Public Diplomacy: A Review of Past Recommendations

CRS Report for Congress
Public Diplomacy: A Review of Past
Recommendations
Updated October 31, 2005
Susan B. Epstein
Specialist in Foreign Policy and Trade
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Lisa Mages
Information Research Specialist
Knowledge Services Group

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Public Diplomacy: A Review of Past Recommendations
Summary
Public diplomacy has been officially acknowledged as a tool in the foreign
policy arsenal since World War I. Later, during World War II, it became part of the
U.S. government structure when in 1942 the President issued an executive order to
create the Office of War Information (OWI). OWI aired the first Voice of America
program on February 24, 1942, in Europe. These activities were carried out without
any authority or formal recognition by Congress.
More recently, during the post-Cold War era of the 1990s, public diplomacy was
viewed as a low priority, and was often seen by lawmakers as a source of funds to tap
for other programs. This culminated in 1999 when Congress abolished the agency
primarily concerned with public diplomacy — the U.S. Information Agency (USIA)
— and merged its public diplomacy functions into the Department of State.
Following the elimination of the USIA and after the September 11, 2001 attacks,
U.S. government officials, foreign policy experts, and academicians began to assess
the direction of, and the increased need for, public diplomacy.
This report looks at 29 articles and studies on public diplomacy that have been
identified by the Department of State as being credible reports with valuable
suggestions. Various recommendations from these studies are similar. This report
organizes the recommendations and provides a brief discussion of them. CRS takes
no position on the recommendations.
This report will not be updated.

Contents
In troduction ......................................................1
Background ..................................................1
The Public Diplomacy Matrix....................................2
General Recommendation Comparisons................................7
Define Overall Strategy.........................................7
Presidential Directive/Reorganize Public Diplomacy at the White House..7
Create a New Agency...........................................8
Reorganize Public Diplomacy at the Department of State...............8
Redefine the Role of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy...9
Increase Embassy Involvement..................................10
Coordination ................................................10
Increase Financial and Human Resources..........................11
Increase Public Diplomacy and/or Language Training................11
Increase Technology Use.......................................11
Increase Private Sector Involvement..............................11
Improve Communication.......................................12
Increase Exchanges and Libraries................................13
Increase Oversight............................................13
Broadcasting Recommendation Comparisons...........................15
Define Overall Objectives......................................15
Reorganize Broadcasting.......................................15
Develop Rapid Response to Anti-American Messages................16
Bring Broadcasting Board of Governors under White House...........16
Special Attention to Arab/Muslim Populations......................16
More Resources..............................................16
New Technologies............................................17
Combat Jamming.............................................17
Appendix A — Reports............................................18
Appendix B — Recommendations by Report...........................21
List of Tables
Table 1. Key Recommendations for Public Diplomacy Reform .............4
Table 2. Key Recommendations for International Broadcasting............14

Public Diplomacy: A Review of Past
Recommendations
Introduction
Background
Public diplomacy is the promotion of America’s interests, culture, and policies
by informing and influencing foreign populations. From 1977 to the 1990s, all
functions of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the USIA’s
international information and broadcasting activities merged to become the
International Communication Agency (ICA). Subsequently, in 1982, Section 303(b)
of P.L. 97-241 renamed ICA to be the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). In 1994, the
international broadcasting activities were consolidated by Title III, P.L. 103-236 and
administered by a new entity referred to as the Broadcasting Board of Governors. As
of October 1, 1999, USIA was abolished and its functions were merged back into the
Department of State.
Currently, public diplomacy primarily consists of three categories of activities:
(1) international information programs, (2) educational and cultural exchange
programs, and (3) international nonmilitary broadcasting. The Under Secretary of
State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs administers the Bureau for
International Information Programs and the Bureau for Educational and Cultural
Affairs, while the Broadcasting Board of Governors manages and oversees
international broadcasting. Other public diplomacy efforts involve the White House,
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of
Defense (DOD).
After the abolishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1999
and the terrorist attacks two years later, the U.S. government expedited
implementation of public diplomacy to help win its war on terrorism. Some
observers noted as evidence that the Administration was new at conducting public
diplomacy when immediately after 9/11 it referred to the U.S. response as “Operation
Enduring Crusade,” a name that experts pointed out could be viewed by Muslims as
inflammatory.”¹
Over the past four years, the Bush Administration has taken numerous actions
to improve the effectiveness of its public diplomacy. For example, in November

2001, two months after the terrorist attacks, the Bush Administration created the

¹ Bin Laden referred to the crusades (undertaken by the Christians of Europe in the 11^th, 12^th
and 13^th centuries to recover the Holy Land from the Muslims) as one of the historical issues
for which he was trying to retaliate.

Coalition Information Center (CIC) headquartered in the Old Executive Office
Building. The CIC, which was touted by the Administration as public diplomacy,
coordinated U.S. government agency press conferences and talking points, dispersing
them rapidly and around-the-clock worldwide. Soon thereafter, the President created,
by Executive Order, the Office of Global Communications (OGC), which replaced
the CIC with a primary mission to “coordinate strategic communications with global
audiences.”² Also, then-National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice established a
Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) in September 2002.
The PCC mission was to coordinate interagency activities, develop the White House
message, and disseminate it abroad.
More recently, the President created the Muslim World Outreach Policy
Coordinating Committee in July 2004 which replaced the Strategic Communications
Policy Coordinating Committee. The State Department also established an Office
of Policy, Planning, and Resources in the Office of the Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs.
Informally in 2002 and officially in 2003, the Pentagon created the Office of
Strategic Influence (OSI) to oversee military propaganda and other information
related to the war on terrorism. The Secretary of Defense dissolved OSI after press
coverage claimed the Office was to place disinformation deliberately in foreign
media. In October 2003, the Department of Defense issued Information Operations
Roadmap which involves the direction that DOD wants to take in public diplomacy
and other information operations. DOD has appointed its Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy as the Defense point person for public diplomacy and will be
continuing to define DOD’s role in public diplomacy.
USAID became more involved in public diplomacy after the 9/11 Commission
reported to Congress that some of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid had very
strong anti-American sentiment among its population. Since 2004, USAID has acted
to more prominently inform U.S. aid recipients that the aid they have received was
a gift from American taxpayers. Also, by establishing a State-USAID Policy Council
and a Public Diplomacy Working Group, it has established closer ties with the
Department of State and embassies around the world to publicize America’s
humanitarian and development aid initiatives.
The Public Diplomacy Matrix
Since 1999, U.S. public diplomacy has been rigorously examined to determine
whether improved methods, structure, and goals could help the United States win the
war on terrorism. This report reviews 29 articles and studies on public diplomacy
that have been identified by the Department of State as being credible reports with
valuable suggestions and compares the recommendations.
These 29 documents, listed in reverse chronological order from 2005 to 1999
in Appendix A, vary in scope, depth, and purpose. Some focus on public diplomacy

² New White House Office Coordinates Global Communications, White House Press
Release, January 21, 2003.

and include numerous, specific recommendations; others are more general in nature
and deal with public diplomacy in the context of broader foreign policy issues. Some
reports represent the consensus of a group of authors; others state the views of a
series of individuals. For the purposes of this review, each document has been given
an abbreviation, for example, “PDC” for the Public Diplomacy Council, to make it
easier to identify. Appendix B provides each report’s specific recommendations.
Following in Table 1 is a matrix indicating the major recommendations of all
29 reports. (Note, however, that the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP1) report from 2003
did not have relevant recommendations for this review.) The matrix lists 14
categories of recommendations that appeared most frequently. A second matrix in
Table 2 lists only those reports that include specific recommendations concerning
international broadcasting. A brief discussion of recommendation similarities and
differences follows each matrix. Note that this discussion deals only with the
content of the documents. An author or organization listed in the Appendix may
have written on public diplomacy at an earlier or a later date, and the views expressed
in a particular document may not represent those of the organization that published
the document. (For more detail on public diplomacy, in general, please see CRS
Report RL32607, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations, by Susan B. Epstein.)

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General Recommendation Comparisons
From 1999 through 2005 numerous reports, articles, studies, and op-ed pieces
have been written touting the importance of public diplomacy as a foreign policy tool
and focusing on how the United States government can improve its public diplomacy
operations to help win the war on terrorism. Among the many writings are the 29
considered here. (See Appendix A for a reverse chronological list of the reports
included in this CRS review.)
Define Overall Strategy
Several reports suggest that the Administration has not sufficiently defined or
verbalized an overall strategy for the use of public diplomacy to both improve the
U.S. image around the world, but also counter the threat of terrorism against
Americans. The 9/11 Commission Report states that the United States should
identify what it stands for and communicate that message clearly. Of the ten reports
that recommend defining an overall strategy, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) reports that the United States needs to do a better job of defining its public
diplomacy message, and that while the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) does
have a strategy for its broadcasting activities, the Department of State (DOS) does not
have an integrated strategy for its public diplomacy operations. GAO states that the
“absence of an interagency strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent
messages.” Furthermore, GAO offers that the Administration needs to define public
diplomacy success and determine how it can be measured.
The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World
report recommends that the White House establish strategic goals and oversee the
implementation of programs that meet those goals. The U.S. Advisory Commission
on Public Diplomacy study claims that the State Department lacks authority to
implement an overall strategy for the various agencies engaged in public diplomacy
and recommends that the DOS Policy, Planning and Resources Office coordinate all
public diplomacy efforts. The Heritage Foundation recommends that the U.S.
government view public diplomacy as a long-term effort, saying that public
diplomacy should be “enshrined in a doctrine that emphasizes consistent efforts.”
The more recent Council on Foreign Relations report recommends rethinking how
the United States formulates, strategizes, and communicates its foreign policy and
should “move public diplomacy from the margins to the center of foreign policy
making.” The National War College report notes a “lack of strategic planning,” and
the earlier Council on Foreign Relations study says there is an absence of an overall
strategy and recommends the Administration develop a coherent strategic and
coordinating framework for public diplomacy activities.
Presidential Directive/Reorganize Public Diplomacy at the
White House
Ten of the studies discuss the White House taking a more proactive role in
promoting public diplomacy, coordinating public diplomacy activities throughout the
executive branch agencies, and reorganizing or initiating public diplomacy task
forces or coordinating committees at the White House. For example, reports by the

Defense Science Board Task Force and the Council on Foreign Relations urge the
President to issue a directive to strengthen the importance of communication and
public diplomacy and coordinate all activities through the White House. The
Heritage Foundation also recommends that inter-agency coordination of public
diplomacy activities be carried out through the White House. The Advisory Group
on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World report recommends the
President appoint a cabinet-level Special Counselor to the President for Public
Diplomacy. This person would, in consultation with the President and other
agencies, establish strategic goals and messages, and oversee the implementation of
programs that meet those stated goals, the report suggests. Similar ideas are offered
by the Public Diplomacy Council which suggests that a cabinet level Interagency
Committee on Public Diplomacy should be established by Presidential Directive,
cochaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor for Communication and the
Director of a new U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy (USAPD).
Create a New Agency
Several of the studies suggest that the existing public diplomacy structure at the
Department of State is not working. The Washington Post op-ed piece by Marks,
Wick, Gelb, and Catto states that “shutting down the USIA was a major mistake,”
a sentiment that has been expressed by others in recent years.³ The op-ed piece goes
on to say that public diplomacy is not very effective under DOS and “the re-creation
of an effective instrument of public diplomacy has been urged by many.” Other
reports propose establishing an entirely new agency to have primary responsibility
for U.S. public diplomacy activities and coordination with other government entities.
The Council on Foreign Relations recommends establishing a Corporation for Public
Diplomacy to be modeled after the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. The Public
Diplomacy Council suggests establishing an agency, the U.S. Agency for Public
Diplomacy (USAPD), within the Department of State and the National Security
process. The Defense Science Board reports that the President should establish a
permanent strategic communications structure within the National Security Council
(NSC). That report goes on to state that “the President should work with Congress
to establish and fund a non-profit, non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication
to support the NSC, departments, and organizations represented on a newly-
recommended Strategic Communication Committee.”
Reorganize Public Diplomacy at the Department of State
Since the 1999 elimination of the USIA, numerous experts and observers have
critiqued how the Department of State has conducted public diplomacy. According
to the GAO, public diplomacy activities at State are fragmented among various
organizational entities within the Department, with insufficient direction from the
top. Many of the studies here agree that public diplomacy in the Department of State
could be working better, but there are differing views as to how DOS should improve
it.

³ For example, Congressman Frank Wolf, Chairman of the Commerce, Justice, State
Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee expressed this view at a hearing on
Public Diplomacy February 4, 2004.

The 2002 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy report says there
should be a review of the 1999 consolidation of USIA into State with the Secretary
of State making recommendations on new training, location, and reporting structure
of public diplomacy personnel at the Department. The Defense Science Board’s
2004 report recommends redefining the role of the Under Secretary of State for
Public Diplomacy to be policy advisor and manager. Furthermore, it suggests raising
the public diplomacy office Directors to the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary or
Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary. The report urges DOS to strengthen the
Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) with an Assistant Secretary and
modernize and diversify its products.
The Heritage Foundation suggests restoring the independent reporting and
budget channels that public diplomacy lost during the USIA merger and recreating
a public diplomacy hierarchy within the Department of State as previously existed
at USIA.
Another suggestion by author William Kiehl proposes creating a new public
diplomacy organization within the State Department, including a new Bureau of
Public Diplomacy Operations. Also, he writes, “regional bureaus must include senior
public diplomacy officers at least at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level.”
The Hart/Rudman Commission recommends repealing laws that establish an
Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and having some of those functions migrate
to an Assistant Secretary level official reporting directly to the Secretary of State.
Other functions could be folded into the Assistant Secretary for Economic and
Transnational Affairs, according to the Commission. Overhauling the Foreign
Service system, including ending the oral exam’s policy so that applicants could be
better matched to particular cones, like public diplomacy, would be beneficial, the
Commission asserts.
Beyond reorganizing public diplomacy at State, several of the reports refer to
the need for a new “culture” at State: seeking to change the perception that public
diplomacy personnel are second class citizens in the Department; recruiting and
hiring practices that would encourage public diplomacy skills to be highly valued;
and a “much more open approach in which innovation trumps the caution,” according
to the National War College report.
Redefine the Role of the Under Secretary of State
for Public Diplomacy
Six of the studies refer to the need for redefining the role of the Under Secretary
of State for Public Diplomacy. Most call for strengthening the role, the chain of
authority leading to the Under Secretary, and the authority to make decisions
regarding public diplomacy funding, policy, personnel, and direction. In contrast, the
Hart/Rudman Commission recommends repealing the laws establishing an Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and having some of those functions migrate to an
Assistant Secretary-level officer reporting directly to the Secretary of State. Other
public diplomacy functions should become the responsibility of the Assistant
Secretary for Economic and Transnational Affairs, the Commission said.

Increase Embassy Involvement
Several reports speak of a need to increase embassy involvement in public
diplomacy activities. Suggestions include expanding U.S. diplomats’ personal
contacts in the host country, sending the message from the top tiers of the
Administration and the Department of State that public diplomacy is central to U.S.
foreign policy, and requiring at least one tour in a public diplomacy assignment for
Foreign Service Officers to be promoted to Senior Foreign Service Officers or Chief
of Mission. Another suggestion involves embassies maintaining networks of
individuals (such as former Peace Corps volunteers, exchange students, and retired
Foreign Service Officers) who could be tapped to help portray America in the best
light.
Coordination
Several studies suggest a lack of coordination of U.S. government public
diplomacy activities by the White House and within the Department of State. The
U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy notes that there have been attempts
to improve coordination, citing the January 2003 creation of the Office of Global
Communications within the White House, as well as the September 2002 formation
of the Strategic Communication Policy Coordination Committee and the December

2002 interagency Strategic Communications Fusion Team. Nevertheless,

coordination is still inadequate, according to several of the reports.
Recommendations on improving government coordination of public diplomacy
entities and programs include
(1) the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy suggests assigning the State
Department’s Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources with the responsibility for
overseeing the strategic planning of all public diplomacy programming and
resources;
(2) the Heritage Foundation seeks better coordination through the White House,
specifically through the Office of Global Communications;
(3) the Public Diplomacy Council recommends that a new U.S. Agency for Public
Diplomacy be responsible for coordinating all U.S. government public diplomacy
efforts and establish an Interagency Committee on PD at the Cabinet level to
coordinate and direct the national PD strategy;
(4) the Council on Foreign Relations recommends that a coherent strategic and
coordinating framework for public diplomacy be developed, including a presidential
directive on public diplomacy and a Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure led by
the president’s personal designee;
(5) the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World advises
a strengthening of the role of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy to coordinate
government-wide public diplomacy activities, review country program plans with
respect to public diplomacy, allocate human and financial resources, and play a role

in performance evaluations. The Group asserts that strengthening the Under
Secretary’s role is essential.
Increase Financial and Human Resources
About half of the reports state that public diplomacy resources are inadequate
and call for increased monetary and human resources. The Council on Foreign
Relations said that funding should be increased to “significantly higher levels” to be
more in line with public diplomacy’s role as a vital component of U.S. foreign policy
and national security. The Council put forth the idea of establishing a Public
Diplomacy Reserve Corps patterned after FEMA’s disaster-relief model. The Public
Diplomacy Council specifically recommends a 300% increase in public diplomacy
overseas staffing and a four-fold budget increase over five years. Some, such as the
Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, state that
additional professional staff dedicated only to Arab and Muslim issues would be
valuable.
Increase Public Diplomacy and/or Language Training
Coupled with the view since 9/11 that public diplomacy is an essential tool in
U.S. foreign policy and national security is the belief that all personnel involved with
conducting U.S. foreign policy should be trained about the importance of public
diplomacy and given skills needed to fully utilize public diplomacy effectively. The
Council on Foreign Relations states that there is a deficit of trained professionals
regarding public diplomacy. GAO suggests expanding public diplomacy and foreign
language training of Foreign Service Officers; the Council on Foreign Relations
offers the idea of establishing an independent public diplomacy training institute;
and the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World
recommends that all State Department personnel receive public diplomacy training.
Taking that a step further, the Foreign Policy Association argues that “public affairs
diplomacy officers should be encouraged to develop language fluency and country
and regional expertise and should not be rotated among regions like other FSOs
[Foreign Service Officers].”
Increase Technology Use
Most of the eight reports that speak about increased, more effective, and creative
uses of technology referred to use of the Internet. For example, the National War
College report states that there are “deficiencies in information technologies and the
mindsets needed to integrate new technologies into the conduct of diplomacy.... State
Department needs to learn how to leverage the Internet’s capabilities and potential
in the conduct of diplomacy.” In addition, some reports promote increased satellite
broadcasting and more creative use of all available information technologies.
Increase Private Sector Involvement
Some studies make the observation that the private sector has many advantages
in getting things done quickly, being highly effective, and efficient in influencing
people. By incorporating the best practices of the private sector in U.S. government

public diplomacy activities, it is believed that public diplomacy can become a more
valuable foreign policy tool. RAND suggested that “outsourcing” public diplomacy
would put some distance between a “favorable message and an unfavorable
messenger,” and that identifying private sector talents could be motivated through a
competitive bidding process. Another idea comes from the Public Diplomacy
Council to create a public-private partnership “Foundation for the Global Future” to
provide permanent off-budget funding for international exchanges conducted by
civilian and military federal agencies.The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public
Diplomacy agrees with the Council on Foreign Relations about creating an
independent Corporation for Public Diplomacy. Additionally, the Commission
would encourage overseas posts to explore local public-private partnerships, find
ways for visitor exchanges to take advantage of private sector generosity, and
develop Internet and media programming that would utilize public/private
partnerships. The Advisory Commission also proposes that private sector
communication consultants could become more involved in public diplomacy efforts
with advertising, as well as entertainment programs, and that the academic
community could offer public diplomacy majors at American colleges and
universities. GAO adds that the U.S. government could collaborate with the private
sector to develop optimal methods for measuring effectiveness of public diplomacy
efforts.
Improve Communication
Improved and increased communication between the United States and foreign,
particularly Arab and Muslim, populations was cited by a few of the studies. The
Defense Science Board’s 2004 report asserts that “nothing shapes U.S. policies and
global perceptions of U.S. foreign and national security objectives more powerfully
than the President’s statements and actions, and those of senior officials.” The Board
suggests that the President communicate directly with overseas audiences.
The 9/11 Commission Report recommends that the United States should
identify what it stands for and communicate that message clearly. The 9/11
Commission observed that many foreign populations receive large amounts of aid
from U.S. citizens and never know from where it came.
The Council on Foreign Relations proposes a more customized, “two-way”
dialogue, as contrasted to conventional one-way, “push-down” mass communication,
including an “engagement” approach that involves listening, dialogue, and debate
that increases the amount and the effectiveness of public opinion research.
Furthermore, communication should foster increasingly meaningful relationships
between U.S. government, foreign publics, and foreign journalists. The Council says
the U.S. government should: support voices of moderation, especially among the
young; identify and develop indigenous talent; and craft messages highlighting
cultural overlaps between American values and those of the rest of the world.
The RAND study encourages finding different ways of promoting two-way
communication, such as call-in talk shows, live interaction among different elements
of an audience, and broadcasting debates, rather than offering monologues. The
Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World proposes
establishing an Arab and Muslim Countries Public Communications Unit under the

direction of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy to work closely with the
Office of Global Communications and coordinate U.S. government media outreach
to Arab and Muslim populations and promote a ‘rapid response’ team to react and
correct inaccuracies and distortions in foreign media.
Increase Exchanges and Libraries
More than half of the 29 reports recommend expanding U.S. exchange programs
and/or U.S. libraries overseas, making it the most common proposal among this
group of reports. Some ideas for exchanges include expanding the U.S. Speaker and
Specialist Program, expanding shorter duration exchange programs, creating
American studies programs in local universities in Arab and Muslim populations,
creating a public-private partnership, “Foundation for the Global Future,” to provide
permanent off-budget funding for international exchanges conducted by civilian and
military federal agencies, significantly broadening Middle East/U.S. exchange
programs, and expanding exchanges to government officials and business
professionals. Several studies echoed recommendations to expand American
overseas libraries as well as the American Corners Program.⁴ In addition, the
Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World proposes
implementing a new American Knowledge Library to translate the best American
books and make them available to local libraries and universities.
Increase Oversight
A few of the studies recommend greater and continuous oversight of public
diplomacy activities. One suggestion was for Congress to provide legislative
authority for a quadrennial review of public diplomacy. Another would create a new
congressional committee structure with sustained oversight of all U.S. government
public diplomacy programs and activities.

⁴ The American Corners is a program that was initiated in October 2000 whereby a library
in a host country provides space, staff and overhead expenses for the United States to offer
publically-accessible research facilities and information on U.S. culture.

CRS-14
Table 2. Key Recommendations for International Broadcasting
^Brⁱⁿ^{g BBG}^b^Special^Atten^tⁱ^oⁿ^to^Mo^r^e^New^Co^m^b^a^t
^udy^a^{Define Overall}^Objectives^R^e^organⁱ^ze^Broad^cas^tⁱⁿ^g^Dev^e^lo^{p Ra}^pid^Re^spoⁿ^se^Under^Ara^b^/M^uslim^Res^o^urces^T^echnologies^J^a^mmiⁿ^g
^{White H}^o^use^P^o^pula^t^io^ns
^C¹^X^XX
^XX^X^X
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^://wiki
^h^ttp¹^X
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²^X
^X
^X^X^X
^:^Pu^blⁱ^c^Dⁱ^pl^om^acy^C^o^uⁿ^cⁱ^l^2005;^ADV1^:^U^.^S^.^A^d^vⁱ^s^o^ry^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^on^Pu^blⁱ^c^Dⁱ^pl^om^acy^2004;^GA^O¹^{: Gov}^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^A^ccouⁿ^t^ability^Of^fⁱ^{ce 2004;}^NSF^R^{: N}^a^tⁱ^onal^St^r^a^t^e^gy
^For^u^m^Re^vie^w^;^PDC3^:^Pu^blⁱ^c^Dⁱ^pl^om^acy^C^o^uⁿ^cⁱ^l^2004;^DJ^E²^:^D^j^erejⁱ^aⁿ^,^Edw^a^{rd, O}^c^t^{ober 2003;}^HE^R1^:^H^e^ri^t^a^g^e^F^o^uⁿ^d^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^May^2003;^HE^R2^{: Her}^itag^e^Fo^uⁿ^d^atioⁿ^,^A^p^rⁱ^l
^2003;^USIP2^{: U.S. In}^s^titu^{te of}^P^{eace 2002;}^CFR2^:^C^o^uⁿ^cⁱ^l^on^F^o^rei^gⁿ^R^e^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^2002;^PBS^{: P}^u^b^{lic B}^r^o^a^d^castin^g^Ser^v^ice
^tⁱⁿ^g^{Board of}^G^o^v^e^rn^ors

Broadcasting Recommendation Comparisons
Of the 29 reports and articles, 11 offer recommendations specifically for U.S.
government international broadcasting. Recommendations range from having
strategic objectives to reorganizing the broadcasting entities to increasing resources
and using more technologies to focusing on combating jamming. (See Table 2.)
Define Overall Objectives
GAO, the Public Diplomacy Council (PDC), and the PBS News Hour broadcast
suggest the need for the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) to better define its
overall objectives and strategy of obtaining the objectives. The 2002 PBS broadcast
states that there is no grand strategy or coordinated approach of U.S. broadcasting
with other public diplomacy activities. GAO’s 2004 report states that while the
BBG does have a strategic plan and has made progress in some measuring of its
progress, the BBG has not defined a plan to adequately measure audience size or its
programming credibility overseas. The PDC’s January 2005 report urges the
“Administration and Congress to take a hard look at how international broadcasting
is managed to serve broad U.S. public diplomacy goals and the American taxpayer
and integrate broadcasting more closely with other public diplomacy tools.” The
PDC believes that international broadcasting should be more closely integrated with
other elements of strategic communication.
Reorganize Broadcasting
Although the U.S. government international broadcasting structure was
reorganized in 1994, some reports recommend reorganizing U.S. international
broadcasting again. The U.S. Institute of Peace states that, “the current array of US
government broadcasting services is duplicative, expensive, and even
counterproductive.”
The Heritage Foundation’s May 2003 report asserts that international
broadcasting has “lapsed into a jumble of duplicative efforts, led by a part time Board
of Governors.” Reorganizing broadcasting would make it more streamlined and
more efficient, the report claims. Furthermore, according to Heritage, revitalizing the
Voice of America’s resources and program content is in order as VOA has been
neglected while Middle East programing has “proliferated in a confusing array.”
The Council on Foreign Relations (July 30, 2002) “supports an independent and
well-qualified broadcasting board with a full-time, top-caliber Chief Executive
Officer who would report to the current BBG and be empowered to direct and
supervise all U.S. nonmilitary international broadcasting activities. Furthermore, the
Department of State and the BBG should strengthen the Secretary of State’s role in
providing information and guidance on foreign policy to the BBG by clarifying and
specifying the Secretary’s role in making decisions on broadcast languages and other
foreign policy matters.”

Develop Rapid Response to Anti-American Messages
The Advisory Group for the Arab and Muslim World proposes that U.S.
government media should reach out to Arab and Muslim populations and promote
a ‘rapid response’ team to react and correct inaccuracies and distortions in foreign
media.
Bring Broadcasting Board of Governors under White House
The Advisory Group for the Arab and Muslim World states that about half of
the fund for public diplomacy goes for international broadcasting. The Group
believes that U.S. government international broadcasting should be brought under the
strategic direction of their proposed new Special Counselor to the President, saying
“[broadcasting] must be part of the public diplomacy process, not marching to its
own drummer with its own goals and strategy, sources of funding and board.”
Special Attention to Arab/Muslim Populations
Five reports provide various proposals regarding additional broadcasting to Arab
and Muslim populations. As previously mentioned, the Heritage Foundation argues
that the various Middle East surrogate broadcasting entities such as Radio Sawa and
Al Hurra TV have distracted the BBG from properly maintaining VOA resources and
programming. The Advisory Group for the Arab and Muslim World recommends a
thorough independent review of the Middle East Television Network, saying that
there is a high level of skepticism in the Middle East region about state-owned
television of any sort. The Group suggests that paring up with private sector
programming might be more effective. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public
Diplomacy recommends expanding communication with Arab press by creating a
network of 24-hour message dissemination and monitoring centers. The Public
Diplomacy Forum (February 2004) held a panel discussion on Middle East
broadcasting. One panelist referred to Radio and Al Hurra TV as being state-run, and
therefore, less successful with Middle East audiences. The panelist said that, “the
Arab public is interested in American programming, but they are not necessarily
interested in programming that is under tight U.S. government direction.” Another
panelist said that “there is no market waiting for Al Hurra’s message.” The third
panelist strongly disagreed and said that “the United States should have started Radio
Sawa and Al Hurra a long time ago.”
Other reports generally support ongoing Middle East broadcasting or think more
resources and expanded programming to Muslim and Arab populations should be
forthcoming.
More Resources
As with public diplomacy, most reports that addressed resources urged a greater
long-term monetary commitment for international broadcasting. Reaching larger
audiences and improving the ability to measure impact are two primary needs for
additional broadcast funding.

New Technologies
International broadcasting is one area of foreign policy that can make use of new
technologies to become more effective. The Advisory Commission on Public
Diplomacy encourages the BBG to look for better software to improve broadcasting’s
reach to foreign audiences over the Internet. The Commission suggests the
educational programs teaching the English language or American culture might be
useful. Also, the Commission recommends that satellite television programs can be
further developed to increase local language programming available via satellite TV.
The Public Diplomacy Council recommends more innovative broadcasting, Internet
programs for youth, and interactive radio programming.
Combat Jamming
The Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy notes that there are some areas
of the world such as North Korea, China and Cuba where the United States has
difficulty reaching audiences because of local government jamming. The
Commission notes that technologies such as the Internet and direct broadcast satellite
have made it more difficult, but not impossible, for governments to block American
programming from their citizens. The Commission urges the BBG to continue to
develop new methods to combat jamming.

Appendix A — Reports
(WP) Leonard H. Marks, Charles Z. Wick, Bruce Gelb and Henry E. Catto.
“America Needs a Voice Abroad,” Washington Post, February 26, 2005.
[ http://www.washingt onpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54764-2005Feb25.html]
(PDC1) Public Diplomacy Council. Call for Action on Public Diplomacy. January
2005. [http://pdi.gwu.edu/merlin-cgi/p/downloadFile/d/7536/n/off/other/1/name
/ACALLFORACTIONONPUBLICDIP LOMACY01-2005prin/]
(PDC2) Public Diplomacy Council. “Transformation Not Restoration.” Statement
of Dissent to Call for Action on Public Diplomacy. January 2005.
[http://pdi.gwu.edu/merlin-cgi/p/downloadFile/d/7537/n/off/other / 1 / n a m e / D i s s e n t
_12-21-04pdf/]
(ADV1) United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. 2004 Report
of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. September 28,

2004.

[ http://www.state.gov/r/adcompd/rls/36275.htm]
(DSB1) Defense Science Board. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force
on Strategic Communication. September 2004.
[ http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategi c_Communication.pdf]
(GAO1) U.S. Government Accountability Office. U.S. Public Diplomacy: State
Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Post-9/11 Efforts but
Challenges Remain. GAO-04-1061T. August 23, 2004. [http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d041061t.pdf]
(911) National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11
Commission Report. July 22, 2004.
[ http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index .html]
(NSFR) Walter R. Roberts and Barry Fulton. “Rebuilding Public Diplomacy.”
National Strategy Forum Review. Spring 2004.
[ h ttp://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cf m ? o u t f i t = p m t & r e q u e s ttimeout=500&folder=

7&paper=1611]

(PDC3) Public Diplomacy Council. “Engaging the Arab/Islamic World - Next Steps
for U.S. Public Diplomacy.” Summary of Public Diplomacy Forum. February 27,
2004. [http://pdi.gwu.edu/merlin-cgi/p/downloadFile/d/6504/n/off/other/1/name
/SummaryoftheFeb27Forumdoc/]
(RAND) Charles Wolf, Jr. and Brian Rosen. Public Diplomacy - How To Think
About and Improve It. RAND Corporation. 2004. [http://www.rand.org/pubs/
occasional_papers/2004/RAND_OP 134.pdf]
(FPA) Jerrold Keilson. “Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy.” Great
Decisions 2004. Foreign Policy Association.

[ h ttp://www.fpa.org/topics_info2414/topics_info_show.htm? doc_id=200548]
(KIE) William Kiehl. “Can Humpty Dumpty be Saved?” American Diplomacy.
November 13, 2003. [http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll
/2003_10-12/kiehl_humpty/ kiehl_humpty.html]
(DJE1) Peter G. Peterson and Edward Djerejian. A New Strategic Direction for U.S.
Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World. Transcript. Council on Foreign
Relations. October 7, 2003. [http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=6417]
(DJE2) Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World.
Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public
diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World. October 1,2003.
[ h ttp://www.state.gov/documents/organiz ation/24882.pdf]
(USIP1) Richard Solomon and Sheryl J. Brown. Creating a Common
Communications Culture: Interoperability in Crisis Management. United States
Institute of Peace. September 12, 2003. [http://www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/
publications/reports/17.html]
(GAO2) U.S. General Accounting Office. U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department
Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges.GAO-03-951. September 2003.
[ http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03951.pdf]
(CFR1) Council on Foreign Relations. Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for
Reinvigorating Public Diplomacy. September 2003. [http://www.cfr.org/content/
publications/attachments/public_diplomacy.pdf]
(HER1) Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale. Reclaiming America’s Voice Overseas.
Web Memo #273. The Heritage Foundation. May 4, 2003.
[ h ttp://www.heritage.org/ Research /NationalSecurity/wm273.cfm]
(HER2) Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale. How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public
Diplomacy. Backgrounder #1654. The Heritage Foundation. April 23, 2003.
[ h ttp://www.heritage.org/ Research /NationalSecurity/bg1645.cfm]
(ISD) Talking with the Islamic World: Is the Message Getting Through? Institute for
the Study of Diplomacy. Working Paper. October 2002.
[ http://www.ciaonet.org/ wps/sites/isd.html]
(USIP2) Barry Fulton, ed. Net Diplomacy I, II, and III. Virtual Diplomacy Report.
United States Institute of Peace. October 2002.
[ http://www.usip.org/ virtualdiplomacy/publications/pubs.html#vdr]
(BRO) John Brown. “The Purposes and Cross Purposes of Public Diplomacy.”
American Diplomacy. August 15, 2002. [http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/
archives_roll/2002_07-09/brown_pubdipl/brown_pubdipl.html]
(CFR2) Council on Foreign Relations. Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform.
Report of a Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force. July 2002.

(PBS) “Public Diplomacy, U.S. Outreach to Arab World.” OnlineNewsHour, the
website of the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. February 18, 2002.
[ h ttp://www.pbs.org/ newshour/media/public_diplomacy/]
(ADV2) United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. Building Public
Diplomacy Through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources. 2002.
[ h ttp://www.state.gov/documents/organiz ation/13622.pdf]
(DSB2) Defense Science Board. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force
on Managed Information Dissemination. September 2001.
[ http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/mid.pdf]
(NWC) Information Age Diplomacy. National War College/Northwestern University
Symposium. April 5-6, 2001. [http://www.ndu.edu/nwc/activities/public/
SymposiumWebsite/sym posium_main.htm]
(CFR3) Council on Foreign Relations and Center for Strategic and International
Studies Task Force. State Department Reform. 2001.
(HRC) U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart/Rudman
Commission). Phase I report: New World Coming: American Security in the 21^st
Century (1999); Phase II report: Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for
Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom (2000); Phase III report: Road Map for
National Security: Imperative for Change (2001).
[ http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ nssg/Reports/reports.htm]

Appendix B — Recommendations by Report
WP — Leonard H. Marks, Charles Z. Wick, Bruce Gelb and Henry E. Catto.
“America Needs a Voice Abroad,” Washington Post, February 26, 2005.
This editorial by former USIA directors is a general call to rebuild U.S. public
diplomacy. While it does not make specific recommendations, it does call for the
United States to explain its policies directly and openly; argues for the importance
of public affairs officers and USIA libraries; states that shutting down USIA was
major mistake; and supports the Public Diplomacy Council’s recommendation to
create a U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy (see below).
PDC1 — Public Diplomacy Council. Call for Action on Public Diplomacy. January

2005.

Recommendations:
^!Establish U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy;
^!Increase public diplomacy staffing overseas by 300% and budgets
for international broadcasting and exchange programs by 400% over
five years;
^!Provide long-term resources necessary for global international
broadcasting capability;
^!Establish an Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy at the
Cabinet level; and
^!Create a public-private partnership “Foundation for the Global
Future” to provide permanent off-budget funding for international
exchanges.
PDC2 — Public Diplomacy Council. “Transformation Not Restoration.” Statement
of Dissent to Call for Action on Public Diplomacy. January 2005.
This statement of dissent refutes each of the five recommendations made in a
Call for Action on Public Diplomacy (see above), arguing that the report draws too
heavily on the past. The dissent emphasizes that understanding what is credible in
the context of other societies is the foundation upon which effective public
diplomacy is constructed; that the reference point for U.S. public diplomacy must be
the hopes, aspirations, and fears of foreign citizens; and that the United States’ first
priority must be observing and listening.
ADV1 — Report of the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2004
Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, September

28, 2004.

Recommendations:
Message dissemination
^!Have more U.S. government staff employed abroad serve as
messengers of public diplomacy;
^!Expand the London Media Outreach Center’s ability to
communicate with Arab press by creating a network of 24-hour
message dissemination and monitoring centers;
^!Model a public diplomacy strategy in a test region through
concentrated programs, programming, exchanges, and initiatives;
^!Evaluate the success by measuring public perception.
Coordination
^!Bridge disparate public diplomacy mechanisms within the State
Department by tasking the Policy, Planning and Resources Office
with overseeing the strategic planning of all public diplomacy
programming and resources.
Third party credibility
^!Require embassies to maintain networks of individuals interested in
communicating positive concepts on behalf of the United States;
^!Provide electronic products, through the Bureau of International
Information Programs (IIP), to support the efforts of individuals
interested in advocating U.S. policies and perspectives.
Cross-cultural communications
^!Implement the language continuum strategy aggressively to help
Foreign Service officers achieve language proficiency, and provide
cross-cultural and language training for other government personnel
and contractors abroad;
^!Support the Administration’s efforts to negate certain terrorist
messages and convey ideas through the skillful use of semantics.
Border security
^!Fund a significant marketing campaign, either through the private
sector or the government, to explain visa processes and recruit
visitors, and help the United States maintain its competitive
advantage;
^!Encourage Congress to ensure that international citizens not bear the
entire costs of new security measures dedicated to visa processes;
^!Phase out redundant and duplicative checks based primarily on
ethnic origin and gender once US-visit is completely functional, and
encourage Congress to allow Visa Waiver Program countries
sufficient time to incorporate biometric identifiers in their passports.
Exchange programs
^!Allocate the resources necessary to develop a comprehensive
exchange alumni database;

^!Encourage the resourcefulness of posts in offering exchange
programs by requiring the submission of competitive proposals for
such programs.
Centers, corners, virtual consulates, and libraries
^!Encourage each American Corner with Internet access to provide a
virtual consulate Website as a start-up page on all workstations;
^!Fund American centers/libraries wherever security constraints permit
their existence, in order to continue benefitting from the great public
diplomacy value they provide;
^!Encourage Congress to give the Secretary of State the authority to
create American presence posts, and thereby expand this concept, by
notifying the House International Relations Committee and the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
USAID and public diplomacy
^!Create, for multiple areas of the globe, director of public diplomacy
positions in the Bureau of Legislative and Public Affairs, as has been
done for the Middle East;
^!Continue to enhance efforts to publicize the substantial amount of
financial aid that the American people contribute abroad;
^!Continue to coordinate with USAID to better publicize the numerous
contributions America makes to foreign societies.
English language programs
^!Seek the support of the private sector to bolster programs designed
to increase knowledge of the English language around the world;
^!Continue efforts to reach English teachers through official training
programs and exchanges, for better use of government resources and
greater results from the programs.
Private sector
^!Encourage individual posts to explore public-private partnerships on
a local level;
^!Create a means of allowing visitors to overcome restrictions and take
advantage of private sector generosity while on visitor exchanges;
^!Use the small Cultural Affairs budget as seed money to initiate
projects that ultimately will be self-sustaining;
^!Continue to foster the kinds of Internet and media programming
developed by the private sector that exemplify mutually beneficial
public-private partnerships in public diplomacy.
Broadcasting: War on Terror
^!Grant more resources.
Broadcasting: Educational Programs
^!Continue circumventing heavy jamming and reaching Chinese
audiences through websites and teaching products that educate users
in both the English language and American culture.

Broadcasting: Satellite Programs
^!Develop satellite television technologies further and expand on
recent successes in making native language programming available
via satellite television to missions of viewers in other countries.
Internet
^!Encourage the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) to actively
look for ways to use emerging software developments to expand its
broadcasting reach over the Internet.
Hard-to-reach areas
^!Continue the BBG development of new transmission methods to
combat jamming.
DBS1 — Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force
on Strategic Communication, September 2004.
^!The President should issue a directive to strengthen, understand, and
communicate with global audiences; coordinate all components of
strategic communication including public diplomacy, public affairs,
international broadcasting, and military information operations; and
provide a foundation for new legislation for planning, coordination,
conduct and funding of strategic communications.
^!The President should establish a permanent strategic communication
structure within the National Security Council (NSC) and work with
Congress to create legislation and funding.
^!The President should work with Congress on legislation to establish
and fund a non-profit and non-partisan [501(c) (3) hybrid
organization such as Rand or the National Endowment for
Democracy] Center for Strategic Communication to support the
NSC and departments and organizations represented on its Strategic
Communication Committee. The Department of State should
provide a core funding grant for the Center.
^!The President should redefine the role of Under Secretary of State
for public diplomacy and public affairs to be both policy advisor and
manager for public diplomacy. Responsibilities should include
approving public diplomacy assignments, setting program direction
and evaluation, reviewing performance ratings of the public
diplomacy office director and embassy public affairs officers. All
foreign policy initiatives and directives should have a public
diplomacy component approved by the Under Secretary. Personnel
and funding resources should be tripled and placed under the control
of the Under Secretary.
^!State Department public diplomacy office directors should be raised
to level of Deputy Assistant Secretary or Senior Advisor to the
Assistant Secretary. Officers promoted to Chief of Mission or
Senior Foreign Service should have at least one tour in a public
diplomacy assignment in the Department or in an interagency
assignment related to public diplomacy. The Bureau of IIP should
be directed by an Assistant Secretary.

^!DOD’s Under Secretary for Policy should act as the DOD focal
point for strategic communication and serve as the DOD’s principal
on NSC’s Strategic Communication Coordinating Committee.
^!DOD’s Under Secretary for Policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
should ensure that all military plans and operations have appropriate
strategic communication components, ensure collaboration with
DOS and with theater security cooperation plans. DOD should triple
resources — personnel and funding — available to combatant
commanders for DOD support to public diplomacy and reallocate
information operations funding within U.S. STRATCOM (U.S.
Strategic Command) for expanded support for strategic
communication programs.
GAO1 — U.S. Government Accountability Office. U.S. Public Diplomacy, State
Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Post-9/11 Efforts but
Challenges Remain. August 23, 2004.
This report discusses some findings of post-9/11 public diplomacy efforts. The
report includes criticisms, including some by public affairs officers, of insufficient
time spend on public diplomacy, insufficient public affairs resources; the amount of
time devoted to public diplomacy training is inadequate; and often the Foreign
Service Officers lack foreign language skills. This report did not list specific
recommendations, but the following were implied in the text of the report:
^!Implement an overall public diplomacy strategy;
^!Improve interagency communication and coordination efforts;
^!Define success and how it should be measured;
^!Collect polling data and establish reporting requirements;
^!The Department of State public diplomacy operation is fragmented
among various entities within State and needs better organization;
^!The U.S. Government must define its message;
^!BBG’s strategic plan does not, but should, include a single goal or
related program objective to gage progress;
^!BBG’s plan needs measurable program objectives to support its
strategic goals;
^!U.S. public diplomacy resources need to be expanded to areas of the
world thought to breed terrorist activities.
911 — National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11
Commission Report, July 22, 2004.
^!Expand funding for public diplomacy activities, such as information
programs, broadcasting, exchanges, scholarships, libraries, and U.S.
aid;
^!Clearly identify that U.S. assistance comes from the citizens of the
United States;
^!The U.S. should identify what it stands for and communicate that
message clearly;
^!The U.S. government should join other nations in generously
supporting a new International Youth Opportunity Fund to improve

education and provide textbooks that do not teach hate, offering a
choice of schools other than madrassas;
^!Establish a forum for engaging both Western and Arab/Muslim
representatives to discuss each culture’s needs and perspectives.
This would help create long-term relationships and understanding
among cultures.
NSFR — Walter R. Roberts and Barry Fulton. “Rebuilding Public Diplomacy.”
National Strategy Forum Review. Spring 2004.
Recommendations:
^!Substantially increase public diplomacy resources;
^!Conduct a careful assessment of America’s public diplomacy
readiness;
^!New broadcast programs (e.g. Radio Sawa and Al Hurra) have to be
initiated and adequately funded;
^!Better coordination with White House, other government agencies,
and the private sector is needed.
PDC3 — Public Diplomacy Council. “Engaging the Arab/Islamic World - Next
Steps for U.S. Public Diplomacy.” Summary of Public Diplomacy Forum. February

27, 2004.

This forum dealt specifically with American public diplomacy in the Arab/Islamic
world. Its recommendations and comments include:
^!Public diplomacy must be more engaged in advising the policy
community;
^!Increase resources and trained personnel;
^!Elites must lead in creating a civil discourse and in breaking down
stereotypes;
^!Use the potential of Radio Sawa and Al Hurra TV;
^!Increase foreign language training and knowledge of culture and
history;
^!Create a White House Counselor for Public Diplomacy at the
Cabinet level;
^!The Djerejian Report (see DJE) should be adopted;
^!Arabs and Muslims need to study and understand the United States
much more deeply;
^!Break down stereotypes on both sides; reveal more of U.S. diversity
and complexity;
^!Improve personal contact by professionals, especially public affairs,
political, and economic officers and ambassadors;
^!Strengthen foreign press centers;
^!Send American speakers abroad;
^!Encourage more robust educational exchange programs.

RAND — Charles Wolf, Jr. And Brian Rosen. Public Diplomacy — How to Think
About and Improve it, 2004.
Rand Observations:
^!Public diplomacy should not come from government alone;
^!The United States should seek creative talents in the private sector,
business, and academia which could be motivated through a
competitive bidding process;
^!It may be useful to find different modes of communicating big
picture ideas of public diplomacy through debate and discussion,
call-in shows, live interaction among different elements of the
audience, rather than through the typical monologic conveyance of
the message;
^!Outsourcing public diplomacy may be helpful to put some distance
between a favorable message and an unfavorable messenger (i.e. the
United States).
FPA — Jerrold Keilson. “Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy.” Great
Decisions 2004. Foreign Policy Association.
This edition of the annual “Great Decisions” series offers mostly historical and
background information. While it refers to recommendations of other reports, it
makes relatively few of its own. Among its recommendations and comments are:
^!Educational exchange programs are important;
^!The evidence on international broadcast programming effectiveness
is mixed;
^!The USIA realignment has reduced flexibility and independent
action;
^!Foreign public opinion of the United States has declined even as
financial support for public diplomacy has increased in the last three
years;
^!Significant investment in number and quality of trained public
diplomacy officers is needed;
^!Public diplomacy officers need language proficiency and regional
expertise and should not be rotated among regions like other foreign
service officers;
^!The United States should create special libraries of key books on
America in accessible libraries, rather than in security-conscious
embassy libraries;
^!The United States should consolidate exchange, cultural, and
information programs into one agency. Public diplomacy is now lost
within overall operation of the State Department;
^!America should dramatically increase the number of international
visitors from the Muslim world;
^!The possibility of policies being profoundly unpopular overseas
should be taken into account when developing the policy;
modifications should be considered that might make them less so.

KIE — William Kiehl. “Can Humpty Dumpty be Saved?” American Diplomacy.
November 13, 2003.
Among Kiehl’s comments and recommendations:
^!Public diplomacy must be proactive, more akin to psychological
operations than to public relations;
^!Regional bureaus must include senior public diplomacy officers at
least at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level;
^!Establish a new organization for public diplomacy that would be a
middle ground between the old USIA and the current weak structure
[includes organizational chart];
^!Amend Smith-Mundt to lift restriction on domestic dissemination of
American international informational material.
DJE1 — Peter G. Peterson and Edward Djerejian. A New Strategic Direction for
U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World, Council on Foreign Relations,
October 7, 2003.
This article presented a question and answer session between the moderator,
Peter G. Peterson of the Council on Foreign Relations at the Council on Foreign
Relations and the speaker, Edward Djerejian of the Advisory Group on Public
Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World. In this article, Mr. Djerejian presents
Advisory Group recommendations that the U.S. government:
^!needs strategic coordination at the top — Special Counselor to the
President;
^!should create an office to monitor what is being done and said about
America and immediately craft talking points to support or refute;
^!would benefit by getting the private sector more involved in public
diplomacy;
^!should create a Corporation for Public Diplomacy (modeled after the
Council on Foreign Relations concept);
^!should get embassies more involved in public diplomacy;
^!identify policies that would benefit the people in a region, such as
outreach to high school students;
^!recognize solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the center of most
of U.S. public diplomacy problems;
^!realize that there is a gap between what we stand for and what we
do.
DJE2 — Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World.
Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public
Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World, October 1, 2003.
This report organizes recommendations under three specific headings: Structure,
Financial and Economic Resources, and Programs.
Structure — The White House should:
^!create a cabinet-level Special Counselor to the President for Public
Diplomacy which would, in consultation with the President, and
other government agencies, establish strategic goals and messages,

oversee the implementation of programs that meet the strategic
goals, and ensure effective measurement of those programs;
^!establish a board — President’s Public Diplomacy Experts’ Board;
^!reactivate the interagency Strategic Communications Policy
Coordinating Committee to be co-chaired by the Under Secretary of
State for public diplomacy as well as a high-level representative
from the National Security Council.
Structure — The Department of State should:
^!emphasize to all its personnel that public diplomacy is of primary
interest in doing their job;
^!encourage every employee abroad to participate in public diplomacy
activities;
^!provide training on the basics of public diplomacy to every
employee who serves abroad;
^!strengthen the role of the Under Secretary of State for Public
Diplomacy to coordinate public diplomacy government-wide and set
strategic public diplomacy guidance, review country program plans,
allocate human and financial resources, monitor public opinion and
program results, and play a role in performance evaluation. The
Advisory Group is convinced that strengthening the
Undersecretary’s role is essential.
^!establish an Office of Policy, Plans, and Resources within the
Undersecretary’s office to coordinate the development of strategy
and strategic guidance, oversee country-specific plans, monitor
execution of plans, and assist in allocation and management of
financial and human resources;
^!establish an Arab and Muslim Countries Public Communications
Unit under the direction of the Undersecretary; it would work closely
with the Office of Global Communications in the White House and
would coordinate the U.S. government’s media outreach to Arab and
Muslim nations and promote ‘rapid response’ in disseminating
messages and reacting and correcting inaccuracies and distortions in
foreign media;
^!find creative ways to measure effectiveness of public diplomacy
programs.
Structure — The U.S. Agency for International Development should:
^!get the same public diplomacy training as the Department of State;
^!publicize that aid is from the United States.
Structure — The Department of Defense should:
^!be better connected to the other agencies involved in public
diplomacy and better coordinated with strategic plan.
Structure — The Broadcasting Board of Governors should:
^!be brought under the White House’s Office of Special Counselor to
the President.
Financial and Human Resources — U.S. Public Diplomacy:
^!needs a dramatic increase in funding;

^!needs additional professional staff dedicated to Arab and Muslim
issues;
^!should increase funding AID scholarships;
^!needs a greater concentration of budget on tapping into uses of the
Internet and information technology;
^!should provide a greater effort to aiding Arabs and Muslims to gain
access to U.S. education.
Programs — The U.S. government should:
^!expand English language training programs;
^!expand the American Corners Program;
^!implement a new American Knowledge Library — to translate the
best American books and make them available to local libraries and
universities;
^!create American studies programs in Arab and Muslim countries in
collaboration with local universities;
^!expand the U.S. Speaker and Specialist Program;
^!expand shorter duration exchange programs;
^!thoroughly review the Middle East Television Network.
USIP1 — Richard Solomon and Sheryl J. Brown. Creating a Common
Communications Culture: Interoperability in Crisis Management. United States
Institute of Peace. September 12, 2003.
Originally this was presented as a speech at the Conference on Crisis
Management and Information Technology in Helsinki, Finland, which focused on
ways of developing interoperable communications systems that can facilitate
information sharing during crises. The speech did not directly address public
diplomacy.
GAO2 — Government Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State
Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges, September 2003.
Recommendations:
That the Secretary of State:
^!develop and widely disseminate throughout the Department a
strategy that considers the techniques of private sector public
relations firms in integrating all of State’s public diplomacy efforts
and directing them toward achieving common and measurable
objectives;
^!consider ways to collaborate with the private sector to employ best
practices for measuring efforts to inform and influence target
audiences, including expanded use of opinion research and better use
of existing research;
^!designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs
sections to reduce the administrative burden;
^!strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreign
languages;

^!program into State’s assignment process adequate time for public
diplomacy training.
The Department of State’s response to this GAO report was that it generally
concurred with the report and intended to implement recommendations and said it
has already begun to do so in some areas.
CFR1 — Council on Foreign Relations. Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for
Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy. September 2003.
In addition to the following recommendations, this report includes appendices
on State Department organizational reforms, a draft mission program plan on public
diplomacy, and an overview of U.S. international broadcasting.
I. Rethink how the U.S. formulates, strategizes, and communicates its foreign policy.
^!Make the formulation of foreign policy more sensitive to public
diplomacy concerns;
^!Strengthen the public diplomacy coordinating structure so that it
resembles the National Security Council;
^!Issue Presidential Decision Directive on public diplomacy;
^!Initiate a “Quadrennial Public Diplomacy Review;”
^!Improve U.S. capacity to listen to foreign publics, e.g. polling and
research;
^!Craft messages highlighting cultural overlaps between American
values and those of the rest of the world.
II. Build new institutions to bolster public diplomacy efforts
^!Create independent, not-for-profit “Corporation for Public
Diplomacy” as focal point for private sector involvement in public
diplomacy;
^!Establish an “Independent Public Diplomacy Training Institute;”
^!Establish a Public Diplomacy Reserve Corps (patterned on FEMA’s
disaster-relief model).
III. Improve the practice of public diplomacy
^!Through State Department reforms, ensure that public diplomacy is
central to the work of all U.S. ambassadors and diplomats;
^!Enhance training for U.S. ambassadors;
^!Expand the range of America’s messengers abroad. Identify and
develop credible local messengers and increase the use of
independent, diverse U.S. messengers;
^!Foster increasingly meaningful relationships between the U.S.
government and foreign journalists;
^!Support voices of moderation in other countries, especially among
young people;
^!Adopt an “engagement” approach that involves listening, dialog,
debate, and relationship building, as opposed to our traditional
“push-down” method;
^!Make better use of satellite broadcasting and the Internet;

^!Create bridges between U.S. society and others using common
cultural pursuits in every genre of art, music, theater, religion, and
academia.
IV. Improve funding and allocation
^!Bring public diplomacy funding in line with its role as a vital
component of foreign policy and national security;
^!Build congressional support for public diplomacy.
HER1 — Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale. Reclaiming America’s Voice Overseas,
The Heritage Foundation, May 4, 2003.
Recommendations — The U.S. government should:
^!provide control of the public diplomacy budget and personnel to the
Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and create reporting
channels in State Department from embassy personnel up to the
Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy;
^!expand academic exchanges and U.S.-supported libraries;
^!reorganize and streamline international broadcasting and eliminate
waste;
^!enhance public diplomacy and public affairs career training at the
State Department;
^!improve inter-agency coordination through the White House Office
of Global Communications. OGC should do more than keep senior
political leaders on message; it should ensure that all agencies
involved with public diplomacy cooperate to do the best job possible
to win hearts and minds of foreigners;
^!adopt a doctrine that would enshrine public diplomacy practices of
emphasizing consistent efforts to explain to foreign publics U.S.
policies.
HER2 — Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale. How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public
Diplomacy, The Heritage Foundation, April 23, 2003.
This article recommends that the Bush Administration and Congress should:
^!recognize that public diplomacy is a long-term effort;
^!restore public diplomacy’s independent reporting and budget
channels that were lost during the USIA/State merger in 1999;
^!return public diplomacy currently dispersed among other State
Department bureaus into a public diplomacy hierarchy;
^!strengthen exchange programs and revive overseas libraries;
^!reorganize foreign broadcasting to streamline management,
eliminate duplicative and ineffective services, and improve
programming;
^!enhance public diplomacy career training and increase the number
of experienced foreign service personnel in State Department’s
public affairs office;
^!strengthen inter-agency coordination through the White House and
define DOD communications efforts for use on the battlefield;

^!modify outdated legislation, such as the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act that
place irrelevant restrictions on public diplomacy activities.
ISD — Talking with the Islamic World: Is the Message Getting Through? Institute
for the Study of Diplomacy. Working Paper. October 2002.
This document is comprised of the text of speakers’ statements and of
transcripts of discussions from three sessions. Key comments from the discussions
include:
^!It is not enough for U.S. to change its public diplomacy; it must
change its foreign policy. The U.S. must address [Arab] peoples’
real problems and do something to change the Arab condition;
^!Mutual understanding between American and Muslim worlds is the
most important first step;
^!The U.S. must change (particularly regarding the Palestinian issue)
before Muslims embrace Americans;
^!Examples of what the State Department is doing to improve
communication between the United States and the Middle East
include live video on their website, links with secondary schools,
expanded Fulbright program, English language teaching, teacher
training, sports and music exchanges;
^!Much more is needed in the way of resources. Public diplomacy
resources have been dismantled over the past years;
^!Better coordination between civilian and military public diplomacy
efforts is needed;
^!The U.S. should seek and embrace coalition efforts as opposed to
unilateralism;
^!The dialogue between Americans and Muslims should be broadened
and deepened;
^!Expand exchange programs and fund major exchange programs with
the Islamic world;
^!The United States is most successful when Americans interact with
foreign citizens in business, education, culture, music, and
technology, outside official American foreign policy.
^!Engage in real dialogue; be more humble; practice what we preach;
^!Stop the contradictions between rhetoric and action.
USIP2 — Barry Fulton, ed. Net Diplomacy I, II, and III. Virtual Diplomacy Report.
United States Institute of Peace. October 2002.
This series of individual articles looks ahead to diplomacy in 2015. Among its
predictions and recommendations are:
^!State broadcasting will continue as element of public diplomacy.
Current array of U.S. government broadcasting services is
duplicative, expensive, and even counterproductive;
^!Training of diplomats must give greater attention to interaction in
cyberspace, public diplomacy, international financial markets, and
results-oriented management;

^!Public diplomacy needs to be thought of as at the core of foreign
affairs. The job done well by USIA must be carried on at an
intensified level;
^!Exchange programs are important;
^!U.S. diplomats must have language skills;
^!The State Department should change the perception that public
diplomacy generalists are second class citizens in the Foreign
Service Officer corps;
^!The State Department should change its culture and personnel
system to recruit “change agents”;
^!Public diplomacy will be a key element in dealing with new national
security challenges;
^!Public diplomacy requires active engagement with both domestic
and foreign publics and their representation in civil society, based on
transparency and information sharing;
^!Internet-based technology has a big impact on public diplomacy;
^!Effective public diplomacy requires a willingness to search for
commonality through well-funded cultural diplomacy;
^!Americans need to fund, support, and embark on genuine voyages
of discovery — bilaterally through embassies, at home, and through
global forums (e.g. UNESCO);
^!Educational exchanges have become the cornerstone of public
diplomacy;
^!International broadcasting is an important element in the conduct of
public diplomacy;
^!Traditional diplomacy will increasingly need to be supplemented by
public diplomacy;
^!The Department of State needs to follow the example of the
Department of Defense and train and educate its employees to meet
the Department’s requirements.
BRO — John Brown. “The Purposes and Cross Purposes of Public Diplomacy.”
American Diplomacy. August 15, 2002.
Comments and recommendations include the following:
^!A truthful and accurate information campaign, if both persuasive and
credible, can set the record straight about U.S. policies and
intentions;
^!There is no substitute for long-term educational exchange programs.
It is especially important to bring responsible Muslim opinion-
makers to the United States;
^!There is a need for serious, but not solemn, cultural activities
regarding the United States that would appeal to Muslim audiences,
especially to the young;
^!Adequate funding is necessary.
CFR2 — Council on Foreign Relations. Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform.
July 2002.
The Council on Foreign Relations offered the following recommendations:

I. Develop a coherent strategic and coordinating framework for public diplomacy
^!Issue a presidential directive on public diplomacy;
^!Create a Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure led by the
president’s personal designee;
^!Move public diplomacy from the margins to the center of foreign
policy making.
II. Increase customized, “two-way” dialogue, as contrasted to conventional one-way,
“push-down” mass communication
^!Adopt an “engagement” approach that involves listening, dialogue,
debate, and relationship-building and increases the amount and the
effectiveness of public opinion research;
^!Support voices of moderation, with particular attention over the
longer term to the young to empower them to engage in effective
debate through means available or created in their societies;
^!Foster increasingly meaningful relationships between the U.S.
government and foreign journalists;
^!Craft messages highlighting cultural overlaps between American
values and those of the rest of the world.
III. Significantly increase private sector involvement
^!Broaden use of credible and independent messengers from diverse
sectors of American life;
^!Create an independent, not-for-profit “Corporation for Public
Diplomacy.”
IV. Raise the effectiveness of public diplomacy resources
^!Initiate State Department reforms (details are included in an
appendix to the report).
^!Initiate a structured evaluation of diplomatic readiness and
prioritized spending through a “Quadrennial Diplomacy Review;”
^!Establish a quasi-public/private “Independent Public Diplomacy
Training Institute;”
^!Establish a Public Diplomacy Reserve Corps;
^!Use Internet-age technologies effectively.
V. Increase public diplomacy resources
^!Build congressional support for public diplomacy through sustained
oversight and the formation of a new congressional committee
structure;
^!Bring public diplomacy funding in line with its role as a vital
component of foreign policy and national security;
^!Build a stronger public diplomacy through enhancements in key
areas: foreign public-opinion research, recruiting, training, media
studies, program evaluation, significantly expanded field staffing
and exchanges, increases in U.S. international broadcasting via the
Middle East Radio Network and American Embassy Television
Network, and enhancements of content, marketing, and branding of
multi-language websites.

Appendix V deals specifically with the Broadcasting Board of Governors. The
Task Force supports an independent and well-qualified broadcasting board with a
full-time, top-caliber Chief Executive Officer who would report to the current BBG
and be empowered to direct and supervise all U.S. nonmilitary international
broadcasting activities. Furthermore, the Department of State and the BBG should
strengthen the secretary of state’s role in providing information and guidance on
foreign policy to the BBG by clarifying and specifying the Secretary’s role in making
decisions on broadcast languages and other foreign policy matters.
PBS — “Public Diplomacy, U.S. Outreach to Arab World.” OnlineNewsHour, the
website of the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. February 18, 2002.
This series of interviews with four individuals examines the U.S. government’s
efforts to counter anti-American sentiment in the Arab world through broadcasts and
ad campaigns. Among the speakers’ comments and recommendations are:
^!The United States is not spending or doing enough on international
broadcasting. There is no grand strategy or coordinated approach;
^!The United States needs more official representation on the ground
around the world;
^!More cultural exchanges are needed ($1.5 billion budget suggested);
^!The United States needs a “salesperson,” preferably local or, at least,
people who are close to local sentiment, to sell the U.S. message;
^!Need to know basic facts about Arab media consumption and nature
of the audience;
^!Any person carrying the U.S. message [to Arab world] should be
Muslim or a native speaker of the language in which they are
broadcasting;
^!There must be a meticulous, careful, methodical selection of
broadcasters;
^!Help from businesses and governments in the region to get U.S.
message across would be useful;
^!There’s been a significant drop in human and material resources for
public diplomacy since the Cold War.
ADV2 — U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. Building America’s
Public Diplomacy Through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources.
September 2002.
Recommendations:
I. Structural Reform
^!Issue a Presidential mandate that public diplomacy has strategic
importance in U.S. foreign policy and significant reform is needed;
^!Fully implement the White House Office of Global Communications
— coordinate various agencies’ efforts and work closely with the
Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs;
^!Review the consolidation of the USIA into the Department of State
— the Secretary of State should review and make recommendations
on training, location, and reporting structure of public diplomacy
units at the Department of State;

^!Integrate Congress into public diplomacy efforts — legislative
authority for a quadrenniel review of public diplomacy should be
provided;
^!Involve the private sector — communications consultants, the
academic community (i.e., colleges offering majors in public
diplomacy), advertising, and entertainment sectors.
II. Expanding resources
^!Money alone will not fix the problems — assess the state of
America’s public diplomacy readiness worldwide;
^!Examine the nation’s public diplomacy investment relative to other
areas.
DSB2 — Defense Science Board. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force
on Strategic Communication, Managed Information Dissemination, October 1, 2001.
The earlier of two reports done by the Defense Science Board recommends:
^!The President issue a National Security Presidential Directive
(NSPD) on international information dissemination to strengthen,
coordinate, assess impact, and develop strategies;
^!The NSPD should establish an NSC Policy Coordinating Committee
(PCC) on International Information Dissemination to be chaired by
a person of Under Secretary rank to specify who and which agencies
will be on the PCC;
^!The NSPD should delegate to the PCC authority to coordinate public
diplomacy activities including analysis for foreign public opinion,
development of strategic themes and messages for long-term and
crisis response communications, identification of appropriate media
channels, and production of information products;
^!The Secretary of State should support the PCC through a dedicated
and expanded Secretariat in the DOS consisting of the current
interagency working group on International Information Programs,
augmented by an expanded staff, budget, and executive staff
drawing on expertise from DOS, DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 4^th
PSYOP Group, the CIA, commercial media, and communication
entities to facilitate audience research and develop channels and
information products;
^!DOS should strengthen International Information Bureau under an
Assistant Secretary, substantially increase funding for the Bureau,
with much of the increase going for contracted products and
services; DOS should make these assets available to support the
strategic objectives of the PCC;
^!DOS should modernize and diversify products of the Information
Bureau to include expanded use of: Internet websites, streaming
audio/video, leased emerging satellite TV and FM radio broadcasts
channels, American Embassy TV and radio and Washington File
print services, the Foreign Press Center by U.S. policymakers and
military leaders to communicate with foreign publics, interactive
information networks containing key foreign audiences, Joint State-
DOD training and increased interagency assignments, and a reserve

cadre of retired, language-qualified State and DOD officers available
for crisis response deployment;
^!DOD should establish an International Public Information
Committee to coordinate all DOD open information programs
carried out under the authority of the PCC;
^!The Secretary of Defense should implement DOD’s draft guidelines
to increase coordination between PSYOP forces and the Commander
in Chief (CINC)/Joint Forces (JFC) staff, revitalize CINCs’ Theater
Engagement Plans, strengthen PSYOP capability to support the U.S.
government’s strategic information programs, and effectively
integrate these programs into the activities of the PCC Secretariat;
^!The Secretary of Defense should enhance DOD’s information
dissemination capabilities worldwide in support of the regional
CINCs Theater Engagement Plans and in anticipation of crisis
response requirements. In addition, the Secretary should make these
capabilities available to support U.S. strategic policy objectives at
the direction of the PCC. Enhancements include expanded use of
direct satellite FM radio and TV; additional use of regional
magazines such as Forum and Dialogue; expanded use of regional
Internet websites; and establishment of a public diplomacy office
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense;
^!The President and his senior national security advisors should
strengthen U.S. international information dissemination by 1)
insisting that civilian and military information capabilities be
harnessed to the Internet revolution, 2) taking full advantage of
commercial media production methods, and 3) significantly
increasing foreign opinion research and studies of foreign media
environments and influence structures.
NWC — Information Age Diplomacy. National War College/Northwestern
University Symposium. April 5-6, 2001.
Symposium overview followed by statements by individual speakers.
Symposium Overview:
^!Change is needed in State Department culture, i.e. more open
approach in which innovation trumps caution;
^!State Department change efforts have fallen short due to: inadequate
financial and personnel resources, lack of training and strategic
planning, and deficiencies in information technology and the
mindsets to integrate new technologies into the conduct of
diplomacy;
^!Public diplomacy should be given higher priority;
^!The merger of USIA into the State Department hasn’t been
accompanied by a fundamental change in the culture of diplomacy.
From individual speakers:
^!Public diplomacy and information technology must be at the center
of statecraft;
^!Diplomats need to give much more attention to public diplomacy;

^!The Jeffersonian concept of the State Department didn’t distinguish
between internal and external functions. This concept has relevance
today;
^!Unlike the Department of Defense, the State Department personnel
system is antiquated and doesn’t put proper emphasis on training;
^!No government agency is in greater need of reform than the State
Department. It must revamp culture, procedures, and infrastructure
and give greater attention to public outreach;
^!The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy needs to be at the table
on the first day of a crisis. Public diplomacy is substantive
engagement over a long period of time with a broad range of people.
CFR3 — Council on Foreign Relations and Center for Strategic and International
Studies Task Force. State Department Reform. 2001.
This report was prepared for the incoming Bush administration and is broader
in scope than public diplomacy. The main body of the report states that the State
Department is impaired by a professional culture that emphasizes confidentiality over
public diplomacy and public affairs. Among the additional views included at the end
of the report are: Merging of USIA and the State Department hasn’t enhanced public
diplomacy; and State Department leadership should do as much as it can to ensure
that the talents, perspective, and methodology of former USIA officers aren’t lost.
HRC — U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart/Rudman
Commission). Series of three reports, 1999-2001.
Phase I contains a series of broad conclusions, but no recommendations.
Phase II report:
^!Public diplomacy is an important part of American diplomacy;
^!The United States should help spread information technology
worldwide;
^!The United States should employ new technologies creatively to
improve its public diplomacy.
Phase III report:
^!State Department was weakened by having many of its core
functions parceled out to other agencies, e.g. USIA;
^!Tailor public diplomacy to policy goals and integrate these activities
with other aspects of U.S. diplomacy;
^!Overhaul the U.S. Foreign Service system, including ending oral
exam’s blindfolding policy so that applicants could be better
matched to particular cones, e.g. public diplomacy;
^!Repeal the United States Code provisions establishing an Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and have some of those functions
migrate to an Assistant Secretary-level officer reporting directly to
the Secretary of State, and others be folded into the Assistant
Secretary for Economic and Transnational Affairs.