U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Side-By-Side Comparison of Current Legislation

U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Side-By-Side
Comparison of Current Legislation
Updated December 22, 2006
Sharon Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Jill Marie Parillo
Research Associate
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation:
A Side-By-Side Comparison of Current Legislation
Summary
In March 2006, the Bush Administration proposed legislation to create an
exception for India from certain provisions of the Atomic Energy Act to facilitate a
future nuclear cooperation agreement. After hearings in April and May, the House
International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
considered bills in late June 2006 to provide an exception for India to certain
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act related to a peaceful nuclear cooperation
agreement. On July 26, 2006, the House passed its version of the legislation, H.R.
5682, by a vote of 359 to 68. On November 16, 2006, the Senate incorporated the
text of S. 3709, as amended, into H.R. 5682 and passed that bill by a vote of 85 to 12.
The Senate insisted on its amendment, and a conference committee produced a
conference report on December 7, 2006. The House agreed to the conference report
(H.Rept. 109-721) on December 8 in a 330-59 vote; the Senate agreed by unanimous
consent to the conference report on December 9. The President signed the bill into
law (P.L. 109-401) on December 18, 2006.
The Senate and House versions of the India bill contained similar provisions,
with four differences. The Senate version contained an additional requirement for
the President to execute his waiver authority, an amendment introduced by Senator
Harkin and adopted by unanimous consent that the President determine that India is
“fully and actively participating in U.S. and international efforts to dissuade, sanction
and contain Iran for its nuclear program.” This provision was watered down into a
reporting requirement in the conference report. The Senate version also had two
unique sections related to the cooperation agreement, Sections 106 and 107, both of
which appear in the conference report. Section 106 (now Section 104 (d) (4))
prohibits exports of equipment, material or technology related for uranium
enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing or heavy water production unless conducted in
a multinational facility participating in a project approved by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or in a facility participating in a bilateral or
multilateral project to develop a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle. Section 107 (now
Section 104 (d) (5)) would establish a program to monitor that U.S. technology is
being used appropriately by Indian recipients. Finally, the Senate version also
contained the implementing legislation for the U.S. Additional Protocol in Title II,
which was retained in the conference bill. Minor differences in reporting
requirements and statements of policy are compared in Table I of this report.
This report provides a thematic side-by-side comparison of the provisions of the
conference report with H.R. 5682 as passed by the House and by the Senate, and
compares them with the Administration’s initially proposed legislation, H.R. 4974/S.
2429, and the conference report. The report concludes with a list of CRS resources
that provide further discussion and more detailed analysis of the issues addressed by
the legislation summarized in the table. This report will not be updated.

Contents
Overview ........................................................1
H.R. 5682 in the House.........................................1
Committee Actions........................................1
Floor Debate and Votes.....................................4
S. 3709/H.R. 5682 in the Senate..................................5
Committee Actions........................................5
Floor Debate and Votes.....................................5
H.R. 5682 Conference Report....................................9
P.L. 109-401 Signing Statement..................................9
Additional Resources..............................................38
List of Tables
Table 1. Comparison of Current Legislation
on Waivers for U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation.....................10

U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation:
A Side-By-Side Comparison
of Current Legislation
Overview
In July 2005, President Bush announced his intention to conclude a peaceful
nuclear cooperation agreement with India. India, which is not a party to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), is considered under U.S. law to be a non-nuclear
weapon state, yet has tested nuclear weapons and has an ongoing nuclear weapons
program. For these reasons, the President would need to make certain waivers and
determinations pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) before nuclear cooperation
with a state such as India could proceed.
The Administration proposed legislation (introduced as H.R. 4974/ S. 2429) in
March 2006 that, in addition to providing waivers of relevant provisions of the AEA
(Sections 123 a. (2), 128, and 129), would have allowed a nuclear cooperation
agreement with India to enter into force without a vote from Congress, as though it
conformed to AEA requirements. On July 26, 2006, the House passed H.R. 5682 by
a vote of 359 to 68. On November 16, 2006, the Senate passed H.R. 5682 by a vote
of 85 to12, substituting the text of S. 3709 as an engrossed amendment; the Senate
insisted on its amendment, necessitating a conference to resolve differences between
the bills. On December 7, conferrees filed a conference report, and on December 8,
the House approved the conference report by a vote of 330 to 59; the Senate
approved the conference report by unanimous consent in the early hours of December
9. On December 18, President Bush signed the bill into law, P.L. 109-401. His
signing statement is discussed in more detail below.
H.R. 5682 in the House
Committee Actions. The House International Relations Committee met on
June 27, 2006 to consider H.R. 5682, “United States and India Nuclear Cooperation¹
Promotion Act of 2006,” introduced on June 26 by Representative Hyde. The
Committee voted to adopt 6 of 12 amendments (one was withdrawn):

¹ The National Journal and Congressional Quarterly wrote reports of the HIRC markup,
available at [http://nationaljournal.com/members/markups/2006/06/mr_20060627_5.htm]
and [http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/committees/

109/committe e s 109-2006062700228055.ht ml @committees&metapub=CQ-

COMMIT T EEMARK UPS&s earchIndex=0&seqNum=1].

^!Representative Royce offered an amendment to ensure that nothing
in the act shall be interpreted as permitting any civil nuclear
cooperation with India that would in any way assist, encourage, or
induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons
(Section 4 (d) (1));
^!Representative Sherman offered an amendment to strengthen one of
the determinations the President must make to implement the
waivers pertaining to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
stipulating that the required NSG decision would not permit nuclear
commerce with any other non-nuclear weapon state that does not
have full-scope International Atomic Energy Act (IAEA) safeguards
(Section 4 (b) (7)).
^!Representative Schiff offered an amendment with three components:
to add a provision to U.S. policy with respect to South Asia (Section
3 (b)(7)) encouraging India not to increase its production of fissile
material at military facilities pending a multilateral moratorium on
production of such material for nuclear weapons; to add a reporting
requirement for the Presidential submission to implement the
waivers (Section 4 (c) (2) (I)) on steps taken to ensure the U.S.
transfers will not be replicated by India or used in its military
facilities and that U.S. nuclear fuel supply does not facilitate military
production of high-enriched uranium or plutonium; and to add a
reporting requirement for an annual report on the same (Section 4 (o)
(2) (C)).
^!Representative Crowley offered an amendment to add a requirement
(Section 4 (o)(3)) for an annual report on new Indian nuclear
facilities.
^!Representative Berkley offered two amendments related to India’s
spent fuel disposal: an annual report describing the disposal of spent
nuclear fuel from India’s civil nuclear program (Section 4 (o) (4), and
a statement of policy that any spent civilian nuclear fuel in India that
might be stored in the United States is considered by Congress under
existing procedures of the Atomic Energy Act (Section 3 (b) (7)).
An amendment by Ms. Berkley to prohibit any Indian spent fuel from being
stored in the United States was rejected by a vote of 15-19. The Committee also
voted down four other amendments, including two by Representative Berman
designed to place limits on U.S. cooperation until India halts production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons. The first Berman amendment, rejected by a vote of 13-
32, sought to condition the President’s use of waiver authority (by adding a new
determination by the President in Section 4 (b) of the bill) on India’s adherence to a
unilateral or multilateral moratorium or a multilateral treaty prohibiting the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The second amendment, rejected
by a vote of 12-31, sought to restrict transfers of U.S. nuclear material under a
cooperation agreement until such time that India halted fissile material production
for weapons, either by adhering to a unilateral or multilateral moratorium, or a
multilateral treaty. The Committee also rejected by a vote of 10-32 an amendment
by Representative Sherman to condition the President’s use of waiver authority on
an additional determination, under Section 4 (b) of H.R. 5682, that India’s nuclear
weapons program was not using more domestic uranium than it had before July 2005.

The amendment would have attached an annual certification that required termination
of nuclear cooperation if the certification could not be made. Finally, the Committee
rejected, by a vote of 4-37, an amendment by Representative Lee that would have
required India to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) before the President
could exercise his waiver authority.
The Committee on Rules held a hearing on July 25^th to consider amendments
to H.R. 5682 and procedures for handling the bill on the floor. H. Res 947 waived
all points of order against the bill, specified the allowed amendments and limited
floor debate to one hour. The following six amendments were allowed to be offered
on the floor:²
^!Representatives Hyde (IL)/Lantos (CA): Manager’s amendment,
containing technical and conforming changes to the text, as well as
one substantive change: removing an amendment proposed by
Representative Sherman and adopted during the full committee
markup relating to subsection 4(b)(7).
^!Representative Stearns (FL): Reinforces the intent of Congress that
the nuclear cooperation into which the governments of the United
States and India would enter is for peaceful, productive purposes,
not military.
^!Representatives Jackson-Lee (TX)/Burton (IN): Sense of Congress
declaring the importance of the South Asia region and urging the
continuation of the United States’ policy of engagement,
collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and Pakistan.
^!Representative Sherman (CA): Requires that, before any nuclear
cooperation with India can go forward, and every year thereafter, the
President must certify that during the preceding year India has not
increased the level of domestic uranium it sends through its weapons
program. Baseline for the determination under the amendment is the
365 day period preceding the July 18, 2005, Bush-Singh declaration
on nuclear cooperation.
^!Representative Berman (CA): Restricts exports of uranium and other
types of nuclear reactor fuel (defined as “source material” and
‘special nuclear material’ in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954) to
India until the President determines that India has halted the
production of fissile material (i.e., plutonium and highly enriched
uranium) for use in nuclear weapons.
^!Representative Fortenberry (NE): Provides Congress with the ability
to assess, to the extent possible, whether annual levels of India’s
nuclear fissile production may imply a possible violation of Article
I of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

² See the description in H.Rept. 109-599, “Providing for Consideration of H.R. 5682, United
States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006,” Congressional Record, July

25, 2006, p. H5820.

Three amendments were not allowed for consideration on the floor.³ These
were
^!an amendment by Representative Woolsey that would have
prohibited the export of any nuclear-related item to India until the
President has implemented and observed all NPT obligations and
commitments of the United States and has revised United States’
policies relating to nuclear weapons accordingly;
^!an amendment by Representative Barbara Lee that would have
required India to place all electricity-producing reactors under
safeguards, undertake a binding obligation not to transfer any
nuclear-weapon-related information or technology (per Article I of
the NPT) and take concrete steps toward disarmament; and
^!an amendment by Representatives Markey and Upton that would
have prohibited nuclear cooperation with India from commencing
until the President has determined that the United States has secured
India’s full and active support in preventing Iran from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction.
Floor Debate and Votes. The House first considered H. Res 947, which,
after several objections to limits on time and the exclusion of certain amendments by
Representative Markey and others, passed by a vote of 311 to 112. Of the six
amendments considered, three passed by voice vote (the Managers’ amendment,
Representatives Jackson-Lee/Burton’s amendment, and Representative Fortenberry’s
amendment); Representative Stearn’s amendment was recorded as 414-0, and the
amendments offered by Representatives Sherman and Berman were defeated (the
votes, respectively, were 155 to 268, and 184 to 241).
Representative Markey made a motion to recommit the legislation back to the
House International Relations Committee with instructions to include language that
would require that nuclear cooperation with India could only commence after the
president has determined that the United States has secured India’s full support in
preventing Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. That motion to
recommit was defeated in a vote of 192 to 235.
The House passed H.R. 5682, “Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear
Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006,” as amended, by 359 to 68 on July 26, 2006.

³ A fourth amendment, proposed by Mr. Hyde, would have implemented a Congressional
review process for arms sales and exports under the Arms Export Control Act, but this
amendment was withdrawn.

S. 3709/H.R. 5682 in the Senate
Committee Actions. On June 29, 2006, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee considered original legislation, S. 3709, to create an exception for India
from relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act (See S.Rept. 109-288).⁴ The
Committee voted to adopt 2 of 3 amendments:
^!Senator Chafee offered an amendment making it U.S. policy to
ensure that exports of nuclear fuel to India did not encourage India
to increase its production of fissile material (Section 103 (9));
^!Senator Obama offered an amendment to ensure that the United
States did not encourage other states to continue nuclear exports to
India, if the United States exports to India terminated under U.S. law
(Section 102 (6)).
The Committee rejected an amendment by Senator Feingold requiring an additional
presidential determination in Section 105 of the bill by a vote of 5-13. The Feingold
amendment would have conditioned the President’s use of waiver authority on a
determination that U.S. civil nuclear assistance to India would in no way assist,
encourage, or induce India to manufacture nuclear weapons or nuclear devices. The
amendment was identical in text to the Schiff amendment to H.R. 5682, but sought
instead to require a determination rather than a report.
Floor Debate and Votes. An initial attempt to bring S. 3709 to the Senate
floor in September failed to gain unanimous consent agreement. Among several
issues, two apparently delayed the bill — language in Title II pertaining to
implementing legislation for the U.S. Additional Protocol, and potential concern
about whether the United States would accept U.S.-origin spent fuel back from
Indian reactors. In the first case, concerns appeared to be mostly resolved by
incorporating language into a manager’s amendment, with the exception of two
issues raised by Senator Ensign in two amendments he introduced on the floor on^th
November 16 that did not pass. These are described in more detail below. In the
second case, the concern about disposition of Indian spent fuel was dropped prior to
the bill’s reaching the floor.
On November 15, 2006, the Senate agreed by unanimous consent to consider
S. 3709, at a time to be determined by the Majority Leader, in consultation with the⁵
Democratic Leader. The unanimous consent agreement specified that a managers’
amendment would serve as the original text for the purpose of further amendment;
and that the only other amendments to be considered would include the following:
Senators Ensign (considered in closed session), Reed, Levin, Obama, Dorgan (two
amendments), Feingold, Boxer, Feinstein, Harkin, Bingaman (up to seven

⁴ Details on the mark-up are available at Congressional Quarterly, [http://www.cq.com/
display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/committees/109/committees109-
2006062900228090.html@committees&met apub=CQ-COMMIT T EE
MARKUPS&searchIndex=0&seqNum=1] for report of the markup.
⁵ Congressional Record, November 15, 2006, p. S. 10941-42, daily edition.

amendments), Kennedy, and Dodd. Of these, Senators Reed, Levin, Kennedy, and
Dodd did not introduce amendments, and Senator Bingaman introduced three, rather
than seven. All but Senator Feingold’s amendment were considered to be relevant
second-degree amendments and related to the subject matter of the bill. Further, the
unanimous consent agreement provided that once the bill was read a third time, the
Senate would begin consideration of H.R. 5682, the House-passed companion,
striking all text after the enacting clause and inserting the amended text of S. 3709
in its place.
Senator Lugar introduced the bill and offered a section-by-section analysis.⁶
The following amendments, in brief, were passed either by unanimous consent or
voice vote without debate:
^!Senator Lugar introduced a manager’s amendment, which contained
new language in Title II related to the Additional Protocol (S.Amdt.

5168; unanimous consent);

^!Senator Obama introduced an amendment containing a statement of
U.S. policy (which became Section 114) that any nuclear power
reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of India for use in
safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with
reasonable reactor operating requirements (S.Amdt. 5169; voice
vote);⁷
^!Senator Harkin introduced an amendment requiring the President to
determine, before executing his waiver authority, that India was
supporting U.S. and international efforts to dissuade, sanction, and
contain Iran’s nuclear program (S.Amdt. 5173; unanimous consent);⁸
^!Senator Bingaman introduced an amendment to add a reporting
requirement to Section 108 (b) on the amount of uranium mined in
India during the previous year; the amount of such uranium that has
likely been used or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive
devices; and the rate of production in India of fissile material for
nuclear explosive devices and of nuclear explosive devices as well
as an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected the rate
of production in India of nuclear explosive devices (S.Amdt. 5179;
unanimous consent);⁹
^!Senator Bingaman introduced an amendment to add a new Section
in Title I (which became Section 115) requiring the Secretary of
Energy to create a Cooperative Threat Reduction Program with India
(S.Amdt. 5180; unanimous consent).

⁶ See Senator Lugar’s opening statement in the Congressional Record, November 16, 2006,
S10982-84, daily edition.
⁷ See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11021, daily edition, for the colloquy
between Senator Obama and the managers of the bill on the subject of limiting nuclear fuel
reserves to provide a disincentive for India to conduct future nuclear tests.
⁸ See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S10996, daily edition, for Senator
Harkin’s description of the amendment.
⁹ See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S. 11003, daily edition for the text of
Senator Bingaman’s amendments, S.Amdt. 5179 and S.Amdt. 5180.

Senator Lugar’s amendment, S.Amdt. 5168 contained minor changes in Title
I of S. 3709 as reported out of Committee. One potentially significant change was
the deletion of a Sense of Congress on licensing policy in Section 106. In Title II,
however, which contains the implementing legislation for the U.S. Additional
Protocol,¹⁰ significant provisions were added. These included Section 202 on
findings, Section 251 (3), and Sections 254, 261, 262 and 271-275. In his opening
statement, Senator Lugar reported that “a compromise was reached between the
Administration, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and those Senators who
expressed concern about the IAEA Additional Protocol implementing legislation.”¹¹
These additional provisions appear to make explicit existing U.S. rights to exclude
inspectors and certain kinds of inspection activities under the Additional Protocol.
Several of the modifications address the use of environmental sampling, both for
specific locations and for detecting anomalies in a wide-area mode.
Other amendments were introduced, debated, and defeated. These included the
following:
^!Senator Bingaman introduced an amendment requiring a Presidential
determination that the United States and India are taking specific
steps to conclude a multilateral treaty on the cessation of fissile
material for weapons before U.S. nuclear equipment or technology
could be exported under the future agreement for cooperation and
that no nuclear materials may be exported to India unless the
President has determined that India has stopped producing fissile
materials for weapons (S.Amdt. 5174; Vote 26-74);¹²
^!Senator Dorgan introduced an amendment to add a declaration of
U.S. policy to continue to support implementation of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1172 (S.Amdt. 5178; Vote 27-71);¹³
^!Senator Ensign introduced an amendment to Title II of the bill
related to the Additional Protocol that would have required any
inspection equipment, materials and resources to have been
purchased, owned, inspected, and controlled by the United States
(S.Amdt. 5181; Vote 27-71);¹⁴

¹⁰ The Additional Protocol is a protocol to IAEA safeguards agreements under the Nuclear
Nonproliferaton Treaty (NPT) which enhances the IAEA’s inspection rights, methods, and
information. The model agreement is INFCIRC/540. Nuclear weapon states have modified
the model to include provisions for national security exclusions, because of their weapons
status. The United States signed its additional protocol in 1998, and the Senate gave its
consent for ratification in 2004, but the additional protocol requires implementing
legislation to enter into force. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out such
implementing legislation, S. 2489, in April 2006.
¹¹ Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S10984, daily edition.
¹² Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S. 10998-11001, daily edition, for Senator
Bingaman’s explanation of his amendments and responses by Senators Lugar and Biden..
¹³ Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11001, daily edition.
¹⁴ Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11009, daily edition, for text of Ensign
(continued...)

^!Senator Dorgan introduced an amendment that would have required
the President to determine, before executing his waiver authority,
that India has committed to putting all electricity-producing nuclear
reactors under safeguards, has undertaken an obligation not to
proliferate nuclear weapons technology, has joined a legally-binding
nuclear test moratorium; is verifiably reducing its nuclear weapons
stockpile, and has undertaken an obligation to agree to ultimate
disarmament (S.Amdt. 5182; voice vote);¹⁵
^!Senator Feingold introduced an amendment that would have
required the President to determine, before executing his waiver
authority, that the scope and content of the cooperation agreement
would not allow India to use U.S. technology, equipment or material
in unsafe guarded facilities, would not result in India replicating U.S.
technology nuclear fuel and would not facilitate the increased
production by India of fissile material in unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities (S.Amdt. 5183; Vote 25-71);¹⁶
^!Senator Boxer introduced an amendment that would have required
the President to determine, before he could execute his waiver
authority, that India had halted military-to-military contacts with Iran
(S.Amdt. 5187; Vote 38-59).¹⁷
Most of these amendments were characterized by Senators Lugar and Biden as
“killer amendments.” Senator Bingaman described his amendment as implementing
a proposal by former Senator Nunn.¹⁸ Senator Dorgan’s amendment supporting U.S.
implementation of U.N. Security Council 1172 sought to reaffirm U.S. support for
the steps endorsed by the U.N. Security Council following the 1998 Indian and
Pakistani nuclear tests, including limits on those nuclear programs such as a ban on
deployments, and fissile material production for weapons, as well as a commitment
on all states’ parts not to sell nuclear technology to India and Pakistan. Senator
Dorgan’s other amendment, S.Amdt. 5182, was similar to Representative Barbara
Lee’s amendment to the House bill that was rejected by the House Rules Committee.
That amendment attempted to commit India to undertake the same obligations as
other nuclear weapon states under the NPT. Senator Feingold’s amendment was
similar to the one he introduced in Committee that was rejected. Although modified
to address objections voiced in the mark-up, the amendment was described by
Senator Lugar on the floor as requiring a certification that would have been

¹⁴ (...continued)
amendment. The debate was held in closed session.
¹⁵ See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11006, daily edition, for Senator
Dorgan’s introduction of the amendment and debate.
¹⁶ See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11011-15, daily edition, for Senator
Feingold’s introduction of the amendment and debate.
¹⁷ See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11016-11019, daily edition, for Senator
Boxer’s introduction of the amendment and debate.
¹⁸ Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S109998-11000, daily edition.

“impossible to make.”¹⁹ Senator Ensign’s amendment was debated in closed session,
apparently because of the potential need to discuss classified information relating to
the protection of national security information during IAEA inspections under an
Additional Protocol in the United States.
H.R. 5682 Conference Report
On December 7, 2006, conferees on H.R. 5682 filed Conference Report H.Rept.
109-721. The bill essentially combines many of the provisions of both the House and
Senate versions. Specific differences are highlighted in Table 1, below. Of note, the
Senate provisions to ban enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production
cooperation with India (now Section 104. (d) (4)) and create an end-use monitoring
program (now Section 104.(d) (5)) prevailed in the conference bill, as did Title II,
which includes the implementing legislation of the U.S. Additional Protocol. The so-
called Harkin amendment, which added a determination that India was fully and
actively supporting U.S. and international efforts to contain, dissuade, and sanction
Iran for its nuclear weapons program, did not remain as a determination, but became
two reporting requirements: first, as a one-time report when the Section 123
agreement is submitted to Congress (now Section 104.(c)(2)(H)) and as an annual
reporting requirement (now Section 104.(g)(2)(E)).
P.L. 109-401 Signing Statement
On December 18, 2006, President Bush signed the “Henry J. Hyde United
States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006" into law (P.L. 109-
401). President Bush noted that the act “will strengthen the strategic relationship
between the United States and India.”²⁰ In particular, President Bush stated that the
executive branch would construe two sections of the bill as “advisory” only: policy
statements in Section 103 and the restriction contained in Section 104 (d) (2) on
transferring items to India that would not meet NSG guidelines. On the first, the
President cited the Constitution’s “commitment to the presidency of the authority to
conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs;” on the second, the President raised the question
of whether the provision “unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to an
international body.” In other words, the President was questioning whether Congress
were ceding authority to approve U.S. exports to the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
However, U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Rice, have formally told
Congress multiple times that the United States government would abide by NSG
guidelines. The President’s signing statement also noted that the executive branch
would construe “provisions of the Act that mandate, regulate, or prohibit submission
of information to the Congress, an international organization, or the public, such as
sections 104, 109, 261, 271, 272, 273, 274, and 275, in a manner consistent with the
President’s constitutional authority to protect and control information that could
impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative processes of the
Executive, or the performance of the Executive’s constitutional duties.” This could
suggest that the executive branch might limit the scope of reporting required by
Congress in those sections.

¹⁹ Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11014, daily edition.
²⁰ See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061218-12.html].

CRS-10
Table 1. Comparison of Current Legislation on Waivers for U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
WaiverProvides authority forSection 1 (a):Section 4 (a):Section 104 (a):Section 104
authorityPresident to waivePresident may waiveSame as H.R. 4974.Same as H.R. 4974.(a):
Atomic Energy Actsections of AEA (seeSame as H.R.
(AEA) requirements.below) if he makes a4974.
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561} determination.
^g/w
^s^.orSection 123 a.Full-scope safeguards.Section 1 (a) (1):Section 4 (a) (1):Section 104 (a) (1):Section 104
^le^ak(2) of AtomicWaived AND theWaived BUT entryEquivalent to H.R.(a) (1): Senate
Energy Actfuture cooperationinto force requires5682. See Sectionversion.

^://wiki(AEA)agreement enters intoJoint Resolution of104 (b).
^h^ttpforce as though it metApproval as all other
all Section 123 a.exempted
requirements (doesagreements (See
not require a Jointalso Section 4 (e)).
Resolution of
Approval).

CRS-11
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
Section 128 ofAnnual review bySection 1 (a) (2):Section 4 (a) (2):Section 104 (a) (2):Section 104
AEACongress of exportApplication ofWaiver ends if IndiaSection 128 waived(a) (2):
license for an agreementSection 128 waivedengages in anywithout conditions.Same as
exempted from full-without conditions.Section 129 actionsSenate
scope safeguards(see descriptionversion.

requirement.below for Section
129), except for its
ongoing weapons
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}program [129 a. (1)
^g/w(D)] and future
^s^.or reprocessing
^le^aktransfers to a non-
^://wikinuclear weapon state[129 a. (2) (C)].
^h^ttp

CRS-12
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
Section 129 ofa. Terminate U.S.Section 1 (a) (3): Section 4 (a) (3):Section 104 (a) (3):Section 104
AEAnuclear exports if“Sanctions” underWaiver of SectionEquivalent to H.R.(a) (3):
President determinesSection 129 waived.129 limited to:5682 but wordedSame as
that a (1) non-nuclearIndian nuclear testsdifferently. TheSenate
weapon state: before 2005 [Sectionlanguage specifiesversion.

(A) Has tested a nuclear129 a. (1) (A)] andwaiver for sanctions
deviceongoing nuclearunder Section 129 a.
(B) terminates orweapons activities(1) (D), but covers
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}abrogates IAEA[Section 129 a. (1)the 1998 Indian
^g/wsafeguards(D)].nuclear test by
^s^.or(C) materially violateswaiving any Section
^le^akIAEA safeguards129 sanctions
^://wiki(D) Has ongoing nuclearweapons programregarding any actionsthat occurred before
^h^ttpOR if PresidentJuly 18, 2005. (There
determines (2) any state has only been one
Presidential
(A) materially violates adetermination for
cooperation agreementIndia prior to 2005
(B) assists non-nuclearthat is relevant to
weapon state in nw-Section 129 — for
related activitiesthe Indian nuclear
(C) Has agreement or test in 1998).
transfers reprocessing
material, technology, or

CRS-13
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
DeterminationEstablishes threshold forSection 1b: Section 4 (b):Section 105:Section 104
President to use waiverPresident must makeSame requirementsSame requirements(b):
authority.1 determination that 7with minor changeswith minor changes Closer to
actions have occurredthat strengthenSpecifies safeguardsHouse-passed
(see below).measures. Specifiesin perpetuity. Addedversion.
safeguards indetermination on
perpetuity.India and Iran
(Harkin amendment)
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}
^g/wSeparation planIdentification of Indian(1) India hasSection 4 (b) (1):Section 105 (1) andSection 104
^s^.orcivilian nuclear facilitiesprovided to US andSame language as(2) Same language as(b) (1):
^le^akto US and IAEA.IAEA a credible planH.R. 4974.H.R. 4974 butCloser to
to separate civil andseparates theHouse-passed
^://wikimilitary facilities,declaration provisionversion.

^h^ttpmaterials, andinto Section 105 (2).
programs, and has
filed a declaration
regarding its civil
facilities with the
IAEA.

CRS-14
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
SafeguardsIndia committed to(2) Entry into forceSection 4 (b) (2):Section 105 (3)Section 104
planplacing additional of safeguardsSpecifies safeguardsSpecifies safeguards(b) (2)
civilian nuclear facilitiesagreement inin perpetuity inin perpetuity inChange:
under IAEA safeguardsaccordance withaccordance withaccordance withRequires
under the July 18, 2005,IAEA practices forIAEA standards,IAEA standards,concluding
Joint Statement.India’s civil nuclearprinciples andprinciples and“all legal steps
facilities as declaredpractices. Alsopractices. Alsoprior to
in the plan.mentions safeguardsmentions safeguardssignature”
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}on materials andon materials and(meaning
^g/wprograms, includingprograms.Board of
^s^.ormaterials used in orGovernors
^le^akproduced throughapproval of
^://wikiuse of civil nuclearfacilities.the safeguardsagreement).
^h^ttp Specifies
safeguards in
perpetuity
with IAEA
standards, etc.

CRS-15
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
AdditionalAn agreement with(3) MakingSection 4 (b) (3)Section 105 (4)Section 104
ProtocolIAEA to enhancesatisfactorySpecifiesSpecifies “substantial(b) (3)
inspections, access, andprogress toward“substantialprogress.”“Substantial
declarations relevant toimplementation.progress” consistentprogress
safeguards.with IAEAtoward
principles, practicesconcluding
and policies.and Additional
Protocol.”
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}
^g/wFMCTFuture negotiations to(4) Working with theSection 4 (b) (4)Section 105 (5)Section 104
^s^.or(Fissileend production of fissileUnited States forSpecifies workingEquivalent to H.R.(b) (4)
^le^akMaterialmaterial for nuclearconclusion of a“actively” for the4974.House
Productionweapons.multilateral FMCT.“early” conclusion.version.
^://wikiCutoff Treaty)
^h^ttpHaltingJuly 18, 2005,(5) SupportingSection 4 (b) (5)Section 105 (6)Section 104
enrichment/commitment by India tointernational effortsSpecifies “workingSpecifies preventing(b) (5)
reprocessingsupport U.S. policy toto prevent the spreadwith and supportingspread “to any stateCombines
transfersrestrict access toof enrichment andUS and internationalthat does not alreadyboth texts.

enrichment andreprocessingefforts.”possess full-scale,
reprocessing. technology. functioning
enrichment and
reprocessing plants.”

CRS-16
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
Export controlsJuly 18, 2005(6) Ensuring thatSection 4 (b) (6)Section 105 (7)Section 104
commitment by India tonecessary stepsSpecifies enactmentSpecifies effective(b) (6)
strengthen exportare taken to secureand enforcement ofenforcement actions.Closer to
controls and adhere tonuclear materials andexport control laws;House
international norms,technology through specifiesversion.
including Missilecomprehensiveharmonization of
Technology Controlexport controllaws, regulations,
Regime (MTCR) andlegislation andpolicies and
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}Nuclear Suppliers Groupregulations; andpractices with the
^g/w(NSG) guidelines.harmonization andpolicies and
^s^.oradherence to MTCRpractices of MTCR
^le^akand NSG guidelines.and NSG.
^://wikiNuclearNSG guidelines(7) Supply to India isSection 4 (b) (7)Section 105 (9)Section 104
^h^ttpSupplierscurrently prohibitconsistent with USSpecifies NSGSpecifies NSG(b) (7)
Group (NSG)nuclear transfers toparticipation in NSG. consensus decision.consensus decisionHouse
India; a decision must beThis assumes that thethat does not permitversion.

taken to allowNSG will agree to anan exception for
cooperation. NSGexception for exportsanother non-nuclear
operates by consensus.to India.weapon state.

CRS-17
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
IranEnsure that India isNONENONE Section 105 (8)Senate
supporting U.S. andBut see Section 3 (b)Requires India’s fullprovision
international efforts to(4) statement of& active participation(Harkin
dissuade, sanction, andpolicy on India’sin U.S. andamendment)
contain Iran’s nuclearsupport for U.S.international effortsremoved and
programefforts vis-a-visto dissuade, sanction,placed in
Iran.and contain Iran forreporting
its nuclear programrequirements
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}consistent with U.N.(see Section
^g/wSecurity Council104.(c)(2)
^s^.orresolutions(H)) and
^le^ak Section
^://wiki 104.(g)(2)(E)).

^h^ttp

CRS-18
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
Report onNotify Congress that 7Section 1 c.Section 4 (c) (2):Section 105:Section 104
Determinationactions have occurred toReport to HIRC,Provides detailsDetermination must(c) (1) and (2)
allow waiver.SFRC that 7 actionsabout what reportsbe made in writing toIncludes ten
have occurred,to HIRC, SFRCappropriaterequirements
including basis forshould contain,Committees.in the report to
determination.specifically on the 7be submitted
actions. Also, twoSimilar reports arewith the 123
other reports arerequired in Sectionagreement.

ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}required for the108 (a) (1), but are
^g/wdetermination: anot tied to President’s
^s^.ordescription of thedetermination.
^le^akscope of the 123
^://wikiagreement with theUS and the steps
^h^ttptaken to ensure that
U.S. assistance will
not aid India’s
nuclear weapons
program (Schiff
amendment).

CRS-19
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
TerminationEstablish a threshold forSection 1d. Section 4 (a) (3):Section 104 (a) (3):Section 104
halting U.S. exports toAll waiver authoritiesAll terminationAll termination(d) (3):
India (now contained in(for Section 123 a.provisions ofprovisions of SectionAll
Section 129 of the AEA(2), Section 128, andSection 129 of the129 of the AEAtermination
and in the proposedSection 129)AEA (except 129(except 129 a.(1) (D))provisions of
peaceful nuclearterminate if Indiaa.(1) (D)) would bewould be in effectSection 129 of
cooperation agreementtests a nuclearin effect (see(see description ofthe AEA
itself, which is not yetexplosive device.description ofsec.129 waiver(except 129
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}drafted).sec.129 waiverabove).a.(1) (D))
^g/wabove).would be in
^s^.oreffect (see
^le^akdescription of
^://wikisec.129waiver above).

^h^ttp

CRS-20
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
ALSONo equivalentSection 104
Section 4 (d) (3):provision to H.R.(d) (3):
Exports would5682 but Section 108Incorporated
terminate if India(b) (3) (A) contains aHouse version
makes a materiallyreporting reqt if IndiaSection 4 (d)
significant transferdoes not comply with(3) (Berman
of items in violationNSG guidelines andamendment).

of NSG guidelines,Section 108 (b) (4)
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}or of items in(A) requires an
^g/wviolation of MTCRannual certification
^s^.orguidelines.that India is in full
^le^akcompliance with all
^://wikiJuly 18, 2005commitments.
^h^ttp

CRS-21
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
Sense ofTo describe Congress’sNONESection 2Section 102Section 102
Congresspolicy objectives withNotes importance ofNotes that engagingCombines
respect to nuclearnonproliferation andIndia is in theboth texts.

cooperation with India.NPT and focuses onnational security
how the Unitedinterest of the United
States couldStates, but need to
strengthen itsminimize
nonproliferationproliferation risk.
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}policy by engagingUnited States should
^g/wNPT outliers likenot facilitate trade by
^s^.orIndia. Sets upother nations if U.S.
^le^akcriteriaexports terminated.
^://wiki(nonproliferationrecord, democratic
^h^ttpgovernment, support
for U.S.
nonproliferation
aims) for
engagement and
states India meets
criteria.

CRS-22
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
Statements ofTo describe U.S. policyNONESection 3 (a)Section 103Section 103
Policy (I)*objectives, with respectGeneralSection 103 (8):(a)
[* Presidentto nonproliferation.(1) Oppose nuclearmaintain support forSection 103
Bush hasweaponsNPT.(a)(1)
interpreted asdevelopment.Combines
“advi sory”] both.
(2) Support peacefulNo equivalentSection 103
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}uses of nuclear(a)(2)
^g/wenergy, but onlyHouse
^s^.orwith full NPTversion.
^le^ak compliance.
^://wiki(3) Strengthen NSGimplementation,Similar to Section103 (6) on supportSection 103(a)(3) and
^h^ttpincluding cutoff offor NSG.Section 103(a)
exports for(4).

violations.

CRS-23
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
Statements ofTo describe U.S. policyNONESection 3 (b) SouthSection 103 (1), butSection
Policy (II)objectives, with respectAsiamoratorium does not103(b)(1)
to South Asia, U.S.-(1) Fissile materialinclude China.House version
India bilateral relations,production
and South Asianmoratorium for
proliferation.India, Pakistan,
China.
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}
^g/w
^s^.or(2) FMCTNo equivalentSection
^le^ak 103(b)(2)
House version
^://wiki(3) OtherSection 103 (2), butSection
^h^ttpnonproliferationno mention of103(b)(3)
activities, like PSI,Convention onHouse version
Australia Group,Supplementary
Wassenaar, Compensation.
Convention on
Supplementary
Compensation.
(4) Support for U.S.No equivalent, butSection
policies to preventlanguage similar to103(b)(4)
Iran from acquiringSection 105 (8)Modified
nuclear weapons.determinationHouse version

CRS-24
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
(5) Cap, roll backNo equivalentSection
and eliminate South103(b)(5)
Asian nuclear
arsenals.
(6) No spent fuelNo equivalentSection
transfer without103(b)(6)
Congressional
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561} approval.
^g/w(7) Encourage capNo equivalentSection
^s^.oron production ofprovision103(b)(7)
^le^akfissile material for
^://wikiweapons, pendingmoratorium.
^h^ttp
Statements ofNONENo equivalentSection 103 (3): FullRemoved.
Policy (III)provisioncompliance with all
nonproliferation
obligations.
No equivalentSection 103 (4):Section
provisionEnsure reliability of103(b)(8)

safeguards and
Additional Protocol.

CRS-25
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
No equivalentSection 103 (5):Section
provisionAgreement must103(b)(9)
meet all other Section

123 a. requirements.

No equivalentSection 103 (6):Section
provisionConsistency with103(a)(3)
NSG guidelines.
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}No equivalentSection 103 (7):Section 103
^g/wprovision Work with NSG(a)(5)
^s^.ormembers to restrict
^le^aktransfers of
^://wikienrichment andreprocessing, also to
^h^ttp India.
No equivalentSection 103 (8):Akin to
provision Maintain support forSection 102
adherence &(2).

compliance with
NPT.

CRS-26
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
No equivalentSection 103 (9):Removed (see
provision Exports of nuclearreporting
fuel to India shouldrequirements).
not contribute to or
encourage India to
increase production
of fissile material for
military uses.
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}
^g/wNo equivalentSection 114: AnySection 103
^s^.orprovision nuclear power reactor(b)(10)

^le^akfuel reserve provided
to India should be
^://wikicommensurate with
^h^ttpreasonable reactor
operating
requirements

CRS-27
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
ExpeditedTo provide proceduresNone, except asSection 4 (f) and (g):None, except asNone, except
proceduresfor expeditedprovided already intrack with existingprovided already inas provided
consideration of JointSection 130 of AEA.law (Section 130 ofSection 130 of AEA.already in
Resolution of Approval.AEA). Section 130 of
AEA.
End-UseTo provide reasonableNONENONESection 107 requiresSection 104
Monitoringassurances that thefollowing measures:(d)(5)

ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}recipient is complying(1) Obtain and
^g/wwith relevantimplement assurances
^s^.orrequirements, terms andand conditions
^le^akconditions of U.S.regarding end-use
export licenses.monitoring; (2) a
^://wikidetailed system of
^h^ttpreporting on
technology transfers,
including those
authorized by Section

57 b of AEA.

(3) Fall-back
safeguards, should
IAEA be unable to
implement safeguards
in India.

CRS-28
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
Restrictions onNONESection 4 (d)Section 104
cooperation(1) No assistanceNo equivalent but(d)
that would aidsimilar conceptSection 104
India’s nuclearbehind Section 106,(d)(1)
weapons program.Section 103 (9)
(2) No transfers ifSimilar to SectionSection 104
they would violate103 (6): to act in a(d)(2)*
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}NSG guidelines.manner fullyHouse
^g/wconsistent with NSGversion.
^s^.orguidelines (but this is[* President
^le^akonly a Statement ofBush has
Policy).interpreted as
^://wiki “advi sory”]
^h^ttp(4) President shouldSection 102 (6):Similar to
seek to preventUnited States shouldSection 102
cooperation by othernot seek to facilitate(13).

states with India ifcooperation by other
United Statesstates with India if
terminates exports.United States
terminates exports.

CRS-29
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
No equivalentSection 106Section 104
provisionBans cooperation on(d)(4)
enrichment,Minor editing
reprocessing, andchanges.

heavy water
materials, equipment,
and technology with
exception for
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}multilateral and
^g/wbilateral fuel cycle
^s^.orcooperation, if
^le^akPresident determines
^://wikithat the export willnot improve India’s
^h^ttpability to produce
nuclear weapons.
ability to produce
fissile material for
weapons.

CRS-30
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
Other reportingNONESection 4 (j) (1):No equivalentRemoved

annual report onprovision
U.S. policy
objectives for South
Asia (i.e., steps
taken by the United
States and India,
extent of success,
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}and cooperation by
^g/wother countries).
^s^.or
^le^ak
^://wiki
^h^ttp

CRS-31
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
Section 4 (j) (2)Section 108 (b) (6)Section 104
Annual report on Annual report on(g) (2) (H)
U.S. nuclear exportsestimated amount ofand Section
to India, includinguranium mined in104 (g) (2) (J)

estimates of IndianIndia during the
uranium mining,previous year(A);
fissile material andamount of such
nuclear weaponsuranium that has
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}production rates; aslikely been used or
^g/wwell as impact ofallocated for the
^s^.orimported uranium onproduction of nuclear
^le^aksuch rates. Reportexplosive devices
^://wikialso to describeIndia’s use of any(B); and the rate ofproduction in India of
^h^ttpU.S. nuclearfissile material for
equipment, materialnuclear explosive
or technology in andevices(C)(I); and of
uninspected facility;nuclear explosive
replication ofdevices(C)(ii)
anything transferred
and whetherSection 108 (b) (7)
imported nuclear fuelAnalysis on whether
has helped toimported uranium has
increase fissileaffected the rate of
material productionproduction in India of

CRS-32
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
OtherNONESection 4 (j) (3): Section 108 (b) (2):Section 104
reporting,annual report onlist of licenses(g) (2) (B)
continuednew Indian nuclearapproved by NRC,
facilities.DOE, Commerce or
any other U.S.
authorizations of
exports and reexports
of nuclear materials
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}and equipment.
^g/w
^s^.orSection 4 (j) (4):No equivalentSection 104
^le^akannual report onprovision(g) (2) (L)

India’s spent fuel
^://wiki disposal.
^h^ttp

CRS-33
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
Section 4 (j) (5):Section 108 (b) (1):Section 104
annual report ondescription of(g) (2) (A)

growth in India’sadditional nuclear
military fissilefacilities/materials
material production,India places under
to includeIAEA safeguards.
information onSection 108 (a) (3):
Indian uraniumImplementation &
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}mining, electricityCompliance Report;
^g/wproduction,Information on
^s^.ordomestic uraniumNuclear Activities of
^le^akused in civilianIndia; “significant
^://wikielectricityproduction, &changes in theproduction by India
^h^ttpmilitary fissileof nuclear weapons
material production,or in the types or
etc.amounts of fissile
material produced.”
See also Section 108
(b) (6).

CRS-34
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
No equivalentSection 108 (b) (3):Section 104
provisionAny significant(g) (2) (C)

nuclear commerce
between India and
other countries that
does not comply with
NSG guidelines, or
would not meet
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}standards applied to
^g/wU.S.-origin material.
^s^.or
^le^ak
^://wiki
^h^ttp

CRS-35
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
OtherNONENONESection 108 (b) (4): Section 104
PresidentialThat India is in full(g) (2)

certificationscompliance with
following obligations
(listed in Section 108
(a) (1)): Joint
Statement
commitments,
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561}separation plan,
^g/w safeguards
^s^.or agreement,
^le^akAdditional Protocol,
^://wiki123 agreement, termsand conditions of
^h^ttpapproved export
licenses. If
certification is not
possible, report on
steps, responses and
implications.

CRS-36
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
ConsultationNONESection 4 (e (2):No equivalentRemoved
with CongressRequires monthlyprovision
consultations with
Congress on
progress in 123
agreement
negotiations and
IAEA safeguards
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561} agreement
^g/w negotiations.
^s^.or
^le^akNo equivalentSection 108 (a): keepSection 104
provisionCongress fully(g) (1))

^://wikiinformed on India’s:
^h^ttp(1) non-compliance
(2) nuclear facility
construction
(3) fissile material
production
(4) changes in
operational status of
nuclear facilities.

CRS-37
IssueDescription/PurposeH.R. 4974/S. 2429 H.R. 5682 (HouseH.R. 5682 (SenateH.R. 5682
as introducedversion)version)Conference
Report
Program forTo further commonNONENONESection 115Section 109
cooperativenonproliferation goals,Requires Secretary of
threat reductionincluding scientificEnergy to establish a
research andUnited States-India
development effortsScientific
related to nuclearCooperative Threat
nonproliferation, withReduction Program.
emphasis on nuclear
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33561} safeguards.
^g/w
^s^.orTITLE IIImplementingNONENONEEntire Title IITitle II

^le^akLegislation for the U.S.See. S. 2489 for
Additional Protocol.comparison and S.
^://wiki3709 as reported out
^h^ttpof committee for
differences between
those and the version
voted on by the
Senate.

Additional Resources
CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress,
by Sharon Squassoni.
CRS Report RL33292, India’s Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views, by
Sharon Squassoni.
CRS Report RL33072, U.S.-India Bilateral Agreements and ‘Global Partnership,’
by K. Alan Kronstadt.
CRS Report RS22474, Banning Fissile Material Production for Nuclear Weapons:
Prospects for a Treaty (FMCT), by Sharon Squassoni, Andrew Demkee, and Jill
Marie Parillo.