli Issues and Lebanon.............................................................................................15
Lebanon War and Aftermath.............................................................................................16
Figure 1. Qatar and Its Neighbors...................................................................................................1
Figure B-1. Map of Qatar..............................................................................................................19
Table 1. U.S. Aid to Qatar FY2005-2007 and FY2008 Request.....................................................8
Appendix A. Qatar in Brief...........................................................................................................17
Appendix B. Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Qatar........................................................18

Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................20

atar, a small peninsular state bordering Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf, is a constitutional
monarchy governed by the Al Thani family. The country gained independence from the Q
United Kingdom on September 3, 1971. Qatar’s Emir, Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani,
replaced his father as Qatar’s ruler in a 1995 palace coup and has survived at least one counter-¹
coup attempt.

On June 27, 1995, in a bloodless palace coup, Figure 1. Qatar and Its Neighbors
Shaikh Hamad replaced his father, Khalifa,
who had ruled Qatar for 23 years. At the time,
Khalifa had turned over many routine affairs
of state to Shaikh Hamad, then crown prince
and commander of Qatar’s small armed
forces. The ruling Al Thani family rallied
behind Shaikh Hamad, who quickly
consolidated control. In February 1996,
supporters of Shaikh Hamad’s father
unsuccessfully attempted a counter-coup,
which prompted Shaikh Hamad to initiate
civil proceedings against his father to retrieve
an alleged $3-$12 billion of state assets ²
supposedly in his possession. The alleged
mastermind of the counter-coup attempt,
Shaikh Hamad’s cousin and a former minister
Shaikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Hamad Al
Thani, was captured outside of Qatar and
prosecuted: he remains on death row. Saudi
Arabian mediation facilitated an out-of-court

settlement between the Shaikh Hamad and his
father, and they have reconciled.
Shaikh Hamad, at age 54, has been described as a representative of an emerging new generation ³
of Persian Gulf leaders. Like King Abdullah II of Jordan, Shaikh Hamad was educated in the
United Kingdom and holds degrees from Sandhurst Military Academy and Cambridge University.
He has three wives and eleven children. In 1997, the Emir underwent kidney transplant surgery in
the United States.

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The Emir is head of the executive branch of the Qatari government and appoints members of the
Al Thani family and other notables to a governing Council of Ministers (cabinet), which is
headed by Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al Thani. The
country’s constitution (approved in April 2003 and in force as of June 2005) formalized Qatari
tradition that the rule of the state is hereditary within the Al Thani family in addition to the
previously contested principle that future successors to the throne will follow the line of the ⁴
Emir’s male offspring. Previous succession decisions have been characterized by rivalry among
different branches of the Al Thani family, and it is unclear whether a future transition to Shaikh
Hamad’s heir would be contested by other elements of the royal family. In August 2003, the Emir
replaced his third oldest son, Jassem bin Hamad Al Thani, as heir apparent. His fourth oldest son, ⁵
Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, is now the named successor to the Qatari monarchy.
The constitution also states that legislative authority will reside in the hands of a 45-member
Advisory Council (Majlis Al Shura), two-thirds of which will be directly elected and one-third ⁶
appointed by the Emir from among ministers or others. Preparations for national elections for the
new Advisory Council are underway, and women will have the right to vote in the elections and
to run for office. The Advisory Council will have oversight authority over the Council of
Ministers and will be able to propose legislation and review budgets. The constitution also
empowers the Advisory Council to issue motions of no-confidence against government ministers;
no-confidence motions must be approved by two-thirds of the Advisory Council. Council
members will serve four-year terms.
Shaikh Hamad and his advisers have embarked on a limited political reform program designed to
gradually make Qatar’s government more participatory and accountable. Although a series of
national elections have been held (see below), the government continues to maintain strict limits
on freedoms of assembly and association: a series of new laws allow for individuals to organize
political demonstrations and public gatherings, but organizers must obtain a permit from the
government, and Qatari authorities may impose restrictions on the topics of discussion. Political
parties are not allowed in Qatar, and all private professional and cultural associations must
register with the state and are monitored.

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ⁱⁿ^cremen^t^s^siⁿ^{ce 1}⁹⁷⁵^.

Qatari authorities have allowed a series of national elections as components of the country’s
gradual transition toward greater democratic participation. The elections also have provided a
“trial and error” setting for the creation and improvement of Qatar’s national electoral
infrastructure. In April 1998, 3,700 business community leaders participated in an election for a
national Chamber of Commerce, selecting 17 members from a slate of 41 candidates. In March
1999, a Central Municipal Council election occurred in which 248 candidates (including 6
women) competed for 29 seats, and all adult Qatari citizens, with the exception of members of the
police and armed forces, were allowed to vote and run for office. The election marked the first
time a Persian Gulf country had enfranchised all of its male and female citizens in a nation-wide ⁷
election. In April 2003, national elections for the Municipal Council’s new term resulted in the
first electoral victory for a Qatari female candidate, Shaikha Yousef Al Jiffri, an appointed officer ⁸
at the Education Ministry who ran unopposed. The latest round of elections was held in April
2007, and voter turnout was higher than in previous elections. Authorities announced that 51% of

28,000 eligible Qatari voters cast ballots—over 80% of the country’s population of 907,000 are ⁹

ineligible to vote because they are foreign nationals.
Although the Municipal Council functions primarily in an advisory role to the Ministry of
Municipal and Agricultural Affairs, some observers view it as a stepping-stone to the wider
political liberalization implied by the creation of the Advisory Council by the new constitution.
Similarly, the national elections for the Municipal Council are seen by Qatari officials as test
cases for future Advisory Council elections. A special electoral law for the Advisory Council
elections remains under consideration, and efforts to prepare candidates are underway.
Controversy has developed in some Qatari circles over concern that the draft elections law
discriminates against naturalized Qatari citizens by establishing certain criteria for their voting
eligibility.
The U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights for 2006 states that “while there ¹⁰
were improvements in the overall human rights practices, some serious problems remained.”
According to the report, the rights of non-citizens are at times abused, particularly among
domestic servants from the Phillippines and South East Asia. As in other Gulf countries,
expatriate laborers are vulnerable to exploitation by employers who capitalize on their fear of
deportation. Citizenship is withheld from foreign workers, who outnumber native Qataris in the ¹¹
labor force by an estimated ratio of more than 5 to 1. In December 2004, Qatar announced that
it was banning the use of children as camel jockeys, a practice long decried by the international
community.

⁷^A^l^l^si^x^f^e^mal^e^can^dⁱ^d^a^t^e^{s w}^e^{re d}^e^feat^edⁱⁿ^t^h^e¹⁹⁹⁹^el^ectⁱ^oⁿ^.
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^http:^//www^.sta^te^.g^ov^/^g^/drl/rls/^h^rrpt/²⁰⁰^6/⁷⁸⁸⁶¹^.htm^.
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In May 2004, the Emir issued a new labor law, which gives Qatari nationals the right to form
associations with legal status and allows workers to go on strike. The new legislation also bans
employing youth under the age of 16, sets the working day at eight hours, and grants women
equal rights with men, in addition to a paid 50-day maternity leave. Some observers have
criticized the new legislation for not extending legal protections to Qatar’s large foreign
workforce. Critics charge that the labor law places additional restrictions on guest workers by
prohibiting non-citizens from forming labor unions and restricting their ability to bargain
collectively and to strike. Law Number 7 of 2007 established a labor court to hear the grievances
of foreign laborers.

Islam is the official religion of the state of Qatar. Conditional freedom of worship is protected
under the constitution, although proselytization by non-Muslims is illegal. Qatar, like Saudi
Arabia, officially adheres to the Wahhabi version of Sunni Islam; however, in contrast with Saudi ¹³
Arabia, Wahhabi tenets are not publicly enforced or strictly adhered to in most public settings.
Qatar hosts a number of conservative Islamic clerics, including Dr. Yusuf Al Qaradawi, a
controversial figure whose views on the conditional legitimacy of suicide bombing and whose
outspoken critiques of Israel, the United States, and terrorism have made him a target of criticism
from a wide range of observers. During the summer 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, Qaradawi
publicly argued that Muslims should support the activities of Hezbollah and Hamas as legitimate
“resistance” activities, based on Quranic injunctions to defend Muslim territory invaded by ¹⁴
outsiders.
In November 2005, the Emir donated a plot of land for the construction of a $7 million Anglican ¹⁵
church: construction began in April 2006. The church and three others are expected to be
complete in 2008. Qatar established diplomatic ties with the Holy See in November 2002. Qatar
does not ban alcohol, which is available in licensed premises such as the bars of major hotels and
clubs.

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Shaikh Hamad helped establish the Al Jazeera satellite television news network in 1996 with a
$140 million grant. Since then, the Qatari government has provided most of the channel’s
funding, as advertising revenue only meets 35%-40% of Al Jazeera’s annual operating expenses.
Qatari government officials and Al Jazeera executives argue that the station’s inability to attract
sufficient advertising revenue is a function of the channel’s controversial status across the Middle
East. These officials and executives allege that other Arab governments exert pressure on
companies based in or operating in their countries to refrain from advertising on Al Jazeera,
because the channel may provide coverage of internal political, social, and economic
developments that are unflattering to ruling regimes or less biased or censored than traditional ¹⁶
government-run media outlets. Al Jazeera devotes less of its air time to coverage of Qatari
affairs than of the internal affairs of other Arab states.
In 2005, British media reports concerning alleged comments made by President George W. Bush
referring to the possible bombing of Al Jazeera headquarters in Doha sparked widespread concern
and debate in Qatar, leading some Qataris to question their country’s support for U.S. policy ¹⁷
initiatives. Al Jazeera launched an international English language satellite channel in 2006. In
September 2007, Al Jazeera board chairman Sheik Hamad bin Thamer al Thani reportedly
traveled to Saudi Arabia with Qatar’s Emir to participate in meetings to further a broader Qatari-¹⁸
Saudi rapprochement (see below). Saudi officials had prohibited Al Jazeera from operating in
the kingdom and had withdrawn their ambassador from Doha in response to Al Jazeera coverage.
Al Jazeera was allowed to cover the annual haj pilgrimage in Mecca for the first time in
December 2007. Some observers have argued that Al Jazeera’s coverage of Saudi affairs has been
more moderate in the months following the reported meeting.
Although the Qatari government lifted formal censorship of the Qatari media by decree in 1995,
the U.S. Department of State reports that journalists tend to exercise a degree of self-censorship, ¹⁹
particularly with regard to the Emir and his immediate family. Internet service in Qatar is
monitored for pornography and other material considered insulting to Islam. In January 2008,
Qatar signed an agreement with Reporters Without Borders to create the Doha Media Freedom
Center, an organization intended to spread “the culture of freedom of the press and media and in
defending the press and media people who are subjected to harassment, detention and ill-²⁰
treatment because of their professional activity.”
Qatar has invested heavily in improving the educational opportunities available to its citizens in
recent years. Prominent Qatari women also have taken a leading role in a number of education
reform programs. On May 5, 2003, Shaikh Hamad appointed Shaikha Bint Ahmed Al Mahmoud,
daughter of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, as Minster of Education. This appointment

¹⁶^A^u^t^h^o^r^m^eetⁱⁿ^{g at}^A^l^Ja^zeer^{a h}^ea^dqua^r^t^e^r^s^,^J^aⁿ^u^a^r^y²⁰⁰⁵^.
¹⁷^T^h^{e W}^hⁱ^t^e^Ho^u^s^{e ref}^u^sed^t^o^co^m^m^en^t^oⁿ^t^h^{e repo}^rt^ed^c^o^mm^en^t^s^o^t^h^e^{r t}^h^aⁿ^t^o^ch^aract^eri^{ze t}^h^em^as^“o^u^t^l^a^ndⁱ^s^h^aⁿ^d
ⁱⁿ^coⁿ^cei^vab^l^e.^”^T^h^e^Peⁿⁱ^ns^ula⁽^D^oha⁾^“^D^o^h^a^Sh^oc^k^e^{d, Sit-}ⁱⁿ^T^oda^y^,^”^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{24, 2}⁰⁰⁵^.
¹⁸^Ro^b^e^rt^F^.^W^o^rt^h^,^“A^l^Jazeer^{a n}^o^l^oⁿ^g^{er a h}^a^mm^{er t}^o^S^a^u^dⁱ^s,^”^In^t^e^rⁿ^a^t^io^na^l^H^e^r^a^ld^T^r^ib^un^e^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^4,²⁰^08.
¹⁹^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^,^B^u^r^e^a^u^of^D^e^m^o^c^r^acy^{, H}^u^m^a^{n R}ⁱ^g^h^ts^{, a}^{nd L}^a^bor^{, C}^o^uⁿ^tr^y^R^e^por^ts^oⁿ^H^u^m^a^{n R}ⁱ^g^h^ts
^P^r^a^c^tic^e^s^{, Q}^a^ta^r^-²⁰⁰⁶^,^Ma^r^c^{h 6}^,²⁰^07.
²⁰^Qa^ta^{r News A}^g^en^cy^{, “}^D^e^a^l^{on m}^e^dia^f^r^e^e^d^o^m^sⁱ^gⁿ^e^d^,”^J^a^nua^r^y^{4, 200}^8.

signified the first appointment ever of a female cabinet minister in any Persian Gulf state. In
October 2003, Shaikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al Missned, one of Shaikh Hamad’s wives, helped
launch Qatar’s new “Education City,” a state-of-the-art campus complex in Doha that offers
degrees from several U.S. universities including Weill Cornell Medical College, Georgetown
University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Texas A&M University, Virginia
Commonwealth University, and Carnegie Mellon University. Shaikha Mozah serves as the ²¹
Chairperson of the Qatar Foundation, which directs Education City’s activities. The RAND
Corporation has evaluated and recommended reform options for Qatar’s primary, secondary, and
post-secondary education systems and operates a public policy analysis center in cooperation with
the Qatar Foundation on the Education City campus.

Oil and natural gas production is the mainstay of Qatar’s robust economy, which has experienced
an average annual growth rate of 9.1% over the last five years. Income from oil and gas accounts
for over 60% of the country’s gross domestic product. Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are the
leading importers of oil from Qatar. With regard to Qatar’s economy, in a major departure from
his more conservative-minded father, Shaikh Hamad has borrowed heavily from foreign banks
since the late-1990s in order to modernize Qatar’s energy infrastructure. The efforts have
produced significant returns, with annual growth projections for 2008 and 2009 nearing 9% and
12% respectively. In February 2007, Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hamad bin
Jassem bin Jabor Al Thani reiterated that Qatar is pursuing parallel economic reform, education,
and investment strategies in order to create economic growth opportunities not tied to the ²²
country’s natural resources.
Qatar Petroleum (QP), the state-owned oil company, has increased its output from 593,000 barrels ²³
per day (b/d) in 1999 to 822,000 b/d in 2006. However, with oil reserves likely to be exhausted
by 2026 at current production rates, Qatar is rapidly moving to exploit its vast natural gas ²⁴
reserves. As part of a long-term development strategy, Qatar has tapped international financial
markets and invited foreign investment in recent years in order to finance the expansion of its gas ²⁵
extraction and liquified natural gas (LNG) production facilities. The Export-Import Bank of the

²¹^{For m}^o^re^on^Ed^uc^a^tio^{n City}^a^nd^the^Qa^ta^{r Fo}^un^da^tio^n,^w^h^ic^h^ov^e^r^se^e^s^{its a}^c^tiv^itie^s,^se^e^the^Foun^da^tⁱ^{on’s w}^e^bsite^,
^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^ww^.qf^.^e^du.qa^/out^put/^P^a^g^e¹^.a^sp^.
²²^T^h^{e P}^eⁿⁱⁿ^s^ul^a^(D^o^h^a^)/^Re^u^t^e^r^s^{, “}^Q^a^t^a^r^{i FM H}ⁱ^nts^a^t^C^h^aⁿ^g^e^sⁱⁿ^Sp^ons^or^s^h^ip^R^u^le^s^,^Dⁱ^v^e^r^s^if^ic^a^tion^of^Ec^onom^y^,^”
^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{27, 2}⁰⁰⁷^.
²³^Q^a^ta^r^is^the^s^m^a^lle^s^t^{oil pr}^o^ducⁱⁿ^g^m^e^m^b^e^r^of^O^P^EC^{. R}^e^v^e^nue^s^f^r^om^pe^tr^ole^u^m^e^x^por^ts^a^c^c^{ount f}^o^r^60%^-⁷^0%^of
^G^D^P^.^So^urc^e^s^{: Ec}^on^om^is^{t Inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^Uⁿ^{it, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{2008, a}^{nd CIA}^W^o^{rld Fa}^c^t^Bo^ok^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r²⁰^06.
²⁴^W^{ith pr}^ov^eⁿ^oil^re^s^e^rv^e^s^of^15.2^billi^on^ba^rre^ls^{, Q}^a^ta^{r ha}^s^f^a^{r le}^s^s^{oil t}^h^aⁿ^t^h^e^m^a^{jor P}^e^rs^iaⁿ^G^u^lf^produc^e^r^s^,^s^u^c^h^a^s
^K^u^w^a^{it (96.5}^bill^io^{n ba}^rre^ls^{), Ira}^q⁽¹¹²^billi^on^ba^rre^ls^{), a}ⁿ^{d Sa}^u^dⁱ^A^r^a^b^ia^{(252 b}^illi^on^ba^rre^ls^{). H}^o^w^e^v^e^{r, Q}^a^ta^{r ha}^s^the
^thir^d^la^r^g^e^s^{t na}^tur^a^{l g}^a^s^r^e^s^e^r^v^es^{in the}^w^o^r^l^d^be^hi^nd^R^u^s^sⁱ^a^aⁿ^{d I}^r^a^{n. Q}^a^ta^r^’^s^s^u^p^p^ly^of^na^tur^a^{l g}^a^s^doub^le^{d i}ⁿ²⁰^02,
^w^h^eⁿ^s^u^r^v^ey^or^s^dis^c^ov^e^r^e^d^ne^w^ga^s^de^pos^itsⁱⁿ^Q^a^ta^r^’^sⁿ^o^r^t^h^fⁱ^e^l^d.
²⁵^Q^a^ta^r^’^s^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt ha}^s^a^60%^-⁷^0%^s^t^a^k^e^{in tw}^{o join}^{t pa}^r^t^ne^r^s^hips^w^{ith f}^o^r^e^ig^{n f}ⁱ^r^m^s^,^inc^l^ud^ing^Ex^x^onMo^b^{il (}^U^SA⁾^,
^T^o^ta^lFina^E^lf⁽^F^r^a^nc^e⁾^{, K}^o^G^a^s⁽^S^out^{h K}^o^r^e^a⁾^{, a}ⁿ^{d Ma}^ts^{ui (}^J^a^p^aⁿ⁾^.^Iⁿ^Fe^br^ua^r^y^2005,^Q^a^ta^r^P^e^tr^ole^u^m^sⁱ^gⁿ^e^d^a^$7
^billi^{on a}^g^re^e^m^eⁿ^{t w}^{ith She}^{ll a}ⁿ^d^a^$12^bi^llio^{n a}^g^re^em^eⁿ^{t w}^{ith Ex}^xonM^obi^{l t}^o^e^x^port^na^tura^{l g}^a^s^to^t^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s
^a^{nd E}^u^r^o^pe^.

United States has provided over $1 billion dollars in loan guarantees to support the development
of Qatar’s gas production facilities in cooperation with a range of U.S., European, and Asian ²⁶
companies, banks, and export credit agencies.
Qatar intends to expand its yearly LNG output, which is not subject to OPEC production quotas,
from 4.5 million tons per annum in 2002 to 14 - 18 million tons per annum by 2010. Although
Qatar’s LNG industry has low capital costs due to government investment, it has high operational
costs, which has required Qatar to develop economies of scale in order to be more competitive ²⁷
with established LNG exporters such as Indonesia and Nigeria. The large natural gas production
and shipping facilities at the coastal city of Ras Laffan in northern Qatar serve as the main site for
the country’s gas development projects, with several independent gas production and conversion
“trains” linked to corresponding fields and contracted export markets. Qatar’s Emir and Russian
President Vladimir Putin reportedly discussed plans to create an organization of natural gas
producing countries, sparking fears among some observers that an OPEC-style natural gas cartel ²⁸
could emerge.
Qatar has signed several agreements with U.S. energy companies (ConocoPhillips and
ExxonMobil) and other international companies to develop facilities to export LNG to the United
States, the UK, Spain, Italy, South Korea, Taiwan, and India. Under Project Dolphin, Qatar has
begun exporting natural gas via an underwater pipeline to the United Arab Emirates, although
objections from Saudi Arabia have limited progress in other areas (see “Qatari Foreign Policy,”
below). Qatari government officials estimate that natural gas revenues will outstrip oil income as
natural gas production projects come online. Qatar also is in the midst of several gas to liquids
(GTL) projects and aims to become the largest GTL producer in the world. In February 2007,
Qatar Petroleum and ExxonMobil announced that a planned joint-GTL production facility project
would be cancelled in the wake of rising cost projections. Other GTL plans are proceeding.

A U.S. embassy was established in Doha in 1973, but U.S. relations with Qatar did not blossom
until after the 1991 Persian Gulf war. In the late 1980s, the United States and Qatar engaged in a
prolonged diplomatic dispute regarding Qatar’s black market procurement of U.S.-made Stinger ²⁹
anti-aircraft missiles. The dispute froze planned economic and military cooperation, and
Congress approved a ban on arms sales to Qatar (Section 566(d), P.L. 100-461) until the months
leading up to the 1991 Gulf War, when Qatar allowed coalition forces to operate from Qatari

²⁶^For^e^x^a^m^ple^,^sⁱ^nc^e¹⁹⁹^6,^the^Ex^por^{t I}^m^por^t^B^a^nk^ha^s^pr^ov^ide^d^lo^aⁿ^g^u^a^r^aⁿ^te^e^s^{to s}^u^pp^or^{t t}^h^e^e^x^po^r^t^of^U^.^S.
^eq^uⁱ^p^m^en^{t an}^d^serv^ices^f^o^{r th}^{e co}ⁿ^s^tru^c^ti^oⁿ^o^f^f^a^{cilities at}^{Ras L}^a^ffan^,ⁱⁿ^cl^u^dⁱⁿ^g^m^o^{st recen}^tl^y^,^th^{e co}ⁿ^s^tru^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f
ⁿ^a^tu^ra^{l g}^a^{s liq}^u^e^f^a^c^tioⁿ^p^l^aⁿ^{ts a}ⁿ^d^f^a^c^ilitie^{s a}^sso^cⁱ^a^t^e^d^w^ith^th^e^Qa^ta^rGa^s^{II a}ⁿ^d^III^p^r^o^j^e^c^t^{s. Se}^e^Ex^p^o^r^{t Im}^p^o^r^t^Baⁿ^k^o^f
^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, “}^E^x^-^I^m^B^a^nk^$930^Mil^lio^{n G}^u^a^r^aⁿ^te^e^Sup^por^ts^U^.^{S. Ex}^p^o^r^t^s^to^B^u^il^{d L}^N^G^P^l^aⁿ^t^{in Q}^a^ta^r^,^”
^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^18,²⁰^04;^aⁿ^d^Ex^por^t^I^m^por^{t B}^a^nk^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^,^“^E^x^-^I^m^B^a^nk^Fina^nc^e^s^Q^a^ta^r^G^a^s^{3 L}ⁱ^qui^{d N}^a^tur^a^l
^G^a^{s C}^o^m^p^l^e^x,^De^ce^m^b^er¹⁵^,²⁰⁰⁵^.
²⁷^Me^e^ting^w^{ith Qa}^ta^{r P}^e^tr^ole^u^m^,^Qa^ta^{r Ga}^{s, a}^{nd Ra}^s^G^a^s^ex^ec^utiv^es^{, R}^a^s^L^a^f^f^aⁿ^{, Q}^a^ta^r^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^5.
²⁸^{Platts C}^o^mmo^dity^Ne^ws^{, “}^R^ussia^,^Qa^ta^{r to}^disc^{uss a}^llia^nc^e^of^g^a^{s pro}^duc^e^r^na^ti^ons,”^Fe^brua^ry^13,²⁰⁰⁷^.
²⁹^Q^a^ta^r^de^f^e^nde^{d its}^pr^oc^ur^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^the^mⁱ^ss^ile^s^{in pr}^o^t^e^s^t^of^the^sa^le^of^sim^ila^r^mⁱ^s^s^ile^{s b}^y^the^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^to
^Ba^hraⁱ^{n, w}^h^ic^{h Qa}^ta^{r ha}^d^aⁿ^unre^s^olv^e^{d bor}^de^{r d}ⁱ^spu^t^e^w^{ith un}^til²⁰⁰¹^{. Ela}ⁱ^ne^Sc^iolⁱⁿ^o^{, “}^Q^a^t^a^r^Re^je^c^t^{s U.S. De}^m^a^nd
^{For Re}^turⁿ^of^Illic^{it Sti}ⁿ^g^e^rs,”^{New Yo}^{rk Times}^{, J}^u^ne²⁸^,¹⁹^88;^P^a^t^r^ic^k^{E. Ty}^le^{r, “}^U^{.S. D}^r^a^w^{n Into}^G^u^lf^Dⁱ^s^pute^{- S}^t^ra^y
^Stin^g^e^{rs T}ⁱ^ed^T^o^Qatar-Bah^rain^Tⁱ^ff^,”^W^a^s^h^ingt^{on P}^o^s^t^{, O}^c^t^obe^r^6,¹⁹^88.

territory and agreed to destroy the missiles in question.³⁰ In January 1991, Qatari armored forces
helped coalition troops repel an Iraqi attack on the Saudi Arabian town of Kafji, on the coastal ³¹
road leading south from Kuwait into Saudi Arabia’s oil rich Eastern Province. In June 1992,
Qatar signed a defense cooperation agreement with the United States, opening a period of close
coordination in military affairs that has continued to the present.
The United States promptly recognized the assumption of power by Shaikh Hamad in June 1995
and has welcomed Qatar’s defense cooperation, as well as Qatari political, economic, and
educational reform efforts since that time. Qatari-U.S. defense relations have expanded over the
last 15 years to include cooperative defense exercises, equipment pre-positioning, and base access
agreements, although Qatari officials have been, at times, critical of U.S. military operations in ³²
the Persian Gulf. U.S. concerns regarding alleged material support for terrorist groups by some
Qataris, including members of the royal family, have been balanced over time by Qatar’s
counterterrorism efforts and its broader, long-term commitment to host and support U.S. military
forces being used in ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the global war on terrorism.
Today, Qatari-U.S. relations remain cordial and close. Since September 2005, Qatar has donated
$100 million to victims of Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. Gulf states.
The U.S. has provided limited counterterrorism aid to Qatar to support the development of its
domestic security forces (see Table 1 below), and the Export-Import Bank has provided over $2
billion in loan guarantees to support various natural gas development projects in Qatar since

1996.

Table 1. U.S. Aid to Qatar FY2005-2007 and FY2008 Request
^{($ thousands)}
^Acc^{ount FY20}⁰⁵^FY20⁰⁶^FY20⁰⁷^FY20⁰⁸^Request
^IMET^a^-^-^-¹⁵
^NADR-ATA^b^1,37⁹⁷⁸⁸^1,12⁰^c²⁷⁰
^{NADR-CTF -}¹¹⁸^-
^Source:^{U.S. Department of Stat}^{e, FY2007 a}^{nd FY20}⁰⁸^Congressi^{onal Budget Justifications for For}^eign
^Operations.
^a.^{Qatar has}^{not p}^{reviously particip}^{ated in the I}^MET^program.
^b.^{Through t}^{he e}^{nd of FY20}^{06, over}^{$3.3 million in Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining and Related}
^{Programs - Anti-terrorism Assist}^{ance (NADR - ATA) has be}^en^pr^{ovided to train over 500}^{Qatari s}^ecurity
^{officers and officials since FY19}⁸⁷^.

³⁰^T^h^e^ba^{n w}^a^s^f^o^r^m^a^l^l^y^r^e^pe^a^l^e^d^by^the^For^e^ig^{n O}^p^e^r^a^tions^,^Ex^por^t^Fina^ncⁱⁿ^g^,^a^{nd R}^e^la^te^d^P^r^og^r^a^m^s^A^ppr^opr^ia^ti^ons
^A^c^{t o}^f¹⁹⁹^{1 (}^S^e^c^tⁱ^on⁵⁶⁸⁽^b)^,^P^.^L^.¹⁰^1-⁵¹³⁾^{. T}^h^e^c^onf^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^r^e^por^t^{on H}^.^R^.⁵¹¹⁴^,^For^e^ig^{n O}^p^e^r^a^tions^{, Ex}^por^t
^Fina^ncⁱⁿ^g^,^a^{nd R}^e^la^te^d^P^r^og^r^a^m^s^A^ppr^opr^ia^ti^ons^A^c^{t, 19}⁹¹⁽^H^.R^e^p^{t. 1}^01-⁹⁶⁸⁾ⁱⁿ^s^e^r^t^e^d^Se^na^te^la^ng^u^a^g^e⁽^A^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^t
^N^o^{. 1}⁴⁴⁾^tha^t^r^e^pe^a^l^e^d^the^baⁿ^ba^s^e^{d on}^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion pr}^ov^ide^d^by^the^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^Def^e^ns^e^“^t^ha^{t it is}ⁱⁿ^the^na^tio^na^l
ⁱⁿ^t^e^rest^t^o^reest^a^b^lⁱ^s^h^Unⁱ^t^ed^S^t^at^es-Qat^ari^secu^ri^t^y^rel^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^b^ecau^{se o}^f^t^h^ei^{r su}^pp^o^r^t^f^o^{r Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es t}^r^oopsⁱⁿ^the
^Midd^le^Ea^s^t^.”
³¹^T^hom^a^s^Fe^rra^{ro, “}^A^llie^{s Re}^ta^k^e^Sa^{udi C}^ity^,”^Unite^{d Pre}^{ss Inte}^rna^tion^a^l^{, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{31, 1}⁹⁹¹^{; a}^{nd J}^o^s^e^{ph A}^l^br^ig^ht,
^“M^ariⁿ^{es T}^a^k^e^Credⁱ^t^f^o^{r Kh}^af^jⁱ^Vⁱ^ct^o^r^y^,^”^Atla^{nta J}^our^nal^an^{d C}^o^nstitutⁱ^oⁿ^{, Fe}^br^ua^r^y^{3, 1}⁹⁹¹^.
³²^Qat^a^ri^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^{s at}^tⁱ^m^{es t}^o^o^k^st^{eps t}^o^di^st^an^{ce t}^h^em^sel^v^es^f^r^o^m^Op^eratⁱ^oⁿ^S^o^u^t^h^e^rn^W^a^t^c^h^and^asso^ci^at^ed^U.^S^.^aⁿ^d
^c^o^a^litio^{n a}ⁱ^{r strik}^e^{s in t}^h^e^so^uthe^rⁿⁿ^o^-f^l^y^z^one^of^Ira^q.

^c.^FY2007^reg^ul^{ar fu}^{nding for Qata}^r^{is provided under t}^{he term}^{s of a}^{continuing a}^ppro^{priations resolu}^tion
^{(H.R. 5631/P.L. 10}^9-28^{9 Division B, as amended by H.J.Res. 20, P.L. 11}^{0-5 on Fe}^br^uary^{15, 2}⁰⁰^{7), wh}^{ich sets}
^{funding levels for major aid accou}^{nts. Aid allocat}^{ion amounts relea}^{sed by th}^{e State Departme}^{nt in}^mid-2007
^{do not distinguish between}^NAD^{R sub-accou}^nts.
With its small territory and narrow population base, Qatar relies to a large degree on external
cooperation and support for its security. With a personnel strength of 11,800, Qatar’s armed ³³
forces are the second smallest in the Middle East. Qatar, like other Gulf states, contributes
military units to a small Gulf Cooperation Council rapid deployment force of 5,000 - 10,000
known as Peninsula Shield. France has provided approximately 80% of Qatar’s arms inventory.
Since the 1991 Gulf war, Qatar has pursued a limited program of force modernization. To date,
however, it has not purchased significant U.S. weapons systems. The Administration has
requested $15,000 in FY2008 IMET funds for Qatar.
The Al Udeid airbase south of Doha, the Qatari capital, serves as a logistics, command, and
basing hub for U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraqi. Nearby Camp As Sayliyah is the largest
pre-positioning facility of U.S. military equipment in the world. Qatar invested over $1 billion to
construct the Al Udeid air base during the 1990s: it did not have an air force of its own at the
time. Qatar’s financing and construction of the state-of-the-art air force base at Al Udeid was
widely interpreted to be a tacit invitation to deeper cooperation with U.S. military forces, and
U.S. access to the base there was formalized in late 2000. In April 2003, the U.S. Combat Air
Operations Center for the Middle East moved from Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia to
Qatar’s Al Udeid. Qatar is contributing $400 million to U.S. efforts to upgrade and construct ³⁴
facilities there, including a new air operations command center. From FY2003 to FY2007,
Congress appropriated and authorized $126 million for U.S. military construction activities in
Qatar. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (H.R. 4986) authorizes $81.7
million in FY2008 spending to build new Air Force and Special Operations facilities in Qatar.
Terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia during 2003 and 2004 forced U.S. and Qatari officials to focus
on Qatar’s internal security, as analysts have expressed concern that Al Qaeda operatives
displaced by an ongoing Saudi crackdown or other local terrorist cells could try to establish a
presence and destabilize Qatar. In November 2004, the U.S. State Department issued a warning of
a possible terrorist attack against a hotel or hotels used by Americans in Doha. The warning
expired without incident. On March 19, 2005, an Egyptian national carried out a car bomb attack
at a theater popular with Western expatriates on the outskirts of the capital city of Doha. The car
bombing, the first terrorist incident of its kind in Qatar, killed one British citizen and wounded
twelve others. The suicide bomber was an engineer employed at Qatar Petroleum, and authorities
have been unable to definitively link him to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. The attack came

³³^Bah^r^aiⁿ^,^wⁱ^t^h^{an est}ⁱ^m^at^ed¹¹^,⁰⁰⁰^-m^e^m^b^e^r^f^o^rce,^h^a^{s t}^h^{e sm}^al^l^e^st^.
³⁴^Mic^h^a^e^l^{R. G}^o^rdaⁿ^a^nd^Eric^Sc^h^m^{itt, “}^U^{.S. W}^{ill Mov}^e^Aⁱ^{r Ope}^r^a^{tions t}^o^Qa^ta^{r Ba}^se^,”^{New Yo}^{rk Ti}^mes^{, A}^p^{ril 28,}
²⁰⁰^{3; a}^nd^Eric^Sc^hm^{itt, “}^P^eⁿ^ta^g^oⁿ^Co^nstruc^ti^{on B}^oom^Be^e^f^{s Up}^Mide^a^s^{t A}ⁱ^{r Ba}^se^s,”^{New Yo}^{rk Times}^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r^18,
²⁰⁰^5.

on the second anniversary of the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom and a week after an Al
Qaeda leader in Saudi Arabia called for a new wave of attacks against Western interests in the
Persian Gulf. The Qatari Ministry of the Interior is responsible for internal security and is legally
empowered to detain suspects without trial for up to two years.
According to the 9/11 Commission Report and former U.S. government officials, royal family
member and current Qatari Interior Minister, Shaikh Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani, provided safe
harbor and assistance to Al Qaeda leaders during the 1990s, including the suspected mastermind ³⁵
of the September 11 hijacking plot, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Former U.S. officials and
leaked U.S. government reports state that Osama Bin Laden also visited Doha twice during the
mid-1990s as a guest of Shaikh Abdullah bin Khalid, who then served as Qatar’s Minister for
Religious Endowments & Islamic Affairs, and, later, as Minister of State for Internal Affairs.
During a January 1996 visit to Doha, Bin Laden reportedly “discussed the successful movement
of explosives into Saudi Arabia, and operations targeted against U.S. and U.K. interests in ³⁶
Dammam, Dharan, and Khobar, using clandestine Al Qaeda cells in Saudi Arabia.” According
to other accounts, Shaikh Abdullah bin Khalid welcomed dozens of so-called “Afghan Arab”
veterans of the anti-Soviet conflict in Afghanistan to Qatar in the early 1990s and operated a farm ³⁷
where some of those individuals lived and worked over a period of several years.
In January 1996, FBI officials narrowly missed an opportunity to capture Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed in Qatar, where he held a government job at Qatar’s Ministry of Electricity and
Water and had been targeted for arrest in connection with an investigation of his nephew—1993 ³⁸
World Trade Center bombing mastermind Ramzi Yousef. The FBI dispatched a team to arrest

³⁵^A^c^c^o^r^d^ing^t^o^the^9/^{11 C}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on R}^e^p^o^r^t^,^K^h^a^lid^Shaⁱ^k^h^Mo^ha^m^m^e^{d pr}^ov^ide^d^fⁱ^na^nc^ia^{l s}^u^p^por^{t t}^o^a^c^o^-^c^ons^pⁱ^r^a^tor
^{in t}^h^e¹⁹⁹³^W^o^{rld T}^r^a^d^e^Ce^nte^r^b^o^m^b^ing^w^h^ile^liv^ing^{in Qa}^ta^r^a^nd^la^te^r^m^ove^{d his}^f^a^mⁱ^l^y^{to Q}^a^ta^r^a^t^Shaⁱ^k^h^A^bda^lla^h
^bⁱⁿ^K^h^alⁱ^d^A^l^T^h^anⁱ^’^{s su}^ggestⁱ^oⁿ^.^T^h^{e Rep}^o^r^t^al^so^st^at^{es t}^h^at^Mo^h^a^mmed^“cl^ai^m^s^t^h^at^S^h^ei^kh^A^b^d^a^l^l^a^h^w^a^{s n}^o^t^a
^m^e^m^b^e^r^{, f}ⁱ^na^nc^ie^{r, or sup}^porte^r^o^f^a^l^Qa^e^d^a^,^”^a^{nd tha}^t^M^oha^m^m^e^d^a^d^m^itte^{d “}^t^ha^{t A}^bda^lla^{h u}^nde^rw^rote^a¹⁹⁹⁵^tri^p
^[^M^oha^m^m^e^d^]^to^ok^to^joiⁿ^t^h^e^B^o^sⁿ^ia^jiha^d^.”^Fi^na^{l R}^e^p^o^r^t^of^the^N^a^tiona^{l C}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on on}^T^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^A^tta^c^k^s^U^{pon t}^h^e
^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s⁽^T^he^9/1¹^C^o^m^mⁱ^{ssion R}^e^por^t)^{, p}^p^.⁷³^{, 1}^47-^8,⁴⁸^8-⁹^.^T^h^e^Em^ir^nam^e^{d Sha}ⁱ^k^h^A^bdulla^{h bi}^{n K}^h^a^l^{id A}^l
^T^h^aⁿ^{i to t}^h^e^p^o^s^t^of^Minis^t^e^r^of^Iⁿ^te^rⁱ^orⁱⁿ^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^{1, a}^pos^t^he^c^onti^nue^s^t^o^h^o^l^d^{. H}ⁱ^s^de^pu^ty^{, Min}ⁱ^s^t^e^r^of^Sta^t^e^f^o^r
^Iⁿ^te^rⁱ^or^A^f^f^a^ir^s^A^bda^lla^{h bi}^{n N}^a^sⁱ^r^bin^K^h^a^lif^a^A^l^T^h^aⁿ^{i, c}^u^r^r^e^nt^ly^s^e^r^v^e^s^as^the^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^mⁱ^nis^t^r^y^liaⁱ^s^{on t}^o^f^o^r^e^igⁿ
^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nts^,^inc^l^u^d^ing^t^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^{. J}^a^m^e^s^Rⁱ^s^e^{n a}^{nd D}^a^vⁱ^{d J}^ohns^t^oⁿ^,^“^Q^a^e^d^a^Aⁱ^de^Slippe^{d A}^w^a^y^L^ong^B^e^f^o^r^e
^Se^pte^m^be^r^{11 A}^tta^c^k^,”^{New Yo}^rk^Times^,^M^a^rch^8,²⁰⁰³^;^Jo^s^h^M^e^y^e^{r an}^d^J^o^hn^G^o^et^z,^“Qat^{ar’s S}^ecu^ri^t^y^Chⁱ^e^f
^S^u^sp^ect^ed^o^f^Haviⁿ^g^Tⁱ^{es t}^o^A^l^Q^aed^a,^”^L^o^{s Ang}^e^{les T}ⁱ^mes^,^Ma^r^c^{h 28, 20}⁰³^.
³⁶^Me^m^o^ra^ndum^f^r^o^m^the^D^e^pa^rt^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^{to the}^Se^na^te^Se^le^c^t^Com^m^itte^e^{on Inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^pa^rt^ia^lly^re^printe^{d in}
^S^t^even^F^.^Hay^e^s,^{“Case Cl}^o^s^ed^,^”^Weekl^{y S}^t^andar^d^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^24,²⁰⁰^3.^P^e^nta^g^on^s^pok^e^s^m^e^{n r}^e^s^ponde^d^to^the
^pub^lic^a^tio^{n of}^the^e^x^c^e^r^pts^f^r^om^t^h^e^m^e^m^o^r^a^ndum^{in the}^H^a^y^e^s^a^r^ti^c^l^e^by^indic^a^ting^tha^t^t^h^e^m^e^m^o^r^a^ndum^w^a^s^a
^c^o^lle^c^tion^of^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^da^ta^f^r^o^m^v^a^{rious sourc}^e^s^w^h^ic^{h di}^dⁿ^o^t^c^onstitu^te^a^fⁱ^nishe^dⁱⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^pro^duc^{t. I}^t^is^unc^le^a^r
^if^{Bin L}^a^de^{n’s re}^porte^{d v}ⁱ^{sit w}^a^{s re}^la^te^{d to}^pre^p^a^r^a^tio^ns^f^o^{r the}^Juⁿ^e¹⁹⁹^{6 a}^tta^c^k^on^the^K^h^o^b^a^r^T^o^we^rs^m^ilita^r^y
^ba^rra^c^k^{s in Sa}^udi^A^r^a^b^ia^tha^t^k^ille^{d 19}^U.S.^se^rv^ic^e^m^eⁿ^{. P}^r^e^{ss re}^p^o^rting^f^r^om^the^la^te¹⁹^{90s c}^ite^{s a}^f^o^r^m^e^r^U.S.
^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^a^s^indic^a^ting^tha^t^the^“^Q^a^t^a^r^{i i}^ndivⁱ^d^u^a^l^”^w^{ho h}^o^s^t^e^d^Bi^{n L}^a^de^{n w}^a^s^A^bdulla^{h Bi}^{n K}^h^a^lⁱ^d^A^l
^T^h^aⁿ^{i. Se}^e^J^a^m^e^s^Rⁱ^s^e^{n a}^{nd B}^e^nj^am^{in W}^e^is^e^r^{, “}^U^{.S. O}^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^Say^Aⁱ^{d f}^o^r^Te^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^s^C^a^m^e^T^h^r^oug^{h Tw}^{o P}^e^r^s^ia^{n G}^u^lf
^N^a^tions^,”^{New Y}^o^{rk Times}^{, J}^u^ly^{8, 19}⁹⁹^.
³⁷^J^a^m^e^s^Rⁱ^s^e^{n a}^{nd B}^e^nja^m^{in W}^e^ise^r^{, “}^U^{.S. O}^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^Say^Aⁱ^{d f}^o^r^T^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^s^C^a^m^e^T^h^r^oug^{h T}^w^{o P}^e^r^sⁱ^a^{n G}^u^lf
^N^a^tions^,”^{New Y}^o^{rk Times}^{, J}^u^ly^{8, 19}⁹⁹^{. J}^a^m^e^s^Rⁱ^s^e^{n a}^{nd D}^a^vⁱ^{d J}^o^hns^to^{n, “}^Q^a^e^d^a^Aⁱ^de^Slip^pe^{d A}^w^ay^L^ong^B^e^f^o^r^e
^Se^{pt. 11}^A^tta^c^k^,”^{New Yo}^{rk Times}^,^M^a^rch^8,²⁰⁰³^;^J^o^sh^M^e^y^e^{r an}^d^Jo^hn^G^o^et^z,^“Qat^{ar’s S}^ecu^ri^t^y^Chⁱ^e^f^S^u^sp^ect^ed^o^f
^Haviⁿ^g^Tⁱ^{es t}^o^A^l^Qaed^a,^”^L^o^{s An}^g^e^{les T}ⁱ^mes^{, Ma}^rc^h²⁸^{, 2}⁰⁰³^.
³⁸^A^c^c^o^r^d^ing^t^o^the^9/^{11 C}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on R}^e^p^o^r^t⁽^p^.¹⁴⁷⁾^{, K}^h^a^lid^Shaⁱ^k^h^Mo^ha^m^m^e^{d “}^eⁿ^g^a^ge^{d in e}^x^te^nsⁱ^v^e^inte^rⁿ^a^tio^na^l
^tra^v^e^l^during^hⁱ^s^teⁿ^u^re^[^a^{t the}^Mi^nis^t^ry^of^Ele^c^t^ricⁱ^t^y^a^{nd W}^a^te^r]^...^m^u^c^h^of^{it in f}^u^rthe^ra^nc^e^of^te^rrorⁱ^s^t^a^c^tiv^it^y^.^”

Mohammed, but he fled Qatar before he could be detained. Some former U.S. officials have since
stated their belief that a high ranking member of the Qatari government alerted Mohammed to the ³⁹
impending raid, allowing him to flee the country.
More recent concerns regarding potential support for terrorism by prominent Qataris have
centered around claims that the late Abu Musab Al Zarqawi may have transited Qatar after
September 11, 2001 and benefitted from a safehouse and financial support provided by a member ⁴⁰
of the ruling Al Thani family. Any discussions by Clinton Administration or Bush
Administration officials with the government of Qatar regarding these allegations have not been
made public. Current U.S. security officials working to ensure the safety and security of U.S.
facilities, citizens, and assets in Qatar report that their relationships with Ministry of Interior
officials, including serving Minister of State for Interior Affairs Shaykh Abdullah bin Nasir bin
Khalifah Al Thani, are positive and cooperative. The Emir reappointed Shaikh Abdullah bin
Khalid as Minister of Interior in April 2007.
The U.S. Department of State has characterized Qatar’s counterterrorism support since September ⁴¹
11, 2001 as “significant.” Qatar’s Combating Terrorism Law, passed in March 2004, established
definitions of terrorism and terrorist financing and broadened the government’s power to detect
and prevent terrorist threats and to investigate and prosecute terrorists and their supporters. Qatar
also established the Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities (QACA) in March 2004 to monitor
the activities of all Qatari domestic and international charitable organizations, including
prominent organizations such as the Qatar Charitable Society and the Shaikh Eid bin Mohammed
Al Thani Charitable Association. All international financial charity transfers and project ⁴²
verification fall within the jurisdiction of the new QACA. However, Article 24 of the law
establishing the Authority allows the Emir to grant an exemption from QACA oversight to any
organization at any time. Qatar’s central bank operates a financial intelligence unit (FIU) which
monitors activity in Qatar’s banking system and serves as a liaison office to similar units in the ⁴³
United States and around the world.
On February 13, 2004, a Chechen national named Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev was assassinated in a ⁴⁴
car bombing outside a mosque in Doha. In the past, the Russian government had accused

³⁹^“^T^he^U^.^{S. A}^ttorⁿ^e^y^obtaⁱ^ne^{d a}ⁿⁱ^ndic^t^m^e^{nt a}^g^aⁱ^ns^{t K}^S^{M in}^J^a^nua^r^y^1996,^but^aⁿ^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{in the}^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt of}^Q^a^ta^r
^pr^o^b^a^b^ly^w^a^rⁿ^e^d^him^a^{bout i}^t^...^Iⁿ^J^a^nua^r^y¹⁹⁹^{6, w}^e^{ll a}^w^a^r^e^tha^t^U^.^{S. a}^u^t^horⁱ^tie^s^w^e^r^e^c^h^a^s^ing^hi^m^,^he^le^f^t^Q^a^ta^r^f^o^r
^g^{ood a}ⁿ^{d f}^l^e^d^to^A^f^g^h^aⁿ^is^ta^n.”^9/^{11 C}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on R}^e^por^t,^p.⁷³^{. T}^h^e^R^e^por^t^pr^ov^ide^s^t^h^e^f^o^llowⁱ^ng^c^ita^tion^:
^“^I^nte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^re^port,^inte^rrog^a^tioⁿ^of^{KSM, July}^23,²⁰⁰³^.”
⁴⁰^P^a^tric^k^{E. Ty}^le^{r “}^I^nte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^Br^e^a^k^L^e^{t P}^o^w^e^{ll L}ⁱ^nk^Ira^{q a}^{nd Qa}^e^d^a^,^”^Ne^w^York^Tⁱ^m^e^{s, Fe}^brua^r^y^{3, 2}⁰⁰³^.
⁴¹^C^o^uⁿ^tr^y^R^e^por^ts^oⁿ^T^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^{, R}^e^le^a^s^e^d^by^the^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^-^O^f^fⁱ^ce^of^the^C^oor^dⁱ^na^tor^f^o^r
^C^oun^te^r^t^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^{, A}^p^r^{il 27,}²⁰⁰⁵^.
⁴²^A^u^thorⁱⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith Q}^A^C^A^C^h^aⁱ^r^m^aⁿ^A^{bdul A}^z^iz^{bin A}^bdul^R^a^hm^aⁿ^{bin H}^a^s^a^{n A}^l^T^h^aⁿ^{i, D}^oha^,^Q^a^ta^r^,^A^p^r^il
²⁰⁰^5.
⁴³^Me^e^ting^w^{ith QCB G}^o^v^e^{rnor A}^bda^lla^{h b}ⁱ^{n K}^h^a^{lid A}^l^A^ttiy^a^h^{, Do}^ha^{, Qa}^ta^{r, A}^p^{ril 2}⁰⁰⁵^.
⁴⁴^Da^vⁱ^{d Ig}^na^{tius, “}^Iⁿ^Qa^ta^{r, Sta}ⁿ^di^ng^{Up to}^Putin^,”^W^a^s^hⁱ^ngt^{on Pos}^t^{, Ma}^r^c^{h 1}⁶^,²⁰⁰⁴^{; a}ⁿ^{d A}^ndr^e^w^Mc^G^r^e^g^or^{, “}^T^he
^A^s^s^a^s^sⁱ^na^{tion of}^Ze^lim^k^h^aⁿ^Y^a^nda^r^b^iy^ev^{: I}^m^plic^a^tions^f^o^r^the^W^a^r^{on T}^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^,”^T^e^rro^{rism Mo}ⁿ^itor^{, v}^o^lum^e^{2, Is}^s^u^e
^{14, J}^u^ly^15,²⁰^04.

Yandarbiyev of funding Chechen terrorist activity. Soon after the bombing, Qatari authorities ⁴⁵
arrested two Russians and filed criminal charges against them. The United States sent a team of
explosive experts to Doha in response to a Qatari request but denied aiding the investigation or ⁴⁶
arrest of the Russian suspects. In July 2004, a Qatari court sentenced the two Russians to life in ⁴⁷
prison and subsequently agreed to transfer them to Russian custody and detention. Russian
officials have denied that the individuals have been released, although a state television news
broadcast in July 2006 characterized the Doha explosion as successful operation by the Russian
security services, which has been interpreted by some observers as an indirect admission of ⁴⁸
responsibility by Russian authorities.
Trade between the United States and Qatar has increased since the 1990-1991 Gulf war. U.S.
exports to Qatar amounted to $1.45 billion from January through September 2007, consisting
mainly of machinery and transport equipment. U.S. imports from Qatar, mainly fuel and ⁴⁹
fertilizers, totaled $338.7 million during the same period. Although the bulk of Qatar’s trade
continues to be with a few European countries and Japan, several U.S. firms, including
ExxonMobil, Occidental Petroleum, and Pennzoil are active in the development of Qatar’s oil and
gas resources. ExxonMobil and an affiliate of Qatar Petroleum are cooperating in the construction
of a large LNG terminal (known as Golden Pass) on the Texas coast that is expected to begin ⁵⁰
receiving Qatari natural gas some time in 2009.

A combination of factors—strains with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and aspiration to a more
influential role in regional affairs—has contributed to Qatar’s independent foreign policy
approach since 1992. Although it was an active member of the allied coalition formed during the
1990-1991 Gulf crisis and participated in post-war security arrangements, Qatar adopted a
conciliatory stance toward both Iraq and Iran before the other members of the GCC did. Qatar
restored diplomatic ties with Saddam Hussein’s regime shortly after the 1991 Gulf war, hosted
visits by the Iraqi Foreign Minister, and called for relaxing economic sanctions against Iraq.
Nevertheless, Qatar played an important logistics role in Operation Iraqi Freedom, providing
headquarters for the U.S. Central Command and pre-positioning facilities for U.S. tanks and
armored personnel carriers. At the same time, the Al Jazeera news network has been criticized by

⁴⁵^T^h^e^indivⁱ^d^u^a^l^{s na}^m^e^{d a}^r^e^Aⁿ^a^t^o^l^y^Be^l^a^shk^o^v^a^{nd V}^a^siliy^Bog^a^c^h^y^o^v^.^T^h^e^y^a^r^e^de^sc^ribe^{d in Russia}ⁿ^pre^{ss so}^urc^e^s
^a^s^“ⁱ^nte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^offⁱ^c^e^r^s”^a^{nd “}^s^p^e^cⁱ^a^l^se^rv^ic^e^s^a^g^eⁿ^ts.”^A^{third sus}^p^e^c^t^w^a^{s not a}^rre^ste^d^on^the^ba^{sis of}^dipl^om^a^tic
^im^m^unit^y^.
⁴⁶^In^terfa^x^{News S}^e^rvice^{, “}^U^{.S. D}^e^nie^s^Inv^o^lv^e^m^eⁿ^{t in Q}^a^ta^r’s^A^rre^s^t^of^Rus^sⁱ^aⁿ^s^,^”^Ma^rc^h^22,²⁰⁰⁴^.
⁴⁷^In^terfa^x^{News S}^e^rvice^,^“Ru^ssi^an^s^Coⁿ^vⁱ^c^t^e^dⁱⁿ^Qat^a^{r S}^e^rviⁿ^g^P^rⁱ^s^on^S^eⁿ^t^eⁿ^{ces i}ⁿ^Ru^ssi^a,^{” Decem}^b^e^{r 1}⁴^,²⁰⁰⁵^.
⁴⁸^W^P^S:^D^e^fe^ns^e^&^Se^c^u^r^ity^,^“T^h^e^Destin^y^o^f^Yan^d^a^rb^iy^e^v^{’s Killers}^{is Un}^kⁿ^o^wⁿ^,^{” Dece}^m^b^{er 1}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁵^{; BBC}
^Moni^tori^ng^Form^e^r^Sovⁱ^e^t^Uni^on,^“^R^ussiaⁿ^T^V^Re^f^l^e^c^t^s^{on Killi}^ng^of^“^T^e^{rrorist Num}^b^e^r^One^”^Ba^sa^ye^v^,^”^Jul^y^12,
²⁰⁰^6.
⁴⁹^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^ona^{l T}^r^a^d^e^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tion,^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^C^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^,^T^r^a^d^e^S^ta^ts^Ex^pr^e^s^s^-^N^a^tiona^l
^T^r^a^d^e^D^a^ta^{, a}^c^c^e^s^se^{d J}^a^nua^r^y^24,²⁰⁰^8.
⁵⁰^Natur^a^{l Gas}^Inte^lli^ge^nc^e^{, “}^S^ha^k^e^out^of^G^u^lf^L^N^G^P^r^oje^c^t^s^B^e^gⁱ^ns^a^s^Ex^x^onMobi^{l, B}^P^She^l^v^e^P^l^aⁿ^s^,^”^A^u^g^u^s^t^28,
²⁰⁰^6.

some U.S. officials for being sensationalist in its coverage of U.S. military operations, for inciting
violence, and for airing terrorist and insurgent propaganda. On May 8, 2003, President Bush
hosted the Emir of Qatar at the White House, thanking him for his steadfast support during
Operation Iraqi Freedom and highlighting his role as a reformer. Qatar continues to serve as an
important base of operations for U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Qatar is a member of the
United Nations, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and the Gulf ⁵¹
Cooperation Council (GCC). Qatar is also a member of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC). Qatar was a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council from 2005 to 2007 and used this position to support its assertive and independent ⁵²
policies. Current Qatari concerns focus on positioning the country with regard to the ongoing
confrontation between Iran and the international community, led by the United States, over
nuclear technology.
Territorial disputes marred Qatar’s relations with Bahrain from the early 19^th century until
recently. Emigrant members of the Kuwait-based Utub tribe settled in Bahrain and northern Qatar ^th
during the late 18 century. Subsequent political divergences led the leading families of Qatar and
Bahrain to jointly claim sovereignty over the Hawar island chain in the waters separating the two
states, along with the now-abandoned town of Zubarah on Qatar’s northwestern coast. The two
states engaged in a number of minor military skirmishes related to the claims over the years. On
March 16, 2001, after seven years of deliberations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found
that Qatar has sovereignty over Zubarah and that Bahrain has sovereignty over the Hawar ⁵³
islands. In June 2006, Qatar and Bahrain signed an agreement to construct a 28-mile causeway, ⁵⁴
aptly named the “Friendship Bridge,”which will connect the two kingdoms. The project is
expected to take five years to complete.
Historically, Qatar has been deeply affected by political and economic conditions in neighboring
Saudi Arabia, particularly by changes in the Al Saud family’s control over the eastern province of
Al Hasa and the movements of bedouin tribes loyal to the Al Saud into and out of Qatar. During
Qatar’s pre-independence period, the Al Saud family long regarded Qatar as either tacitly or
explicitly under its jurisdiction, and various Qatari leaders maintained a degree of autonomy by
balancing relationships with the Al Saud and outside powers, such as the Ottoman and British
empires. Similarly, the Al Saud sought to preserve their influence on the Qatari peninsula via
relationships with bedouin tribes and prominent Qataris, including leading businessmen and rival

⁵¹^T^h^e^G^C^C^is^a^s^ub-^r^e^gⁱ^ona^{l or}^g^aⁿⁱ^z^a^{tion c}^o^ns^is^ting^of^sⁱ^x^s^t^a^t^e^s^(Sa^{udi A}^r^a^b^ia^{, Kuw}^a^{it, Ba}^hraⁱ^n,^Qa^ta^{r, the}^Unite^d
^A^r^a^b^E^m^ir^a^t^e^s^{, a}^{nd O}^m^aⁿ⁾^bor^de^rⁱ^ng^the^P^e^r^s^ia^{n G}^u^lf^a^{nd t}^h^e^G^u^lf^of^Om^aⁿ^.
⁵²^Q^a^ta^rⁱ^dipl^om^a^t^s^a^ttr^ibute^Q^a^ta^r^’^s^v^a^rⁱ^e^d^pos^iti^ons^on^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^{il is}^s^u^e^s^{to Q}^a^ta^r^’^s^pe^r^c^eⁱ^v^e^d^ne^e^d^to^r^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^t
^the^p^o^sitio^{ns of}^ot^he^{r A}^r^a^b^a^{nd M}^u^slim^sta^t^e^s^{on spe}^cⁱ^fⁱ^cⁱ^ssue^s^a^s^w^e^{ll a}^s^{to pursue}ⁱ^nde^pe^nde^nt^p^o^l^itic^a^l^initia^tiv^e^s^.
^A^u^thorⁱⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith Q}^a^ta^rⁱ^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^W^a^s^h^ing^t^{on, D}^C^,^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰⁶^.
⁵³^“^T^he^I^s^la^nds^Dⁱ^s^pute^-^R^e^s^o^lv^e^d^,^”^Mⁱ^ddle^Eas^t^Ec^o^nom^ic^Dⁱ^ge^s^t^,^Se^pte^m^be^r^{28, 2}⁰⁰¹^.
⁵⁴^Ree^m^Kh^alⁱ^f^a,^“P^ersi^an^G^u^l^f^S^t^at^{es Bah}^r^aiⁿ^an^{d Qat}^a^{r t}^o^b^e^Lⁱⁿ^k^ed^Vⁱ^{a Cau}^s^ew^a^y^,^”^A^sso^ci^a^t^ed^P^r^e^s^s^{, J}^une¹¹^,
²⁰⁰^6.

members of the ruling Al Thani family. Oil concession negotiations provided the impetus to ^th
firmly define the international boundary between Saudi Arabia and Qatar during the mid-20
century, and an agreement was reached in 1965. An armed clash along the Saudi-Qatari border in

1992 led to the temporary suspension of the 1965 border agreement between the two countries.

The border was demarcated in 1999 following lengthy consultations via a joint technical ⁵⁵
committee.
In recent years, Saudi-Qatari relations have been cordial but marked by periodic indications of
continuing tension. In 1970, Saudi Arabia supported the former Emir, Shaikh Khalifa, in his effort
to depose his predecessor. Some Qatari officials accused Saudi Arabia of supporting the
unsuccessful attempt in 1996 by dissident Al Thani family members to restore Shaikh Khalifa
following the palace coup that brought his son Hamad, the current Emir, to power. From the mid-

1990s until recently, differences between the two capitals frequently have been aired in state-

affiliated media: Al Jazeera’s treatment of Saudi Arabia in its programming proved to be the most
significant point of public contention between the two regimes. Saudi Arabia withdrew its
ambassador from Doha in September 2002 in protest of an Al Jazeera program that criticized the
kingdom’s founder, King Abdul Aziz Al Saud. Similarly, Saudi-owned media outlets in London
have frequently criticized Qatar’s foreign policy and questioned the Qatari government’s
positions on issues of pan-Arab importance. In October 2006, Qatar announced plans to launch a
Doha-based Arabic newspaper that is expected to compete with the dominant Saudi-backed
regional newspapers based in London.
Differences between the two governments at times have moved beyond rhetoric, such as in July
2006 when the Saudi Arabian embassy in the United Arab Emirates faxed a notice to financial
backers of the $3.5 billion Dolphin undersea natural gas pipeline project objecting to construction
of the link between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The Saudi notice reportedly claimed that
the pipeline would pass through Saudi territorial waters without Saudi approval. Qatari and
Emirati officials downplayed the reports and stated their expectation that the project would not be
delayed. Many observers interpreted the step as an indication that Saudi Arabia may have been
trying to reassert its historically dominant role in relations among the smaller Gulf states and to
underscore its boundary and territorial water claims, some of which have been questioned by ⁵⁶
sources in the UAE. (The pipeline was inaugurated and has begun shipping gas.) Prior tension
between Qatar and Saudi Arabia disrupted plans for a similar pipeline to link Qatar with Kuwait.
A September 2007 visit to Riyadh by the Qatari Emir has opened a process of apparent Saudi-
Qatari rapprochement. In December 2007, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz visited Doha for the
GCC summit and Saudi Arabia announced plans to return its ambassador to Qatar.
Relations between Qatar and the new Iraqi government have been limited but friendly. In August

2004, the Iraqi government closed Al Jazeera’s bureau office in Baghdad after accusing the ⁵⁷

station of airing material that incited violence. Saddam Hussein’s wife, Sajida Khayrallah Tilfa,
and their daughter Hala currently live in Qatar, reportedly at the private invitation of former

⁵⁵^A^g^en^{ce F}^r^an^ce-P^r^esse^{, “}^Rⁱ^y^a^{dh a}^{nd Do}^ha^Se^ttle^L^ong^staⁿ^ding^Bo^rde^r^Dispute^,^”^J^une^7,¹⁹^99.
⁵⁶^{Platts Oi}^lgram^{, “}^Q^a^t^a^r^{, U}^A^{E P}^l^a^y^D^o^wⁿ^D^o^lphi^{n G}^a^s^Pⁱ^pe^line^Fe^a^r^s^,^”^Vol^u^m^e^{84, N}^u^m^b^e^r¹⁷^5,^Se^pte^m^be^r^13,
²⁰⁰^6.
⁵⁷^Reu^t^ers,^{“Jazeera S}^a^{ys Iraq}^Cl^o^s^{es i}^t^s^Bagh^d^a^d^Of^fⁱ^c^e^,^”^S^e^p^t^e^m^b^e^{r 4}^,²⁰⁰⁴^.

deputy prime minister Shaikh Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Thani.⁵⁸ In 2004, the U.S. Treasury
Department designated Sajida and Hala under Executive Order 13315 and recommended that the
U.N. Security Council 1518 Committee require that their assets be frozen and transferred to the ⁵⁹
Development Fund for Iraq. In July 2006, Iraqi authorities listed Saddam’s wife on its most
wanted list for allegedly providing financial support to insurgents and demanded her extradition ⁶⁰
to Iraq. Interpol has issued an international arrest warrant for Sajida Khayrallah Tilfa and
another of Saddam’s daughters, Raghad.
Iran and Qatar have maintained positive relations, in spite of periods when Iran’s relationships
with the Arab Gulf states otherwise foundered, such as during the Iran-Iraq war and tanker war of
the 1980s. Iran and Qatar share the large North Field/South Pars natural gas deposit off the Qatari
coast, and related cooperation and negotiations have built on historical commercial and family
ties between Qatari and Iranian Arabs. Qatari officials have met frequently with members of
Iran’s government in Iran and in Qatar in recent years, and the Qatari government regularly
advocates for increased dialogue between the GCC states and Iran. Qatar’s policy of referring to
the Persian Gulf as the Arabian Gulf has led to diplomatic tension with Iran at times. In July
2006, Qatar was the sole member of the United Nations Security Council to oppose Security
Council resolution 1696, which called on Iran to “suspend all enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA,” and
proposed potential sanctions should Iran refuse. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad
attended the December 2007 GCC summit in Doha at the invitation of the Qatari emir.
Although Qatar and Israel do not have formal diplomatic ties, Qatar has been in the forefront of
Arab-Israeli talks on expanding economic ties during periods of progress in the peace process.
Qatar’s position regarding the Arab boycott of Israel is governed by the September 1994 decision
by the GCC to terminate enforcement of the indirect boycotts, while maintaining, at least in
theory, the primary boycott. Qatar has hosted meetings of multilateral Arab-Israeli working
groups and then Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres visited in April 1996.
Qatar agreed to the establishment of an Israeli trade mission in Doha, Qatar’s capital city,
although relations cooled after the peace process slowed down in 1996. Following the outbreak of
the second Palestinian uprising in 2000, Qatar claimed to have shut down the office; however, ⁶¹
according to Qatari officials, it continued to operate at a very low level. Prior to the start of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Israeli Foreign Ministry closed the trade mission in Doha and
evacuated three Israeli envoys and their families. Israel promised to reopen the office after the ⁶²
war. Despite pressure from some other Arab states, Qatar hosted the fourth annual Middle

⁵⁸^Ian^M^a^t^h^er,^“M^on^ey^No^Ob^j^ect^fo^{r Di}^ct^at^o^rⁱⁿ^t^h^{e Mo}^t^h^er^o^f^al^l^T^rⁱ^a^l^s^,^”^Sc^otl^aⁿ^d^oⁿ^Su^nd^ay^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r¹²^{, 2}⁰⁰⁴^.
⁵⁹^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^the^T^r^e^a^s^ur^y^,^“^J^S-¹²^{42: T}^r^e^a^s^ur^y^D^e^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^t^e^s^{16 Fa}^mⁱ^l^y^Mem^b^e^r^s^of^the^For^m^e^r^I^r^a^{qi R}^e^gⁱ^m^e^,
^Subm^{its 19}^{1 Ira}^qi^En^titie^{s to}^Unit^e^d^Na^tions,”^Ma^rc^{h 1}⁸^,²⁰⁰⁴^.
⁶⁰^A^sso^ci^a^t^{ed P}^r^ess^{, “}^S^a^dda^m^’^s^R^e^l^a^tiv^e^s^Soug^ht,”^J^u^ly^3,²⁰^06.
⁶¹^Me^e^ting^w^{ith the}^Q^a^ta^rⁱ^Mi^nis^t^e^r^of^Sta^t^e^,^A^h^m^e^{d A}^bdulla^{h A}^l^Me^hm^{ood, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{12, 2}⁰⁰³^.
⁶²^“Israel^S^h^u^t^{s Qat}^a^{r M}ⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^,^T^o^Red^u^{ce S}^t^af^fⁱⁿ^E^g^y^p^t^,^Jo^rd^an^,^Mau^rⁱ^t^aⁿⁱ^a,^”^Ye^di^’ot^Ah^ar^an^ot^,^Ma^r^c^{h 3,}²⁰⁰³^,
^tr^aⁿ^s^l^a^t^e^d^by^the^For^e^ig^{n B}^r^oa^dc^a^s^ting^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion Se}^r^v^ic^e⁽^F^B^I^S)^,^D^o^c^u^m^e^{nt I}^D^{: G}^M^P²⁰⁰³⁰³¹¹⁰⁰⁰²⁰^8.

East/North Africa Economic Conference (MENA) in November 1997, which brought together
Arab and Israeli business and political leaders to discuss regional economic cooperation.
In May 2003, Qatari and Israeli Foreign Ministers met in Paris to discuss ways of reviving the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The meeting took place only a week after the Emir’s visit to
Washington, prompting speculation that President Bush encouraged Qatari officials to take a
more active role in the peace process. Shaikh Hamad has acknowledged that Qatar is keen to play
a role in encouraging negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, but that it is too early to
open full diplomatic ties with Israel. Analysts regard Qatar’s exchanges with Israel, though
limited, as broadly in accord with U.S. efforts to foster an expanding dialogue between Israel and
Arab states.
Qatar offered $50 million in financial support to the then-Hamas-led Palestinian Authority
government and has hosted Hamas officials for numerous talks and consultations since January
2006. In October, the Qatari government launched an ultimately unsuccessful round of shuttle
diplomacy aimed at resolving differences between Palestinian factions and securing the release of ⁶³
kidnaped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit by his Hamas captors. Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni
declined a Qatari invitation to participate in an October 2006 democracy conference in Doha
because of the presence of Hamas representatives, but an Israeli delegation participated in the ⁶⁴
conference, led by lower-ranking Foreign Ministry officials. Israeli Deputy Prime Minister
Shimon Peres visited Qatar in February 2007 and declined the Emir’s reported suggestion that ⁶⁵
Israel negotiate directly with Hamas.
During the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, Qatari leaders were
outspoken in their criticism of Israel and other Arab states and used their non-permanent seat on
the United Nations Security Council and their own diplomatic initiatives to advance alternative
cease-fire, mediation, and peacekeeping proposals. In the aftermath of the war, the Emir praised ⁶⁶
Hezbollah’s “victory” and visited Lebanon, pledging to adopt southern Lebanese villages
destroyed in the fighting. Qatar has sent over 200 troops to participate in the UNIFIL
peacekeeping mission and remains active in supporting reconstruction and compensations
programs inside Lebanon.

⁶³^Daily^S^t^ar⁽^B^eⁱ^r^u^t)^{, “}^Q^a^t^a^r^{i Me}^di^a^tion^Fa^ils^to^B^r^idg^e^H^a^m^a^s^-^Fa^{tah G}^a^p,”^O^c^tobe^r¹¹^,²⁰^06.
⁶⁴^A^g^en^{ce F}^r^an^{ce P}^r^esse^{, “}^L^iv^{ni Shuns}^Q^a^ta^r^C^onf^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^,^{but I}^s^r^a^e^l^T^h^e^r^e^,^”^O^c^tobe^r^29,²⁰⁰⁶^.
⁶⁵^D^a^nna^H^a^r^m^aⁿ^{, “}^Tⁱⁿ^y^Q^a^t^a^r^Vie^s^f^o^r^Bⁱ^g^R^e^gⁱ^ona^{l R}^o^le^,”^C^h^rⁱ^s^t^ia^{n Sc}^ie^nc^e^M^onit^o^r^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{6, 2}⁰⁰⁷^.
⁶⁶^A^t^joint^pr^e^s^s^c^onf^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^w^{ith L}^e^ba^ne^s^e^P^r^e^sⁱ^d^eⁿ^{t Em}^ile^L^a^houd^,^Shaⁱ^k^h^H^a^m^a^{d s}^a^{id: “}^T^he^Le^ba^ne^s^e^pe^ople^aⁿ^d
^theⁱ^{r re}^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^ha^v^e^a^c^h^ie^v^e^{d the}^fⁱ^rs^{t A}^r^a^b^vⁱ^c^t^ory^,^s^o^m^e^thing^w^e^ha^{d l}^ong^e^d^f^o^r...T^he^Is^ra^e^lis^us^e^d^{to be}^a^b^le^to
^dom^ina^t^e^A^r^a^b^s^w^{ith m}^ilita^r^y^mⁱ^{ght b}^u^{t t}^h^{is is}^no^lo^ng^e^r^possi^ble^a^f^te^{r w}^h^a^t^ha^ppe^ne^d^{in s}^out^he^{rn L}^e^ba^no^n.”^S^h^eⁱ^k^h
^H^a^m^a^{d a}^l^s^o^s^a^{id, “}^b^aⁿ^ning^w^e^a^pons^f^r^om^the^L^e^ba^ne^se^a^{nd a}^llowⁱⁿ^g^the^m^f^o^r^the^I^s^r^a^e^lis^is^not^accep^t^a^b^l^e.^Aⁿ^y^oⁿ^e
^w^{ho be}^lie^v^e^s^this^a^r^g^u^m^e^nt^w^a^{nts to}^put^L^e^ba^non^{in a}^c^a^g^e^{to m}^a^k^e^{it a}ⁿ^e^a^s^y^pr^ey^f^o^r^I^s^r^a^e^l^.”^A^g^en^{ce F}^r^aⁿ^{ce P}^r^esse^,
^“Qat^{ar Hai}^l^s^L^e^b^aⁿ^e^se^f^o^{r ‘f}ⁱ^r^st^Arab^vi^ct^o^r^y^’^o^v^{er Israel}^,^”^A^u^gu^st²¹^,²⁰⁰⁶^.

^Area:^11,4^{37 s}^q^{km (slightly smaller tha}^{n Connectic}^ut)
^{Population (July 2007):}^907,²²⁹
^Literacy:^89%
^Religion:^77.5%^Mu^{slim, Christian 8.5%, other}^14%
^{Ethnic Gr}^oups:^{40% A}^{rab, 1}^{8% Pakistani, 1}^{8% I}ⁿ^d^{ian, 10% I}^ranian,^{14% ot}^her
^{GDP (200}^7):^$75,9⁰⁰^per^{capita (based on}^$6⁸^{.87 billion GDP PPP)}
^{Inflation (2007):}^12%
^{Oil Reserves (20}^06):^15.2^{1 billion barrels}
^{Gas Reserves (200}^6):^24.7^{3 trillion cubic meters}
^{Armed Fo}^rces:^12,4^{00 active}^person^{nel, 30 ta}^nks^{, 18 fighte}^{r aircraft}
^Sources:^{The U}^{nited States Cen}^{tral Intelligence Agency,}^{World Factbook}^{, Janua}^{ry 2}⁰⁰^{8; Armed for}^c^{es data -}
^Inter^{national Institute}^{for Strategic Studies,}^{Military B}^{alance 2005-2}⁰⁰⁶^{, May 20}^06.

^Emir^{Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani}
^{Heir Appa}^rent^{Tamim bin Hamad bin}^{Khalifa Al Thani}
^{Prime Minister}^{Hamad bin Jas}^sem^{bin Jab}^{r Al Th}^ani
^{Deputy Prime}^Minister^{Abdallah bin Hamad Al Attiyah}
^{Foreign Minister}^{Hamad bin Jas}^sem^{bin Jab}^{r Al Th}^ani
^Energ^{y Minister}^{Abdallah bin Hamad Al Attiyah}
^{Interior Minister}^{Abdallah bin Khalid Al Thani}^a
^{Finance Minister}^{Youssef Hu}^{ssein Al Kamal}
^{Ambassador to the U}^{nited States}^Vacant
^a.^{Minister of State for I}^{nterior Affa}^{irs Abdallah bin Nas}^ser^{bin Khalifa Al Thani conducts m}^u^c^h^{of the}^official
^busines^{s of the}^{Ministry of}^Interi^{or, including serving as liaison to foreign governme}^{nts a}^{nd secu}^{rity services.}

Figure B-1. Map of Qatar
^Source:^{Shaded Relief Country}^{Map of Qata}^{r, Central I}^{ntelligence Agency, 1}⁹⁹^5.

^C^h^ri^s^t^oph^{er M. B}^l^an^ch^ard
^An^al^y^s^{t i}ⁿ^{Middle Eas}^t^ern^Affairs
^cbl^aⁿ^c^h^a^rd@^c^rs^.l^oc.^g^ov^{, 7-}⁰⁴²⁸