Mutual Fund Reform Bills in the 108th Congress: A Side-by-Side Comparison

CRS Report for Congress
th
Mutual Fund Reform Bills in the 108 Congress:
A Side-by-Side Comparison
Updated February 2, 2005
Mark Jickling
Specialist in Public Finance
Government and Finance Division


Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Mutual Fund Reform Bills:
A Side-by-Side Comparison
Summary
The mutual fund was embroiled in scandal in September 2003, when New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer brought charges against a few mutual funds, brokers,
and hedge funds. Subsequently, the New York investigation widened, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) intensified its scrutiny of mutual funds.
A number of illegal or unethical practices came under investigation: the common
theme is that fund managers and insiders have permitted favored customers,
including hedge funds, to engage in highly profitable short-term trading strategies
that reduce the investment returns of millions of long-term investors. A number of
firms have paid fines to settle civil charges. The SEC reported (in testimony before
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on November 3, 2003) that preliminary
investigations indicated that trading practices that appear to be abusive (but not in all
cases illegal) were widespread in the industry.
The congressional response to the mutual fund investigations included several
hearings and bills. Legislative proposals in the 108th Congress included H.R. 2420
(Representative Baker), which passed the House on November 19, 2003; S. 1822
(Senator Akaka), introduced November 5, 2003; S. 1958 (Senators Kerry and
Kennedy), introduced November 25, 2003; S. 1971 (Senators Dodd and Corzine),
also introduced on November 25, 2003; and S. 2059 (Senators Fitzgerald, Levin, and
Collins), introduced on February 10, 2004.
All of these bills would have required mutual funds to provide more information
to investors about the fees they charge and about the funds’ financial relationships
with stockbrokers and investment advisers. The bills also required that funds’
governing boards contain majorities of independent directors with no financial or
family ties to fund management. S. 1958 proposed the creation of a new mutual fund
regulator to carry out registration, inspections, and disciplinary proceedings, and to
make rules promoting mutual fund ethics and independence.
None of these bills was enacted by the 108th Congress. However, the SEC,
using its existing statutory authority, has issued rules that incorporate some of the
provisions of the legislative proposals. For instance, the SEC has mandated that
mutual fund boards have an independent chairman and a majority of independent
directors. Other regulations are under consideration and the SEC appears to have
become more vigilant and aggressive in its oversight of the funds. Thus, unless new
scandals appear, some may now see the need for reform legislation as less pressing.
This report compares the provisions of these legislative proposals. It serves as
an historical record of legislative activity in the 108th Congress, and will not be
updated.



Contents
Side-by-Side Comparison of Mutual Fund Reform Legislation in the
108th Congress............................................2
New Regulatory Structure...................................2
Disclosure and Regulation of Mutual Fund Fees and Costs.........3
Soft Dollar, Revenue Sharing, and Directed Brokerage
Arrangements .........................................6
Mutual Fund Governance...................................7
Restrictions on Late Trading, Market Timing, and Other Forms of
Trading .............................................13
Other Provisions.........................................16
Studies and Reports Called For..............................17



Mutual Fund Reform Bills:
A Side-by-Side Comparison
The mutual fund scandal began in September 2003, when New York Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer brought civil and criminal charges against a few mutual funds,
brokers, and hedge funds. Since then, the New York investigation has widened, and
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has intensified its scrutiny of mutual
funds. Several illegal or unethical practices are under investigation: the common
theme is that fund managers and insiders have permitted favored customers,
including hedge funds, to engage in highly profitable short-term trading strategies
that reduce the investment returns of millions of long-term investors. The number of
firms and individuals charged to date is fairly small, but growing. The SEC reported
(in testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on November 3,
2003) that preliminary investigations indicate that trading practices that appear to be
abusive (but not in all cases illegal) are fairly widespread in the industry.
Congressional response to the mutual fund investigations took the forms of
hearings and proposed legislation. On November 19, 2003, the House passed a
mutual fund reform bill, H.R. 2420, by a vote of 418-2. In the Senate, four bills were
introduced — S. 1822, S. 1958, S. 1971, and S. 2059 — but none saw committee
action.
All the bills would have required mutual funds to make more extensive
disclosure of the fees and charges that investors pay. Financial relationships among
mutual funds, brokers, and investment advisers would also have to be disclosed.
Under three of the bills, brokers selling mutual funds would have had to disclose how
their compensation was structured, including any incentives for selling particular
funds.
The proposals would all have required mutual funds’ boards of directors to
contain majorities of independent directors — those not affiliated with the funds or
its advisers. The bills also included various provisions to enhance the oversight role
of the board, in matters such as auditing, nomination of directors, and supervision of
ethical and legal compliance.
S.1958 proposed an independent regulator for mutual funds, to operate under
the oversight of the SEC. S. 2059 would repeal SEC Rule 12b-1, which permits
funds to charge investors for certain marketing, advertising, and distribution costs.
Finally, the proposals called for a number of reports or studies on subjects
including the creation of an independent regulator for mutual funds, the SEC’s
enforcement record, “soft dollar” arrangements (financial links among brokers,
advisers, and funds), transaction costs, arbitration in mutual fund disputes, fund
advertising, and the financial literacy of mutual fund investors.



CRS-2
Side-by-Side Comparison of Mutual Fund Reform Legislation in the 108th Congress
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
ort TitleMutual Funds IntegrityMutual FundMutual Fund InvestorMutual Fund InvestorMutual Fund Reform Act of
and Fee Transparency ActTransparency Act ofProtection Act of 2003Confidence Restoration Act2004
of 2003 2003 of 2003
New Regulatory Structure.
w mutual fundNo provision.SEC shall study andEstablishes a Mutual FundGAO is directed to studyDirects GAO to study the
atorreport to Congress on theOversight Board to registerthe feasibility and benefitsefficacy of the SECs current
creation of an entity withmutual funds and establish(if any) to shareholders oforganizational structure as it
inspection andethical, quality control,establishing a Mutual Fundaffects the regulation of mutual
iki/CRS-RL32157enforcement authorityinternal auditing,Oversight Board withfunds.
g/wover mutual fund boardsindependence, and otherinspection, examination,(Sec. 412)


s.orof directors, funded bystandards. The Board willand enforcement authority
leakassessments on mutualconduct inspections andover mutual fund boards of
funds, and appointed byinvestigations of mutualdirectors.
://wikithe SEC.funds, and may impose a(Sec. 401)
http(Sec. 3(e))range of sanctions, includingcivil fines. The Board will
have five members,
appointed by the SEC to five
year terms. The SEC will
have oversight authority,
including the right of prior
approval (or modification)
of all the Boards rules. The
Board’s budget (to be
subject to SEC approval)
will be funded by an annual
assessment upon registered
mutual funds.
(Title II)

CRS-3
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
Disclosure and Regulation of Mutual Fund Fees and Costs.
provedDirects the SEC to requireBrokers selling mutualDirects the SEC to revise itsDirects SEC to requireDirects the SEC to make rules
losure ofperiodic disclosure of:funds would be requiredregulations to requiredisclosure of:setting forth standardized forms
tual fund fees(1) the estimated amount,to disclose to theirdisclosure of:(1) the actual dollar amountof disclosure of as many
d costsin dollars per $1000customers(1) the estimated dollarborne by each shareholderoperating and transaction costs
invested, of operatingthe amount ofamount of the fund’sof the funds expenses;that are borne by shareholders as
expenses borne bycompensation to beoperating expenses borne by(2) the structure and totalis practicable. The SEC shall
shareholders; (2) how thereceived by the broker. each shareholder (and theamount of compensationalso require funds to disclose
fund pays investmentSuch disclosure must beamount per $1000 invested);paid to investment advisers,annually the dollar amount of
advisers, and thosemade before the sale is(2) how the fund paysand advisers’ investmentssuch costs charged to each
advisers’ investments infinal.investment advisers, andin the fund;customer’s account, based on the
iki/CRS-RL32157the fund; (3) the rate atwhich the fund turns over(Sec. 2(a))those advisers’ holdings inthe fund;(3) the dollar amounts of allpayments made by thevalue of customers’ holdings. The SEC would define which
g/wits portfolio; (4) how theFunds would be required(3) the rate at which thefund, set out so as to permitexpenses and costs could be
s.orfund pays commissions toto include the cost offund turns over its portfolio; comparison among funds;charged to shareholders. (Sec.
leakbrokers who providebrokerage commissions(4) commission payments to(4) how the fund pays210)
://wikiinvestment advice orresearch or who facilitatein any disclosure of feesand expenses that may bebrokers who provideinvestment advice orcommissions to brokerswho provide investmentWould require funds to disclose
httpthe sale of the fundspayable by shareholders.research or who facilitate theadvice or research or whothe amount and structure of
shares; (5) payments to(Sec. 2(b))sale of the funds shares;facilitate the sale of thecompensation paid to the funds
any other person who(5) payments to any otherfunds shares;portfolio management team, as
facilitates the sale of theSEC shall by rule requirepersons who facilitate the(5) payments to any otherwell as the value of their
funds shares; and (6)funds to disclose howsale of the funds shares;person who facilitates theholdings of the fund’s shares.
information on feethey compensateand (6) information onsale of the funds shares;(Sec. 211)
discounts for whichportfolio managers, anddiscounts in front-end feesand
investors may be eligible,the ownership of fundfor which investors may be(6) information onReports filed with the SEC
including the minimumshares by sucheligible, including thediscounts in front-end feeswould include information on
purchase amountsinvestment advisers andminimum required purchasefor which investors may bebreakpoints,” or volume
(breakpoints) required totheir employees.amounts (“breakpoints). eligible, including thediscounts for which investors
qualify for discounts. (Sec. 4)(Sec. 101)minimum required purchasemay be eligible. (Sec. 213)
(Sec. 101)amounts (breakpoints).
(Sec. 101)Funds would be required to
disclose and explain their
portfolio turnover ratio.
(Sec. 214)



CRS-4
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
datorySEC shall require thatNo provision.Fee disclosure must beNo provision.Disclosures about operating costs
sions in feequarterly statementsincluded in each statementand transaction cost ratios must
losuresdisclose that investorsof account, and feebe displayed prominently, and all
have been charged fees,information must befees, charges, and expenses must
and where additionaldisplayed in close proximitybe clearly defined.
information on fees mayto the value of the investors(Sec. 210)
be found.shares.
(Sec. 101)(Sec 101)
losure ofSEC shall by rule requireBrokers selling mutualNo provision.Brokers would be requiredBrokers would be required to
anddisclosure by brokers offunds would be requiredto disclose in writing todisclose in writing the amount
mpensation inthe amount and source ofto disclose to theirtheir customers the amountand source of compensation they
iki/CRS-RL32157tual fund salessales fees and charges,incentives, commissions,customersthe amount ofand nature of compensationthey receive for sellingreceive for selling the fund. Such disclosure must be made
g/wany other expensescompensation to bemutual funds, and anybefore the sale is concluded, and
s.orincurred in the sale ofreceived by the broker.conflicts of interest thatmay not be made exclusively in a
leakmutual funds or municipal(Sec. 2(a))arise from suchregistration statement or
://wikisecurities, as well asrelated conflicts of interestcompensation.(Sec. 104)prospectus.(Sec. 212)
httpbetween the broker and
the customer.
(Sec. 110)
C approval ofNo provision.No provision.No provision.No provision.SEC directed to define by rule all
w fees andspecific types of fees and
pensesexpenses that may be borne by
fund shareholders. No new fee
may be imposed on shareholders
unless the SEC determines that
the fee fairly reflects services
provided, or that the fee is in the
shareholders’ best interests.
(Sec. 210(e))



CRS-5
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
peal of RuleNo provision.No provision.No provision.No provision.Repeals SEC Rule 12b-1, which
1allows funds to charge marketing
and distribution expenses to the
shareholders. Such expenses
would instead be paid out of the
management fee received by the
investment adviser. The
advisers expenditures related to
sale of fund shares must be
disclosed to the funds board of
directors and accounted for in the
funds published expense ratio.
iki/CRS-RL32157The board may prohibit theadviser from incurring
g/wdistribution expenses that are not
s.orin the shareholders interest.
leak(Sec. 310)
://wikiohibition ofNo provision.No provision.No provision.No provision.Asset-based distribution fees (to
httpt-basedbe defined by the SEC) are
tribution feesprohibited. (Sec. 310)
duction ofSEC shall consider waysNo provision.SEC shall consider ways ofNo provision.No provision.
losure burdenof reducing costsreducing costs associated
small fundsassociated with disclosurewith disclosure to small
to small funds, consistentfunds, consistent with public
with public interest. interest. (Sec. 101)
(Sec. 101)
inition of no-SEC directed to makeNo provision.No provision.SEC directed to make rulesNo provision.


d fundrules defining “no-loaddefiningno-load” mutual
mutual funds andfunds and requiring
requiring disclosure todisclosure to prevent
prevent investors frominvestors from being misled
being misled by the use ofby the use of such
such terminology.terminology.
(Sec. 106)(Sec. 103)

CRS-6
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
Soft Dollar, Revenue Sharing, and Directed Brokerage Arrangements.
losure of, orInvestment advisers toSoft dollar paymentsCertain soft dollar paymentsInvestment advisers toAmends statute to prohibit soft
ictions upon,mutual funds must reportwould be included in thewould be included in theregistered mutual fundsdollar, revenue sharing, and
ft dollar,annually to the fund’saggregate brokerageaggregate operatingwould be required to reportdirected brokerage arrangements,
nue sharing,board on (1) paymentscommission disclosureexpenses disclosuresannually to the fund’s boardas defined. The SEC is
d directedmade to promote sale ofrequired by Sec. 2(b).mandated by Sec. 101.regarding all paymentsauthorized to refine the statutory
eragethe funds sharesreceived and servicesdefinition of these terms by rule,
angements(revenue sharing”), (2)provided (includingor otherwise tailor the
services or payments toresearch). A summary ofproscriptions in this section, if it
the fund by a broker inthese reports would beis in the interest of fund
exchange for brokerageincluded in the fundsshareholders, or if such
iki/CRS-RL32157business (directedbrokerage”), and (3)annual report toshareholders.modifications reduce conflicts ofinterest or increase transparency
g/wresearch services obtained(Sec. 102)and competition in trade
s.orby the adviser from aexecutions.
leakbroker in exchange for(Sec. 311)
://wikisecurities transactions(soft dollar
httparrangements”). A
summary of this annual
report must be included in
the annual report to
shareholders.
(Sec. 102)
duciary duty ofDirectors shall have aNo provision.SEC shall issue regulationsNo provision.No provision: such arrangements
tual fundfiduciary duty to reviewestablishing a fiduciary dutywould be prohibited by Sec. 311.


orssuch arrangements tofor directors to demonstrate
rding softensure that they complythat all management,
llar, revenuewith law and regulationmarketing, and investment
aring, andand are in the bestadvisory fees paid by the
interests of fundfund are reasonable and in
erageshareholders.the best interests of fund
angements(Sec. 102)shareholders.
(Sec. 101(g))

CRS-7
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
eepingSEC shall by rule requireNo provision.No provision.No provision.No provision: such arrangements
irementsthat all such arrangementswould be prohibited (see above).
rding softinvolving research service
llar, revenuebe documented by written
aring, andcontracts that describe the
nature and value of
erageservices provided.
angements(Sec. 102)
Mutual Fund Governance.
dependentAt least 2/3 of a mutualAt least 75% of a mutualAt least 75% of a mutualAt least 75% of a mutualAt least 75% of a mutual funds
iki/CRS-RL32157 andairmenfunds directors must beindependent (versus 40%funds directors must beindependent, includingfunds directors must beindependent. The chairmanfunds directors must beindependent. The chairmandirectors must be independent,including the chairman of the
g/wunder current law).the chairman of theof the board must beof the board must beboard.
s.or(Sec. 103(a))board.independent.independent.
leak(Sec. 101(e))(Sec. 201)Interested persons who serve as
Interested persons whoboard members must be
://wikiserve as board membersapproved by shareholder vote at
httpmust be approved byleast every five years.
shareholder vote at least(Sec. 110)
every five years.
(Sec. 3(a))
ohibition onNo provision.No action taken by theNo provision.No provision.No provision.
ns requiringboard may require the
vote of non-vote of a non-
dentindependent director.
ors (Sec. 3(b))
rmination ofNo provision.No provision.No provision.No provision.SEC is directed to make a rule
stmentfacilitating the termination of an
iserinvestment adviser by a fund’s
independent directors, without
undue exposure to financial or
litigation risk.
(Sec. 114)



CRS-8
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
mination ofNo provision.A committee made upNo provision.A committee made upA committee made up entirely of
orsentirely of independententirely of independentindependent directors shall select
directors shall selectdirectors shall selectpersons to be nominated to the
persons to be nominatedpersons to be nominated toboard, adopt qualification
to the board and adoptthe board and adoptstandards, and set compensation
qualification standardsqualification standards forfor directors.
for directors. directors. (Sec. 110)
(Sec. 3)(Sec. 201)
inition ofA member of a class ofIncludes any person withA member of a class ofIncludes any person with aIncludes any person with a
terestedpersons whom the SEC bya material business orpersons whom the SEC bymaterial business or familymaterial business or family
on” (i.e., notrule deems to be unlikelyfamily relationship with,rule deems to be unlikely torelationship with, or whorelationship with, or who was
iki/CRS-RL32157dent)to exercise an appropriatedegree of independenceor who was employed bya fund’s investmentexercise an appropriatedegree of independencewas employed by a fundsinvestment adviser,employed by a fund’s investmentadviser, principal underwriter, or
g/wbecause of a business,adviser, underwriter, orbecause of a business,underwriter, or who servedwho served as an officer or
s.orprofessional, or familywho served as an officerprofessional, or familyas an officer or director of adirector of a “significant service
leakrelationship with fundor director of arelationship with fundsignificant serviceprovider” (to be defined by the
://wikimanagement orinvestment advisers.significant serviceprovider” (to be definedmanagement or investmentadvisers.provider” (to be defined bythe SEC) within the last 10SEC) within the last 10 years.(Sec. 110)


http(Sec. 103(b))by the SEC) within the(Sec. 101(f))years. (If one was merely
last 10 years. (If one wasemployed by the significant
merely employed by theservice provider, the term
significant serviceof restriction is five years.)
provider, the term of(Sec. 201)
restriction is five years.)
(Sec. 3)

CRS-9
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
ciary dutiesNo provision.No provision.Directs the SEC to makeBoard of directors shallDirects the SEC to make rules
independentrules specifying that thehave a fiduciary duty toclarifying the fiduciary duties of
andboard of directors shall haveensure that soft dollar,independent directors, which
stmenta fiduciary duty todirected brokerage, andshall include (1) evaluation of
isersdemonstrate that allrevenue sharingthe relationship between fees and
negotiated fees arearrangements adhere to theactual costs, the quality of
reasonable and in thefunds stated policies andmanagement and disclosures, the
shareholders interest, and toare in the shareholders bestsize and suitability of the funds
disclose any business orinterests.portfolio, costs and benefits of
professional links between(Sec. 102)marketing plans, and other
directors and providers ofmatters, and (2) implementation
advisory, investment, orand monitoring of policies to
iki/CRS-RL32157other services to the fund.(Sec. 101)ensure compliance withsecurities laws, and policies with
g/wrespect to predatory trading
s.or practices.
leak(Sec. 113)
://wikiFor investment advisers,
httpfiduciary duty shall include
supplying independent directors
with material information and
may require reference to the
advisers actual costs with
respect to compensation received
from the fund.
(Sec. 114)



CRS-10
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
dit committeeA mutual fund’s boardNo provision.No provision.Audit committees wouldThe audit committees would
mposition andshall include an auditconsist entirely ofconsist entirely of independent
onsibilitiescommittee, made upindependent directors, anddirectors, and would be
entirely of independentwould be responsible forresponsible for hiring,
directors, which shall behiring, compensating, andcompensating, and overseeing
responsible for selection,overseeing outside auditors. the funds outside auditor.
compensation, andThe audit committee willSelection of an auditor would be
oversight of the fund’salso establish proceduressubject to ratification by
independent auditor, andfor receiving andshareholder vote. The audit
for procedures forencouraging complaintscommittee will also establish
monitoring complaintsabout auditing andprocedures for receiving and
from investors and fundaccounting matters.encouraging complaints about
iki/CRS-RL32157employees regardingquestionable accounting(Sec. 202)auditing and accounting matters.(Sec. 115)
g/wand auditing practices.
s.or(Sec. 104)
leak
://wikiancial expertNo provision.No provision.No provision.Each mutual fund boardshall include a financialNo provision.
httpexpert, to be defined by the
SE C.
(Sec. 201)
emption fromSEC may exempt mutualNo provision.No provision.No provision.SEC may exempt mutual fund
personfund directors from thedirectors from the requirement
grequirement that they bethat they be physically present to
irementsphysically present to castcast a vote, if their presence is
a vote, if their presence isimpractical.
impractical, and if this(Sec. 115)


exemption is consistent
with the public interest.
(Sec. 108)

CRS-11
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
If an SEC inspectionNo provision.No provision.Significant deficiencies in aNo provision.
atorydiscovers deficiencies in afund or its advisers and
icienciesfund’s operations, fundunderwriters found by SEC
management must informinspectors must be
the board of directors.disclosed to the funds
(Sec. 107)board. The 10 most
common deficiencies in
mutual funds would be
made public annually by
the SEC.
(Sec. 203)
iki/CRS-RL32157sidersactions inShort-term transactions infund shares by insiders,No provision.No provision.Share purchases by seniorexecutive officers of mutualShort-term transactions by fund insiders, affiliates, advisers, or
g/wnd shares advisers, or underwritersfunds must be disclosed andunderwriters would be
s.orprohibited. shares must be held at leastprohibited. The prohibition
leak(Sec. 203)six months.excludes money market funds.
://wiki(Sec. 307)The SEC would define short-term trading.
http(Sec. 314)



CRS-12
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
tification ofIndependent directorsNo provision.No provision.Board chairman would beFund advisers would be required
ncialshall certify in disclosurerequired to certify theto certify that net asset values of
ents and/ordocuments that proceduresaccuracy of disclosurefund shares were calculated
ionalare in place to oversee thedocuments, and thatappropriately, that different
ressetting of net asset values,procedures were in place toclasses of shares (if offered) are
the flow of funds in andoversee the setting of netin shareholders interest, that
out of the mutual fund, theasset values, the flow ofportfolio information is not
provision of discounts tofunds in and out of theimproperly disclosed, that the
eligible investors, thatmutual fund, the provisionindependent directors have
different classes of mutualof discounts to eligiblereviewed the compensation of
fund shares areinvestors, that differentthe funds portfolio manager, and
appropriate for investors,classes of mutual fundthat the code of ethics is in place
iki/CRS-RL32157disclosure of the fund’sportfolio, compensation ofshares are appropriate forinvestors, disclosure of theand enforced.(Sec. 116)
g/wportfolio managers, andfunds portfolio,
s.orthe funds code of ethicscompensation of portfolio
leakand antifraud policies. managers, and that the fund
://wiki(Sec. 201)has established andenforces a code of ethics.
http(Sec. 204)
icsRequires funds andNo provision.Directs the SEC to require Requires funds andRequires funds, advisers, and
mplianceinvestment advisers tofunds to appoint ainvestment advisers toprincipal underwriters to adopt
adopt a code of ethics andcompliance officer, who willadopt a code of ethics andcodes of ethics to prevent
policies and procedures toreport only to independentpolicies and procedures tofraudulent, deceptive, or
prevent violations of lawdirectors.prevent violations of lawmanipulative conduct. Funds
and SEC regulations, to(Sec. 101(j))and SEC regulations, tomust adopt policies and
review those policiesreview those policiesprocedures reasonably designed
annually, and to appoint aannually, and to appoint ato prevent violations of law and
compliance officer. compliance officer, whoregulation, to review such
Independent directorswould certify thatpolicies annually, and to appoint
shall certify that suchappropriate internala chief compliance officer,
procedures and policiescontrols existed.. reporting only to the independent
are in force.(Sec. 301)directors. Funds must also adopt
(Sec. 201)rules to protect whistleblowers.
(Sec. 116)



CRS-13
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
Restrictions on Late Trading, Market Timing, and Other Forms of Trading.
te trading rulesSEC directed to writeNo provision.Amends the InvestmentSEC directed to write rulesSEC directed to issue rules to
rules to prevent after-Company Act to prohibitto prevent and detect after-prevent late trading and to
hours trading. late trading.hours trading.regulate the processing of late
(Sec. 205)(Sec. 101(a))(Sec. 306) orders received through
intermediaries at the previous
days price.
(Sec. 315)
SEC directed to issue rules
requiring intermediaries to
iki/CRS-RL32157provide funds with sufficientcustomer information to allow
g/wthem to enforce their trading
s.or p o licies.
leak(Sec. 216)
://wikicreasedNo provision.No provision.Increases civil and criminalNo provision.No provision.


httpna lties p e na lties.
(Sec. 101)

CRS-14
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
ket timingShort-term transactions inNo provision.Requires disclosure ofShort-term transactions inThe SEC would require
lesfund shares by affiliatedmarket timing policies andfund shares by affiliateddisclosure of a fund’s market
persons (fund managers,steps taken to prevent abusepersons (fund managers,timing policy (or lack of such a
directors, advisers, orof such policies.directors, advisers, orpolicy).
underwriters) are(Sec. 101(d))underwriters) are (Sec. 312)
prohibited. prohibited.
Prohibits short-termShort-term transactions by fund
SEC directed to maketransactions in fund sharesDirects the SEC to requireinsiders, affiliates, advisers, or
rules permitting funds toby interested persons (fundfunds that do not allowunderwriters would be
charge redemption fees inmanagers, directors,market timing trading toprohibited. The prohibition
excess of 2% to preventadvisers, or underwriters).charge a redemption fee forexcludes money market funds.
short-term trading that the (Sec. 101(i))short-term trades.The SEC would define short-
iki/CRS-RL32157SEC deems unfair toshareholders. (Sec. 303)term trading. (Sec. 314)
g/w(Sec. 203)
s.orDirects the SEC to require funds
leakthat do not allow market timing
://wikitrading to charge a redemptionfee for short-term trades, and
httppermits such fees to exceed 2%.
(Sec. 314)
Directs the SEC to require by
rule that intermediaries provide
mutual funds with the identities
of their customers so that the
fund can enforce its trading and
fee policies.
(Sec. 216)



CRS-15
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
ination ofSEC directed to makeNo provision.No provision.SEC directed to make rulesThe SEC would by rule require
rules governing the use ofgoverning the use of fairthe adoption of fair value
fair value pricing to setvalue pricing to set net assetpricing, when market quotations
net asset values whenvalues when marketdo not accurately reflect portfolio
market quotations arequotations are unavailablevalue.
unavailable or out of date.or out of date. Funds and(Sec. 313)
(Sec. 204)advisers would be required
to adopt formal policies
regarding price-setting
procedures and certify that
they were being adhered to.
(Sec. 304)
iki/CRS-RL32157ension ofMutual funds may notNo provision.No provision.No provision.No provision.


g/wemptionssuspend investors’ right of
s.orredemption unless the
leakprimary stock market is
://wikiclosed or other emergencyexists. SEC is directed to
httpmake rules specifying the
conditions under which
trading may be restricted.
(Sec. 105)

CRS-16
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
Other Provisions.
losure ofCodifies SEC rules thatNo provision.No provision.No provision.Requires funds to report annually
y votesrequire funds to discloseon their proxy voting record, and
how they voted in proxyto make this information
contests of companiesavailable via the Internet or a
whose shares they hold.toll-free telephone number.
(Sec. 109)(Sec. 215)
dge fundsProhibits persons fromNo provision.No provision.Prohibits persons fromProhibits investment advisers and
serving as advisers orserving as advisers orportfolio managers from
managers of both mutualmanagers of both mutualproviding services to both mutual
iki/CRS-RL32157funds and hedge funds.(Sec. 202)funds and hedge funds.(Sec. 302)funds and hedge funds, except aspermitted by SEC exemption.
g/w(Sec. 316)
s.or
leakeNo provision.No provision.No provision.No provision.Directs the SEC to make rules to
losureprevent selective disclosure of
://wikimutual fund portfolio contents.
http(Sec. 317)
bitration ofSEC directed to studyNo provisionDirects the SEC to adoptSEC directed to studySEC directed to study trends in
stor disputestrends in mutual fundrules giving complainants intrends in mutual fundmutual fund arbitration claims
arbitration claims, and themutual fund disputes thearbitration claims, and thesince 1995, and alternative
reasons for the increase inright to have theirreasons for the increase (ifmeans to settle such disputes out
such claims since 1995. complaints heard in anany) in such claims sinceof court.
(Sec. 112)independent arbitration1995(Sec. 413)
forum.(Sec. 406)
(Sec. 209)
histleblowersA mutual funds auditNo provision.No provision.Requires funds to establishFunds must adopt rules to protect
committee shall bepolicies and procedures towhistleblowers who report
responsible for monitoringprotect whistleblowers fromviolations of law, regulation, or
complaints from fundretaliation.ethical standards.
employees and others(Sec. 301)(Sec. 116)


regarding questionable
accounting and auditing
practices. (Sec. 104)

CRS-17
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
nd advertisingNo provision.No provision.No provision.No provision.Directs the SEC to establish
standards and benchmarks for
claims regarding investment
performance contained in fund
a d ve r t i s i ng.
(Sec. 217)
Studies and Reports Called For.
stmentNo provision.No provision.No provision.No provision.SEC to study and report to
viser conflictsCongress on conflicts between
interestfunds and advisers, whether
iki/CRS-RL32157changes in law or regulation areneeded to ameliorate such
g/wconflicts or to encourage internal
s.orinvestment management by
leakmutual funds.
(Sec. 410)
://wiki
httpft dollarSEC directed to study softNo provision.SEC to issue a conceptSEC directed to study softNo study required, but Sec. 311
angements anddollar arrangementsrelease and report todollar arrangementsprohibits soft dollar
saction costsinvolving fund investmentCongress on portfoliotrends, amounts, benefitsarrangements.
advisers — trends,transaction costs, includingand costs to investors,
amounts, benefits andcommission, spread,possible conflicts of
costs to investors, possibleopportunity, and marketinterest, and transparency.
conflicts of interest, andimpact costs.(Sec. 404)
transparency — and to(Sec. 101(h))
make legislative
recommendations.
(Sec. 111)
bitrationSEC directed to studyNo provision.No provision.SEC directed to studySEC directed to study trends in
strends in mutual fundtrends in mutual fundmutual fund arbitration claims
arbitration claims, and thearbitration claims, and thesince 1995, and alternative
reasons for the increase inreasons for the increase (ifmeans to settle such disputes out
such claims since 1995. any) in such claims sinceof court.
(Sec. 112)1995.(Sec. 413)


(Sec. 406)

CRS-18
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
eation of aNo provision.SEC shall study andNo provision. (Section 101GAO to study the feasibilityDirects GAO to study the
utual Fundreport to Congress on theestablishes such a board.)and benefits (if any) toefficacy of the SECs current
ersight Boardcreation of an entity withshareholders of establishingorganizational structure as it
inspection anda Mutual Fund Oversightaffects the regulation of mutual
enforcement authorityBoard with inspection,funds.
over mutual fund boardsexamination, and(Sec. 412)
of directors, funded byenforcement authority over
assessments on mutualmutual fund boards of
funds, and appointed bydirectors.
the SEC.(Sec. 401)
(Sec. 3(e))
iki/CRS-RL32157equacy ofedial actionsSEC to report to Congresson market timing and lateNo provision.No provision.GAO directed to study thecoordination of theSEC directed to study thecoordination between SEC
g/wtrading, including (1)enforcement activities ofheadquarters, regional offices,
s.oreconomic harm to long-the SEC and the states.and state and local regulators and
leakterm shareholders, (2) the(Sec. 402)law enforcement.
://wikiSEC’s findings regardingsuch trading practices, (3)SEC to study the allocation(Sec. 411)


httpwhen and how the SECand adequacy of its
discovered that suchregulatory and enforcement
trading was harmingresources devoted to mutual
shareholders, (4) stepsfunds.
taken by the SEC to(Sec. 403)
protect long-term
shareholders, and (5)SEC to report on economic
additional legislation orharm caused by late trading
regulation needed toand market timing and the
protect shareholders. SEC’s actions since
(Sec. 206)becoming aware of those
practices.
(Sec. 405)

CRS-19
ProvisionH.R. 2420 (Rep. Baker)S. 1822(Sen. Akaka)S. 1958(Sen. Kerry & Kennedy)S. 1971 (Sens. Dodd & Corzine)S. 2059(Sen. Fitzgerald, et al.)
dge fundsNo provision.No provision.No provision.No provision.SEC directed to study whether
additional regulation of hedge
funds might deter trading abuses,
manipulations, and distortions
that affect investors in mutual
fund s.
(Sec. 414)
ancial literacyNo provision.SEC shall study andNo provision.SEC to study the existingSEC to study means of using the
report to Congress on thelevel of financial literacyInternet to increase financial
existing level of financialamong mutual fundliteracy and to improve investor
literacy among mutualinvestors, the informationaccess to mutual fund filings.
iki/CRS-RL32157fund investors, whatinformation they mostmost needed by investors,methods to increase(Sec. 415)
g/wneed, the transparency oftransparency, and existing
s.orfee disclosure, and effortsand improved methods of
leakand strategies to educateeducating investors.
://wikiinvestors. (Sec. 5) (Sec. 501)
http
utual fundNo provision.The GAO shall study andNo provision.No provision.No study required, but Sec 217
vertisingreport to Congress on thedirects the SEC to establish
impact and regulation ofstandards and benchmarks for
mutual fund advertising,claims regarding investment
current sales practices inperformance contained in fund
the industry, and consideradvertising.


recommendations to
improve investor
protection.
(Sec. 6)