Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ship Programs: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress

Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime
Prepositioning Ship Programs: Background and
Oversight Issues for Congress
Updated February 1, 2008
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime
Prepositioning Ship Programs: Background and
Oversight Issues for Congress
Summary
The Navy is proposing to maintain in coming years a Navy with 31 amphibious
ships and an additional squadron of 14 Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or
MPF(F), ships. The MPF(F) squadron is intended to implement a new operational
concept called sea basing, under which forces would be staged at sea and used to
conduct expeditionary operations ashore with little or no reliance on nearby land
bases.
The Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget requests $1,398.3 million in procurement
funding for a ninth San Antonio (LPD-17) amphibious ship to be procured in
FY2008. The Navy estimates the total procurement cost of this ship at $1,798.3
million. The ship received $296.2 million in FY2008 advance procurement funding,
and the Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget calls for the final $103.2 million of the
ship’s procurement cost to be provided in FY2009 as a “program closeout” cost.
Although the Navy’s proposed force of 31 amphibious ships includes ten LPD-17
class ships, the Navy is proposing in its FY2008 budget to end LPD-17 procurement
with the ninth ship.
The Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget also requests $1,377.4 million in
procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of LHA-6, a large-deck
amphibious assault ship that was procured in FY2007 using split funding (two-year
incremental funding) in FY2007 and FY2008. The Navy estimates the total
procurement cost of LHA-6 at $2,806.2 million.
The Navy’s FY2008 unfunded programs list (UPL) — a list of programs that the
Navy desires but which are not funded in the Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget —
includes, as its top item, an additional LPD-17 at an estimated cost of about $1,700
million, and, as its second item, two modified Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) dry cargo
ships for the MPF(F) squadron, at an estimated combined cost of about $1,200
million. These two TAKEs are currently scheduled for procurement in FY2009 and
FY2010. (The FY2008 budget also requests $456.1 million in the National Defense
Sealift Fund (NDSF) for one “regular” TAKE-1 class ship intended for general Navy
use, not for the MPF(F)).
One potential issue for Congress is whether to fund an additional LPD-17 and/or
one or more additional TAKEs in FY2008. Additional potential oversight issues for
Congress include cost growth and construction problems in the LPD-17 program, the
estimated cost of the two TAKEs in the Navy’s FY2008 UPL, the adequacy of the

31-ship amphibious-ship force-level goal, the stability of the amphibious and MPF(F)

force-level goals, the clarity of the sea basing concept, the potential affordability and
cost-effectiveness of the sea basing concept, sea basing’s relationship to the Navy’s
new Global Fleet Stations (GFS) concept, and Navy and Marine Corps coordination
with other services in developing the sea basing concept.
This report will be updated as events warrant.

Contents
In troduction ......................................................1
Background ......................................................2
Current Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships...............2
Amphibious Ships.........................................2
Maritime Prepositioning Ships...............................4
Amphibious and MPF(F) Force-Level Goals........................6
Sea Basing Concept............................................7
The Concept in General.....................................7
Capability and Cost of MPF(F) Squadron.......................8
Related Transport Ships....................................10
Global Fleet Station (GFS) Concept..............................10
Ship Procurement Programs....................................12
LPD-17 Program.........................................13
LHD-8 .................................................14
LHA-6/LHA(R) Program...................................14
MPF Lease Buyout........................................14
Potential Issues for Congress........................................15
LPD-17 Cost Growth and Construction Problems....................15
Cost Growth.............................................15
Construction Problems.....................................16
Funding Additional Ships in FY2008.............................20
Estimated Cost of Two TAKEs in FY2008 UPL.....................21
Adequacy of 30- or 31-Ship Amphibious Ship Force.................22
Stability of Amphibious and MPF(F) Force Level Goals..............25
Crewing of Large-Deck MPF(F) Ships............................25
Clarity of Sea Basing Concept...................................26
Affordability and Cost-Effectiveness of Sea Basing..................28
Navy Perspective.........................................29
CBO Perspective.........................................30
CSBA Perspective........................................31
Potential Oversight Questions...............................31
Relationship to Global Fleet Station (GFS) Concept..................32
Coordination with Other Services on Sea Basing....................32
Legislative Activity for FY2008.....................................36
FY2008 Budget Request.......................................36
LPD-17 Program.........................................36
LHA-6/LHA(R) Program...................................36
TAKE Program..........................................36
Navy FY2008 Unfunded Priorities List (UPL)..................36
FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1585/S. 1547)..............36
House ..................................................36
Senate ..................................................37
Conference ..............................................39
FY2008 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3222/P.L. 110-116)........39

Senate ..................................................40
Conference ..............................................41
List of Tables
Table 1. Funding For Acquisition of MPF(F) Ships.......................9
Table 2. FY2008-FY2013 Amphibious and MPF(F) Ship Procurement Plan..13

Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and
Maritime Prepositioning Ship Programs:
Background and Oversight Issues
for Congress
Introduction
The Navy is proposing to maintain in coming years a Navy with 31 amphibious
ships and an additional squadron of 14 Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or
MPF(F), ships. The MPF(F) squadron is intended to implement a new operational
concept called sea basing, under which forces would be staged at sea and used to
conduct expeditionary operations ashore with little or no reliance on nearby land
bases.
The Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget requests $1,398.3 million in procurement
funding for a ninth San Antonio (LPD-17) amphibious ship to be procured in
FY2008. The Navy estimates the total procurement cost of this ship at $1,798.3
million. The ship received $296.2 million in FY2008 advance procurement funding,
and the Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget calls for the final $103.2 million of the
ship’s procurement cost to be provided in FY2009 as a “program closeout” cost.
Although the Navy’s proposed force of 31 amphibious ships includes ten LPD-17
class ships, the Navy is proposing in its FY2008 budget to end LPD-17 procurement
with the ninth ship.
The Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget also requests $1,377.4 million in
procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of LHA-6, a large-deck
amphibious assault ship that was procured in FY2007 using split funding (two-year
incremental funding) in FY2007 and FY2008. The Navy estimates the total
procurement cost of LHA-6 at $2,806.2 million.
The Navy’s FY2008 unfunded programs list (UPL) — a list of programs that the
Navy desires but which are not funded in the Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget —
includes, as its top item, an additional LPD-17 at an estimated cost of about $1,700
million, and, as its second item, two modified Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) dry cargo
ships for the MPF(F) squadron, at an estimated combined cost of about $1,200
million. These two TAKEs are currently scheduled for procurement in FY2009 and
FY2010. (The FY2008 budget also requests $456.1 million in the National Defense
Sealift Fund (NDSF) for one “regular” TAKE-1 class ship intended for general Navy
use, not for the MPF(F)).
The issue for Congress is whether to approve, modify, or reject the Navy’s plans
for procuring amphibious and MPF(F) ships. Decisions that Congress makes on this

issue could affect Navy and Marine Corps capabilities, Navy and Marine Corps
funding requirements, and the shipbuilding industrial base.
Background
Current Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ships
Amphibious Ships. Amphibious ships are one of four principal categories
of combat ships that traditionally have helped define the size and structure of the U.S.
Navy. The other three are aircraft carriers, surface combatants (e.g., cruisers,
destroyers, frigates, and Littoral Combat Ships), and submarines.¹
The primary function of amphibious ships is to transport Marines and their
equipment to distant operating areas, and enable Marines to conduct expeditionary
operations ashore in those areas. Amphibious ships have berthing spaces for
Marines, flight decks and hangar decks for their helicopters and vertical/short take-
off and landing (VSTOL) fixed-wing aircraft, well decks for storing and launching²
their landing craft, and storage space for their wheeled vehicles, their other combat
equipment, and their supplies. Although amphibious ships are designed to support
Marine landings against opposing military forces, they can also be used for Marine
landings in so-called permissive or benign situations where there are no opposing
forces.
U.S. amphibious ships are Navy ships operated by Navy crews, with the Marines
as passengers. They are built to survivability standards similar to those of other U.S.³
Navy combat ships, and are included in the total number of battle force ships in the
Navy, which is the commonly cited figure for the total number of ships in the fleet.⁴
Amphibious ships are procured in the Navy’s shipbuilding budget, known as the
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation account. Designations of
amphibious ship classes start with the letter L, as in amphibious landing.
Today’s amphibious ships can be divided into two main groups — the so-called
“big-deck” amphibious assault ships, designated LHA and LHD, which look like
medium-sized aircraft carriers, and the smaller (but still sizeable) LSD- and LPD-

¹ The Navy also includes mine warfare ships and a variety of auxiliary and support ships.
² A well deck is a large, garage-like space in the stern of the ship. It can be flooded with
water so that landing craft can leave or return to the ship. Access to the well deck is
protected by a large stern gate that is somewhat like a garage door.
³ To enhance their survivability in battle — their ability to absorb damage from enemy
weapons — U.S. Navy ships are built with features such as extensive interior
compartmentalization and increased armor protection of certain critical interior spaces.
⁴ Battle force ships are ships that are readily deployable overseas and which contribute to
the overseas combat capability of the Navy. They include both active duty and Naval
Reserve Force combat ships as well Navy- and Military Sealift Command-operated
auxiliaries — such as oilers, ammunition ships, dry cargo ships, and multiproduct resupply
ships — that transport supplies from shore to Navy combat ships operating at sea.

type amphibious ships.⁵ The LHAs and LHDs have large flight decks and hangar
decks for embarking and operating numerous helicopters and VSTOL fixed-wing
aircraft, while the LSDs and LPDs have much smaller flight decks and hangar decks
for embarking and operating smaller numbers of helicopters. The LHAs and LHDs,
as bigger ships, in general can embark more Marines and equipment than the LSDs
and LPDs. As of the end of FY2006, the Navy included 33 amphibious ships:
^!7 Wasp (LHD-1) class ships, commissioned between 1989 and⁶

2001, each displacing about 40,500 tons;

^!4 Tarawa (LHA-1) class ships, commissioned between 1976 and

1980, each displacing about 40,000 tons;

^!12 Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class ships,
commissioned between 1985 and 1998, each displacing about

16,000 tons;

^!1 San Antonio (LPD-17) class ship, commissioned in 2006,
displacing about 26,000 tons; and
^!9 Austin (LPD-4) class ships, commissioned between 1965 and

1971, each displacing about 17,000 tons.⁷

The Navy organizes its amphibious ships into expeditionary strike groups
(ESGs). Each ESG notionally includes one LHA or LHD, one LSD, and one LPD.
The amphibious ships in an ESG together can embark a Marine expeditionary unit
(MEU) consisting of about 2,200 Marines, their aircraft, their landing craft, their
combat equipment, and about 15 days worth of supplies. Each ESG also notionally
includes three surface combatants (some or all armed with Tomahawk cruise
missiles), one submarine, and perhaps one or more P-3 long-range, land-based
maritime patrol aircraft. ESGs are designed to be independently deployable, strike-
capable naval formations, but they can also operate in conjunction with carrier strike
groups (CSGs) to form larger naval task forces. On average, two (or perhaps three)
ESGs might be forward-deployed at any given time.

⁵ LHA can be translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, assault. LHD can be translated
as landing ship, helicopter-capable, well deck. LSD can be translated as landing ship, well
deck. LPD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter platform, well deck. Whether noted
in the designation or not, all these ships have well decks.
⁶ For comparison, a Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier displaces about 100,000
tons, and a cruiser or destroyer displaces about 9,000 tons.
⁷ The Navy also operates two Blue Ridge (LCC-19) class command ships. As their
designation suggests, these ships were originally built as amphibious command ships. In
recent years, they have evolved into general fleet command ships. Some listings of U.S.
Navy ships include the two LCCs as amphibious ships, while others list them in a separate
category of command ships, along with one other fleet command ship — the Coronado
(AGF-11), which is a converted LPD.

Maritime Prepositioning Ships. Today’s maritime prepositioning ships are
large military cargo ships that are loaded with combat equipment and supplies and
forward-located to sea areas that are close to potential U.S. military operating zones.
They are essentially forward-located, floating warehouses. Most have a roll-on/roll-
off (RO/RO) capability, which means that they are equipped with ramps that permit
wheeled or tracked vehicles to quickly roll on or off the ship when the ship is at pier.
A total of 36 U.S. prepositioning ships, controlled by the Military Sealift
Command (MSC), store equipment and supplies for various parts of DOD. The 16
ships used primarily for storing Marine Corps equipment and supplies are called
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships. The 10 ships used primarily for storing
equipment and supplies for the Army are called the Combat Prepositioning Force.
The remaining 10 ships used primarily for storing equipment and supplies for the Air
Force, Navy, and Defense Logistics Agency are called Logistics Prepositioning
Ships. This report focuses on the 16 MPF ships.
The 16-ship MPF fleet is organized into three squadrons of five or six ships
each. Each squadron stores enough combat equipment and supplies to equip and
support a MEB for a period of 30 days. One squadron is normally forward-located
in the Atlantic or Mediterranean, one is normally forward-located in the Indian Ocean
at Diego Garcia, and one is normally forward-located in the Western Pacific at Guam
and Saipan.⁸
Today’s MPF ships are designed to support Marine landings at friendly ports or
ports that Marines or other U.S. or friendly forces have previously seized by force.
Under the basic MPF concept of operations, the MPF ships would steam into such
a port, while Marines would be flown into a nearby friendly or seized airbase. The
Marines would then travel to the port, help unload the MPF ships, unpack and “marry
up” with their equipment and supplies, and begin conducting their operations ashore.
MPF operations can be used to reinforce an initial Marine presence ashore that was
created by a Marine landing against opposing forces, or to establish an initial Marine
presence ashore in a permissive or benign landing environment.
The MPF concept permits a MEB-sized Marine force to be established in a
distant operating area more quickly than would be possible if the MEB’s equipment
and supplies had to be transported all the way from the United States. Unlike
prepositioning of equipment and supplies on the soil of foreign countries, maritime
prepositioning in international waters does not require permanent host nation access.
The MPF concept also provides a degree of intertheater operational flexibility, since
an MPF squadron can be moved from one theater (e.g., the Mediterranean) to an
adjoining theater (e.g., the Indian Ocean) relatively quickly if needed to respond to
a contingency. DOD used the Mediterranean and Western Pacific MPF squadrons
to supplement the Indian Ocean MPF squadron in the 1991 Gulf War (Operation
Desert Storm) and the more recent Iraq War (Operation Iraqi Freedom).

⁸ The maritime prepositioning ships serving the other military services are located
principally at Diego Garcia.

Today’s MPF ships are DOD sealift ships operated with civilian crews. They
are built to survivability standards similar to those of commercial cargo ships, which
are lower than those of U.S. Navy combat ships. They are not included in the total
number of battle force ships in the Navy.⁹ Today’s MPF ships are designated TAKs.
The “T” means the ships are operated by the MSC; the “A” means auxiliary; and the
“K” means cargo.
The MPF fleet was established in the mid-1980s. It includes 13 ships (TAK-
3000 through TAK-3012) that entered service with the MPF in 1984-1986, and three
ships (TAK-3015 through TAK-3017) that were added to the MPF fleet in 2000-2003
under the MPF Enhancement, or MPF(E), program, so as to increase the storage
capacity of the MPF fleet in accordance with lessons learned during the 1991 Gulf
War. One MPF(E) ship was added to each squadron.
The 13 earlier MPF ships, which each displace between about 44,000 and
49,000 tons, are owned and operated by private companies under 25-year charters
(i.e., leases) to MSC. The three more recently added MPF(E) ships, which each
displace between about 50,000 and 55,000 tons, are owned by the U.S. government
and are operated by private companies under contract to MSC.
Since FY1993, new-construction DOD sealift ships similar to the MPF ships
have been procured not in the SCN account, but rather in the National Defense
Sealift Fund (NDSF), a DOD revolving fund that is outside both the Department of
the Navy budget and the procurement title of the annual DOD appropriation act.
NDSF funding is used for acquiring, operating, and maintaining DOD sealift ships
and certain Navy auxiliary ships.
As of the end of FY2005, the MPF fleet included the following ships:
^!5 Cpl. Louis J. Hauge Jr. (TAK-3000) class ships, which were
originally built in Denmark in 1979-1980 as civilian cargo ships for
Maersk Line Ltd. Their conversions into MPF ships began in 1983-

1984. The ships are owned and operated by Maersk.

^!3 Sgt. Matej Kocak (TAK-3005) class ships, which were originally
built in the United States in 1981-1983 as civilian cargo ships for the
Waterman Steamship Corporation. Their conversions into MPF
ships began in 1982-1983. The ships are owned and operated by
Waterman.
^!5 2^nd Lt. John P. Bobo (TAK-3008) class ships, which were built
in the United States in 1985-1986 as new-construction ships for the
MPF. They are owned and operated by American Overseas Marine.

⁹ In contrast to Navy auxiliaries that are counted as battle force ships because they transport
supplies from land to Navy ships operating at sea, MPF ships, like most other DOD sealift
ships, transport supplies from one land mass to another, primarily for the benefit of a service
(in this case, the Marine Corps) other than the Navy.

^!1 1^st Lt. Harry L. Martin (TAK-3015) class ship, which was
originally built in Germany in 1980 as a civilian cargo ship. Its
conversion into an MPF ship began in 1999.
^!1 LCPL Roy M. Wheat (TAK-3016) class ship, which was
originally built in Ukraine as a Soviet auxiliary ship. It was acquired
for conversion in 1997.¹⁰
^!1 Gunnery Sgt. Fred W. Stockham (TAK-3017) class ship, which
was originally built in Denmark in 1980 as a commercial cargo ship.
In the early 1990s, it was acquired for conversion into a kind of
DOD sealift ship called a large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off
(LMSR) ship. It was used by MSC as an LMSR under the name
Soderman (TAKR-299) until 2000, when it was converted into an
MPF(E) ship, and renamed the Stockham.¹¹
Amphibious and MPF(F) Force-Level Goals
The Navy is proposing to maintain in coming years a fleet of 313 ships,
including 31 amphibious ships and a 14-ship MPF(F) squadron.¹² The 31-ship
amphibious force is to include the following:
^!9 LHD- or LHA-type large-deck amphibious assault ships;
^!10 LPD-17 class amphibious ships; and
^!12 LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships.
The 14-ship MPF(F) squadron is intended to help implement a new operational
concept called sea basing, which is discussed in the next section. The squadron is
to include 2 new-construction amphibious assault ships, 1 existing LHD-type
amphibious assault ship, 9 new-construction sealift-type ships, and 2 existing, older-
generation MPF ships. The 11 new-construction ships are as follows:

¹⁰ The conversion of this ship took considerably longer than expected and was the subject
of a lawsuit. For discussion, see Christopher J. Castelli, “MSC Names and Deploys MPF(E)
Vessel, While Bender Pursues Lawsuit,” Inside the Navy, October 13, 2003; Christopher J.
Castelli, “Finally, MSC Plans to Name Converted Cargo Ship This October,” Inside the
Navy, August 25, 2003; Christopher J. Castelli, “MSC: Beleaguered Cargo Vessel to Make
First Deployment This Year,” Inside the Navy, June 2, 2003; Christopher J. Castelli, “MSC
Postpones Wheat Christening, Citing Current Military Ops,” Inside the Navy, February 17,
2003; Christopher J. Castelli, “Cargo Ship Mired in Conversion Process to Reach Fleet In

2003,” Inside the Navy, January 6, 2003.

¹¹ Another LMSR was built as a new-construction LMSR and named the Soderman (TAKR-

317).

¹² For additional discussion of the proposed 313-ship fleet, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy
Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.

^!2 modified LHA Replacement, or LHA(R), ships equipped with
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) command and control (C2)
facilities;
^!3 modified Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) sealift
ships;
^!3 modified Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class cargo and ammunition
resupply ships; and
^!3 Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships.
Sea Basing Concept
The Concept in General. The Navy and Marine Corps are proposing to
implement a new concept of operations for staging forces at sea and conducting
expeditionary operations ashore with little or no reliance on nearby land bases. The
concept is called enhanced networked sea basing, or sea basing for short.
Under the traditional concept of operations for conducting expeditionary
operations ashore, the Navy and Marine Corps would establish a base ashore, and
then use that base to conduct operations against the desired ashore objective. Under
sea basing, the Navy and Marine Corps would launch, direct, and support
expeditionary operations directly from a base at sea, with little or no reliance on a¹³
nearby land base.
A key rationale for the sea basing concept is that in the future, fixed land bases
ashore will become vulnerable to enemy attack from weapons such as cruise missiles
or short-range ballistic missiles. Launching the operation directly from a base at sea,
advocates of sea basing argue, will enhance the survivability of the attacking Navy-
Marine Corps force by putting the base out of the range of shorter-range enemy
weapons and targeting sensors, and by permitting the sea to be used as a medium of
maneuver for evading detection and targeting by longer-range enemy weapons and
sensors.
A second rationale for sea basing is that by eliminating the nearby base ashore
— the logistical “middleman” — sea basing will permit the Marine Corps to initiate
and maintain a higher pace of operations against the desired objective, thus
enhancing the effectiveness of the operation. A third rationale for sea basing is that
it could permit the Marine force, once the operation is completed, to reconstitute and
redeploy — that is, get back aboard ship and be ready for conducting another
operation somewhere else — more quickly than under the traditional concept of
operations.
The sea base being referred to is not a single ship, but rather a collection of
ships, including the MPF(F) squadron, other ships (such as an aircraft carrier strike

¹³ For an in-depth discussion of the sea basing concept, see Defense Science Board Task
Force on Sea Basing, op. cit. See also Otto Kreisher, “Sea Basing,” Air Force Magazine,
July 2004, p. 64; Scott C. Truver, “Sea Basing: More Than the Sum of Its Parts?” Jane’s
Navy International, March 2004, pp. 16-18, 20-21; Art Corbett and Vince Goulding, “Sea
Basing: What’s New?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2002, pp. 34-39.

group), and intertheater and sea base-to-shore connector ships. Under sea basing,
certain functions previously carried out from the nearby base ashore, including
command and control and logistics, would be transferred back to the ships at sea that
collectively make up the sea base.
The Defense Science Board (DSB) in August 2003 issued a report on sea basing
which concluded that “sea basing represents a critical future joint military capability
for the United States.”¹⁴
In August 2005, the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously approved a Joint
Integrating Concept (JIC) document for sea basing.¹⁵ Approval of the JIC gave
seabasing DOD recognition as a key future U.S. military capability, and created a
more formal requirement for seabasing to be implemented in a way that satisfies joint
requirements rather than those of the Navy and Marine Corps alone. The seabasing
concept must still complete DOD’s Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) process and obtain acquisition milestone approvals.¹⁶
Capability and Cost of MPF(F) Squadron. The MPF(F) squadron will
replace one of the three existing MPF squadrons. The MPF(F) squadron was
described in a June 2005 Navy report to Congress on the MPF(F) program¹⁷ that was
required by the conference report (H.Rept. 108-622 of July 20, 2005) on the FY2005
defense appropriations act (H.R. 4613/P.L. 108-287 of August 5, 2004),¹⁸ and again¹⁹
in a February 2007 Navy report to Congress on the MPF(F) program that was

¹⁴ Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing, op.cit., p. xi. Italics as in the original.
Similar statements are made in two cover memos included at the front of the report, and on
p. 87. For press reports about this study, see John T. Bennett, “Marine Corps Commandant,
DSB Describe Visions of Seabasing Concept,” Inside the Pentagon, October 30, 2004;
Jason Ma, “DSB Study, Conference Examine Seabasing Needs and Challenges,” Inside the
Navy, October 27, 2003; Jason Sherman, “Pentagon Group Details Sea Base Concept,”
Defense News, October 27, 2003.
¹⁵ Christopher J. Castelli, “Joint Chiefs Endorse Pentagon’s Proposed Seabasing Concept,”
Inside the Navy, September 19, 2005. See also David W. Munns, “Forward Progress,”
Seapower, September 2005: 14-16, 18.
¹⁶ Jason Ma, “Navy Weighted U.S. Shipbuilding Capabilities When Crafting MPF(F) Plan,”
Inside the Navy, September 19, 2005.
¹⁷ U.S., Department of the Navy, Report to Congress, Maritime Prepositioning Force,
Future, MPF(F), Washington, 2005, 8 pp. (Prepared by Program Executive Officer, Ships,
Washington DC 20376, June 2005.) A 20-page appendix to the report provides supporting
budget details. Letters of transmission to Congress accompanying the report are dated June

6, 2005.

¹⁸ The requirement for the report on the MPF(F) program is on page 360 of H.Rept. 108-622.
¹⁹ U.S., Department of the Navy, Report to Congress, Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) [or] MPF(F) [Program], Washington, 2007, 22 pp. (Prepared by Director,
Expeditionary Warfare Division (OPNAV N85), 1000 Navy Pentagon, Washington, DC

20350, February 2007.)

directed by the report of the Senate Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 109-254 of
May 9, 2006) on the FY2007 defense authorization bill (S. 2766).²⁰
The February 2007 Navy report states that the key performance parameters for
the MPF(F) squadron include, among other things, an ability to deliver ashore, in a
period of 8 to 10 hours, one Marine Brigade Landing Team (BLT) by surface
transportation from a range of up to 25 nautical miles, and a second BLT by air
transportation (i.e., “vertically”) from a range of up to 110 nautical miles. The report
states that
Affordability and industrial base considerations were key elements of the
MPF(F) squadron composition decision. The squadron includes existing assets
(an LHD and two T-AKs) which reduces overall squadron procurement costs.
It also leverages hot production lines for two ship classes (T-AKE and LHA(R))
which significantly reduces non-recurring costs, reduces technical and cost risk,
and takes advantage of learning curves during the production process. The
MPF(F) squadron includes an additional vessel type (MPF(F) LMSR) which is
based on an existing design, further reducing non-recurring costs. The MLP is
the only new design platform included in the MPF(F) squadron. The MLP was
also selected with affordability in mind, as the vessel will leverage existing²¹
commercial technology in performing the mission.
The February 2007 report estimates the acquisition cost of the MPF(F) squadron
at $11.1 billion to $13.8 billion in constant FY2008 dollars. The report states that
this estimate includes test and evaluation (T&E), outfitting, and post-delivery costs,
but excludes the cost of additional shore facilities. The report estimates the MPF(F)
squadron’s life-cycle costs, including disposal costs, at $25.8 billion to $33.5 billion²²
in constant FY2008 dollars.
Table 1 below shows annual funding for the acquisition of MPF(F) squadron
ships in the proposed FY2008 budget.
Table 1. Funding For Acquisition of MPF(F) Ships
(millions of then-year dollars)
FY06 F Y 07 F Y 08 F Y 09 F Y 10 F Y 11 F Y 12 F Y 13 B e yond Tot a l
andFY13
prior
95 86 68 1,682 2,612 3,748 1,015 2,074 1,381 12,761
^So^urce^:U.S., Department of the Navy, Report to Congress, Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) [or] MPF(F) [Program], Washington, 2007, 22 pp. (Prepared by Director,
Expeditionary Warfare Division (OPNAV N85), 1000 Navy Pentagon, Washington, DC

20350, February 2007.)

²⁰ The requirement for the report on the MPF(F) program is on pages 114-115 of H.Rept.

109-254.

²¹ Report to Congress, Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) [or] MPF(F) [Program],
op cit, p. 14.
²² Report to Congress, Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) [or] MPF(F) [Program],
op cit, p. 15.

Related Transport Ships. In addition to the MPF(F) squadron ships, the
Navy and Army plan to procure several Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) for high-
speed intra-theater transport of Marine Corps and Army forces and equipment. The
JHSV is to be a 35- to 45-knot, shallow-draft, intratheater transport ship similar to
the leased commercial high-speed ferries that DOD has used experimentally in recent
years. The Navy also plans to procure sea base-to-shore connector (SSC) ships for
transporting personnel and equipment from the sea base to the shore area of
operations. The SSCs would replace the Navy’s current LCAC air-cushioned landing
craft.
Global Fleet Station (GFS) Concept
In connection with the sea basing concept and the concept of adaptive force
packaging (which refers to the ability of U.S. naval forces to be split apart and
recombined into force packages of various sizes and mission orientations, so as to
meet the needs of various contingencies), the Navy is proposing to establish what it
calls global fleet stations, or GFSs. A 2006 Navy operations concept document
states that one method for furthering the Navy’s contribution to national security will
involve:
Providing operational maneuver and assured access to the joint force while
significantly reducing our footprint ashore and minimizing the permissions
required to operate from host nations. With a sustainable logistics tail safely at
sea, sea basing leverages the ability to operate from international waters. We are
exploring innovative operational concepts that combine sea basing with adaptive
force packaging that will further support national security and the Combatant
Commanders’ objectives worldwide. One such concept is the Global Fleet
Station (GFS). GFS is a persistent sea base of operations from which to
coordinate and employ adaptive force packages within a regional area of interest.
Focusing primarily on Phase 0 (shaping) operations, Theater Security
Cooperation, Global Maritime Awareness, and tasks associated specifically with
the War on Terror, GFS offers a means to increase regional maritime security
through the cooperative efforts of joint, inter-agency, and multinational partners,
as well as Non-Governmental Organizations. Like all sea bases, the composition
of a GFS depends on Combatant Commander requirements, the operating
environment, and the mission. From its sea base, each GFS would serve as a
self-contained headquarters for regional operations with the capacity to repair
and service all ships, small craft, and aircraft assigned. Additionally, the GFS
might provide classroom space, limited medical facilities, an information fusion
center, and some combat service support capability. The GFS concept provides
a leveraged, high-yield sea based option that achieves a persistent presence in
support of national objectives. Additionally, it complements more traditional²³
CSG/ESG training and deployment cycles.
The document describes a hypothetical scenario in which a future GFS is
organized around an LPD-type ship that operates in the region for up to two years.

²³ U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Operations Concept 2006, Washington, 2006, pp.
30-31

In the scenario, the LPD-type ship acts as a host or support platform for sailors,
Marines, Army personnel, Air Force personnel, and a Coast Guard small boat unit.²⁴
A March 20, 2006, Navy white paper on the GFS concept posted online by
InsideDefense.com states that
The purpose of a GFS is to establish a base of operations from which to
coordinate and launch a variety of missions within a regional area of interest,
focusing primarily on Phase 0/Shaping and Stability operations, Theater Security
Cooperation, Maritime Domain Awareness, and tasks associated specifically
with the War on Terror.... These activities range from traditional counter piracy,
MIO, and security patrols, to mobile training teams (MTTs), construction
assistance, medical outreach, and information sharing....
By taking advantage of existing host nation basing arrangements, it is anticipated
that five Fleet Stations could be developed within the next five to seven years,
based upon the availability of trained personnel, ships, helicopters and
equipment. Possible locations for these initial Global Fleet Stations include
Guam or Singapore (GFS - SE Asia); Bahrain or UAE (GFS - East Africa,
Arabian Gulf); Diego Garcia (GFS — South Asia); Rota (GFS - West Africa);
and, Key West (GFS — South and Central America). These locations were
selected due to the availability of facilities that could support a US military
presence with dependents. As a pilot, Naval Station Key West could serve as the
site for proof of concept....
Each GFS is a self-sustaining home base from which to conduct regional Phase
0 operations ranging from Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) activities to
Maritime Interdiction and counter-piracy. It is a base from which tailored and
adaptive force packages can be launched in response to humanitarian crises,
natural disasters, and counter-terrorism tippers. It is a center for intelligence and
information fusion in support of enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness, and
when networked with other Fleet Stations, each GFS fusion center will serve as
an intelligence feeder for Global Maritime Intelligence Integration. Most
importantly, these information fusion centers will offer increased regional
maritime domain awareness to host nation partners and will provide timely
queuing to interdict illegal transnational activities.
Each GFS is a base from which to sustain and deploy riverine units throughout
the region, whether in concert with Mobile Training Teams and other Phase 0
activities or to conduct missions in direct support of GWOT (surveillance, MIO
[maritime intercept operations], combat insertion, etc). Each GFS will serve as
the logistics and C2 HQ for regional expeditionary operations, to include the
basing of Blue and Gold crews to sustain high OPTEMPO [operational tempo]
throughout the region with a limited number of ships, small craft, helicopters and
UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]. Each GFS is home base for regional NECC
[Naval Expeditionary Combat Command] detachments consisting of Seabees
[construction battalions, or CBs], salvage divers, EOD [explosive ordnance
disposal], and security force personnel as well as small expeditionary medical
and logistics teams. It is also the hub for FAOs [Foreign Area Officers]
dedicated to supporting activities within the region, tailored to the needs of the
host nations involved. Further, each GFS will leverage existing SOFA’s [Status

²⁴ U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Operations Concept 2006, op. cit., p. 32.

of Forces Agreements with other countries] and MOU’s [Memoranda of
Understanding] to manage bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation as well as
IMET [International Military Education and Training] funds and other incentive
programs, and will be the focal point for coordination with local representatives
from the Inter-Agency, International Organizations, and NGOs [non-
governmental organizations]....
At a minimum, each GFS must include at least one expeditionary warfare ship
LPD/LSD/HSV [high-speed vessel] capable of serving as a mother/command
ship to transport a variety of riverine craft and helicopters/UAVs, mobile training
teams, Seabees and materiel, medical teams, and a limited security force. This
ship should also provide sufficient C4I, limited medical facilities, and
configurable classroom space to sustain Phase 0 operations throughout the
region. Initially one or two FFGs [frigates] (to be replaced by LCSs [littoral
combat ships]) would provide limited NSFS [naval surface fire support],
MIO/VBSS [visit, board, search, and seizure], AAW [anti-air warfare] and ASW
[anti-submarine warfare] support (as well as the ability to train with larger
regional and coastal Navy’s). Each GFS must serve as a self-contained Group
HQ for regional operations, and should have the capacity to repair and service
all ships, small craft, and aircraft assigned. Additionally, the GFS should have
a limited combat service support capability. The GFS (and mother ship) must
maintain robust and secure Joint C4I capabilities to support a JFMCC [Joint
Force Maritime Component Commander] or JFLCC [Joint Force Land
Component Commander] command structure. There should be a medical
treatment facility at the GFS (and/or on the command ship assigned) to provide
medical support/humanitarian assistance as well as sufficient combat
construction equipment and material to support Phase 0 operations in remote
locations. The intelligence fusion cell should be equipped with sufficiently
robust and secure communications to handle the fusion of open source
information as well as tactical and strategic intelligence (to include IMINT,
SIGINT, HUMINT [imagery, signal, and human intelligence] and other sensitive
intelligence sources). Each GFS would include at least two small boat units and
eventually, perhaps, an entire riverine squadron. Additionally, at least one
helicopter detachment (and eventually a UAV detachment) would be assigned
to each GFS. The GFS would ideally have regular access to, and contact with,
inter-agency, international community, and NGO representatives throughout the
region. There would be sufficient language expertise on board the Station,
through FAO and other personnel, to provide direct interaction with indigenous
populations throughout the region....
The most feasible place to test the Global Fleet Station concept would be Key
West (Naval Station Annex and Truman Annex) serving Central and South²⁵
America.
Ship Procurement Programs
Table 2 shows the Navy’s plan for procuring amphibious and MPF(F) ships in
FY2008-FY2013.

²⁵ “Navy White Paper on Global Fleet Stations,” posted online at InsideDefense.com
[subscription required].

Table 2. FY2008-FY2013 Amphibious and MPF(F) Ship
Procurement Plan
(Ships fully funded in FY2006 shown for reference)
FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13
For the 31-ship amphibious force
LPD-171
LH A( R) (0)^a
For the 14-ship MPF(F) squadron
LHA(R)-MPF(F)11
TAKE-M PF(F) (1)^b 11 1
LMSR-MPF(F)1111
MLP-MPF(F)
^Sources^:^D^e^part^m^eⁿ^t^of^t^h^{e N}^a^v^y^,^Hⁱ^ghlⁱ^ght^s^of^t^h^{e D}^e^par^t^m^ent^of^t^h^{e N}^a^{vy FY}^{2007 Budget}^{, C}^h^art
^{15 (p. 5-}^{3), an}^d^D^r^af^t^Repor^t^t^o^C^ongr^es^s^{on Annual}^L^{ong-Range Pl}^{an f}^o^r^C^ons^t^r^uctⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^N^a^val
^Ves^s^e^l^s^f^o^r^FY²⁰⁰⁷^.
^Key:
^L^P^D^-¹⁷^Sa^{n A}ⁿ^{tonio (}^L^P^D^-¹⁷⁾^c^l^a^s^s^a^m^phibious^s^h^ip
^L^H^A⁽^R⁾^L^H^A⁽^R⁾^c^l^a^s^s^a^m^phibious^a^s^s^a^{ult s}^h^{ip. A}^l^s^o^k^now^{n a}^s^the^L^H^A^-^{6 c}^l^a^s^s^.
^L^H^A⁽^R⁾^-^M^P^F⁽^F⁾^M^odifⁱ^e^d^L^H^A⁽^R⁾^inte^nde^{d f}^o^r^MP^F(^F)^s^qua^dr^on
^T^A^K^E^-^M^P^F⁽^F⁾^M^odifⁱ^e^d^L^e^wⁱ^s^a^{nd C}^l^a^r^k⁽^T^A^K^E-¹⁾^c^l^a^s^s^r^e^s^upply^s^h^{ip inte}^nde^{d f}^o^r^MP^F(^F)^s^qua^dr^on
^L^M^SR-MP^F^(F)^M^o^dⁱ^fⁱ^ed^larg^{e, m}^e^dⁱ^u^m^-sp^eed^{, ro}^ll-^on/roll-of^f^(L^{MSR) se}^a^lif^{t ship inte}^nde^{d f}^o^r
^MP^F(^F)^s^qua^dr^on
^ML^P^-^MP^F(^F)^Mobile^L^a^nding^P^l^a^t^f^o^r^m^s^h^{ip inte}^nde^{d f}^o^r^MP^F(^F)^s^qua^dr^on
^a.^FY2008^bu^dg^et^requ^es^{t in}^clu^d^es^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^f^o^{r an}^L^H^A⁽^R⁾^procu^r^{ed in}^{FY2007 u}^sⁱⁿ^g^s^p^{lit f}^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g
ⁱⁿ^F^Y^{2007 an}^{d F}^Y^2008.
^{b. T}^h^{e N}^a^v^y^’^s^F^Y^2008-^F^Y^{2013 s}^hⁱ^pbuⁱ^l^dⁱⁿ^g^pl^anⁱⁿ^cl^u^d^es^{a “}^r^eg^u^l^{ar” T}^A^K^Eⁱⁿ^FY^{2008 i}ⁿ^t^eⁿ^d^ed
^fo^r^ge^ne^r^a^l^N^a^vy^use^r^a^t^h^e^r^t^h^aⁿ^t^h^e^M^P^F(^F)^sq^ua^d^r^oⁿ^.
LPD-17 Program. As a replacement for older LPDs and other older
amphibious ships, the Navy is currently procuring new San Antonio (LPD-17) class
amphibious ships. The ships are built primarily at Northrop Grumman Ship Systems
(NGSS), which includes, among other things, the old Avondale shipyard near New
Orleans, LA, and the old Ingalls shipyard at Pascagoula, MS.²⁶
A total procurement of 12 LPD-17s was originally planned. The Navy’s
proposed 31-ship amphibious fleet includes a total of 10 LPD-17s. In spite of this
10-ship goal, the Navy plans to end LPD-17 procurement with the ninth ship, which
is to be procured in FY2008.
The Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget requests $1,398.3 million in procurement
funding for ninth ship. This ship received $296.2 million in FY2008 advance
procurement funding, and the Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget calls for the final

²⁶ LPD-17-related work is also done at Northrop’s Ingalls shipyard at Pascagoula, MS, and
at a third Northrop facility at Gulfport, MS. The Avondale, Ingalls, and Gulfport facilities
together make up Northrop Grumman Ship Systems (NGSS).

$103.2 million of the ship’s procurement cost to be provided in FY2009 as a
“program closeout” cost.
The Navy’s FY2008 unfunded programs list (UPL) — a list of programs that the
Navy desires but which are not funded in the Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget —
includes, as its top item, an additional (i.e., tenth) LPD-17 at an estimated cost of
about $1,700 million.
LHD-8. To replace one of its five aging LHAs, the Navy in FY2002 procured
LHD-8 — an eighth Wasp-class ship²⁷ — at a total budgeted cost of about $2.06
billion. At the direction of the FY2000 and FY2001 defense appropriation bills, the
ship was incrementally funded in the SCN account, with the final funding increment
being provided in FY2006. The ship is being built by the Ingalls shipyard at
Pascagoula, MS, that now forms part of NGSS. The Ingalls shipyard is the builder
of all previous LHAs and LHDs, and is scheduled to be delivered to the Navy in May

2008.

LHA-6/LHA(R) Program. As a successor to the Wasp-class design, the Navy
is procuring a new class of amphibious assault ships called the LHA Replacement
(LHA[R]) or LHA-6 class. The Navy estimates the procurement cost of the first such
ship, LHA-6, at $2,806.2 million. The ship was procured in FY2007 using split
funding (two-year incremental funding) in FY2007 and FY2008. The ship received
$149.3 million in FY2005 advance procurement funding, $148.4 million in FY2006
advance procurement funding, and $1,131.1 million in FY2007 procurement funding.
The Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget requests $1,377.4 million in procurement
funding to complete the procurement cost of the ship. The ship is scheduled to be
delivered to the Navy in December 2011.
As shown in Table 2, the Navy’s FY2008-FY2013 shipbuilding plan does not
include any additional “regular” LHA(R)s through FY2013, but does include two
modified LHA(R)s for the MPF(F) squadron — one in FY2010 and the other in
FY2013. The Navy’s 30-year (FY2008-FY2037) shipbuilding plan shows the next
“regular” LHA(R) being procured in FY2017. Both “regular” LHA(R)s and modified
LHA(R)s built for the MPF(F) squadron will be built at the Ingalls shipyard that
forms part of NGSS.
The LHA(R) design is to have enhanced aviation features compared to the basic
Wasp-class design, but would lack a well deck, making it the first amphibious ship
in decades built without a well deck. The sacrifice of the well deck appears to be, in
part at least, a consequence of building enhanced aviation features and other
improvements into the design while staying within the envelope of the Wasp-class
hull.
MPF Lease Buyout. The Navy’s FY2008 UPL includes, at the 17^th of 20
items, a $430-million proposal to buyout the leases of the nine ships in the existing
MPS force still under lease. Buying out the leases means DOD would purchase the
ships from the private companies that currently lease them to DOD. DOD estimated

²⁷ LHD-8 will differ from the earlier LHDs in terms of propulsion plant and other respects.

in 2005 that buying out the leases on all 13 MPS ships would save about $840
million in payments between FY2006 and FY2020 (when the last of the 13 ships is
to be phased out of service). Since five of these 13 ships (the TAK-3000 class ships)
were built in a foreign country (Denmark), DOD requested legislative authority to
spend NDSF funds to purchase these five ships.²⁸ The owners of some of these 13
ships reportedly believed in 2005 that the Navy underestimated the market value of
their ships, and that buying out the leases on them would cost at least $500 million
more than the Navy has budgeted.²⁹
Potential Issues for Congress
LPD-17 Cost Growth and Construction Problems
The LPD-17 program has experienced considerable cost growth and
construction problems.
Cost Growth. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) testified in July 2007
that the first LPD-17 experienced cost growth of about 70% and was, on a per-ton
basis, the most expensive amphibious ship ever built for the Navy.³⁰ When LPD-17
procurement began, follow-on ships in the class were estimated to cost roughly $750
million each. Estimated procurement costs for the follow-on ships subsequently grew
to figures between about $1,200 million and about $1,500 million. The Navy
estimates the procurement cost of the ninth ship at $1,798.3 million.
A relatively small portion of the cost growth in the program since its inception
is attributable to the decision to reduce the program’s sustaining procurement rate
from two ships per year to one ship per year. Most of the program’s cost growth is³¹

attributable to other causes.
²⁸ Christopher J. Castelli, “Pentagon Seeks Authority on Carl Vinson, LHA(R),
Prepositioning Ships,” Inside the Navy, May 2, 2005; Geoff Fein, “Navy Underestimated
Cost to Buyout Leases on MSC Ships, Source Says,” Defense Daily, May 10, 2005.
²⁹ Geoff Fein, “Navy Underestimated Cost to Buyout Leases on MSC Ships, Source Says,”
Defense Daily, May 10, 2005.
³⁰ CBO Testimony, Statement of J. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director for National
Security, and Eric J. Labs, Senior Analyst, [on] The Navy’s 2008 Shipbuilding Plan and Key
Ship Programs, before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, July 24, 2007, pp. 13 and

20.

³¹ RAND estimates that halving a shipbuilding program’s annual procurement rate typically
increases unit procurement cost by about 10%. (Mark V Arena, et al, Why Has the Cost of
Navy Ships Risen? A Macroscopic Examination of the Trends in U.S. Naval Ship Costs Over
the Past Several Decades. RAND, Santa Monica (CA), 2006. p. 45. (National Defense
Research Institute, MG-484-NAVY). The December 2006 Selected Acquisition Report
(SAR) summary table, available online at [http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/
2006-DEC-SST.pdf], states that in then-year dollars, changes in the LPD-17 program’s
production schedule (including the reduction in annual procurement rate) account for
(continued...)

Construction Problems. The first LPD-17, which was procured in FY1996,
encountered a roughly two-year delay in design and construction. It was presented
to the Navy for acceptance in late June 2005. A Navy inspection of the ship
conducted June 27-July 1, 2005, found numerous construction deficiencies.³² The
ship was commissioned into service on January 14, 2006. In April 2007, it was
reported that the first LPD-17 had thousands of construction deficiencies.³³
The Navy accepted delivery of LPD-17 with about 1.1 million hours of
construction work remaining to be done on the ship. This equates to about 8.7% of
the total hours needed to build the ship, and (with material costs included) about 7%
of the total cost to build the ship.
The Navy accepted delivery of LPD-18 with about 400,000 hours of
construction work remaining to be done on the ship. This equates to about 3.3% of
the total hours needed to build the ship.
The Navy projects that it will accept delivery of LPD-19 with about 100,000
hours of construction work remaining to be done on the ship. This would equate to
about 0.8% of the total hours needed to build the ship.
The Navy states that it accepted LPD-17 in incomplete condition for four
reasons:
^!It permitted the fleet to begin sooner the process of evaluating LPD-

17 through operational use so as to identify problems with the LPD-

17 class design that need to be fixed in follow-on LPD-17s.

^!It avoided further delays in giving the LPD-17’s crew an opportunity
to conduct post-delivery tests and trial events that are intended to

³¹ (...continued)
$768.1million in increased costs for the program, or about 11.2% of the increased costs
caused by all factors. The other factors leading to increased costs were economic errors
(meaning errors in projected rates of inflation), which account for $361.7 million; estimating
errors, which account for $4,648.8 million; and “other,” which accounts for $1,093.4
million. The LPD-17 program’s total cost was also reduced by $4,037.8 million due to the
reduction in program quantity from an originally planned total of 12 ships to the currently
planned total of 9 ships. The resulting net change in the program’s estimated cost is an
increase of $2,832.2 million.
³² Associated Press, “Shipbuilder: Navy Will Accept New Vessel,” NavyTimes.com, July 21,
2005; Christopher J. Castelli, “Naval Inspection Report Finds Numerous Problems With
LPD-17,” Inside the Navy, July 18, 2005; Dale Eisman and Jack Dorsey, “Problems On New
Ship A Bad Sign, Analyst Warns,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 14, 2005; Nathan Hodge,
“Navy Inspectors Flag ‘Poor Construction’ On LPD-17,” Defense Daily, July 14, 2005. A
copy of the Navy’s inspection report, dated July 5, 2005, is posted online at
[http://www.coltoncompany.com/newsandco mment/comment/lpd17insurv.htm]
³³ See, for example, Louis Hansen, “New Navy Ship San Antonio Found To Be Rife With
Flaws,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, April 14, 2007; Christopher P. Cavas, “Thousands of
Problems Found On New Amphibious Ship,” DefenseNews.com, April 23, 2007.

identify construction (as opposed to class design) problems with
LPD-17 itself.
^!It permitted LPD-17 to leave the shipyard sooner and thereby
mitigated schedule and cost impacts on other ships being built at the
shipyard (other LPD-17s, LHD-8, and DDG-51s) that would have
resulted from having LPD-17 remain in the shipyard longer.
^!It reduced the cost of the remaining construction work to be done on
LPD-17 because the work in question could be performed by repair
shipyards that charge lower rates for their work than the construction
shipyard.
Of the approximately $160 million in post-delivery work performed on LPD-17,
$108 million was for the 1.1 million hours of construction work remaining to
complete the ship. (The rest was for post-shakedown and other work that normally
occurs after a ship is completed and delivered to the Navy.)³⁴ This $160 million in
work was funded through the post-delivery part of the outfitting/post-delivery
(OF/PD) line item in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account. Since
OF/DP costs are not included in ship end cost, the reported end cost of LPD-17 will
understate the ship’s actual construction cost by $108 million.
The Navy plans to fund post-delivery construction work on LPD-18 and LPD-19
through the completion of prior-year shipbuilding line item in the SCN account —
a line item that is included in ship end cost.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) testified in July 2007 that:
The Navy moved forward with ambitious schedules for constructing LPD 17 and
[the Littoral Combat Ship] despite significant challenges in stabilizing the
designs for these ships. As a result, construction work has been performed out
of sequence and significant rework has been required, disrupting the optimal
construction sequence and application of lessons learned for follow-on vessels
in these programs.
In the LPD 17 program, the Navy’s reliance on an immature design tool led
to problems that affected all aspects of the lead ship’s design. Without a stable
design, work was often delayed from early in the building cycle to later, during
integration of the hull. Shipbuilders stated that doing the work at this stage could
cost up to five times the original cost. The lead ship in the LPD class was
delivered to the warfighter incomplete and with numerous mechanical failures,
resulting in a lower than promised level of capability. These problems continue
today — 2 years after the Navy accepted delivery of LPD 17. Recent sea trials
of the ship revealed problems with LPD 17’s steering system, reverse osmosis
units, shipwide area computing network, and electrical system, among other
deficiencies. Navy inspectors noted that 138 of 943 ship spaces remained
unfinished and identified a number of safety concerns related to personnel,

³⁴ On July 16, 2007, CRS and CBO asked the Navy to break down the $160 million figure
into ship-construction work and other work. The Navy’s response was not provided to CRS
in time to be incorporated into this statement.

equipment, ammunition, navigation, and flight activities. To date, the Navy has³⁵
invested over $1.75 billion constructing LPD 17.
In late June and early July 2007, it was reported that Secretary of the Navy
Donald Winter had sent a letter to the chairman and chief executive officer of
Northrop Grumman, Ronald Sugar, dated June 22, 2007, expressing deep concerns
about NGSS’s performance, particularly in connection with the LPD-17 program.
According to these news reports, Winter’s letter contained the following statements
among others, although not necessarily in the order shown below:
^!“I am deeply concerned about Northrop Grumman Ship Systems’
(NGSS) ability to recover in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
particularly in regard to construction of LPD 17 Class vessels.”
^!“I am equally concerned about NGSS’ ability to construct and
deliver ships that conform to the quality standards maintained by the
Navy and that adhere to the cost and schedule commitments agreed
upon at the outset by both NGSS and the Navy.”
^!“... even prior to Katrina [NGSS’s performance] was marginal,
resulting in significant cost overruns that forces the Navy to take
delivery of the LPD-17 with numerous outstanding deficiencies....”
^!“NGSS’ inefficiency and mismanagement of LPD 17 put the Navy
in an untenable position.”
^!“By taking delivery of ships with serious quality problems, the Fleet
has suffered unacceptable delays in obtaining deployable assets.
Twenty-three months after commissioning of LPD 17, the Navy still
does not have a mission-capable ship.”
^!“These delays create further problems as work must be completed or
redone by other shipyards that are not as familiar with the ship’s
design.”
^!“The Navy also took delivery of LPD-18 (USS New Orleans) in an
incomplete fashion, albeit more complete than LPD-17.”
^!“... persistent shortcomings at the NGSS yards are troubling and
causing me not only grave concern about the LPD program, but also
the LHA and DDG-1000 programs.”
^!“The Navy does not wish to find itself in the same situation [with
other ships that] it faces with LPD 17 & 18.”

³⁵ Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Realistic Business Cases
Needed to Execute Navy Shipbuilding Programs, Statement of Paul L. Francis, Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, July 24, 2007 (GAO-07-943T), p. 10.

^!“It is imperative that NGSS deliver future ships devoid of significant
quality problems and that it meet its cost and schedule obligations.”
^!One press report stated: “‘Continued, focused management’ is
necessary to successfully deliver the remainder of the class,
according to Winter.”
^!“[Navy acquisition executive] Dr. [Delores] Etter will be closely
monitoring metrics with NGSS and the acquisition team as we move
forward.”³⁶
Northrop chairman and CEO Sugar reportedly sent a reply letter to Winter dated
June 29, 2007. According to one press report, Sugar stated in the letter: “I share your
concern regarding the need to fully recover and improve our shipyards, and produce
completed LPD 17 class vessels of the highest quality with increasing efficiency....
Irrespective of Hurricane Katrina, Northrop has much work to do to meet the needs
of the U.S. Navy.”³⁷ Another press report stated:
Northrop Grumman Corp (NOC) has ‘much more work to do’ to improve
its performance on Navy ships, but problems with a $13.6-billion amphibious
ship program were not solely the contractor’s making, Chief Executive Ron
Sugar said in a June 29 letter.
“The original acquisition strategy was changed after contract award, there
was funding instability, limited early funding for critical vendor information, and
the ‘integrated’ Navy/contractor design team produced constant design churn and
thousands of design changes,” Sugar wrote, responding to a tersely worded letter
from Navy Secretary Donald Winter.
Northrop “certainly had performance problems,” but the unprecedented
effects of Hurricane Katrina, which severely damaged Northrop’s three shipyards
in the Gulf region in August 2005, “only served to greatly exacerbate the
situation.”...
Sugar said he shared Winter’s concerns and vowed that Northrop would
invest, train and manage its operations to produce Navy ships of the highest
quality with increasing efficiency. “Irrespective of Hurricane Katrina, Northrop
has much more work to do to meet the needs of the U.S. Navy.”

³⁶ Sources for these reported passages from the June 22 letter: Louis Hansen, “Navy Ship
$840 Million Over Budget And Still Unfinished,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, June 30, 2007;
Tony Capaccio, “Northrop Grumman Criticized For ‘Mismanagement’ By U.S. Navy,
Bloomberg News, July 2, 2007; Geoff Fein, “Navy To Monitor Work At Northrop Grumman
Gulf Coast Shipyards, Official Says,” Defense Daily, July 5, 2007; Christopher P. Cavas,
“U.S. Navy Furious Over LPD-17,” DefenseNews.com, July 9, 2007. InsideDefense.com
on July 9, 2007, posted on the subscribers-only portion of its website a copy of what it says
is the June 22 letter.
³⁷ Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Navy Furious Over LPD-17,” DefenseNews.com, July 9,

2007.

“We are not happy with this history,” Sugar added in the letter obtained by
Reuters, “but we are incorporating the lessons from this experience into our
operational plans going forward for new ships in the design, planning and
production stages.”
He noted that Navy recently praised Northrop’s work on a destroyer that
was damaged by Hurricane Katrina, and termed it “one of the best ships ever
delivered.”
Sugar said Northrop officials had given the Navy a list of efforts under way
to improve training, quality, processes, productivity and facilities at the Gulf
Coast shipyards. He promised “substantial investment,” but gave no details.
He said Northrop was aggressively reworking schedules for delivery of all³⁸
ships affected by the hurricane. “We know we must do our part,” Sugar said.
Potential oversight issues for Congress, including the following:
^!To what extent are cost growth and construction problems in the
LPD-17 program due to poor performance by NGSS, poor
performance by other contractors, inadequate program management
and oversight by the Navy, Hurricane Katrina, and other factors?
^!What specific actions have NGSS, other contractors, and the Navy
taken, and what additional actions do they plan to take, to avoid
further cost growth and construction problems in the LPD-17
program?
^!Although the Navy in the past has accepted delivery of ships that
were not complete, has the Navy previously accepted delivery of a
ship with one million or more hours of shipyard construction work
remaining to be done, and if so, when?
Funding Additional Ships in FY2008
A potential key issue for Congress in marking up the Navy’s proposed FY2008
budget is whether to procure an additional LPD-17 and/or one or two modified
TAKEs in FY2008. As discussed earlier, the additional LPD-17 is not currently in
the Navy’s shipbuilding plan, and the two modified TAKEs are currently in the plan
for procurement in FY2009 and FY2010.
Supporters of procuring an additional LPD-17 in FY2008 could argue that this
is the top item on the Navy’s FY2008 UPL, and that building this ship would give
the Navy a force of ten LPD-17s, as called for in the Navy’s 313-ship plan.
Supporters could argue that if Congress decides that it has the funding available in
FY2008, but perhaps not in a future year, to procure an additional LPD-17, it should
procure the ship in FY2008, even if the shipyard is not able to start work on it right

³⁸ Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Northrop Says Katrina Exacerbated Ship Problems,” Reuters, July

10, 2007.

away, because the shipyard will eventually be able to build it, and because what will
matter more in the long run is the presence of this additional ship in the force
structure, not the fact that it took longer than average to build.
Opponents of procuring an additional LPD-17 in FY2008 could argue that
unless the Navy’s budget top line were increased, the $1,700 million or so needed to
procure the ship might have to come from other FY2008 Navy programs, disrupting
these other programs and possibly creating operational risks for the Navy in other
areas. Opponents could argue that the shipyard that would build this ship — the
Avondale yard near New Orleans, LA, that forms part of NGSS — would not be able
to start work right away on an additional LPD-17 procured in FY2008 due to
disruption of the yard’s workforce and work schedule caused by Hurricane Katrina.
Consequently, opponents could argue, procuring this ship in FY2008 would amount
to booking but not (immediately) building a ship. Such an action, they could argue,
would tie up $1,700 million in budget authority that would not result in immediate
obligations and expenditures.
Supporters of procuring one or two modified TAKEs in FY2008 could argue
that this is the second item on the Navy’s FY2008 UPL, and that accelerating these
two ships from FY2009 and FY2010, where they are currently planned, into FY2008,
could release funding in the Navy’s FY2009 and FY2010 budgets for additional ships
or other programs. Supporters could argue that funding one or both of these TAKEs
in FY2008 in addition to the “regular” TAKE for Navy use that is requested in the
Navy’s FY2008 budget could improve economies of scale for these ships, reducing
their costs.
Opponents of procuring one or two modified TAKEs in FY2008 could argue
that unless the Navy’s budget top line were increased, the $1,200 million or so
needed to procure the ship might have to come from other FY2008 Navy programs,
disrupting these other programs and possibly creating operational risks for the Navy
in other areas. Opponents could argue that the $1,200 million cost listed in the
FY2008 UPL for these two ships suggests that procuring one or two modified
TAKEs in addition to the “regular” TAKE being procured in FY2008 will not
significantly reduce their cost.
Estimated Cost of Two TAKEs in FY2008 UPL
As mentioned above, the Navy’s FY2008 UPL includes, as its second item, two
modified TAKEs for the MPF(F) squadron at an estimated combined procurement
cost of about $1,200 million, implying a unit procurement cost of about $600 million
per ship. The “regular” TAKE that the Navy wants to procure in FY2008 has an
estimated procurement cost of $456.1 million. The difference in unit procurement
cost between the “regular” TAKE and the two modified TAKEs raises a potential
oversight question for Congress: Why does the Navy estimate that the two modified
TAKEs in the Navy’s FY2008 UPL would be approximately one-third more
expensive to procure than the “regular” TAKE that the Navy wants to procure in
FY2008?
At a May 3, 2007, markup meeting of the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces
subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the Representative Bartlett,

the subcommittee’s ranking member, stated the following in connection with the
subcommittee’s decision to recommend $456 million in FY2008 for the procurement
of an additional TAKE for the MPF(F) squadron:
Mr. Chairman, as we discussed earlier this week, I would ask that as we
move forward, we continue to refine funding for T-AKE. I understand that while
the mark in Title III [in the National Defense Sealift Fund] fully funds the
procurement cost for an additional T-AKE in Fiscal Year 2008, the actual cost
of an additional T-AKE in 2008, may be $122 million - $145 million greater than
the amount provided in the mark. This is due to additional post delivery and
outfitting costs, which are separate from procurement costs, and also due to
material cost escalations, not reflected in the baseline budget request for the³⁹
Fiscal Year 2008 ship.
Adequacy of 30- or 31-Ship Amphibious Ship Force
The Navy and Marine Corps currently appear to disagree on whether a 30 or 31-
ship amphibious force would be adequate. The Marine Corps has testified that it
would prefer a 33-ship force, so as to support a required total force of 30
operationally available ships (i.e., ships not in depot-level maintenance and repair)
at any given point:
For forcible entry, the Marine Corps’ requirement is a single,
simultaneously-employed two Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) assault
capability. One MEB requires seventeen amphibious warfare ships; however,
given the fiscally constrained environment, the Navy and Marine Corps have
agreed to assume risk by only using fifteen. Historical amphibious ship
availability rates dictate a minimum of eleven ships of each of the current types
of amphibious ship — a minimum of thirty-three total ships — resulting in a
Battle Force that provides thirty operationally available amphibious warfare
ships. In that Battle Force, ten aviation-capable big deck ships
(LHA/LHD/LHA(R)) and ten LPD 17 class ships are required to accommodate⁴⁰
the MEB’s aviation combat element.
The Navy has testified that when the capabilities of the MPF(F) squadron, which
includes three amphibious assault ships, are taken into account, a force of 30
amphibious ships (one fewer than the 31 called for in the 313-ship plan) is adequate:
The ability of our future fleet to meet the demand signal for amphibious
forces must be viewed in the aggregate. Given the cost of ships today, we cannot
discount the value of ships procured to support prepositioned equipment.
Prepositioned assets must be included in the overall force availability equation
— ignoring MPF(F) as the lift component of an additional MEB is would be
incongruous with today’s fiscal environment. The capabilities provided by the
MPF(F) mitigate concerns regarding the operational availability of the assault

³⁹ Opening Statement of Ranking Member Roscoe Bartlett, Mark-up of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, May 3, 2007.
⁴⁰ See, for example, Statement of General James T. Conway, Commandant of the Marine
Corps, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Marine Corps Posture, March 29,

2007, p. 24. Italics and underlining as in the original.

echelon force required to deliver 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Battalion (MEB) lift,
vehicle square footage, and passenger requirements. As reflected in our 30 year
shipbuilding plan, we believe 30 amphibious ships will meet these requirements,⁴¹
when supported by, and supporting, the MPF(F).
A May 2007 press report states:
Navy and Marine Corps officials are engaged in a major debate about the
kind of fleet the sea service will need in the future, but senior leaders are
pledging to resolve their differences.
The debate focuses on the number of amphibious ships that will be built in
future years as well as plans for new vessels designed to create bases at sea.
Marine Commandant Gen. James Conway and Chief of Naval Operations
Adm. Michael Mullen recently agreed to “come to grips” with these issues,
Conway told Inside the Navy on May 2, noting both sides need to understand
each other’s philosophies.
“We’re going to meet on that,” he said. “We’ve got a meeting coming up
as soon as Mike Mullen can get with us.” The meeting will be the “next step in
the process,” he said.
Mullen made similar remarks the next day at a Senate Armed Services
seapower subcommittee hearing on Capitol Hill.
The admiral said he and Conway agreed there is a requirement to have 30
amphibious ships operationally available in the future. Based on past experience,
the services estimate 33 ships would be needed to ensure 30 are always available,
Mullen said.
“Now that’s how we’ve done it historically,” Mullen said.
But the Navy’s shipbuilding plan maintains only 30 amphibious vessels
from fiscal year 2015 onward, which has sparked complaints from Conway....
Mullen told senators he has committed to providing the Marine Corps with
the lift capability it needs. But he seemed to suggest alternatives to buying more
amphibious ships.
“We’ve got to look at how we’re going to fight in the future and
specifically how we’re going to move this 2.0 [i.e., Marine expeditionary
brigades] into the fight,” Mullen said. “Gen. Conway and I have agreed to figure
out a way together to make that work.”
The fixes could include achieving a higher availability rate for ships (some
of which would depend on the warning time involved in particular situations),
Mullen said.

⁴¹ Statement of Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the Senate
Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower, May 3, 2007, p. 12.

The admiral also said new maritime prepositioning ships — MPF(F) vessels
designed to form sea bases — could help move Marines to the fight in the future.
But MPF(F) has been a contentious subject. The Marine Corps has argued
civilian-manned, unarmed MPF(F) ships cannot provide the forcible-entry
capability associated with amphibious warships.
Sorting through these issues will not be easy, but the outcome will have
very important implications for plans to build sea bases with MPF(F) ships,
Mullen said....
[T]he cost of the [MPF(F)] squadron — which Mullen called “significant”
— has been a source of tension with the Marine Corps because the Navy argues
it cannot afford to develop MPF(F) ships without buying fewer traditional
amphibious ships, which carry Marine forces....
Further, unlike amphibious warships, the MPF(F) squadron’s amphibious
vessels will lack active self-defense systems and will not be operated by Navy
sailors.
Conway has publicly argued MPF(F) vessels will not provide forcible-entry
capabilities and should not be considered part of the traditional amphibious
fighting force known as the assault echelon....
Further, officials have discussed the idea of having the big-deck amphibious
ships associated with MPF(F) sail with other amphibious ships in the
expeditionary strike force and not with the unarmed, civilian-manned ships.
Vice Adm. Jonathan Greenert, deputy chief of naval operations for
integration of capabilities and resources, acknowledged this discussion late last
month, but did not say how the Navy views the idea.
“It’s an option,” he told [Inside the Navy] on April 24, following a
congressional hearing....
Greenert declined to predict the outcome of the talks.
“I can’t tell you how it’s going to come out because we’re having the
debate,” he said. “And it’s more of a discussion than a debate. Debate would
imply that there’s only two ways to solve this. We’re sitting down and going⁴²
through the capabilities in the aggregate.”
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
^!What are the potential operational risks of having a force of 30 or 31
amphibious ships rather than 33? What steps can be taken to
mitigate these risks?

⁴² Christopher J. Castelli, “Conway and Mullen Seek To Resolve Debate On Future Fleet,”
Inside the Navy, May 7, 2007.

^!What are the operational risks of having 15 operational amphibious
ships for each MEB, rather than 17?
Stability of Amphibious and MPF(F) Force Level Goals
Perhaps reflecting the apparent disagreement between the Navy and Marine
Corps regarding the required size of the amphibious force, the Navy has suggested
that it might change its required numbers of amphibious and MPF(F) ships. The
Navy’s February 2007 report on the 30-year (FY2008-FY2037) shipbuilding plan
stated:
Future combat operations may require us to revisit many of the decisions
reflected in this report, including those associated with amphibious lift. As the
Navy embarks on production of the Maritime Prepositioning Force in this FYDP,
the Navy will continue to analyze the utility of these ships in terms of their
contribution to, and ability to substitute for, the assault echelon forces in the
Navy’s future battle-force inventory. The current force represents the best
balance between these forces available today. However, changing world events
and resulting operational risk associated with the various force structure elements
that make up these two components of overall lift will be analyzed to ensure the
Navy is not taking excessive risk in lift capability and capacity. While there
needs to be a balance between expeditionary and prepositioning ships for
meeting the overall lift requirement, future reports may adjust the level of
support in one or both of these solutions. Any adjustments made in these
capabilities will have to be accommodated in light of the resources available and
could require the Navy to commit additional funding to this effort in order to⁴³
support the overall balance of our shipbuilding program.
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
^!When might the Navy know whether it wants to change its required
numbers of amphibious and/or MPF(F) ships?
^!How might these numbers change?
^!How much confidence can Congress have in the stability of the
Navy’s current stated requirements for amphibious and MPF(F)
ships?
^!Should Congress take actions to hedge against the possibility of the
Navy changing its requirements for amphibious and MPF(F) ships,
and if so, what actions?
Crewing of Large-Deck MPF(F) Ships
The Navy and Marine Corps have not yet determined what combination of
civilian mariners and Navy personnel will be used to crew the three large-deck

⁴³ U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval
Vessels for FY 2008, p. 5.

amphibious assault ships in the MPF(F) squadron. The February 2007 Navy report
on the MPF(F) program contains a section devoted to the question of crewing
MPF(F) ships, which states in part:
The use of Civilian Mariners or MSC contracted Mariners as operational
crews for MPF(F) ships has been proposed and briefed to Navy Judge Advocate
General (JAG) representatives on August 30, 2006. The Navy JAG provided a
memorandum on September 19, 2006, confirming that there are no legal
objections to developing the two options defined. The one option is to initially
designate the aviation big decks as naval auxiliaries (USNS), manned with 100%
civilian crew, but develop the capability to timely and seamlessly convert them
to warships (USS) in order to employ them during an international armed
conflict. The other option is to designate the big decks as warships (USS) upon
initial commissioning, and man them with mixed military-civilian crews.
Regardless of option, when operating as a warship, the platforms will need a
Navy Commanding Officer and selected senior staff (this requirement may be
met by Mariners who are in the Navy Reserve). Ship crew not engaged in
warfighting functions may remain civilian mariners, performing propulsion, ship
auxiliaries, and housekeeping type operations. With both options the other ships
in the squadron (due to their roles and logistics centric activities) may be
permanently designated as USNS throughout their employment. Precedence has
been established for selected capabilities by ships such as the USNS⁴⁴
STOCKHAM and USS MOUNT WHITNEY.
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
^!What are the potential cost and operational implications of manning
options for the large-deck amphibious assault ships in the MPF(F)
squadron?
^!When do the Navy and Marine Corps anticipate making a decision
on the manning strategy for these ships?
Clarity of Sea Basing Concept
The February 2007 report to Congress on the MPF(F) program refers to sea
basing as “an emerging concept.”⁴⁵ Some observers have expressed concern about
a lack of clarity regarding the meaning of sea basing, and consequently about what
kinds of shipbuilding and other programs are needed to implement it. For example,
Robert Work, a naval analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
(CSBA), an independent defense-policy research institute, states the following in a
lengthy report on sea basing released in November 2006:
“Seabasing” is a new defense buzzword of growing importance and
prominence in both joint and naval circles. Unfortunately, despite the
increasingly common use of the term by both joint and naval planners alike, there

⁴⁴ Report to Congress, Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) [or] MPF(F) [Program],
op cit, p. 14.
⁴⁵ Report to Congress, Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) [or] MPF(F) [Program],
op cit, p. 2.

still remains much mystery and misunderstanding about this important “new”
concept. Indeed, one of the key problems that has hindered meaningful debate
and discussion about seabasing — and especially the priorities revealed in its
associated plans and programs — is that its contemporary definition and the
important ideas that support it are poorly understood except among the relatively
small group of officers and planners who have been intimately involved with
their development.
To make matters worse, since its grand unveiling by the Department of the
Navy (DoN) in 2002, the concept’s definition has constantly changed. For
example, in August 2005, the Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) defined
seabasing as “the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection,
reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while
providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select
expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint
Operations Area (JOA). These capabilities expand operational maneuver options
and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea.” However, in the very month
the Seabasing JIC was published, The DOD Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, amended through August 31, 2005, defined seabasing as, “in
amphibious operations, a technique of basing certain landing force support
functions aboard ship which decreases shore-based presence.” Moreover, as is
explained in this report, both of these definitions — and others like them — are
unduly restrictive, incomplete, confusing, or all of these things.
Partly as a result, there remains much uncertainty over exactly what
seabasing is, and over the current programmatic and budgetary direction of joint
seabasing programs....
[T]he current definition for seabasing and the direction of its programs are
narrowly focused on one thing: revitalizing the DoN’s seabased operational
maneuver and seabased expeditionary power-projection capabilities which were
allowed atrophy during the Cold War. The list of seabasing functions is much
longer.... Only if all of these seabasing functions are understood and compared
can a rational prioritization of planned seabasing improvements occur....
[A]lthough seabasing concept development within both the Department of
the Navy and the Department of Defense (DoD) is focused on seabased
operational maneuver and expeditionary power-projection capabilities, its
disjointed development since the end of the Cold War has only served to confuse
an urgently needed open debate and discussion about the future of naval
maneuver in general and amphibious operations in particular, and the best mix
of platforms to support both. Central to this debate is whether or not future
forcible entry operations from the sea should be conducted from amphibious
warships or commercial-standard MPF(F) ships, or a combination of both; and
whether or not these operations should emphasize surface maneuver, aerial
maneuver, or a combination of the two. The current understanding of both these⁴⁶
issues need to be thoroughly questioned and reviewed.
A January 8, 2008 defense trade press article states:

⁴⁶ Robert Work, Thinking About Seabasing: All Ahead, Slow. Washington, CSBA, 2006.
pp. iii-v.

The Navy and Marine Corps have spent the past year working to better
define the requirement for sea base operations, looking at platform needs and
how best to move warfighters and their equipment from ship to shore, a Marine
Corps official said.
The cornerstone of the sea basing effort is the Navy’s Maritime Preposition
Force Future or MPF(F).
“We learned a lot in the last year in developing the requirement,” Maj. Gen.
Thomas Benes, director, Expeditionary Warfare, told Defense Daily in a recent
interview.
The two services took a step back and spent a lot more time reviewing the
MPF(F), he added. “We needed to define the requirement a little bit more
between the two services, and we did that.
“There is alignment between the Commandant (Gen. James Conway) and
the CNO (Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead). They definitely
understand and have given us guidance as to where we need to develop this,”
Benes said. “MPF(F) is now going to be a reinforcing capability to deliver a⁴⁷
MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade) from a sea base.”
Affordability and Cost-Effectiveness of Sea Basing
One issue in assessing the cost of the sea basing concept concerns the accuracy
of the Navy’s procurement cost estimate for the new-construction sea basing ships.
If these estimates turn out to be too low, the sea basing concept would be more
difficult to afford. Navy ship construction costs in recent years have risen more
quickly than some anticipated. Several recent Navy ships procured in recent years
have turned out to be more expensive to build than the Navy originally projected.⁴⁸
CBO believes the Navy is currently underestimating the procurement cost of
proposed ships.⁴⁹
In addition, as previously discussed, fully implementing the sea basing concept
will involve procuring connector ships as well as research and development work to
develop supporting sea basing technologies. The costs of these development and
procurement efforts are currently unclear, making it difficult to assess the potential
overall affordability of the sea basing concept.

⁴⁷ Geoff Fein, “Navy, Marine Corps Gaining Better Understanding of Sea Basing
Requirements,” Defense Daily, January 8, 2008.
⁴⁸ See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Improved
Management Practices Could Help Minimize Cost Growth in Navy Shipbuilding Programs.
(GAO-05-183, February 2005)
⁴⁹ See, for example, Congressional Budget Office, Resource Implications of the Navy’s
Fiscal Year 2008 Shipbuilding Plan, March 23, 2007, and CBO Testimony, Statement of
J. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director for National Security, and Eric J. Labs, Senior
Analyst, [on] The Navy’s 2008 Shipbuilding Plan and Key Ship Programs, before the
Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
House of Representatives, July 24, 2007.

Although sea basing offers potential advantages in terms of eliminating
vulnerable intermediate land bases, enabling higher-paced operations ashore, and
permitting more rapid reconstitution and redeployment of the expeditionary force,
uncertainty regarding the total potential cost to implement sea basing makes it
difficult to assess its potential cost-effectiveness compared to alternative concepts for
conducting future expeditionary operations ashore or compared to programs for
meeting other, unrelated defense priorities. Potential alternative concepts for
conducting future expeditionary operations include making improvements to today’s
capabilities for conducting amphibious operations and making improvements to
Army capabilities for inserting airborne forces.⁵⁰
Skeptics of the Navy’s plan for implementing the sea basing concept could
argue that the capability to be provided by the MPF(F) squadron is more than what
is needed for the Navy’s contribution to the global war on terrorism (GWOT), and
of uncertain relevance to U.S. participation in a conflict with China in the Taiwan
Strait area.⁵¹ Navy and Marine officials disagree with this view (see discussion
below).
Navy Perspective. Regarding the affordability of the MPF(F) squadron, the
February 2007 Navy report on the MPF(F) program states:
The MPF(F) squadron will be affordable over its lifecycle (research,
development, acquisition, operation and maintenance costs). Doctrine,
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) cost will be considered. Life cycle cost reduction will
be stressed in the development of the one new design, the MLP, to ensure long
term value to the Navy and Marine Corps.
The Navy’s independent cost estimating arm, NAVSEA Code 017, led all
AoA [Analysis of Alternatives] and post AoA cost analyses and produced all
comparative cost estimates using approved Navy and DoD cost estimating
practices. The threshold and objective values below represent a more affordable
prepositioned lift and delivery of warfighting capability than other alternatives⁵²
with the same or similar capability.
Navy and Marine Corps officials argue that seabasing is relevant to a spectrum
of potential future operations, ranging from humanitarian and disaster-relief
operations to stability operations and major combat operations (MCOs). In support
of this argument, they note the recent use of U.S. naval forces in providing disaster

⁵⁰ See also John P. Patch, “Sea Basing: Chasing the Dream,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, May 2005: 38-43.
⁵¹ For more discussion of these two issues, see CRS Report RS22373, Navy Role in Global
War on Terrorism (GWOT) — Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke,
and CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
⁵² Report to Congress, Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) [or] MPF(F) [Program],
op cit, p. 15.

relief following the December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean and Hurricane
Katrina along the U.S. Gulf Coast.⁵³
CBO Perspective. A November 2004 Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
report on the Navy’s amphibious and maritime prepositioning ship forces expressed
concerns about the Navy prospective ability to expressed concerns about the Navy’s
potential ability to afford desired numbers of both MPF(F) ships and ships for the
regular amphibious force.⁵⁴
A July 2007 CBO study compared the potential costs and capabilities of eight
alternatives for deploying and/or sustaining ground combat forces — the Navy’s
proposed MPF(F) squadron (referred to in the CBO report as Alternative E1) and
seven other approaches. The report states:
Five of the alternatives would include some form of a base at sea. The other three
would deliver forces and supplies by aircraft. To examine the potential benefits
of new technologies, four of the alternatives would develop new systems —
rotorcraft able to carry a greater payload of passengers and cargo and with a
longer range than existing rotorcraft, and large airships with greater payloads
than conventional aircraft.
The eight alternatives are grouped into two sets of four. The first group of
four (Alternatives E1 through E4) could both employ one brigade and sustain
two brigades; the second group of four (Alternatives S1 through S4) could only
sustain two brigades that were already in place. Although the alternatives are
generally structured to employ and/or sustain ground forces that are similar in
size, their specific capabilities would vary considerably.
CBO’s analysis of those alternatives points to several general conclusions.
— The planned MPF(F) would provide a capability similar to today’s
amphibious task forces but with improved responsiveness — a MEB-sized force
could be ready one to two weeks earlier for a conflict in the Persian Gulf or
Indian Ocean region — and with a much smaller logistics presence required
ashore.
— Alternative systems could provide lesser but still substantial improvements
in capability at a significantly lower cost than that of the MPF(F). For example,
although Alternative E3 (adding sea-based logistics to amphibious task forces)
would not improve response time, it would offer most of the logistics
improvements expected from the MPF(F) but at less than one-fifth of the cost.

⁵³ See, for example, Geoff Fein, “Relief Efforts In Gulf Demonstrate Sea Basing Capability,
CNO Says,” Inside the Navy, October 7, 2005; Nathan Hodge, “Marine Corps Commandant
Stumps For ‘Sea Basing’ Capability,” Defense Daily, August 19, 2005; John Liang, “Hagee:
Seabasing Can Contribute To More Than Just Combat Ops,” Inside the Navy, August 15,

2005.

⁵⁴ U.S. Congressional Budget Office, The Future of the Navy’s Amphibious and Maritime
Prepositioning Force, November 2004, pp. xiii-xv. See also Aarti Shah, “Unclear Seabasing
Concept, High Costs Worry Military Officials,” Inside the Navy, February 14, 2005.

— Achieving greater capabilities than those currently envisioned for the MPF(F)
would probably require significantly higher investment — either larger numbers
of systems or new, more capable, and therefore more expensive systems.
The alternatives examined by CBO in this study would satisfy the primary
objectives of the third and/or fourth of the [Joint Chiefs of Staff Sea Basing Joint
Integrating Concept’s, or JIC’s] lines of operation (employment and sustainment,
respectively). Alternatives E1 through E4 are structured to provide a
ship-to-shore delivery capacity sufficient to employ a Marine expeditionary
brigade in 8 to 10 hours and to deliver enough supplies per day by aircraft to
support the MEB plus an Army light brigade. Alternatives S1 through S4 are
structured to deliver enough supplies per day by aircraft to sustain those two
types of brigades. The extent to which the alternatives meet the performance⁵⁵
objectives for the JIC’s other lines of operation varies.
CSBA Perspective. Robert Work of CSBA characterized sea basing in 2004
as “a rich man’s approach to solving the [access denial] problem.”⁵⁶ In his November
2006 report on sea basing, Work states that seabasing programs
are being conceived of and pursued long before the full range of desired and
possible joint seabasing capabilities have been adequately explored and debated.
The end result: current seabasing plans are rather narrowly focused on two rather
limited capabilities — landing a single brigade on a hostile shore in 11 to 17 days
from the “go” order, and thereafter providing seabased logistical support for two
early entry brigades until follow-on joint forces arrive.
It is true that these two key capabilities reflect the “top level requirements”
identified in the aforementioned Seabasing JIC. However, these two capabilities
reflect a view of seabasing that rests upon questionable assumptions and⁵⁷
analysis.
Potential Oversight Questions. Potential oversight and policy questions
for Congress include the following:
^!If the procurement costs of the new-construction ships in the
proposed MPF(F) squadron turn out to be higher than the Navy
estimates, how might this affect the affordability of the sea basing
concept?
^!When does DOD intend to present to Congress an estimate of the
potential total cost to fully implement all aspects of the sea basing
concept? How does the current absence of such an estimate affect
Congress’s ability to assess the potential affordability of sea basing
or its potential cost effectiveness compared to potential alternatives

⁵⁵ Congressional Budget Office, Sea Basing and Alternatives for Deploying and Sustaining
Ground Forces, July 2007: ix.
⁵⁶ As quoted in Otto Kreisher, “Sea Basing,” Air Force Magazine, July 2004. Material in
brackets as in the article.
⁵⁷ Thinking About Seabasing: All Ahead, Slow, op. cit., p. iv.

for conducting future expeditionary operations ashore or compared
to programs for meeting other defense priorities?
^!What is the potential applicability of the capability to be provided by
the MPF(F) squadron to the GWOT or to other potential conflict or
non-conflict scenarios?
^!Would an ability to employ one surface Marine battalion and one
vertical Marine battalion from a sea base in a period of 8 to 10 hours
be worth the cost to field this capability? What are the potential
costs and merits of alternatives to sea basing for conducting future
expeditionary operations ashore? How do land bases and sea bases
compare in terms of vulnerability to attack and cost to defend against
potential attacks of various kinds?
^!What other defense programs might need to be reduced to finance
the implementation of sea basing?
^!What are the potential operational risks of not implementing sea
basing?
Relationship to Global Fleet Station (GFS) Concept
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Global Fleet Station
(GFS) concept and its relationship to the form of sea basing to be implemented with
the planned MPF(F) squadron. Potential oversight questions for Congress include
the following:
^!Since the Navy has stated that each of a potential total of five GFSs
might be built around an LPD- or LSD-type amphibious ship, or
around a high-speed vessel (HSV), how might implementing the
GFS concept affect planned deployments and force-structure
requirements for these kinds of ships?
^!What is the relationship between the GFS concept and the form of
sea basing to be implemented with the MPF(F) squadron? Can the
GFS concept be viewed as “sea basing light”? How might the
existence of up to five GFSs in various regions affect requirements
for the planned MPF(F) squadron, or for the ships that are to make
up that squadron? Is the Navy proposing the GFS with the partial
aim or hope that the concept will eventually take the place in Navy
planning of the MPF(F)-based notion of sea basing?
Coordination with Other Services on Sea Basing
Regarding interservice coordination in the development of sea basing, the
February 2007 Navy report on the MPF(F) program states:
Joint Force requirements are included and validated via the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process. The MPF(F)
CDD [Capability Development Document] has been introduced and fully vetted

to the Joint community within JCIDS, which will result in a Joint Requirement
Oversight Council (JROC) review in March 2007. Additionally, the MPF(F)
CDD provides traceability to the emerging Seabasing concept, and to associated
capability gaps. The Seabasing Capabilities Based Assessment Functional Needs⁵⁸
Assessment has identified capability gaps (JROC approved November 6, 2006).
A January 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report states:
While DOD has taken action to establish a joint seabasing capability, it has
not developed a comprehensive management approach to guide and assess joint
seabasing. GAO’s prior work showed that sound management practices for
developing capabilities include involving top leadership, dedicating an
implementation team, and establishing a communications strategy. DOD is
developing a joint seabasing concept and various DOD organizations are
sponsoring seabasing initiatives. However, DOD has not provided sufficient
leadership to guide joint seabasing development and service initiatives are
outpacing DOD’s analysis of joint requirements. DOD also has not established
an implementation team to provide day-to-day management to ensure joint
seabasing receives the focused attention needed so that efforts are effective and
coordinated. Also, DOD has not fully developed a communications strategy that
shares information among the organizations involved in seabasing. Without a
comprehensive management approach containing these elements, DOD may be
unable to coordinate activities and minimize redundancy among service
initiatives.
DOD has not developed a joint experimentation campaign plan, although
many seabasing experimentation activities — including war games, modeling
and simulation, and live demonstrations — have taken place across the services,
combatant commands, and other defense entities. No overarching joint seabasing
experimentation plan exists to guide these efforts because the U.S. Joint Forces
Command has not taken the lead in coordinating joint seabasing experimentation,
although it has been tasked with developing a biennial joint experimentation
campaign plan for future joint concepts. While the U.S. Joint Forces Command
is in the process of developing the plan, it is unclear the extent to which this plan
will address joint seabasing or will be able to guide joint seabasing
experimentation efforts. Without a plan to direct experimentation, DOD and the
services’ ability to evaluate solutions, coordinate efforts, and disseminate results
could be compromised.
While service development efforts tied to seabasing are approaching
milestones for investment decisions, it is unclear when DOD will complete
development of total ownership cost estimates for a range of joint seabasing
options. Joint seabasing is going through a capabilities-based assessment process
that is intended to produce preliminary cost estimates for seabasing options.
However, DOD has not yet begun the specific study that will identify potential
approaches, including changes to doctrine and training as well as material
solutions, and produce preliminary cost estimates. DOD officials expect the
study will not be complete for a year or more. Meanwhile, the services are
actively pursuing a variety of seabasing initiatives, some of which are
approaching milestones which will guide future program investments. Until total

⁵⁸ Report to Congress, Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) [or] MPF(F) [Program],
op cit, p. 16.

ownership cost estimates for joint seabasing options are developed and made
transparent to DOD and Congress, decision makers will not be able to evaluate⁵⁹
the cost-effectiveness of individual service initiatives.
Robert Work’s November 2006 report on sea basing states that
under no circumstances should seabasing be viewed as a naval concept that
“enables” joint operations. As a maritime concept and key component of
emerging forms of joint littoral warfare marked by the widespread use of guided
weapons, seabasing initiatives should be prioritized and pursued by a joint
organization. Therefore, the 2004 decision by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) not to stand up a Joint Project Office for Seabasing and to
instead consign the concept to the new Joint Concept Integration and
Development System process was a serious mistake — one only compounded by
assigning the Navy to be the lead agent for the Seabasing [Joint Integrating
Concept]....
[Observations developed throughout this report] suggest that OSD should
order a thorough zero baseline review of the joint seabasing concept. This review
should take its basic guidance from the 2005 National Defense Strategy and the
2005/06 Quadrennial Defense Review. These two documents provide guidance
that is broad enough to facilitate a thorough and independent zero baseline
seabasing review that is free of any preconceived notions or concepts. In this
regard, while such a review should consider all concept work and program
definitions to date, it is important that the review be in no way constrained by
them. In this regard, OSD should not make the same mistake it made in 2002,
when it directed the Defense Science Task Force on Seabasing to use an existing
naval seabasing concept as its start point. It should instead direct the group
conducting the review — either a newly formed Joint Project Office on
Seabasing or a group composed of retired Combatant Commanders — to start
from a clean sheet of paper, and to recommend the seabasing program with the⁶⁰
highest joint payoff in the 21st century.
An October 2005 press article stated:
Cultural differences between the services are one of the stumbling blocks
holding up development of the U.S. Navy’s new Sea Basing concept, a former
officer told a group of industry representatives here last week.
Greg Cook, a U.S. Air Force colonel who retired in August after working
to develop Sea Basing plans and concepts for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the
“roles-and-missions debate” centered on how different services and commands
viewed the idea of a squadron of large ships gathered as an operating base about

100 miles off an enemy shore.

⁵⁹ Government Accountability Office, Force Structure[:] Joint Seabasing Would Benefit
from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Experimentation before
Services Spend Billions on New Capabilities, GAO-07-211, January 2007.
⁶⁰ Thinking About Seabasing: All Ahead, Slow, op. cit., p. iv-v, vi.

“If the Army operates from the sea, isn’t that what the Marines do?” Cook
asked an audience gathered here Oct. 26 to discuss future naval planning. “If the
Air Force operates from the sea, isn’t that what the Navy does?”
Cook said the services view the Sea Basing concept in light of their own
traditional missions. The Army looks at the idea as allowing for faster and
greater strategic access via the high-speed, shallow-draft connectors to transfer
troops, vehicles and gear between the ships and shore.
The Air Force doesn’t see the concept as supporting its core competencies
and is concerned about costs, said Cook, a former pilot for that service’s Air
Mobility Command.
“The Air Force is not that excited” about the idea, he said.
The Navy, he said, looks at Sea Basing as “a foundation of strategic access
and power projection,” but the Marine Corps is looking at it simply as a faster
means to deliver a Marine Expeditionary Brigade to the fight.
Special Operations Command sees it as a “high-speed mothership for rapid
access,” while joint commanders have a wider view, regarding it as a mobile base
that provides options and flexibility that increases global presence and provides
strategic access.
“These things have to be worked out,” Cook said. The question of who⁶¹
should operate the ships is another issue, he said.
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
^!To what degree, if any, does the Navy-Marine Corps concept for sea
basing conflict with emerging Army or Air Force concepts of
operation for conducting future expeditionary operations? Are the
Navy and Marine Corps taking potential Army, Air Force, and
Special Operations Command requirements sufficiently into account
in developing the sea basing concept?
^!How might the Army’s new plan for reorganizing itself into
modular, brigade-sized entities called units of action (UAs)⁶² affect,
or be affected by, the sea basing concept? How might the Army’s
plans for procuring its own next-generation sealift ships affect, or be
affected by, the sea basing concept?
^!Should OSD order a review of the seabasing concept by a newly
formed joint project office on seabasing or a group composed or

⁶¹ Christopher P. Cavas, “‘Cultural Differences’ Slow USN Sea Basing Progress,”
DefenseNews.com, October 31, 2005.
⁶² For more on this plan, see CRS Report RL32476, U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues
for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.

retired combatant commanders, as suggested by the 2006 CSBA
report?
Legislative Activity for FY2008
FY2008 Budget Request
LPD-17 Program. The Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget requests $1,398.3
million in procurement funding a ninth San Antonio (LPD-17) amphibious ship to
be procured in FY2008. The Navy estimates the total procurement cost of this ship
at $1,798.3 million. The ship received $296.2 million in FY2008 advance
procurement funding, and the Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget calls for the final
$103.2 million of the ship’s procurement cost to be provided in FY2009 as a
“program closeout” cost. Although the Navy’s proposed force of 31 amphibious
ships includes 10 LPD-17 class ships, the Navy is proposing in its FY2008 budget
to end LPD-17 procurement with the ninth ship.
LHA-6/LHA(R) Program. The Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget also requests
$1,377.4 million in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of LHA-
6, a large-deck amphibious assault ship that was procured in FY2007 using split
funding (a two-year form of incremental funding) in FY2007 and FY2008. The Navy
estimates the total procurement cost of LHA-6 at $2,806.2 million.
TAKE Program. The Administration’s proposed FY2008 defense budget
requests $1,044.2 million for the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF). Included
in this request is $456.1 million for a “regular” Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class dry
cargo ship to be used a Navy auxiliary (rather than as part of the MPF(F) squadron).
Navy FY2008 Unfunded Priorities List (UPL). The Navy’s FY2008
unfunded programs list (UPL) — a list of programs that the Navy desires but which
are not funded in the Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget — includes, as its top item,
an additional LPD-17 at an estimated cost of about $1,700 million, and, as its second
item, two modified TAKE-1 class ships for the MPF(F) squadron, at an estimated
combined cost of about $1,200 million. These two TAKEs are currently scheduled
for procurement in FY2009 and FY2010.
FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1585/S. 1547)
House. The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 110-146
of May 11, 2007) on H.R. 1585, recommended approving the Navy’s FY2008 request
for procurement funding in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN)
appropriation account for the LPD-17 and LHA-6 programs, and also recommended
adding $1,700 to the SCN account for the procurement of an additional LPD-17. The
report states:
The committee understands that a tenth [LPD-17 class] ship is the top
priority on the Chief of Naval Operations’ unfunded priority list. The committee

recognizes that authorizing a tenth ship of this class would allow the Marine
Corps to more fully meet its requirement for amphibious assault.
The committee recommends $1.4 billion for the [LPD-17 class] ship
contained in the budget request and recommends an increase of $1.7 billion, to
include advance procurement, for the construction of an additional San Antonio
[i.e., LPD-17 class] class amphibious assault ship. (Page 79)
According to the committee’s press release on its markup of H.R. 1585, the
markup also recommends an increase of $456 million for the procurement of an
additional TAKE-1 class dry cargo ship.⁶³ Section 302 of the House-reported version
of H.R. 1585 recommends authorizing a total of $1,535.2 million for the National
Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) — an increase of $456 million over the requested
amount. The NDSF is the part of the DOD budget in which TAKE-1 class ships are
procured. The committee’s press release states:
The Committee understands that accelerating the construction of the T-
AKE class of vessels would more fully support the Maritime Prepositioning
Force, Future (MPF(F)) concept and notes that acceleration of this ship class is
the Chief of Naval Operations number two priority on his Unfunded Priority⁶⁴
List.
Senate. The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 110-77
of June 5, 2007) on S. 1547, recommended approving the Navy’s FY2008 request for
procurement funding in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation
account for the LPD-17 and LHA-6 programs.
Regarding planned numbers of amphibious ships and the option of procuring a
tenth LPD-17 class ship, the report states:
The budget request for fiscal year 2008 included funding for the ninth ship
of the USS San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship program. The Secretary
of the Navy’s 2007 report to Congress on the long-range plan for construction of
naval vessels calls for a “below threshold” expeditionary warfare force.
Specifically, the plan would reduce expeditionary force size, including a
reduction in the LPD-17 class from a total of 12 to 9 ships. The committee is
concerned that this plan does not provide the total number of amphibious ships
needed to support the Department of the Navy’s two Marine Expeditionary
Brigade lift requirements for forcible entry operations. In testimony before
Congress in fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007, Marine Corps leadership stated
that a class of 10 LPD-17 ships was required to meet Marine Corps forcible entry
requirements, with acceptable risk. The Chief of Naval Operations has identified
procurement of a tenth LPD-17 ship in 2008 as the Navy’s top unfunded priority.
The committee is aware that construction for a tenth LPD-17 ship would
not commence until fiscal year 2009, but delaying procurement beyond 2009
would cause significant cost growth and jeopardize industrial base stability by

⁶³ House Armed Services Committee press release, “House Armed Services Committee
Approves Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Authorization Bill,” May 9, 2007, p. 20.
⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 38.

introducing production breaks in the program. Therefore, the committee directs
the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report not later than November 1, 2007,
that outlines the funding required for a “smart buy” of LPD-26, maintaining
continuous, uninterrupted production at critical vendors’ and shipbuilders’
facilities. (Page 134)
Regarding MPF(F) ships, particularly the LHA(R), and the National Defense
Sealift Fund (NDSF), the report states:
The fiscal year 2008 budget request included $96.6 million within the
National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) for various research and development
activities, including $67.8 million for the Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future), MPF(F). This amount includes $4.9 million for amphibious assault
replacement ships which are to be assigned to the MPF(F), designated MPF(F)
LHA(R).
The Navy’s concept for MPF(F) operations indicates that these ships will
be multi-mission vessels capable of afloat prepositioning, sea basing operations
in support of amphibious assault, and routine operations in support of lesser
contingencies. MPF(F) ships are planned to be operated by a Military Sealift
Command crew. However, the MPF(F) concept of operations differs sharply
from current maritime prepositioning ships as a result of the MPF(F) contribution
to the Navy’s sea basing capability.
The MPF(F) role to embark and deploy marines ashore while sustaining
expeditionary warfare operations potentially exposes these ships and embarked
marines to hostile fire. The Navy plans to protect the MPF(F) ships through
employment of the naval “sea shield,” and therefore the Navy does not plan to
outfit MPF(F) ships with self defense features. The committee has expressed
concern regarding the Navy’s MPF(F) survivability concept and, in particular,
the Navy’s proposal to eliminate the self defense features for the MPF(F)
LHA(R). The restoration of the ship’s combat system would allow the MPF(F)
LHA(R) to fill current shortfalls to the Navy’s forcible entry lift capability.
The committee is aware that the Department of the Navy is continuing to
review the military features for the MPF(F), and that the Navy expects to present
the program plan to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) later in
fiscal year 2007. Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to
submit a report to the congressional defense committees within 30 days of the
JROC MPF(F) decision outlining the findings of the JROC. The report shall
include a detailed vulnerability assessment of MPF(F) for major combat
operations.
The committee has been advised by the Navy that the Department of the
Navy will need to rephase into fiscal year 2009 certain MPF(F) research and
development efforts. Therefore, the committee recommends a decrease of $30.0
million for MPF(F) research and development. Furthermore, the committee does
not agree with funding development and procurement for amphibious assault
ships within the NDSF.
This ship type is specifically not included within the scope of sealift vessels
eligible for NDSF, defined within section 2218 of title 10, United States Code.
Therefore, the committee recommends a decrease of $4.9 million in PE 48042N,
and a corresponding increase of $4.9 million in PE 64567N for MPF(F) LHA(R).

The committee recommends a total authorization of $32.9 million in PE

48042N for MPF(F). (Page 429)

Conference. The conference report (H.Rept. 110-477 of December 6, 2007)
on H.R. 1585 states:
The Senate report (S.Rept. 110-77) accompanying the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (S. 1547) contained direction for the
Navy to maintain decommissioned LHA — 1 class amphibious assault ships in
a reduced operating status until such time that the active fleet could deliver 2.0
Marine Expeditionary Brigade forcible entry lift capability in response to a
national emergency. Total forcible lift entry capability was to be assessed under
the assumption that no less than 10 percent of the force will be unavailable due
to extended duration maintenance availabilities.
The conferees agree with the intent of this provision. The conferees
understand that the Navy’s preferred method of meeting this intent would be to
retain decommissioned LHA-1 class amphibious assault ships in a mobilization
category B status.
The conferees agree to direct the Navy to: (1) maintain these ships in
mobilization category B status until such time that the active fleet could deliver
2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade forcible entry lift capability in response to a
national emergency; and (2) assess total forcible lift entry capability under the
assumption that no less than 10 percent of the force will be unavailable due to
extended duration maintenance availabilities. (Pages 981-982)
FY2008 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3222/P.L. 110-116)
House. The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 110-279
of July 30, 2007) on H.R. 3222, recommended reducing by $7 million the Navy’s
FY2008 SCN funding request for the ninth LPD-17 — the LPD-17 that the Navy
requested for procurement in FY2008. Of the $7 million reduction, $5 million was
for C4ISR equipment on the ship, and $2 million was for a guided missile launch
system on the ship. (Page 226)
The committee also recommended an additional $1,700 million in the SCN
account for the procurement of an additional (i.e., tenth) LPD-17. Taking into
account the recommended $7 million reduction for the ninth LPD-17, the committee
recommended a net increase of $1,693 million to the LPD-17 program for FY2008.
(Page 226)
The committee’s report recommended reducing by $2 million the Navy’s
FY2008 SCN funding request for the LHA(R) program. The $2 million reduction
is for the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system on the ship. (Page 226)
The Administration’s budget requested $456.1 million in the National Defense
Sealift Fund (NDSF) for the procurement of a final “regular” TAKE-1 class cargo
ship for use as a Navy auxiliary. The committee’s report recommended $1,866.1
million NDSF for the procurement of four TAKEs — an increase of $1,400 million

and three ships over the requested amount. The additional three TAKEs are to be for
the MPF(F) squadron, which is to include three TAKEs. (Page 390)
Regarding the LPD-17 and TAKE programs, the committee’s report stated that
the Committee believes that more stability can be gained in the shipbuilding
program by increasing the throughput of ships with proven design and
construction processes. Therefore, funding is being added to the request for an
additional LPD-17 amphibious transport dock ship, three additional T-AKE dry
cargo/ammunition ships (which will buy out the requirement for the Maritime
Pre-positioned Force (Future)), and advance procurement for a Virginia Class
attack submarine. (Page 227)
Regarding the LPD-17 program, the report stated:
The request includes $1,398,922,000 for the procurement of the ninth San
Antonio Class (LPD-17) Amphibious Transport Dock Ship. This ship is the final
LPD-17 class ship that the Navy has in the budget. The Committee notes that the
313 ship fleet that the Navy has stated as a goal requires ten San Antonio Class
ships and that this tenth ship was the highest priority listed on the Navy’s
unfunded priority list. In an effort to achieve stability in the Navy’s shipbuilding
program by increasing throughput and helping the Navy meet its stated
requirement for LPD-17 Class ships, the Committee provides an additional
$1,700,000,000 for the procurement of a tenth San Antonio Class Amphibious
Transport Dock Ship. (Page 228)
Regarding the TAKE program, the report stated:
The Lewis and Clark Class of Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ships (T-AKE) will
provide logistic lift capability as a shuttle ship from supply sources to ships at
sea. The request includes $456,110,000 for the acquisition of the eleventh Lewis
and Clark Class T-AKE Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ship. In an effort to provide
stability to the Navy’s shipbuilding program by increasing throughput, the
Committee provides $1,866,110,000 for the procurement of 3 additional T-AKE
ships, which is $1,410,000,000 above the request. In addition to providing
stability, this effort satisfies the second highest priority on the Navy’s unfunded
priority list. This increase will allow the Navy to buy out the T-AKE requirement
for the Maritime Pre-positioned Force (Future) while at the same time promoting
stability to the construction yard and sub-vendors and achieving volume
efficiencies. (Page 390)
Senate. The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 110-155
of September 14, 2007) on H.R. 3222, recommended approving the Navy’s request
for FY2008 procurement funding for the LPD-17 and LHA-6 programs. The
committee’s report states:
The Committee fully supports the CNO’s [Chief of Naval Operations’] goal
of a 313 ship Navy as a minimum requirement for the Nation. The Committee,
however, has serious concerns with the Navy’s ability to deliver on the current
shipbuilding program of record. The Navy’s track record for building ships on
time and on budget has not been good. The Government Accountability Office
(GAO) has recently pointed out that the ships under construction at the beginning
of the current fiscal year have experienced cumulative cost growth of almost

$5,000,000,000 above their original budgets. Significant cost growth, schedule
delay, or both have occurred in the LPD-17 program, Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS) program, the T-AKE program, as well as the next-generation destroyer
and aircraft carrier programs. While supportive of additional funding for
shipbuilding, the Committee is very concerned that accelerating any of the
current shipbuilding programs is unexecutable and would have the effect of just
“banking” funds.
Naval shipbuilding has been plagued with too frequent design changes,
requirements creep, poor cost estimating, and poor government performance in
program management and contractor oversight. Under staffing of critical
government oversight functions has also been a major problem for the Navy. The
Committee believes that the acquisition changes proposed by current Navy
leadership is movement in the right direction, however, the Committee would
like to see some positive results in cost, schedule and performance of the current
program of record before supporting significant increases to the shipbuilding
account. (Page 133)
Conference. The conference report (H.Rept. 110-434 of November 6, 2007)
on H.R. 3222/P.L. 110-116 of November 13, 2007, reduced by $7 million the Navy’s
FY2008 SCN funding request for the ninth LPD-17 — the LPD-17 that the Navy
requested for procurement in FY2008. Of the $7 million reduction, $5 million was
for C4ISR equipment on the ship, and $2 million was for a guided missile launch
system on the ship.
The conference report also provided an additional $50 million in the SCN
account for the procurement in a future fiscal year of an additional (i.e., 10^th) LPD-17.
Taking into account the $7-million reduction for the ninth LPD-17, the conference
report provided a net increase of $43 million to the LPD-17 program for FY2008.
(Page 189)
The conference report reduced by $2 million the Navy’s FY2008 SCN funding
request for the LHA(R) program. The $2 million reduction is for the Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC) system on the ship. (Page 189)
The Administration’s budget requested $456.1 million in the National Defense
Sealift Fund (NDSF) for the procurement of a final “regular” TAKE-1 class cargo
ship for use as a Navy auxiliary. The conference report approved this request and
provided an additional $300 million in funding “for advance procurement of long-
lead time material and advance construction activities” for three other TAKEs that
the administration currently plans to procure in FY2009-FY2011. These three other
TAKEs are intended for the MPF(F) squadron. The conference report stated that the
$300 million in additional funding is “to support economic order quantity purchases
of materials in fiscal year 2008 that could yield additional savings and reduce
pressure on the outyear shipbuilding budget.” (Page 350)