Funding for Military and Peacekeeping Operations: Recent History and Precedents

CRS Report for Congress
Funding for Military and Peacekeeping
Operations: Recent History and Precedents
November 7, 2003
Jeffrey Chamberlin
Analyst in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division


Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Funding for Military and Peacekeeping Operations:
Recent History and Precedents
Summary
Congress recently completed action on the Bush Administration’s FY2004
supplemental budget request to fund continuing military operations and
reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was signed into law, P.L. 108-106, on
November 6, 2003. A major issue in the congressional debate on this, and other such
supplementals of the past, is whether military and peacekeeping operations should
be funded with supplemental requests or via the regular defense appropriations
process. Some Members of Congress have urged the President to include the costs
of current and future operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the Department of
Defense’s (DOD’s) regular appropriations, arguing that these are now ongoing
operations that should be planned for and funded in the annual defense budget.
Others prefer supplementals due to the unpredictability of military and peacekeeping
circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan. This unpredictability, they argue, makes it
extremely difficult to estimate the costs of either type of operation in advance.
This report examines 46 cases since FY1990 in which Congress approved
funding for combat or peacekeeping operations using regular appropriations,
supplemental appropriations, or a combination of the two. The report shows that
since 1990, Congress generally has funded combat operations with supplemental
appropriations. In initial stages of post-combat peacekeeping operations, however,
Congress has tended to rely on a combination of supplemental and regular
appropriations. As peacekeeping operations have become ongoing, Congress has
switched to using regular appropriations.



Contents
In troduction ......................................................1
Initial Appropriations: Usually Supplementals...........................1
The Transition to Regular Appropriations...............................2
Haiti and Kosovo..............................................2
Bosnia ......................................................2
The First Gulf War and the “No-Fly” Zones.........................3
Recent Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq..............................4
List of Tables
Table 1: Methods of Funding for Wars and Contingency Operations,
First Persian Gulf War to Operation Iraqi Freedom....................5



Funding for Military and Peacekeeping
Operations: Recent History and Precedents
Introduction
Congress recently completed action on the Bush Administration’s FY2004
supplemental budget request to fund continuing military operations and1
reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan. A major issue in the congressional debate
on this, and other such supplementals of the past, is whether military and
peacekeeping operations should be funded with supplemental requests or via the
regular defense appropriations process. Some Members of Congress have urged the
President to include the costs of current and future operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
in the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) regular appropriations, arguing that these
are now ongoing operations that should be planned for and funded in the annual
defense budget. Others prefer supplementals due to the unpredictability of military
and peacekeeping circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan. This unpredictability, they
argue, makes it extremely difficult to estimate the costs of either type of operation in
advance.
This report examines 46 cases since FY1990 in which Congress approved
funding for combat or peacekeeping operations using regular appropriations,
supplemental appropriations, or a combination of the two. Table 1 shows that since
1990, Congress generally has funded combat operations with supplemental
appropriations. In initial post-combat peacekeeping operations, however, Congress
has tended to rely on a combination of supplemental and regular appropriations. As
peacekeeping operations have become ongoing, Congress has switched to using
regular appropriations.
Initial Appropriations: Usually Supplementals
Examining the funding patterns for combat operations in the First Gulf War,
Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom shows they were
all funded initially with supplemental appropriations. In each case, the President
requested supplemental funding shortly after operations were underway, and
Congress approved the requests within months.


1 President Bush signed P.L. 108-106, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, into law on November 6, 2003.
For more information on the supplemental, see CRS Report RL32090, FY2004
Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism:
Military Operations and Reconstruction Assistance, by Stephen Daggett.

The only exception to this pattern is Bosnia, where United States’ involvement
began in 1993 with a humanitarian airlift. DOD funded this airlift using resources
previously appropriated by Congress in FY1993 regular appropriations.2 In FY1995,
when the United States first launched airstrikes in support of U.N. peacekeepers,
DOD used a combination of supplemental appropriations and FY1995 regular
appropriations to fund combat operations. Thus, although supplemental
appropriations were not used to fund the United States’ initial involvement in Bosnia,
Congress did turn to supplemental appropriations to fund combat and later
peacekeeping operations after the initial humanitarian airlift.
The Transition to Regular Appropriations
Table 1 suggests that in the past decade, Congress generally has funded combat
operations with supplemental appropriations and ongoing peacekeeping operations
with regular appropriations. Each operation, however, has gone through an interim
period of initial post-combat peacekeeping in which Congress has used different
combinations of supplemental and regular appropriations.
Haiti and Kosovo
Congress funded combat operations in Haiti and Kosovo with supplemental
appropriations in FY1994 and FY1999, respectively. In both cases, Congress also
used supplemental appropriations to fund initial post-combat peacekeeping. In Haiti,
Congress funded peacekeeping through the remainder of FY1994 and all of FY1995
with supplemental appropriations, and switched to regular appropriations in FY1996.
Similarly, Congress funded FY1999 post-combat peacekeeping in Kosovo with
supplemental appropriations, and continued to fund peacekeeping in Kosovo with
supplemental appropriations in FY2000. In FY2001, however, Congress switched
to using regular appropriations to fund operations in Kosovo. Regular appropriations
have also been used in FY2002 and FY2003 as peacekeeping has remained ongoing.
Bosnia
FY1995 combat operations in Bosnia were funded mostly with supplemental
appropriations, and since FY1999 ongoing peacekeeping operations have been
funded with regular appropriations. From FY1995 to FY1998, however, a mixture
of supplemental and regular appropriations was used to fund peacekeeping
operations. In FY1995 and FY1996, this mixture consisted of supplemental funding
and the use of previously appropriated funds. In FY1997 and FY1998, both
supplemental and regular appropriations were used.


2 For a detailed explanation of how DOD “absorbs” and “transfers” previously appropriated
funds, see CRS Report 98-823 F, Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia, Southwest Asia,
and Other Operations: Questions and Answers, by Nina Serafino.

The First Gulf War and the “No-Fly” Zones
Funding for the First Gulf War and the “No-Fly” zones established in Southwest
Asia after the war underwent a transition from supplemental to regular
appropriations, but it was over the course of 11 years. The long duration of the
operations and the use of some regular appropriations to fund combat during the First
Gulf War distinguish these operations from Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti.
Operation Desert Shield for the First Gulf War was initially funded with
supplemental appropriations that were included in the FY1991 continuing resolution.
The next funding for Operation Desert Shield, consisting of $1 billion, was included
in the FY1991 regular Defense Appropriations Act from amounts contributed by
allies. This use of regular appropriations early in the Gulf War was contrary to the
use of supplemental appropriations to fund combat operations in Bosnia, Kosovo,
Haiti, Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, it may reflect
congressional use of the funding vehicle that was immediately available to cover the
initial costs of the operation. The next and largest appropriations for the First Gulf
War were included in the FY1991 Desert Shield/Desert Storm supplemental, which
was signed into law on March 22, 1991. The size of this supplemental appropriation
($42.6 billion) suggests that the $1 billion included in FY1991 regular appropriations
was indeed an exception, rather than a significant change, to the practice of funding
combat operations with supplemental appropriations.
The “No-Fly” zones (Southwest Asia operations) following the First Gulf War
were funded at least partially with supplemental appropriations for 7 years, the
longest use of supplemental appropriations in any of the cases examined. Unlike
Kosovo and Haiti, the “No-Fly” zones did not progress directly from supplemental
to regular appropriations as they became ongoing operations. Instead, they were
funded partially with supplemental appropriations in FY1992 and FY1993 and fully
with supplemental appropriations in FY1994 and FY1995. In FY1996, Congress
used regular appropriations to fund the “No-Fly” zones. At this point, rather than
continuing to use regular appropriations, Congress returned to a combination of
regular and supplemental appropriations from FY1997 through FY1999. In FY2000
and FY2001, regular appropriations were used again.
Thus, although Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the “No-Fly” zones began with
supplemental appropriations and ended with regular appropriations, the 7-year
interim between those points differed from the interim between combat operations
and ongoing peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti. Not only was
this interim longer in the case of the “No-Fly” zones, but it also provided two
instances where Congress returned to either partial or full supplemental funding after
having used only regular appropriations during the prior fiscal year.



Recent Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
According to the President, the United States concluded major military3
operations in Afghanistan in December, 2001 and in Iraq on May 1, 2003. Except
for funds appropriated for Afghanistan in the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations
Resolution, both operations have been funded to date using supplemental
appropriations, including the recently enacted FY2004 supplemental. Although the
President has declared the end of major combat in both operations, low intensity
conflict is still prevalent, making it unclear whether Iraq and Afghanistan can yet be
referred to as ongoing peacekeeping operations. Going forward, Congress might
designate a point at which an operation becomes ongoing, and thus merits funding
in the regular appropriations process.


3 “President Bush Announces that Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended”, White House
Press, May 1, 2003.

Table 1: Methods of Funding for Wars and Contingency
Operations, First Persian Gulf War to Operation Iraqi Freedom
Notes:Please note that certain operations, such as Operation Desert Shield, were
funded more than once in the same fiscal year.
An asterisk indicates that DOD covered some of the cost by using existing
resources that were originally programmed for other purposes.
Name ofType ofFiscalType of AppropriationNotes
Conflict orOperationYear
Operation Regul a r Suppl em ent a l
Desert Shieldcombat1991XP.L. 101-403;
Supplemental
Appropriations fora
FY1990
Desert Shieldcombat1991XP.L. 101-511; In DOD’s
FY1991 appropriations,
Congress included $1
billion from amounts
contributed by allies for
Desert Shield
Desert Shieldcombat1991XP.L. 102-28; FY1991
& DesertDesert Shield/Desert
StormStorm Supplemental
Appropriations
Southwestpeacekeeping1992X*P.L. 102-368
Asia (SWA)
SWApeacekeeping1993X*P.L. 103-50
SWApeacekeeping1994XP.L. 103-211
SWApeacekeeping1995XP.L. 104-6
SWApeacekeeping1996X*P.L. 104-61; Costs were
not originally included in
P.L. 104-61, but were
later covered using
appropriations from P.L.

104-61.


SWApeacekeeping1997X*P.L. 105-18
SWApeacekeeping1997XP.L. 104-208; Part of
FY1997 costs funded in
regular FY1997 Defense
Appropriations Act


a FY1990 supplemental appropriations for Operation Desert Shield were added to the FY1991
Continuing Resolution . Both are contained in P.L. 101-403.

Name ofType ofFiscalType of AppropriationNotes
Conflict orOperationYear
Operation Regul a r Suppl em ent a l
SWApeacekeeping1998XP.L. 105-174
SWApeacekeeping1998XP.L. 105-56; Part of
FY1998 costs funded in
regular FY1998 Defense
Appropriations Act
SWApeacekeeping1999XP.L. 105-277
SWApeacekeeping1999XP.L. 105-262; Part of
FY1999 costs funded in
regular FY1999 Defense
Appropriations Act
SWA peacekeeping2000XP.L. 106-79
SWApeacekeeping2001XP.L. 106-259
Haiticombat/1994XP.L. 103-211
peacekeeping
Haitipeacekeeping1995XP.L. 104-6
Haitipeacekeeping1996XP.L. 104-61
Somaliapeacekeeping1993XP.L. 103-50
Somaliapeacekeeping1993X*A portion of FY1993
costs were covered by
funds in regular defense
appropriations that were
not rescinded as planned.
Somaliapeacekeeping1994XP.L. 103-211
Bosniapeacekeeping1993X*P.L. 102-484
Bosniapeacekeeping1994X*P.L. 103-211
Bosniacombat/1995X*P.L. 104-6
peacekeeping
Bosniapeacekeeping1996X*P.L. 104-134
Bosniapeacekeeping1997XP.L. 104-208
Bosnia peacekeeping1997XP.L. 105-18
Bosniapeacekeeping1998XP.L. 105-56
Bosniapeacekeeping1998XP.L. 105-174
Bosniapeacekeeping1999XP.L. 105-262
Bosniapeacekeeping2000XP.L. 106-79



Name ofType ofFiscalType of AppropriationNotes
Conflict orOperationYear
Operation Regul a r Suppl em ent a l
Bosniapeacekeeping2001XP.L. 106-259
Bosniapeacekeeping2002XP.L. 107-117
Bosniapeacekeeping2003XP.L. 107-248
Kosovocombat/1999XP.L. 106-31
peacekeeping
Kosovopeacekeeping2000XP.L. 106-246; FY2000
supplemental request
included in FY2001
Military Construction
Appropriations act
Kosovopeacekeeping2001XP.L. 106-259
Kosovopeacekeeping2002XP.L. 107-117
Kosovopeacekeeping2003XP.L. 107-248
Afghanistancombat2001XP.L. 107-38; FY2001
Emergency Terrorism
Response Supplemental
appropriated in P.L. 107-
38 and allocated by the
President
Afghanistancombat2002XP.L. 107-38; Separate
chapter for supplemental,
using funds appropriated
in P.L. 107-38, included
in P.L. 107-117, FY2002
Defense Appropriations
Act.
Afghanistancombat2002XP.L. 107-206
Afghanistancombat2003XP.L. 108-7; FY2003
Consolidated
Appropriations
Resolution
Afghanistancombat2003XP.L. 108-11
Iraqcombat2003XP.L. 108-11
Iraqcombat/2004XP.L. 108-106
peacekeeping
Sources: This table was conceived of and partially assembled by Amy Belasco and Nina Serafino of
CRS, using the cited public laws and corresponding congressional reports. For more specific cost
information on Bosnia and Southwest Asia, see CRS Report 98-823 F, Military Contingency Funding for
Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questions and Answers by Nina Serafino. For more



specific information on funding for Kosovo, see CRS Report RS20161, Kosovo Military Operations:
Costs and Congressional Action on Funding, by Stephen Daggett. Specific information on Persian Gulf
War funding can be found in CRS Issue Brief IB91019, Persian Gulf War: U.S. Costs and Allied
Financial Contributions, by Stephen Daggett and Gary J. Pagliano.