Protection of National Security Information

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

Recent cases involving alleged disclosures of classified information to the news media or others
who are not entitled to receive it have renewed Congress’s interest with regard to the possible
need for legislation to provide for criminal punishment for the “leaks” of classified information.
The Espionage Act of 1917 and other statutes and regulations provide a web of authorities for the
protection of various types of sensitive information, but some have expressed concern that gaps in ^th
these laws may make prosecution of some disclosures impossible. The 106 Congress passed a ^th
measure to criminalize leaks, but President Clinton vetoed it. The 108 Congress reconsidered the
same provision, but instead passed a requirement for the relevant agencies to review the need for
such a proscription. The Department of Justice in turn reported that existing statutes and
regulations are sufficient to prosecute disclosures of information that might harm the national
security.
This report provides background with respect to previous legislative efforts to criminalize the
unauthorized disclosure of classified information; describes the current state of the laws that
potentially apply, including criminal and civil penalties that can be imposed on violators; and
some of the disciplinary actions and administrative procedures available to the agencies of federal
government that have been addressed by federal courts. Finally, the report considers the possible
First Amendment implications of applying the Espionage Act to prosecute newspapers for
publishing classified national defense information.

Introduc tion ............................................................................................................................... 1
Backgr ound ............................................................................................................................... 2
Criminal Statutes for the Protection of Classified Information..........................................3
Civil Penalties and Other Measures....................................................................................9
Prior Legislative Efforts...........................................................................................................11
Constitutional Issues...............................................................................................................13
First Amendment Principles..............................................................................................14
Due Process.......................................................................................................................18
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 19
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................20

Continued revelations involving alleged disclosures of classified information to the news media
or to others who are not entitled to receive it have renewed Congress’s interest with regard to the
possible need for legislation to provide for criminal punishment for the “leaks” of classified
information. Opponents of any such legislation express concern regarding the possible
consequences to freedom of the press and other First Amendment values. The current laws for
protecting classified information have been criticized as a patchwork of sometimes abstruse and
antiquated provisions that are not consistent and do not cover all the information the government ¹
legitimately needs to protect. Certain information is protected regardless of whether it belongs to
the government or is subject to normal classification. Information related to “the national
defense” is protected even though no harm to the national security is intended or is likely to be
caused through its disclosure. However, nonmilitary information with the potential to cause
serious damage to the national security is only protected from willful disclosure with the requisite
intent or knowledge regarding the potential harm. For example, under 50 U.S.C. § 783, the
communication of classified information by a government employee is expressly punishable only
if the discloser knows or has reason to believe the recipient is an agent or representative of a
foreign government, but not, for example, if the recipient is an agent of an international terrorist
organization.
To close some perceived gaps, the 106^th Congress passed a measure to criminalize all leaks of ²^th
classified information; however, President Clinton vetoed the measure. The 108 Congress
considered passing an identical provision as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal ³
Year 2001, but instead directed the Attorney General and heads of other departments to
undertake a review of the current protections against the unauthorized disclosure of classified
information, and to issue a report recommending legislative or administrative actions by May 1, ⁴
2002. In its response to Congress, the Department of Justice concluded that existing statutes and

¹^Se^e^E.E.B.^a^{nd K}^.^E.M^{., N}^o^te^,^Pl^uggⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^e^Le^ak^:^T^h^e^C^a^s^e^f^o^r^a^Le^gis^l^ativ^e^Re^s^o^l^u^ti^on^of^the^C^onf^lic^{t be}^tw^e^eⁿ^t^h^e
^D^e^m^ands^o^f^Se^c^r^{ecy a}ⁿ^d^t^h^{e Nee}^d^f^o^{r O}^p^en^G^o^vern^m^en^t^{, 7}¹^V^A^.^L.^R^EV^{. 80}^1,⁸¹^{1 (}¹⁹⁸⁵⁾^.^W^{ith r}^e^s^p^e^c^t^{to a}^m^a^jor
^c^o^m^pone^{nt of}^the^le^g^a^{l f}^r^am^ew^or^k^,^one^dⁱ^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^c^o^ur^{t j}^udg^e^ha^d^the^f^o^llowⁱ^ng^{to s}^a^y^:
^T^h^e^c^onc^lusⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^a^t^the^s^t^a^t^ute^is^c^ons^titu^tio^na^lly^pe^r^m^is^sⁱ^ble^doe^s^{not re}^f^l^e^c^t^a^judg^m^e^{nt a}^bout
^w^h^e^t^he^r^C^ong^r^e^s^s^c^{ould s}^t^rⁱ^k^e^a^m^o^r^e^a^ppr^opr^ia^te^ba^la^nc^e^be^tw^e^e^{n the}^s^e^c^o^m^p^e^ting^inte^r^e^s^t^s^,^or
^w^h^et^h^e^{r a}^m^o^{re care}^f^u^l^l^y^d^r^awⁿ^s^t^at^u^t^{e co}^ul^d^b^e^t^t^e^{r serve b}^o^t^{h t}^h^eⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^secu^ri^t^y^an^d^t^h^{e val}^u^e
^of^publ^ic^de^ba^te^{. I}^nde^e^d^,^the^ba^sⁱ^c^te^r^m^s^a^{nd s}^t^r^u^c^t^ur^e^of^this^s^t^a^t^u^t^e^ha^v^e^r^e^m^a^ine^d^la^r^g^e^l^y
^unc^ha^ng^e^d^si^nc^e^the^a^d^mⁱ^nistra^tio^{n of}^W^illia^m^Ho^w^a^{rd T}^a^f^t^.^T^h^e^inte^rv^eⁿ^ing^y^e^a^r^{s ha}^ve^w^itne^sse^d
^d^r^am^atⁱ^c^ch^an^g^e^{s i}ⁿ^t^h^e^p^o^sⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es i}ⁿ^w^o^rl^{d aff}^aⁱ^r^{s an}^d^t^h^{e n}^a^t^u^{re o}^f^t^h^reat^{s t}^o
^our^na^tio^na^{l se}^c^u^rity^{. T}^h^e^inc^r^e^a^sⁱⁿ^g^im^porta^nc^e^of^the^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{in w}^o^{rld a}^f^f^a^{irs ha}^{s c}^a^u^se^{d a}
^sigⁿ^if^ic^aⁿ^{t inc}^r^e^a^s^e^{in the}^siz^e^aⁿ^{d c}^o^m^p^le^xⁱ^t^y^of^the^Unite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^{’ m}^ilita^r^y^a^{nd f}^o^re^ig^{n polic}^y
^e^s^ta^blis^hm^eⁿ^ts^{, a}^{nd in}^the^im^por^t^a^nc^e^of^our^na^ti^on’^s^f^o^r^e^ig^{n polic}^y^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^{on m}^a^kⁱ^ng^{. Fina}^lly^{, in}
^the^ne^a^r^ly^one^hu^ndr^e^d^y^e^a^r^s^sⁱ^nce^the^pa^s^s^a^g^e^of^the^D^e^f^e^ns^e^Se^c^r^e^t^s^A^c^{t m}^a^nk^{ind ha}^s^m^a^de^g^r^e^a^t
^te^c^hnol^og^ic^a^l^a^d^v^a^nc^e^s^af^f^e^c^ting^not^on^ly^the^na^tur^e^aⁿ^d^p^o^te^ntia^l^de^v^a^s^t^a^{tion of}^m^ode^rⁿ^w^a^r^f^a^r^e^,
^{but a}^l^s^o^the^v^e^r^y^na^tur^e^of^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion a}ⁿ^{d c}^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion. T}^h^e^s^e^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^s^s^houl^{d s}^u^g^g^e^s^t^{to e}^v^eⁿ
^t^h^{e m}^o^st^casu^a^l^o^b^s^{erver t}^h^at^t^h^{e t}ⁱ^m^eⁱ^s^ri^p^e^f^o^{r Co}ⁿ^g^{ress t}^o^en^gag^eⁱⁿ^{a t}^h^o^r^ou^gh^revi^ew^an^d
^revi^si^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{ese p}^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^t^o^en^s^u^{re t}^h^at^t^h^ey^re^f^l^ect^b^o^t^h^t^h^{ese ch}^an^ges,^an^d^co^nt^em^p^o^r^ar^y^vi^e^w^s
^a^bout^the^a^p^pro^p^ria^t^e^ba^la^nc^e^be^t^w^ee^{n our}^na^tio^n’s^s^e^c^u^rity^a^{nd o}^u^r^c^itiz^eⁿ^s^’^a^b^ility^{to e}ⁿ^g^a^g^eⁱⁿ
^pub^lic^de^ba^te^a^b^o^u^{t t}^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^a^t^e^s^’^c^onduc^tⁱⁿ^the^s^o^cⁱ^e^t^y^of^na^tions^.
^Unite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^v^.^Rose^n,⁴⁴^{5 F.}^Su^pp.^2d⁶⁰^2,⁶⁴^{6 (E}^.D.^V^a^.²⁰^06)(E^{llis, J.).}
²^H.^R^.⁴³⁹²^§³⁰^4,¹⁰⁶^th^Coⁿ^g^ress^;^Se^e^S^t^at^em^en^t^b^y^t^h^{e P}^r^esi^d^ent^t^o^t^h^{e H}^o^u^s^{e o}^f^Rep^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^v^es,³⁶^W^E^E^KL^Y^C^OM^P^.
^P^RE^S^.^D^OC^{. 27}⁸⁽^N^ov^{. 4, 20}⁰⁰⁾^.
³^T^h^e^C^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion P}^r^ote^c^{tion A}^c^{t of}²⁰⁰^{1, H}^.^R^.²⁹^43,¹⁰⁷^th^C^ong^.

regulations are sufficient to prosecute disclosures of information that might harm the national ⁵
security.
This report describes the current state of the law with regard to the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information, including criminal and civil penalties that can be imposed on violators, as
well as some of the disciplinary actions and administrative procedures available to federal
agencies with respect to their employees, as such measures have been addressed by federal courts.
The report also describes the background of legislative efforts to amend the laws, including the
measure passed in 2000 and President Clinton’s stated reasons for vetoing it. Finally, the report
considers possible constitutional issues—in particular, issues related to the First Amendment—
that may arise if Congress considers new legislation to punish leaks or if the Attorney General
seeks to apply current law to punish newspapers that publish leaked classified information.
The classification by government agencies of documents deemed sensitive has evolved from a ⁶
series of executive orders. Congress has, for the most part, let the executive branch make
decisions regarding the type of information to be subject to protective measures. The current
criminal statutory framework providing penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of classified ⁷
government materials traces its roots to the Espionage Act of 1917, which made it a crime to ⁸⁹
disclose defense information during wartime. The National Security Act of 1947 directed the ¹⁰
Director of the CIA to protect “intelligence sources and methods.” The Atomic Energy Act of ¹¹¹²

1954 provided for secrecy of information related to nuclear energy and weapons. The ¹³

Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 gave the government the authority to declare a patent application
secret if disclosure of an invention might expose the country to harm.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
⁴^Se^e^Inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^A^u^thoriz^a^tⁱ^{on A}^c^{t f}^o^{r Fisc}^a^l^Ye^a^r²⁰⁰^2,^P.L^.¹⁰^7-¹⁰⁸^{, §}³^{10 (}²⁰⁰¹⁾^{. A}ⁿ^ideⁿ^tic^a^l^m^e^a^s^ure^wa^s
^intro^duc^e^d^{in the}¹⁰⁹^th^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^{S. 3}⁷⁷⁴^,^but^w^a^s^{not r}^e^por^te^d^out^of^c^o^m^m^itte^e^.
⁵^L^e^tte^r^f^r^om^J^{ohn A}^s^hc^r^o^f^t^,^A^ttorⁿ^e^y^G^e^ne^r^a^{l of}^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^,^{to C}^o^ng^r^e^s^s^,^O^c^tobe^r¹⁵^,²⁰⁰²^,^r^e^por^te^d¹⁴⁸^C^ONG^.
^R^EC^{. S11,}⁷³^{2 (}^d^a^ily^e^d^{. N}^o^v^.²⁰^,²⁰⁰²⁾^,^av^ai^la^ble^oⁿ^line^at^htt^p^://^www^.^f^a^s^.org^/sg^p^/othe^r^g^o^v^/^doj^le^a^k^s.htm^l⁽^L^a^s^t^vⁱ^site^d
^J^une²⁹^,²⁰⁰⁶⁾^.
⁶^Se^e^S^EN^A^TE^C^OM^M^’^{N ON}^P^ROT^E^CT^I^{NG A}^ND^R^E^DUCI^NG^G^O^V^ER^N^M^EN^T^S^E^CRE^CY^,¹⁰³^d^C^ONG^.,^R^EPO^R^T^P^URS^U^A^N^T^T^O
^P^UB^L^I^C^L^AW^{236 (}^C^om^m^.^P^rⁱⁿ^t¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^;^C^R^S^R^e^por^t^R^S²¹⁹^00,^T^h^e^Prote^c^tion^of^Classifie^d^Inf^o^rmati^on:^The^Le^g^a^l
^Fr^am^e^w^or^k^{, by}^J^e^nnif^e^r^K^.^Els^e^a^.
⁷^A^c^{t of}^J^une^15,¹⁹^17,^c^h^.³⁰^{, tit}^le^I^,^§^§^1,^{6, 4}⁰^Sta^t^.²¹^7,²¹^{9, c}^o^di^fⁱ^e^d^a^s^am^e^nde^{d a}^t^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§§⁷⁹³^et^seq^.
⁸^Se^e^Aⁿ^thony^R^.^K^l^eⁱ^{n, C}^o^m^m^eⁿ^t,^N^a^ti^on^al^Se^c^u^r^ity^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^ati^on:^I^t^s^Pr^ope^r^R^o^le^aⁿ^d^Sc^o^p^eⁱⁿ^a^Re^pr^e^s^eⁿ^tativ^e
^Demo^cra^c^y^{, 42 F}^ED^.^C^OM^M^.^L^.^J^.⁴³³^,⁴³⁷⁽¹⁹⁹⁰⁾⁽^d^e^s^c^r^ibiⁿ^g^e^v^olu^tion^of^aⁿ^ti-^e^s^pi^ona^g^e^la^w^s⁾^.
⁹^C^odifⁱ^e^d^a^t^{50 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁴⁰¹^et^se^q^.
¹⁰^{50 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁴⁰³⁽^g⁾^.
¹¹^C^odifⁱ^e^d^a^t^{42 U}^.^S.C^.^§²²⁷¹^et^seq^{. T}^h^e^disse^mⁱ^na^{tion of}^c^e^r^ta^{in u}ⁿ^c^l^a^ssifⁱ^e^d^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion re}^la^te^{d t}^o^nuc^le^a^r^f^a^c^ilitie^s
^m^a^y^be^r^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^e^d^by^the^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^{y of}^Ene^r^gy^pur^s^u^aⁿ^t^to⁴²^U^.^S.C^.^{§ 2}¹⁶⁸^u^p^oⁿ^a^fⁱ^nd^ing^tha^t^dis^s^e^mⁱ^na^tio^{n “}^c^o^u^l^d
^reasoⁿ^a^b^l^y^b^e^exp^ect^ed^t^o^resu^l^tⁱⁿ^{a si}^gnⁱ^fⁱ^can^t^ad^{verse e}^f^f^ect^oⁿ^t^h^{e h}^eal^t^h^aⁿ^d^saf^e^t^y^o^f^t^h^{e p}^u^b^lⁱ^c^o^r^t^h^{e c}^o^mm^oⁿ
^de^f^e^ns^e^a^{nd s}^e^c^u^rity^....”^{42 U}^.^S^.^C^.^§²¹^68(a⁾⁽⁴^)(B).
¹²^Se^e^Be^nja^m^{in S. Du}^V^a^{l, Jr.}^,^T^h^e^Occa^si^oⁿ^s^o^f^S^ecrecy^{, 47 U}^.^P^ITT^.^L.^R^EV^{. 579}^{, 5}⁹⁶⁽¹⁹⁸⁶⁾⁽^d^e^t^aⁱ^lⁱⁿ^g^r^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^tions
^dⁱ^rect^ed^at^p^r^o^t^ectⁱⁿ^{g nu}^cl^{ear s}^ecret^s,^o^r^“Rest^rⁱ^c^t^e^d^Dat^a”).
¹³^C^odifⁱ^e^d^a^t^{35 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁸¹^et^se^q^.

National defense information is protected by the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793 et seq. The
penalty for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 793 (gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information) is
a fine or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both. Thus, under § 793, persons convicted
of gathering defense information with the intent or reason to believe the information will be used
against the United States or to the benefit of a foreign nation may be fined or sentenced to no ¹⁴
more than 10 years imprisonment. Persons who have access to defense information that they
have reason to know could be used to harm the national security, whether the access is authorized
or unauthorized, and who disclose that information to any person not entitled to receive it, or
willfully retain the information despite an order to surrender it to an officer of the United States, ¹⁵
are subject to the same penalty. Although it is not necessary that the information be classified by
a government agency, the courts give deference to the executive determination of what constitutes

¹⁴¹⁸^U^.^S.C.^§⁷⁹³⁽^{a)-(c) p}^r^o^v^id^es:
⁽^a⁾^W^hoe^v^e^r^,^f^o^r^the^pur^pos^e^of^o^b^taⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion r}^e^s^p^e^c^ting^th^e^na^tiona^l^de^f^e^ns^e^w^{ith inte}^nt^or
^re^a^s^{on to}^be^lie^v^e^tha^t^t^h^e^inf^o^rm^a^tion^{is to}^be^us^ed^t^o^t^h^eⁱⁿ^j^u^ry^o^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^es,^o^r^t^o^t^h^e
^a^d^v^a^nta^g^e^of^aⁿ^y^f^o^r^e^ig^{n na}^tion,^g^o^e^s^upo^{n, e}ⁿ^te^r^s^{, f}^lie^s^ov^e^r^{, or}^ot^he^r^w^is^e^obtaⁱ^ns^inf^o^r^m^a^tion
^coⁿ^cernⁱⁿ^g^an^y^vessel^,^ai^rcra^f^t^,^wo^{rk o}^f^d^e^f^eⁿ^s^e,^[^e^t^c^.^]^,^o^r^an^y^p^r^o^hⁱ^bⁱ^t^e^d^p^l^{ace so}^d^e^si^gn^at^ed^b^y^t^h^e
^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^t^by^pr^oc^la^m^a^{tion i}ⁿ^tim^{e of}^w^a^r^or^{in c}^a^s^e^of^na^tiona^{l e}^m^er^g^e^ncy^{in w}^h^ic^{h a}ⁿ^y^t^hing^f^o^r
^the^us^e^of^the^A^r^m^y^{, Na}^vy^{, or}^Aⁱ^r^For^c^e^is^beⁱⁿ^g^pr^e^p^a^r^e^d^or^c^o^ns^tr^uc^te^{d or}^s^t^or^e^d^{, inf}^o^r^m^a^{tion a}^s
^t^o^w^hⁱ^c^h^p^r^o^hⁱ^bⁱ^t^e^d^p^l^{ace t}^h^e^P^r^esi^d^en^t^h^a^{s d}^e^t^e^rmⁱⁿ^ed^w^o^u^l^d^b^e^p^r^ej^u^dⁱ^ci^al^t^o^t^h^{e n}^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^d^e^f^eⁿ^s^e;
^or
⁽^b⁾^W^hoe^v^e^r^,^f^o^r^the^p^u^r^p^os^e^a^f^or^e^s^aⁱ^{d, a}^{nd w}^{ith l}ⁱ^k^e^inte^nt^or^r^e^a^s^{on t}^o^be^lie^v^e^{, c}^opie^s^{, ta}^k^e^s^,
^m^a^k^e^s^,^or^o^b^ta^ins^,^or^a^tte^m^p^ts^to^c^opy^{, ta}^k^e^,^m^a^k^e^{, or}^obtaⁱ^{n a}ⁿ^y^s^k^e^t^c^h^{, ph}^otog^r^a^ph^{, p}^h^o^t^og^r^a^phic
^ne^g^a^tiv^e^,^blue^prin^t,^plaⁿ^{, m}^a^{p, m}^ode^l,^instr^u^m^e^{nt, a}^pplia^nc^e^,^doc^u^m^eⁿ^{t, w}^r^iting^,^or^note^of
^aⁿ^y^t^hing^c^onne^c^t^e^d^w^{ith t}^h^e^na^ti^oⁿ^a^l^de^f^e^ns^e^;^or
^{(c) W}^h^o^e^ver,^f^o^{r t}^h^{e p}^u^r^p^o^s^{e af}^o^r^esai^d^,^recei^{ves o}^r^o^b^t^aiⁿ^s^o^r^{agrees o}^r^at^t^e^m^p^t^s^t^o^recei^{ve o}^r
^o^b^t^aiⁿ^f^r^o^m^an^y^p^e^rsoⁿ^,^o^r^f^r^o^m^an^y^so^u^r^{ce w}^h^at^e^v^er,^an^y^[^p^rot^ect^ed^t^hⁱⁿ^g^]^conⁿ^ect^ed^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^e
^na^tio^na^{l de}^f^e^nse^,^k^now^ing^{or ha}^vⁱ^ng^re^a^s^{on to}^be^lie^v^e^{... t}^h^a^t^it^ha^s^be^eⁿ^{or w}^{ill be}^ob^ta^ine^d^,^ta^k^e^n,
^m^a^de^{, or}^dis^pos^e^d^of^by^aⁿ^y^pe^r^s^{on c}^o^ntr^a^r^y^{to the}^pr^ov^is^io^ns^of^th^is^c^h^a^p^te^r^[¹^{8 U}^.^S^.^C^.^§§⁷⁹²^et
^seq^.]^;^...
¹⁵¹⁸^U^.^S.C.^§⁷⁹³⁽^d^)-(f^{) p}^r^o^v^id^es:
^(d^{) W}^h^o^e^ver,^l^a^wf^u^l^l^y^h^a^viⁿ^g^p^o^s^sessi^oⁿ^o^f^,^{access t}^o^,^coⁿ^t^r^o^l^o^v^er,^o^r^b^eⁱⁿ^{g en}^t^r^u^s^t^e^d^wⁱ^t^h^an^y
^doc^um^eⁿ^{t [}^o^r^othe^r^pr^o^t^e^c^t^e^d^thiⁿ^g^]^r^e^la^ting^t^o^the^na^tio^na^l^de^f^e^nse^,^{or i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^a^{tion re}^la^ting^to^the
^na^tio^na^{l de}^f^e^ns^e^{... the}^pos^s^e^s^s^o^r^ha^s^re^a^s^{on to}^be^lie^v^e^c^oul^{d be}^us^e^d^to^theⁱⁿ^j^u^ry^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^d
^Sta^t^e^s^{or t}^o^the^a^d^v^a^nta^g^e^of^aⁿ^y^fore^ig^{n na}^ti^on,^w^illf^ull^y^c^o^m^m^unic^a^t^e^s^{, de}^liv^e^r^{s, tra}ⁿ^sm^{its ... to}
^an^y^p^e^rsoⁿⁿ^o^t^en^title^d^t^o^receiv^e^{it, o}^r^w^illf^u^l^l^y^re^tain^{s th}^{e same an}^d^f^a^{ils to}^d^e^liv^{er it}^oⁿ^d^e^m^aⁿ^d
^to^t^h^{e o}^f^fⁱ^{cer o}^r^e^m^p^l^o^y^{ee o}^f^th^{e Un}^ited^S^t^{ates en}^titled^to^receiv^e^{it; o}^r
^{(e) W}^h^o^e^{ver h}^a^viⁿ^g^uⁿ^a^u^t^ho^ri^{zed p}^o^ssessi^oⁿ^o^f^,^{access t}^o^,^o^r^con^t^r^o^l^o^v^{er an}^y^d^o^c^u^m^en^t^[o^r^o^t^h^e^r
^pr^ote^c^t^e^d^t^hⁱⁿ^g^]^,^orⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion r}^e^la^ting^{to t}^h^e^na^ti^ona^l^de^f^e^ns^e^w^h^ic^{h inf}^o^r^m^a^{tion the}^pos^s^e^s^s^o^r
^ha^s^r^e^a^s^{on to}^be^lie^v^e^c^oul^{d be}^us^e^d^to^theⁱⁿ^j^u^r^y^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^or^to^the^a^d^v^a^nta^g^e^of^aⁿ^y
^f^o^reigⁿⁿ^a^tioⁿ^,^w^illf^u^l^l^y^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^{cates, d}^e^liv^{ers, tran}^sm^{its ... to}^an^y^p^e^rsoⁿⁿ^o^{t en}^ti^tled^t^o^receiv^e
^{it, or}^w^illf^ull^y^re^ta^{ins the}^sa^m^e^a^{nd f}^a^{ils to de}^liv^e^r^it^{to t}^h^e^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^{or e}^m^plo^y^e^e^o^f^the^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s
^en^titled^t^o^receiv^e^{it; o}^r
⁽^f⁾^W^hoe^ve^r^,^be^ing^eⁿ^tr^us^te^{d w}^ith^or^ha^vⁱ^ng^la^w^f^{ul pos}^s^e^s^sⁱ^on^or^c^ontr^o^l^of^aⁿ^y^doc^um^eⁿ^{t [}^o^r^othe^r
^pr^ote^c^t^e^d^t^hⁱⁿ^g^]^,^orⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion, r}^e^la^ting^{to t}^h^e^na^ti^ona^l^de^f^e^ns^e^,
⁽¹^{) t}^h^r^o^u^{gh gro}^{ss n}^e^glⁱ^g^en^{ce p}^e^rmⁱ^t^s^t^h^{e sa}^m^e^t^o^b^e^rem^o^v^e^d^f^r^o^mⁱ^t^s^p^r^o^p^e^{r p}^l^{ace o}^f^cu^st^od^y
^or^de^liv^e^r^e^d^t^o^aⁿ^y^one^{in v}ⁱ^ola^tio^{n of}^his^tr^us^t,^or^t^o^be^los^t^,^s^t^oleⁿ^,^a^b^s^t^r^a^c^t^e^d^{, or}^de^s^t^r^o^y^e^{d, or}
⁽²^{) h}^a^vⁱⁿ^g^kⁿ^o^w^led^g^{e th}^{at th}^{e sa}^{me h}^a^{s b}^een^illeg^a^lly^re^m^o^v^e^d^f^r^o^m^{its p}^r^o^p^e^{r p}^l^{ace o}^f
^c^u^s^t^ody^or^de^liv^e^r^e^d^t^o^aⁿ^y^oneⁱⁿ^vⁱ^ola^tion^of^his^tr^us^t,^or^l^o^s^t^,^or^s^t^oleⁿ^{, a}^b^s^t^r^a^c^t^e^d^{, or}
^de^s^t^r^o^y^e^{d, a}^{nd f}^a^ils^{to m}^a^ke^pr^om^{pt r}^e^p^o^r^t^of^s^u^c^h^los^s^,^the^f^{t, a}^b^s^t^r^a^c^tion,^or^de^s^t^r^u^c^tⁱ^{on t}^o^his
^s^upe^rⁱ^or^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^—
^Sha^ll^be^fⁱ^ne^{d u}^nde^r^t^h^is^tit^le^orⁱ^m^pr^is^one^{d n}^o^{t m}^o^r^e^thaⁿ^te^{n y}^e^a^r^s^,^or^bot^h.

“defense information.”¹⁶ Information that is made available by the government to the public is not
covered under the prohibition, however, because public availability of such information negates ¹⁷
the bad-faith intent requirement. On the other hand, classified documents may remain within the
ambit of the statute even if information contained therein is made public by an unauthorized ¹⁸
leak. Any person who is lawfully entrusted with defense information and who permits it to be
disclosed or lost, or who does not report such a loss or disclosure, is also subject to a penalty of
up to 10 years in prison. The act covers information transmitted orally as well as information in ¹⁹
tangible form.

18 U.S.C. § 794 (aiding foreign governments) provides for imprisonment for any term of years or ²⁰

life, or under certain circumstances, the death penalty. The provision penalizes anyone who
transmits defense information to a foreign government (or certain other foreign entities) with the
intent or reason to believe it will be used against the United States. The death penalty is available
only upon a finding that the offense resulted in the death of a covert agent or directly concerns
nuclear weapons or other particularly sensitive types of information. The death penalty is also
available under §794 for violators who gather or transmit information related to military plans ²¹
and the like during time of war, with the intent that the information reach the enemy. Offenders ²²
are also subject to forfeiture of any ill-gotten gains and property used to facilitate the offense.

¹⁶^Se^e^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^{es v.}^M^o^rⁱ^so^n,⁸⁴⁴^F^.²^d¹⁰⁵⁷⁽⁴^th^Cir.),^c^e^r^{t. de}^nie^d^,⁴⁸⁸^U^.^S.⁹^{08 (}¹⁹⁸⁸⁾⁽^u^p^h^o^l^di^ng^c^onv^ic^tio^{n u}^nde^r
^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁷⁹^{3 f}^o^r^de^liv^e^r^y^of^c^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^ph^otog^r^a^p^h^s^to^pu^blis^he^r⁾^.
¹⁷^G^o^riⁿ^v.^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^es,³¹^2,^U.^S^.⁹^,²⁷^-²⁸⁽¹⁹⁴¹⁾^(“W^h^{ere t}^h^{ere i}^sⁿ^o^o^ccasi^oⁿ^f^o^{r secrec}^y^,^as^wⁱ^t^h^rep^o^r^t^s^rel^a^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^o
^na^tio^na^{l de}^f^e^nse^,^pu^blishe^d^by^a^u^thority^of^Cong^re^{ss or the}^m^ilita^ry^de^pa^rtm^e^{nts, the}^r^e^c^aⁿ^{, of}^c^ourse^{, in a}^l^l^lik^e^lih^oo^d
^be^no^r^e^a^s^ona^bleⁱⁿ^te^nt^to^gⁱ^v^e^aⁿ^a^d^v^a^nta^g^e^{to a}^f^o^r^e^ig^{n g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt.”⁾^.
¹⁸^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es v.}^S^q^uⁱ^l^l^aco^t^e^,²²¹^F^.^3d⁵⁴^2,⁵⁷^{8 (}⁴^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.^But^se^e^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es v.}^R^o^sen,⁴⁴⁵^F^.^S^u^p^p^.²^d⁶⁰^2,
⁶²⁰^(E.D.^V^a^.²⁰⁰⁶^{) (i}ⁿ^t^erp^r^etin^g^th^{e ref}^e^ren^{ce in}^Sq^uill^ac^ote^t^o^a^p^ply^{not to}^the^doc^um^eⁿ^{t a}^t^is^s^u^e^,^{but r}^a^t^h^e^r^{, t}^o
^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion pe}^r^t^aⁱⁿⁱ^ng^{to t}^h^e^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt’^s^a^s^se^s^s^m^e^{nt of}^the^v^a^lid^ity^of^the^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion c}^ontaⁱ^ne^{d i}ⁿ^it)^.
¹⁹^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^v^.^R^o^s^e^{n, 44}⁵^F^.^Su^pp.^{2d 60}^{2, 61}⁶⁽^E^.D^{. Va}^{. 20}⁰⁶⁾^.
²⁰^{§ 7}⁹⁴^.^G^a^the^r^ing^or^de^liv^e^r^ing^de^f^e^nse^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion to a}ⁱ^d^f^o^re^ig^{n g}^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt
^(a^{) W}^hoe^v^e^r,^w^{ith inte}^{nt or}^re^a^s^{on to}^be^lie^v^e^tha^t^it^{is t}^o^be^use^d^t^o^theⁱⁿ^jury^of^the^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s
^or^to^the^a^d^v^a^nta^g^e^of^a^f^o^r^e^ig^{n na}^tion,^c^o^m^m^unic^a^t^e^s^{, de}^liv^e^r^s^,^or^tr^aⁿ^s^m^its^{. . . to a}ⁿ^y^f^o^r^e^igⁿ
^g^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt, or t}^o^aⁿ^y^f^a^c^{tion or}^pa^rty^{or m}^ilita^r^y^{or na}^v^a^l^f^o^rc^e^wⁱ^thin^a^f^o^re^ig^{n c}^oun^try^,^w^h^e^t^he^r
^reco^gnⁱ^zed^o^r^uⁿ^r^eco^gnⁱ^zed^b^y^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es,^o^r^t^o^an^y^rep^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^v^e,^o^f^fⁱ^cer,^a^g^en^t^,^e^m^p^l^o^y^ee,
^s^ubje^c^t^,^or^c^itiz^eⁿ^t^h^e^r^e^o^f^,^e^ithe^r^dir^e^c^tly^or^indir^e^c^tly^{, a}ⁿ^y^doc^um^ent^[^o^r^ot^he^r^pr^ote^c^t^e^d^t^h^ing^]^,^or
^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion r}^e^la^ting^{to t}^h^e^na^ti^on^a^l^de^f^e^ns^e^,^s^h^a^{ll be}^p^unis^h^e^d^by^de^a^t^{h or}^byⁱ^m^pr^is^onm^eⁿ^{t f}^o^r^aⁿ^y
^t^e^rm^o^f^y^e^{ars o}^r^f^o^{r l}ⁱ^f^e,^exc^e^p^t^t^h^at^t^h^{e sen}^t^en^{ce o}^f^d^eat^h^s^h^al^l^no^t^b^eⁱ^m^p^o^s^ed^un^l^e^{ss t}^h^{e j}^u^ry^o^r^.^.
^{. the}^c^o^ur^{t, f}^u^r^t^he^r^fⁱ^nds^t^h^a^t^the^o^f^f^e^ns^e^r^e^s^u^lte^{d in the}^ideⁿ^tⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^{tion by}^a^f^o^r^e^ig^{n pow}^e^r⁽^a^s^defⁱ^ne^d
^{in s}^e^c^tion¹^01(a⁾^of^the^Fore^igⁿ^Iⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^Surv^e^illa^nc^e^A^c^{t of}¹⁹⁷⁸^[⁵^{0 U}^.^C.^S.^{§ 1}⁸⁰¹^(a⁾^]^{) of}^aⁿ
ⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vi^du^al^actⁱⁿ^{g as an}^agen^t^o^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es an}^d^con^s^eq^u^eⁿ^t^l^yⁱⁿ^t^h^{e d}^eat^h^o^f^t^h^atⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vi^du^al^,
^{or dire}^c^tly^c^onc^e^r^ne^d^nuc^le^a^r^w^e^a^pon^ry^,^m^ilita^r^y^spa^c^e^c^r^a^f^{t or sa}^te^llite^{s, e}^a^r^ly^wa^rning^sy^ste^m^{s, or}
^othe^r^m^e^aⁿ^s^of^de^f^e^ns^e^or^r^e^ta^lia^{tion a}^g^aⁱ^ns^{t la}^r^g^e^-^s^c^a^l^e^a^tta^ck^{; w}^a^r^plaⁿ^s^;^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions
^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^{or c}^r^y^p^tog^r^a^phicⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^a^tion;^{or a}ⁿ^y^othe^{r m}^a^{jor w}^e^a^p^{ons sy}^ste^m^or^m^a^{jor e}^l^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}
^de^f^e^ns^e^s^t^r^a^tegy^.
^{(b) W}^hoe^v^e^{r, in t}ⁱ^m^e^of^w^a^r,^w^{ith inte}^nt^tha^t^t^h^{e sam}^e^sh^al^l^b^e^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^cat^ed^t^o^t^h^{e e}ⁿ^emy^,
^co^l^l^ect^s,^reco^rd^s,^p^u^b^lⁱ^s^h^e^s,^o^r^comm^uⁿⁱ^cat^es,^o^r^a^tte^m^p^{ts to e}^lic^it^aⁿ^y^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion w}^{ith re}^spe^c^t^to
^the^m^o^v^e^m^e^{nt, num}^be^r^s^{, de}^s^c^rⁱ^pti^{on, c}^oⁿ^d^iti^on,^or^dis^p^os^iti^on^of^aⁿ^y^o^f^the^A^r^m^e^{d For}^c^e^s^{, s}^hⁱ^p^s^,
^ai^rcra^f^t^,^o^r^w^a^r^m^a^t^e^ri^al^{s o}^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es,^o^r^wⁱ^t^h^resp^ect^t^o^t^h^{e p}^l^an^s^o^r^con^d^u^c^t^,^o^r^sup^p^o^s^ed
^plaⁿ^{s or}^c^oⁿ^duc^t^of^aⁿ^y^na^v^a^{l or m}^ilita^r^y^ope^ra^{tions, or}^w^{ith re}^spe^c^t^{to a}ⁿ^y^w^o^rk^{s or}^m^e^a^s^ure^s
^unde^r^t^a^k^eⁿ^f^o^r^or^c^oⁿⁿ^e^c^t^e^d^w^ith,^orⁱⁿ^teⁿ^d^e^d^f^o^r^the^f^o^r^tif^ic^a^tion^o^r^de^f^e^ns^e^of^aⁿ^y^pl^ace,^o^r^an^y
^othe^{r i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^a^{tion re}^la^ting^{to t}^h^e^p^ublic^de^f^e^nse^,^w^h^ic^h^mⁱ^g^h^{t be}^use^f^{ul to the}^eⁿ^e^m^y^,^sha^{ll be}
^pun^is^he^d^by^de^a^t^{h or}^byⁱ^m^pris^on^m^e^{nt f}^o^{r a}ⁿ^y^te^r^m^o^f^y^e^a^r^s^{or f}^o^{r lif}^e^....
²¹^During^tim^e^of^wa^{r, a}ⁿ^y^indivⁱ^d^u^a^{l w}^{ho c}^o^m^m^unic^a^t^e^s^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^{or a}ⁿ^y^othe^{r i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^a^{tion to t}^h^e^eⁿ^e^m^y^m^a^y^be
^pros^e^c^u^te^d^by^the^m^ilita^r^y^f^o^{r a}ⁱ^ding^the^eⁿ^e^m^y^unde^{r A}^r^tic^le¹⁰⁴^o^f^the^Uⁿ^if^orm^Code^of^Milita^ry^J^u^s^tic^e^(U^CMJ⁾^,
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Members of the military²³ who commit espionage, defined similarly to the conduct prohibited in

18 U.S.C. § 794, may be tried by court-martial for violating Article 106a of the Uniform Code of ²⁴

Military Justice (UCMJ), and sentenced to death if certain aggravating factors are found by ²⁵
unanimous determination of the panel. Unlike offenses under § 794, Article 106a offenses need
not have resulted in the death of a covert agent or involve military operations during war to incur
the death penalty. One of the aggravating factors enabling the imposition of the death penalty
under Article 106a is that “[t]he accused has been convicted of another offense involving
espionage or treason for which either a sentence of death or imprisonment for life was authorized
by statute.”
The unauthorized creation, publication, sale or transfer of photographs or sketches of vital
defense installations or equipment as designated by the President is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. §§ ²⁶

795 and 797. Violators are subject to fine or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^a^{nd if}^c^onv^ic^te^d,^pu^nishe^d^by^“^d^e^a^t^{h or s}^u^c^h^othe^r^pu^nish^m^e^{nt a}^s^a^c^ourt-m^a^rtia^{l or m}^ilita^r^y^c^o^m^m^issⁱ^{on m}^a^y^dire^c^t^.”
^{10 U.}^S.C.^§⁹⁰^4.^P^e^rsoⁿ^{s c}^o^nv^ic^te^{d by}^a^g^e^ne^ra^{l c}^ourt-m^a^r^tia^{l or b}^y^a^m^ilita^r^y^c^o^m^m^{ission f}^o^{r “}^l^urkⁱ^ng^a^s^a^spy^or
^actⁱⁿ^{g as a sp}^yⁱⁿ^o^r^ab^ou^t^an^y^p^l^ace,^vess^el^,^o^r^ai^rcraf^t^,^[^e^t^c^.^]^{” du}^riⁿ^g^tⁱ^m^{e o}^f^{war are t}^o^b^e^puⁿⁱ^s^h^{ed b}^y^d^eat^h^.¹⁰
^U.S.C.^{§ 9}⁰⁶^.^A^lie^{n un}^la^wf^{ul c}^o^m^b^a^t^aⁿ^ts^w^{ithin t}^h^e^m^e^aⁿ^ing^of^c^h^a^p^te^{r 4}⁷^A^of^title¹⁰^{, w}^{ho, “}^w^{ith inte}^nt^{or re}^a^s^oⁿ^t^o
^be^lie^v^e^tha^t^{it is t}^o^be^use^d^{to t}^h^e^inju^ry^o^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^{es o}^r^t^o^t^h^{e ad}^van^t^{age o}^f^a^f^o^rei^gⁿ^p^o^w^er,^co^l^l^ect^{s o}^r^at^t^e^m^p^t^s
^{to c}^o^lle^c^tⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion by}^c^l^a^nde^s^tine^m^e^aⁿ^s^or^w^h^ile^a^c^ting^unde^r^f^a^ls^e^pr^e^t^eⁿ^s^e^s^,^f^o^r^the^pur^pos^e^of^c^onv^ey^ing^s^u^c^h
ⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^an^eⁿ^emy^o^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es,^o^r^oⁿ^e^o^f^t^h^{e co}^-b^el^lⁱ^g^eren^t^s^o^f^t^h^{e en}^emy,^sh^al^l^b^e^punⁱ^s^h^e^d^b^y^d^eat^h^o^r
^suc^h^ot^he^{r p}^uⁿⁱ^shm^e^{nt a}^s^a^m^ilita^ry^c^o^m^mⁱ^{ssion ... m}^a^y^dire^c^t^.”¹⁰^U.S.C.A^.^{§ 9}^50v⁽²^7).
²²¹⁸^U^.^S^.^C.^§⁷⁹⁴⁽^d⁾^.^P^r^o^ceed^{s go}^t^o^t^h^{e Cri}^m^{e V}ⁱ^ctⁱ^m^{s F}^und.
²³^P^e^r^s^ons^s^u^bje^c^t^t^o^the^U^C^MJ^inc^l^ude^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^of^r^e^g^u^la^r^c^o^m^pone^nts^of^the^a^r^m^e^{d f}^o^r^c^e^s^{, c}^a^d^e^t^s^aⁿ^{d m}ⁱ^ds^hipm^eⁿ^,
^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^of^r^e^se^r^v^e^c^o^m^pone^nts^w^h^ile^{on tr}^aⁱⁿⁱ^ng^{, m}^e^m^b^e^r^s^of^the^na^tio^na^{l g}^u^a^r^{d w}^h^eⁿⁱⁿ^Fe^de^r^a^{l s}^e^r^v^ic^e^,^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^of
^cert^aⁱⁿ^o^r^ganⁱ^zatⁱ^oⁿ^s^w^h^en^assi^gned^t^o^aⁿ^d^serviⁿ^{g t}^h^{e arm}^e^d^f^o^rce^s^,^p^rⁱ^s^on^{ers o}^f^w^a^r,^p^e^rsoⁿ^s^acco^m^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g^t^h^e
^a^r^m^e^{d f}^o^rc^e^s^{in the}^fⁱ^e^l^{d in tim}^e^o^f^w^a^{r or a}^“^c^onting^e^nc^y^ope^ra^tion^,^”^a^{nd c}^e^r^taⁱⁿ^ot^he^{rs w}^{ith m}^ilita^r^y^sta^t^{us. 1}⁰^U.^S.C.
^{§ 8}^02.
²⁴^{10 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁹⁰^6a⁽^a⁾^pr^ov^ide^s^:
^A^r^{t. 106a}^{. Es}^pioⁿ^a^g^e
^(a^{)(1) A}ⁿ^y^pe^{rson su}^bje^c^t^to^[^t^he^{UCMJ, c}^h^a^p^te^{r 4}⁷^of^title¹⁰^{, U.S}^.^{C.] w}^{ho, w}^{ith i}ⁿ^te^nt^{or re}^a^s^on
^{to be}^lie^v^e^tha^t^{it is t}^o^be^use^d^t^o^t^h^e^inj^u^ry^of^the^Unite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^{or t}^o^the^a^d^v^a^nta^g^e^of^a^f^o^re^igⁿ
^na^tio^{n, c}^o^m^m^unic^a^t^e^s^{, de}^liv^e^r^s^,^or^tr^aⁿ^s^m^its^{, or}^a^tte^m^p^{ts to c}^o^m^m^unic^a^t^e^,^de^liv^e^r^{, or}^traⁿ^sm^{it, to}
^aⁿ^y^eⁿ^tit^y^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d in}^pa^r^a^g^r^a^ph⁽²⁾^,^eⁱ^t^h^e^r^dir^e^c^tly^orⁱⁿ^dir^e^c^tly^{, any}^t^hing^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d i}ⁿ^pa^r^a^g^r^a^ph
⁽³^{) sh}^al^l^b^e^puⁿⁱ^s^h^ed^{as a cou}^r^t^-^m^a^rtⁱ^a^l^m^a^{y d}ⁱ^rect^,^excep^t^t^h^atⁱ^f^t^h^{e accu}^sedⁱ^s^f^{ound g}^uⁱ^lty^of^aⁿ
^of^fe^ns^e^tha^t^dire^c^tly^c^onc^e^r^ns^(A⁾^nuc^le^a^r^w^e^a^ponry^,^m^ilita^r^y^s^p^a^c^e^c^r^af^{t or s}^a^te^llite^s^,^e^a^r^ly^w^a^rning
^sy^s^t^em^s^,^or^ot^he^r^m^e^aⁿ^s^of^def^e^ns^e^or^r^e^ta^lia^tio^{n a}^g^aⁱ^ns^{t la}^r^g^e^s^c^a^l^{e a}^tta^c^k^{, (}^B⁾^w^a^r^plaⁿ^s^,⁽^C⁾
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^or^c^r^y^p^tog^r^a^phic^inf^o^rm^a^{tion, or (D}^{) a}ⁿ^y^othe^{r m}^a^{jor w}^e^a^pons^s^y^s^t^em
^o^r^m^a^j^o^{r el}^e^m^en^t^o^f^d^e^f^eⁿ^s^{e st}^rat^e^g^y^,^t^h^{e accu}^sed^sh^al^l^b^e^p^uⁿⁱ^sh^ed^b^y^d^eat^h^o^r^su^{ch o}^t^h^e^r
^pun^ishm^eⁿ^{t a}^s^a^c^ourt-m^a^rtia^l^m^a^y^dire^c^t^.
^{(2) A}ⁿ^eⁿ^tity^re^fe^rre^{d to in}^pa^ra^g^r^a^{ph (1)}^is—
^(A^{) a}^f^o^reigⁿ^g^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t;
^{(B) a}^f^a^c^{tion or pa}^rty^{or m}^ilita^r^y^{or na}^v^a^{l f}^o^r^c^e^w^{ithin a}^f^o^re^ig^{n c}^ountry^{, w}^h^e^t^he^{r re}^c^o^gⁿ^iz^e^d
^o^r^un^reco^gnⁱ^zed^b^y^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es;^o^r
^{(C) a rep}^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^v^e,^o^f^fⁱ^c^e^r,^agen^t^,^em^p^l^o^y^ee,^su^b^j^ect^,^o^r^ci^tⁱ^zen^o^f^su^ch^{a go}^vern^m^eⁿ^t^,
^f^a^c^tion,^pa^r^t^y^,^or^f^o^r^c^e^.
^{(3) A}^thing^re^f^e^rre^{d to in}^pa^ra^g^r^a^{ph (}¹^{) is}^a^doc^um^eⁿ^{t, w}^r^iting^,^c^o^d^e^book^{, s}ⁱ^gⁿ^a^l^b^ook^{, s}^k^e^t^c^h^,
^pho^tog^r^a^p^h^,^p^h^o^t^og^r^a^phic^ne^g^a^tiv^e^,^blue^pr^int^,^p^l^aⁿ^{, m}^a^{p, m}^ode^{l, n}^o^t^e^,^ins^t^r^u^m^e^{nt, a}^pplia^nc^e^,^or
^inf^o^rm^a^{tion re}^la^ting^{to t}^h^e^na^ti^on^a^l^de^f^e^nse^.
²⁵¹⁰^U^.^S.C.^§⁹⁰⁶^a^(b^)-(c).
²⁶^{§ 7}⁹⁵^.^Phot^og^r^a^phi^ng^a^{nd s}^k^e^t^c^h^ing^de^f^e^ns^e^ins^t^a^lla^tions
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

The knowing and willful disclosure of certain classified information is punishable under 18 ²⁷
U.S.C. § 798 by fine and/or imprisonment for not more than 10 years. To incur a penalty, the
disclosure must be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United States or work to the benefit
of any foreign government and to the detriment of the United States. The provision applies only
to information related to cryptographic systems and information related to communications
intelligence specially designated by a U.S. government agency for “limited or restricted ²⁸
dissemination or distribution.” The provision protects information obtained by method of
communications intelligence only if the communications were intercepted from a “foreign
government,” which, while broadly defined, may not include a transnational terrorist ²⁹
organization.
18 U.S.C. § 641 punishes the theft or conversion of government property or records for one’s own
use or the use of another. While this section does not explicitly prohibit disclosure of classified

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^(a^{) W}^h^eⁿ^e^v^e^r^{, in the}ⁱⁿ^te^re^{sts of}^na^tiona^l^de^f^e^nse^,^the^Pre^s^ideⁿ^t^de^fⁱ^ne^{s c}^e^r^ta^{in v}^ita^{l m}^ilita^r^y^a^nd
^na^v^a^{l ins}^t^a^lla^tio^ns^or^e^qui^pm^eⁿ^{t a}^s^r^e^quirⁱ^ng^pr^o^t^e^c^tion^a^g^aⁱ^ns^{t the}^g^e^ne^r^a^{l dis}^s^e^mⁱ^na^tion^of
^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion r}^e^la^tiv^e^the^r^e^t^{o, it s}^h^a^{ll be}^unla^w^f^u^{l to m}^a^k^e^aⁿ^y^photo^g^r^a^{ph, s}^k^e^t^c^h^{, pic}^t^ur^e^,^dr^a^w^ing^,
^m^a^{p, or g}^r^a^p^hⁱ^c^a^l^re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tioⁿ^of^s^u^c^h^v^ita^{l m}^ilita^r^y^a^{nd na}^v^a^{l in}^s^t^a^lla^tions^{or e}^q^uipm^eⁿ^{t w}^ithout
^fⁱ^{rst obta}ⁱⁿⁱ^ng^pe^rm^{ission of}^the^c^o^m^m^a^nding^offⁱ^c^e^r^of^the^m^ilita^ry^{or na}^v^a^{l post, c}^a^m^{p, or sta}^tio^n,
^{or na}^v^a^{l v}^e^sse^ls,^m^ilita^r^y^a^{nd na}^v^a^{l a}ⁱ^rc^ra^f^t^{, a}^{nd a}ⁿ^y^se^pa^ra^te^m^ilita^ry^{or na}^v^a^{l c}^o^m^m^a^nd
^c^onc^e^r^ne^d,^or^hig^h^e^r^a^u^t^hority^{, a}ⁿ^{d pr}^om^ptly^sub^m^itting^the^pr^od^uc^{t ob}^ta^ine^d^{to s}^u^c^h^c^o^m^m^a^nding
^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^{or hig}^h^e^r^a^u^t^hority^f^o^{r c}^eⁿ^s^o^rs^hip^{or s}^u^c^h^othe^{r a}^c^tio^{n a}^s^he^m^a^y^de^e^m^ne^c^e^s^s^a^r^y^....
^{§ 7}^97.^Public^a^tⁱ^{on a}^{nd s}^a^le^of^p^h^o^t^og^r^a^phs^of^de^f^e^ns^e^ins^t^a^lla^tio^ns
^{On a}ⁿ^d^a^f^te^{r thirty}^da^y^s^f^r^o^m^the^da^te^up^on^w^h^ic^{h the}^P^r^e^sⁱ^d^eⁿ^t^de^fine^{s a}ⁿ^y^v^ita^l^m^ilita^r^y^{or na}^v^a^l
^insta^lla^tio^{n or}^e^q^uⁱ^pm^eⁿ^{t a}^s^be^ing^w^{ithin the}^c^a^t^e^g^or^y^c^onte^m^pla^t^e^d^un^de^r^s^e^c^tion⁷⁹⁵^of^this^tit^le
^[¹⁸^]^,^w^hoe^v^e^r^r^e^pr^oduc^e^s^,^pu^blis^he^s^,^s^e^lls^{, or}^gⁱ^v^e^s^a^w^ay^aⁿ^y^phot^og^r^a^{ph, s}^k^e^t^c^h^,^pic^t^ur^e^,^dr^a^w^ing^,
^m^a^{p, or g}^r^a^p^hⁱ^c^a^l^re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tioⁿ^of^the^v^ita^{l m}^ilita^r^y^{or na}^v^a^{l insta}^lla^tions^{or e}^q^ui^pm^eⁿ^{t so de}^fⁱ^ne^d,
^w^{ithout f}ⁱ^rs^{t ob}^taⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^pe^rm^is^sⁱ^{on of}^the^c^o^m^m^a^nding^of^fⁱ^ce^{r ... or}^hig^h^e^r^a^u^th^ority^{, unle}^s^s^s^u^c^h
^p^h^o^t^o^grap^h,^sket^ch^,^pⁱ^ct^u^r^e,^drawiⁿ^g,^m^a^p^,^o^r^gr^ap^hⁱ^cal^rep^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^h^a^{s cl}^earl^yⁱⁿ^dⁱ^cat^ed^t^h^ereoⁿ
^tha^t^it^ha^{s be}^eⁿ^c^eⁿ^so^re^{d by}^the^pr^ope^{r m}^ilita^ry^{or na}^v^a^{l a}^u^thority^{, sha}^{ll be}^fⁱ^ne^d^un^de^{r th}^{is title}^or
^im^pr^is^one^{d n}^o^{t m}^o^r^e^thaⁿ^one^y^e^ar^{, or}^bot^h.
²⁷^§⁷⁹^8.^Disclo^su^re^o^f^classifⁱ^ed^inf^o^r^m^atioⁿ
^(a^{) W}^hoe^v^e^{r k}^now^ing^l^y^a^{nd w}^illfully^c^o^m^m^unic^a^t^e^s^{, f}^u^rnishe^{s, tra}ⁿ^sm^{its, or ot}^he^rw^ise^m^a^k^e^s
^a^v^a^ila^ble^{to a}ⁿ^uⁿ^a^u^t^hor^iz^e^d^pe^r^s^on,^or^pu^blis^he^s^,^or^us^e^s^{in a}ⁿ^y^m^a^nne^r^pr^e^j^udicⁱ^a^l^t^o^t^h^e^s^a^f^e^t^y^or
^inte^re^{st of}^the^Uni^t^e^d^Sta^t^e^s^{or f}^o^{r the}^be^ne^f^it^of^aⁿ^y^f^o^r^eⁱ^g^{n g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt to t}^h^e^de^tr^im^eⁿ^{t of}^the
^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es an}^y^cl^as^si^fⁱ^edⁱⁿ^f^o^rmatⁱ^oⁿ^—
⁽¹^{) co}ⁿ^cerniⁿ^g^t^h^eⁿ^a^t^u^re,^p^r^ep^ara^tⁱ^o^n,^o^r^u^s^{e o}^f^an^y^co^d^e^,^ci^p^h^e^r,^{or cr}^y^p^t^o^grap^hⁱ^{c sy}^st^e^m^o^f^t^h^e
^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^or^aⁿ^y^f^o^r^e^ig^{n g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt; or}
⁽²⁾^c^onc^e^rⁿⁱ^ng^the^de^sⁱ^gⁿ^{, c}^o^ns^tr^u^c^tion,^us^e^,^m^a^inte^na^nc^e^,^or^r^e^pa^ir^of^aⁿ^y^de^vⁱ^c^e^,^a^ppa^r^a^tus^,^or
^a^pplia^nc^e^us^e^d^or^pr^e^p^a^r^e^d^or^pla^nne^{d f}^o^r^us^e^by^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^or^aⁿ^y^f^o^r^e^ig^{n g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt f}^o^r
^c^r^y^p^tog^r^a^phic^{or c}^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion i}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^pur^pose^s^{; or}
^{(3) c}^onc^e^rⁿⁱ^ng^the^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion in}^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^a^c^tiv^itie^{s of}^the^Unite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^{or a}ⁿ^y^f^o^re^igⁿ
^go^verⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^;^o^r
^{(4) o}^b^ta^ine^d^by^the^pr^oc^e^sse^{s of}^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion i}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^f^r^om^t^h^e^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tions of}^aⁿ^y
^f^o^r^e^ig^{n g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt, k}^now^ing^the^s^a^m^e^{to ha}^v^e^be^eⁿ^ob^ta^ine^d^by^s^u^c^h^pr^oc^e^s^s^e^s^—
^Sha^ll^be^fⁱ^ne^{d u}^nde^r^t^h^is^tit^le^orⁱ^m^pr^is^one^{d n}^o^{t m}^o^r^e^thaⁿ^te^{n y}^e^a^r^s^,^or^bot^h.
²⁸^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁷⁹⁸⁽^b)^.
²⁹^Id^{. (}^“^T^h^e^te^r^m^‘^f^or^eⁱ^gⁿ^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt’^inc^l^ude^sⁱⁿ^its^m^e^aⁿ^ing^aⁿ^y^pe^r^s^{on or}^pe^r^s^oⁿ^s^a^c^ting^or^pur^por^tⁱ^ng^{to a}^c^t^f^o^r^or
^on^be^ha^lf^of^aⁿ^y^f^a^c^tion,^pa^rty^,^de^pa^rtm^e^{nt, a}^g^eⁿ^c^y^{, bure}^a^u^{, or}^m^ilit^a^r^y^f^o^rc^e^of^{or w}^{ithin a}^f^o^re^ig^{n c}^o^untry^{, or f}^o^{r or}^on
^be^ha^lf^of^aⁿ^y^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt or}^aⁿ^y^pe^r^s^on^or^pe^r^s^ons^pur^por^ti^ng^to^a^c^t^a^s^a^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt w}^{ithin a}^f^o^r^e^ig^{n c}^oun^tr^y^,^w^h^e^t^he^r
^o^r^no^t^su^c^h^go^vern^m^eⁿ^tⁱ^s^reco^gnⁱ^zed^b^y^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es.^”^).

information, it has been used for that purpose.³⁰ Violators may be fined, imprisoned for not more
than 10 years, or both, unless the value of the property does not exceed the sum of $100, in which
case the maximum prison term is one year.
18 U.S.C. § 952 punishes employees of the United States who, without authorization, willfully
publish or furnish to another any official diplomatic code or material prepared in such a code, by
imposing a fine, a prison sentence (up to 10 years), or both. The same punishment applies for
materials “obtained while in the process of transmission between any foreign government and its ³¹
diplomatic mission in the United States.”
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) punishes the willful retention, communication, or transmission, etc., of
classified information retrieved by means of knowingly accessing a computer without (or in
excess of) authorization, with reason to believe that such information “could be used to the injury
of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation.” The provision imposes a fine or
imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both, in the case of a first offense or attempted
violation. Repeat offenses or attempts can incur a prison sentence of up to twenty years.
18 U.S.C. § 1924 prohibits the unauthorized removal of classified material.³² The provision
imposes a fine of up to $1,000 and a prison term up to one year for government officers or
employees who knowingly take material classified pursuant to government regulations with the ³³
intent of retaining the materials at an unauthorized location.
42 U.S.C. § 2274 punishes the unauthorized communication by anyone of “Restricted Data,”³⁴ or
an attempt or conspiracy to communicate such data, by imposing a fine of not more than
$500,000, a maximum life sentence in prison, or both, if done with the intent of injuring the ³⁵
United States or to secure an advantage to any foreign nation. An attempt to disclose or

³⁰^Se^e^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^{es v.}^M^o^rⁱ^so^n,⁸⁴⁴^F^.²^d¹⁰⁵⁷⁽⁴^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁸⁾⁽^p^h^o^to^g^r^a^phs^a^{nd r}^e^p^o^r^t^s^w^e^r^e^ta^ng^ible^pr^o^p^e^r^ty^of^the
^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt)^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Fo^w^l^e^r^{, 932 F.}^2d³⁰⁶⁽⁴^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹¹⁾⁽^“^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion is}^a^s^p^e^cⁱ^e^s^of^pr^o^p^e^r^t^y^a^{nd a}^thiⁿ^g^of
^v^a^lue^”^suc^h^tha^t^“^c^onv^e^r^sioⁿ^aⁿ^d^c^onv^e^y^aⁿ^c^e^of^g^ove^rn^m^e^nta^l^inf^o^rm^a^{tion c}^aⁿ^vⁱ^ola^t^e^§⁶⁴¹^,”^c^iting^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^th
^J^e^te^r^,⁷⁷⁵^F.^2d⁶⁷^0,⁶⁸^0-⁸²⁽⁶^{Cir. 1}⁹⁸⁵^{)); Un}^ited^{States v}^.^Gⁱ^rard^{, 6}⁰¹^F.2^d⁶⁹^,⁷⁰^-7¹⁽²^d^Cir.¹⁹⁷⁹^).
³¹^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁹⁵^2.
³²^{18 U}^.^C^.^S.^§¹⁹²⁴^pr^ov^ide^s^:
⁽^a⁾^W^hoe^v^e^r^,^be^ing^aⁿ^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^{, em}^ploy^e^e^,^c^ontr^a^c^t^or^,^or^c^o^ns^ultaⁿ^t^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, a}ⁿ^d,^by
^vⁱ^r^t^ue^of^his^of^fⁱ^c^e^,^em^plo^y^m^e^{nt, pos}^iti^on^{, or}^c^ontr^a^c^t^,^be^c^o^m^e^s^pos^s^e^s^s^e^{d of}^doc^um^eⁿ^ts^or
^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^l^s^c^ontaⁱ^ning^c^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion of}^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^{, k}ⁿ^o^wⁱ^ng^l^y^r^e^m^ove^s^s^u^c^h
^doc^um^eⁿ^ts^or^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^l^s^w^{ithout a}^u^th^or^ity^a^{nd w}^{ith the}ⁱⁿ^te^nt^to^r^e^ta^{in s}^u^c^h^doc^um^eⁿ^ts^or^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^l^s
^a^t^aⁿ^uⁿ^a^u^th^or^iz^e^d^l^o^c^a^tio^{n s}^h^a^l^l^be^fⁱ^ne^{d n}^o^{t m}^o^r^e^thaⁿ^{$ 1}^,⁰^00,^or^im^pr^is^one^{d f}^o^rⁿ^o^{t m}^o^r^e^thaⁿ
^one^y^e^a^r^{, or}^bot^h.
⁽^b⁾^F^o^r^p^u^r^p^os^e^s^of^this^s^e^c^tio^{n, t}^h^e^pr^ov^isⁱ^on^of^doc^um^eⁿ^ts^a^{nd m}^a^te^rⁱ^a^l^s^{to the}^C^ong^r^e^s^s^s^h^a^{ll n}^o^t
^c^ons^titu^te^aⁿ^of^fe^ns^e^unde^{r s}^u^bs^e^c^{tion (a}^).
^{(c) In}^t^hⁱ^s^sectⁱ^oⁿ^,^t^h^{e t}^e^rm^“cl^assⁱ^fⁱ^edⁱⁿ^f^o^rmatⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es”^m^e^an^{s i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ
^or^ig^ina^t^e^d^,^ow^ne^{d, or}^p^o^s^s^e^s^s^e^{d b}^y^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt c}^onc^e^rⁿⁱ^ng^the^na^ti^ona^l^de^f^e^ns^e
^{or f}^o^re^ig^{n re}^la^tions^of^the^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^tha^t^ha^s^be^eⁿ^de^te^rm^ine^d^p^u^rsua^nt^to^la^w^{or Ex}^e^c^u^tiv^e
^or^de^r^t^o^r^e^q^u^ir^e^pr^ote^c^tio^{n a}^g^aⁱ^ns^{t una}^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^z^e^d^dⁱ^s^c^los^u^r^eⁱⁿ^t^h^e^int^e^r^e^s^t^s^of^na^tiona^{l s}^e^c^u^r^ity^.
³³^Id^.
³⁴^T^h^e^te^r^m^“^R^e^s^tr^ic^te^{d D}^a^ta^”^is^defⁱ^ne^{d by}^the^A^t^o^m^ic^Ene^r^gy^A^c^{t of}¹⁹⁵⁴^to^inc^l^u^d^e^“^a^{ll da}^ta^c^o^nc^e^r^ning⁽¹⁾^de^sⁱ^gⁿ^,
^m^a^nuf^a^c^t^ur^e^,^or^util^iz^a^tion^of^a^t^o^m^ic^w^e^a^pons^{; (}²⁾^the^pr^o^duc^ti^on^of^s^p^e^cⁱ^a^l^nuc^le^a^r^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^{l; or}⁽³⁾^the^us^e^of^s^p^e^cⁱ^a^l
^nuc^le^a^r^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^l^{in the}^pr^od^uc^tioⁿ^of^eⁿ^e^r^gy^{, but s}^h^a^ll^no^{t inc}^l^ude^d^a^ta^de^c^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^or^r^e^m^o^v^e^{d f}^r^o^m^the^R^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^e^d
^D^a^ta^c^a^t^eg^or^y^pur^s^u^aⁿ^t^to^[⁴^{2 U}^.^C^.^{S. §}²¹⁶²^]^.”⁴²^U^.^C^.^S.^§²⁰¹⁴⁽^y⁾^.
³⁵⁴²^U^.^S^.^C.^§²²⁷⁴⁽^a).^Recei^p^t^o^r^t^a^m^p^eriⁿ^{g w}ⁱ^t^h^Rest^ri^ct^ed^Dat^a^wⁱ^t^h^lⁱ^k^{e i}ⁿ^t^eⁿ^tⁱ^s^p^uⁿⁱ^sh^a^b^l^eⁱⁿ^t^h^e^sa^m^e^w^a^y^unde^r
⁴²^U.S^.^C^.^§^§²²⁷⁵^and²²⁷⁶^.

participate in a conspiracy to disclose restricted data with the belief that such data will be used to
injure the United States or to secure an advantage to a foreign nation, is punishable by ³⁶
imprisonment for no more than 10 years, a fine of no more than $100,000, or both. The
disclosure of “Restricted Data” by an employee or contractor, past or present, of the federal
government to someone not authorized to receive it is punishable by a fine of not more than ³⁷
$12,500.

50 U.S.C. § 421 provides for the protection of information concerning the identity of covert ³⁸

intelligence agents. Any person authorized to know the identity of such agents who intentionally
discloses the identity of a covert agent is subject to imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a ³⁹
fine or both. A person who learns the identity of an agent through authorized access to classified ⁴⁰
information and discloses the agent’s identity to someone not authorized to receive classified
information is subject to a fine, a term of imprisonment not more than five years, or both. A
person who learns of the identity of a covert agent through a “pattern of activities intended to
identify and expose covert agents” and discloses the identity to any individual not authorized
access to classified information, with reason to believe that such activities would impair U.S.
foreign intelligence efforts, is subject to a fine or imprisonment for a term of not more than three
years. To be convicted, a violator must have knowledge that the information identifies a covert
agent whose identity the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal. An agent is not
punishable under this provision for revealing his or her own identity, and it is a defense to ⁴¹
prosecution if the United States has already publicly disclosed the identity of the agent.

50 U.S.C. § 783 penalizes government officers or employees who, without proper authority,

communicate classified information to a person whom the employee has reason to suspect is an ⁴²
agent or representative of a foreign government. It is also unlawful for the representative or

³⁶^{42 U}^.^S.C^.^§²²⁷⁴⁽^b)^.
³⁷^{42 U}^.^S.C^.^§²²⁷⁷^.
³⁸^T^h^e^Inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^Ideⁿ^titie^s^aⁿ^d^Pr^ote^c^tion^A^c^{t of}¹⁹⁸²^{, c}^o^difⁱ^e^d^a^t^{50 U}^.^S.C.^§§⁴^21-^26.^For^m^o^re^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion, s}^e^e
^{CRS Rep}^o^r^t^RS2¹⁶³⁶^,^In^te^lligeⁿ^c^e^Ideⁿ^titie^{s Pr}^ote^c^tion^Ac^t^,^b^y^E^lⁱ^zab^et^h^B.^Bazan^.
³⁹^{50 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁴²¹⁽^a⁾^pr^ov^ide^s^:
^{(a) W}^h^o^e^ver,^h^a^viⁿ^g^o^r^h^a^viⁿ^g^h^a^d^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^{access t}^o^cl^assi^fⁱ^edⁱⁿ^f^o^rmatⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^atⁱ^d^eⁿ^tⁱ^fⁱ^e^{s a}
^c^o^v^e^{rt a}^g^eⁿ^{t, inte}^nti^ona^lly^disc^los^e^{s a}ⁿ^y^inf^o^rm^a^{tion i}^d^eⁿ^tif^yⁱ^ng^su^c^h^c^o^v^e^{rt a}^g^eⁿ^{t to a}ⁿ^y^indivⁱ^d^u^a^l
ⁿ^o^t^a^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^t^o^recei^{ve cl}^assi^fⁱ^e^dⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^kno^wⁱⁿ^g^t^h^at^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^f^o^rmatⁱ^oⁿ^di^scl^o^sed^so
ⁱ^d^en^tⁱ^fⁱ^e^{s su}^ch^co^vert^agen^t^an^{d t}^h^at^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es i}^s^t^a^kiⁿ^g^affⁱ^rmatⁱ^v^e^m^e^asu^r^{es t}^o^coⁿ^ceal
^suc^h^c^o^v^e^{rt a}^g^eⁿ^{t’s inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^r^e^la^tionshi^{p t}^o^t^h^e^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, s}^h^a^{ll be}^fⁱ^ne^d^un^de^{r title}¹⁸^,
^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^C^ode^,^or^im^pr^is^one^{d n}^o^{t m}^o^r^e^thaⁿ^te^{n y}^e^a^r^s^,^or^bot^h^.
⁴⁰^“^C^la^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^tion”^is^de^fⁱ^ne^{d in}⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.^§⁴²⁶⁽¹⁾^a^s^“ⁱ^nf^or^m^a^{tion or}^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^l^de^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^t^e^d^a^{nd c}^l^e^a^r^l^y^m^a^r^k^e^d
^or^c^l^e^a^r^ly^r^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^te^{d, p}^u^r^s^uaⁿ^t^to^the^pr^ov^is^io^ns^of^a^s^t^a^t^ute^or^Ex^e^c^u^tiv^e^or^de^r⁽^o^r^a^r^e^g^u^la^tio^{n or}^or^de^r^is^s^u^e^d
^p^u^r^su^aⁿ^t^t^o^{a st}^at^u^t^e^o^r^E^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^{e o}^r^d^e^r),^{as requ}ⁱ^rⁱⁿ^{g a sp}^eci^fⁱ^{c d}^e^g^r^{ee o}^f^p^r^o^t^ectⁱ^o^{n agai}ⁿ^s^t^uⁿ^a^u^t^ho^rⁱ^zed^dⁱ^scl^o^su^{re f}^o^r
^r^e^a^s^ons^of^na^tio^na^{l s}^e^c^u^r^ity^.”
⁴¹^Se^e^L^a^w^r^en^{ce P}^.^G^o^t^t^e^sman^,^No^t^e^,^The^In^te^lligeⁿ^c^e^Ideⁿ^tit^ie^{s Prot}^e^c^{tion Ac}^t^of¹⁹^82:^An^Asse^ssmeⁿ^{t of t}^h^e
^Constit^uti^oⁿ^a^lity^of^Se^c^tⁱ^{on 60}¹⁽^c⁾^{, 4}⁹^B^ROOKL^YN^L.^R^EV^{. 479,}⁴⁸³^-⁴^{85 (}¹⁹⁸³⁾⁽^out^liniⁿ^g^the^e^l^e^m^ents^of^aⁿ^of^f^e^ns^e
^unde^r⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.^§⁴²¹⁾^.
⁴²^{50 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁷⁸³⁽^a⁾^pr^ov^ide^s^:
^C^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion of}^c^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion by}^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt of}^fⁱ^c^e^r^or^e^m^plo^y^e^e^.^I^t^s^h^a^{ll be}^uⁿ^la^w^f^ul
^f^o^r^aⁿ^y^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^or^em^ploy^ee^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^or^of^aⁿ^y^de^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt or}^a^g^eⁿ^cy^the^r^e^o^f^,^or^of^aⁿ^y
^c^o^r^por^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^the^s^t^oc^k^of^w^h^ic^{h is}^ow^ne^{d in w}^hole^orⁱⁿ^m^a^jor^pa^r^t^b^y^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^or^aⁿ^y
^d^e^p^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^r^agen^c^y^t^h^ereo^f^,^t^o^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^cat^{e i}ⁿ^an^y^manⁿ^e^{r o}^r^by^an^y^m^ean^s,^t^o^an^y^o^t^h^e^{r p}^e^rson
^w^h^o^m^s^u^c^h^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^or^em^ploy^e^e^know^s^or^ha^s^r^e^a^s^on^to^be^lie^v^e^{to b}^e^aⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^{t or}^r^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^of
^aⁿ^y^f^o^r^e^ig^{n g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt , a}ⁿ^y^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion of}^a^kⁱ^{nd w}^h^ic^{h s}^h^a^l^l^ha^v^e^be^eⁿ^c^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^by^the
^P^r^esi^d^eⁿ^t⁽^o^{r b}^y^t^h^{e h}^ead^o^f^an^y^s^u^ch^d^e^p^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^,^agen^c^y^,^o^r^co^rp^oratⁱ^oⁿ^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e app}^r^o^v^al^o^f^t^h^e
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

agent of the foreign government to receive classified information.⁴³ Violation of either of these ⁴⁴
provisions is punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 10 years. ⁴⁵
Violators are thereafter prohibited from holding public office. Violators must forfeit all property
derived directly or indirectly from the offense and any property that was used or intended to be ⁴⁶
used to facilitate the violation.
Disclosure of a patent that has been placed under a secrecy order pursuant to the Invention ⁴⁷
Secrecy Act of 1951 can result in a fine of $10,000, imprisonment for up to two years, or both.
Publication or disclosure of the invention must be willful and with knowledge of the secrecy ⁴⁸
order to be punishable.
In addition to the criminal penalties outlined above, the executive branch employs numerous
means of deterring unauthorized disclosures by government personnel using administrative ⁴⁹
measures based on terms of employment contracts. The agency may impose disciplinary action ⁵⁰
or revoke a person’s security clearance. The revocation of a security clearance is usually not ⁵¹
reviewable by the Merit System Protection Board and may mean the loss of government
employment. Government employees may be subject to monetary penalties for disclosing

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^P^r^esi^d^eⁿ^t⁾^{as af}^fectⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e secu}^r^ity^o^f^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, k}^now^ing^o^r^ha^vⁱ^ng^r^e^a^s^{on t}^o^k^now^tha^t
^su^chⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^h^a^s^b^een^so^cl^as^si^fⁱ^ed^,^uⁿ^l^{ess su}^ch^o^f^fⁱ^c^e^{r o}^r^em^p^l^o^y^e^e^sh^al^l^h^a^{ve b}^een
^sp^eci^fⁱ^c^a^l^l^y^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^b^y^t^h^{e P}^r^e^sⁱ^d^en^t^,^o^r^b^y^t^h^{e h}^ead^o^f^t^h^{e d}^e^p^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^,^agen^c^y^,^o^r^co^rp^o^r^atⁱ^oⁿ
^by^w^h^ic^{h this}^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^or^e^m^plo^y^e^e^is^e^m^plo^y^e^d^{, to m}^a^k^e^s^u^c^h^dis^c^lo^s^u^r^e^of^s^u^c^h^inf^o^r^m^a^tion.
⁴³^{50 U}^.^S.C^.⁷⁸³⁽^b)^pr^ov^ide^s^:
^Recei^p^t^o^f^,^o^r^at^t^e^m^p^t^t^o^recei^ve,^b^y^f^o^rei^gⁿ^agen^t^o^r^m^e^m^b^{er o}^f^C^o^mm^uⁿⁱ^st^o^r^ganⁱ^zatⁱ^o^n,
^cl^assi^fⁱ^edⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^.^It^sh^al^l^b^e^uⁿ^l^aw^f^u^l^f^o^{r an}^y^ag^en^t^o^r^rep^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^v^{e o}^f^an^y^f^o^rei^gⁿ
^go^vern^m^eⁿ^t^kn^o^wⁱⁿ^gl^y^t^o^o^b^t^aiⁿ^o^r^recei^ve,^o^r^at^t^e^m^p^t^t^o^ob^t^aⁱⁿ^o^r^recei^ve,^dⁱ^rect^l^y^o^rⁱⁿ^di^rect^l^y^,
^f^r^o^m^an^y^o^f^fⁱ^{cer o}^r^e^m^p^l^o^y^{ee o}^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^{es o}^r^o^f^an^y^d^e^p^a^rt^men^t^o^r^agen^cy^t^h^ereo^f^o^r^o^f^an^y
^c^o^r^por^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^the^s^t^oc^k^of^w^h^ic^{h is}^ow^ne^{d in w}^hole^orⁱⁿ^m^a^jor^pa^r^t^b^y^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^or^aⁿ^y
^d^e^p^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^r^agen^c^y^t^h^ereo^f^,^an^yⁱⁿ^f^o^rmatⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^{a ki}ⁿ^d^w^hⁱ^c^h^sh^al^l^h^a^{ve b}^een^cl^assi^fⁱ^ed^b^y^t^h^e
^P^r^esi^d^eⁿ^t⁽^o^{r b}^y^t^h^{e h}^ead^o^f^an^y^s^u^ch^d^e^p^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^,^agen^c^y^,^o^r^co^rp^oratⁱ^oⁿ^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e app}^r^o^v^al^o^f^t^h^e
^P^r^esi^d^eⁿ^t⁾^{as af}^fectⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e secu}^ri^t^y^o^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es,^un^l^e^{ss sp}^eci^al^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^zatⁱ^o^{n f}^o^{r su}^ch
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion s}^h^a^{ll f}ⁱ^r^s^{t ha}^v^e^be^eⁿ^ob^ta^ine^d^f^r^om^the^he^a^d^of^the^de^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt, a}^g^eⁿ^cy^{, or}
^c^o^r^por^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^ha^vⁱ^ng^c^u^s^t^o^d^y^of^or^c^ontr^o^{l ov}^e^r^s^u^c^h^inf^o^r^m^a^tion.
⁴⁴^{50 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁷⁸³⁽^c⁾^.
⁴⁵^Id^.
⁴⁶^{50 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁷⁸³⁽^e⁾^.
⁴⁷^C^odifⁱ^e^d^a^t^{35 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁸¹^et^se^q^.
⁴⁸^{35 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁸^6.
⁴⁹^Se^e^DuV^a^l,^sup^r^a^f^oot^no^te¹²^{, a}^t⁵⁹⁷⁽ⁱ^de^ntif^yⁱ^ng^a^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e^r^e^g^u^la^tions^a^s^pr^incⁱ^pa^{l m}^e^aⁿ^s^of^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^ing^s^e^c^r^ecy
^pr^oc^e^dur^e^s⁾^.
⁵⁰^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^Ex^e^c^.^O^r^de^{r 1}²^,⁹⁵⁸^{. Sa}^nc^tio^ns^m^a^y^inc^l^ude^“^r^e^p^rim^a^{nd, s}^u^s^p^eⁿ^sⁱ^oⁿ^w^itho^u^t^pa^y^,^re^m^ova^{l, ... l}^o^s^s^or^de^nia^l
^o^f^acce^{ss t}^o^cl^assi^fⁱ^edⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^{or o}^t^h^e^{r san}^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^sⁱⁿ^acco^rd^an^c^e^wⁱ^t^h^ap^p^lⁱ^cab^l^e^l^a^w^an^d^agen^c^y^regu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^.^”^Id^.^at
^§5.⁷⁽^c⁾^.
⁵¹^Se^e^De^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^Na^vy^v^.^Eg^aⁿ^{, 48}^{4 U.}^S.⁵¹^8,⁵²^6-2⁹⁽¹⁹⁸^8).^Fe^de^ra^{l c}^{ourts m}^a^y^re^vⁱ^e^w^c^onstituti^ona^{l c}^h^a^lle^ng^e^s
^ba^s^e^{d on}^the^r^e^v^o^c^a^tioⁿ^of^s^e^c^u^r^ity^c^l^e^a^r^aⁿ^c^e^.^W^e^bs^te^r^v^.^D^o^e^,⁴⁸⁶^U^.^{S. 5}⁹²⁽¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^.

classified information.⁵² Violators of the Espionage Act and the Atomic Energy Act provisions ⁵³
may be subject to loss of their retirement pay.
Agencies also rely on contractual agreements with employees, who typically must sign non-⁵⁴
disclosure agreements prior to obtaining access to classified information, sometimes agreeing to
submit all materials that the employee desires to publish to a review by the agency. The Supreme
Court enforced such a contract against a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), upholding the government’s imposition of a constructive trust on the profits of a book the ⁵⁵
employee sought to publish without first submitting it to CIA for review.
In 1986, the Espionage Act was amended to provide for the forfeiture of any property derived ⁵⁶
from or used in the commission of an offense. Violators of the Atomic Energy Act may be
subjected to a civil penalty of up to $100,000 for each violation of Energy Department regulations ⁵⁷
regarding dissemination of unclassified information about nuclear facilities.
The government can also use injunctions to prevent disclosures of information. The courts have
generally upheld injunctions against former employees’ publishing information they learned ⁵⁸
through access to classified information. The Supreme Court also upheld the State Department’s
revocation of passports for overseas travel by persons planning to expose U.S. covert intelligence
agents, despite the fact that the purpose was to disrupt U.S. intelligence activities rather than to ⁵⁹
assist a foreign government.
Similarly, the government can enjoin publication of inventions when it is determined that the
release of such information is detrimental to the national security. If an inventor files a patent
application for an invention that the Commissioner of Patents believes should not be made public,
the Commissioner may place a secrecy order on the patent and establish conditions for granting a ⁶⁰
patent, or may withhold grant of a patent as long as the “national interest requires [it].” In
addition to criminal penalties cited previously, in the case of an unauthorized disclosure or
foreign filing of the patent information, the Patent Office will deem the invention to be
“abandoned,” which means a forfeiture by the applicant, his successors, or assigns of all claims ⁶¹
against the United States based on the invention.

⁵²^Se^e⁴²^U^.^S.C^.^§²²⁸²⁽^b)⁽^p^r^o^vⁱ^dⁱ^ng^f^o^r^fⁱ^ne^of^{up to}^$¹⁰⁰^,0⁰⁰^f^o^r^vⁱ^ola^tion^of^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Ene^r^gy^se^c^u^rⁱ^t^y
^re^g^u^la^tions).
⁵³^{5 U}^.^C^.^S.^{§ 8}³¹²⁽²⁰⁰¹⁾⁽^lis^tⁱ^ng^vⁱ^ola^tio^ns^of¹⁸^U^.^S.C^.^§^§⁷⁹^{3 &}⁷^98,⁴²^U^.^S.C^.^§²²⁷²^-⁷^{6, a}ⁿ^d⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.^{§ 4}²¹^,
^a^m^ong^those^f^o^{r w}^h^ic^{h f}^o^rf^e^iture^of^re^tire^m^eⁿ^{t pa}^y^{or a}^nnuitie^{s m}^a^y^beⁱ^m^pose^d^).
⁵⁴^Se^e^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Ma^rc^he^tti,⁴⁶⁶^F.2^d¹³^{09 (}⁴^th^Cir.),^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁴^{09 U}^.^S.¹⁰⁶³⁽¹⁹⁷²⁾⁽^e^nf^or^cⁱ^ng^c^ontr^a^c^t^ua^l
^non^-^d^is^c^l^os^ur^e^a^g^r^e^em^eⁿ^{t by}^f^o^r^m^e^r^em^ploy^e^e^r^e^ga^r^d^ing^“^s^e^c^r^e^tⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion t}^ouc^hi^ng^u^p^oⁿ^t^h^e^na^tⁱ^ona^l^de^f^e^ns^e^a^nd
^the^c^oⁿ^duc^t^of^f^o^r^e^ig^{n a}^f^f^a^ir^s^”^obtaⁱ^ne^{d th}^r^oug^h^e^m^ploy^m^e^{nt w}^{ith C}^I^A⁾^.
⁵⁵^Se^e^Sne^p^{p v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 4}⁴⁴^U^.^{S. 5}⁰⁷⁽¹⁹⁸⁰⁾^{; s}^{ee a}^l^so^A^l^aⁿ^E.^G^a^r^f^ie^ld,^Pr^om^is^e^s^{of Si}^le^nc^e^:^C^ontr^a^c^t^Law^a^nd
^F^r^eed^o^m^o^f^S^p^eech^,⁸³^C^ORNE^L^L^L.^R^EV^{. 261,}²^{74 (}¹⁹⁹⁸⁾⁽^not^ing^t^h^e^r^e^m^e^d^yⁱⁿ^Sne^p^p^w^a^{s en}^f^o^rced^d^e^spⁱ^t^e^t^h^e
^agen^c^y^’^s^stⁱ^p^u^l^atⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^at^t^h^{e bo}^o^k^dⁱ^{d no}^t^con^t^ai^{n an}^y^cl^assi^fⁱ^edⁱⁿ^fo^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ⁾^.
⁵⁶^Se^e¹⁸^U^.^S.C^.^§^§⁷⁹³⁽^h)^,⁷⁹⁴⁽^d)^,⁷⁹⁸⁽^d)^;^K^l^eⁱⁿ^,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note^{8, a}^t⁴³^8-⁴^39.
⁵⁷^{42 U}^.^S.C^.^§²¹⁶⁸⁽^b)^.
⁵⁸^Se^e^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Ma^rc^he^tti,⁴⁶⁶^F.2^d¹³^{09 (}⁴^th^Ci^r.¹⁹⁷²^{) (grant}ⁱⁿ^{g an}ⁱⁿ^j^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^p^r^even^t^{a f}^o^{rmer CI}^A^agen^t
^f^r^o^m^publis^hing^a^b^ook^dis^c^losⁱⁿ^g^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt s}^e^c^r^e^t^s⁾^.
⁵⁹^Se^e^H^a^ig^v^.^A^g^e^e^,^{453 U}^.^S.²^{80 (}¹⁹⁸¹⁾^.
⁶⁰^{35 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁸^{1. T}^h^e^de^te^r^m^ina^{tion m}^u^s^t^be^r^e^ne^w^e^{d on}^a^y^e^a^r^l^y^ba^sⁱ^s^.
⁶¹^{35 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁸^2.

The government has had less success trying to enjoin the media from disclosing classified
information. Most famously, the government failed to enjoin publication of the Pentagon Papers
by a newspaper, even though the information was clearly classified and had been stolen by ⁶²
someone with access to it. In that case, the Supreme Court set very high standards for imposing
prior restraint on the press. Yet in another case, the government was able to enjoin a newspaper
from printing information about the design of an atomic bomb, even though the information did ⁶³
not originate from classified material and the author’s purpose was not subversive.
The current laws for protecting classified information have been criticized as a patchwork of
provisions that are not consistent and do not cover all the information the government ⁶⁴
legitimately needs to protect. Certain information is protected regardless of whether it belongs
to the government or is subject to normal classification. Technical and scientific information, for ⁶⁵
example, can be restricted regardless of source. Information related to “the national defense” is
protected even though no harm to the national security is intended or is likely to be caused
through its disclosure. However, nonmilitary information with the potential to cause serious
damage to the national security is only protected from willful disclosure with the specific intent to ⁶⁶⁶⁷
harm the national interest, or with the knowledge that such harm could occur.
In 2000, and again in 2002, Congress sought to create 18 U.S.C. § 798A, subsection (a) of which
would have read:
^W^h^oev^e^{r, being}^aⁿ^offⁱ^{cer or}^e^m^plo^y^{ee o}^f^t^h^{e U}ⁿ^ited^States^{, a f}^o^r^m^{er or retired off}ⁱ^{cer or}
^e^m^plo^y^{ee of}^t^h^{e Un}^{ited Stat}^es^{, any}^oth^e^{r pers}^on^wⁱ^t^h^auth^{orized acces}^s^{to clas}^sⁱ^fⁱ^ed
^inf^o^r^m^ation^,^{or any}^oth^e^{r pers}^on^f^o^r^m^erl^y^wⁱ^th^a^u^th^{orized acces}^s^{to clas}^sⁱ^fⁱ^{ed inf}^o^r^m^atioⁿ^,
^kⁿ^o^wⁱⁿ^g^l^y^an^d^wⁱ^l^l^f^u^ll^y^dⁱ^sc^lo^{ses, o}^r^atte^m^p^{ts to}^dⁱ^sc^lo^s^e^{, an}^y^cla^ssi^fⁱ^edⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ
^acquⁱ^{red as}^{a res}^u^lt^of^s^u^c^h^per^s^on’^s^a^u^t^h^orized^acces^s^{to c}^l^as^sⁱ^fⁱ^ed^inf^o^r^m^at^ion^{to a pers}^oⁿ
^(oth^{er th}^an^aⁿ^of^{ficer or em}^ploy^{ee of}^th^{e U}ⁿ^{ited State}^s⁾^w^h^{o is}ⁿ^o^{t au}^t^h^{orized acces}^s^{to s}^u^c^h
^clas^sⁱ^fⁱ^{ed inf}^o^r^m^atioⁿ^,^kn^o^wⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{at th}^{e pers}^on^isⁿ^o^{t au}^t^h^{orized acces}^s^{to s}^u^ch^clas^sⁱ^fied
ⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^,^sh^al^{l b}^e^fⁱⁿ^e^d^uⁿ^d^e^r^th^{is title, i}^m^p^rⁱ^s^oⁿ^edⁿ^o^t^m^o^r^e^t^h^aⁿ³^y^ear^{s, o}^r^b^o^t^h^.
The new provision would have penalized the disclosure of any material designated as classified
for any reason related to national security, regardless of whether the violator intended that the

⁶²^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^Tⁱ^m^e^s^,⁴⁰^{3 U}^.^S^.⁷¹³⁽¹⁹⁷¹⁾^.^Se^e^Klein,^s^upr^a^f^oot^note^{8, a}^t⁴³^9-⁴⁰^.
⁶³^Se^e^DuV^a^l,^sup^r^a^f^o^o^tⁿ^o^t^e¹²^,^at⁶⁰⁴^(d^escri^bⁱⁿ^g^P^r^o^g^ressi^ve^m^a^g^a^ziⁿ^e^artⁱ^c^l^e^atⁱ^ssu^{e i}ⁿ^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^{es v.}
^P^r^og^r^e^s^sⁱ^v^e^{, I}ⁿ^c^{., 46}⁷^F.S^u^p^p^.⁹⁹^{0 (}^W^.D^{. W}ⁱ^s^.¹⁹⁷⁹⁾⁾^;^K^l^eⁱ^n,^s^upr^a^f^ootn^o^te^{8, a}^t⁴³^{5 (}ⁿ^otiⁿ^g^dis^p^a^r^ity^be^t^w^e^eⁿ^r^u^ling^s
ⁱⁿ^{New Y}^o^{rk Times}^a^nd^Pr^ogr^e^s^sⁱ^v^e^{). T}^h^e^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion the}^Prog^re^ssiv^e^soug^{ht to}^p^ubl^{ish w}^a^{s re}^la^te^{d to t}^h^e^b^u^ildiⁿ^g^of^a
^nuc^le^a^r^b^o^m^b^a^{nd w}^a^s^thus^c^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^a^s^“^R^e^s^tr^ic^te^{d D}^a^ta”^unde^r^t^h^e^A^t^o^m^ic^Ene^r^gy^A^c^{t, e}^v^eⁿ^thoug^{h the}^inf^o^r^m^a^tion
^ha^{d be}^eⁿ^c^o^m^p^ile^{d f}^r^om^unc^la^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^{, p}^u^b^lic^ly^av^a^ila^ble^doc^um^eⁿ^ts^{. O}ⁿ^e^r^e^a^s^{on f}^o^r^t^h^e^dif^f^e^r^e^{nt outc}^o^m^e^s^{in the}^tw^o
^{cases i}^s^t^h^at^t^h^{e A}^t^o^mⁱ^c^Eⁿ^erg^y^A^c^t^coⁿ^t^aiⁿ^s^st^at^u^t^o^r^y^au^th^oriz^a^tion^f^o^{r the}^A^ttorne^y^G^e^ne^ra^{l to se}^e^k^inju^nc^tio^n.^Se^e⁴²
^U.^S^.^C^.^§²²⁸⁰^.^Iⁿ^{New Y}^o^{rk Time}^s^{, a}^m^a^jorⁱ^t^y^of^J^u^s^tic^e^s^took^into^a^c^c^{ount t}^h^e^f^a^c^t^tha^t^C^ong^r^e^s^s^ha^{d n}^o^{t a}^u^th^or^iz^e^d^aⁿ
^inju^nc^tio^n.⁴⁰^{3 U}^.^S^.^a^t⁷¹^{8 (}^B^la^c^k^{, J}^{., c}^onc^ur^rⁱ^ng⁾^;^id^{. a}^t⁷²^1-²²⁽^D^oug^la^s^,^J^{., c}^o^nc^ur^rⁱ^ng⁾^;^id^.^a^t⁷³⁰^(Ste^w^a^{rt, J}^.,
^c^onc^ur^rⁱ^ng⁾^;^id^.^a^t⁷^31-⁴⁰⁽^W^hite^,^J^{., c}^o^nc^ur^rⁱ^ng⁾^;^id.^a^t⁷^{42 (}^M^a^r^s^h^a^{ll, J}^{., c}^o^nc^ur^rⁱ^ng⁾^.
⁶⁴^Se^e^E.E.B.^a^{nd K}^.^E.M^{., N}^o^te^,^Pl^uggⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^e^Le^ak^:^T^h^e^C^a^s^e^f^o^r^a^Le^gis^l^ativ^e^Re^s^o^l^u^ti^on^of^the^C^onf^lic^{t be}^tw^e^eⁿ^t^h^e
^D^e^m^ands^o^f^Se^c^r^{ecy a}ⁿ^d^t^h^{e Nee}^d^f^o^{r O}^p^en^G^o^vern^m^en^t^{, 7}¹^V^A^.^L.^R^EV^{. 80}^1,⁸¹^{1 (}¹⁹⁸⁵⁾^.
⁶⁵^Se^e^id.^a^t⁸^14.
⁶⁶^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t⁸^15.
⁶⁷^Se^e^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^{es v.}^M^o^rⁱ^so^n,⁸⁴⁴^F^.²^d¹⁰⁵⁷⁽¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^.

information be delivered to and used by foreign agents (in contrast to 50 U.S.C. § 783). It would
have been the first law to penalize disclosure of information to entities other than foreign
governments or their equivalent solely because it is classified, without a more specific definition ⁶⁸
of the type of information covered. In short, the provision would have made it a crime to ⁶⁹
disclose or attempt to disclose classified information to any person who does not have
authorized access to such information, with exceptions covering disclosures to Article III courts,
or to the Senate or House committees or Members, and for authorized disclosures to persons
acting on behalf of a foreign power (including an international organization). The provision
would have amended the espionage laws in title 18 by expanding the scope of information they
cover. The proposed language was intended to make it easier for the government to prosecute
unauthorized disclosures of classified information, or “leaks” of information that might not
amount to a violation of current statutes. The language was intended to ease the government’s
burden of proof in such cases by eliminating the need “to prove that damage to the national ⁷⁰
security has or will result from the unauthorized disclosure,” substituting a requirement to show
that the unauthorized disclosure was of information that “is or has been properly classified” under
a statute or executive order.
The 106^th Congress passed the measure,⁷¹ but President Clinton vetoed it, calling it “well-
intentioned” as an effort to deal with a legitimate concerns about the damage caused by
unauthorized disclosures, but “badly flawed” in that it was “overbroad” and posed a risk of ⁷²
“unnecessarily chill[ing] legitimate activities that are at the heart of a democracy.” The
President explained his view that
^{[a] des}ⁱ^{re t}^o^av^oi^{d t}^h^{e ri}^s^k^t^h^at^t^h^ei^r^g^{ood f}^aⁱ^t^h^ch^oi^ce^of^w^o^rds^—^t^h^ei^{r e}^x^erci^s^e^o^f
^j^u^dgm^eⁿ^{t—could becom}^e^t^h^{e s}^u^bj^{ect of}^{a crim}ⁱⁿ^al^ref^e^rral^f^o^{r pr}^os^ec^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^mⁱ^g^h^t^dⁱ^s^c^ou^r^a^g^e
^G^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt^of^fi^ci^al^s^f^r^o^m^eng^a^gⁱ^ng^ev^eⁿⁱⁿ^appropri^a^t^e^pu^blⁱ^c^di^s^c^u^s^si^on^{, pres}^s^bri^e^fⁱⁿ^g^s,
^o^r^o^t^h^e^r^leg^iti^m^a^{te o}^f^fⁱ^{cial acti}^v^itie^{s. Si}^m^ilar^l^y^,^t^h^{e l}^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^m^a^y^uⁿ^d^u^ly^r^e^s^t^r^aⁱⁿ^th^e^a^b^ilit^y
^of^f^o^r^m^{er Go}^v^e^rnm^e^{nt off}ⁱ^cial^s^{to teach}^,^w^r^{ite, or en}^g^a^g^eⁱⁿ^any^act^ivⁱ^t^y^ai^m^e^{d at bu}^ildiⁿ^g
^pu^{blic un}^ders^tan^dⁱⁿ^g^o^f^co^m^p^lexⁱ^s^s^u^es^{. I}ⁿ^cu^rriⁿ^g^s^u^c^h^ris^k^sⁱ^s^unn^eces^s^a^r^y^aⁿ^d
ⁱⁿ^ap^p^r^o^p^r^{iate in}^{a so}^ciety^b^u^ilt^oⁿ^f^r^eed^o^m^o^f^ex^p^r^essioⁿ^an^d^t^h^e^c^oⁿ^s^en^t^o^f^t^h^e^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^e^d^aⁿ^d
^is^particu^l^arl^yⁱⁿ^advis^a^{ble in}^{a con}^t^ex^{t i}ⁿ^w^h^ich^t^h^{e rang}^e^of^clas^sⁱ^fⁱ^ed^m^a^terials^is^s^o
^ex^ten^sⁱ^v^{e. I}ⁿ^su^c^h^cir^c^u^m^s^t^an^c^e^{s, th}^{is cr}ⁱ^mⁱⁿ^a^l^p^r^o^v^isioⁿ^w^o^u^l^d^,ⁱⁿ^m^y^vⁱ^ew^,^c^r^e^a^t^e^aⁿ^uⁿ^d^u^e⁷³
^ch^illiⁿ^g^ef^f^ect.

⁶⁸^{18 U}^S^C^S^{§ 1}⁹²⁴^pr^o^h^ibi^t^s^r^e^m^ova^{l of}^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt-^o^wⁿ^e^d^or^c^oⁿ^t^r^o^lle^{d c}^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion by}^a^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt
^em^ploy^ee^w^{ithout a}^u^t^hor^iz^a^tⁱ^on.^{50 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁷⁸^{3 c}^o^v^e^r^s^onl^y^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion c}^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^by^the^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^t^or^aⁿ^e^x^e^c^u^tiv^e
^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^traⁿ^s^m^itte^{d by}^a^g^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt e}^m^ploy^e^e^{to a}^f^o^re^ig^{n g}^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt. 1}⁸^U.S.C^.^§^§⁷⁹^{3 a}ⁿ^{d 7}⁹⁴^a^r^e^poteⁿ^tia^lly
^b^r^o^a^d^e^{r t}^h^an^t^h^{ese i}ⁿ^t^h^at^t^h^ey^co^{ver i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^“rel^at^ed^t^o^t^h^eⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^d^e^f^eⁿ^s^e,^{” b}^y^go^vern^m^eⁿ^t^e^m^p^l^o^y^ees^an^d
^o^t^h^e^r^s^wⁱ^t^h^ou^t^r^e^gar^d^t^o^t^h^{e id}^en^tⁱ^t^y^o^f^t^h^{e r}^eci^pⁱ^en^t^o^f^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^b^u^t^th^{ese r}^e^q^uⁱ^r^eⁱⁿ^t^eⁿ^t^o^r^know^l^e^d^g^e^r^e^gar^dⁱⁿ^g
^ha^r^m^{to the}^na^ti^ona^l^de^f^e^ns^e^.
⁶⁹^“^C^la^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^inf^o^r^m^a^tion”^w^a^s^de^fⁱ^ne^{d i}ⁿ^t^h^e^pr^op^os^e^d^m^e^a^s^ur^e^{to m}^e^aⁿ^“ⁱ^nf^or^m^a^{tion or}^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^l^de^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^t^e^d^a^nd
^c^l^e^a^r^l^y^m^a^r^k^e^d^or^r^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^te^d,^or^tha^t^the^pe^r^s^on^k^now^s^or^ha^s^r^e^a^s^{on t}^o^be^lie^v^e^ha^s^be^eⁿ^de^te^r^m^ine^d^by^a^ppr^opr^ia^te
^a^u^thor^itie^{s, p}^u^rsuaⁿ^t^to^the^prov^is^ions^of^a^sta^t^ute^{or Ex}^e^c^u^tiv^e^Ord^e^{r, a}^s^re^quiri^ng^prote^c^tⁱ^{on a}^g^aⁱ^nst^una^u^t^h^o^riz^e^d
^dis^c^los^u^r^e^f^o^r^r^e^a^s^ons^of^na^tio^na^l^s^e^c^u^r^ity^.”
⁷⁰^Se^e^H.^R^e^p^t^.¹⁰⁶^-⁹⁶^{9 at}⁴⁴⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
⁷¹^H.^R^.⁴³⁹²^§³⁰^4,¹⁰⁶^th^Con^g^ress.
⁷²^Me^ssa^g^e^{on Re}^turniⁿ^g^W^itho^u^t^A^pprov^a^l^{to t}^h^e^House^of^Re^pre^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^the^“^I^nte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^A^u^thori^z^a^{tion A}^c^{t f}^o^r
^Fⁱ^scal^{Year 2}⁰⁰¹^”^,³⁶^W^E^E^KL^Y^C^OM^P^.^P^RE^S^.^D^OC^{. 27}^{8 (}^N^ov^{. 4,}²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
⁷³^Id^.

The 108^th Congress considered passing an identical provision as part of the Intelligence ⁷⁴
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, but instead directed the Attorney General and heads of
other departments to undertake a review of the current protections against the unauthorized
disclosure of classified information, and to issue a report recommending legislative or ⁷⁵^th
administrative actions. An identical measure was introduced late in the 109 Congress, but was ⁷⁶
not reported out of committee.
The Attorney General, in his report to the 108^th Congress, concluded that
^[^a^]^lth^o^u^g^h^t^h^er^{e is}ⁿ^o^siⁿ^g^{le statu}^t^{e th}^{at p}^r^o^v^id^{es cr}ⁱ^mⁱⁿ^{al p}^eⁿ^a^lties^f^o^r^{all t}^y^p^e^{s o}^f
^una^ut^ho^rⁱ^z^e^d^dⁱ^sc^lo^sur^e^{s o}^f^c^l^a^ssi^fie^dⁱⁿ^fo^r^m^a^t^io^n,^uⁿ^a^u^tho^r^iz^e^d^dⁱ^sc^lo^sur^e^{s o}^f^c^l^a^ssi^fie^d
ⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^f^a^l^l^wi^t^hⁱⁿ^t^h^e^s^c^o^p^e^o^f^v^a^rⁱ^o^u^s^c^u^r^r^en^t^sta^t^u^t^o^r^y^crⁱ^mⁱⁿ^al^p^r^o^h^ib^itioⁿ^s^.^I^t^m^u^st^b^e
^ackⁿ^o^w^l^ed^g^e^{d th}^{at th}^{ere is}ⁿ^o^com^p^re^h^e^ns^iv^e^s^t^at^u^t^{e th}^{at prov}^ides^cri^mⁱⁿ^{al pen}^a^lt^ies^f^o^r^t^h^e
^uⁿ^a^u^t^h^o^ri^{zed di}^s^c^l^o^su^{re of cl}^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^{ed i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^{on i}^r^res^p^ectⁱ^v^{e of}^t^h^e^t^y^pe^ofⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^or
^recipien^{t inv}^o^l^v^{ed. Giv}^eⁿ^t^h^eⁿ^a^tu^{re o}^f^un^a^u^th^ori^{zed di}^s^c^l^o^su^res^of^cl^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^{ed i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^on
^th^at^h^a^v^e^occu^rred,^h^o^w^e^v^e^r,^{I con}^c^l^u^{de t}^h^{at c}^u^rren^t^s^t^at^u^t^es^prov^{ide a le}^g^a^{l ba}^sⁱ^s^to
^p^r^o^s^ecu^{te th}^o^s^e^w^h^o^en^g^a^g^eⁱⁿ^uⁿ^a^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^dⁱ^sclo^su^r^e^{s, if}^t^h^e^y^can^b^e^id^en^tif^ied^.^I^t^m^a^y^b^e
^th^at^carefu^l^l^y^dra^f^ted^legⁱ^s^l^ation^s^p^ecifⁱ^ca^l^l^y^t^aⁱ^l^o^r^e^d^t^o^uⁿ^a^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^z^e^d^dⁱ^s^c^l^o^s^u^r^e^s^o^f^c^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^ed
ⁱⁿ^fo^r^m^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^ge^ne^r^a^l^l^y,^r^a^t^h^e^r^t^h^aⁿ^t^o^e^s^pⁱ^oⁿ^a^g^e^,^c^o^ul^d^e^nha^nc^e^o^u^rⁱ^nve^stⁱ^g^a^tⁱ^v^e^e^f^f^o^rt^s^.^T^h^e
^ex^ten^t^to^w^h^ic^h^su^c^h^{a p}^r^o^v^isioⁿ^w^o^u^l^d^yⁱ^eld^an^y^p^r^actic^{al ad}^d^itioⁿ^a^{l b}^eⁿ^e^fⁱ^t^s^to^th^e
^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^tⁱⁿ^ter^m^{s o}^fⁱ^m^p^r^o^vⁱⁿ^g^o^u^r^ab^ilit^y^to^id^en^ti^f^y^th^o^s^e^w^h^o^en^g^a^g^eⁱⁿ^uⁿ^au^t^h^o^r^ized⁷⁷
^dⁱ^sclo^su^r^e^{s o}^f^classⁱ^fⁱ^edⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^o^r^d^e^ter^rⁱⁿ^g^su^c^h^acti^vⁱ^t^y^is^uⁿ^c^lear^{, h}^o^w^e^v^e^r^.
The publication of information pertaining to the national defense may serve the public interest by
providing citizens with information necessary to shed light on the workings of government, but
some observe a consensus that the public release of at least some defense information poses a
significant enough threat to the security of the nation that the public interest is better served by
keeping it secret. The Constitution protects the public right to access government information and
to express opinions regarding the functioning of the government, among other things, but it also
charges the government with “providing for the common defense.” Policymakers are faced with
the task of balancing these interests.
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: “Congress shall make no law ... ⁷⁸
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press....” Despite this absolute language, the Supreme
Court has held that “[t]he Government may ... regulate the content of constitutionally protected
speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further ⁷⁹
the articulated interest.”

⁷⁴^T^h^e^C^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion P}^r^ote^c^{tion A}^c^{t of}²⁰⁰^{1, H}^.^R^.²⁹^43,¹⁰⁷^th^C^ong^.
⁷⁵^Inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^A^u^thoriz^a^tio^{n A}^c^{t f}^o^{r Fisc}^a^l^Ye^a^r²⁰⁰^2,^P.L^.¹^07-¹⁰^8,^{§ 3}¹⁰⁽²⁰⁰^1).
⁷⁶^S.³⁷^74,¹⁰⁹^th^C^ong^.
⁷⁷^Re^port^{to C}^ong^re^{ss on}^Una^u^t^hori^z^e^d^Disc^losure^of^Cla^ssifⁱ^e^d^Inf^o^rm^a^{tion, Oc}^t.¹⁵^{, 2}⁰⁰²^(c^ita^ti^ons^o^m^itte^d).
⁷⁸^For^aⁿ^aⁿ^a^l^y^s^is^of^ex^c^e^p^tions^to^t^h^e^Fir^s^{t A}^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^t^95-⁸¹^5,^F^r^eed^o^m^of^Sp^eech^aⁿ^d^P^r^ess:
^E^xcep^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^t^o^t^h^{e F}ⁱ^rst^A^m^end^m^en^t^,^by^H^e^nr^y^C^ohe^n.
⁷⁹^Sa^ble^C^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^of^C^a^lif^or^nia^v^.^Fe^de^r^a^{l C}^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^C^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on, 49}^{2 U}^.^S^.¹¹⁵^,¹²⁶⁽¹⁹⁸⁹⁾^.

Where speech is restricted based on its content, the Supreme Court generally applies “strict
scrutiny,” which means that it will uphold a content-based restriction only if it is necessary “to
promote a compelling interest,” and is “the least restrictive means to further the articulated ⁸⁰
interest.”
Protection of the national security from external threat is without doubt a compelling government ⁸¹
interest. It has long been accepted that the government has a compelling need to suppress ⁸²
certain types of speech, particularly during time of war or heightened risk of hostilities. Speech ⁸³
likely to incite immediate violence, for example, may be suppressed. Speech that would give ⁸⁴
military advantage to a foreign enemy is also susceptible to government regulation.
Where First Amendment rights are implicated, it is the government’s burden to show that its
interest is sufficiently compelling to justify enforcement. Whether the government has a
compelling need to punish disclosures of classified information turns on whether the disclosure
has the potential of causing damage to the national defense or foreign relations of the United ⁸⁵
States. Actual damage need not be proved, but potential damage must be more than merely ⁸⁶
speculative and incidental.
In addition to showing that the stated interest to be served by the statute is compelling, the
government must also show that the law actually serves that end. If the accused can show that the
statute serves an unrelated purpose—for example, to silence criticism of certain government ⁸⁷
policies or to manipulate public opinion—a judge might be prepared to invalidate the statute. If,
for example, the government releases some positive results of a secret weapons program while

⁸⁰^Id^.
⁸¹^Se^e^H^a^ig^v^.^A^g^e^e^,^{453 U}^.^S.²^{80 (}¹⁹⁸¹⁾⁽^“^I^t^is^‘^o^bv^ious^a^nd^una^r^g^u^a^ble^’^tha^t^{no g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nta^l^inte^r^e^s^t^is^m^o^r^e
^c^o^m^p^e^lling^thaⁿ^t^h^e^s^e^c^u^rity^of^the^N^a^tion.”^)(c^iti^ng^A^p^the^k^e^r^v^.^Sec^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^Sta^t^e^,^{378 U}^.^S^{., a}^t⁵⁰^9;^a^cco^rd^Co^{le v}^.
^Y^oung^,³⁵^{1 U}^.^S^.⁵³⁶^,⁵⁴⁶⁽¹⁹⁵⁶⁾⁾^.
⁸²^Se^e^Sc^he^nc^k^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 2}⁴⁹^U^.^S.⁴⁷⁽¹⁹¹⁹⁾⁽^f^or^m^u^la^ting^“^c^l^e^a^r^a^{nd pr}^e^s^eⁿ^t^da^ng^e^r^”^te^s^t⁾^.
⁸³^B^r^a^ndeⁿ^bur^g^v^.^O^hⁱ^o^,³⁹^{5 U}^.^{S. 4}^{44 (}¹⁹⁶⁹⁾^.
⁸⁴^N^e^a^r^v^.^Minne^s^o^ta^,²^{83 U}^.^S.⁶⁹⁷^,⁷¹^{6 (}¹⁹³¹⁾⁽^“^N^o^oⁿ^e^w^ould^q^u^e^s^tion^bu^{t tha}^t^a^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt^mⁱ^g^h^t^pr^e^v^eⁿ^{t a}^c^t^ua^l
^obstruc^tⁱ^oⁿ^to^{its re}^c^r^uiti^ng^se^rv^ic^e^or^the^pu^blic^a^tioⁿ^of^the^sa^iling^da^te^{s of}^tr^aⁿ^sports^{or t}^h^eⁿ^u^m^b^e^r^a^{nd l}^o^c^a^tion^of
^tr^oo^ps^.”⁾^.
⁸⁵^“^N^a^tiona^{l Se}^c^u^r^ity^”^is^de^fⁱ^ne^{d a}^s^na^tio^na^{l de}^f^e^ns^e^a^{nd f}^o^r^e^ig^{n r}^e^la^tions^.^Se^e^Ex^e^c^.^O^r^de^r^N^o^{. 12,}⁹⁵^{8, 60 Fe}^d.
^R^e^g^.^19,8^{25 (}^A^pr^.¹⁷^{, 1}⁹⁹⁵⁾^.
⁸⁶^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^New^Yo^r^k^Ti^{mes C}^o^.^v.^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^es,⁴⁰^{3 U.}^S^.⁷¹³^,⁷²^{5 (}¹⁹⁷¹⁾⁽^B^r^eⁿⁿ^a^n,^J.^{, co}ⁿ^c^u^r^rⁱⁿ^g⁾⁽^r^e^j^ectⁱⁿ^{g as}
^ins^u^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^eⁿ^{t g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt’^s^a^s^s^e^r^tio^ns^tha^t^pu^blic^a^tioⁿ^of^P^eⁿ^t^a^g^on^Pa^pe^r^s^“^c^ould,”^“^m^ig^ht,”^or^“^m^ay^”^pr^e^j^ud^ic^e^the
^na^tio^na^{l inte}^r^e^s^t⁾^;^E^l^r^o^{d v}^.^B^u^rⁿ^s^,⁴²⁷^U^.^S.³^47,³^{62 (}¹⁹⁷⁶⁾⁽^“^T^h^e^inte^r^e^s^t^a^d^v^a^nc^e^d^m^u^s^t^be^pa^r^a^m^o^unt,^oⁿ^e^of^v^ita^l
^im^porta^nc^e^,^a^{nd t}^h^e^b^u^rdeⁿ^{is o}ⁿ^t^h^e^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt to show}^th^e^e^x^iste^nc^e^of^suc^h^aⁿⁱⁿ^te^re^st.”^)(c^iting^B^u^c^k^le^y^v^.^V^a^le^o,
⁴²⁴^U.S.^1,⁹⁴⁽¹⁹⁷^{6); W}^illia^m^s^v^.^Rho^d^e^s^{, 3}^{93 U}^.^S.²³^{, 3}¹^-3³⁽¹⁹⁶⁸^{); NAA}^CP^v^.^Bu^tto^n,³⁷^{1 U.S}^.³⁸^{, 4}⁵⁽¹⁹^63);^Ba^te^s
^v^.^L^ittle^Roc^k^{, 361}^U.S.⁵^16,⁵²⁴⁽¹⁹^{60); NA}^A^C^P^v^.^A^l^a^b^a^m^a^,³⁵⁷^U.S.⁴⁴^9,⁴⁶^4-4^{66 (}¹⁹⁵⁸⁾^{; T}^hom^a^s^v^.^Collins,³²³
^U.^S^.⁵¹^6,⁵³^{0 (}¹⁹⁴⁵⁾⁾^.
⁸⁷^Iⁿ^a^{ll l}ⁱ^k^e^liho^od,^s^u^c^h^a^de^f^e^nda^{nt w}^ould^ha^v^e^{to pr}^ov^e^not^oⁿ^ly^tha^t^s^u^c^h^aⁿ^im^pe^r^m^is^sⁱ^ble^us^e^is^p^o^s^sⁱ^ble^,^but^a^l^s^o
^t^h^atⁱ^tⁱ^s^p^e^rtⁱⁿ^en^t^t^o^t^h^{e p}^a^rtⁱ^c^u^l^{ar case.}

suppressing negative results, a person prosecuted for releasing negative information could
challenge the statute by arguing that his prosecution is related to the negative content of his
speech rather than to valid concerns about the damage it might cause. If he can show that those
who disclose sensitive information that tends to support the administration’s position are not
prosecuted, while those who disclose truthful information that is useful to its opponents are
prosecuted, he might be able to persuade a court that the statute as enforced is an unconstitutional ⁸⁸
restriction of speech based on impermissible content-related interests.
To survive a constitutional challenge, a law must be narrowly drawn to affect only the type of ⁸⁹
speech that the government has a compelling need to suppress. A statute that reaches speech that
the government has no sufficiently compelling need to regulate may be subject to attack due to
overbreadth. A law is overly broad if it prohibits more speech than is necessary to achieve its
purpose. If a defendant can show that a statute regulating speech is “substantially overbroad,” he ⁹⁰
may challenge its validity on its face. If the law is found to be substantially overbroad, a court
will invalidate the law even if the defendant’s conduct falls within the ambit of conduct that the
government may legitimately prohibit. For this reason, a statute that relies solely on the
Executive’s classification of information to determine the need for its protection might be ⁹¹
contested as overbroad. If a challenger were able to show that agencies classify information that
it is unnecessary to keep secret, he could argue that the statute is invalid as overly broad because
it punishes protected speech that poses no danger to the national security
Although information properly classified in accordance with statute or executive order carries by
definition, if disclosed to a person not authorized to receive it, the potential of causing at least ⁹²
identifiable harm to the national security of the United States, it does not necessarily follow that

⁸⁸^Cf.^R^.^A^.^V.^v^.^C^ity^of^St.^P^a^ul,⁵⁰^{5 U}^.^S.³^{77 (}¹⁹⁹²⁾^;^bu^t^see^Sne^pp^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^{, 44}^{4 U}^.^S.⁵⁰^{7 (}¹⁹⁸⁰⁾⁽^S^te^v^e^ns^{, J}^.,
^dⁱ^ssen^tⁱⁿ^g).^Sⁿ^epp^’^{s assert}ⁱ^o^{n o}^f^sel^ectⁱ^v^{e en}^f^o^rce^m^en^t^ag^aiⁿ^s^{t his}^b^ook^ba^s^e^d^on^its^c^r^itic^a^l^tr^e^a^t^m^e^{nt of}^the^C^I^A^f^a^ile^d
^{to pe}^r^s^ua^de^the^Su^pr^e^m^e^C^our^{t th}^a^t^aⁿ^y^vⁱ^ola^{tion of}^the^Fi^r^s^{t A}^m^eⁿ^dm^eⁿ^{t ha}^{d oc}^c^u^r^r^e^d^.^Se^e^J^u^dit^h^S^c^he^nk^K^o^f^f^l^e^r^a^nd
^B^e^nne^{tt L}^.^G^e^r^s^h^m^aⁿ^,^N^a^tio^nal^S^e^c^u^r^ity^and^Cⁱ^v^{il L}ⁱ^be^r^tie^s^:^T^h^e^N^e^w^Se^diti^ous^Lⁱ^be^l^{, 69}^C^ORNE^L^L^L.^R^EV^{. 81}^6,⁸⁴⁷
⁽¹⁹⁸⁴⁾^.
⁸⁹^Se^e^E.E.B.^aⁿ^d^K.E.^M.,^s^upr^a^f^o^o^t^no^t^e^1,^at⁸⁴^9.
⁹⁰^B^r^oa^dr^ic^k^v^.^O^k^la^hom^a^,^{413 U}^.^S^.⁶⁰^{1 (}¹⁹⁷³⁾^.
⁹¹^C^our^ts^ha^v^e^r^e^je^c^t^e^d^c^h^a^lle^ng^e^s^of^the^Es^pi^ona^g^e^A^c^{t ba}^s^e^{d on ov}^e^r^br^e^a^d^{th s}^t^e^m^mⁱ^ng^f^r^om^theⁱ^m^pr^e^cⁱ^sⁱ^{on of}^the
^te^r^m^“ⁱⁿ^f^or^m^a^{tion r}^e^la^te^{d t}^o^theⁿ^a^tiona^l^de^f^e^ns^e^”^b^y^r^e^a^d^ing^othe^r^r^e^quir^e^m^e^nts^{into t}^h^e^s^t^a^t^ute^.^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^Uⁿ^ite^d
^{States v}^.^Ro^sen^,⁴⁴⁵^F.^Su^p^p^.²^d⁶⁰²^,⁶⁴³^(E^.D.^V^a^.²⁰⁰⁶^)(rejectin^g^o^v^erb^r^ead^th^c^h^allen^g^{e o}ⁿ^th^e^b^a^{sis o}^f^ju^dⁱ^cial
^inte^rpre^ta^tioⁿ^of^{18 U.}^S.C.^§⁷⁹³^tha^t^re^q^u^ire^s^the^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt^{to pr}^ov^e^“⁽^{1) tha}^t^t^h^eⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^a^{tion re}^la^t^e^{s to the}^na^tio^n’s
^m^ilita^r^y^a^c^tiv^itie^{s, inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^g^a^the^r^ing^or^f^o^re^ig^{n pol}^ic^y^,⁽²⁾^tha^t^the^inf^o^rm^a^{tion is c}^l^ose^l^y^he^{ld by}^the^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt,
^{in t}^h^a^t^it^doe^s^{not e}^x^is^{t i}ⁿ^t^h^e^p^ubl^ic^dom^aⁱ^{n; a}^nd⁽³⁾^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion is}^s^u^c^h^t^h^a^t^its^dis^c^los^u^r^e^c^o^{uld c}^a^u^s^eⁱⁿ^jur^y
^{to t}^h^e^na^ti^{on’s se}^c^u^rity^”⁾^.
⁹²^Ex^e^c^.^O^r^de^r^N^o^.^12,⁹⁵^8,⁶⁰^Fe^d.^R^e^g^.^19,8^{25 (}^A^pr^.¹⁷^{, 1}⁹⁹⁵⁾⁽^“^C^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^N^a^tiona^{l Se}^c^u^r^ity^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^tion”⁾^.
^S^ec.¹^.^{3 d}^e^fⁱⁿ^e^{s t}^h^{ree l}^e^vel^s^o^f^cl^assi^fⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^:
⁽¹⁾^“^T^{op Se}^c^r^e^t^”^s^h^a^ll^be^a^ppl^ie^d^{to i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion, t}^h^e^uⁿ^a^u^t^hor^iz^e^d^dis^c^los^u^r^e^of^w^h^ic^{h r}^e^a^s^ona^bly
^co^u^l^{d b}^e^exp^ect^ed^t^o^cau^se^excep^tⁱ^o^na^l^l^y^g^r^a^{ve d}^a^m^a^g^e^t^o^t^h^e^na^ti^oⁿ^a^l^se^c^u^rity^tha^t^the^or^ig^ina^l
^c^l^a^ssi^fⁱ^c^a^{tion a}^u^th^ority^{is a}^b^le^toⁱ^d^eⁿ^tif^y^{or de}^sc^ribe^.
⁽²⁾^“^S^e^c^r^e^t^”^s^h^a^{ll be}^a^p^plie^d^toⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion, the}^una^uth^o^rⁱ^z^e^d^dis^c^los^u^r^e^of^w^h^ic^{h r}^e^a^s^ona^bly^c^ould
^b^e^exp^ect^ed^t^o^cau^se^s^e^rⁱ^ous^dam^age^t^o^t^h^e^na^tio^na^{l se}^c^u^rity^tha^t^th^e^orig^ina^l^c^l^a^ssifⁱ^c^a^tion
^a^u^thor^ity^{is a}^b^le^{to i}^d^eⁿ^tif^y^{or de}^sc^ribe^.
⁽³⁾^“^C^onf^ideⁿ^tia^l”^s^h^a^ll^be^a^ppl^ie^{d to}^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion, t}^h^e^uⁿ^a^u^t^hor^iz^e^d^dis^c^l^o^s^u^r^e^of^w^h^ic^{h r}^e^a^s^ona^bly
^co^u^l^{d b}^e^exp^ect^ed^t^o^cau^se^dam^a^g^e^to^the^na^tⁱ^ona^l^se^c^u^rity^tha^t^the^orig^ina^l^c^l^a^ssifⁱ^c^a^{tion a}^u^t^hority
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

government classification by itself will be dispositive of the issue in the context of a criminal
trial. Government classification will likely serve as strong evidence to support the contention.
Typically, courts have been unwilling to review decisions of the executive related to national ⁹³
security, or have made a strong presumption that the material at issue is potentially damaging. In
the context of a criminal trial, especially in a case with apparent First Amendment implications,
courts may be more willing to engage in an evaluation of the propriety of a classification decision
than they would in a case of citizens seeking access to information under the Freedom of ⁹⁴
Information Act (FOIA).
The Supreme Court seems satisfied that national security is a vital interest sufficient to justify
some intrusion into activities that would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment—at least
with respect to federal employees. Although the Court has not held that government classification ⁹⁵
of material is sufficient to show that its release is damaging to the national security, it has
seemed to accept without much discussion the government’s assertion that the material in
question is damaging. Lower courts have interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 798, which criminalizes the ⁹⁶
unauthorized release of specific kinds of classified information, to have no requirement that the ⁹⁷
government prove that the classification was proper or personally approved by the President. It
is unlikely that a defendant’s bare assertion that information is unlikely to damage U.S. national
security will be persuasive without some convincing evidence to that effect, or proof that the ⁹⁸
information is not closely guarded by the government.
Snepp v. United States⁹⁹ affirmed the government’s ability to enforce contractual non-disclosure
agreements against employees and former employees who had had access to classified
information. The Supreme Court allowed the government to impose a constructive trust on the
earnings from Frank Snepp’s book about the CIA because he had failed to submit it to the CIA for
prepublication review, as he had agreed to do by signing an employment agreement. Although the ¹⁰⁰
CIA stipulated to the fact that the book contained no classified information, the Court accepted
the finding that the book caused “irreparable harm and loss” to the American intelligence

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^{is a}^b^le^to^ideⁿ^tⁱ^fy^{or de}^sc^ribe^.
⁽^E^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d)^.
⁹³^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^H^a^ig^v^.^A^g^e^e^,^{453 U}^.^S.²⁸^0,²⁹^{1 (}¹⁹⁸¹⁾⁽^“^Ma^tte^r^sⁱⁿ^tim^ate^l^y^r^e^l^a^te^{d to f}^o^r^e^ig^{n p}^o^lic^y^a^{nd na}^tio^na^{l s}^e^c^u^r^ity
^{are rarel}^y^p^r^o^p^e^{r su}^bj^ect^{s f}^o^{r j}^u^dⁱ^ci^alⁱⁿ^t^e^rven^tⁱ^oⁿ^.^”).
⁹⁴^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 5}⁵²⁽^b)⁽¹⁾^e^x^em^pts^c^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^om^r^e^lea^s^e^t^o^r^e^que^s^t^e^r^s^.
⁹⁵^S^ee,^e.^g^.^Sc^a^r^be^c^k^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^{, 31}^{7 F.}^2d⁵^{46 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁶²⁾⁽^hol^di^ng^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt did}ⁿ^o^t^ha^v^e^{to s}^h^ow
^doc^um^eⁿ^ts^w^e^r^e^pr^ope^r^l^y^c^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^“^a^s^a^f^f^e^c^ting^the^na^tio^na^{l de}^f^e^ns^e^”^{to c}^o^nv^ic^{t e}^m^plo^y^e^e^unde^r⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.^§⁷⁸^3,
^w^h^ic^{h proh}^{ibits g}^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt e}^m^ploy^e^e^s^f^r^om^traⁿ^s^m^itting^c^l^a^ssi^fⁱ^e^d^doc^um^eⁿ^{ts to f}^o^re^ig^{n a}^g^eⁿ^{ts or e}ⁿ^titie^s).
⁹⁶^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁷⁹⁸^pr^ov^ide^sⁱⁿ^pe^r^tⁱⁿ^eⁿ^t^pa^r^t:
^“⁽^a⁾^W^hoe^v^e^{r k}ⁿ^o^w^ing^l^y^a^{nd w}^illf^ull^y^c^o^m^m^unic^a^t^e^s^{, f}^u^rnis^he^{s, tra}ⁿ^sm^{its, or ot}^he^rw^ise^m^a^k^e^{s a}^v^a^ila^ble^to^aⁿ
^una^ut^hor^iz^e^d^pe^r^s^oⁿ^{, .}^{.. a}ⁿ^y^c^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion ..}^{. (}²⁾^c^onc^e^rⁿⁱ^ng^the^de^sⁱ^gⁿ^,^c^ons^tr^uc^tio^n,^us^e^,^m^aⁱⁿ^te^na^nc^e^,^o^r
^re^pa^{ir of}^aⁿ^y^de^vⁱ^c^e^{, a}^ppa^ra^tus^,^or^a^pplia^nc^e^us^e^d^or^pre^p^a^r^e^d^or^pla^nne^{d f}^o^r^us^e^by^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{... f}^o^r
^c^r^y^p^tog^r^a^phic^{or c}^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion i}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^pur^pose^s^{; ..}^{. (s)ha}^l^l^be^fⁱ^ne^{d ...}^{or im}^prisone^{d ..}^..”
⁹⁷^S^ee,^e.^g^.^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^{es v.}^B^o^y^ce,⁵⁹⁴^F^.²^d¹²⁴⁶^,¹²⁵¹⁽⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁹⁾⁽^“^U^nde^r^s^e^c^tioⁿ⁷⁹^{8, t}^h^e^pr^oprⁱ^e^t^y^of^the
^cl^assi^fⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿⁱ^sⁱ^rrel^e^van^t^.^T^h^{e f}^a^ct^o^f^cl^assi^fⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^{a d}^o^c^u^m^en^t^o^r^do^cu^m^eⁿ^t^{s i}^s^en^o^u^{gh t}^o^satⁱ^s^{fy t}^h^{e cl}^assi^fⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ
^el^e^m^en^t^o^f^t^h^{e o}^f^fen^s^e.^”).
⁹⁸^Se^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^D^e^de^y^a^{n, 59}^{4 F.}^2d³⁶^,^{39 (}⁴^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^.
⁹⁹⁴⁴^{4 U}^.^S^.⁵⁰⁷⁽¹⁹⁸⁰⁾^.
¹⁰⁰^Id^.^a^t⁵¹^1.

services.¹⁰¹ The Court suggested that the CIA did not need a signed agreement in order to protect
its interests by subjecting its former employees to prepublication review and possible ¹⁰²
censorship.
Haig v. Agee¹⁰³ was a First Amendment challenge to the government’s ability to revoke a citizen’s
passport because of his intent to disclose classified information. Philip Agee was a former CIA
agent who engaged in a “campaign to fight the United States CIA,” which included publishing
names of CIA operatives around the world. In order to put a stop to this activity, the Department
of State revoked his passport. Agee challenged that action as an impermissible burden on his
freedom to travel and an effort to penalize his exercise of free speech to criticize the ¹⁰⁴
government. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the passport regulations constitutional
because they may be applied “only in cases involving likelihood of ‘serious damage’ to national ¹⁰⁵
security or foreign policy.”
United States v. Morison¹⁰⁶ is significant in that it represents the first case in which a person was
convicted for selling classified documents to the media. Morison argued that the espionage
statutes did not apply to his conduct because he could not have had the requisite intent to commit
espionage. The Fourth Circuit rejected his appeal, finding the intent to sell photographs that he
clearly knew to be classified sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 793.
The definition of “relating to the national defense” was not overbroad because the jury had been ¹⁰⁷
instructed that the government had the burden of showing that the information was so related.
In addition to restricting the disclosure of information by prosecuting the person responsible after
the fact, the government may seek to prevent publication by prior restraint (i.e., seeking a ¹⁰⁸
temporary restraining order or an injunction from a court to enjoin publication). The Supreme
Court, however, is unlikely to uphold such an order. It has written:
^[^P^]^rⁱ^o^r^r^e^str^aⁱⁿ^{ts ar}^{e th}^e^m^o^st^s^e^rⁱ^o^u^{s an}^d^lea^s^{t to}^ler^a^b^l^{e in}^f^rⁱⁿ^g^e^m^eⁿ^t^oⁿ^Fir^s^t^Am^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^t
^rig^h^t^s....^A^{prior restrai}ⁿ^{t,... b}^y^defⁱⁿ^ition^,^h^a^s^aⁿⁱ^m^m^e^diate^an^{d irrev}^e^rsible^saⁿ^c^tion^.^{If it}
^can^b^e^said^th^{at a t}^h^{reat o}^f^cri^mⁱⁿ^{al o}^r^civ^il^san^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^{s a}^f^{ter p}^u^b^licatioⁿ^“^c^h^ills”^sp^eech^{, p}^r^io^r
^res^t^rain^t^“f^reezes^{” it at lea}^s^t^{for th}^{e ti}^m^e^{. T}^h^{e da}^m^a^g^e^can^{be particu}^l^arl^y^g^r^eat^w^h^eⁿ^th^e¹⁰⁹
^prior^res^t^rain^{t f}^a^ll^s^u^pon^th^{e co}^mm^un^icatioⁿ^ofⁿ^e^w^s^aⁿ^{d co}^m^m^e^ntar^y^on^cu^{rrent ev}^ents^.

¹⁰¹^Id^.^a^t⁵¹^2.
¹⁰²^Id^.^at⁵⁰⁹^,ⁿ³^(“M^o^reo^v^er,^t^hⁱ^s^C^o^u^r^t^’^{s cases m}^a^{ke cl}^e^a^{r t}^h^at^{- even}ⁱⁿ^t^h^{e ab}^sen^ce^o^f^an^exp^r^{ess agr}^e^e^m^en^t^{- t}^h^e
^C^I^A^c^{ould ha}^v^e^a^c^t^e^d^to^pr^ote^c^t^s^ubs^ta^ntia^l^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt inte}^r^e^s^t^s^byⁱ^m^pos^ing^r^e^a^s^ona^ble^r^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^tion^s^{on e}^m^ploy^e^e
^a^c^tiv^itie^{s tha}^tⁱⁿ^othe^{r c}^onte^x^{ts m}ⁱ^g^h^{t be}^pr^ot^e^c^t^e^d^by^the^{First Am}^e^ndm^eⁿ^t”^)(c^ita^{tions om}^itte^d).
¹⁰³⁴⁵^{3 U}^.^S^.²⁸⁰⁽¹⁹⁸¹⁾^.
¹⁰⁴^Id^.^a^t³⁰^5.
¹⁰⁵^Id^.^a^t³⁰^5-⁰⁶^.
¹⁰⁶⁸⁴⁴^F.^2d¹⁰⁵⁷⁽⁴^th^Cir.),^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁴⁸^{8 U}^.^S^.⁹⁰⁸⁽¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^.
¹⁰⁷^{But se}^e^Sc^a^r^be^c^k^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 31}^{7 F}^.²^d⁵⁴⁶⁽^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁶²⁾⁽^hol^ding^t^h^a^t^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt did}^notⁿ^e^e^d^to^pr^ov^e
^pr^o^p^e^r^c^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^ca^tion^of^doc^um^eⁿ^ts^{to pr}^ov^e^a^vⁱ^ola^tioⁿ⁾^.
¹⁰⁸^T^h^e^Supre^m^e^{Court struc}^k^d^o^wⁿ^aⁿ^inj^unc^ti^on^a^g^aⁱ^{nst pu}^blishⁱ^ng^t^h^e^P^e^nta^g^on^P^a^pe^{rs, w}^r^iting^:^“^A^ny^s^y^ste^m^o^f
^{prior re}^straⁱⁿ^{ts of}^e^x^pre^{ssion c}^o^m^e^{s to the}^C^ourt^be^a^r^ing^a^he^a^v^y^pre^s^um^{ption a}^g^aⁱ^{nst its c}^o^nstitu^tioⁿ^a^{l v}^a^lidity^.”^Ne^w
^Y^o^r^k^Tⁱ^m^e^s^C^o^{. v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^,⁴⁰³^U^.^S.⁷^13,⁷^{14 (}¹⁹⁷¹⁾^.
¹⁰⁹^N^e^br^a^s^k^a^P^r^e^s^s^A^s^s^o^cⁱ^a^{tion v}^.^St^ua^r^t^{, 4}²⁷^U^.^S.⁵³^9,⁵⁵^{9 (}¹⁹⁷⁶⁾⁽^s^tr^ik^ing^dow^{n a}^c^our^{t or}^de^r^r^e^s^t^r^aⁱⁿ^ing^the
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

The government’s ability to protect sensitive information was explored in the context of prior ¹¹⁰
restraints of the media in the Pentagon Papers case. In a per curiam opinion accompanied by
nine concurring or dissenting opinions, the Court refused to grant the government’s request for an
injunction to prevent the New York Times and the Washington Post from printing a classified
study of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. A majority of the justices indicated in dicta, however,
that the newspapers—as well as the former government employee who leaked the documents to ¹¹¹
the press—could be prosecuted under the Espionage Act.
A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it does not permit the ordinary person to determine with
reasonable certainty whether his conduct is criminally punishable. Therefore, a statute prohibiting
the unauthorized disclosure of classified information must be sufficiently clear to allow a
reasonable person to know what conduct is prohibited. Where First Amendment rights are
implicated, the concern that a vague statute will have a chilling effect on speech not intended to ¹¹²
be covered may make that law particularly vulnerable to judicial invalidation.
The Espionage Act of 1917¹¹³ has been challenged for vagueness without success. There have
been very few prosecutions under that act for disclosing information related to the national
defense. The following elements are necessary to prove an unauthorized disclosure offense under

18 U.S.C. § 793:

¹^.^T^h^{e in}^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^o^r^m^a^terⁱ^a^l^dⁱ^sclo^sed^m^u^{st b}^e^r^e^lated^to^th^eⁿ^a^tioⁿ^a^{l d}^e^f^eⁿ^s^{e, t}^h^{at i}^s^,
^pert^aiⁿⁱ^ng^t^o^any^m^a^t^t^e^rs^“^dⁱ^r^e^c^t^l^y^an^{d reas}^on^abl^y^conn^ect^{ed w}ⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e def}^e^ns^{e of}^ou^{r n}^a^tⁱ^on
^ag^ain^s^t^its^en^e^m^ie^{s” t}^h^at^“^w^o^u^ld^b^e^p^o^t^en^tiall^y^d^a^m^a^gⁱⁿ^g^to^t^h^{e U}ⁿ^ited^States,^o^r^mⁱ^g^h^{t b}^e
^u^s^e^f^u^l^{to a}ⁿ^eⁿ^e^m^y^{of t}^h^e^Un^ited^States^”^an^{d are}^“^c^los^e^l^y^h^e^{ld” i}ⁿ^th^at^t^h^{e rele}^v^a^nt
^go^ve^rⁿ^me^nt^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^ha^{s so}^ug^h^t^t^o^ke^e^p^t^h^e^m^fr^o^m^t^h^e^p^u^b^lⁱ^c^ge^ne^r^a^l^l^{y a}ⁿ^d^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^s^eⁱ^t^e^m^s¹¹⁴
^h^a^v^eⁿ^o^{t b}^een^m^a^d^e^p^u^b^{lic a}ⁿ^d^ar^{e n}^o^{t av}^ailab^l^{e to}^th^{e g}^eⁿ^e^r^a^{l p}^u^b^lic.
^2.^T^h^{e di}^s^c^l^o^s^u^re^m^u^st^be^m^a^de^wⁱ^t^h^kn^o^w^l^e^d^g^{e t}^h^at^s^u^c^h^di^s^c^l^o^s^u^{re i}^sⁿ^o^t^au^t^h^ori^zed.
³^.^T^h^er^{e m}^u^st^b^e^an^“ⁱⁿ^t^eⁿ^{t o}^r^r^easoⁿ^to^b^e^liev^e^th^a^t^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^{. . . is}^to^b^e^u^s^ed^to^th^e
ⁱⁿ^j^u^r^y^o^f^t^h^{e U}ⁿ^ited^State^s^{, o}^r^to^th^{e ad}^v^aⁿ^t^a^g^{e o}^f^aⁿ^y^f^o^r^e^igⁿⁿ^a^tioⁿ^.
There does not appear to be a requirement that the disclosure cause actual harm.¹¹⁵ An evil motive
is not necessary to satisfy the scienter requirement; the willfulness prong is satisfied by the

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^pub^lic^a^tio^{n or}^br^oa^dc^a^s^{t of}^a^c^c^ounts^of^c^onf^e^s^sⁱ^ons^or^a^d^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^ons^m^a^de^by^the^de^f^e^nda^{nt a}^t^a^c^r^im^ina^l^tr^ia^l)^.
¹¹⁰^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^Tⁱ^m^e^s^C^o^{. v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^{, 40}^{3 U}^.^S.⁷^{13 (}¹⁹⁷¹⁾^.
¹¹¹^Se^e^D^a^vⁱ^{d T}^opol,^N^o^te^,^Uⁿ^ite^d^S^t^ate^s^v^.^M^o^riso^{n: A}^Thre^at^to^the^{First Ame}^ndmeⁿ^t^Rig^h^{t t}^o^P^u^b^lis^{h Se}^c^u^rity
^Informat^io^n,^{43 S.C}^.^L.^R^EV^{. 58}^1,⁵⁸^{6 (}^notiⁿ^g^tha^t^sⁱ^x^of^theⁿⁱ^ne^P^e^ntag^on^Pa^pe^r^s^justic^e^s^sug^g^e^ste^d^tha^t^the
^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt c}^ould^c^onv^ic^{t t}^h^e^ne^w^s^pa^pe^r^s^unde^r^the^Es^pioⁿ^a^g^e^A^c^{t e}^v^eⁿ^tho^u^g^h^it^c^oul^d^not^eⁿ^jo^{in t}^h^e^m^f^r^o^m^pr^inti^ng
^t^h^{e do}^cu^m^eⁿ^t^s).
¹¹²^Se^e^A^p^t^h^{eker v.}^S^ecret^ar^y^o^f^S^t^at^e,³⁷⁸^U.^S^.⁵⁰^{0 (19}⁶⁴⁾^;^Un^it^ed^Stat^{es v.}^R^o^b^e^l^,³⁸^{9 U.}^S^.²⁵⁸⁽¹⁹⁶⁷⁾^;^S^mⁱ^t^h^v.
^G^o^g^u^eⁿ^{, 41}^{5 U.S.}⁵^66,⁵^{73 (}¹⁹⁷⁴⁾^{; V}ⁱ^lla^g^e^of^Sha^u^m^b^e^r^g^v^.^Citiz^eⁿ^{s f}^o^{r a}^Be^tte^{r Env}ⁱ^ro^nm^eⁿ^{t, 44}⁴^{U.S. 6}²⁰⁽¹⁹⁸^0).
¹¹³^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁷⁹³^et^seq^.
¹¹⁴^Se^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Morⁱ^s^oⁿ^,⁶²²^F.^Su^pp^{. 1}⁰⁰⁹^,¹⁰¹⁰^(D^{. M}^d^.1⁹^85).
¹¹⁵^Se^e^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^{es v.}^M^o^rⁱ^so^n,⁸⁴⁴^F^.²^d¹⁰⁵⁷^,¹⁰⁷⁴⁽⁴^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^.

knowledge that the information may be used to the injury of the United States.¹¹⁶ It is irrelevant ¹¹⁷
whether the information was passed to a friendly foreign nation. A patriotic motive will not ¹¹⁸
likely change the outcome.
The Supreme Court, in Gorin v. United States,¹¹⁹ upheld portions of the Espionage Act now
codified as sections 793 and 794 of title 18, U.S. Code (communication of certain information to
a foreign entity) against assertions of vagueness, but only because jury instructions properly
established the elements of the crimes, including the scienter requirement and a definition of
“national defense” that includes potential damage in case of unauthorized release of protected
information and materials. Gorin was a “classic case” of espionage, and there was no challenge
based on First Amendment rights. The Court agreed with the government that the term “national
defense” was not vague; it was satisfied that it “is a generic concept of broad connotations,
referring to the military and naval establishments and the related activities of national ¹²⁰
preparedness.” Whether information was “related to the national defense” was a question for ¹²¹
the jury to decide, based on its determination that the information “may relate or pertain to the
usefulness, efficiency or availability of any of the above places, instrumentalities or things for the
defense of the United States of America. The connection must not be a strained one nor an ¹²²
arbitrary one. The relationship must be reasonable and direct.” As long as the jury was properly
instructed that information not likely to cause damage was not “related to the national defense”
for the purpose of the statute, the term was not unconstitutionally vague.
No other challenge to a conviction under the Espionage Act has advanced to the Supreme Court.
Under the present legal framework, the publication of national security information by non-
government personnel may be prosecuted under various provisions, but only if the information
meets the definition set forth by statute and the disclosure is made with the requisite knowledge
or intent with regard to the nature of the damage it could cause. The First Amendment limits
Congress’s ability to prohibit the publication of information of value to the public, especially with
regard to pre-publication injunctions against non-government employees. That the publication of
some information has the potential to damage U.S. national security interests is rarely denied, but
an agreement on how to protect such information without harming the public’s right to know
what its government is doing may remain elusive.

¹¹⁶^Id^.^a^t¹⁰⁷³^.
¹¹⁷^G^o^rⁱ^{n v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 3}¹²^U^.^S.^19,²⁹⁽¹⁹⁴¹⁾^.
¹¹⁸^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Morⁱ^s^on,⁶²²^F.^Sup^p^.¹⁰⁰⁹⁽^D^{. M}^d^.¹⁹⁸⁵⁾^.
¹¹⁹³¹^{2 U}^.^S^.¹⁹⁽¹⁹⁴¹⁾^.
¹²⁰^Id^.^a^t²⁸^.
¹²¹^Id^.^a^t³²^.
¹²²^Id^.^a^t³¹^.

^J^eⁿⁿⁱ^fe^r^K^.^E^l^se^a
^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e A}^t^torn^e^y
^j^e^ls^ea@^crs^.^loc.g^o^v^{, 7-}⁵⁴⁶⁶