Labor Union Certification Procedures: Use of Secret Ballots and Card Checks

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA) gives private sector workers the right to join
or form a labor union and to bargain collectively over wages, hours, and other working
conditions. An issue before Congress is whether to change the procedures under which a union is
certified as the bargaining representative of a union chosen by a majority of workers.
Under current law, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) conducts a secret ballot election
when a petition is filed requesting one. A petition can be filed by a union, worker, or employer.
Workers or a union may request an election if at least 30% of workers have signed a petition or
authorization cards (i.e., cards authorizing a union to represent them). The NLRA does not require
secret ballot elections. An employer may voluntarily recognize a union if a majority of workers
have signed authorization cards.
Legislation was introduced in the 110^th Congress that, if enacted, would have changed current
union certification procedures. The Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 800 and S. 1041,
would require the NLRB to certify a union if a majority of employees sign authorization cards.
The Secret Ballot Protection Act, H.R. 866, would require secret ballot elections for union
certification.
Proponents of both measures sometimes use similar language to support their positions.
Employers argue that, under card check certification, workers may be pressured or coerced into
signing authorization cards and may only hear the union’s point of view. Unions argue that,
during an election campaign, employers may pressure or coerce workers into voting against a
union. Supporters of secret ballot elections argue that casting a secret ballot is private and
confidential. Unions argue that, during an election campaign, employers have greater access to
workers. Unions argue that card check certification is less costly than a secret ballot election.
Employers maintain that unionization may be more costly to workers, because union members
must pay dues and higher union wages may result in fewer union jobs.
Requiring card check certification may increase the level of unionization, while requiring secret
ballot elections may decrease it. Research suggests that, where card check recognition is required,
unions undertake more union drives and the union success rate is higher. The union success rate is
also greater where card check recognition is combined with a neutrality agreement (i.e., an
agreement where the employer agrees to remain neutral during a union organizing campaign).
To the extent that requiring secret ballot elections or requiring certification when a majority of
employees sign authorization cards would affect the level of unionization, the economic effects
may depend on how well labor markets fit the model of perfect competition. Requiring card
check certification may improve worker benefits and reduce earnings inequality—if more
workers are unionized. Requiring secret ballot elections may increase inequality in
compensation—if fewer workers are unionized. This report will be updated as issues warrant.

Legislation in the 110^th Congress....................................................................................................1
The National Labor Relations Act...................................................................................................3
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).................................................................................4
Organizing Campaign Rules.....................................................................................................4
Employers ...................................................................................................................... ..... 4
Employees ...................................................................................................................... ..... 5
Union Organizers................................................................................................................5
Unfair Labor Practices..............................................................................................................5
Employers ...................................................................................................................... ..... 6
Unions ................................................................................................................................. 6
Reme dies ....................................................................................................................... ...... 6
Union Certification and Recognition...............................................................................................8
Secret Ballot Elections..............................................................................................................8
Number of NLRB Elections..............................................................................................10
First Contract Agreements Following Certification.................................................................11
Voluntary Card Check Recognition.........................................................................................12
Neutrality Agreements......................................................................................................13
Corporate Campaigns........................................................................................................13
Number of Voluntary Recognitions..................................................................................14
Bargaining Orders...................................................................................................................14
Certification Versus Recognition............................................................................................15
Withdrawal of Recognition.....................................................................................................16
Joy Silk Doctrine.....................................................................................................................16
NLRB Review of Voluntary Recognition...............................................................................16
The United Auto Workers (UAW) and the Dana and Metaldyne Corporations................17
Shaw’s Supermarkets and the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW)
Union ............................................................................................................................. 17
NLRB Review of Withdrawal of Recognition........................................................................18
Potential Effects of Changes in Union Certification Procedures...................................................19
Research Findings...................................................................................................................19
Is There an Economic Rationale for Protecting the Rights of Workers to Organize and
Bargain Collectively?.................................................................................................................23
Government Intervention in Labor Markets............................................................................23
Distribution of Earnings..........................................................................................................24
Collective Voice......................................................................................................................24
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 25
Figure 1. Unfair Labor Practice Charges, Fiscal Years 1970-2007................................................8

Table 1. Number of Representation Elections Conducted by the NLRB, FY1994-FY2007........10
Table 2. First Contract Agreements Following Certification..........................................................11
Table 3. Number of Voluntary Recognitions in Which the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service (FMCS) Provided Assistance for Initial Contracts, FY1996-
FY2004 ....................................................................................................................................... 14
Table 4. Common Arguments Made by Proponents of Requiring Card Check Certification
and Requiring Secret Ballots......................................................................................................20
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................25

he National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), as amended, gives private sector
workers the right to join or form a labor union and to bargain collectively over wages, ¹
hours, and other conditions of employment. The act also requires employers to bargain in T

good faith with a union chosen by a majority of employees. An issue before Congress is whether
to change the procedures under which a union is certified as the bargaining representative of a
union chosen by a majority of workers.
Legislation was introduced in the 110^th Congress that, if enacted, would have changed existing ^th
union certification procedures. Similar legislation is expected to be introduced in the 111 ^th
Congress. This report summarizes legislation introduced in the 110 Congress. The report then
reviews the rights and responsibilities of workers and employers under the NLRA and the
different ways that workers may form or join a union. Next, the report analyzes the potential
effects of changes in union certification procedures. Finally, the report considers whether there is
an economic rationale for protecting the rights of workers to organize and bargain collectively.

H.R. 800, the Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, would require the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) to certify a union if a majority of employees in a bargaining unit sign ²
authorization cards designating the union as their bargaining representative. If less than a
majority, but at least 30%, of employees sign authorization cards, a secret ballot election may be
held. (See the section on “Secret Ballot Elections” later in this report.)
H.R. 800 would also establish procedures for reaching a first contract agreement. Within 10 days
(or a longer period if agreed to by both the union and employer) after receiving a request to begin
bargaining, the employer and union must meet to begin negotiations over an initial contract
agreement. If the employer and union cannot reach an agreement within 90 days after bargaining
has begun (or a longer period if agreed to by both parties), either party may request mediation by
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS). If an agreement cannot be reached
within 30 days through mediation (or a longer period if agreed to by both parties), the dispute
would be subject to binding arbitration. The legislation would increase the penalties for employer
violations of certain unfair labor practices committed during a union organizing campaign or
during negotiation of a first contract. H.R. 800 was introduced by Representative George Miller ³
on February 5, 2007, and referred to the House Committee on Education and Labor. A hearing on

¹^T^h^e^N^L^R^A^is^a^l^s^o^k^now^{n a}^s^the^W^a^gⁿ^e^r^A^c^{t, a}^f^te^r^Se^na^tor^R^obe^r^t^W^a^gⁿ^e^r^of^New^Y^o^r^k^w^{ho s}^p^ons^or^e^d^t^h^e^bil^lⁱⁿ^the
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^Rep^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^v^es.
²^T^h^{is se}^c^{tion use}^s^te^rm^{s a}^{nd re}^f^e^r^s^{to a}^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^—e^.g^{., c}^e^r^tif^ic^a^tion,^re^c^o^gⁿ^ition^,^ba^rg^aⁱⁿⁱ^ng^un^it,^unf^aⁱ^{r la}^bor^pra^c^tic^e^s^,
^Na^tiona^{l L}^a^{bor Re}^la^ti^{ons B}^o^a^r^{d (}^N^L^{RB), a}^{nd Fe}^de^ra^{l Me}^dia^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^{nd C}^onc^ilia^ti^on^Se^rv^ic^e^(FMCS)^—tha^{t a}^r^e^de^sc^ribe^d
^la^te^{r in t}^h^{is re}^p^o^rt.
^Aⁿ^a^u^thor^iz^a^tio^{n c}^a^r^{d m}^a^y^s^e^r^v^e^m^o^r^e^thaⁿ^one^pur^pos^e^.^A^sⁱ^ng^le^-^pur^pos^e^c^a^r^{d a}^u^t^hor^iz^e^s^the^uⁿ^ioⁿ^{to r}^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^t^the
^e^m^p^l^o^y^e^e^si^gnⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e card}^.^A^d^u^a^l^-^p^u^r^p^o^s^{e card}^requ^est^s^an^el^ectⁱ^oⁿ^an^{d d}^e^si^gn^at^{es t}^h^e^uⁿⁱ^oⁿ^{as t}^h^e^e^m^p^l^o^y^e^e^s’
^b^a^rgaiⁿⁱⁿ^g^rep^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^v^e.^T^h^{e NL}^RB^m^a^{y n}^o^tⁱ^ssu^{e a}^b^a^rgaiⁿⁱⁿ^g^o^r^d^e^{r (see “Bargai}ⁿⁱⁿ^{g Ord}^e^{rs” l}^a^t^e^{r i}ⁿ^t^hⁱ^s^repo^rt^{) i}^f
^a^uni^on^us^e^s^dua^l-^pur^pos^e^c^a^r^ds^.^D^u^a^l^-^pur^pos^e^c^a^r^ds^c^o^uldⁱⁿ^dic^a^t^e^tha^t^a^m^a^jor^ity^o^f^em^ploy^e^e^s^w^a^{nt a}ⁿ^e^l^e^c^tio^n,^bu^t
^not^tha^t^a^m^a^jor^ity^of^em^plo^y^ee^s^w^a^{nt to be}^r^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^te^d^by^a^unioⁿ^.^C^o^m^m^e^r^ce^C^l^e^a^r^ing^H^ous^e^,^L^abo^{r L}^a^w^Rep^o^r^ter:^rd
^Lab^o^{r Re}^la^tio^ns^(Chic^a^g^{o: CCH}^Iⁿ^c^{., 2}⁰⁰⁷^{), ¶}³⁰⁴²^{. Br}^uc^e^{S. Fe}^l^d^a^c^k^e^r,^Labor^G^u^ide^t^o^L^a^b^o^r^L^a^w^{, 3}^e^d^.
⁽^E^ng^le^w^{ood C}^lif^f^s^{, N}^.^J^.^{: P}^r^eⁿ^tic^e^H^a^{ll, 19}⁹⁰⁾^{, p}^.⁷²^{. (}^H^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^c^ite^{d a}^s^Fe^lda^c^k^e^r^,^Lab^o^r^G^u^ide^t^o^Lab^o^r^L^a^w^.)
³^Re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^Ge^org^e^Mille^{r, “}^I^ntro^duc^ti^on^of^{H.R. 8}⁰⁰^,^T^h^e^Em^ploy^e^e^Fre^e^Choic^e^A^c^t,”^C^ongr^e^s^sⁱ^onal^Re^c^o^r^d^,
^v^o^{l. 1}^53,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{5, 20}^07,^p.^E2^60.

the legislation was held on February 8, 2007, by the House Subcommittee on Health, ⁴
Employment, Labor, and Pensions. The Committee on Education and Labor approved the bill on ⁵
February 14, 2007, by a vote of 26 to 19. The full House approved the measure on March 1,

2007, by a vote of 241 to 185.

S. 1041, the Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, was introduced in the Senate on March 29, 2007
by Senator Edward Kennedy. The bill was referred to the Committee on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions (HELP). Hearings on the legislation were held in the Senate on March 27, ⁶
2007. On June 26, 2007, the Senate voted to consider H.R. 800. By a vote of 51 in favor and 48
opposed, the Senate fell 9 votes short of the 60 needed to end debate and proceed to a vote on the
legislation.
H.R. 866, the Secret Ballot Protection Act, would require a secret ballot election for union
certification. The bill would make it an unfair labor practice for an employer to recognize or
bargain with a union that has not been selected by a majority of employees in a secret ballot
election conducted by the NLRB. It would also be an unfair labor practice for a union to cause or
attempt to cause an employer to recognize or bargain with a union that has not been chosen by a
majority of employees in a secret ballot election. H.R. 866 was introduced by the late
Representative Charlie Norwood on February 7, 2007 and was referred to the House Committee ⁷
on Education and Labor. Senator Jim DeMint introduced S. 1312, the Secret Ballot Protection ⁸
Act of 2007 in the Senate on May 7, 2007.
On March 1, 2007, during floor debate on H.R. 800, Representative Howard “Buck” McKeon
offered an amendment that would have substituted H.R. 866 for H.R. 800. The amendment failed
by a vote of 173 to 256.

⁴^{U.S. C}^ong^re^{ss, House}^Com^m^itte^e^{on E}^duc^a^tⁱ^{on a}^{nd L}^a^bor,^Su^bc^o^m^m^itte^e^{on He}^a^lth^{, Em}^ploy^m^e^{nt, L}^a^{bor a}^nd
^P^e^nsⁱ^ons^,^S^t^reng^t^h^enⁱⁿ^g^A^m^eri^c^a^’^{s Mi}^d^d^l^{e Cl}^a^ss^T^h^rou^g^h^t^h^{e E}^m^p^l^o^{yee F}^r^{ee Ch}^oⁱ^{ce A}^c^t^{, Fe}^br^ua^r^y^{8, 20}⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble
^a^t^http^://e^dla^b^or.^h^o^u^se^.g^ov^/he^a^rⁱⁿ^g^s^/^h^e^l^p⁰²⁰⁸⁰⁷^.^shtm^l.
⁵^F^o^{r m}^o^{re i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^on^t^h^{e “E}^m^p^l^o^y^{ee F}^r^{ee Ch}^oⁱ^{ce Act}^,^{” see C}^R^S^Rep^o^r^t^RS²¹⁸⁸^7,^T^h^{e E}^m^p^l^o^{yee F}^r^{ee Ch}^oⁱ^ce
^Ac^t^{, by}^J^{on O}^.^S^h^im^a^buk^ur^{o. L}^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^tion^tha^t^w^oul^{d r}^e^q^u^ir^e^c^a^r^{d c}^h^e^c^k^r^e^c^o^gⁿ^{ition w}^a^s^intr^o^duc^e^dⁱⁿ^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s^a^s^e^a^r^l^y^th^th
^{as t}^h^{e 9}⁵^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s⁽¹⁹⁷^7-¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^.^Ea^r^l^y^{in the}⁹⁵^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^R^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^Fr^aⁿ^k^T^hom^ps^{on J}^r^{. intr}^oduc^e^d^H^.^R^.^77,
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^rep^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^v^{e o}^f^e^m^p^l^o^y^{ees i}ⁿ^{a b}^a^rgaiⁿⁱⁿ^g^uⁿⁱ^tⁱ^f⁵⁵^%^o^f^t^h^{e em}^p^l^o^y^ee^{s si}^gn^ed^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^zatⁱ^o^{n card}^s^.^No^h^eariⁿ^{gs w}^e^re^th
^he^{ld a}ⁿ^d^{no a}^c^tⁱ^{on w}^a^s^ta^k^e^{n on t}^h^e^bill^{. L}^a^te^r^{in t}^h^e⁹⁵^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s^,^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t J}ⁱ^m^m^y^C^a^r^t^e^r^s^e^{nt to C}^ong^r^e^s^s^pr^o^pos^a^l^s
^{to a}^m^e^{nd the}^N^L^R^A^{. H}^.^R^.⁸⁴¹^0/S^.¹⁸⁸³^{, w}^h^ic^{h w}^a^s^a^l^s^o^c^a^lle^{d the}^L^a^bor^R^e^f^o^r^m^A^c^{t of}^{1977, w}^a^s^intr^o^duc^e^dⁱⁿ^t^h^e
^House^by^Re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^Fraⁿ^k^Thom^{pson Jr.}^a^ndⁱⁿ^the^Se^na^te^by^Se^na^to^{rs Ha}^rrison^W^illia^m^s^{Jr. a}^{nd Ja}^c^{ob Ja}^v^its.
^{H.R. 8}⁴¹⁰^/S.¹⁸⁸³^w^ould^ha^v^e^c^r^e^a^t^e^d^tim^e^t^a^b^le^s^f^o^{r hold}ⁱ^ng^re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^{tion e}^l^e^c^tⁱ^{ons. T}^h^e^b^ill^pa^sse^{d the}^H^ouse^.^Iⁿ^t^h^e
^Se^na^te^{, the}^Se^na^te^H^u^m^a^{n R}^e^s^our^c^e^s^C^o^m^m^itte^e^r^e^por^te^{d a}^bi^{ll (}^r^e^num^be^r^e^{d a}^s^{S. 2}⁴⁶⁷⁾^.^T^h^e^m^e^a^s^u^r^e^w^a^s^f^ilibus^te^r^e^d
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^r^e^por^{t a}ⁿ^ot^he^r^bill^.
⁶^{U.S. C}^ong^re^{ss, Se}^na^te^Com^m^itte^e^{on He}^a^lth^{, Ed}^uc^a^tio^{n, L}^a^bor,^aⁿ^d^P^e^nsi^ons,^T^h^{e E}^m^p^l^o^{yee F}^r^{ee Ch}^oⁱ^{ce A}^c^t^:
^Re^s^t^or^ing^Ec^on^om^ic^O^p^por^t^uni^ty^for^W^o^r^k^ing^Famⁱ^lⁱ^e^s^,^h^eariⁿ^g^oⁿ^t^h^{e E}^m^p^l^o^y^{ee F}^r^{ee Ch}^oⁱ^ce^A^c^t^,¹¹⁰^th^Cong^.,¹^st
^sess.^,^M^a^rch²⁷^,²⁰⁰⁷^,^avai^l^a^b^l^{e a}^t^h^t^t^p^:^/^/^h^e^l^p^.^s^en^at^e.^go^v.
⁷^R^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^C^h^a^r^lie^N^o^r^w^ood^die^d^on^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{13, 2}⁰⁰⁷^.
⁸^S.¹³^{12 i}ⁿ^c^l^u^d^e^s^a^pr^ov^is^ion^no^t^{in H}^.^R^.⁸⁶^6.^Se^c^tion⁴⁽^b)^of^S.¹³^{12 s}^t^a^t^e^s^t^h^a^t^“^N^othi^ngⁱⁿ^this^A^c^t⁽^o^r^t^h^e
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^L^a^bor^R^e^la^tions^B^o^a^r^d.”^W^{ith t}^hⁱ^s^pr^ov^is^io^{n, t}^h^e^N^L^R^B^s^houl^{d, f}^o^r^e^x^am^ple^,^be^a^b^le^to^is^s^u^e^a^ba^r^g^aⁱ^ning^or^de^r^a^s^a
^re^m^e^d^y^t^o^em^p^l^o^y^{er u}ⁿ^f^ai^{r l}^a^b^o^r^p^r^actⁱ^ces.^S^{ee t}^h^{e sect}ⁱ^oⁿ^oⁿ^“Bargaiⁿⁱⁿ^{g Ord}^e^{rs” l}^a^t^e^{r i}ⁿ^t^hⁱ^s^repo^r^t^.

The NLRA, as amended, provides the basic framework governing labor-management relations in ⁹
the private sector. The act begins by stating that the purpose of the law is to improve the
bargaining power of workers:
^T^h^{e in}^equ^a^lit^y^o^f^barg^aiⁿⁱⁿ^g^po^w^e^{r bet}^w^{een e}^m^plo^y^ees^{... a}ⁿ^{d e}^m^plo^y^ers^{... s}^u^bs^taⁿ^tiall^y
^bu^rden^s^aⁿ^{d aff}^ect^s^t^h^{e flo}^w^of^co^m^m^e^{rce, an}^{d te}ⁿ^d^s^{to ag}^g^r^a^v^{ate recu}^rreⁿ^t^busⁱⁿ^es^s
^depres^sⁱ^on^s^b^y^depres^sⁱ^ng^w^a^g^e^rates^an^{d th}^{e pu}^rc^h^a^sⁱ^ng^pow^{er of}^w^a^g^e^earn^e^rs^{... an}^{d by}
^p^r^ev^en^tiⁿ^g^t^h^{e stab}^ilizatioⁿ^o^f^co^m^p^etiti^v^e^w^a^g^e^r^a^{tes an}^d^w^o^r^kⁱⁿ^g^coⁿ^d^itioⁿ^s^w^ithⁱⁿ^aⁿ^d
^bet^w^eeⁿⁱⁿ^d^u^s^t^rie^s^....
^{It is}^h^e^reb^y^{declared to be th}^e^policy^of^t^h^e^Uⁿ^ited^States^to^eli^mⁱⁿ^{ate t}^h^{e ca}^u^s^e^s^{of certain}
^s^u^bs^taⁿ^{tial obs}^tr^u^c^tions^{to th}^e^f^r^{ee f}^l^o^w^of^co^mm^{erce an}^{d t}^o^m^iti^g^a^{te an}^{d eli}^mⁱⁿ^{ate t}^h^es^e
^o^b^s^t^r^uc^tⁱ^o^{ns w}^h^eⁿ^t^h^e^y^ha^ve^o^c^c^u^r^r^e^d^b^y^en^co^u^r^agⁱⁿ^g^{the practice an}^{d p}^r^ocedu^r^{e of}¹⁰
^collectiv^{e barg}^aiⁿⁱ^ng^....
The NLRA gives workers the right to join or form a labor union and to bargain collectively over
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment through a representative of their choosing.
Under the act, workers also have the right not to join a union. The act requires an employer to
bargain in good faith with a union chosen by a majority of employees. To protect the rights of ¹¹
employers and workers, the act defines certain activities as unfair labor practices.
The NLRA does not apply to railroads or airlines, federal, state, or local governments, agricultural
workers, family domestic workers, supervisors, independent contractors, and others. The
definition of “employee” in the NLRA does not exclude unauthorized workers. Thus, ¹²
unauthorized workers can engage in union activities.

⁹^Mor^e^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^l^l^y^{, the}^N^L^R^A^a^pplie^s^{to e}^m^ploy^e^r^s^e^nga^ge^{d in i}ⁿ^te^r^s^ta^te^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^.^{29 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁵²⁽⁶⁾^.
¹⁰^{29 U}^.^S.C.^§¹⁵^1.^Ma^ny^e^c^onom^is^ts^a^r^g^u^e^tha^t^the^r^e^is^not^aⁿⁱⁿ^e^q^u^a^lity^o^f^ba^rg^aⁱ^ning^pow^e^r^be^tw^e^e^{n e}^m^ploy^e^r^s^a^nd
^em^ploy^ee^s^.^For^e^x^am^ple^,^s^e^e^Mor^g^aⁿ^O^.^R^e^y^nolds^,^Powe^{r a}ⁿ^d^Priv^ile^ge^{: La}^{bor U}ⁿ^io^{ns i}ⁿ^Ame^r^ic^a^,^Ne^w^Yo^rk:
^Univ^e^r^se^Book^{s, 19}^84,^p^p^.^59-^62;^a^nd^Morg^aⁿ^{O. Re}^y^nolds,^“^T^he^My^{th of}^La^{bor’s Ine}^q^ua^lity^of^Ba^rg^aⁱ^ning^P^o^w^e^r,”
^Jo^u^r^na^l^of^La^bo^{r R}^e^sea^r^ch^{, v}^o^l.¹²^{, s}^p^rⁱ^ng¹⁹⁹¹^,^pp.¹^68-¹⁸^{3. T}^h^e^a^r^g^u^m^e^{nt tha}^t^w^o^r^k^e^r^s^a^{nd e}^m^ploy^e^r^s^ha^v^e^e^qua^l
^ba^rg^aⁱ^ning^pow^e^r^is^g^e^ne^ra^ll^y^ba^s^e^{d on}^the^pre^m^is^e^tha^t^la^{bor m}^a^rke^t^s^f^{it the}^e^c^onom^ic^m^ode^{l of}^pe^rf^e^c^t^c^o^m^p^e^tition.
^S^{ee t}^h^{e sect}ⁱ^oⁿ^l^a^t^e^{r i}ⁿ^t^hⁱ^s^repo^rt^oⁿ^w^h^et^h^e^{r t}^h^{ere i}^s^an^e^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^ra^tiona^le^f^o^{r pr}^ote^c^ting^the^rⁱ^g^h^{ts o}^f^w^o^rk^e^r^{s to}
^or^g^a^niz^e^a^{nd ba}^r^g^aⁱ^{n c}^o^lle^c^tiv^e^l^y^.
¹¹^N^a^tiona^{l L}^a^bor^R^e^la^ti^ons^B^o^a^r^d,^Basic^Gui^d^e^to^the^N^a^tio^na^{l L}^a^b^o^r^Re^latio^{ns Ac}^t⁽^W^a^s^hing^to^{n: U}^.^S^.^G^o^v^t^{. P}^rⁱⁿ^t.
^Off^{., 199}^7),^pp.^1,¹⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^ww^.nlrb.g^o^v^.^(He^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^c^ite^{d a}^s^NL^RB,^B^a^si^{c Gu}ⁱ^d^{e t}^o^t^h^{e NL}^R^A^.)
^T^h^e^L^a^bor^Ma^na^g^e^m^e^{nt R}^e^la^tions^A^c^{t of}^{1947 (}^P^.L^{. 80-}¹⁰^{1, c}^o^m^m^onl^y^c^a^lle^{d the}^T^a^f^t^-^H^a^r^tley^A^c^t)^a^m^e^nde^{d the}
^N^L^R^A^{to a}^{dd la}^ng^ua^g^e^tha^t^e^m^ploy^ee^s^ha^v^e^the^rⁱ^g^h^{t to r}^e^f^r^aⁱ^{n f}^r^om^joining^a^uⁿ^io^n,^unle^s^s^a^c^o^lle^c^tiv^e^ba^r^g^aⁱ^ning
^agree^m^en^t^wⁱ^t^h^{a u}ⁿⁱ^on^secu^ri^t^y^agree^m^en^tⁱ^sⁱⁿ^ef^f^ect^.^A^uⁿⁱ^oⁿ^secu^ri^t^y^agre^e^m^en^t^m^a^y^r^e^q^uⁱ^{re b}^a^rgaiⁿⁱⁿ^g^unⁱ^t
^em^ploy^ee^s^{to joi}ⁿ^t^h^e^uⁿ^io^{n a}^f^te^r^be^ing^hir^e^d⁽ⁱ^.e^.,^a^uⁿ^io^{n s}^h^op)^or^,^if^the^e^m^plo^y^e^e^is^{not r}^e^qui^r^e^{d t}^o^joiⁿ^the^un^io^{n, t}^o
^pa^y^a^r^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^{tion f}^e^e^{to t}^h^e^uⁿⁱ^{on (}ⁱ^.e^{., a}ⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^cy^s^hop)^{. U}^nde^r^S^e^c^{tion 1}⁴⁽^b⁾^of^the^T^a^f^t^-^H^a^r^tley^Ac^{t, s}^t^a^t^e^s^m^a^y
^en^act^ri^gh^t^-^t^o^-w^o^r^{k l}^a^w^s^,^w^hⁱ^c^h^do^no^t^al^l^o^w^coⁿ^t^ract^{s t}^oⁱⁿ^cl^ud^{e a}^uⁿⁱ^oⁿ^secu^ri^t^y^agree^m^en^t^.^Mⁱ^ch^ael^Bal^l^o^t^,^L^a^u^rⁱ^e
^Lⁱ^c^h^te^r^-^H^e^a^t^{h, T}^hom^a^s^K^a^{il, a}^nd^R^u^{th W}^a^ng^,^L^a^b^o^r^-^M^ana^ge^m^e^nt^Re^latio^nsⁱⁿ^a^C^h^an^gin^g^Eⁿ^vⁱ^r^oⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^,^New^Yo^rk:
^J^ohn^W^iley^a^{nd So}^ns^{, I}ⁿ^c^.,¹⁹^92,^pp.²⁶^5-²⁶⁸^.
¹²^NL^{RB, Basic}^G^u^id^{e to}^th^{e NL}^RA^{, p}^.³⁷^.
^Iⁿ^a¹⁹⁸⁴^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^{on (}^S^ur^e^-^T^a^{n, I}ⁿ^c^.^v^.^N^L^R^B^,⁴⁶⁷^U^.^S.⁸⁸³⁾^,^the^U^.^{S. S}^upr^e^m^e^C^our^{t r}^u^le^{d t}^h^a^t^the^d^e^fⁱ^nition^of
^em^ploy^ee^{in the}^N^L^R^A^doe^s^not^e^x^c^l^ude^una^ut^hor^iz^e^d^w^o^r^k^e^r^s^.^Thus^,^una^uth^o^rⁱ^z^e^d^w^o^r^k^e^r^s^c^aⁿ^eⁿ^g^a^ge^{in u}ⁿ^ioⁿ
^or^g^a^nizⁱ^ng^a^{nd c}^o^lle^c^tiv^e^ba^r^g^aⁱ^ning^{, c}^aⁿ^v^o^teⁱⁿ^N^L^R^B^e^l^e^c^tions^{, a}^{nd a}^r^e^pr^ote^c^t^e^d^f^r^om^unf^aⁱ^r^la^bor^pr^a^c^tic^e^s^{. B}^u^t,
^the^Su^pr^e^m^e^C^our^{t ha}^s^a^l^s^o^r^u^le^d^tha^t^uⁿ^a^u^t^hor^iz^e^d^w^o^r^k^e^r^s^c^a^nnot^be^a^w^a^r^de^{d ba}^c^k^pay^a^s^the^r^e^s^u^{lt of}^vⁱ^ola^tions^of
^unf^aⁱ^r^la^bor^pr^a^c^tic^e^s^{. Se}^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^S²¹¹⁸^6,^H^o^f^f^m^an^P^l^a^s^tⁱ^c^C^o^mp^ou^nd^{s v.}^N^L^RB^an^{d B}^a^{ckpay A}^w^a^r^d^s^to
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

The NLRA is administered and enforced by the NLRB, which is an independent federal agency
that consists of a five-member Board and a General Counsel. The Board hears appeals of unfair
labor practices and resolves questions about the composition of bargaining units. It also resolves ¹³
objections and challenges to secret ballot elections. The General Counsel’s office conducts
secret ballot elections, investigates complaints of unfair labor practices, and supervises the ¹⁴
NLRB’s regional and other field offices.
Campaign rules differ for employers, employees, and union organizers. Rules also differ for
soliciting union support (e.g., expressing support for a union or distributing authorization cards)
and for distributing union literature. Because of exceptions to the basic rules, the rules that apply ¹⁵
to a specific union organizing campaign may differ from the general rules described here.
Employers may campaign against unionization.¹⁶ Employers may require employees to attend
meetings during work hours where management can give its position on unionization. These
meetings are called “captive audience” meetings. Employers cannot hold a captive audience
meeting during the 24-hour period before an election. Supervisors can give employees written
information (including memos and letters) and hold individual meetings with employees.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^U^ndoc^um^eⁿ^te^{d A}^lie^ns^,^by^J^{on O}^.^Shim^a^buk^ur^o.
¹³^A^ba^r^g^aⁱ^ning^unit^is^a^g^r^ou^{p of}^e^m^plo^y^e^e^s^r^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^te^{d, or}^s^e^e^k^ing^r^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tion,^by^a^uni^on.^A^ba^r^g^aⁱ^ning^uⁿ^{it is}
^g^e^ne^r^a^ll^y^de^te^r^m^ine^d^{on t}^h^e^ba^sⁱ^s^of^a^“^c^o^m^m^unit^y^of^inte^r^e^s^t^”^of^t^h^e^e^m^plo^y^e^e^s^inv^o^lv^e^d^{. Em}^plo^y^ee^s^w^{ho ha}^v^e^the
^s^a^m^e^or^sⁱ^m^ila^r^inte^r^e^s^t^s^w^{ith r}^e^s^p^e^c^t^{to w}^a^g^e^s^,^hour^s^,^aⁿ^d^othe^r^w^o^r^k^ing^c^oⁿ^d^iti^ons^m^a^y^be^g^r^oupe^{d tog}^e^the^rⁱⁿ^t^o^a
^ba^r^g^aⁱ^ning^un^{it. A}^ba^r^g^aⁱ^ning^uⁿ^it^m^a^y^inc^l^ude^the^e^m^ploy^e^e^s^o^f^on^e^em^ploy^e^r^{, one}^e^s^ta^blis^hm^eⁿ^{t, or}^one^oc^c^upa^ti^on
^or^c^r^a^f^{t. A}^ba^r^g^aⁱ^ning^un^{it m}^a^y^inc^l^ude^b^o^th^pr^of^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l a}^nd^no^npr^of^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l em}^ploy^e^e^s^,^pr^ov^ide^d^a^m^a^jor^ity^of
^pr^of^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l e}^m^ploy^e^e^s^v^o^te^{to be}^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^of^the^unit^.^G^u^a^r^ds^c^a^nnot^beⁱⁿ^c^l^ude^{d in}^the^s^a^m^e^ba^r^g^aining^unit^a^s^ot^he^r
^e^m^ploy^e^e^{s. A}^{union a}ⁿ^{d e}^m^ploy^e^r^m^a^y^a^g^r^e^e^{on the}^a^p^pro^p^ria^t^e^ba^rg^aⁱ^ning^uni^{t. If}^no^{t, t}^h^e^issue^{is s}^e^ttle^{d by}^the
^NL^{RB. N}^L^RB,^Basic^Gui^d^e^to^th^e^Natio^nal^La^bor^Re^lati^ons^Ac^t^,^p.⁷^.^F^e^l^d^acker,^La^bor^G^u^ide^t^o^L^a^bor^L^a^w^{, pp}^.³⁹^-
^44.
¹⁴^NL^RB,^B^a^si^{c Gu}ⁱ^d^{e t}^o^t^h^{e NL}^R^A^{, p.}³³^{. W}^illia^m^{N. Cook}^e^,^Uⁿ^ioⁿ^O^r^ganizⁱ^ng^a^{nd P}^u^b^lic^Po^lic^y^:^F^a^ilur^e^t^o^Se^c^u^r^e
^{First Co}^ntra^cts⁽^K^a^l^a^m^az^{oo, MI}^:^W^.^{E. U}^p^jo^{hn I}ⁿ^s^tit^ute^,¹⁹⁸⁵⁾^,^p.^85.
¹⁵^Uⁿ^le^s^s^note^d^o^t^he^r^w^is^e^,^this^s^e^c^{tion is}^ba^s^e^{d o}ⁿ^S^t^e^phe^{n I}^.^Sc^hlos^s^b^e^r^g^a^{nd J}^u^dit^h^A^.^Sc^ott,^O^r^ga^nizⁱ^ng^an^{d t}^h^e^L^a^w^,
⁴^th^e^d^{., W}^a^s^h^ing^t^on:^B^u^r^e^a^u^of^N^a^tiona^{l A}^f^f^a^ir^s^,^1991,^p^p^.^45-^55.⁽^H^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^c^ite^{d a}^s^Sc^hlos^s^b^e^r^g^a^nd^Sc^ott,
^O^r^ganizⁱ^ng^a^{nd t}^h^e^L^a^w^.⁾^Jam^e^s^J.^Bru^dⁿ^e^y^,^Neu^t^ra^{lity Ag}^reemen^t^s^aⁿ^d^Ca^r^d^Ch^{eck Reco}^gⁿ^iti^oⁿ^:^P^r^o^s^p^{ects fo}^r
^C^han^gi^{ng Par}^a^di^gm^s^,^P^u^b^lⁱ^c^L^a^w^an^d^L^e^gal^T^h^eo^r^y^W^o^rkiⁿ^{g P}^a^{per S}^e^ri^{es No}^.²⁸^,^N^o^ve^m^b^{er 2}⁰^04,^p^.⁸^,^avai^l^a^b^l^{e at}
^http:^//w^w^w^.law^.be^p^r^e^s^s^.^c^o^m^/^os^ul^w^p^s^.⁽^H^e^r^eⁱ^naf^t^e^r^c^ite^{d a}^s^B^r^udne^y^,^Neu^t^ra^{lity Ag}^reemen^{ts a}ⁿ^d^Ca^r^d^Ch^eck
^Re^c^ognitⁱ^oⁿ^.⁾^F^e^l^d^acker,^L^a^bo^{r G}^uⁱ^d^{e to}^La^bo^{r La}^w^{, pp.}⁷⁴^-⁷^9.
¹⁶^T^h^e^T^a^f^t^-^H^a^r^tley^A^c^{t of}^{1947 a}^m^e^nde^{d t}^h^e^N^L^R^A^{to a}^{dd Se}^c^tio^{n 8}⁽^c⁾^{, w}^h^ic^{h g}ⁱ^v^e^s^em^plo^y^e^r^s^a^{nd unio}ⁿ^s^the^rⁱ^g^h^{t t}^o
^e^x^pr^e^s^s^theⁱ^r^vⁱ^ew^s^{on u}ⁿ^io^niz^a^tⁱ^on,^pr^ov^ide^d^s^u^c^h^“^e^x^pr^e^s^sⁱ^{on c}^o^ntaⁱ^ns^{no t}^h^r^e^a^t^of^r^e^pr^is^a^l^or^f^o^r^c^e^or^pr^om^is^e^of
^be^ne^f^it.”^For^a^le^g^a^{l his}^t^or^y^of^this^pr^ov^is^io^{n, s}^e^e^K^a^te^{E. A}^ndr^ia^s^,^“^A^R^obus^t^P^u^blic^D^e^ba^te^{: R}^e^a^lizⁱⁿ^g^Fr^e^e^Sp^eechⁱⁿ
^W^o^rkp^l^{ace Rep}^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^E^l^ectⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^Yale^L^a^{w J}^o^urⁿ^a^l^,^v^o^l^{. 11}^{2, J}^une²⁰⁰³^{, pp.}²⁴¹⁹^-²⁴³^2.

During work hours, employees can campaign for union support from their coworkers in both
work and nonwork areas (e.g., a coffee room or the company parking lot). But employees can
only campaign on their own time (e.g., at lunchtime or during breaks). If an employer does not
allow the distribution of literature in work areas, employees may only distribute union literature
in nonwork areas. If an employer allows the distribution of other kinds of literature in work areas,
employees may also distribute union literature in those areas.
An employer may prevent employees from using the employer’s e-mail for union activities (e.g.,
organizing and bargaining), provided the employer does not allow employees to use their work e-¹⁷
mail to solicit support for other causes or organizations. Conversely, if an employer allows
employees to use their work e-mail to solicit support for other causes or organizations, employees ¹⁸
may also use their work e-mail for union activities.
In general, union organizers cannot conduct an organizing campaign on company property. A
union cannot reply to an employer’s captive audience speech if the union has other means of ¹⁹
reaching employees. Organizers may be allowed in the workplace if the site is inaccessible (e.g.,
a logging camp or remote hotel) or if the employer allows nonemployees to solicit on company
property. Organizers may meet with employees on union property. They may also meet with
workers and distribute literature in public areas on employer property (e.g., a cafeteria or parking
lot) or in public areas (e.g., sidewalks or parking areas). Organizers may also contact employees ²⁰
at home by phone or mail or may visit employees at home. Under a neutrality agreement
(described later in this report), an employer may allow organizers onto company property.
To protect the rights of both employees and employers, the NLRA defines certain activities as
unfair labor practices.

¹⁷^In^{a Decem}^b^e^r²⁰⁰⁷^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^on^{, t}^h^e^B^o^a^r^{d r}^u^le^{d t}^h^a^t^aⁿ^e^m^ploy^e^r^’^s^e^-^m^a^{il sy}^s^t^em^is^the^em^plo^y^e^r^’^s^pr^ope^r^t^y^a^{nd tha}^t
^e^m^ploy^e^e^{s do n}^o^t^ha^v^e^a^sta^t^utory^rig^h^{t to}^use^t^h^eⁱ^{r w}^o^rk^e^-^m^a^{il f}^o^r^uni^{on a}^c^tiv^itie^{s. Na}^tio^na^{l L}^a^{bor R}^e^la^{tions Boa}^r^d,
^The^G^u^ar^{d P}^ubl^is^hi^{ng C}^o^m^p^any^d/b/^{a T}^h^e^Re^gis^t^e^r^-^G^u^a^r^d^an^{d E}^u^ge^ne^N^e^w^s^pa^pe^r^G^u^il^{d, C}^W^{A L}^o^c^a^{l 3}⁷¹⁹⁴^{, v}^o^l.³^51,
ⁿ^o^.⁷⁰^{, Decem}^b^e^{r 1}⁶^,²⁰⁰⁷^{, av}^ailab^l^{e at h}^t^t^p^://w^ww^.n^lrb^.^g^o^v^/^sh^ared^_^f^iles/Bo^ard^Decisioⁿ^s^/³⁵¹^/^V³⁵¹⁷⁰^.p^d^f^{, p}^p^.¹^,⁵^,⁷^.
¹⁸^N^a^tiona^{l L}^a^bor^R^e^la^ti^ons^B^o^a^r^d,^O^f^fⁱ^ce^of^the^G^e^ne^r^a^{l C}^ouns^e^l^,^R^e^p^o^r^t^oⁿ^C^a^{se Devel}^o^p^m^en^t^s^,^M^a^{y 1}⁵^,²⁰⁰⁸^,
^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^ww^.nlrb.g^o^v^/^sha^r^e^d_f^ile^s/G^C^Me^m^o^/²⁰⁰^8/^G^C^08-^{07 Re}^p^o^rt^on^Ca^se^De^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^t.p^d^f^.
¹⁹^Co^mm^en^t^,^“L^ab^o^r^L^a^w^Re^f^o^rm^:^T^h^{e Regu}^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^F^r^{ee S}^p^eech^and^E^q^u^a^l^A^{ccess i}ⁿ^NL^{RB Rep}^r^es^eⁿ^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ
^Ele^c^tions^,^Uⁿ^iv^e^r^s^ity^{of Pe}ⁿⁿ^s^y^lv^ani^{a L}^a^w^Re^vⁱ^e^w^{, v}^o^l.¹²^{7, J}^a^nua^r^y^1979,^p.⁷⁶^8.
²⁰^Un^d^e^{r w}^h^atⁱ^s^kn^o^wⁿ^{as t}^h^{e “E}^xcel^si^o^r^{” ru}^l^e^,^wⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^seven^d^a^y^s^a^f^t^e^{r t}^h^{e NL}^{RB h}^a^{s d}ⁱ^rect^ed^t^h^at^{a r}^e^p^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ
^e^l^e^c^{tion be}^he^ld^or^a^f^te^r^a^uni^{on a}^{nd e}^m^ploy^e^r^ha^v^e^ag^r^e^e^d^{to hol}^d^aⁿ^e^l^e^c^tion,^aⁿ^e^m^ploy^e^r^m^u^s^t^pr^ov^ide^the^r^e^gⁱ^ona^l
^dir^e^c^t^or^of^the^N^L^R^B^a^lis^{t of}^the^na^m^e^s^a^{nd a}^ddr^e^s^s^e^s^of^e^m^pl^o^y^e^e^{s e}^lig^ible^{to v}^o^te^{in t}^h^e^e^l^e^c^tio^n.^T^h^{is list is m}^a^de
^a^v^a^ila^ble^{to a}^{ll pa}^r^tie^s^.^N^a^ti^ona^{l L}^a^bor^R^e^la^tio^ns^B^o^a^r^{d, O}^f^fⁱ^c^e^o^f^the^G^e^ne^r^a^{l C}^ouns^e^l^,^Aⁿ^O^u^t^line^o^f^Law^an^d
^P^r^o^ced^u^r^{es i}ⁿ^R^e^p^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^Cases^{, W}^a^s^h^ing^t^{on: U}^.^S.^G^o^v^t^{. P}^r^int^.^O^f^f^{., A}^p^r^{il 20}^02,^p.²^51.^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^nts^of
^L^a^bor^a^{nd C}^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^,^Fac^t^Fin^dⁱ^{ng Re}^por^t:^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^oⁿ^t^h^e^Fu^tur^e^{of W}^o^r^k^e^r^-^M^ana^ge^m^e^{nt Re}^l^a^tions^,^Ma^y¹⁹⁹⁴^,
^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://^dig^ita^lc^om^m^ons^.ilr^.c^or^ne^ll^.e^du^/^c^gⁱ^/^v^iew^c^onteⁿ^t.c^g^i?^a^r^tic^le⁼^1279&^c^onte^x^t=^k^e^y^_^w^o^r^k^pl^ace,^p^.⁶⁸^.
^T^h^e^la^tte^r^r^e^por^{t is}^po^pula^r^ly^c^a^{lled the}^“^D^uⁿ^l^{op r}^e^por^t,”^a^f^te^r^f^o^r^m^e^r^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^L^a^bor^J^ohn^T^.^D^u^nlo^p^{, w}^{ho c}^h^aⁱ^r^e^d
^the^c^o^m^m^{ission. (It is}^he^re^ina^f^te^{r c}^ite^{d a}^s^Johⁿ^T^.^Dunl^op^,^F^a^c^t^Fiⁿ^dⁱⁿ^{g Re}^p^o^r^t^:^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^on^the^Futur^e^{of W}^o^r^k^e^r^-
^M^ana^ge^m^e^{nt Re}^latⁱ^oⁿ^s^.)

Although employers have the right to campaign against unionization, they cannot interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in their right to form or join a union. An employer cannot threaten
employees with the loss of their jobs or benefits if they vote for a union or join a union. An
employer cannot threaten to close a plant should employees choose to be represented by a union.
An employer cannot raise wages to discourage workers from joining or forming a union. An
employer cannot discriminate against employees with respect to the conditions of employment
(e.g, fire, demote, or give unfavorable work assignments) because of union activities. An
employer must bargain in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other working ²¹
conditions.
Employees have the right to organize and bargain collectively. But a union cannot restrain or
coerce employees to join or not join a union. A union cannot threaten employees with the loss of
their jobs if they do not support unionization. A union cannot cause an employer to discriminate
against employees with respect to the conditions of employment. A union must bargain in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other working conditions. A union cannot boycott or strike ²²
an employer that is a customer of or supplier to an employer that the union is trying to organize.
An unfair labor practice may be filed by an employee, employer, labor union, or any other person.
After an unfair labor practice charge is filed, regional staff of the NLRB investigate to determine
whether there is reason to believe that the act has been violated. If no violation is found, the
charge is dismissed or withdrawn. If a charge has merit, the regional director first seeks a
voluntary settlement. If this effort fails, the case is heard by an NLRB administrative law judge. ²³
Decisions by administrative law judges can be appealed to the five-member Board.
The NLRA attempts to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices. The purpose of the act is not to
punish employers, unions, or individuals who commit unfair labor practices. The act allows the
NLRB to issue cease-and-desist orders to stop unfair labor practices and to order remedies for
violations of unfair labor practices. If an employer improperly fires an employee for engaging in
union activities, the employer may be required to reinstate the employee (to their prior or
equivalent job) with back pay. If a union causes a worker to be fired, the union may be ²⁴
responsible for the worker’s back pay.

²¹^NL^RB,^B^a^si^{c Gu}ⁱ^d^{e t}^o^t^h^{e NL}^R^A^,^pp^{. 1}⁴^-^22.
²²^Ibid^.,^pp.²³^-3^2.
²³^N^a^tiona^{l L}^a^bor^R^e^la^ti^ons^B^o^a^r^d,^Ann^ual^Re^por^t^of^the^N^a^tio^na^{l L}^a^bor^Re^l^a^tio^ns^B^oar^d^,^f^o^r^the^Fⁱ^s^c^{al Ye}^ar^En^de^d
^Se^pte^m^be^r³⁰^,²⁰⁰⁷⁽^W^a^s^hing^toⁿ^:^U^.^{S. G}^o^v^t^.^P^rⁱⁿ^{t. O}^f^f^{., O}^c^tobe^r¹⁶^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸⁾^,^p.^{4, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://^w^w^w^.nlr^b.g^o^v^.
^(Hereiⁿ^a^f^t^{er ci}^t^e^d^{as N}^L^RB,^Ann^ual^Re^por^t^,^Fis^c^al^Ye^ar²⁰⁰⁷^.)^N^L^RB,^B^a^si^{c Gu}ⁱ^d^{e t}^o^t^h^{e NL}^R^A^{, p}^.³⁶^.
²⁴^{29 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁶⁰⁽^c⁾^{. N}^L^R^B^,^B^a^si^{c Gu}ⁱ^d^{e t}^o^t^h^{e N}^L^R^A^,^p.³⁸^.
^T^h^e^am^{ount of}^ba^c^k^pa^y^aw^a^r^de^{d is}^“ⁿ^e^t^ba^c^k^pa^y^”^plus^inte^r^e^s^t^{. N}^e^{t ba}^c^k^pa^y^is^the^am^ount^of^c^o^m^p^eⁿ^s^a^{tion (}ⁱ^.e^.,
^w^a^{ges p}^l^u^s^b^eⁿ^e^fⁱ^t^s^{) t}^h^at^{a w}^o^rke^r^w^o^u^l^d^h^a^{ve recei}^vedⁱ^f^h^e^o^r^sh^e^h^a^dⁿ^o^t^b^een^uⁿ^l^aw^f^u^l^l^y^fⁱ^r^e^d^l^e^{ss t}^h^{e am}^{ount of}
^co^m^p^en^satⁱ^oⁿ^recei^ved^(l^{ess t}^h^{e exp}^eⁿ^s^{es f}^r^o^m^l^o^o^kⁱⁿ^{g f}^o^{r w}^o^rk)^f^r^o^m^o^t^h^e^{r w}^o^{rk d}^u^rⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e b}^{ack p}^a^y^p^e^ri^o^d^.^If^a
^dⁱ^sch^a^rged^em^p^l^o^y^{ee i}^s^ab^l^e^t^o^wo^{rk b}^u^t^do^{es n}^o^t^l^o^o^k^f^o^{r w}^o^rk,^co^m^p^en^satⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^at^h^e^o^r^sh^{e cou}^l^d^h^a^{ve recei}^ved^f^r^o^m
^w^o^r^k^m^a^y^be^de^duc^te^{d f}^r^om^g^r^os^{s ba}^c^k^pa^y^.^Iⁿ^te^r^e^s^t^{on ne}^t^ba^c^k^pa^y^is^sⁱ^m^p^le^inte^r^e^s^t⁽ⁱ^.e^{., n}^o^{t c}^o^m^poun^de^d)^.^N^a^tio^na^l
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

In FY2007, 29,821 employees were awarded $117.3 million in back pay. Employers paid $116.8 ²⁵
million to 29,559 employees, while unions paid $0.5 million to 262 employees. Back pay can be
awarded to workers who were fired, demoted, denied work, or were otherwise discriminated
against for union activities. Estimates of the number of workers who are illegally fired for union ²⁶
activities range from 1,000 to 3,000 a year, with more firings in the 1980s than in later years. In
a study of 400 NLRB election campaigns conducted in 1998 and 1999, Kate Bronfenbrenner ²⁷
concluded that workers are fired for union activities in 25% of union campaigns.
Figure 1 shows the trend in the number of unfair labor practice charges filed from FY1970 to
FY2007. During this period, the number of charges filed peaked at 44,063 in FY1980. The ²⁸
number stood at 22,331 in FY2007. In FY2007, 38.7% of the charges filed were found to have ²⁹
merit. In FY2007, 73.2% of the charges were filed against employers (by unions or individuals) ³⁰
and 26.8% were filed against unions (by employers or individuals).

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^L^a^bor^R^e^la^tions^B^o^a^r^d,^N^L^R^B^C^a^seh^aⁿ^d^lⁱⁿ^g^Man^u^a^l^,^P^a^rt³^,^C^o^mp^lⁱ^aⁿ^{ce P}^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^s^,^avai^l^a^b^l^{e at}
^http:^//w^w^w^.nlr^b.g^o^v^/^P^u^blic^a^tio^ns^/Ma^nua^ls^,^§§¹⁰⁵^{36 a}^nd¹⁰⁵⁶^6.
^{In a}^Se^pte^m^be^{r 20}⁰⁷^de^cⁱ^sion^{, t}^h^e^Boa^r^{d r}^u^le^{d t}^h^a^t^if^a^w^o^rk^e^r^w^{ho is f}ⁱ^re^{d f}^o^{r unio}ⁿ^a^c^tiv^itie^{s d}^o^e^sⁿ^o^{t sta}^r^{t t}^o^l^ook^f^o^r
^w^o^r^k^w^{ithin tw}^{o w}^e^ek^s^of^be^ing^fⁱ^r^e^{d, ba}^c^k^pa^y^doe^s^not^be^gⁱ^{n t}^o^a^c^c^r^ue^until^the^w^o^r^k^e^r^s^t^a^r^ts^{to l}^o^ok^f^o^r^w^o^r^k^.
^N^a^tiona^{l L}^a^bor^R^e^la^ti^ons^B^o^a^r^d,^G^r^os^v^e^nor^Re^s^o^r^t^,^vo^l^.³⁵⁰^,^no^.⁸⁶^,^S^e^pt^em^b^e^r¹¹^,²⁰⁰⁷^,^avai^l^a^b^l^e^at
^http:^//w^w^w^.nlr^b.g^o^v^/^s^h^a^r^e^d_f^ile^s^/^B^o^a^r^d%^20D^e^cⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^/^350/^v³⁵⁰^86.^pdf^{, p.}^3.
²⁵^NL^RB,^Annu^{al Re}^por^t,^Fis^c^al^Ye^ar²⁰⁰⁷^{, T}^a^ble^4.
²⁶^Johⁿ^Sc^hm^{itt a}ⁿ^d^Be^{n Zi}^ppe^re^r,^D^r^oppi^ng^the^Ax^:^I^lle^ga^{l Fir}ⁱ^ngs^D^u^rⁱ^ng^Uⁿⁱ^{on E}^l^e^c^tion^C^a^m^p^ai^gn^s^{, Ce}^nte^r^f^o^r
^Ec^onom^ic^a^nd^Polic^y^Re^s^e^a^r^c^h^{, J}^a^nua^ry^2007,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^w^w^.ce^p^r.ne^t/^doc^um^eⁿ^ts^/publ^ic^a^tions^/
^uni^ons^_²⁰⁰⁷^_⁰¹^.^pdf^{, p.}^9.^J^o^hⁿ^T^.^D^unl^op^,^F^a^c^t^Fi^ndi^ng^Re^por^t:^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^on^the^F^u^t^u^r^e^{of W}^o^r^k^e^r^-^M^anage^m^e^nt
^Re^latio^ns^{, pp.}⁶⁹^-⁷^{0, 84.}
²⁷^K^a^te^B^r^onf^e^nbr^e^nne^r^,^Une^a^sy^Te^{rrain: T}^h^e^Imp^a^c^t^of^Ca^pita^{l M}^o^b^ility^oⁿ^W^o^rk^e^{rs, W}^age^{s an}^{d U}ⁿ^io^{n Orga}^nizi^ng^,
^U^.^{S. T}^r^a^d^e^D^e^fⁱ^c^{it R}^e^vⁱ^ew^C^o^m^m^issⁱ^on,²⁰^00,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://^dig^ita^lc^om^m^ons^.ilr^.c^or^ne^ll^.e^du/^c^g^i/
^vⁱ^ew^c^onteⁿ^t.c^g^i?^a^r^tic^le⁼^1002&^c^o^nte^x^t=^r^e^por^ts^{, p}^.⁷^43.
²⁸^NL^RB,^Annu^{al Re}^por^t,^Fis^c^al^Ye^ar²⁰⁰⁷^{, C}^h^a^r^{t 2.}
²⁹^NL^RB,^Annu^{al Re}^por^t,^Fis^c^al^Ye^ar²⁰⁰⁷^{, C}^h^a^r^{t 5.}^Fr^om^FY¹⁹⁷⁰^t^o^FY²⁰⁰⁷^,^the^pe^r^c^eⁿ^t^of^unf^aⁱ^r^la^bor^pr^a^c^tic^e
^c^h^a^r^g^e^s^f^ound^to^ha^v^e^m^e^r^{it r}^a^ng^{ed f}^r^om^a^{bout 3}⁰^%^to^40%^{. N}^L^R^B^,^An^nu^{al Re}^p^o^r^t^,^varⁱ^ou^{s y}^ear^s.
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^gⁱ^v^e^a^t^le^a^s^{t a}^10-da^y^notic^e^be^f^o^re^pic^k^e^ting^{or strik}ⁱ^ng^a^he^a^l^t^h^c^a^r^e^institu^tio^{n. (A}^“^{hot c}^a^r^g^o^”^a^g^re^e^m^eⁿ^{t is w}^h^e^r^e^aⁿ
^e^m^ploy^e^r^a^{nd uni}^{on a}^g^re^e^tha^t^t^h^e^e^m^plo^y^e^r^w^ill^not^do^busiⁿ^e^{ss w}ⁱ^{th a}ⁿ^othe^{r e}^m^ploy^e^r^{.) NL}^R^B^,^An^nua^{l Re}^p^o^rt,
^Fis^c^{al Ye}^ar²⁰⁰⁷^{, T}^a^ble^{2. N}^L^R^B^,^B^a^si^{c Gui}^d^{e t}^o^t^h^{e NL}^R^A^,^p^p^.²¹^{, 32}^.

Figure 1. Unfair Labor Practice Charges,
Fiscal Years 1970-2007
^Source:^NLRB,^{Annual Reports}^{, v}^{arious years.}

Section 9(a) of NLRA states that a union may be “designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees” (emphasis added). Currently, there are
three ways for employees to join or form a union. First, a union that is selected by a majority of
employees in an election conducted by the NLRB is certified as the employees’ bargaining
representative. Second, an employer may voluntarily recognize a union if a majority of employees
in a bargaining unit have signed authorization cards. Finally, the NLRB may order an employer to
recognize and bargain with a union if a majority of employees have signed authorization cards
and the employer has engaged in unfair labor practices that make a fair election unlikely.
A union must be certified through a secret ballot election or recognized by an employer before
collective bargaining can begin. As discussed below under “Certification,” a union that is
certified as the result of a secret ballot election has certain advantages over a union that is
recognized by an employer without an election.
The NLRB conducts a secret ballot election when a petition is filed requesting one. A petition can
be filed by a union, worker, or employer. Employees or a union may petition the NLRB for an
election if at least 30% of employees have signed a petition or authorization cards. An employer
may request an election if a union has claimed to represent a majority of its employees and has
asked to bargain with the employer (and the union itself has not requested an election). An

employer is not required to give a reason for requesting an election.³¹ If a majority of employees
voting (i.e., not a majority of employees in the bargaining unit) in an NLRB-conducted election
choose to be represented by a union, the union is certified by the NLRB as the employees’ ³²
bargaining representative. The NLRA does not provide a timetable for holding an election.
Certification of a union by the NLRB does not require that a union and employer reach an initial ³³
contract agreement.
After a petition is filed requesting an election, the employer and union may agree on the time and
place for the election and on the composition of the bargaining unit. If an agreement is not
reached between the employer and union, a hearing may be held in the regional office of the
NLRB. The regional director may then direct that an election be held. The regional director’s ³⁴
decision may be appealed to the Board.
In a secret ballot election, employees choose whether to be represented by a labor union. If an
election has more than one union on the ballot and no choice receives a majority of the vote, the ³⁵
two unions with the most votes face each other in a runoff election.
The right of an individual to vote in an NLRB election may be challenged by either the employer
or union. If the number of challenged ballots could affect the outcome of an election, the regional
director determines whether the ballots should be counted. Either the employer or union may file
objections to an election, claiming that the election or the conduct of one of the parties did not
meet NLRB standards. A regional director’s decision on challenges or objections may be ³⁶
appealed to the Board.
A union and employer may also agree to a secret ballot election conducted by a third party, such ³⁷
as an arbitrator, clergyman, or mediation board.
The NLRB also conducts secret ballot elections to decertify a union that has previously been
certified or recognized. A decertification petition may be filed by employees or a union acting on
behalf of employees. A decertification petition must be signed by at least 30% of the employees

³¹^{U.S. S}^upre^m^e^{Court, “}^N^a^tio^na^{l L}^a^{bor Re}^la^tio^{ns Boa}^r^{d v}^.^Gⁱ^sse^{l P}^a^c^k^ing^{Co., Inc}^.^,”^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^Re^por^ts^,^vo^l.³⁹⁵
⁽^W^a^s^hing^{ton: U}^.^S^.^G^o^v^t^.^P^r^int^.^O^f^f^{., 196}⁹⁾^,^pp^{. 5}^93-⁵⁹^4,⁶⁰^{9. (}^H^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^c^ite^{d a}^s^U^.^{S. Su}^pr^e^m^e^C^o^ur^t,^NL^{RB v}^.
^{Gissel Pa}^ckin^g^.)^In^N^L^R^B^v.^Gi^ss^el^P^a^ckiⁿ^g^,^t^h^{e U.}^S^.^S^u^p^r^em^{e Co}^u^r^t^con^s^o^lⁱ^d^at^ed^f^o^u^r^NL^{RB cases}^.^In^each^case,^a
^m^a^jor^ity^of^em^plo^y^ee^s^sⁱ^gⁿ^e^d^a^u^thor^iz^a^tio^{n c}^a^r^ds^{. T}^h^e^e^m^ploy^e^r^re^f^u^sed^t^o^b^a^rgaiⁿ^,^arguⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^aut^h^o^rⁱ^zatⁱ^oⁿ^card^s^are
^inhe^re^ntly^unre^lia^b^l^e^.^T^h^e^NL^{RB c}^onc^lu^de^{d t}^h^a^t^the^e^m^ploy^e^r^{s c}^o^m^m^itte^{d unf}^aⁱ^{r la}^bor^pra^c^tic^e^s^tha^t^m^a^de^a^f^a^ir
^e^l^e^c^{tion u}ⁿ^lik^e^l^y^a^{nd or}^de^r^e^d^the^em^ploy^e^r^s^{to ba}^r^g^aⁱ^{n w}^{ith the}^r^e^s^p^e^c^tiv^e^unioⁿ^s^.^U^.^{S. S}^upr^e^m^e^C^our^t,^NL^{RB v}^.^Gisse^l
^P^a^ckiⁿ^g^{, p}^p^.⁵⁷^5-⁵^95.
³²^{29 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁵⁹⁽^c⁾^{. N}^L^R^B^,^A^nnua^{l R}^e^por^t^,^Fis^c^a^l^Y^e^a^r²⁰⁰⁷^,^p.²⁷^{. N}^a^tio^na^{l L}^a^bor^R^e^la^tio^ns^B^o^a^r^{d, T}^h^e^N^L^R^B^:
^W^h^a^t^{it is, W}^h^a^t^{it D}^o^e^s^{, Na}^tiona^l^L^a^{bor Re}^la^{tions B}^o^a^r^d,^p.^3,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^ww^.nlrb.g^o^v^.^U.S.^Su^pre^m^e^Court,
^N^L^R^B^v^.^Gⁱ^s^s^e^{l P}^a^c^k^ing^,^pp.⁵⁹³^-⁵⁹^4,⁶⁰^{9. N}^L^R^B^,^B^a^sⁱ^c^G^u^ide^to^the^N^L^R^A^{, p. 8.}
³³^Som^e^e^v^ideⁿ^c^e^indic^a^t^e^s^tha^t^w^ithin^thr^e^e^y^e^a^r^s^of^wⁱ^nning^aⁿ^e^l^e^c^tion^,^a^p^pr^ox^im^a^t^e^l^y^one^-^f^our^{th of}^uni^ons^ha^v^e^not
^reach^ed^{a f}ⁱ^rst^coⁿ^t^ract^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e em}^p^l^o^y^er.^T^h^o^m^{as F}^.^Reed^,^“Unⁱ^on^A^t^t^aⁱⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^Fⁱ^rst^Coⁿ^t^ract^s:^Do^S^e^rvi^{ce Un}ⁱ^oⁿ^s
^Posse^{ss a}^Com^p^e^titiv^e^A^d^v^a^nta^g^e^?^”^J^our^nal^{of La}^bor^Re^s^e^ar^c^h^{, v}^o^l^{. 1}¹^{, f}^a^{ll 19}⁹⁰^{, p}^p^.,⁴^26,⁴^30.^W^illia^m^{N. Cook}^e^,
^“^T^he^Fa^ilure^{to Ne}^g^o^tia^te^{First C}^onta^c^t^s:^De^te^rm^inaⁿ^{ts a}^nd^Polic^y^Im^plic^a^tions,”^Iⁿ^d^u^s^t^rⁱ^al^a^nd^La^b^o^r^Re^lati^ons
^R^evi^ew^{, v}^o^{l. 3}⁸^{, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^1985,^p.¹⁷⁰^.
³⁴^NL^RB,^B^a^si^{c Gu}ⁱ^d^{e t}^o^t^h^{e NL}^R^A^{, pp}^{. 8}^-^9.^N^a^tiona^{l L}^a^bor^R^e^la^tioⁿ^s^B^o^a^r^d,^N^L^{RB R}^u^le^s^a^nd^Re^gu^latⁱ^ons^,^avai^l^a^b^l^e
^a^t^http^://w^ww^.nlrb.g^o^v^/^nlrb/^,^Se^c^.¹⁰^2.6⁷^.
³⁵^NL^RB,^B^a^si^{c Gu}ⁱ^d^{e t}^o^t^h^{e NL}^R^A^{, p.}³⁶^.
³⁶^NL^RB,^Annu^{al Re}^por^t,^Fis^c^al^Ye^ar²⁰⁰⁷^,^pp.^5,¹^10,¹^13.
³⁷^Sc^hlos^s^b^e^r^g^a^{nd Sc}^o^tt,^Orgaⁿⁱ^zi^ng^an^d^t^h^{e La}^w^,^{p. 17}^6.

in the bargaining unit represented by the union. Under what is called a “certification bar,” a union
that is certified after winning a secret ballot election is protected for a year from a decertification
petition and from an election petition filed by another union. A secret ballot election is required ³⁸
for decertification.
Table 1 shows the number of secret ballot elections conducted by the NLRB from FY1994 to
FY2007. In FY2007, the NLRB conducted 1,905 elections. Unions won 54.9% of these elections, ³⁹
which was up from 44.4% in FY1994.
In most elections conducted by the NLRB, the employer and union agree on the composition of
the bargaining unit and on the time and place for an election. In FY2007, 85.6% of elections were ⁴⁰
based on agreements between the two parties.
Table 1. Number of Representation Elections Conducted by the NLRB,
FY1994-FY2007
^{Fiscal Year}^{Number of}^{Elections Cond}^ucted^{Number of}^{Elections Won}^{by Unio}^ns^{Percentage of}^{Elections Wo}^{n by Uni}^ons
²⁰⁰^{7 1,90}⁵^1,04⁵^54.9%
²⁰⁰^{6 2,18}¹^1,19⁵^54.8%
²⁰⁰^{5 2,74}⁵^1,50⁴^54.8%
²⁰⁰^{4 2,82}⁶^1,44⁷^51.2%
²⁰⁰^{3 3,07}⁷^1,57⁹^51.3%
²⁰⁰^{2 3,15}¹^1,60⁶^51.0%
²⁰⁰^{1 3,97}⁵^1,59¹^40.0%
²⁰⁰^{0 3,46}⁷^1,68⁵^48.6%
¹⁹⁹^{9 3,74}³^1,81¹^48.4%
¹⁹⁹^{8 4,00}¹^1,85⁶^46.4%
¹⁹⁹^{7 3,68}⁷^1,67⁷^45.5%
¹⁹⁹^{6 3,47}⁰^1,46⁹^42.3%
¹⁹⁹^{5 3,63}²^1,61¹^44.4%
¹⁹⁹^{4 3,75}²^1,66⁵^44.4%
^Sources:^{National Labor Relations Board,}^{Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, for the}^{Fiscal Year}
^{Ended September 30, 2007}^{(Washington: U.S. Govt.}^{Print. Off., October 1}^{6, 20}^{08), Char}^{t 1}^{2, available at}

³⁸^NL^RB,^Annu^{al Re}^por^t,^Fis^c^al^Ye^ar²⁰⁰⁷^,^p.^27.^N^a^tiona^l^L^a^bor^R^e^la^tions^B^o^a^r^d,^The^N^a^tio^na^{l L}^a^b^o^r^Re^latio^ns
^Boar^d^a^nd^YO^U^:^Re^pr^e^s^eⁿ^tatⁱ^oⁿ^C^a^s^e^s^{, p.}^{2, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^h^ttp:^//www^.nlrb.g^o^v^.^Fe^lda^c^k^e^r^,^La^bor^G^uⁱ^d^e^to^La^bor^L^a^w^,
^{p. 5}⁷^{. H}^ous^e^,^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on Ed}^uc^a^{tion a}ⁿ^{d t}^h^e^W^o^r^k^f^o^r^c^e^,^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on Em}^ploy^e^r^-^E^m^p^loy^e^e^R^e^la^tions^{, H}^.^R^.^th
⁴³⁴³^,^Se^c^r^e^t^Ball^{ot Pr}^ote^c^tio^{n Ac}^{t of}²⁰⁰⁴^{, he}^a^r^ing^s^,¹⁰⁸^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^s^e^c^{ond s}^e^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^{, Se}^rⁱ^a^l^N^o^.¹⁰^8-^70,^Se^pte^m^be^r
²⁰⁰^{4, W}^a^s^h^ing^t^{on: U}^.^{S. G}^o^v^t^.^P^rⁱⁿ^{t. O}^f^f^{., p. 1}¹^{. (}^H^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^c^ite^d^a^s^H^ous^e^Ed^uc^a^tion^a^nd^the^W^o^r^k^f^o^r^c^e^,^H^.^{R. 43}^43,
^S^ecret^B^a^l^l^o^t^P^r^o^t^ectⁱ^oⁿ^A^c^t^o^f²⁰⁰⁴^.)
³⁹^NL^RB,^Annu^{al Re}^por^t,^Fis^c^al^Ye^ar²⁰⁰⁷^{, C}^h^a^r^{t 1}²^.
⁴⁰^NL^RB,^Annu^{al Re}^por^t,^Fis^c^al^Ye^ar²⁰⁰⁷^{, T}^a^ble¹¹^A^.

^{http://www.nlrb.gov. National Labor Relations Board,}^Ann^{ual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, for the}
^{Fiscal Year Ended September 30, 2003}^{(Washington: U.S. Govt. Pr}^{int. Off., April 20, 2}^{004), Cha}^{rt 1}^2,^{available at}
^{http://www.nlrb.gov.}
^Note:^{The numbe}^{r of elections c}^{onducted includes elections that}^{resulted in a r}^unoff^{or rer}^un.
The NLRB does not collect data on how long it takes for a union and employer to reach a first
contract agreement after a union wins an NLRB election. Nor does the NLRB collect data on
whether the parties reach a first contract agreement. However, a recent study estimated that,
within two years of winning an NLRB election, a contract had not been reached in over two-fifths
of cases. This is a higher percentage than found in estimates published in previous studies.
Estimates from several studies are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. First Contract Agreements Following Certification
^Period^{A First Contra}^ct^{A First Contra}^{ct Agreement}
^{Studied Sample}^{Agreement Was Rea}^ched^{Was Not Reached}
^{October 1,}^{First contract agreem}^{ent aft}^er^{In 5}^{6% of}^{certifications, a}^{In 4}^{4% of}^{certifications, a contrac}^t
¹⁹⁹^{9 to J}^une^{a union won a}ⁿ^N^LRB^{contract was ag}^{reed to within}^{was not agreed to within two}
^{1, 20}⁰⁴^a^election.^{two years of the}^election.^{years of the}^election.
^FY1986^to^{First contract agreem}^{ent aft}^er^{At least 56%}^{of certifications}^{At most, 44% of c}^{ertifications did}
^FY1993^b^{a union won a}ⁿ^N^LRB^{resulted in a first}^contract.^{not result in a}^{first contra}^{ct. The}
^election.^{The actual pe}^rcentage^may^be^{actual perce}^{ntage may}^be^closer
^{closer to two-thirds.}^{to one-third.}
¹⁹⁸^{2 to}^c^{First contract agreem}^{ent aft}^er^85%^{of service unions}^ac^hieved^{15% of}^service^{unions did not}
¹⁹⁸⁶^{a union won a}ⁿ^N^LRB^{a first contract ag}^reeme^nt;^{reach a}^{first contract}^agreeme^nt;
^election.^64%^{of man}^ufact^{uring unions}^36%^{of man}^ufact^{uring unions}^did
^{achieved a first cont}^ract.^{not reach a}^{first cont}^ract
^agreement.
^{April 19}⁷⁹^{First contract agreem}^{ent aft}^er
^{to March}^d^{a union won a}ⁿ^N^LRB
¹⁹⁸¹^{election. Sample included}^{63% 37%}
^bargaining^{units of 1}⁰⁰^or
^{more employees.}
¹⁹⁷^{9 to}^{First contract agreem}^{ent aft}^er
¹⁹⁸⁰^e^{a union won a}ⁿ^N^LRB^{77% 33%}
^election.
¹⁹⁷⁰^f^{First contract agreem}^{ent aft}^er
^{a union won a}ⁿ^N^LRB^{78% 22%}
^election.
^{July 1, 1}⁹⁵⁷^{First contract agreem}^{ent aft}^er
^{to June}^30,^{a union won a}ⁿ^N^LRB^{86% 14%}
¹⁹⁶²^g^election.
^a.^{The estimate is based on}^8,15⁵^N^{LRB elections won by u}^{nions in c}^{ases closed between}^October^1,¹⁹⁹⁹
^{and Ju}^{ne 1,}²⁰^{04. Em}^{ployers m}^u^s^t^{bargain in good faith for on}^{e ye}^{ar after a}ⁿ^N^{LRB election is won by a}
^{union. Therefore, th}^{e study}^used^{information from the F}^{MCS for t}^{he pe}^{riod from October}^{1, 19}⁹⁹^{to June}
^{1, 20}^{05. I}ⁿ^rece^{nt yea}^{rs, the FMC}^{S has attempted to conta}^{ct the}^p^{arties involved in first contract}
^{negotiations. John-Paul Ferguson, “The Eyes}^{of the}^{Needles: A Seq}^{uential Model of Union Organizin}^g
^{Drives, 199}^9-20^04,”^{Industrial and Labor Relations Review}^{, vol. 62, October 2}⁰⁰^{8, p}^{p. 3-6.}
^b.^{The 56}^{% estimate is ba}^{sed on 1}^0,783^u^{nion elections certified by t}^{he NLRB a}^{nd contract ag}^reemeⁿ^{ts in}
^{which th}^{e FMCS was involved. Other ce}^{rtifications may have}^resul^{ted in a first contra}^{ct agreeme}^nt^(e.g.^,

^{where t}^{he FMCS was}^{not contact}^{ed for help). Therefore, t}^{he actua}^{l percentage}^{of certifications that}
^{resulted in a first}^{contract ma}^{y b}^e^{closer to two-thirds. The estimates were calculated b}^y^the^FMC^{S for the}
^{Commission on the Futu}^{re of W}^{orker-Manageme}^{nt Relations (th}^{e “Dunlop Commission”). U.S}^.
^Department^{s of Labor}^{and Com}^merce,^{Fact Finding Report: Commi}^ssion^{on the Future of Worker-Man}^agement
^Relations^{, May 1}⁹⁹^{4, available at}
^[digita^lcommons.i^lr.cornell.e^{du/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1279&}^c^{ontext=key_workplace], p}^{p. 7}^{3, 87.}
^c.^{The estimates are}^{based on a s}^u^r^{vey of u}^{nion organizers involved in 1}^{28 elections won}^by^{unions. Thomas}
^{F. Reed, “Uni}^{on Attainment of First Contracts: Do Service Unions}^{Possess a Competitive Advantag}^e?,”
^{Journal of Labor Research}^{, vo}^{l. 11, Fall 1990, p}^{p. 42}^8-4^30.
^d.^{The estimates are}^{based on a s}^u^r^{vey by t}^{he AFL-CIO of}²⁷^{1 electi}^{ons won by}^u^{nions. Will}^{iam N. Cooke,}
^{“The Failure to Negotiate First Contracts: Determinant}^{s and Policy Implications,”}^{Industrial an}^{d Lab}^or
^{Relations Review}^{, vol. 38, Janua}^ry¹^985,^{p. 16}^4.
^e.^{The estimates are}^{based on a s}^u^r^{vey of u}^{nions that won}¹^{18 electi}^{ons in Indiana d}^uring¹⁹^{79 a}^{nd 1}⁹^{80. The}
^survey^{was conduc}^{ted betwee}^{n J}^une^{1, 19}⁸²^{and Octo}^ber^{1, 19}⁸²^{. Wil}^{liam N. Co}^{oke, “The Failure}^to
^{Negotiate First Contracts: Determinants a}^{nd Policy Implications,”}^{Industrial an}^{d Labor Relations Review}^{, vol}^.
^{38, Jan}^uary¹⁹⁸^{5, pp. 1}^69-¹⁷^0.
^f.^{The estimates are}^{based on a}¹⁹⁷⁵^su^rvey^{by th}^{e AFL-CIO of}^2,65^{6 elections won by}^u^{nions in 1}⁹⁷^{0. The}
^{estimates are bas}^{ed on the}ⁿ^umb^{er of res}^{ponses, which}^{was not}^r^{eported. Will}^{iam N. Cooke}^{, “The Failure}
^{to Negotiate First Contracts: Determinants a}^{nd Policy Implications,”}^{Industrial an}^{d Labor Relations Review}^,
^{vol. 38, January}¹⁹⁸^{5, p. 16}^4.
^g.^{Paul Weiler, “}^Strik^{ing a New Balance: Freedom of Contract a}^{nd th}^{e Prospects for U}^{nion Represe}^nt^ation,”
^Harva^{rd Law Review}^{, vol}^{. 98, December}¹⁹^{84, p}^{p. 3}^53-3^55.
Although the NLRA does not provide a specific timetable for holding an election, most elections
are held within two months of the filing of a petition. In FY2007, 93.9% of initial representation
elections were conducted within 56 days of filing a petition. The median time to proceed to an ⁴¹
election from the filing of a petition was 39 days.
In FY2007, objections were filed in 163 of the elections conducted. Most (66.9%) of the
objections were filed by unions. The remainder were filed by employers (33.1%) or by both ⁴²
parties. For decisions reached in FY2007, it took a median of 102 days between a regional ⁴³
hearing on a contested election and a decision from the Board. As of September 30, 2007,
representation cases awaiting a Board decision had been pending for a median of 318 days from ⁴⁴
the date that an election petition was filed.
The NLRA does not require secret ballot elections. An employer may voluntarily recognize a
union when presented with authorization cards signed by a majority of employees in a bargaining
unit. An employer may also enter into a card check agreement with a union before union

⁴¹^N^a^tiona^{l L}^a^bor^R^e^la^ti^ons^B^o^a^r^d,^G^e^ne^r^a^{l C}^ouns^e^l^,^S^u^m^m^a^r^y^{of O}^p^e^r^ations^:^Fis^c^{al Ye}^ar²⁰⁰⁷^{, Me}^m^o^r^a^nd^um^G^C^08-
^{01, p. 6,}^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^ww^.n^lrb.g^o^v^.
⁴²^Ibid^{., T}^a^ble¹¹^C.
⁴³^Ibi^d^{., T}^a^ble²³^.
^Aⁿ^aⁿ^a^l^y^s^is^b^y^the^G^e^ne^r^a^l^A^c^c^ountiⁿ^g^O^f^fⁱ^c^e⁽^G^A^O⁾^of^ca^s^e^s^a^ppe^a^l^e^d^{to t}^h^e^B^o^a^r^d^f^oun^{d tha}^t^a^m^oⁿ^g^c^a^s^e^s^c^l^os^e^d
^be^tw^e^eⁿ¹⁹⁸⁴^aⁿ^d¹⁹⁸⁹^the^m^e^diaⁿ^tim^e^f^r^om^the^da^te^of^r^e^gⁱ^ona^{l a}^c^{tion o}ⁿ^aⁿ^a^ppe^a^l^t^o^a^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^on^by^the^B^o^a^r^{d w}^a^s
^be^tw^e^eⁿ^{190 a}ⁿ^d²⁵^{6 da}^y^s^{. U}^.^S.^G^e^ne^r^a^{l A}^c^c^ounting^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^,^N^a^tional^La^bor^Re^l^a^ti^ons^B^oar^d:^Ac^ti^oⁿ^N^e^e^d^e^d^t^o
^I^m^pr^ov^e^C^a^s^e^-^P^r^o^c^e^s^sⁱ^ng^Tim^e^at^H^e^adq^uar^te^r^s^{, R}^e^p^o^r^t^H^R^D^-⁹¹^-²^{9, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^1991,^pp^{. 2}¹^-²^{2. T}^h^e^G^e^ne^r^a^l
^A^c^c^ountiⁿ^g^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^is^now^c^a^lle^{d the}^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt A}^c^c^ounta^b^ili^ty^Of^fⁱ^c^e^.
⁴⁴^NL^RB,^Annu^{al Re}^por^t,^Fis^c^al^Ye^ar²⁰⁰⁷^{, T}^a^ble²³^.

organizers begin to collect signatures. A card check agreement between a union and employer
may require the union to collect signatures from more than a majority (sometimes called a ⁴⁵
supermajority) of bargaining unit employees. A neutral third party often checks, or validates,
signatures on authorization cards. A collective bargaining contract may include a card check
arrangement for unorganized (including new) branches, stores, or divisions of a company.
Under voluntary recognition, employees have 45 days to file a decertification petition or an
election petition requesting representation by another union. After 45 days, an election petition
cannot be filed for “a reasonable period of time.” (See the section on “NLRB Review of
Voluntary Recognition” later in this report.)
A card check arrangement may be combined with a neutrality agreement. Not all neutrality
agreements are the same. However, in general, under a neutrality agreement an employer agrees
to remain neutral during a union organizing campaign. The employer may agree not to attack or
criticize the union, while the union may agree not to attack or criticize the employer. The
agreement may allow managers to answer questions or provide factual information to employees.
A neutrality agreement may give a union access to company property to meet with employees and
distribute literature. An employer may also agree to give the union a list of employee names and ⁴⁶
addresses. A neutrality agreement may cover organizing drives at new branches of a company.
To gain an agreement from an employer for a card check campaign—possibly combined with a
neutrality agreement—unions sometimes engage in “corporate campaigns.” A corporate campaign
may include a call for consumers to boycott the employer; rallies and picketing; a public relations
campaign (e.g., press releases, Internet postings, news conferences, or newspaper and television
ads); charges that the employer has violated labor or other laws; public support from political, ⁴⁷
civic, and religious leaders; and other strategies.

⁴⁵^On^{e st}^ud^y^o^f^c^a^rd^ch^{eck agre}^e^m^eⁿ^t^s^f^o^uⁿ^d^t^h^at^,^un^d^e^{r s}^o^m^e^agr^e^e^m^en^t^s^,^{a u}ⁿⁱ^oⁿⁿ^eed^{ed si}^gn^at^u^r^es^f^r^o^m^at^l^east⁶⁵^%
^of^ba^rg^aⁱ^ning^uni^{t e}^m^ploy^e^e^s.^A^d^rie^nne^E.^Ea^to^{n a}ⁿ^{d J}^{ill Krie}^sk^y^,^“^U^{nion Org}^a^nizⁱ^ng^Unde^{r Ne}^utra^lity^a^{nd Ca}^rd
^Ch^{eck A}^g^re^e^m^en^t^s^,^”^I^ndus^tr^ia^{l a}^nd^La^bor^Re^l^a^tio^ns^Re^vⁱ^e^w^{, v}^o^l.⁵⁵^{, O}^c^to^be^r²⁰⁰¹^,^p.^48.⁽^H^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^c^ite^{d a}^s^Ea^ton
^a^{nd K}^r^ie^s^k^y^,^Un^ioⁿ^Org^aⁿⁱ^zin^g^Uⁿ^d^e^{r Neu}^t^ra^{lity a}ⁿ^d^Ca^rd^Ch^{eck Ag}^reemen^ts^.)
⁴⁶^Ea^ton^a^{nd Kr}^ie^sky^,^Un^ioⁿ^Org^aⁿⁱ^zin^g^Uⁿ^d^e^{r Neu}^t^r^a^lity^aⁿ^d^Ca^r^d^Ch^{eck Ag}^reemen^ts^{, pp}^{. 4}⁷^-⁴^{8. C}^h^a^r^le^s^I^.^C^oheⁿ^,
^“Neu^trality^Ag^ree^m^en^{ts: W}^{ill th}^{e NRL}^B^San^c^tioⁿ^{Its Ow}ⁿ^Ob^so^les^cen^ce?”^The^Lab^o^r^Lawy^e^r^{, v}^o^l.¹⁶^{, f}^a^{ll 20}⁰⁰^{, p}^p^.
²⁰³^-²^04.^B^r^ud^ne^y^,^Ne^utr^a^lity^Agr^e^e^m^eⁿ^ts^{and C}^a^r^d^C^h^{eck R}^eco^gⁿⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^{, p}^p^.^5-6^.
^{It ha}^{s be}^eⁿ^a^r^g^u^e^d^tha^t^,^u^nde^{r t}^h^e^NL^R^A^{, ne}^utra^lity^a^{nd c}^a^r^{d c}^h^e^c^k^a^g^re^e^m^eⁿ^{ts, m}^a^y^be^unla^w^f^u^{l. Se}^e^A^r^c^h^Stok^e^s^,
^Robe^{rt L}^.^M^u^rp^hy^{, P}^a^ul^{E. W}^a^gⁿ^e^r^{, a}^{nd Da}^vⁱ^{d S}^.^S^h^e^r^wy^{n, “}^N^e^u^tra^lity^Ag^re^e^m^eⁿ^{ts: How}^{Unions O}^r^g^a^niz^e^Ne^w
^Hote^{ls W}^ithou^{t a}ⁿ^Em^ploy^e^e^Ba^ll^ot,”^C^o^rⁿ^e^{ll H}^o^te^l^a^{nd Re}^s^t^aur^aⁿ^t^Admⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^r^a^ti^{on Q}^uar^te^r^l^y^{, v}^o^l^.⁴²^{, O}^c^to^be^r-
^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r²⁰⁰^1,^pp.⁹¹^-⁹^{4. A}^c^ounte^r^a^r^g^u^m^e^{nt c}^aⁿ^be^f^oun^{d i}ⁿ^B^r^ud^ne^y^,^Neu^t^ra^{lity Ag}^reemen^{ts a}ⁿ^d^Ca^r^d^Ch^eck
^Re^c^ognitⁱ^oⁿ^{, pp.}²⁸^-⁵^3.
⁴⁷^A^uⁿⁱ^oⁿ^m^a^y^en^g^a^g^eⁱⁿ^{a co}^rpo^r^a^t^{e ca}^m^p^ai^gn^t^o^achⁱ^e^{ve o}^t^h^e^r^o^b^j^e^c^tⁱ^v^es,^e.^g.^,^{a co}ⁿ^t^ract^agree^m^en^t^.^Ch^arl^e^{s R.}
^P^e^rry^,^Uⁿ^io^{n C}^o^r^por^a^t^e^C^a^m^p^aigⁿ^s⁽^P^h^ila^de^lp^hia^:^Iⁿ^d^u^stria^l^Re^se^a^r^c^h^Unit,^W^h^a^r^ton^Sc^ho^ol,^Univ^e^r^sity^o^f
^P^eⁿⁿ^s^y^lv^aⁿ^ia^{, 198}⁷⁾^,^pp.^1-^8,^37-^53.
^F^o^r^dⁱ^f^f^eren^t^vi^e^w^{s o}ⁿ^co^rpo^r^at^{e ca}^m^p^ai^gn^s,^{see U.}^S^.^Coⁿ^g^ress,^Hou^s^{e Co}^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee o}ⁿ^E^d^u^catⁱ^o^{n an}^d^t^h^{e W}^o^rkf^o^rce,^th
^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on W}^o^r^k^f^o^r^c^e^P^r^o^t^e^c^tions^,^C^o^m^puls^o^r^y^Uⁿⁱ^{on D}^u^e^s^and^C^o^r^por^ate^C^a^m^p^aigⁿ^s^{, he}^a^r^ing^s^,¹⁰⁷^Cong^.,^nd
²^s^e^s^s^{., J}^u^ly^{23, 20}⁰²^{, Se}^rⁱ^a^l^N^o^{. 10}^7-^{74 (}^W^a^s^hing^to^{n: G}^P^O^,²⁰⁰²⁾^.^F^o^r^a^dis^c^us^sⁱ^on^of^c^o^r^p^or^a^t^e^c^a^m^p^aⁱ^gⁿ^s
^pub^lis^he^d^by^the^U^.^{S. C}^h^a^m^be^r^of^C^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^,^s^e^e^J^a^r^o^{l B}^.^Ma^nheⁱ^m^,^Tr^e^nds^{in U}ⁿⁱ^oⁿ^C^o^r^p^or^ate^C^a^m^pai^gns^:^A
^Br^ie^{fing Bo}^ok⁽^W^a^s^hing^ton:^U^.^S.^C^h^a^m^be^r^of^C^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^,²⁰⁰⁵⁾^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http:^//w^w^w^.us^c^ham^b^e^r^.c^om^/^p^u^b^lic^a^tio^ns^/
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Historically, the NLRB has not collected data on voluntary recognitions.⁴⁸ The FMCS, however,
is involved in voluntary recognitions. The FMCS was created by the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 (the Taft-Hartley Act). The main purpose of the FMCS is to mediate
collective bargaining agreements. FMCS mediators act as a neutral third-party to help settle ⁴⁹
issues during the bargaining process. Some of the requests received by the FMCS are for
mediation where an employer has voluntarily agreed to negotiate with a union. Table 3 shows the
number of voluntary recognitions, for FY1996 to FY2004 (the most recent year for which
published data are available), where the FMCS helped mediate a first contract. Cases where an
employer voluntarily recognized a union and reached a first contract without FMCS assistance
are not included in these numbers. Therefore, the actual number of voluntary recognitions is
probably greater than the numbers shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Number of Voluntary Recognitions in Which the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service (FMCS) Provided Assistance for Initial Contracts,
FY1996-FY2004
^{Fiscal Year}^{Number of}^{Voluntary Re}^cog^nitions
²⁰⁰^{4 258}
²⁰⁰^{3 240}
²⁰⁰^{2 273}
²⁰⁰^{1 420}
²⁰⁰^{0 381}
¹⁹⁹^{9 260}
¹⁹⁹^{8 227}
¹⁹⁹^{7 249}
¹⁹⁹^{6 173}
^Source:^{Federal Mediation and}^Conciliat^{ion Service,}^Annu^{al Report, Fiscal Year 2004}^{, p. 18, availabl}^{e at}
^{http://www.fmcs.gov. Federal Mediation and Concil}^{iation Service,}^{Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2000,}^{p. 39, available}
^{at http://www.fmcs.gov.}
The final way that a union may be recognized by an employer is through a bargaining order. The
NLRB may order an employer to recognize and bargain with a union if a majority of employees

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^r^e^por^ts^/^06uⁿⁱ^on^_c^a^m^paⁱ^g^ns^.htm^.
⁴⁸^{In a}^Se^p^t^e^m^be^{r 2007}^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^{, t}^h^e^Boa^r^{d s}^a^{id t}^h^a^t^t^h^e^Re^gⁱ^ona^{l O}^f^fⁱ^c^e^o^f^the^N^L^RB^m^u^s^t^be^not^if^{ied in}^w^r^iting^(by
^the^e^m^ploy^e^r^{, uni}^on,^or^bot^h)^of^a^v^o^lun^t^a^r^y^re^c^o^gⁿ^ition^.^Na^tio^na^l^L^a^{bor Re}^la^{tions B}^o^a^r^d,^D^aⁿ^a^C^o^r^por^at^ioⁿ^,^vo^l.³⁵^1,
^no.²⁸^{, Se}^p^t^e^m^be^{r 29, 2}⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^aⁱ^l^a^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^w^w^.nlrb.g^o^v^/^s^h^a^r^e^d_f^ile^s^/^Boa^r^d%^20D^e^cⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^/^351/^v³⁵¹²^8.^pdf^{, p.}¹⁰^.
^(Hereiⁿ^a^f^t^{er ci}^t^e^d^{as N}^L^RB,^D^{ana C}^o^r^por^at^ioⁿ^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r^29,²⁰^07.)^A^l^s^o^s^e^e^the^s^e^c^{tion la}^te^rⁱⁿ^t^h^is^r^e^por^{t o}ⁿ^“^T^he
^Uⁿ^ite^{d A}^u^{to W}^o^r^k^e^r^s⁽^U^A^W⁾^a^{nd the}^D^a^na^a^nd^Me^ta^ldyⁿ^e^C^o^r^por^a^tions^.”
⁴⁹^Fe^de^r^a^{l Me}^dia^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^{nd C}^onc^il^ia^ti^on^Se^r^v^ic^e^,^Ann^ual^Re^por^t^,^Fis^c^al^Ye^ar²⁰⁰⁴^,^{p. 29}^,^avai^l^a^b^l^{e at}
^http:^//www^.fm^c^s.^g^o^v^.

have signed authorization cards and the employer has committed unfair labor practices that make
it unlikely that a fair election can be held.
According to Feldacker, “[h]ard and fast rules are not possible in determining the situations in
which the Board will issue a bargaining order. Each case is based on the specific facts of the ⁵⁰
employer’s violations. Bargaining orders may be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals and to ⁵¹
the U.S. Supreme Court.
A union that wins a secret ballot election is certified by the NLRB as the bargaining
representative of employees in that bargaining unit. Voluntary recognition or a bargaining order
do not result in certification by the NLRB. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-101) eliminated ⁵²
certification through any method other than an election conducted by the NLRB.
Certification gives a union certain advantages. For instance, a union that is certified after winning
a secret ballot election is protected for a year from a decertification petition and from an election
petition requesting representation by another union (the “certification bar”). Under voluntary card
check recognition, employees have 45 days to file a decertification petition or an election petition
requesting to be represented by a different union (the “recognition bar”).
The duration of an employer’s duty to bargain also depends on whether a union has been certified
by the Board or has been recognized voluntarily by the employer. If a union wins an NLRB
election (or under a bargaining order), the employer is required to bargain in good faith for a year.
Under voluntary card check recognition, the employer is required to bargain with the union for “a ⁵³
reasonable period of time.”

⁵⁰^F^e^l^d^acker,^L^a^bo^{r Gu}^id^{e t}^o^La^bo^{r L}^a^w^{, pp}^.⁹⁰^-^91.
⁵¹^Da^nie^l^Quiⁿⁿ^Mills,^L^a^b^o^r^-^M^an^ag^emen^t^R^e^l^a^ti^on^s^{, 5}^th^e^d^.,^Ne^w^Y^o^rk^{: Mc}^G^r^a^w^{-Hill, Inc}^{., 1}⁹⁹⁴^,^pp.²¹^3-2¹⁷^.
⁵²^W^h^en^en^act^edⁱⁿ¹⁹³⁵^,^S^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{9(c) o}^f^t^h^{e NL}^R^A^(P^.^L^.⁷⁴^-19⁸⁾^st^at^ed^t^h^at^w^h^en^{ever a q}^u^e^stⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^e^m^p^l^o^y^e^e
^re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^{tion a}^r^is^e^s^t^h^e^N^L^{RB “m}^ay^tak^e^a^s^e^c^r^e^t^ba^llot^of^em^ploy^e^e^s^{, or utiliz}^e^aⁿ^y^othe^{r s}^uⁱ^t^a^b^le^m^e^{thod t}^o^a^s^c^e^r^taⁱⁿ
^s^u^c^h^re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^.”^A^lte^rna^tiv^{e m}^e^thods^of^s^e^le^c^{tion c}^o^u^l^d^inc^l^u^d^e^a^u^th^oriz^a^tio^{n c}^a^r^ds^,^pe^titi^ons^,^em^ploy^ee
^t^e^stⁱ^m^oⁿ^y^,^a^f^fⁱ^d^a^vi^t^s^o^f^uⁿⁱ^on^m^e^m^b^ershⁱ^p^,^p^a^rtⁱ^cⁱ^p^atⁱ^o^{n i}ⁿ^{a st}^rⁱ^ke,^o^r^accep^t^aⁿ^{ce o}^f^st^ri^{ke b}^eⁿ^e^fⁱ^t^s^.^W^hⁱ^c^h^e^ver^m^e^t^hod
^w^a^s^us^e^d^{, if}^a^m^a^jor^ity^of^em^plo^y^e^e^s^c^hos^e^{to be}^r^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^te^{d by}^a^uⁿ^io^{n, t}^h^e^uⁿ^io^{n w}^oul^{d be}^c^e^r^tif^ie^d^by^the^N^L^R^B^.
^Du^riⁿ^g^t^h^{e f}ⁱ^{ve years a}^f^t^e^{r t}^h^{e NL}^RA^w^a^{s en}^act^ed^,^t^h^{e NL}^{RB i}^ssu^ed⁸⁹⁷^certⁱ^fⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^af^t^e^{r an}^el^ectⁱ^oⁿ^and²⁷²
^c^e^r^tif^ica^tions⁽^o^r²³^.3%^of^the^tot^a^l)^w^{ithout a}ⁿ^e^l^e^c^tion^.⁽^T^he^s^e^nu^m^b^e^r^s^{do not}^inc^l^ude^c^a^s^e^s^w^h^e^r^{e the}^uⁿⁱ^{on a}ⁿ^d
^em^ploy^e^r^ag^r^e^e^d^{to hol}^{d a}ⁿ^e^l^e^c^tion.)^B^y^1939,^the^N^L^R^B^oⁿ^ly^c^e^r^tif^ie^{d uni}^ons^t^h^a^t^ha^{d be}^eⁿ^c^hos^eⁿ^by^a^s^e^c^r^e^t^ba^llot
^el^ectⁱ^oⁿ^.^T^hⁱ^s^app^r^o^ach^w^a^{s w}^rⁱ^t^t^enⁱⁿ^t^o^l^a^w^b^y^t^h^{e T}^a^f^t^-H^art^l^e^y^Act^.^T^h^{e act}^a^m^en^d^e^d^S^ectⁱ^o^{n 9}⁽^c)^t^o^say^t^h^at^t^h^e
^Bo^ard^“sh^a^l^l^dⁱ^rect^an^el^ectⁱ^oⁿ^b^y^secret^b^a^l^l^o^t^and^sh^al^l^certⁱ^f^y^t^h^{e resu}^l^t^s^t^h^ereo^f^.^{” T}^h^{e w}^o^rd^{s “o}^{r u}^tⁱ^lⁱ^{ze an}^y^o^t^h^e^r
^s^u^ita^ble^m^e^{thod t}^o^a^s^c^e^r^ta^{in s}^u^c^h^r^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^”^w^e^r^e^r^e^m^o^v^e^{d. N}^a^tiona^{l L}^a^bor^R^e^la^ti^ons^B^o^a^r^d,^Le^gis^l^ativ^e^Hⁱ^s^t^or^y
^{of t}^h^e^N^a^ti^on^{al L}^a^b^o^r^Re^l^a^tio^ns^A^c^{t of}¹⁹³⁵⁽^W^a^s^hing^to^{n: U}^.^{S. G}^o^v^t^{. P}^r^int^.^O^f^f^{., 1949)}^{, p}^.³²⁷⁴^{. N}^a^tⁱ^ona^{l L}^a^bor
^R^e^la^tions^B^o^a^r^d,^Le^gis^l^at^iv^e^Hⁱ^s^t^or^y^{of t}^h^e^L^a^b^o^r^M^aⁿ^age^m^e^{nt Re}^l^a^tio^ns^Ac^t,¹⁹⁴⁷⁽^W^a^s^hing^ton:^U^.^{S. G}^o^v^t^.^P^r^int^.
^Off^.^,¹⁹⁸⁵⁾^,^p^.¹⁶⁷⁰^.^Crai^{g Becke}^r^,^“De^m^o^c^rac^yⁱⁿ^t^h^{e W}^o^rkp^l^ace:^Unⁱ^o^{n Rep}^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^E^l^ectⁱ^oⁿ^s^aⁿ^d^F^e^d^e^ral^L^a^b^o^r
^La^w,^”^Miⁿⁿ^e^so^t^a^L^a^w^R^evi^ew^{, v}^o^{l. 7}⁷^,¹⁹^92,^p^p^.⁵⁰^7-⁵^10.^A^l^aⁿ^R^o^be^r^t^s^Mc^Fa^r^l^aⁿ^d^aⁿ^d^W^a^yⁿ^e^{S. B}ⁱ^s^hop^,^Unⁱ^oⁿ
^Auth^or^iz^ati^oⁿ^C^a^r^d^s^a^{nd t}^h^e^N^L^R^B^:^{A S}^t^u^d^y^{of C}^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^sⁱ^on^{al I}ⁿ^te^{nt, A}^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e^Po^lic^y^,^a^{nd J}^u^dicⁱ^al^Re^vⁱ^e^w
^(Phila^de^l^phia^:^Uⁿ^iv^e^r^sity^of^P^eⁿⁿ^s^y^lv^aⁿ^ia^{, 196}^9),^pp.¹²^-1^4,^50.^W^illia^m^{B. G}^{ould IV,}^A^Pr^im^e^r^{on Am}^e^r^ic^an^La^bor^th
^Law^{, 4}^e^d^{. (}^C^a^m^br^idg^e^{, MA}^{: MI}^T^P^r^e^s^s^,²⁰⁰⁴⁾^,^p.^89.
⁵³^F^e^l^d^acker,^L^a^bo^{r Gu}^id^{e t}^o^La^bo^{r L}^a^w^{, pp}^.⁵⁷^{, 13}^9-1⁴⁰^.

Under certain circumstances, an employer may withdraw recognition of a union before a contract
agreement has been reached. After one year, if an employer and a certified union have not
reached a contract agreement, the employer may withdraw recognition of the union if both parties
have engaged in good faith bargaining and the employer doubts, on the basis of objective
information (e.g., a petition signed by a majority of employees and given to the employer), that a
majority of employees no longer support the union. Under a voluntary recognition, if no contract
agreement has been reached after a reasonable period of time, an employer may withdraw
recognition if the employer has reasonable doubt on the basis of objective information that a ⁵⁴
majority of employees support the union.
Until 1947, only a union or employees could request a secret ballot election. The Taft-Hartley Act ⁵⁵
gave employers the right to request an election. Soon thereafter, a U.S. Appeals court ruled that,
if a majority of employees signed authorization cards, an employer could only insist on an ⁵⁶
election if he had “good faith doubt” that the union represented a majority of employees. This ⁵⁷
approach was known as the “Joy Silk doctrine.” An employer had good faith doubt if he
believed that signatures on the authorization cards were obtained through misrepresentation or ⁵⁸
coercion. The Board could find a lack of good faith doubt and order an employer to bargain if
the employer committed unfair labor practices that were evidence of bad faith or if the employer
rejected a demand by a majority of workers to bargain but did not have reasons for good faith
doubt. By 1969, the Board said that it had largely abandoned the Joy Silk doctrine. Thereafter, if a
majority of employees signed authorization cards, an employer could voluntarily recognize the
union or could insist on an election, either by requesting the union to file an election petition or ⁵⁹
by filing a petition himself. In a 1974 ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court said that, if an employer ⁶⁰
insists on an election, the union must take the next step and file an election petition.
In recent years, the NLRB has considered cases involving voluntary recognition.

⁵⁴^F^e^l^d^acker,^L^a^bo^{r Gu}^id^{e t}^o^La^bo^{r L}^a^w^{, p. 14}^0.
⁵⁵^M^a^ri^{e C.}^G^r^o^ssman^,^“L^ab^o^r^L^a^w—E^m^p^l^o^y^{er’s Du}^t^y^t^o^Bargaiⁿ^—^A^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^zatⁱ^o^{n Card}^s,^”^Ca^{se Western}^{Reserve L}^a^w
^R^evi^ew^{, v}^o^{l. 2}¹^,¹⁹^70,^p.³^08.
⁵⁶^Mⁱ^ch^ael^E^u^gen^e^E^a^rw^o^o^d^an^{d Herb}^ert^C.^E^h^rh^ard^t^,^“L^ab^o^r^L^a^w^—^E^m^p^l^o^y^{er’s Du}^t^y^t^o^Bargaiⁿ^oⁿ^t^h^{e Basi}^{s o}^f
^A^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^zatⁱ^o^{n Card}^s—Unⁱ^oⁿ^Has^t^h^{e Bu}^r^d^en^o^f^S^eekiⁿ^{g an}^NL^RB^E^l^ectⁱ^oⁿ^,^”^Mississipp^{i L}^a^{w Jou}^r^na^l^{, v}^o^l^.⁴⁶^,¹⁹⁷⁵^,
^p^.⁵²^2.
⁵⁷^Joy^Silk^{Mills, Inc}^.^,⁸⁵^NL^{RB 12}^{63 (}¹⁹⁴⁹⁾
⁵⁸^Mc^Fa^r^l^a^{nd a}^{nd B}ⁱ^s^h^o^p^,^Uⁿ^io^{n A}^u^th^or^iz^ati^{on C}^a^r^d^s^an^{d t}^h^e^N^L^RB^,^p.⁵⁵^.
⁵⁹^U^.^{S. S}^upr^e^m^e^C^our^t,^N^L^{RB v}^.^Gi^sse^{l Pac}^kⁱ^ng^{, pp}^.⁵^91-⁵⁹^{2, 59}^4.
⁶⁰^U^.^{S. S}^upr^e^m^e^C^our^{t, “}^L^inde^{n L}^u^m^b^e^r^Dⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on, Sum}^m^e^r^&^C^o^{. v}^.^N^a^tiona^{l L}^a^bor^R^e^la^ti^ons^B^o^a^r^d,”^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s
^Re^por^ts^{, v}^o^l^.⁴¹⁹⁽^W^a^s^hing^ton:^U^.^{S. G}^o^v^t^.^P^rⁱⁿ^{t. O}^f^f^{., 197}⁴⁾^,^p.³¹^0.

In June 2004, the Board voted 3-2 to review two cases where bargaining unit employees filed a
decertification petition within weeks after the employer recognized a union under a card check
agreement. In the first case, the United Auto Workers (UAW) and Metaldyne Corporation entered
into a card check and neutrality agreement in September 2002. Metaldyne recognized the UAW
as the bargaining representative of production and maintenance workers at its St. Marys,
Pennsylvania plant in December 2003. In the second case, the UAW and Dana Corporation
entered into a card check and neutrality agreement in August 2003. The company recognized the
union at its Upper Sandusky, Ohio plant in December 2003.
In both the Dana and Metaldyne cases, the UAW and the employers entered into card check and
neutrality agreements before signatures on authorization cards were collected. The signatures
were validated by a neutral third party. In both cases, employees filed decertification petitions
after the UAW was recognized by the employer, but before an agreement was reached on a
contract. Regional NLRB directors dismissed both decertification petitions, saying that they were
inconsistent with the Board’s “recognition bar” doctrine. Under this doctrine, following an
employer’s voluntary recognition of a union, employees or another union cannot file a petition for
an election for a “reasonable period of time.”
Employees at both Dana and Metaldyne Corporations petitioned the NLRB to review the
dismissals. The employees were represented by the National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation. The NLRB granted the request, saying that the issue was whether voluntary
recognition should prevent employees from filing a decertification petition within a reasonable ⁶¹
time in cases where an employer and union enter into a card check agreement.
In September 2007, the Board issued a decision in both cases. The Board said that, following a
voluntary recognition, employees have 45 days to file a petition to decertify the union. Similarly,
a rival union has 45 days to file an election petition. The petitions must be signed by at least 30%
of bargaining unit employees. Employees must also receive notice of the voluntary recognition
and their right to petition for a decertification or representation election. If a petition is not filed
within 45 days of notice of the voluntary recognition, an election petition cannot be filed during ⁶²
the recognition bar period (i.e., for “a reasonable period of time”).
In another case involving voluntary card check recognition, the NLRB agreed to review a case
where a union claimed that an employer had agreed to voluntary card check recognition at newly
acquired stores. In December 2004, the Board by a vote of 2-1 agreed to review a case involving ⁶³
Shaw’s Supermarkets and the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW). In August
2003, Shaw’s opened a new store in Mansfield, Massachusetts. A majority of workers at the new
store signed authorization cards. The UFCW claimed that, under a clause in an existing

⁶¹^N^a^tiona^{l L}^a^bor^R^e^la^ti^ons^B^o^a^r^d,^O^r^de^r^G^r^antin^{g Re}^vⁱ^e^w^{, C}^a^s^e^s^8-^R^D^-¹⁹⁷^6,^6-^R^D^-¹⁵¹^{8, a}ⁿ^d^6-^R^D^-¹⁵¹^{9, v}^o^l^.³⁴^1,
^no.¹⁵^{0, J}^une^7,²⁰^04,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^w^w^.nlrb.g^o^v^/^s^h^a^r^e^d_f^ile^s^/^Boa^r^{d D}^e^cⁱ^sⁱ^ons^/³⁴¹^/^341-¹⁵^0.^p^d^f^.
⁶²^NL^RB,^D^{ana C}^o^r^p^or^ati^oⁿ^,^Se^pte^m^be^r^{29, 2}⁰⁰⁷^,^pp.^1,^9-^10.
⁶³^T^h^e^N^L^R^A⁽^S^e^c^{tion 3(}^b)⁾^a^llow^s^the^B^o^a^r^{d to}^de^le^g^a^te^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^ons^t^o^a^g^r^ou^{p of}^thr^e^e^or^m^o^r^e^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^.

bargaining contract, Shaw’s had agreed to voluntary card check recognition at newly acquired ⁶⁴
stores. Shaw’s filed a petition requesting a secret ballot election. In May 2004, an acting
regional director of the NLRB dismissed Shaw’s petition without a hearing. The Board agreed to
review the case and returned it to the regional office for a hearing. In its decision, the Board said
^T^h^{e is}^s^u^e^sⁱⁿ^thⁱ^s^cas^{e i}ⁿ^cl^u^d^{e (1) W}^h^eth^e^{r th}^{e E}^m^plo^y^{er clearl}^y^an^{d unm}ⁱ^s^tak^a^bl^y^w^aⁱ^v^ed
^th^{e righ}^{t to a B}^o^{ard electio}ⁿ^;^{(2) if}^s^o^,^w^h^et^h^e^{r pu}^blic^policy^reas^oⁿ^s^ou^t^w^eigh^t^h^e
^E^m^plo^y^er’s^priv^{ate a}^g^ree^m^eⁿ^tⁿ^o^{t to h}^a^v^e^aⁿ^election^.
The Board went on to say: “We do not resolve these issues at this stage. We merely hold that they ⁶⁵
are worthy of review.” After the hearing ordered by the Board, a regional director, in March ⁶⁶

2005, again dismissed Shaw’s petition for an election. In March 2006, the Board again agreed to ⁶⁷

review the case. As of November 24, 2008, the Board has not issued a final decision.
Once a union and employer enter into a collective bargaining agreement, election petitions are
subject to a “contract bar.” A contract of up to three years bars an election petition for the duration ⁶⁸
of the contract. The election petition may be for a decertification election or for representation
by another union.
In August 2007, the Board issued a decision allowing an employer to withdraw recognition of a
union after the third year of a longer-term contract. In January 1999, Shaw’s Supermarkets
entered into a five-year contract with the UFCW. After three years, a majority of employees
signed a petition requesting a decertification election. Instead of going forward with a
decertification election, Shaw’s withdrew recognition of the union. The action was appealed to
the NLRB.
The General Counsel of the NLRB argued that Shaw’s should not be allowed to withdraw
recognition of the union during the term of the five-year contract. The General Counsel said that,
during the term of a contract, neither the employer nor the union can file an election petition. But,
after three years of a contract of more than three years, employees or another union (but not the
employer or existing union) can file an election petition requesting decertification or
representation by another union. By a vote of 2-1, the Board disagreed with the General Counsel.
The majority members of the Board concluded that Shaw’s had acted properly when it withdrew
recognition of the union. The majority said that the employer relied on evidence of a loss of

⁶⁴^T^h^{ese cl}^au^{ses h}^a^v^e^b^een^cal^l^e^d^“af^t^e^r-^acq^uⁱ^red^st^o^r^{es” cl}^au^ses,^“ad^dⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^st^o^r^{es” cl}^au^ses,^an^d^“Kr^o^{ger” cl}^au^ses.
^T^h^e^la^tte^{r te}^r^m^{is the}^re^sult^of^{NLRB a}^{nd c}^o^ur^{t de}^cⁱ^{sions inv}^o^lv^ing^the^Krog^e^r^Com^p^aⁿ^y^.
⁶⁵^N^a^tiona^{l L}^a^bor^R^e^la^ti^ons^B^o^a^r^d,^Shaw^’^s^S^upe^r^m^ar^k^e^t^s^an^{d U}ⁿ^ite^d^Foo^d^aⁿ^d^C^o^m^m^e^r^c^{ial W}^o^r^k^e^r^s^Uⁿ^ion^L^o^c^a^l⁷⁹^1,
^AFL-CIO^{, Ca}^se^1-RM-¹²⁶⁷^,^De^c^e^m^b^e^r^{8, 2}⁰⁰⁴^,^pp^{. 1-}^{3, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^ww^.nlrb.g^o^v^/^nlrb/^s^ha^re^d_f^ile^s/de^cⁱ^sions/
³⁴³^/^343-¹⁰^5.p^d^f^.
⁶⁶^N^a^tiona^{l L}^a^bor^R^e^la^ti^ons^B^o^a^r^d,^Shaw^’^s^S^upe^r^m^ar^k^e^t^s^an^{d L}^o^c^a^l⁷⁹¹^{, U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^d^F^o^o^d^an^{d C}^o^m^m^e^r^c^{ial W}^o^r^k^e^r^s
^Un^io^n,^AF^L^-^CIO^{, Ca}^se^1-RM-¹²^67,^htt^p^://w^ww^.nlrb.g^o^v^/^nlrb/^s^ha^re^d_f^ile^s/de^cⁱ^sions/^dde^/²⁰⁰^5/^1-RM-12⁶⁷⁽^3-2²^-
⁰⁵⁾^.^pdf^.
⁶⁷^B^u^r^e^a^u^of^N^a^tio^na^{l A}^f^f^a^ir^s^,^“^N^LR^B^2-^{1 G}^r^aⁿ^ts^S^h^a^w^’^s^R^e^que^s^t^f^o^r^R^e^vⁱ^ew^{in C}^a^s^e^Iⁿ^v^o^lv^ing^A^f^te^r^-^A^c^quir^e^{d Stor}^e
^Clau^se,”^D^a^ily^La^bor^Re^por^t^{, n}^o^.^55,^Ma^r^c^{h 2}²^,²⁰⁰⁶^{, p}^.^A^-^1.
⁶⁸^NL^RB,^B^a^si^{c Gu}ⁱ^d^{e t}^o^t^h^{e NL}^R^A^{, p.}¹⁰^.

majority support for the union (i.e., signatures of a majority of employees). The dissenting ⁶⁹
member said that the NLRB should have gone forward with a decertification election.

Changes in union certification procedures may affect the level of unionization in the United ⁷⁰
States. This section summarizes the most common arguments made in favor of requiring secret
ballot elections and the most common arguments made in support of card check certification. The
section also reviews research on the effects of different union certification procedures on union
success rates.
The most common arguments made by the proponents of requiring card check certification and ⁷¹
the proponents of requiring secret ballot elections are summarized in Table 4.
Proponents of each view sometimes use similar language in support of their positions. Employers
argue that, under card check certification, employees may be pressured or coerced into signing
authorization cards and that employees may only hear the union’s point of view. On the other
hand, unions argue that, during an election campaign, employers may pressure or coerce
employees into voting against a union. Proponents of secret ballot elections argue that, unlike
signing an authorization card, casting a secret ballot is private and confidential. Unions argue
that, during an election campaign, employers have greater access to employees (e.g., captive
audience meetings and access to employees on company property). Unions argue that card check
certification is less costly than a secret ballot election. But employers maintain that unionization
may be more costly to employees, because union members must pay dues and higher union wages
may result in fewer union jobs.
Little research has been done comparing the effects of requiring card check certification versus
the effects of requiring secret ballot elections. The research that exists, however, suggests that
changes in union recognition procedures could affect the level of unionization in the United
States. Research suggests that the union success rate is greater with card check certification than
with secret ballots. Unions also undertake more unionization drives under card check
certification. The union success rate under card check certification is greater when a card check
campaign is combined with a neutrality agreement.

⁶⁹^N^a^tiona^{l L}^a^bor^R^e^la^ti^ons^B^o^a^r^d,^Shaw^’^s^S^upe^r^m^ar^k^e^t^s^,^vo^l^.³⁵⁰^,^no^.⁵⁵^,^A^u^gu^st¹⁰^,²⁰⁰⁷^,^avai^l^a^b^l^e^at
^http:^//w^w^w^.nlr^b.g^o^v^/^s^h^a^r^e^d_f^ile^s^/^B^o^a^r^d%^20D^e^cⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^/^350/^v³⁵⁰^55.^pdf^{, p}^p^.^1-^3,^7.
⁷⁰^For^a^dis^c^us^sⁱ^oⁿ^of^uⁿ^io^{n m}^e^m^b^er^s^h^{ip tr}^e^ndsⁱⁿ^t^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^,^s^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³²⁵⁵^3,^Uⁿⁱ^{on Memb}^ershⁱ^p
^Tr^e^ndsⁱⁿ^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^{, by}^G^e^ra^{ld Ma}^y^e^r.
⁷¹^T^h^{e argu}^m^eⁿ^t^{s f}^o^{r an}^d^agaiⁿ^s^t^req^uⁱ^riⁿ^g^card^ch^{eck cert}ⁱ^fⁱ^c^atⁱ^oⁿ^aⁿ^d^secret^b^a^l^l^o^t^el^ectⁱ^oⁿ^s^{are co}ⁿ^sⁱ^d^eredⁱⁿ^Hou^s^e,
^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on Educ}^a^tⁱ^{on a}^{nd t}^h^e^W^o^r^k^f^o^r^c^e^,^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on Em}^ploy^e^r^-^E^m^p^loy^e^e^R^e^la^tions^{, H}^.^R^.⁴³⁴³^,^S^ecret
^Ballo^{t Pro}^t^e^c^tion^Ac^{t o}^f²⁰⁰⁴^.

Table 4. Common Arguments Made by Proponents of Requiring Card Check
Certification and Requiring Secret Ballots
^Propo^{nents of Req}^uiring^Propo^{nents of Req}^uiring
^{Card C}^{heck Certification}^{Secret Ballot Elect}^ions
^{Card check ce}^{rtification require}^s^signatures^from^{Casting a secret}^{ballot is private and confidential. A secret}
^{more than}⁵⁰^{% of ba}^{rgaining u}^nit^{employees. A}^{ballot electi}^{on is conducted by t}^h^e^{NLRB. Under card c}^heck
^{secret ballot election is decided by a majority of}^{certification, authorization cards are controlled by the}^union.
^{workers voting.}
^{During a sec}^{ret ballot campaign, t}^{he employer}^has^{Under card c}^{heck ce}^{rtification, employees may only hea}^{r the}
^{greater acces}^{s to employees.}^{union’s point of view.}
^{Because of pote}^{ntial employer pr}^{essure or}^{Because of pote}^{ntial union pr}^ess^{ure or intimidation, some}
^intimidati^{on during a sec}^{ret ballot election, some}^{workers may f}^{eel coerced into signing aut}^{horization cards.}
^{workers may f}^{eel coerced into v}^{oting against a}
^union.
^{Employer objections ca}^{n delay a}^{secret ballot}^{Most secret}^{ballot elections are h}^{eld soon after a petition is}
^election.^filed.
^Allegati^{ons against a u}^{nion for u}ⁿ^{fair labor practices}^Allegati^{ons against an em}^{ployer f}^{or unfair labor}^practices^can
^{can be}^{addressed u}^{nder e}^{xisting law. Existing}^{be addressed u}^{nder e}^{xisting law. Existing rem}^{edies do not}
^{remedies do not deter employer}^violat^{ions of unfair}^{deter union violations of unfair la}^{bor pra}^ctices.
^{labor practices.}
^{Card check ce}^{rtification is less costly for both t}^he^{Union membe}^{rs mu}^{st pay}^u^{nion dues. Unionization may result}
^{union and em}^{ployer. If sec}^{ret ball}^{ot elections were}^{in fewer}^{union jobs.}
^{required, the}^{NLRB would have t}^o^{devote more}
^{resources to co}^{nducting election}^s.
^{Neutrality agreeme}^{nts a}^{nd card c}^{heck certification}^{An employer ma}^{y be}^pres^sured^b^y^{a corporate cam}^{paign into}
^{may lead to more cooperative labor-manageme}^nt^{accepting a}^neut^{rality agreements}^{and card c}^{heck ce}^rtification.
^relations.^{If an e}^{mployer acce}^{pts a}^neut^{rality agreement, em}^{ployees who}
^{do not want a u}^{nion may}^{hesitate to speak out.}
^Source:^{Table compiled by CRS.}
Evidence from Canada suggests that the union success rate is higher under automatic card check
recognition than under secret ballots. In Canada, each of the 10 provinces has laws governing ⁷²
union recognition. In 1976, all 10 provinces allowed card check recognition. Beginning with ⁷³
Nova Scotia in 1977, five provinces currently require secret ballot elections. British Columbia
changed from card check recognition to requiring secret ballot elections in 1984, repealed ⁷⁴
mandatory voting in 1993, and restored mandatory voting in 2001. Under mandatory voting a

⁷²^G^a^r^y^N^.^C^h^aⁱ^s^{on a}ⁿ^{d J}^o^s^e^{ph B}^.^R^o^s^e^{, “}^T^he^C^a^na^diaⁿ^P^e^r^s^pe^c^tiv^e^{on W}^o^r^k^e^r^s^’^Rⁱ^g^h^ts^to^For^m^a^Uⁿ^{ion a}^{nd B}^a^r^g^aⁱⁿ
^Co^l^l^ectⁱ^v^el^y^,^{” E}^dⁱ^t^e^d^b^y^S^h^el^d^oⁿ^F^rⁱ^e^d^m^an^,^Ri^ch^ard^W^.^Hu^rd,^Rudo^l^p^h^A^.^Oswal^d^,^an^{d Ro}ⁿ^a^l^d^L^.^S^eeb^er,ⁱⁿ^Re^storiⁿ^g
^the^Pr^om^is^e^o^f^Am^e^r^ic^an^La^bor^L^a^w^(It^h^aca,^NY:^IL^R^P^r^ess,¹⁹⁹⁴⁾^,^p^.²⁴⁴^.
⁷³^T^h^e^fⁱ^ve^Ca^na^diaⁿ^pr^ov^inc^e^s^tha^t^c^u^rre^ntly^re^quire^se^c^r^e^t^ba^{llot e}^l^e^c^{tions a}^r^e^A^l^be^rta^,^{British C}^o^l^u^m^b^ia^,
^N^e^w^f^ound^la^nd,^N^o^v^a^Sc^otia^,^aⁿ^d^Oⁿ^ta^rⁱ^{o. K}^e^it^{h G}^odin^,^Mi^la^g^r^os^Pa^la^cⁱ^os^{, J}^a^s^{on C}^l^e^m^eⁿ^s^,^Nⁱ^e^l^s^Ve^ldhu^is^{, a}ⁿ^{d A}^m^e^l^a
^K^a^r^a^be^g^o^vⁱ^c^,^“A^{n E}^m^pirⁱ^c^a^l^C^o^m^p^a^r^is^{on of}^L^a^bour^R^e^la^tions^L^a^w^s^{in C}^a^na^da^a^{nd t}^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^,”^Cen^t^{re fo}^r
^Lab^our^M^a^r^k^e^t^S^t^ate^s^{, N}^o^.^{2, Ma}^y^{2006, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^h^ttp:^//w^w^w^.^f^ra^s^e^rins^titute^.c^a^/^a^d^mⁱ^n/bo^ok^s^/^f^ile^s^/
^Em^pC^o^m^pL^R^L^.pdf^{, p.}^10.⁽^H^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^c^ite^{d a}^s^G^{odin e}^t^a^l^.,^Aⁿ^E^m^pirⁱ^c^a^{l C}^o^m^par^is^on^of^La^bo^ur^Re^latio^ns^L^a^w^sⁱⁿ
^C^ana^da^a^nd^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^.)^S^u^s^a^{n J}^o^hns^oⁿ^{, “}^T^he^I^m^pa^c^t^of^Ma^nda^tor^y^Vo^te^s^on^the^C^a^na^da^-^U^.S^{. U}ⁿ^io^{n D}^e^ns^ity
^Ga^p^:^A^N^o^t^e^,^”^I^ndus^trⁱ^a^{l Re}^l^a^ti^on^s^,^vo^l^.⁴³^,^A^p^rⁱ^l²⁰⁰⁴^,^p.³⁵^7.
⁷⁴^Be^gⁱ^nningⁱⁿ¹⁹⁹³^{, Br}^{itish C}^o^l^u^m^b^ia^e^lⁱ^m^ina^t^e^d^the^re^qui^re^m^e^{nt for se}^c^r^e^t^ba^llot^e^l^e^c^{tions. U}ⁿ^io^{n c}^e^rtif^ic^a^tion
^o^ccu^rred^w^h^en^at^l^east⁵⁵^{% o}^f^emp^l^o^y^{ees si}^gn^ed^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^zatⁱ^oⁿ^cards.^E^l^ectⁱ^oⁿ^s^w^e^{re h}^e^l^dⁱ^f⁴⁵^{% t}^o⁵⁵^{% o}^f^e^m^p^l^o^y^e^e^s
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

union must receive a majority of votes in a secret ballot election to be recognized as the
bargaining agent. Under card check recognition, a union is automatically recognized if the
number of employees who sign authorization cards meets a minimum threshold. In general, a
union is automatically recognized if more than 50% to 65% of employees, depending on the ⁷⁵
province, sign authorization cards.
A study of the union success rate under mandatory voting and automatic card check recognition
concluded that the union success rate in Canada is nine percentage points higher under card check
recognition than under secret ballots. The study examined 171 union organizing campaigns ⁷⁶
between 1978 and 1996 in nine provinces.
In the province of British Columbia, union recognition based on card checks was allowed until
1984. From 1984 through 1992, union certification required a secret ballot election. Card checks
were again allowed beginning in 1993. (As noted above, mandatory voting resumed in 2001.) The
union success rate fell almost 19 percentage points (from 93.1% to 74.5%) after mandatory voting
was adopted in 1984 and increased by about the same amount when card check recognition was
reinstated in 1993. In addition, during the period when mandatory voting was in effect, there were
about 50% fewer attempts to organize workers. After 1993, the number of union organizing ⁷⁷
drives did not return to their pre-1984 levels.
Evidence also suggests that card check recognition may be more successful under a neutrality
agreement. A study of union organizing drives in the United States concluded that union success
rates are higher when a card check agreement is combined with a neutrality agreement. The study
examined 57 card check agreements involving 294 organizing drives. Unions had a success rate
of 78.2% in drives where card check recognition was combined with a neutrality agreement and a ⁷⁸

62.5% success rate in cases where there was only a card check agreement.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^sⁱ^gⁿ^e^d^a^u^th^or^iz^a^tio^{n c}^a^r^ds^{. E}^l^e^c^tions^w^e^r^e^he^{ld w}^{ithin te}^{n da}^y^s^{, or}^a^long^e^r^pe^rⁱ^o^d^if^the^e^l^e^c^tio^{n w}^a^{s c}^ond^uc^te^d^by
^m^a^{il. C}^a^na^da^{, H}^u^m^a^{n R}^e^s^our^c^e^s^a^{nd S}^o^cⁱ^a^l^D^e^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^t,^Hi^g^h^lⁱ^g^h^t^{s o}^f^Ma^j^o^{r Devel}^o^p^m^eⁿ^t^sⁱⁿ^L^a^bour^Le^gis^l^atioⁿ
⁽^1992-¹⁹⁹³⁾^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^ww^.hrsdc^.g^c^.^c^a^/^eⁿ^/lp/^s^pila^/c^lli/^dll^c^/11_¹⁹⁹²^_1⁹⁹^3.sh^tm^{l. Be}^gⁱⁿⁿⁱⁿ^g^{in 2}⁰⁰¹^{, se}^c^r^e^t
^b^a^l^l^o^t^el^ectⁱ^oⁿ^s^w^e^{re req}^uⁱ^red^—^w^h^en^at^l^east⁴⁵^{% o}^f^em^p^l^o^y^{ees i}ⁿ^{a b}^a^rgaiⁿⁱⁿ^g^uⁿⁱ^t^si^gn^ed^a^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^zatⁱ^o^{n card}^s^.^Aⁿ
^e^l^e^c^{tion m}^u^s^t^be^he^l^d^w^ithin¹⁰^d^a^y^s^{, or}^long^e^r^if^the^v^o^te^is^c^o^nd^u^c^te^{d by}^m^a^{il. C}^a^na^da^{, H}^u^m^a^{n R}^e^sour^c^e^s^a^nd^Socⁱ^a^l
^D^e^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^t,^Hi^g^h^lⁱ^g^h^t^{s of}^Ma^j^o^{r Devel}^o^p^m^en^t^sⁱⁿ^L^a^b^o^u^r^L^e^gⁱ^sl^a^tⁱ^oⁿ⁽²⁰⁰⁰^-²⁰⁰¹⁾^,^avai^l^a^b^l^{e at}
^http:^//www^.hrsdc^.g^c^.^c^a^/^eⁿ^/^l^p/^spila^/c^lli/dllc^/^03_²⁰⁰⁰^_2⁰⁰^1.sh^tm^l.
⁷⁵^G^{odin e}^t^a^l^.,^An^Em^pirⁱ^c^a^{l C}^o^m^p^ar^is^on^of^La^bo^ur^Re^latⁱ^oⁿ^s^Law^s^{in C}^a^na^da^a^nd^the^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^State^s^{, p.}¹¹^.
⁷⁶^Sus^a^{n J}^o^hⁿ^s^oⁿ^,^“^C^a^r^{d C}^h^e^c^k^or^Ma^nda^tor^y^R^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tion^V^o^te^?^H^o^w^the^Ty^pe^of^Uⁿ^{ion R}^e^c^o^gⁿ^it^ion^Pr^oc^e^d^ur^e
^Aff^e^ct^{s Un}ⁱ^oⁿ^Certⁱ^fⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^S^u^ccess,^”^Ec^onom^ic^J^o^urⁿ^a^l^{, v}^o^l^.¹¹²^,^pp.³⁵^5-³⁵⁹^.
⁷⁷^T^h^e^da^ta^a^r^e^ba^s^e^{d on}^6,⁵⁵⁰^pr^iv^a^t^e^s^e^c^t^or^uni^on^dr^iv^e^s^f^r^om¹⁹⁷⁸^to¹⁹^98.^T^h^e^c^a^l^c^u^la^tions^of^the^uni^{on s}^u^{ccess rat}^e
^a^r^e^f^o^r^the^sⁱ^x^y^e^a^r^s^bef^o^r^e¹⁹⁸⁴^—^w^h^eⁿ^c^a^r^{d c}^h^e^c^k^r^e^c^o^gⁿ^{ition w}^a^s^{in e}^f^f^e^c^t^{, the}^nine^y^e^a^r^s^f^r^o^m¹⁹⁸⁴^to¹⁹⁹²^w^h^eⁿ
^m^a^nda^tory^v^o^ting^w^a^s^{in e}^f^f^e^c^t^{, and t}^h^e^sⁱ^x^y^e^a^r^s^f^r^o^m^{1993 t}^o¹⁹⁹⁸^a^f^te^{r c}^a^r^{d c}^h^e^c^k^re^c^o^gⁿ^{ition w}^a^s^re^s^t^ore^d^{. Chr}ⁱ^s
^Ridde^ll,^“^U^nioⁿ^Ce^rtif^ic^a^tion^Suc^c^e^{ss Unde}^{r V}^o^ting^V^e^rsus^Ca^rd-^C^he^c^k^P^r^oc^e^d^ure^s^{: Ev}^ideⁿ^c^e^f^r^o^m^{British Colum}^b^ia^,
¹⁹⁷^8-¹⁹^98,”^Iⁿ^d^u^s^t^rⁱ^al^a^nd^La^bo^r^Re^latio^ns^Re^vⁱ^e^w^{, v}^o^l.⁵⁷^{, J}^u^ly²⁰⁰^4,^pp^{. 4}^93-⁴⁹^4,⁵⁰^6-⁵⁰⁷^,⁵¹⁰^.
⁷⁸^T^h^e^suc^c^e^{ss ra}^te^w^a^s^m^e^a^s^ure^d^a^s^the^pe^rc^eⁿ^ta^g^e^of^org^a^nizⁱ^ng^c^a^m^pa^ig^{ns tha}^t^re^sulte^{d in}^uⁿ^io^{n re}^c^o^gⁿ^itio^{n. T}^h^e
^resu^l^t^sⁱⁿ^cl^ud^{e so}^m^e^agre^e^m^en^t^sⁱⁿ^t^h^e^p^u^b^lⁱ^c^sect^o^r^.^S^o^m^e^o^f^t^h^{e agree}^m^en^t^s^w^e^r^e^wⁱ^t^h^em^p^l^o^y^ers^w^h^{ere a u}ⁿⁱ^oⁿ
^r^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^te^{d ot}^he^r^w^o^r^k^e^r^s^.^Som^e^of^the^a^g^r^e^em^eⁿ^ts^w^e^r^e^w^{ith e}^m^ploy^e^r^s^w^{ith w}^h^o^m^the^uni^on^ha^dⁿ^o^e^x^is^ting
^ba^r^g^aⁱ^ning^r^e^la^tions^hip^.^Ea^to^{n a}ⁿ^{d K}^r^ie^s^k^y^,^Un^ioⁿ^Org^aⁿⁱ^zin^g^Un^d^e^{r Neu}^t^ra^lity^aⁿ^d^C^a^rd^C^h^{eck Ag}^reemen^ts^{, pp.}⁴⁵^-
^{48, 51}^-⁵^2.
^Becau^{se t}^h^{e E}^m^p^l^o^y^{ee F}^r^{ee Ch}^oⁱ^ce^A^c^t^m^a^yⁱⁿ^crea^{se t}^h^{e n}^u^m^b^e^{r of}^uⁿⁱ^oⁿⁱ^zed^w^o^rkers,^{a rep}^o^r^t^b^y^t^h^{e In}^stⁱ^t^u^t^{e f}^o^r
^Am^e^r^ic^a^’^s^f^u^ture^a^r^g^u^e^s^tha^t^{, if}^th^e^le^gⁱ^sla^{tion w}^e^re^eⁿ^a^c^t^e^d^{, 3.5 m}^illion^m^o^re^pe^{rsons w}^ould^ha^v^e^he^a^{lth ins}^u^ra^nc^e^aⁿ^d
^{2.8 m}^illio^{n m}^o^re^pe^op^le^w^ould^ha^v^e^pe^ns^{ions. A}^l^e^x^Ca^rte^r^a^{nd Eric}^L^o^tk^e^,^T^h^{e E}^m^p^l^o^{yee F}^r^{ee Ch}^oⁱ^c^e^A^c^t^:^Imp^a^c^t^oⁿ
^H^e^{alth C}^a^r^e^an^{d Pe}^nsⁱ^oⁿ^Be^ne^fit^s^,^In^stⁱ^t^u^t^{e f}^o^{r Am}^eri^c^{a’s F}^u^t^u^re,^A^p^ri^l²⁰⁰⁷^,^avai^l^a^b^l^{e at}^[^c^dn^con^.^vo^.^l^lⁿ^w^d^.ⁿ^et^/^o²^/
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

The union success rate may be higher under card check recognition because, in part, employers
have less of an opportunity to campaign against unionization. Unions may initiate more
organizing drives under card check recognition because a card check campaign costs less than a
secret ballot election. A secret ballot election may take longer than a card check campaign and ⁷⁹
employer opposition may be greater (requiring a union to expend more resources). Unions may
have a higher success rate when card check recognition is combined with a neutrality agreement
because there may be less employer opposition to unionization under a neutrality agreement.
(Some research has concluded that management opposition is a key factor affecting union success ⁸⁰
rates in NLRB conducted elections.)
Finally, two surveys provide added information about secret ballot elections and card check ⁸¹
recognition. According to a March 2006 survey conducted for the Center for Union Facts (a
business group), 75% of 1,000 persons surveyed said that they believe that a secret ballot election
is the most fair and democratic way for employees to decide whether or not to join a union. By
contrast, 12% of respondents said that card check recognition is the most fair and democratic way ⁸²
to form a union. According to a 2005 survey conducted by American Rights at Work (a labor
group), 22% of 430 workers who had gone through a union organizing campaign said that they
experienced a “great deal” of pressure from management. By contrast, 6% of workers said that
they experienced a great deal of union pressure. Among workers who signed authorization cards
in the presence of a union organizer, 5% said that the presence of the organizer made them feel ⁸³
pressure to sign the cards.
Requiring card check certification if a majority of employees sign authorization cards may
increase the union success rate. Whether or not requiring card check certification would reverse
the decline in private sector unionization in the United States is not certain. Shrinking
employment in unionized firms and decertifications may offset any increase in union membership
due to requiring card check recognition. In addition, requiring card check recognition may
increase employer opposition during the collection of authorization cards.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^f^o^tf^/^E^FCA^/^Unite^dS^ta^te^sofAm^e^ric^a^.pdf^]^.
⁷⁹^R^obe^r^t^J^.^Flaⁿ^a^g^aⁿ^{, “}^H^a^s^Ma^na^g^e^m^e^{nt Str}^a^ng^le^{d U}^.^S.^Uⁿⁱ^ons^?^,^”^J^ourⁿ^a^l^{of L}^a^b^o^r^Re^s^e^ar^c^h^{, v}^o^l^.²⁶^{, w}ⁱ^nte^r²⁰^05,^p.
^51.
⁸⁰^Ri^ch^ard^B.^F^r^eem^an^an^d^M^o^rri^s^M^.^Kl^eiⁿ^e^r,^“E^m^p^l^o^y^e^{r Beh}^a^vi^o^rⁱⁿ^t^h^{e F}^{ace o}^f^Unⁱ^o^{n Organ}ⁱ^ziⁿ^g^Dri^v^es,^”
^Iⁿ^d^u^s^t^rⁱ^al^an^{d L}^a^b^o^r^Re^la^tio^ns^R^e^vⁱ^e^w^,^vo^l^.⁴³^,^A^p^rⁱ^l¹⁹⁹⁰^,^p^.³^51.
⁸¹^Forⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion on}^the^tw^{o s}^u^r^v^e^y^s^,^s^e^e^B^u^r^e^a^u^of^N^a^tiona^{l A}^f^f^a^ir^s^,^Two^S^u^r^{veys Rea}^c^h^Differen^t^C^oⁿ^c^lu^si^oⁿ^s^oⁿ
^Ben^e^{fits o}^f^Ca^rd^Ch^{ecks, NLRB}^E^l^ectioⁿ^s^,^no.⁵⁵^{, Ma}^r^c^h²²^,²⁰^06,^{p. A}^-^5.
⁸²^T^h^e^s^u^r^v^ey^w^a^s^c^onduc^te^{d by}^the^O^pⁱⁿⁱ^oⁿ^R^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^C^o^r^p^or^a^tio^{n (}^a^s^o^cⁱ^a^l^a^{nd m}^a^r^k^e^ting^r^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^fⁱ^r^m⁾^.^C^e^nte^r^f^o^r
^Unⁱ^o^{n F}^act^s,^Natⁱ^oⁿ^wⁱ^d^{e P}^o^l^l^:^A^m^eri^c^aⁿ^s^Overwh^el^miⁿ^g^l^{y P}^r^ef^{er S}^ecret^B^a^l^l^o^t^E^l^ectⁱ^oⁿ^s^t^o^Ca^r^d^C^h^ecks^{, Ma}^r^c^{h 21}^,
²⁰⁰^{6, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^ww^.unionf^a^c^t^s.c^o^m^/^ne^w^s^.^c^fm^?ⁱ^d=^13.
⁸³^T^h^e^s^u^r^v^ey^w^a^s^pr^e^p^a^r^e^d^by^t^w^{o univ}^e^r^s^ity^pr^of^e^s^s^o^r^s^a^{nd c}^ond^uc^t^e^{d by}^the^Ea^g^l^e^t^{on R}^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^C^e^nt^e^r^a^t^R^u^tg^e^r^s
^Unⁱ^v^ersi^t^y^.^Ameri^can^Ri^gh^t^s^at^W^o^rk,^F^a^ct^{Over F}ⁱ^ctⁱ^oⁿ^:^O^p^po^si^tⁱ^o^{n t}^o^C^a^rd^C^h^{eck Do}^esn^’^t^A^d^d^Up^{, Ma}^r^c^h²⁰⁰⁶^,
^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^ww^.a^m^e^ric^aⁿ^rⁱ^g^h^tsa^t^w^o^rk^.org^.

The NLRA gives private sector workers the right to organize and bargain collectively over wages,
hours, and other working conditions. It also requires employers to bargain in good faith with a
union chosen by a majority of employees. The act says that the purpose of the law is to improve
the bargaining power of workers. This section considers whether there is an economic rationale
for protecting the rights of workers to organize and bargain collectively.
Governments may intervene in labor markets for a number of reasons. One of these reasons is to ⁸⁴
improve competition. According to standard economic theory, competitive markets generally
result in the most efficient allocation of resources, where resources consist of individuals with
different skills, capital goods (i.e., buildings and equipment and associated technology), and
natural resources. In turn, an efficient allocation of resources generally results in greater total
output and consumer satisfaction.
In competitive labor markets workers are paid according to the value of their contribution to
output. Under perfect competition, wages include compensation for unfavorable working
conditions. The latter theory, called the “theory of compensating wage differentials,” recognizes
that individuals differ in their preferences or tolerance for different working conditions—such as ⁸⁵
health and safety conditions, hours worked, holidays and annual leave, and job security.
If labor markets do not fit the model of perfect competition, increasing the bargaining power of
workers may raise wages, improve benefits (e.g., for health care and retirement), and improve
working conditions to levels that would exist under competitive conditions. In labor markets
where a firm is the only employer (called a monopsony) unionization could, within limits, ⁸⁶
increase both wages and employment.

⁸⁴^T^h^e^f^o^llowⁱ^ng^c^onditi^{ons a}^r^e^t^h^e^g^e^ne^ra^{l c}^h^a^r^a^c^t^e^r^istic^{s o}^f^a^c^o^m^p^e^titiv^e^la^{bor m}^a^rk^e^{t: (1) T}^h^e^r^e^a^r^e^m^aⁿ^y^e^m^ploy^e^r^s
^an^d^m^aⁿ^y^w^o^rkers.^E^ach^e^m^p^l^o^y^e^rⁱ^s^sm^al^l^rel^a^tⁱ^v^{e t}^o^t^h^{e si}^{ze o}^f^t^h^{e market}^.⁽²^{) E}^m^p^l^o^y^{ers an}^d^w^o^{rkers are}^f^r^e^e^t^o
^eⁿ^te^r^or^le^a^v^e^a^la^bor^m^a^r^k^e^t^a^{nd c}^aⁿ^m^o^v^e^f^r^ee^l^y^f^r^o^m^one^m^a^r^k^e^t^{to a}ⁿ^othe^r^.⁽³⁾^Em^ploy^e^r^s^{do n}^o^t^or^g^a^niz^e^{to l}^o^w^e^r
^w^a^g^e^s^a^{nd w}^o^r^k^e^r^s^{do n}^o^t^or^g^a^niz^e^{to r}^a^is^e^w^a^g^e^s^.^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nts^{do n}^o^{t i}ⁿ^te^r^v^eⁿ^e^{in la}^bor^m^a^r^k^e^t^s^t^o^r^e^g^u^la^te^w^a^g^e^s^.
⁽⁴^{) E}^m^p^l^o^y^{ers an}^d^w^o^rker^{s h}^a^ve^eq^u^a^l^{access t}^o^l^a^b^o^r^m^a^r^k^etⁱⁿ^f^o^rmatⁱ^oⁿ^.⁽⁵^{) E}^m^p^l^o^y^{ers d}^oⁿ^o^t^p^r^e^f^{er o}ⁿ^e^w^o^rker
^ov^e^r^a^nothe^r^e^qua^lly^qua^lif^ie^{d w}^o^r^k^e^r^{. W}^o^r^k^e^r^s^{do not}^pr^e^f^e^r^one^e^m^plo^y^e^r^ov^e^r^a^nothe^r^e^m^ploy^e^r^w^ho^pa^y^s^the^s^a^m^e
^w^a^g^e^f^o^r^the^s^a^m^e^kⁱ^{nd of}^w^o^r^k^{. (}⁶⁾^Em^ploy^e^r^s^s^e^e^k^{to m}^a^xⁱ^mⁱ^z^e^pr^of^its^{; w}^o^r^k^e^r^s^s^e^ek^{to m}^a^xⁱ^mⁱ^z^e^s^a^tis^f^a^c^{tion. L}^l^oy^d^th
^G^.^R^e^y^nolds^{, Sta}ⁿ^le^y^H^.^Ma^s^t^e^r^s^,^a^{nd C}^o^lle^tta^H^.^M^o^s^e^r^,^L^a^b^o^r^Ec^o^nom^ic^s^a^nd^La^bor^Re^lati^ons^{, 11}^e^d^{. (}^E^ng^le^w^ood
^Cliff^s^{, N.J.: Pre}ⁿ^tic^e^-^Ha^{ll, 1}⁹⁹⁸^),^pp.¹⁶^-2^1.
⁸⁵^R^a^nda^{ll K}^.^File^r^,^D^aⁿⁱ^e^l^{S. H}^a^m^e^r^m^e^s^{h, a}^{nd A}^l^be^r^t^{E. R}^e^e^s^,^T^h^e^E^c^onom^ic^s^o^f^W^o^r^k^a^nd^Pay^{, 6}^th^e^d^{., N}^e^w^Y^o^rk^:
^Ha^rpe^r^Collins^,¹⁹⁹⁶^,^pp^{. 3}^76-³⁹^{0. Ro}^na^ld^G^.^Ehre^nbe^rg^aⁿ^d^Ro^be^{rt S. Sm}^ith,^M^o^de^rⁿ^La^bor^Ec^oⁿ^o^m^ic^s^:^The^o^r^y^a^nd^th
^Public^Polic^y^{, 7}^e^d^{. (}^R^e^a^d^ing^,^MA^:^A^ddis^on-^W^e^s^l^ey^{, 200}⁰⁾^,^pp^.²⁵^1-²⁵⁹^.⁽^H^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^c^ite^{d a}^s^Eh^r^e^nbe^r^g^a^{nd Sm}^ith,
^M^ode^rⁿ^L^a^b^o^r^Ec^o^nom^ic^s^.)
⁸⁶^B^r^uc^e^{E. K}^a^uf^m^a^n,^The^Ec^on^omⁱ^c^s^{of La}^bor^M^a^r^k^e^t^s^{, 4}^th^e^d^{. (}^F^or^t^W^o^r^t^{h: D}^r^y^d^eⁿ^P^r^e^s^s^,¹⁹⁹⁴⁾^,^p^p^.²⁷⁷^-²^80.
^(Hereiⁿ^a^f^t^{er ci}^t^e^d^{as Kau}^f^m^aⁿ^,^The^Ec^on^om^ic^s^of^La^bor^M^a^r^k^e^t^s^.)

On the other hand, increasing the bargaining power of employees in competitive labor markets
may result in a misallocation of resources—and reduce total economic output and consumer
satisfaction. In competitive labor markets, higher union wages may reduce employment for union ⁸⁷
workers below the levels that would exist in the absence of unionization. If unions lower
employment in the unionized sector, they may increase the supply of workers to employers in the ⁸⁸
nonunion sector, lowering the relative wages of nonunion workers.
It is difficult, however, to determine the competitiveness of labor markets. First, identifying the
appropriate labor market may be difficult. Labor markets can be local (e.g., for unskilled labor),
regional, national, or international (e.g., for managerial and professional workers). Second,
measuring the competitiveness of labor markets is difficult. Finally, labor markets may change ⁸⁹
over time because of demographic, economic, technological, or other changes.
A second reason governments may intervene in labor markets is to reduce earnings inequality.⁹⁰
Competitive labor markets may allocate resources efficiently, but they may result in a distribution
of earnings that some policymakers find unacceptable. Unionization may be a means of reducing
earnings inequality. Some economists argue that, during a recession, greater earnings equality
may increase aggregate demand and, therefore, reduce unemployment.
Finally, some economists maintain that unions give workers a “voice” in the workplace.
According to this argument, unions provide workers an additional way to communicate with
management. For instance, instead of expressing their dissatisfaction with an employer by
quitting, workers can use dispute resolution or formal grievance procedures to resolve issues ⁹¹
relating to pay, working conditions, or other matters.

⁸⁷^{In c}^o^m^p^e^titiv^e^la^{bor m}^a^rk^e^t^{s, uni}^{ons c}^aⁿ^of^f^s^e^t^the^e^m^plo^y^m^e^{nt e}^ffe^c^t^of^hig^h^e^r^w^a^g^e^{s b}^y^tr^yⁱ^ng^{to p}^e^rsua^de
^c^ons^um^e^r^s^{to buy}^uni^on-m^a^de^g^oods^(e^.g^{., c}^a^m^pa^ig^ns^{to “}^l^o^o^k^f^o^{r the}^un^io^{n la}^be^l”^{), l}ⁱ^m^iting^c^o^m^p^e^tⁱ^tion^f^r^om^f^o^re^igⁿ
^m^a^de^g^oods⁽^e^.g^{., t}^h^o^u^g^h^ta^rⁱ^f^f^s^or^im^por^{t q}^uota^s⁾^,^or^ne^g^o^tia^tⁱ^ng^c^ontr^a^c^t^s^tha^t^r^e^qui^r^e^m^o^r^e^w^o^r^k^e^r^s^thaⁿ^w^oul^d
^othe^r^w^is^e^be^ne^e^d^e^d^{. K}^a^uf^m^a^n,^The^Ec^on^om^ic^s^of^La^bor^M^a^r^k^e^t^s^,^pp.²⁷^6-²⁷⁷^{. E}^h^r^e^nbe^r^g^aⁿ^{d Sm}^ith,^Mod^e^rn^L^a^bo^r
^Ec^onom^ic^s^,^p.⁴⁹^{3. T}^o^k^e^Aⁱ^{dt a}ⁿ^{d Za}^fⁱ^rⁱ^s^T^z^a^nna^tos^,^Uⁿ^io^ns^aⁿ^d^C^o^lle^c^tiv^e^Bar^g^ainⁱ^ng^:^Ec^o^nom^ic^Effe^c^t^sⁱⁿ^{a G}^l^ob^al
^Eⁿ^vi^roⁿ^m^ent⁽^W^a^s^hing^ton^:^T^h^e^W^o^r^l^{d B}^a^nk^{, 2}⁰⁰²⁾^,^p.²⁷^.
⁸⁸^I^f^unioⁿ^s^r^a^is^e^the^w^a^g^e^s^o^f^unioⁿ^w^o^r^k^e^r^s^a^{nd low}^e^r^em^ploy^m^e^{nt in t}^h^e^uⁿ^io^{n s}^e^c^t^or^,^the^s^u^pp^ly^of^w^o^r^k^e^r^s
^a^v^a^ila^ble^{to no}^nuⁿⁱ^{on e}^m^ploy^e^r^s^m^a^y^inc^r^e^a^s^e^,^re^sultingⁱⁿ^g^r^e^a^t^e^r^c^o^m^p^e^{tition f}^o^{r jo}^{bs a}ⁿ^{d l}^o^w^e^r^wa^g^e^s^f^o^{r non}^uni^on
^w^o^rk^e^r^{s (the}^“^s^pillov^e^r”^e^f^f^e^c^t^).^{On the}^othe^r^haⁿ^d^,^no^nu^nioⁿ^e^m^ploy^e^r^{s, in orde}^{r t}^o^disc^oura^g^e^w^o^rk^e^r^s^f^r^o^m
^uni^onizⁱ^ng^{, m}^a^y^pay^hig^h^e^r^w^a^g^e^s⁽^t^he^“^t^hr^e^a^t^”^e^f^f^e^c^t⁾^.^Ehr^e^nbe^r^g^a^{nd Sm}^ith,^Mod^e^rn^La^bo^{r E}^c^on^omi^c^s^{, pp.}⁵⁰^4-⁵⁰^8.
⁸⁹^Ka^ufm^a^{n a}^r^g^u^e^s^tha^t^la^{bor m}^a^rke^t^{s in t}^h^e^Unite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^ha^v^e^be^c^o^m^e^m^o^re^c^o^m^p^e^titiv^e^sinc^e^W^o^{rld W}^a^{r II. Bruc}^e^E.
^K^a^uf^m^a^{n, “}^L^a^bor^’^s^Iⁿ^e^qua^li^ty^of^B^a^r^g^aⁱ^ning^Pow^e^r^:^C^h^aⁿ^g^e^s^ov^e^r^Tⁱ^m^e^a^{nd I}^m^plic^a^tions^f^o^r^Publ^ic^Polic^y^,^”^J^our^nal
^o^f^L^a^bo^{r Resea}^r^ch^{, v}^o^l^.¹⁰^{, s}^u^m^m^e^r¹⁹⁸^9,^pp.²^92-²⁹^3.
⁹⁰^G^o^vern^m^eⁿ^t^s^m^a^y^al^soⁱⁿ^t^e^rven^{e i}ⁿ^p^rⁱ^v^at^{e m}^a^r^k^et^{s t}^o^p^r^o^d^u^{ce “pu}^b^lⁱ^{c” go}^od^{s (e.}^g^.^,ⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^d^e^f^eⁿ^s^{e) o}^r^co^rrect
^ins^t^aⁿ^c^e^s^w^h^e^r^e^the^m^a^r^k^e^t^pr^ic^e^of^a^g^{ood d}^o^e^sⁿ^o^{t f}^u^lly^r^e^f^l^e^c^t^its^s^o^cⁱ^a^l^c^o^s^t^s^or^be^ne^f^its^—^c^a^lle^{d, r}^e^s^p^e^c^tiv^e^l^y^,
^ne^g^a^tiv^e^a^{nd positiv}^e^“^e^x^te^rna^liti^e^s^.”^Aⁱ^{r a}^{nd wa}^te^{r pollu}^tio^{n a}^r^e^f^r^e^que^ntly^c^ite^{d a}^s^e^x^a^m^ple^s^of^ne^ga^tiv^e^e^x^te^rna^litie^s;
^hom^e^m^a^inte^na^nc^e^a^{nd im}^prov^e^m^eⁿ^{ts a}^r^e^of^te^{n c}^ite^{d a}^s^e^x^a^m^ple^s^of^positiv^e^e^x^te^rna^litie^s.
⁹¹^Rⁱ^c^h^a^r^{d B}^.^Fr^e^e^m^aⁿ^a^{nd J}^a^m^e^s^{L. Me}^d^o^f^f^,^“T^he^Tw^{o Fa}^c^e^s^of^Uⁿ^ionis^m^,”^Public^Iⁿ^te^re^st^{, n}^o^.^57,^f^a^{ll 1}⁹⁷⁹^,^pp.⁷⁰^-
⁷³^.^Rⁱ^ch^ard^B^.^F^r^eem^an^,^“T^h^e^E^xⁱ^t^-^Voⁱ^{ce T}^r^ad^eo^ffⁱⁿ^t^h^{e L}^a^b^o^r^Market^:^Unⁱ^oⁿⁱ^sm^,^Jo^b^T^eⁿ^u^r^e,^Q^uⁱ^t^s,^an^d
^Se^pa^r^a^tions^,”^Q^uar^te^r^l^y^J^our^nal^{of Ec}^o^nom^ic^s^{, v}^o^l^.⁹⁴^{, J}^une¹⁹^80,^pp.⁶^44-⁶⁴^5.

The economic impact of requiring card check certification or secret ballot elections may rest on
the desired objectives of policymakers.
By bargaining collectively, unionized workers may obtain higher wages, improved benefits, and ⁹²
better working conditions than if each worker bargained individually. But, depending on how
well labor markets fit the model of perfect competition, collective bargaining may improve or
harm the allocation of resources (i.e., economic efficiency). If labor markets are competitive,
increasing the bargaining power of workers may reduce economic output and consumer
satisfaction, but may increase equality. On the other hand, if labor markets are not competitive,
increasing the bargaining power of workers may improve the allocation of resources as well as ⁹³
increase equality.
By requiring card check certification, the number of organizing campaigns and the union success
rate may increase. Conversely, by requiring secret ballot elections, the number of organizing
drives and the union success rate may decline. Thus, compared with existing recognition
procedures, requiring secret ballot elections may lower the level of unionization, whereas
requiring card check certification may raise it. Accordingly, depending on the competitiveness of
labor markets, requiring card check certification may either improve or harm economic
efficiency. Similarly, requiring secret ballot elections may either improve or harm efficiency. If
either change were enacted, it may be difficult, however, to predict or measure the size of the
effects.
Regardless of the competitiveness of labor markets, requiring secret ballot elections may increase
earnings inequality—if fewer workers are unionized. Requiring card check certification may
reduce inequality—if more workers are unionized. Again, the size of the effects may be difficult
to predict or measure.
^Geral^d^May^e^r
^An^al^y^s^{t i}ⁿ^L^a^b^o^r^P^o^licy
^gm^a^y^er^@^c^rs^.l^oc.g^ov^{, 7-}⁷⁸¹⁵

⁹²^Bargaiⁿⁱⁿ^g^b^e^t^w^een^e^m^p^l^o^y^{ers a}ⁿ^d^w^o^{rkers i}ⁿ^cl^u^d^e^{s t}^h^{e ri}^gh^t^o^f^w^o^rker^{s t}^o^st^ri^{ke (i}ⁿ^t^h^{e p}^rⁱ^v^at^{e s}^ect^o^{r) an}^d^t^h^{e ri}^gh^t
^of^em^ploy^e^r^s^{to loc}^k^o^u^{t e}^m^ploy^ee^s^.
⁹³^T^h^e^r^e^s^u^lts^of^r^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^{on the}^w^a^g^e^dif^f^e^r^eⁿ^tia^{l be}^tw^e^eⁿ^uni^{on a}ⁿ^d^no^nu^nioⁿ^w^o^r^k^e^r^s^v^a^r^y^{. B}^u^{t, in g}^e^ne^r^a^{l, m}^o^s^t
^st^u^dⁱ^{es f}ⁱⁿ^d^t^h^at^,^af^t^e^{r co}ⁿ^t^r^o^l^lⁱⁿ^g^f^o^{r i}ⁿ^dⁱ^vi^du^al^,^j^o^b,^an^{d l}^a^bo^{r m}^a^r^k^et^ch^aract^eri^s^tⁱ^c^s,^t^h^{e wage}^{s o}^f^uⁿⁱ^on^w^o^{rkers are}
^{in t}^h^e^r^a^ng^e^of^10%^to³⁰^%^hig^h^e^r^thaⁿ^the^w^a^g^e^s^o^f^non^uni^{on w}^o^r^k^e^r^s^.^A^lthoug^h^the^e^v^ideⁿ^c^e^isⁿ^o^t^c^onc^lusⁱ^v^e^{, s}^o^m^e
^s^t^udie^s^ha^v^e^c^onc^l^ude^d^tha^t^un^ioⁿ^s^re^duc^e^e^a^r^ning^s^ine^q^ua^lity^{in th}^e^ov^e^r^a^{ll e}^c^onom^y^.^{CRS Re}^port^RL³²⁵⁵^3,^Union
^Memb^ershⁱ^p^T^r^en^d^sⁱⁿ^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^es^{, by}^G^e^ra^{ld Ma}^y^e^r.