Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress

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Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was launched on March 20, 2003, with the immediate stated goal
of removing Saddam Hussein’s regime and destroying its ability to use weapons of mass
destruction or to make them available to terrorists. Over time, the focus of OIF shifted from
regime removal to the more open-ended mission of helping the Government of Iraq (GoI)
improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development.
Gradually, an insurgency gained strength in Iraq and violence escalated. In January 2007, the
Bush Administration announced a new strategy, the “new way forward,” which included both a
troop surge and new counter-insurgency approaches that emphasized population security and
reconciliation. The last surge brigade redeployed from Iraq without replacement in July 2008.
Most observers agree that security conditions in Iraq have improved markedly since mid-2007.
On September 9, President Bush, calling the decision a “return on success,” announced that about

8,000 additional U.S. troops would redeploy from Iraq without replacement by February 2009.

The next major development in the campaign is likely to be implementation of two new U.S.-
Iraqi strategic agreements, finalized in late 2008. The documents include a strategic framework
agreement, which outlines principles for bilateral cooperation in multiple areas, and a Status of
Forces-like document that defines the legal basis for the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and
imposes a number of constraints on U.S. military operations there. Together, the documents
suggest a shift toward greater exercise of Iraqi sovereignty.
Near-term issues that the new Administration, with oversight from the 111^th Congress, may
choose to address include determining how best to build on recent security gains in Iraq;
assessing “how much U.S. help is enough” in terms of funding, personnel, and other assistance, to
support the GoI but also to encourage its independence; establishing the criteria for further troop
drawdowns; and continuing to revise the organization and focus of the Iraqi Security Forces
training and advisory mission.
Longer-term Iraq strategy and policy considerations include clarifying long-term U.S. strategic
objectives related to Iraq and shaping a more traditional future bilateral relationship with Iraq;
defining U.S. policy toward Iranian intervention in Iraq; and assessing the implications of OIF
“lessons learned” for the future of U.S. military forces and for U.S. government inter-agency
collaboration in general.
This report is designed to provide an assessment of current OIF developments, in the context of
relevant background, in order to support congressional consideration of these short-term and
long-term strategy and policy issues.

Overvi ew ....................................................................................................................... .................. 1
Backgr ound ............................................................................................................................... 1
Current Situation: Strategic and Operational Dynamics...........................................................2
Operational Dynamics: Transitions.....................................................................................2
Strategic Dynamics: Potential “Spoilers”...........................................................................3
Diminishing U.S. Leverage.................................................................................................4
Revised U.S.-Iraqi Strategic Partnership...................................................................................4
Operational Considerations.......................................................................................................5
How Much Help Is Enough?...............................................................................................5
Further Troop Drawdowns..................................................................................................6
Future of the Iraqi Security Forces Training Mission.......................................................10
Future of the U.S. Forces Footprint..................................................................................12
Coordination on Operations under the “SOFA”................................................................13
Civil-Military Roles and Responsibilities.........................................................................15
Strategic Considerations..........................................................................................................16
Clarifying and Updating U.S. Strategic Objectives..........................................................16
Applying Strategic Leverage............................................................................................17
Shaping a Long-Term U.S. Presence in Iraq.....................................................................17
Defining U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Intervention in Iraq................................................18
Assessing the Implications of OIF Lessons for the Future of the Force...........................18
Applying OIF Lessons to Interagency Coordination........................................................18
Options Available to Congress................................................................................................19
Structure and Aim of the Report.............................................................................................20
Decision to Go to War in Iraq........................................................................................................21
Antecedents in the 1990s........................................................................................................21
Bush Administration Strategy and Role of the United Nations...............................................22
Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein................................................................................................23
War Planning.................................................................................................................................23
Strategic Objectives.................................................................................................................23
Military Objectives..................................................................................................................24
Planning for Major Combat....................................................................................................24
Post-War Planning...................................................................................................................27
Inter-Agency Post-War Planning......................................................................................28
Military Post-War Planning..............................................................................................30
Organizational Decisions..................................................................................................31
Major Combat Operations.............................................................................................................32
Early Infiltration......................................................................................................................32
The Launch..............................................................................................................................32
The Ground Campaign............................................................................................................33
Iraqi Contributions to Major Combat......................................................................................35
End of Major Combat..............................................................................................................36
Post-Major Combat: Basis and Organization................................................................................37
Legal Basis for Coalition Presence.........................................................................................37
Formal Occupation............................................................................................................37
Iraqi Request for a Multinational Force............................................................................37
“Status of Forces” Agreement...........................................................................................39

Coalition Command Relationships..........................................................................................39
Post-Major Combat: The Force.....................................................................................................40
Structure and Footprint............................................................................................................40
Headquarters Organization...............................................................................................40
Provincial Iraqi Control....................................................................................................41
U.S. Forces in Iraq..................................................................................................................42
Coalition Partner Forces..........................................................................................................43
Contributions During Major Combat................................................................................43
Past Drawdown Decisions................................................................................................44
Coalition Forces in 2009...................................................................................................44
Post-Major Combat: Security Situation.........................................................................................45
Major Sources and Forms of Violence....................................................................................45
Sunni Extremism...............................................................................................................45
Shi’a Extremism...............................................................................................................46
Nature of Sectarian Violence............................................................................................49
Criminality ........................................................................................................................ 49
Other Security Challenges.......................................................................................................50
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).......................................................................................50
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK)...............................................................................................51
Post-Major Combat: Military Strategy and Operations.................................................................51
Nomenclature: Characterizing the Conflict.............................................................................52
Military Strategy and Operations During Occupation............................................................53
Operation Phantom Fury (Fallujah II).....................................................................................55
Counter-Insurgency in Tal Afar...............................................................................................57
“Clear, Hold, Build”................................................................................................................59
Operation Together Forward...................................................................................................60
New Way Forward..................................................................................................................61
“New Way Forward” National Strategy: Theory of the Case...........................................61
Surge Forces......................................................................................................................62
Surge Military Strategy: Theory of the Case....................................................................63
Surge Operations in 2007..................................................................................................65
Military Operations in 2008..............................................................................................67
Counter-IED Efforts..........................................................................................................71
Special Operations Forces.................................................................................................73
Air Power..........................................................................................................................73
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)............................................................................................................75
Requirement for New Iraqi Security Forces...........................................................................75
ISF Training Efforts During the Formal Occupation..............................................................76
Unity of Effort: Creation of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq...................77
ISF Training: Theory of the Case............................................................................................78
ISF Training: Organizational Structure and Responsibilities..................................................79
ISF Training: Transition Teams...............................................................................................80
Interior Ministry Transition Teams...................................................................................81
Defense Ministry Transition Teams..................................................................................81
ISF Training: Unit Partnering..................................................................................................83
Iraqi Security Forces: The Numbers.......................................................................................85
Iraqi Security Forces: Evaluating the Results.........................................................................86
Iraqi Security Forces as a Whole......................................................................................86
Iraqi Army.........................................................................................................................89

Iraqi Air Force...................................................................................................................92
Iraqi Navy.........................................................................................................................94
Iraqi Special Operations Forces........................................................................................95
Iraqi Police Service...........................................................................................................95
Iraqi National Police.........................................................................................................97
Department of Border Enforcement..................................................................................98
Ministry of the Interior......................................................................................................99
Ministry of Defense........................................................................................................100
Iraqi Population: “Reconciliation”..............................................................................................102
Coalition Outreach to the Disaffected...................................................................................102
“Awakening” Movements.....................................................................................................104
Origins of the Awakening Movement in Al Anbar..........................................................104
Spread of the Awakening Movements to the North........................................................105
Spread of the Awakening Movements to the South........................................................106
Security Volunteers and “Sons of Iraq”.................................................................................106
Who the “Sons of Iraq” (SoIs) Are.................................................................................107
Origins of the “Sons of Iraq” Movement........................................................................108
The “Sons of Iraq” System.............................................................................................108
Security Volunteers in Al Anbar: Provincial Security Force...........................................109
Iraqi Government and Other Views of the “Sons of Iraq”..............................................109
“Sons of Iraq” Integration into Permanent Jobs...............................................................110
GoI Assumption of Responsibility for the SoIs...............................................................112
Detainee Operations...............................................................................................................113
Accountability ..................................................................................................................113
“COIN Inside the Wire” Detainee Program.....................................................................113
Detainee Releases............................................................................................................114
Civil/Military Partnership in Governance and Economics...........................................................115
Civil/Military Partnership in Iraq: Background.....................................................................116
Provincial Reconstruction Teams...........................................................................................116
Coordination Between PRTs and Military Units....................................................................118
Military Role in Governance and Economics.......................................................................120
Gove rnance ..................................................................................................................... 120
Economics ...................................................................................................................... . 122
Assessing the Results to Date......................................................................................................124
Security Situation by the Metrics..........................................................................................124
Overall Attacks...............................................................................................................125
Iraqi Civilian Deaths.......................................................................................................125
Weapons Caches.............................................................................................................126
High-Profile Attacks.......................................................................................................126
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)............................................................................126
Explaining the Security Gains...............................................................................................127
Additional CRS Reports..............................................................................................................128
Figure 1.Map of Iraq...................................................................................................................129

Table 1. Iraqi Security Forces as of September, 2008...................................................................85
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................130

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—the U.S.-led coalition military operation in Iraq—is ongoing.
Despite substantial improvements in security conditions in many parts of Iraq since 2007, as of
late 2008, Iraqi leaders and people were still struggling to consolidate those gains and rebuild.
Two new U.S.-Iraqi strategic agreements finalized in late 2008—a strategic framework agreement
and a Status of Forces-like document—suggested a shift toward greater exercise of Iraqi
sovereignty. Key policy issues the new U.S. Administration may choose to address, with ^th
oversight from the 111 Congress, include identifying which U.S. national interests and strategic
objectives, in Iraq and the region, should guide further U.S. engagement; and determining the
timing, pace, and nature of the transition of the U.S. effort in Iraq from counter-insurgency
operations to a more traditional bilateral relationship.
OIF was launched on March 20, 2003. The immediate goal, as stated by the Bush Administration,
was to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime, including destroying its ability to use weapons of mass
destruction or to make them available to terrorists. The broad, longer-term objective included ¹
helping Iraqis build “a new Iraq that is prosperous and free.” In October 2002, Congress had
authorized the President to use force against Iraq, to “defend the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq,” and to “enforce all relevant United Nations ²
Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”
After the initial combat operations, the focus of OIF shifted from regime removal to the more
open-ended mission of helping an emerging new Iraqi leadership improve security, establish a
system of governance, and foster economic development. Over time, challenges to the emerging
Iraqi leadership from homegrown insurgents and some foreign fighters mounted. Sectarian
violence grew, catalyzed by the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra.
Accordingly, the character of the war evolved from major combat operations to a multifaceted
counter-insurgency (COIN) and reconstruction effort.
In January 2007, in an attempt to reverse the escalation of violence, President George W. Bush
announced a new strategic approach, the “New Way Forward,” including a “surge” of additional
U.S. forces. The troop surge included five Army brigade combat teams (BCTs), a Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and two Marine battalions. More importantly, most observers agree,
the surge institutionalized COIN approaches, designed to promote population security, such as
living among the local population at small outposts.
Over the course of the surge, observers generally agreed, security conditions on the ground
improved markedly. In August 2008, then-Commanding General of Multi-National Force-Iraq,
General David Petraeus, agreed that there had been “significant progress” but argued that it was
¹
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“still not self-sustaining.” “We’re not celebrating,” he commented, and there are “no victory ³
dances in the end zone.”
Practitioners and observers identified a number of factors that may have contributed to the
security improvements, including the additional surge forces; new and institutionalized counter-
insurgency approaches concerning population security and reconciliation; the application of high-
end technological capabilities by Special Operations Forces (SOF) and closer integration between
SOF and conventional forces; the accumulated experience of U.S. leaders at all levels after
multiple tours in Iraq; the growing numbers and capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces; the
ground-up rejection of violence and support for the coalition by many Sunni Arabs; and the
ceasefire declared by Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and the abandonment of violence by many of
his followers.
While conventional, force-on-force wars tend to end with the unequivocal defeat of one party, the
parameters for “mission success” in counter-insurgency efforts like OIF tend to be less definitive
and more subject to qualitative interpretation. OIF remains more likely to end with a policy
decision by the U.S. or Iraqi government, or both, than with a decisive military victory on the
battlefield.
From an operational perspective, the year 2008 witnessed several major but uneven transitions.
First, the substantial security improvements achieved over the course of the “surge” further ⁴
deepened, with some fluctuations during combat operations in specific regions. Second, most
experts believe that the operational capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continued to
grow, reflected in—and catalyzed by—ISF operational experiences in Basra, Sadr City, Amarah,
Mosul, and Diyala. According to U.S. commanders, the March 2008 ISF operations in Basra,
targeting Shi’a militias, were poorly planned and required a strong rescue effort by coalition
forces. The August operations in Diyala, targeting affiliates of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) were
planned by the Iraqis in advance, but still required coalition forces to provide enablers and to help ⁵
hold areas once they were cleared. Some U.S. officials suggested that the ultimate success of
these operations, facilitated by the coalition, gave Iraqi political leaders disproportionate ⁶
confidence in the capabilities of the ISF.
A third transition was that formal Government of Iraq (GoI) responsibility for security grew, as
additional provinces transitioned to “provincial Iraqi control” (PIC). In practice, PIC ⁷
arrangements vary from province to province. Fourth, as the ISF’s basic capabilities improved,
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the coalition’s approaches to training and partnering with the ISF evolved substantially though
unevenly across Iraq. In terms of substance, many embedded “transition teams” shifted their
training focus toward more advanced skills. In terms of organization, the use of unit-to-unit
partnering, complementing the work of transition teams, grew substantially. Fifth, the
geographical focus of U.S. forces in Iraq shifted somewhat from north to south, in part in
anticipation of future challenges, and in part in response to the drawdowns of coalition partner
forces. Sixth and finally, as civilian-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams grew, they increasingly
took the lead in some efforts formerly spearheaded by the U.S. military. Nevertheless, the
military’s extensive presence on the ground at district and local levels, compared with the limited
number of U.S. civilian experts, meant that in practice, the military continued to play a strong
“supporting” role in helping Iraqis develop civil capacity.
The operational evolutions outlined above unfolded against a backdrop of several persistent
strategic challenges—potential “spoilers”—that could still disrupt not only security conditions on
the ground but also progress toward a unified and stable Iraq. One major challenge is resolving
the political status of the multi-ethnic and oil-rich city of Kirkuk, together with other “disputed
territories” along the Green Line that divides the Kurdistan Regional Government from the rest of
Iraq. While Kirkuk itself has been relatively calm, coalition and Iraqi officials in Kirkuk noted
with concern in 2008 that outside players with strong vested interests, including ethnically based
Iraqi political parties and supporters of Iraqi Turkmen in Iraq’s neighboring state Turkey, ⁸
sometimes use inflammatory language to stir up tensions in the city.
A second major challenge concerns how effectively Sunni Arabs, who are concentrated in western
and central Iraq, are incorporated socially, economically, and politically into the Iraqi polity. A
particular concern is the integration of members of the Sons of Iraq (SoI) “community watch”
program. A majority of the SoIs were Sunni Arabs, and some were former insurgents. Key Shi’a
officials in the GoI were long wary of the SoIs, and while some formal mechanisms were
established to help integrate them into permanent security and civilian jobs, the process has been
very slow. On October 1, 2008, the Government of Iraq assumed command responsibility for the
SoI program in Baghdad province, and in November, the GoI began paying the SoIs’ salaries.
During the transition, SoIs generally continued to report to work, and there was no sharp increase
in detentions of SoIs in Baghdad. However, Coalition officials have expressed concerns about the
possible security repercussions if the GoI were to shut down the program, cease paying salaries, ⁹
or fail to secure alternative employment for the SoIs. The GoI was scheduled to assume
responsibility for SoIs in Diyala province in December 2008, and for all remaining SoIs by mid-

2009.

A third major challenge is the potential for violence in “the south,” home to a long-standing and
growing competition for power and resources between well-established Shi’a political factions

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backed by militias that have sometimes used violence, and also to tribal Shi’a who may be
beginning to find a public voice. Against that volatile backdrop in southern Iraq, both U.S. and
Iraqi officials remain concerned about Iranian interventions—economic, social, and sometimes ¹⁰
“military” in the form of munitions and activities by proxies.
Meanwhile, U.S. practitioners in Iraq, both civilian and military, have suggested that the appetite
of GoI officials to be mentored, advised, or guided by U.S. officials—and thus the leverage that
the U.S. government is able to exercise—is diminishing. In 2008, as Iraqi capacity and
capabilities grew, and as Iraqi confidence in those capabilities increased, GoI officials
demonstrated growing assertiveness and less inclination to consult with U.S. officials before ¹¹
taking action. That approach was manifested, for example, in the decision by Prime Minister
Nouri al Maliki to launch military operations in Basra in March 2008, and the GoI’s unilateral
decision to assume full responsibility for Sons of Iraq.
On November 17, 2008, U.S. and Iraqi officials signed two key new agreements, designed to
define the terms of their future partnership at the strategic and operational levels. On November

27, the Iraqi parliament voted its support for the two agreements, and on December 4, the Iraqi ¹²

Presidency Council approved them.
The first document is a broad “strategic framework” agreement, designed to provide a framework
for future cooperation in multiple fields including diplomacy, culture, economics and energy,
health and the environment, information technology, and law enforcement. The agreement was
based broadly on a declaration of principles, signed by President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister ¹³
Nouri al-Maliki, on November 27, 2007.
The second document, referenced by the strategic framework agreement, is similar to a status of
forces agreement (“SOFA”). It was the product of a contentious negotiations process that began
in spring 2008. It elaborates the terms of the bilateral security partnership at the operational level,
and provides the legal basis for the U.S. troop presence in Iraq. When approving the two
agreements, the Iraqi parliament made the “SOFA” subject to a popular referendum, scheduled to
be held by July 2009. The agreement is expected to go into effect on January 1, 2009, when the ¹⁴
current United Nations mandate expires.
¹⁰
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^the^r^e^f^or^e^{did n}^o^{t r}^e^quir^e^f^o^r^m^a^l^cong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l a}^p^pr^ov^a^l^.
¹³^T^h^e^f^o^r^m^a^l^title^of^the^doc^um^eⁿ^t^{is “}^S^tra^t^e^g^ic^Fra^m^e^w^ork^Ag^re^e^m^eⁿ^{t f}^o^{r a}^Re^la^tions^hip^of^Frie^nds^hⁱ^{p a}ⁿ^d
^C^oope^r^a^ti^on^be^tw^e^eⁿ^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^of^A^m^e^r^ic^a^a^{nd the}^R^e^pu^bl^ic^of^I^r^a^q,”^a^{nd i}^t^is^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^th^e^W^h^ite^H^ous^e
^w^e^bs^ite^{, http://w}^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/inf^o^c^u^s^/ira^q^/^S^E_SFA^.pdf^{. Se}^e^a^l^s^o^the^“^D^e^c^l^a^r^a^tion^of^P^rⁱⁿ^cⁱ^pl^e^s^f^o^{r a}^L^ong^-
^T^e^r^m^R^e^l^a^tions^hi^{p of}^C^o^ope^r^a^tio^{n a}ⁿ^d^Fr^ieⁿ^d^s^hⁱ^p^B^e^tw^e^eⁿ^the^R^e^pub^lic^of^I^r^a^{q a}ⁿ^{d t}^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^of^A^m^e^r^ica^,^”
^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^26,²⁰^07,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http:^//w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ne^w^s^/r^e^l^e^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰^7/^11/²⁰⁰⁷¹¹^26-¹¹^.ht^m^l.
¹⁴^T^h^e^doc^um^eⁿ^{t, f}^o^rm^a^l^l^y^eⁿ^title^d,^“^A^g^r^e^e^m^e^{nt Be}^twe^eⁿ^the^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^of^Am^e^r^ic^a^a^{nd the}^Re^pu^bl^ic^of^Ira^{q on}^the
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

The “SOFA” underscores both Iraqi sovereignty and the “temporary” nature of the U.S. military
presence, and it imposes a number of constraints on the presence and operations of U.S. forces. It
provides for the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from Iraqi cities and towns by June 30, ¹⁵
2009, and for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. This language
is a stricter version of earlier drafts that reportedly provided for time horizons or target dates.
The “SOFA” provides that the United States shall not use Iraqi land, sea or air as a “launching or ¹⁶
transit point for attacks against other countries.” The strategic framework agreement, which
echoes this language, also provides that the United States shall not seek a “permanent military
presence” in Iraq. The negotiations process reportedly considered various formulations regarding
external threats to Iraq’s sovereignty. The agreed language, which appears in the “SOFA,” ¹⁷
requires bilateral consultations in case of such a threat, but makes no other actions compulsory.
The “SOFA” requires that U.S. forces coordinate all military operations with Iraqi authorities.¹⁸ It
also grants Iraq some legal jurisdiction over U.S. servicemembers and defense civilians—
specifically, in cases of “grave, premeditated felonies” committed off base and “outside duty ¹⁹
status.” As senior officials on the ground have underscored, the “SOFA” acknowledges that
many of its provisions will require further interpretation. It establishes a committee structure to ²⁰
provide implementation guidance.
The current debates about the “way forward” in Iraq raise a number of key operational
considerations for U.S. practitioners, policy makers, and Members of Congress.
In late 2008, civilian and military U.S. officials in Baghdad were seriously discussing a
fundamental question: how much U.S. help is enough? During the formal occupation of Iraq,
from 2003 to 2004, the coalition was responsible for all facets of Iraqi public life. In the early

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^W^ithdra^w^a^l^of^Unite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^Forc^e^s^f^r^o^m^Ira^{q a}^{nd the}^Org^a^niz^a^tioⁿ^of^theⁱ^{r A}^c^tiv^itie^{s during}^t^h^eⁱ^{r T}^e^m^pora^r^y^P^r^e^s^eⁿ^c^e
^{in Ira}^q,”^is^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/inf^o^c^u^s^/^ira^q^/S^E_SO^FA^.pdf^{. T}^h^e^c^u^rre^{nt U}^N^re^s^o^luti^on^{, U}^N
^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^{il R}^e^s^o^l^u^tioⁿ¹⁷⁹⁰⁽²⁰⁰⁷⁾^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^18,²⁰⁰⁷^{, is}^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://^d^accessd^d^s^.^u^n.^o^r^g^/^d^o^c^/^UNDOC/
^G^E^N^/^N^07/⁶⁵⁰^/^72/^P^D^F/^N⁰⁷⁶⁵⁰⁷²^.p^df^?O^pe^nEle^m^e^nt.
¹⁵^“^S^O^F^A^,^”^A^r^tic^le^{24, pa}^ra^.¹^,2^.
¹⁶^“^S^O^F^A^”^,^A^r^tic^le^{27, pa}^r^a^.³^{. Se}^e^a^l^s^o^s^t^r^a^te^gⁱ^c^f^r^am^ew^or^k^ag^r^eem^{ent, Se}^c^tⁱ^on^1,^pa^r^a^.4.
¹⁷^S^{ee “S}^OF^A^”^A^r^tⁱ^c^l^e²⁷^,^p^a^{ra 1}^:^“In^t^h^{e even}^t^o^f^an^y^e^x^t^e^rn^al^o^rⁱⁿ^t^e^rn^al^t^h^reat^o^r^aggressi^oⁿ^agaiⁿ^s^t^Iraq^t^h^at^w^o^u^l^d
^vⁱ^o^l^{ate its so}^v^e^reigⁿ^t^y^,^p^o^{litical in}^d^e^p^eⁿ^d^eⁿ^{ce, o}^r^terri^to^rialⁱⁿ^teg^r^it^y^,^w^a^t^e^{rs, airsp}^{ace, its d}^e^m^o^cratic^sy^ste^m^o^r^its
^e^l^e^c^t^e^d^institu^tio^{ns, a}ⁿ^{d u}^p^oⁿ^re^q^u^e^s^{t by}^the^G^o^v^e^rn^m^e^nt^of^Ira^{q, the}^P^a^rtie^{s sha}^{ll im}^m^e^dia^t^e^l^y^initia^te^stra^te^gⁱ^c
^de^libe^r^a^tio^{ns a}ⁿ^{d a}^s^m^a^y^be^m^u^tua^lly^a^g^re^e^d^{, the}^Un^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^sha^{ll ta}^k^e^a^ppropr^ia^te^m^e^a^s^ure^s^{, inc}^l^u^d^ing^dⁱ^pl^om^a^tic^,
^e^c^onom^ic^{, or m}^ilita^r^y^m^e^as^ure^s^{, or a}ⁿ^y^othe^{r m}^e^a^s^ure^,^{to de}^te^{r s}^u^c^h^a^thre^a^t^.”
¹⁸^“^S^O^F^A^,^”^A^r^tic^le^{4, pa}^ra^.2.
¹⁹^“^S^OFA^,^”^A^r^tic^le^{12, pa}^ra^.¹^.
²⁰^T^h^e^“^S^OFA^”^m^a^nda^te^{s the}^f^o^rm^a^tion^of^a^Joint^Mi^nist^e^r^ia^{l Com}^mⁱ^tte^e^ta^sk^e^d^{to a}^ddre^{ss in}^te^rpre^ta^ti^{on a}ⁿ^d
^im^ple^m^eⁿ^ta^{tion of}^the^a^g^re^e^m^eⁿ^{t. T}^h^a^t^bo^dy^{is ta}^ske^d^to^a^p^poi^{nt a}^Joint^Milita^ry^Ope^r^a^{tions Co}^ordⁱⁿ^a^{tion C}^o^m^m^itte^e
^{(JMOCC) to}^ov^e^r^se^e^m^ilita^r^y^ope^ra^{tions. I}^t^{is a}^l^so^ta^sk^e^d^{to a}^p^poiⁿ^t^a^se^pa^ra^te^{Joint C}^o^m^m^itte^e^—^w^h^ic^{h m}^a^y^{in turn}
^a^ppoi^nt^Su^bc^om^m^itte^e^s^{—to ov}^e^r^s^e^e^is^s^u^e^s^outsⁱ^de^t^h^e^c^o^m^p^e^t^eⁿ^c^e^of^the^J^M^O^{CC. Se}^e^“^S^O^F^A^”^A^r^tic^le^23.

post-occupation days, the coalition’s general approach was to do everything possible to get Iraqi
institutions up and running, limited primarily by resources and personnel available to implement
the efforts. As Iraqi capacity has grown, the role of Iraqi officials and institutions has shifted, to
various degrees, from sharing responsibilities to leading, with some support or back-up from the
coalition.
A number of U.S. officials, both civilian and military, have argued that, in the words of one
military commander, “it’s time to take the training wheels off,” that it is okay to “let the Iraqis
fail.” Taking a step back, they have argued, is not only a key to reducing the U.S. commitment
over time—it may also be the best way to reduce the risk of Iraqi dependence on U.S. help, and to
encourage Iraqis to assume more responsibility and to learn to solve problems themselves. The
premise might apply to both military capabilities, in the form of independent operations by Iraqi
security forces, and to civil capacity—for example, in the form of independent efforts by
provincial governments to seek the funding they need from the central government and to craft
and execute their own budgets. Other officials have pointed out that the advisability of loosening
the reins may depend on the location and the circumstances. For example, U.S. commanders have
noted, the March 2008 Iraqi-launched military operations in Basra would likely not have been a
success without substantial enablers provided by the coalition. In that case, since the Prime
Minister himself had launched the operation, the political consequences of failure were likely to ²¹
have been great, so it was important for the coalition not to let the Iraqi effort fail.
Other U.S. officials in Iraq have cautioned that progress to date notwithstanding, it is important
“not to declare victory too soon.” They stress that it is the U.S. presence and support that have
made improvements possible, and while further drawdowns may continue to be possible, that is
different from a full departure. One U.S. military commander observed in August 2008, “If we
left today, it would be a significant problem. If we left ten months from now, it would also be a ²²
significant problem.”
The likely future trajectory of the U.S. presence in Iraq, following the redeployment of the last
surge brigade in July 2008, includes further troop drawdowns. On September 9, 2008, speaking at
the National Defense University, President Bush announced the planned redeployment from Iraq
without replacement of an additional 8,000 troops, including combat support forces, a Marine
battalion, and an Army brigade combat team. The President described these drawdown decisions
as a “return on success”—while progress on the ground was “still fragile and reversible,” the
gains had achieved a “degree of durability.” He did not name a timeline for decisions concerning
possible further drawdowns, but he added, “If progress in Iraq continues to hold, General
Petraeus and our military leaders believe additional reductions will be possible in the first half of ²³

2009.”

²¹
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith U}^.^{S. Em}^ba^s^s^y^,^MN^F-^I^,^aⁿ^{d MN}^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^{nd w}^{ith s}^ubor^di^na^te^c^o^m^m^a^nds^{, B}^a^ghda^{d a}^{nd B}^a^s^r^a^,
^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
²²^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^B^a^g^hda^{d, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.
²³^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t G}^e^org^e^W^.^{Bush, Re}^m^a^rk^{s a}^t^Na^tiona^{l De}^f^e^ns^e^Uⁿ^iv^e^r^s^ity^,^W^a^s^h^ing^t^{on, D}^.^C^.^{, Se}^p^t^e^m^be^r^{9, 2}⁰⁰⁸^,
^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^ww^.^w^hite^hou^se^.g^ov^/ⁿ^e^w^s/^re^le^a^s^e^s^/²⁰^08/⁰⁹^/²⁰⁰⁸⁰⁹⁰^9.^htm^l^{. T}^h^e^f^o^llowⁱ^ng^da^y^,^Se^pte^m^be^{r 10,}
²⁰⁰^8,ⁱⁿ^te^s^tim^ony^bef^o^r^e^the^H^ous^e^A^r^m^e^{d Se}^r^v^ic^e^s^C^o^m^m^itte^e^,^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^Def^e^ns^e^R^obe^r^t^G^a^tes^,^e^l^a^bor^a^ting^on
^t^h^e^P^r^esi^d^en^t^’^s^an^no^un^cem^en^t^,^ca^l^l^e^d^t^h^e^d^r^aw^d^o^wⁿ^s^an^“accep^t^a^b^l^{e ri}^{sk” an}^dⁿ^o^t^e^d^t^h^at^t^h^{e U.}^S^.^ef^fo^rtⁱⁿ^Iraq^h^a^d
^eⁿ^te^r^e^{d the}^“^eⁿ^dg^am^e^,^”^a^lthoug^h^the^s^itua^tⁱ^oⁿ^{in I}^r^a^{q r}^e^m^a^ine^d^“^f^r^a^g^ile^.”^Se^e^R^obe^r^t^M.^G^a^te^s^,^Sta^t^em^eⁿ^{t be}^f^o^r^e^the
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

The U.S.-Iraqi “SOFA” mandates that all U.S. forces shall withdraw by the end of 2011.
However, serious debates continue regarding the appropriate timing and nature of further
drawdowns.
A number of other considerations—in addition to security conditions and ISF capabilities—may
be germane to the “future drawdowns” debate. First, forthcoming political milestones in Iraq may
shape both U.S. and Iraqi thinking. Iraq is tentatively scheduled to hold both provincial-level and ²⁴
national-level elections in 2009. Some U.S. officials in Iraq, and some outside observers,
suggest that the potential security risks of these events argue for sustaining a sizable U.S. troop ²⁵
presence through the elections. Some GoI officials, too, might have an interest in maintaining
sufficient U.S. forces to help provide security through the elections. Other GoI officials, on the
other hand, might have an interest, for election purposes, in playing the nationalism card and
publicly calling for an early drawdown of U.S. forces.
Second, the drawdown debates may be affected by the redeployment of most coalition partner
troops. The expiration of the UN mandate authorizing a multi-national force in Iraq applies to all
other coalition partner countries, as well as the United States, and the U.S.-Iraqi “SOFA” does not
apply automatically to other coalition members, and most were expected to withdraw from Iraq
rather than face tough negotiations with the GoI about their troop presence.
Third, the high demand for forces for the ongoing commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan has
meant, for many servicemembers, repeated deployments, extended deployments, and/or short
“dwell times” at home between tours. Military Departments, responsible in accordance with Title
10, U.S. Code, for “organizing, manning, training and equipping” the force, are concerned about
the stress these demands have placed on the force. Over time, DOD has introduced a series of
policies designed to manage that stress—for example, limiting active duty Army deployments to
12 months for those deploying after August 1, 2008. Such stress on the force, and the personnel
policies designed to manage it, may help shape future Iraq drawdown decisions.
Fourth, further drawdown decisions may be affected by competing strategic demands, for
example, potential requirements for additional U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen has publicly stated the need for more forces in
Afghanistan and underscored the connection between the ability to meet that need and the troop ²⁶
requirement in Iraq.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^House^A^r^m^e^{d Se}^rv^ic^e^s^Com^m^itte^e^,^Se^pte^m^be^{r 10,}²⁰^08.
²⁴^Iⁿ^O^c^to^be^r²⁰⁰⁸^{, I}^r^a^q’^s^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^cy^C^ounc^il^pa^s^s^e^{d a}^lo^ng^-^c^onteⁿ^tⁱ^ous^e^l^e^c^tio^ns^la^w^tha^t^pr^ovⁱ^d^e^s^f^o^r^pr^ov^incⁱ^a^l
^e^l^e^c^{tions to}^be^he^ld^by^Ja^nua^r^y^{31, 20}⁰⁹^{, i}ⁿ¹⁷^of^Ira^q’^{s 18}^provⁱⁿ^c^e^s^{. T}^h^e^politic^a^lly^c^onte^s^te^{d pr}^ov^inc^e^of^a^l^-T^a^’^a^m^in,
^w^hose^c^a^p^{itol c}^ity^{is Kirk}^uk^{, is not sc}^he^d^u^le^{d t}^o^pa^rtic^ipa^t^e^.
²⁵^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith U}^.^{S. c}ⁱ^v^ilia^{n a}ⁿ^d^m^ilita^r^y^offⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^Ba^g^hda^{d, A}^ugus^{t 2}⁰⁰⁸^{. Se}^e^f^o^{r e}^x^a^m^ple^Ste^phe^{n Bid}^d^le^,^Mic^h^a^e^l
^O’Han^l^oⁿ^,^Kenⁿ^e^t^h^M^.^P^o^l^l^ack,^“Ho^w^t^o^L^e^a^v^{e a S}^t^ab^l^e^Iraq^,^”^For^e^{ign Af}^fairs^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r^/^O^c^tobe^r²⁰⁰^{8 V}^o^l.8⁷^,^N^o^.⁵^.
²⁶^S^{ee f}^o^{r exa}^m^p^l^{e DOD N}^e^w^s^Briefⁱⁿ^g^w^ith^Ch^airm^an^o^f^th^{e Jo}ⁱⁿ^t^Ch^ief^s^o^f^S^t^a^f^f^A^D^M^Mⁱ^ch^{ael M}^u^llen^,^Ju^ly²^,²⁰⁰⁸^,
^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^ww^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^tr^aⁿ^sc^ripts/^traⁿ^sc^ript.a^spx^?^traⁿ^sc^riptid=⁴²^56.^T^h^e^r^e^,^A^D^M^Mulleⁿ^sta^t^e^d^{, “}^I’v^e
^mad^eⁿ^o^secret^o^f^my^d^e^si^{re t}^o^f^l^o^w^m^o^re^f^o^rces,^U.^S^.^f^o^rces,^t^o^Afgh^anⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^j^u^st^{as so}^on^{as I can}^,ⁿ^o^{r h}^a^{ve I b}^een^sh^y
^a^bout^s^a^yⁱ^ng^tha^t^thos^e^f^o^r^c^e^s^wⁱ^l^l^no^{t be}^a^v^a^ila^ble^uⁿ^le^s^s^or^unt^{il t}^h^e^s^itua^tⁱ^on^{in I}^r^a^{q pe}^r^m^its^us^to^{do s}^o^.”
^Co^mmen^tin^g^oⁿ^hⁱ^s^req^u^e^{st f}^o^{r m}^o^{re U.S. f}^o^{rces f}^o^{r Af}^g^h^an^ista^{n, Com}^m^a^nding^G^e^ne^ra^{l of}^the^Inte^rⁿ^a^tio^na^{l Se}^c^u^rity
^A^s^sistaⁿ^c^e^Forc^e^G^E^{N Da}^vⁱ^{d Mc}^Kie^r^na^{n c}^onf^irm^e^{d the}^link^a^g^e^{: “}^T^he^a^v^a^ila^bilit^y^of^the^f^o^rc^e^s^tha^t^w^e^’^v^e^a^s^k^e^{d f}^o^r
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Fifth and finally, future withdrawal plans will be shaped in part by several sets of practical
constraints, including available ground and air transportation for withdrawing personnel and
equipment from Iraq, and both the willingness and capacity of neighboring states to provide
access and transit.
Against this backdrop, there are two major schools of thought about the basic logic of further
troop drawdown decisions. One school argues for a “conditions-based” approach, and the other
for a phased withdrawal according to a timeline.
The conditions-based approach calls for carrying out continual assessments of the situation on the
ground, and initiating further troop drawdowns as conditions allow, bearing in mind the final
withdrawal date of 2011. The relevant “conditions” might include security conditions on the ²⁷
ground, ISF capabilities, and the capacity of Iraqi governing institutions at all levels.
This approach is generally favored by commanders on the ground, and it was also supported by
the Bush Administration. Speaking at the Pentagon in March 2008, on the fifth anniversary of the
start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, President Bush indicated that further drawdowns of the “surge”
brigades would be conditions-based: “Any further drawdown will be based on conditions on the
ground and the recommendations of our commanders—and they must not jeopardize the hard-²⁸
fought gains our troops and civilians have made over the past year.” In his September 9, 2008,
announcement of further troop drawdowns, President Bush made clear that the reductions were a
response to improved conditions on the ground, and that further reductions would depend on ²⁹
future conditions—whether “progress in Iraq continues to hold.”
The conditions-based approach is highly dynamic. MNF-I expects a continued progression over
time in its relationships with ISF partners—from “leadership” to “partnership” to tactical and then
operational “overwatch,” with the caveats that the progression is unlikely to be steady, and that it ³⁰
will vary from area to area, and even within areas. A December 2007 description of the
approach by out-going Commander of Multi-National Division-Baghdad still applies:

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^h^e^re—t^h^a^t^’^{s d}ⁱ^rect^l^y^coⁿⁿ^ect^ed^t^o^f^o^rce^f^l^o^wⁱⁿ^Iraq^,^{” see T}^o^m^V^a^nd^en^Broo^k,^“A^‘T^o^u^g^h^Fⁱ^gh^t^’^S^e^eⁿ^f^o^{r Af}^gh^an^W^a^r
^{in ‘0}^9,”^{USA T}^o^da^y^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^8,²⁰^08.
²⁷^{In A}^p^{ril 2}⁰⁰⁸^te^stim^ony^{to the}^H^ouse^A^r^m^e^{d Se}^rv^ic^e^s^Co^m^m^itte^e^,^G^E^{N P}^e^tra^e^u^{s no}^te^{d t}^h^a^t^t^h^e^c^r^it^e^r^ia^inc^l^ude^d
^“^s^e^c^u^rit^y^a^{nd loc}^a^l^g^o^v^e^rnaⁿ^c^e^c^o^nditi^ons^{, the}^eⁿ^e^m^y^situa^tion,^t^h^e^a^b^ility^of^Ira^{qi se}^c^u^rity^f^o^rc^e^s^{to ta}^k^e^{on m}^o^re^of^a
^loa^d^.^{.. t}^h^e^a^b^ili^ty^...of^the^loc^a^l^a^u^thorit^ie^s^{to c}^a^rry^{on a}ⁿ^d^pe^rf^orm^ta^s^k^s^tha^t^{in s}^o^m^e^c^a^s^e^s^w^e^w^e^re^h^e^lping^pe^rf^orm^.^”
^Se^e^traⁿ^sc^{ript, H}^ouse^A^r^m^e^{d Se}^rvic^e^s^Com^m^itte^e^,^“^H^ouse^A^r^m^e^{d Se}^rv^ic^e^s^Co^m^m^itte^e^{Holds He}^a^r^{ing on}^the
^C^r^oc^k^e^r^/^P^e^tr^a^e^u^s^I^r^a^{q R}^e^p^o^r^t^,”^A^p^r^il^9,²⁰^08.^T^h^e^Su^pple^m^eⁿ^t^a^{l A}^ppr^o^p^rⁱ^at^io^ns^Ac^t,²⁰⁰⁸^,^§⁹²⁰⁴⁽^c⁾⁽¹^)(G^{), ex}^ten^dⁱⁿ^g
^aⁿ^e^x^isting^re^porti^ng^re^quire^m^e^{nt on sta}^b^ility^a^{nd se}^c^u^rityⁱⁿ^Ira^{q f}^o^{r a}^not^he^{r f}ⁱ^sc^a^l^y^e^a^r^{, re}^quire^{d t}^h^e^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of
^D^e^f^e^ns^e^{to r}^e^por^t^,ⁱⁿ^t^e^r^a^l^ia^,^{on “}^t^he^c^r^ite^ria^the^A^d^mⁱ^nistra^{tion w}^{ill use}^to^de^te^rm^ine^w^h^eⁿ^{it is sa}^f^e^t^o^be^gⁱⁿ
^wⁱ^t^h^d^r^awⁱⁿ^{g Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es f}^o^rces^f^r^o^m^Iraq^.^”
²⁸^Se^e^“^P^re^sⁱ^de^{nt Bus}^h^Dⁱ^s^c^us^s^e^s^G^l^oba^{l W}^a^{r on}^T^e^rror,”^Ma^rc^{h 1}⁹^,²⁰⁰^{8, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^w^w^.^w^hi^te^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/
^ne^w^s^/^r^e^l^e^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰^8/^03/^pr^int^/²⁰⁰⁸⁰³¹^9-^2.htm^l^.
²⁹^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t G}^e^org^e^W^.^{Bush, Re}^m^a^rk^{s a}^t^Na^tiona^{l De}^f^e^ns^e^Uⁿ^iv^e^r^s^ity^,^W^a^s^h^ing^t^{on, D}^.^C^.^{, Se}^p^t^e^m^be^r^{9, 2}⁰⁰⁸^,
^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^ww^.^w^hite^hou^se^.g^ov^/ⁿ^e^w^s/^re^le^a^s^e^s^/²⁰^08/⁰⁹^/²⁰⁰⁸⁰⁹⁰^9.^htm^l^.
³⁰^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^{nd s}^ubor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^{8. Se}^e^a^l^s^o^G^e^ne^r^a^{l D}^a^vⁱ^d
^P^e^tra^e^u^{s, Re}^port^{to C}^ong^re^{ss on}^t^h^e^Sit^u^a^tio^{n in}^Ira^{q, H}^ouse^F^o^re^ig^{n A}^ffa^{irs Com}^m^itte^e^w^e^bsite^,
^http:^//w^w^w^.f^or^eⁱ^gⁿ^a^f^f^a^ir^s^.^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/¹¹^0/^pe^t09¹⁰^07.^pdf^.

^T^h^{e plan}^th^at^w^e^belie^v^e^m^a^k^e^s^th^e^m^o^s^t^s^e^ns^{e at t}^h^is^{point, an}^{d th}^at^w^e^’^r^{e e}^m^bar^kⁱⁿ^g^u^pon^,
^{is o}ⁿ^{e o}^f^si^m^p^l^y^t^hⁱⁿⁿⁱⁿ^g^th^{e r}^aⁿ^k^{s, if}^y^o^u^wⁱ^{ll, in}^ar^{eas th}^at^ar^{e g}^oⁱⁿ^g^w^e^{ll, r}^e^tainⁱⁿ^g^so^m^e
^co^alitioⁿ^p^r^esen^{ce th}^er^{e to}^coⁿ^tin^u^e^to^w^o^r^k^wⁱ^t^h^th^{e I}^r^aq^{i secu}^rⁱ^t^y^f^o^r^{ces an}^d^th^{ese sec}^u^rⁱ^t^y
^v^o^lun^t^eers^{... s}^o^t^h^at^th^ere^’^s^ta^{ctical ov}^er^w^a^tc^h^{or operation}^a^{l ov}^er^w^a^tc^h^,ⁱ^f^y^ou^wⁱ^l^l^{, an}^d³¹
^retainⁱⁿ^g^{[U.S. troop] s}^t^ren^g^t^{h in}^th^{e areas}^w^h^ere^w^e^’^r^{e s}^till^w^o^rkⁱⁿ^g^h^a^rd.
Some proponents argue that this approach supports well-informed decision-making, and that it is
more responsive than other approaches to changing circumstances on the ground, since decisions
are made close to the time of execution rather than a long time in advance. As three key observers
who support this approach wrote, “Any schedule for withdrawal will be subject to the inherent ³²
uncertainty of a conflict as complex as the one in Iraq.” Others argue that, in the words of some
commanders, the approach would help avoid the danger of “going too quickly.” In this view, a
too-hasty withdrawal, unguided by conditions on the ground, could allow AQI affiliates or Shi’a
renegade militias to reassert themselves and attempt to regain lost ground, before Iraqi security
forces have sufficient capabilities to counter such efforts, and before Iraqi governing institutions
have sufficient capacity to orchestrate and lead such responses.
The primary charge against this approach, by those who oppose it, is that a “conditions-based”
approach is inherently open-ended. It does not provide leverage, they charge, for pressing Iraqi
leaders to assume greater responsibility. Further, its inherent uncertainty makes it difficult for the
U.S. military to plan to meet other global security requirements.
The other major school of thought, the phased troop withdrawal approach, calls for establishing a
fixed timeline as the basis for further drawdowns. Advocates of this approach might call, for
example, for the withdrawal of one brigade combat team per month. Alternatively, they might
start by naming a date, earlier than December 2011, by which all U.S. combat forces—or all U.S.
forces—must be withdrawn from Iraq and, working backwards from that date, propose periodic
preceding redeployments.
For some proponents of this school of thought, the primary objective is simply to end the U.S.
commitment in Iraq, on the grounds that the mission simply should not be a top U.S. national
priority. A timetable approach meets that objective by definition.
Other proponents of a scheduled withdrawal stress that the U.S. troop and dollar commitments in
Iraq are detracting from the United States’ ability to prepare to meet other security challenges.
Some point in particular to stress on the ground forces—the Army and the Marine Corps—and
argue that a near-term drawdown would relieve that stress, help guarantee the availability of
forces for Afghanistan and other contingencies, and make it easier for the Services to recruit and ³³
retain.
³¹
^S^{ee Dep}^a^rt^men^t^o^f^Defen^s^{e Ne}^{ws Bri}^e^fⁱⁿ^g^,^M^a^j^o^{r G}^eⁿ^e^ral^Jo^sep^h^Fⁱ^l^,^Decem^b^e^{r 1}⁷^,²⁰⁰⁷^,
^http:^//www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tid=4¹⁰⁷^.
³²^S^t^ep^h^e^{n Bi}^dd^l^e^,^Mi^ch^ael^O’Han^l^oⁿ^,^Keⁿⁿ^e^t^h^M^.^P^o^l^l^ack,^“Ho^w^t^o^L^e^a^v^{e a S}^t^ab^l^e^Iraq^,^”^Fore^ig^{n Af}^f^a^irs^,
^Se^pte^m^be^r^/^O^c^tobe^r²⁰^{08 V}^o^l.^87,^N^o^.5,^p.⁵⁷^.
³³^F^o^{r exam}^p^l^e,ⁱⁿ^{a Dece}^m^b^{er 2}⁰⁰⁷^assess^m^eⁿ^t^,^retⁱ^r^ed^G^eⁿ^e^ral^Bar^r^y^M^c^C^a^f^f^r^e^y^,^w^h^o^ad^vo^cat^ed^no^t^{a co}^m^p^l^e^t^e
^w^ithdr^a^w^a^l^{but r}^a^t^h^e^r^dr^a^w^ing^do^wⁿ^{to 12}^br^ig^a^d^e^c^o^m^b^a^t^te^a^m^s⁽^B^C^T^s⁾^b^y^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁹^{, c}^o^m^m^eⁿ^te^{d tha}^t^“^T^he^A^r^m^y
^is^s^t^a^r^ting^to^unr^a^v^e^l^,”^p^oⁱⁿ^ting^t^o^c^u^r^r^e^{nt r}^e^c^r^uitⁱ^ng^c^a^m^pa^ig^ns^tha^t^a^r^e^br^ingⁱ^ng^on^boa^r^d^“^t^h^o^s^e^w^{ho s}^h^oul^{d n}^o^t^beⁱⁿ
^uⁿⁱ^f^o^rm^{” d}^u^e^e.^g.^t^o^d^r^u^g^u^s^e^o^r^c^rⁱ^mⁱⁿ^alⁱ^t^y^;^t^o^t^h^{e l}^o^{ss o}^f^mⁱ^d^-^care^e^{r o}^f^fⁱ^{cers an}^d^NCOs;^an^d^t^o^t^h^{e “st}^r^et^ch^ed^an^d
^unde^r-re^s^o^urc^e^d^”^Re^s^e^rv^e^Co^m^pone^nt.^Se^e^G^e^ne^ra^{l Ba}^rr^y^{R. Mc}^Ca^ff^re^y^,^“^A^f^t^e^r^A^c^{tion Re}^port^,^Vⁱ^s^it^Ira^{q a}^{nd K}^u^w^a^it
⁵^-¹¹^Dece^m^b^{er 2}⁰⁰⁷^,^{” Decem}^b^e^r¹⁸^,²⁰⁰⁷^{, s}^u^b^m^itted^{as a Statem}^eⁿ^{t f}^o^{r th}^{e Reco}^r^d^f^o^{r th}^{e HA}^{SC O&I Su}^b^c^o^m^m^ittee
^he^a^r^ing^on^J^a^nua^r^y^16,²⁰^08.

And some other timetable proponents base their support at least in part on the view that the U.S.
troop presence in Iraq—and the antipathy that may be generated among the Iraqi population by
the presence of a de facto occupier—could be hindering further progress. They suggest in turn
that announced troop withdrawal plans could spur progress by encouraging Iraqi leaders to
accelerate their own efforts to assume more responsibility and make progress toward ³⁴
reconciliation, and by urging international partners to increase their constructive involvement.
One practical advantage of the timetable option is the clarity and certainty it would provide
concerning costs, timelines, and requirements. U.S. military planners could plan each step with
reasonable fidelity, U.S. diplomats could work well in advance with neighboring countries on
access needed to support the withdrawal, and Iraqi leaders and security forces could plan in detail
how to adjust.
Some opponents of this option suggest that its deliberateness could prove advantageous to various
adversaries in Iraq, who might take advantage of the predictability to target U.S. forces as they
redeploy. Alternatively, such adversaries might simply choose to lie low until U.S. forces
redeploy, making them more difficult to target and leaving the bulk of the challenge for Iraqis to
face on their own. Other opponents of this option argue that its primary strategic drawback is that
if executed too precipitately, it could consign the Iraq mission itself to failure—that Iraqi
institutions are simply not all ready to assume full responsibility, and so a too-early withdrawal of
U.S. forces from Iraq could prove destabilizing and could place Iraq’s future in jeopardy.
Supporting the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is a critical focus of U.S. military
operations in Iraq. Together with security, and helping build civil capacity, it is one of the three
lines of operation of Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), the operational-level command under
MNF-I with geographic responsibility for all of Iraq. The coalition’s efforts to train, equip, and
mentor the ISF have always varied across the “battle space” of Iraq, in terms of organization and
focus, depending on the conditions on the ground, the level of development of the locally based
ISF, and the availability of coalition forces for training missions. In 2008, several discernible
transitions in the training mission were underway, if unevenly, across Iraq. A key operational
consideration is the future direction of the ISF training mission, including its focus, its
organization, and its relative share of the overall U.S. effort.
The “standard” approach to training the ISF has been the use of embedded “transition teams” that
typically live and work with their host unit. A key point of variation over time has been the size of
these teams. Transition teams working with the Iraqi Army, for example, have typically included
between 11 and 15 members, depending on the size of the Iraqi unit they embed with. In practice,
however, the numbers have varied—for example, in western Anbar province, Multi-National
Force-West (MNF-W), led by U.S. Marines, consistently used larger teams, with between 30 and ³⁵
40 members. One key development over time, in the view of coalition leaders on the ground and
³⁴
^Se^e^f^o^r^e^x^am^ple^K^e^vⁱ^{n B}^e^ns^on,^“^S^hif^t^the^D^e^ba^te^oⁿ^I^r^a^q^f^r^om^‘^W^he^n’^t^o^‘^H^ow^,’^”^Atla^nta^J^our^nal-^C^ons^tit^uti^oⁿ^,
^A^u^g^u^s^t^12,²⁰^07.^C^o^l^one^{l B}^e^ns^on^w^a^s^the^le^a^d^O^I^{F pla}ⁿ^ne^r^f^o^r^C^F^L^C^C^.
³⁵^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^,^MN^ST^C^-^I^,^a^nd^MN^F-^I^s^u^b^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^t^e^c^o^m^m^a^nds^inc^l^udi^ng^MN^F-^W^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.

many experts, has been an overall improvement in the quality and effectiveness of the transition
teams—in part a reflection of standardization and improvements in the training “pipelines” used ³⁶
by the Military Departments to produce the trainers.
In 2008, as the basic operational capabilities of the ISF grew, the use of embedded transition
teams shifted toward higher-level ISF headquarters, including brigades and divisions. The
substantive efforts of the teams also shifted, from basic skills like patrolling to leadership and
enablers. For example, teams working with the Iraqi Army increased their focus on staff functions
and logistics, and teams working with the Iraqi Police increased the emphasis on specialized
skills like forensics. While logistics experts in the U.S. military are well-placed to share that
expertise with Iraqi Army counterparts, U.S. Military Police (MPs) generally do not have the
requisite specialized policing skills and have thus relied on collaboration with civilian
International Police Advisors, who are in short supply.
In 2008, in addition to transition teams, coalition forces throughout Iraq made increasing use of
various forms of “unit partnering,” in which coalition maneuver units work side-by-side with
Iraqi units of equal or larger size. Commanders on the ground stressed the value of unit
partnership as an effective way to “show” rather than just “tell” ISF unit leaders how they might ³⁷
most effectively organize their headquarters, lead their troops, and manage staff functions.
Where conditions permitted, commanders extended unit partnering beyond the Iraqi Army to
Ministry of the Interior (MoI) forces, including the Iraqi Police and the Department of Border
Enforcement. That outreach to the MoI was more common in Multi-National Division-Center,
south of Baghdad, and in Multi-National Force-West in Anbar, than in Multi-National Division-
North, which was still actively engaged in combat operations, together with ISF counterparts, in
Diyala and Ninewah provinces.
Unit partnership was not envisaged as a permanent arrangement—any individual unit partnership
was designed to be temporary, a catalyst to the development of that Iraqi unit. Should
circumstances allow, commanders notee that “unit partnership” could still be constructively used
for some time, since some ISF units were still at early stages of maturity, and the Government of
Iraq was still in the process of adding new units to its total force.
Throughout 2008, coalition forces also provided substantial support to the “capacity-building” of
the key security institutions of the Government of Iraq—the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of
the Interior, and the Counter-Terrorism Bureau. This support, led by the Multi-National Security
Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), part of MNF-I, included mentoring Iraqi senior leaders in
leadership and management skills, as well as providing technical assistance to ministry personnel.
³⁶
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^{nd s}^ubor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nds^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^{8. I}ⁿ^t^h^e^vⁱ^e^w^of^m^aⁿ^y^e^x^pe^r^t^s^,
^one^issue^sha^p^ing^t^h^e^q^u^a^lity^of^the^traⁿ^siti^on^te^a^m^{s ha}^{s b}^e^eⁿⁱⁿ^divⁱ^dua^{l i}ⁿ^c^eⁿ^tiv^e^to^se^rv^e^{on suc}^h^te^a^m^{s, ba}^se^{d on}^the
^d^e^{gree to}^w^h^ich^p^r^o^m^o^tion^bo^{ards f}^a^vo^rab^l^y^re^gard^su^ch^service.^S^o^m^e^{DOD o}^f^fⁱ^{cials n}^o^t^{e th}^{at t}^h^{e i}ⁿ^cen^tives,^b^a^sed
^on^pe^rson^ne^{l ru}^le^{s, a}^r^e^im^prov^ing^,^w^h^ile^som^e^pra^c^titione^{rs no}^te^aⁿ^e^c^dota^lly^tha^t^traⁱ^ning^mⁱ^{ssions te}^nd^not^to^be^a^s
^hig^h^ly^re^ga^rde^d^a^s^m^o^re^tra^d^ition^a^{l c}^o^m^b^a^t^a^ssigⁿ^m^e^nts.
³⁷^In^t^e^rvi^e^w^s^wⁱ^t^h^M^N^{C-I o}^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s,^an^d^s^u^bo^rdⁱⁿ^at^{e co}^mm^an^d^e^rs,^Au^gu^st²⁰⁰⁸^.

Coalition officials stressed the growing importance of maximizing such capacity-building efforts
while Iraqis were still receptive to receiving such training. With appropriate leadership skills, they
argued, Iraqi senior leaders in the security sector could make substantially greater and more
effective contributions to the development of the ISF, gradually reducing the need for U.S. advice
and support. Coalition commanders also underscored the importance of utilizing the right
personnel for the mission, including senior “mentors” with enough leadership experience and ³⁸
stature to carry weight with their Iraqi counterparts.
Some key observers have argued that the overall focus of the U.S. effort in Iraq should shift away
from combat and toward training and advising Iraqi forces and the ministries that govern them. In
December 2007, for example, retired General Barry McCaffrey proposed strengthening the
emphasis on ISF training and “massively resourcing the creating of an adequate Iraqi Security ³⁹
Force.” In September 2008, Iraq watchers John Nagl, Colin Kahl, and Shawn Brimley called for
a reorientation of the military mission toward advising, in which “embedded military advisers
would provide just enough help to give Iraqis what they need on the battlefield, but not so much ⁴⁰
that it stymies their development and perpetuates a view of Western occupation.”
In theory, improvements in security conditions, and a corresponding decline in requirements for
combat operations, could continue to make more U.S. forces available to play training and
advisory roles for the ISF, even in the context of further U.S. troop drawdowns. One key
consideration would be making sure that those U.S. forces tasked with training and advisory
missions would have adequate resources to draw on, with fewer U.S. combat forces close by. The
U.S. maneuver units that partner with Iraqi units in the “unit partnering” model are self-
sustaining, but further troop drawdowns would reduce the units available for such missions. In the
various transition team models, in turn, the teams depend on nearby maneuver units for key
logistics and life support. They also rely on outside support to provide Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance (ISR), as well as Close Air Support (CAS) during operations by their partner
Iraqi units.
The new “SOFA” includes the requirement that all U.S. combat forces withdraw from Iraqi
“cities, villages, and localities” no later than the time when ISF assume security responsibility in
the relevant province, but no later than June 30, 2009. Such withdrawals are expected to mean
consolidating combat troops at large Forward Operating Bases outside urban areas. The key
operational issue is what form these changes are likely to take, and what impact they are likely to
have on security conditions on the ground.
Top U.S. commanders in Iraq have long argued that “living where we work” is what has made the
counter-insurgency effort a success to date. This phrase refers to establishing a security presence
³⁸
^In^t^e^rvi^e^w^s^wⁱ^t^h^M^N^F^{-I an}^d^M^N^S^T^{C-I o}^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s,^A^u^gu^st²⁰⁰⁸^.^F^o^r^exa^m^p^l^e,^so^{me argu}^e,^{a U.}^S^.^A^r^{my Co}^l^oⁿ^e^l
^sⁱ^m^p^l^y^ha^s^{not he}^l^d^hig^h^eⁿ^o^u^g^h^l^e^a^d^e^r^s^h^{ip p}^o^s^iti^ons^w^ithiⁿ^his^ow^{n D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^{to be}^aⁿ^a^ppr^o^p^rⁱ^a^t^e
^ad^vⁱ^so^{r to}^aⁿ^Iraqⁱ^Minⁱ^ster.
³⁹^S^{ee G}^eⁿ^e^ral^Barr^y^R.^M^c^Ca^ff^re^y^,^“Af^t^er^A^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^Rep^o^r^t^,^Vi^si^t^Iraq^an^d^Ku^w^aⁱ^t⁵^-¹¹^Decem^b^e^r^2007,^”^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^18,
²⁰⁰^{7, s}^ubm^itte^{d a}^s^a^Sta^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t f}^o^{r the}^Re^c^o^rd^f^o^{r the}^HA^{SC O&}^{I Subc}^om^m^itte^e^he^a^r^ing^{on Ja}ⁿ^u^a^r^y^16,²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁴⁰^Johⁿ^Na^g^l^{, Coli}^{n Ka}^hl,^S^h^a^w^{n Brim}^le^y^,^“^H^ow^{to Ex}^{it Ira}^q,”^{New Yo}^{rk Times}^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r^5,²⁰⁰⁸^.

in cities and towns, including small command outposts of U.S. forces, and Joint Security Stations
that include both U.S. and various Iraqi forces. That presence, commanders have noted, allows
ongoing collaboration between U.S. and Iraqi forces, making those partnerships more effective,
and frequent interaction with the local population, building trust and confidence. In mid-2008,
U.S. commanders favored “thinning” the ranks in cities and towns, that is, using a progressively
lighter but still dispersed U.S. footprint, as ISF gradually assumed responsibility for providing the
“presence” in each area. In December 2008, Major General Mark Hertling, Commanding General
of Multi-National Division-North, noted that most U.S. forces in his area had already moved
outside cities, with some exceptions, for example the city of Mosul, “where they have combat
outposts throughout the city because there is still a significant fight against al Qaeda in that ⁴¹
city.” Also in December 2008, Commanding General of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I),
General Raymond Odierno, noted that some U.S. forces are likely to remain inside cities and ⁴²
towns after June 2009, in order to continue to train and mentor Iraqi security forces.
The new U.S.-Iraqi “SOFA” requires the coordination of all U.S. military operations - including
ground operations, air operations, and detainee operations - with Afghan authorities. U.S.
commanders on the ground have suggested that the agreement’s provisions would require some ⁴³
additional clarification in implementing agreements or arrangements. In a December 2008 letter
to the force, regarding the new “SOFA,” GEN Odierno noted that the environment will “require a
subtle shift in how we plan, coordinate, and execute missions throughout Iraq,” and that new rules ⁴⁴
of engagement will be issued. A key issue is the impact that such measures will have on U.S.
operations.
In practice, according to commanders on the ground, the vast majority of U.S. operations are
already closely coordinated with the GoI. Further, most of those operations are already
“combined” with Iraqi forces. The Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) process has facilitated a
transition in the way U.S. forces do business, since PIC arrangements—which may vary by
province—generally require coordination on U.S. operations. In addition, in some cases, the GoI
has agreed in advance that U.S. forces may carry out certain categories of activities, or may take
action against certain targets. The greatest challenge, in a post-“SOFA” environment, may be
securing Iraqi approval for some time-sensitive missions by Special Operations Forces.
Looking ahead, the premise for U.S. operations, according to MNC-I, is to “figure out how to get ⁴⁵
it done through Iraqis.” The counterinsurgency guidance issued by GEN Odierno on September
16, 2008, emphasized that as the ISF stand up, coalition forces will increasingly “enable from
overwatch.”
Concerning the use of Iraqi air space, the “SOFA” states: “Surveillance and control over Iraqi
airspace shall transfer to Iraqi authority immediately upon entry into force of this Agreement”. It
⁴¹
^Majo^{r G}^eⁿ^e^{ral Mark}^Hertlin^g^,^{DOD Ne}^w^s^Brie^fⁱⁿ^g^{, Dece}^m^b^{er 8}^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁴²^Su^da^rs^aⁿ^Ra^g^h^a^v^aⁿ^a^{nd Q}^a^is^Mi^z^h^e^r^{, “}^T^roops^W^{ill Re}^m^a^{in in Ira}^{qi Citie}^s^A^f^te^{r J}^une^{, O}^d^ie^rno^Sa^y^s^,”^Wa^shⁱⁿ^gt^on
^Post^,^Decem^b^e^{r 1}⁴^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁴³^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^a^{nd s}^u^bor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.
⁴⁴^G^E^N^R^a^y^m^{ond O}^d^ie^r^no,^le^tte^r^d^a^te^{d D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^{4 20}^08,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^https^:^//w^w^w^.^m^nf^-ⁱ^r^a^q.c^o^m^/^im^ag^e^s^/
^C^G^s^_^Me^s^s^a^g^es^/c^g^_^le^tte^r^_on_t^he^_s^e^c^u^r^ity^_a^g^r^e^e^m^e^nt.pdf^.
⁴⁵^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNC-I of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.

adds a caveat: “Iraq may request from the United States forces temporary support for the Iraqi ⁴⁶
authorities in the mission of surveillance and control of Iraqi air space.” The caveat is important
because the capabilities of the Iraqi Air Force are still in the very early stages of development and
training. . In addition, that training has focused, first of all, on skills relevant to the ongoing
counter-insurgency (COIN) fight, such as moving troops and supplies, and providing some ISR.
Iraqi officials and commanders on the ground, aware that they still lack key COIN capabilities
such as sufficient ISR and CAS, and that they do not yet have the ability to defend Iraqi airspace,
are reportedly eager to retain the support of U.S. air assets, and U.S. officials have suggested that ⁴⁷
it should be possible to reach agreements on shared use of air space.
The “SOFA” does not address a parallel concern related to operational coordination: Iraqi
coordination with U.S. forces concerning ISF operations. U.S. commanders on the ground report
that the ISF sometimes have informed U.S. forces only after they have carried out local
operations; some commanders add that these are positive developments in terms of growing ISF ⁴⁸
capabilities and initiative. At the same time, it could be helpful for U.S. forces to know in
advance about significant ISF operations, for two reasons: first, the ISF might call on U.S. forces
suddenly, during such operations, to provide key enablers; second, such operations could have an
impact on U.S. force protection.
Article 22 of the “SOFA” describes provisions for detainee operations. One set of provisions
places tight new constraints on the circumstances under which U.S. forces may take Iraqis into ⁴⁹
physical custody. Another set of provisions, of even more concern to U.S. commanders on the
ground, specifies how the cases of those detainees currently held by coalition forces will be
further adjudicated. Specifically, when the “SOFA” enters into force, U.S. forces are required to
provide information about all detainees held. Then Iraq authorities will “issue arrest warrants for
persons who are wanted by them.” U.S. forces will turn over custody of all “wanted” detainees, ⁵⁰
and then release all remaining detainees “in a safe and orderly manner.”
In anticipation of a more stringent new detention regime, throughout 2008, MNF-I carried out a
detainee release program, releasing detainees to their homes and communities whenever possible.
As of late November 2008, U.S. forces held approximately 15,800 detainees in theater internment ⁵¹
facilities, after releasing more than 17,500 during 2008. But commanders have expressed
concerns about the remaining “legacy” population. In many cases, the coalition lacks releasable
evidence with legal sufficiency in Iraqi courts. Scrupulous collection of evidence—such as
photographs, diagrams, eye-witness accounts—common in civilian law enforcement, was not
always an integral part of coalition combat operations in Iraq. Such legacy detainees could pose
real security threats to the Iraqi population, or to the coalition. Some coalition officials and
outside observers have also expressed concerns that the GoI adjudication of legacy detainee
⁴⁶
^“^S^O^F^A^”^,^A^r^tic^le^{9, pa}^ra^.4-⁵^.
⁴⁷^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^a^{nd s}^u^bor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.
⁴⁸^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^a^{nd s}^u^bo^r^d^ina^t^e^c^o^m^m^a^nds^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.
⁴⁹^“^N^{o de}^te^nti^oⁿ^or^a^r^r^e^s^t^m^a^y^be^ca^r^rⁱ^e^d^ou^{t by}^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^F^o^r^c^e^s⁽^e^xc^e^p^{t w}^{ith r}^e^s^p^e^c^t^{to de}^te^nt^ion^or^a^r^r^e^s^t^of
^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^F^o^r^c^e^s^a^{nd of}^the^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n c}^o^m^pone^nt^{) e}^x^c^e^p^{t throug}^h^aⁿ^Ira^qⁱ^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^is^s^u^e^dⁱⁿ
^acco^rd^an^{ce w}ⁱ^t^h^Iraqⁱ^l^a^w^an^d^p^u^r^su^an^t^t^o^A^r^tⁱ^c^l^e⁴^.^{” If}^U.^S^.^f^o^{rces d}^o^d^e^t^aⁱⁿ^Iraqi^s,^“su^c^h^p^e^rsoⁿ^s^mu^ch^b^e^h^a^nd^ed
^ov^e^r^{to c}^o^m^p^e^t^eⁿ^{t Ira}^{qi a}^u^th^oritie^{s w}^{ithin 2}⁴^h^ours.”^“^S^O^F^A^,^”^A^r^tic^le^22,^pa^ra^.1-²^.
⁵⁰^“^S^OFA^,^”^A^r^tic^le^{22, pa}^ra^.⁴^.
⁵¹^MN^F-^I^pr^e^s^s^r^e^le^a^s^e^,^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^30,²⁰⁰⁸^.

cases, whether or not legally sufficient evidence exists, may evince a sectarian bias—in particular, ⁵²
a tendency to treat Shi’a Arabs more leniently than Sunni Arabs.
Over the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the balance of U.S. civilian and military roles and
responsibilities has shifted. As a rule, the military has played the preponderant role, including in
non-traditional fields such as governance and reconstruction, although civilian contributions have
grown over time. Looking forward, a key operational question is the most effective future balance
of U.S. civilian and military effort in Iraq.
As security conditions on the ground in Iraq have improved, civilian and military officials all
point to increased opportunities for civilian assistance initiatives, particularly capacity-building at
all levels. As one U.S. commander argued, “Embassy people should be out more every day now, ⁵³
like we are.” Some provincial Iraqi officials, for their part, appear eager to welcome additional ⁵⁴
U.S. civilian expertise.
One future option, as U.S. troops draw down, would be to increase the U.S. civilian effort in Iraq
in terms of personnel and resources, to support civil capacity building at the national, provincial,
and local levels. The primary constraint on a possible “civilian surge,” to follow the military
surge, may be the limited capacity of the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International
Development, and other civilian agencies to deploy significant numbers of personnel.
One consideration would be how well Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are able to
function without a substantial nearby coalition military presence. Good test cases for this scenario
already exist. In May 2008, the personnel of the PRTs for Najaf and Karbala provinces, who had
been operating from a remote base in Hillah, in Babil province, relocated to their respective areas
of operation. Najaf and Karbala are both PIC provinces, with limited U.S. military presence. In
Najaf, for example, the PRT, including a small U.S. military team that provides them with
movement, is based at a small Forward Operating Base (FOB), together with a U.S. Army
transition team that works with the local Iraqi Army battalion and a small U.S. military “mayor’s ⁵⁵
cell” that manages the installation. A team of private security contractors from Triple Canopy
provides static security.
Some key steps have been taken to amplify civilian assistance efforts at the provincial level,
including the addition of 66 civilian subject matter experts, in technical fields including ⁵⁶
agriculture and business development, to work with the PRTs. However, U.S. Embassy officials
note that it is likely that peak PRT staffing levels in Iraq have already been reached. The
Embassy—in response to direction from Congress—is working on “PRT strategic drawdown” ⁵⁷
plans.
⁵²
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^a^{nd s}^u^bor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.
⁵³^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith Multi-Na}^ti^ona^{l Di}^vⁱ^{sion c}^o^m^m^a^nde^{r, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁵⁴^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith the}^G^o^v^e^r^nor^of^N^a^jaf^,^the^G^o^v^e^r^nor^of^B^a^s^r^a^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.
⁵⁵^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith U.S. c}ⁱ^v^ilia^{n a}ⁿ^d^m^ilita^r^y^offⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s a}^t^the^Na^ja^f^FO^B.
⁵⁶^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith the}^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^of^P^r^ov^incⁱ^a^l^A^f^f^a^ir^s⁽^O^P^A⁾^,^U^.^{S. Em}^ba^s^s^y^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^{. W}^h^eⁿ^P^R^T^le^a^d^e^r^s^w^e^r^e^a^s^k^e^d
^h^o^w^man^y^su^b^j^ect^m^a^t^t^e^{r e}^x^p^e^rt^{s t}^h^ey^w^o^u^l^d^lⁱ^k^{e t}^o^recei^ve,^t^h^e^y^re^p^o^r^t^e^dl^y^req^u^e^st^ed^{a t}^o^t^a^l^o^f¹⁷⁰^.
⁵⁷^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith U}^.^{S. Em}^ba^s^s^y^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.

Meanwhile, the U.S. military remains the de facto default option, though military officers are ⁵⁸
usually the first to note that they lack the requisite expertise. One key role of the U.S. military in
Iraq is supporting civilian-led efforts to provide Iraqis with governance mentorship, and in
particular, to build linkages among the national, regional, and local levels. As MNC-I officials
noted, “Our job at Corps is to establish the connective tissue between the center and the ⁵⁹
provinces.” In many instances, while PRTs focus on governance at the provincial level, military
units, with far more boots on the ground, work regularly to foster governance at the district and ⁶⁰
local levels, including linkages with higher levels of Iraqi government. The U.S. military
continues to provide some support for small-scale reconstruction initiatives, though unevenly
across Iraq. Some commanders continue to facilitate the reopening of small business—and to use
the number of reopened businesses as a metric of economic progress—while others have decided
to “give back,” that is, “not spend,” their Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) ⁶¹
funds, in order to encourage Iraqis to budget and spend their own money.
OIF experience to date, and the current debates about the “way forward” in Iraq, suggest several
broader strategic considerations for U.S. practitioners, policy makers, and Members of Congress.
As Iraq’s de facto exercise of sovereignty grows, as the role of the United States evolves
correspondingly, and as further U.S. troop drawdowns are contemplated, it might be useful to
confirm or update the short list of critical U.S. national interests regarding Iraq, and the key
strategic objectives that, at a minimum, it is important for the United States to achieve in Iraq.
Such broad objectives might address both Iraq itself and the region, and might include the
following elements:
• U.S. interests in Iraq’s domestic political arrangements. Some might argue
that a democratic or broadly representative and inclusive Iraqi polity is essential
as a key to Iraq’s stability, while others might argue that the nature of Iraq’s
domestic political arrangements is much less important than simply a unified and
stable Iraq.
• U.S. interests in Iraq’s role in the fight against global terrorist networks.
Some might argue that the most important goal is simply ensuring that Iraq does
not serve as a safe haven for terrorists. Others might stress the importance of
active intelligence-sharing with the United States. Still others might argue that it
is in U.S. interests that Iraq couple the counter-terrorism skills it is currently
developing as part of its domestic counter-insurgency effort, with expeditionary
capabilities, so that it could participate in future regional counter-terrorist
activities.
⁵⁸
^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith Multi-Na}^tio^na^l^Divⁱ^{sion c}^o^m^m^a^nde^{rs, A}^u^g^u^{st 20}^{08. A}^s^one^note^d^{, “}^W^ha^{t y}^{ou se}^e^{is the}^U.S.
^m^ilita^r^y^{, but w}^e^don’t^ha^v^e^the^e^x^pe^rtis^e^.^”
⁵⁹^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNC-I of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁶⁰^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith U.S. m}^ilita^r^y^offⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s a}^nd^P^R^T^m^e^m^b^e^r^s,^A^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁶¹^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith Multi-N}^a^tio^na^l^Dⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on c}^o^m^m^a^nde^rs^a^{nd s}^u^bor^dⁱ^na^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^rs^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.

• U.S. interests in the regional balance of power. Some might argue that Iraq’s
strength, relative to that of its neighbors, is important. Others might simply stress
the importance of an absence of conflict—that is, as a long-stated U.S. goal puts
it, an “Iraq at peace with its neighbors.”
• U.S. interests in Iraq compared with those in Afghanistan. Some observers
argue that the U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan face a zero-sum competition
for resources and personnel, as well as time and attention of senior leaders. They
add that hard choices about the relative priority of the two missions may continue
to be necessary.
As the Iraqi appetite for accepting guidance and advice from international partners continues to
wane, U.S. policy makers may wish to reassess how the U.S. government might most effectively
apply political, economic, and security “levers” to help shape Iraq’s transformation into a stable
and prosperous state. One challenge is an apparent mismatch in Iraq between those who are most
susceptible to leverage and those making key decisions. Iraqi warfighting commanders, as a rule,
recognize the extent to which they rely on U.S. military enablers, and remain eager for a
continuation of U.S. support. At the same time, Iraqi political leaders—those who make the
decisions—tend toward overconfidence in the capabilities of Iraqi security forces, and a less
urgent sense of the need for close partnership with U.S. forces.
Another strategic consideration, in addition to U.S. strategic objectives, concerns the kind of
long-term relationship the United States wants to have with Iraq, and the kind of U.S. presence in
Iraq that would be required to support such a relationship. On September 10, 2008, in testimony
before the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued that “...
we should expect to be involved in Iraq for many years to come, although in changing and ⁶²
increasingly limited ways.” Issues for the Congress regarding a future U.S. military presence in
Iraq could include costs, and policy oversight of integrated efforts by Department of State and the
Department of Defense personnel.
In theory, one option would be establishing permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq, to support
broader U.S. policy in the region, possibly on the model of those in Japan, South Korea,
Germany, and Italy. This option does not appear to enjoy support from the Bush Administration,
Members of Congress, or from the Government of Iraq.
Another option would be a particularly robust Office of Security Cooperation (OSC), responsible
for training and mentoring Iraqi security forces and building the capacity of Iraqi security
ministries. Following the usual pattern, the OSC would be responsible to both the U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq and to the Commander of U.S. Central Command. One possible model might
be the U.S. Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia, which operates on the basis of a bilateral
Memorandum of Understanding and serves to train, advise and assist the Saudi Arabian Armed
Forces.
⁶²
^Ro^b^e^rt^M^.^G^a^t^e^s,^S^t^at^emen^t^b^e^f^o^{re t}^h^{e Ho}^u^s^{e A}^r^med^S^e^rvi^{ces Co}^mmi^t^t^ee,^S^e^p^t^em^b^e^{r 1}⁰^,²⁰⁰⁸^.

It is not clear to what extent U.S. “Iran policy” factors in current and potential Iranian activities in
southern Iraq. In the context of growing potential for U.S. military confrontations with Iranian
proxies in southern Iraq, it may be important to consider scenarios in which tactical-level
developments might escalate into strategic-level concerns.
According to U.S. and Iraqi officials, Iraq, particularly in the south, continues to face a potential ⁶³
threat from Special Groups trained by Iran’s Quds forces. Meanwhile, Multi-National Corps-
Iraq (MNC-I) is in the process of shifting its focus somewhat from north to south in Iraq,
including increasing the U.S. troop presence in southern Iraq as coalition partner troops withdraw
or draw down. According to commanders on the ground, the growing U.S. footprint in southern ⁶⁴
Iraq is not likely to be lost on Iran. In this context, the U.S. may find itself increasingly engaged
in “shadow-boxing” with Iranian proxies at the tactical level in southern Iraq.
How Military Departments fulfill their Title 10 responsibilities to organize, man, train, and
equip—how they make decisions about endstrength and capabilities required—may depend in
part on lessons drawn from OIF, and on how applicable those lessons are deemed to be to
potential future engagements. For example, lessons might be drawn from OIF concerning how to
most effectively train foreign security forces and to prepare U.S. forces for that mission; how
increasing the intelligence assets available to commanders on the ground affects their ability to
identify and pursue targets; how “dwell time” policies for the Active and Reserve Components
can best be implemented; and how closer operational integration between Special Operations
Forces and conventional forces might affect their requirements.
For the Department of Defense as a whole, in turn, OIF experiences may be used to help frame
future discussions about the Department’s force planning construct—a shorthand description of
the major contingencies the Department must be prepared to execute simultaneously—which is
used to shape the total force. Analytical challenges include deciding what kind of contingency
OIF represents, how likely it is to be representative of future contingencies, and which
chronological “slice” of OIF requirements (given the great variation in troop strength and ⁶⁵
equipment) to use to represent the effort.
A further strategic consideration concerns how lessons are drawn from OIF regarding U.S.
government coordination in complex contingencies, including both decision-making and
⁶³
^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith U}^.^{S. c}ⁱ^v^ilia^{n a}ⁿ^d^m^ilita^r^y^offⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^Ba^g^hda^{d, A}^ugus^{t 2}⁰⁰⁸^{, a}ⁿ^{d w}^{ith Ira}^qi^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n a}^{nd m}^ilita^ry
^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶⁴^In^t^e^rvi^e^w^s^wⁱ^t^h^M^N^F^{-I an}^d^M^N^{C-I o}^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s,^A^u^gu^st²⁰⁰⁸^.^F^u^rt^h^e^rm^o^r^e,ⁱ^tⁱ^s^coⁿ^cei^vab^l^{e t}^h^at^t^h^{e p}^l^anⁿ^e^dⁱⁿ^{crease i}ⁿ
^U.^S^.^t^r^o^o^p^p^r^esen^{ce i}ⁿ^Af^gh^anⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^,^acro^{ss Iran}^’^{s east}^e^rn^bo^r^d^er,^ma^y^m^a^gnⁱ^f^y^t^h^{e sen}^s^{e o}^f^uⁿ^easiⁿ^es^{s o}^f^so^m^e^Iranⁱ^an
^l^ead^ers.
⁶⁵^Bo^{th DOD Directive 3}⁰⁰⁰^.⁰⁷^“Ir^r^egu^l^ar^W^a^r^f^ar^{e IW” issu}^ed^oⁿ^D^ece^m^b^{er 1}^,²⁰⁰⁸^,^w^h^ich^stated^t^h^{at “it is Do}^D
^p^o^lⁱ^c^y^t^o^reco^gnⁱ^{ze t}^h^at^IWⁱ^s^{as st}^rat^e^gi^cal^l^yⁱ^m^p^o^r^t^aⁿ^t^{as t}^r^adⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^al^w^a^r^f^are,^{” an}^d^t^h^{e 20}⁰⁸^N^a^tio^na^{l De}^fe^nse
^Str^a^te^gy^,^su^g^g^e^sted^{a relativ}^el^y^st^roⁿ^g^f^u^tu^{re DOD em}^p^h^a^{sis o}ⁿ^cap^ab^ilit^{ies req}^uⁱ^red^f^o^{r co}^m^p^lex^coⁿ^tig^en^{cies lik}^{e Iraq}
^a^{nd A}^f^g^h^aⁿ^is^ta^n.

execution. Just as the executive branch’s responsibilities in this area are divided among different
agencies, congressional oversight responsibilities are divided among different committees of
jurisdiction, such that achieving full integration can be a challenge for both branches of
government.
One set of questions prompted by OIF experience concerns the decision-making process about
whether to go to war and if so, how to do so. Key issues include the rigor of the inter-agency
debates, the effectiveness of the provision of “best military advice” to key decision-makers, and
the thoroughness of congressional input concerning the use of force and the exercise of
congressional oversight in general.
Another set of questions raised by OIF concerns the balance of roles, responsibilities, resources,
and authorities among U.S. government agencies to support implementation of activities such as ⁶⁶
security forces training, local governance work, and economic reconstruction. In security forces
training, OIF experiences from the formal occupation to the present have included several
different patterns for the distribution of responsibilities between the Departments of Defense and
State. In governance and economic reconstruction work, OIF also provides at least two
potentially instructive organizational models—Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and ⁶⁷
cooperation between PRTs and partner military units.
A number of tools are available to Congress to help shape U.S. government policy toward Iraq, ⁶⁸
and the execution of that policy. One tool is limiting or prohibiting funding for certain activities.
For example, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 stated
that no funding appropriated pursuant to authorizations in the Act could be used “to establish any
military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United ⁶⁹
States Armed Forces in Iraq,” or “to exercise United States control of the oil resources of Iraq.”
⁶⁶
^Oⁿⁱⁿ^te^r^a^g^e^ncy^r^e^f^o^r^m^{, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³⁴⁴⁵^5,^Orgaⁿⁱ^zi^ng^t^h^e^U.^S^.^Go^vern^m^en^t^f^o^{r N}^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^e^cu^ri^t^y^{: Overvi}^ew
^{of t}^h^e^Inte^ra^ge^nc^y^Re^{form De}^b^a^te^s^,^b^y^Cath^erin^{e Dale,}^Nin^a^M^.^S^e^rafⁱⁿ^o^,^an^d^P^a^t^T^o^w^e^ll.^On^th^{e role o}^f^{DOD in}
^f^o^re^ig^{n a}^ssistaⁿ^c^e^a^c^tiv^itie^{s, inc}^l^u^d^ing^se^c^u^rity^f^o^rc^e^s^traⁱ^ning^aⁿ^d^r^e^c^onstruc^tio^{n a}^c^tiv^itie^{s, se}^e^CRS^Re^{port RL}³⁴⁶³^9,
^The^D^e^par^tm^eⁿ^t^of^D^e^fe^ns^e^Roleⁱⁿ^For^eⁱ^gn^As^sⁱ^s^t^anc^e^:^B^a^c^k^g^r^o^uⁿ^d^{, M}^a^j^o^r^I^s^s^u^e^s^{, a}ⁿ^d^O^p^ti^ons^f^o^r^C^ongr^e^s^s^{, by}^Nⁱ^na
^{M. Se}^ra^fⁱ^{no e}^t^a^l^{. O}ⁿ^t^h^e^c^a^p^a^b^ilit^ie^{s of}^{U.S. g}^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt c}ⁱ^v^ilia^{n a}^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^{, se}^e^{CRS Re}^{port RL}³²⁸⁶²^,
^Pea^cekeepⁱⁿ^g^/^S^t^a^b^iliza^t^ioⁿ^aⁿ^d^C^oⁿ^flict^Traⁿ^sitioⁿ^s^{: B}^a^ckg^ro^uⁿ^d^aⁿ^d^C^oⁿ^g^ressioⁿ^a^{l Acti}^oⁿ^oⁿ^th^{e C}ⁱ^viliaⁿ
^Re^s^pons^e^/^Re^s^e^r^v^e^Cor^p^s^a^nd^othe^r^Civ^ilian^St^abi^liz^ati^oⁿ^a^nd^Re^c^ons^tr^uc^tio^{n C}^a^p^abili^tie^s^{, by}^Nⁱ^na^{M. Se}^r^a^fⁱ^{no a}ⁿ^d
^Ma^{rtin A}^.^W^e^iss.
⁶⁷^T^h^e^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on O}^v^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^{t a}^{nd I}ⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^tions^of^the^H^o^us^e^A^r^m^e^{d Se}^r^v^ic^e^s^C^o^m^m^itte^e^ha^s^hos^te^{d a}^s^e^rⁱ^e^s^of
^h^eariⁿ^{gs ab}^o^u^t^P^R^T^sⁱⁿ^{Iraq an}^d^Afgh^anⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^,^and^t^h^{e p}^o^t^eⁿ^tia^{l im}^plic^a^tio^{ns f}^o^{r f}^u^ture^U.S.^inte^r-a^g^e^nc^y^c^oordi^na^tioⁿ
^a^{nd or}^g^a^niz^a^tⁱ^on.^T^h^e^A^r^m^y^’^s^C^e^nte^r^f^o^r^A^r^m^y^L^e^s^s^ons^L^e^a^r^ne^{d, a}^t^For^t^L^e^a^v^eⁿ^w^o^r^t^{h, K}^a^ns^a^s^{, ha}^s^c^ond^uc^te^d
^inte^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith P}^R^T^pa^r^tic^ipaⁿ^ts^a^{nd p}^u^b^lis^he^dⁱⁿⁱ^tia^{l o}^b^s^e^r^v^a^tions^{. Se}^e^“^P^R^T^P^l^a^y^book^{: T}^a^c^tic^s^,^T^e^c^hniq^u^e^s^aⁿ^d
^P^r^oc^e^dur^e^s^,”^C^e^nte^r^f^o^r^A^r^m^y^Les^s^ons^L^e^a^r^ne^{d, N}^o^.^07-³⁴^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r^2007.
⁶⁸^Oⁿ^o^p^ti^ons^a^v^a^ila^ble^to^the^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^theⁱ^r^c^ons^ti^tuti^ona^li^ty^{, a}^{nd th}^eⁱ^r^pos^sⁱ^b^l^e^im^pa^c^t^{, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³³⁸³^7,
^Congr^e^s^sⁱ^o^nal^Au^th^or^ity^to^Lim^it^U^.^{S. M}^ilit^ar^y^O^p^e^r^ati^onsⁱⁿ^Ir^a^q^,^by^J^e^nnif^e^{r K}^.^Els^e^a^,^Mic^h^a^e^l^J^o^hⁿ^G^a^rc^ia^{, a}^nd
^T^hom^a^s^{J. Nic}^o^la^{. For}^e^x^a^m^ple^s^of^{tools a}^v^a^ila^ble^to^Co^ng^re^{ss in}^g^e^ne^ra^{l f}^o^{r sha}^p^ing^{U.S. m}^ilita^ry^ope^ra^tio^{ns, se}^e^CRS
^R^e^por^{t R}^L³³⁸⁰^3,^C^oⁿ^g^re^ssion^al^Re^stric^{tions o}ⁿ^U.^{S. M}^ilit^ary^Ope^r^atio^{ns in}^Vie^tⁿ^a^{m, C}^a^mbo^dⁱ^a^{, L}^aos,^Som^alia^{, a}ⁿ^d
^K^o^s^o^v^o^:^F^uⁿ^dⁱ^ng^an^{d N}^on-^F^uⁿ^dⁱ^{ng A}^ppr^oac^he^s^,^by^A^m^y^Be^l^a^s^c^{o e}^t^a^l^.
⁶⁹^D^unc^aⁿ^H^u^nte^r^N^a^tⁱ^o^{nal D}^e^fe^ns^e^Auth^or^iz^ati^oⁿ^Ac^{t f}^o^r^Fis^c^al^Ye^ar²⁰⁰⁹^,^P.L^.¹¹^0-⁴¹⁷^,^O^c^tobe^r¹⁴^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸^,^§1²¹^1.
^T^h^is^s^e^c^{tion r}^e^pe^a^t^e^d^la^ng^ua^g^e^f^r^om^the^FY²⁰^{08 N}^D^A^A^.

Congress may also make some funding contingent on achievement of certain milestones. For
example, in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252), Congress required that
funding under Chapter 4 of the Act, “Department of State and Foreign Operations,” be made
available for assistance to Iraq “only to the extent that the Government of Iraq matches such ⁷⁰
assistance on a dollar-for-dollar basis.” More broadly, in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’
Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007, Congress
established 18 benchmarks for the performance of the Government of Iraq, and provided that
further U.S. strategy in Iraq would be conditioned on the Iraqi government’s meeting those ⁷¹
benchmarks.
Another tool is holding oversight hearings, to ask Administration officials to account for the
progress and results to date of policy implementation. For example, on September 10, 2008, the
House Armed Services Committee invited Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen to testify at a hearing entitled “Security and
Stability in Afghanistan and Iraq: Developments in U.S. Strategy and Operations and the Way
Ahead.” On September 23, 2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing on the
situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, with Secretary Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Congress may also shape policy by establishing reporting requirements. For example, in the
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252), Congress required the Secretary of
Defense to provide to Congress, every 90 days beginning not later than December 5, 2008, until
the end of FY2009, a “comprehensive set of performance indicators and measures for progress
toward military and political stability in Iraq.” The Act lists detailed reporting requirements in
two areas, stability and security in Iraq, and the training and performance of Iraqi security forces,
and also required an assessment of “United States military requirements, including planned force ⁷²
rotations, through the end of calendar year 2009.”
This report is designed to support congressional consideration of future policy options for Iraq by
analyzing strategies pursued and outcomes achieved to date, by characterizing current dynamics
on the ground in Iraq, and by identifying and analyzing key strategic and operational
considerations going forward. The report will be updated as events warrant. Major topics
addressed include the following:
• Analysis of future strategic and operational considerations.
• OIF war planning, including stated objectives, key debates in the major
combat and post-major combat planning efforts, and the impact of apparent
short-comings in the planning efforts on post-war developments.
⁷⁰
^Su^pple^m^eⁿ^t^a^{l A}^ppr^oprⁱ^a^tio^ns^Ac^t^,²⁰⁰⁸^,^P.L^.¹¹^0-²^52,^J^u^ne³⁰^{, 2}⁰^08,^§1⁴⁰²⁽^e⁾^.
⁷¹^S^ee^U.S.^Troo^{p Re}^adi^ne^{ss, Ve}^te^{rans’ C}^a^re^{, Katri}^na^Re^c^o^v^e^r^y^,^and^Iraq^Ac^c^oun^ta^bility^A^ppr^opri^a^tio^{ns Ac}^{t o}^f²⁰⁰⁷^,
^P.L^.¹¹^0-²⁸^,^Ma^y^{25, 20}⁰⁷^{, §}¹³¹⁴⁽^b⁾⁽¹⁾⁽^A⁾^,^w^h^ic^{h lis}^ts^the¹⁸^beⁿ^c^hm^a^r^k^s^{. I}ⁿ^§1³¹⁴⁽^c⁾⁽¹⁾^,^the^A^c^{t s}^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^tha^t^no
^f^unding^a^p^pr^o^p^rⁱ^a^t^e^d^f^o^r^I^r^a^{q m}ⁱ^g^h^{t be}^ob^lig^a^t^e^d^or^e^x^peⁿ^d^e^d^unle^s^s^a^nd^until^the^Pr^e^s^ideⁿ^{t c}^e^r^tif^ie^d^tha^t^I^r^a^qi^is
^makiⁿ^g^p^r^o^g^{ress o}ⁿ^each^o^f^t^h^{e ben}^c^h^m^ar^ks.
⁷²^Su^pple^m^eⁿ^t^a^{l A}^ppr^oprⁱ^a^tio^ns^Ac^t^,²⁰⁰⁸^,^P.L^.¹¹^0-²^52,^J^u^ne³⁰^{, 2}⁰^08,^§9²⁰^{4. T}^h^e^r^e^q^u^ir^e^m^eⁿ^{t w}^a^s^{a c}^onti^nua^ti^on^of
^{a req}^uⁱ^rem^eⁿ^t^f^r^o^m^Fⁱ^scal^{Year 2}⁰⁰⁸^,^artⁱ^c^u^l^at^{ed i}ⁿ^t^h^e^C^ons^olid^at^e^d^Ap^pr^oprⁱ^a^ti^ons^Ac^t^,^P^.^L^.¹¹⁰^-¹⁶¹^,^Decem^b^e^r²⁶^,
²⁰⁰^7,^§6^09.

• Major combat operations, including both successes and challenges
encountered.
• Post-major combat military activities—combat operations, Iraqi security
forces training, and an array of “reconciliation,” governance, and economic
reconstruction efforts—including analysis of evolutions over time in strategy and
approaches.
• Assessments of the results of strategy and operations to date.

The Administration’s decision to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom had antecedents stretching back
to the 1991 Gulf War and its aftermath.
In the 1990’s, the United States shared with other countries a concern with the Iraqi government’s
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Iraq had demonstrated a willingness to use
WMD against its neighbors during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, and against its own citizens, as it
did, for example, against Iraqi Kurds in Halabja in 1988. U.S. policy after the Gulf War supported
the United Nations-led weapons inspection regime and the economic sanctions imposed to
encourage Iraq’s compliance with that regime. Before they were withdrawn in 1998, U.N.
weapons inspectors located and destroyed sizable quantities of WMD in Iraq.
U.S. post-Gulf War policy also included containment initiatives—“no fly” zones—imposed by
the United States together with the United Kingdom and, initially, France. The northern “no fly”
zone, Operation Northern Watch was designed to protect the Iraqi Kurdish population in northern
Iraq and international humanitarian relief efforts there. Operation Southern Watch was designed
to protect the Shi’a Arab population in southern Iraq.
These containment measures were periodically marked by Iraqi provocations, including troop
build-ups and attempts to shoot down allied aircraft, and by allied responses including attacks on ⁷³
targets inside Iraq. In December 1998, the United States and the United Kingdom launched
Operation Desert Fox, whose stated purpose was to degrade Iraq’s ability to manufacture or use
WMD.
Also during the late 1990s, a policy climate more conducive to aggressive action against the Iraqi
regime began to take shape in Washington, D.C., as some policy experts began to advocate ⁷⁴
actively fostering Iraqi resistance, in order to encourage regime change. In 1998, Congress
⁷³
^O^v^e^r^a^{ll, s}^o^m^e^300,00^{0 s}^o^rtie^s^w^e^re^f^l^o^w^{n. In}²⁰^{02 f}^o^{r e}^x^a^m^ple^,^{Iraqi f}^o^rc^e^s^fⁱ^re^{d on c}^o^a^liti^on^aⁱ^rc^ra^{ft 50}^{0 tim}^e^s^,
^p^r^o^m^p^tⁱⁿ^{g 90}^co^alⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^ai^{r st}^ri^{kes agai}ⁿ^s^t^Iraqⁱ^t^a^rget^s.^S^{ee S}^u^zanⁿ^Ch^ap^m^aⁿ^,^“T^h^e^W^a^{r Be}^f^o^{re t}^h^{e W}^a^r,^”^{Air Forc}^e
^M^agaz^ine^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^2004.^C^h^a^p^m^a^{n c}^ite^s^Aⁱ^r^For^c^e^G^e^ne^r^a^{l J}^ohn^J^u^m^p^e^r^a^s^notingⁱⁿ^Ma^r^c^h²⁰⁰³^tha^t^be^tw^e^eⁿ^J^une
²⁰⁰^{2 a}ⁿ^{d Ma}^r^c^h²⁰⁰³^{, t}^h^e^U^.^S.^Aⁱ^r^For^c^e^f^l^e^w^a^{bout 4,}⁰⁰^{0 s}^o^r^t^ie^s^a^g^aⁱ^ns^{t I}^r^a^q’^s^aⁱ^r^de^f^e^ns^e^sy^s^t^em^{, s}^u^r^f^a^c^e^-^to-^a^ir
^mⁱ^ss^ile^s^,^a^{nd c}^o^m^m^a^{nd a}^{nd c}^o^ntr^o^l.
⁷⁴^S^{ee t}^h^{e Dece}^m^b^{er 1}^,¹⁹⁹⁷^,ⁱ^ssu^e^o^f^t^h^e^Weekl^{y S}^t^aⁿ^d^a^r^d^,^w^{ith a}^s^e^rⁱ^e^s^of^a^r^tic^le^s^,^unde^r^t^h^e^he^a^dⁱⁿ^g^“^S^a^dda^m^Mus^t
^G^o^,”^inc^l^udi^ng^“^O^v^e^r^t^hr^ow^Hⁱ^m^,^”^by^Za^l^m^ay^K^h^a^lilz^a^d^a^nd^P^a^u^l^W^o^lf^o^w^itz^.

passed the Iraq Liberation Act, authorizing support to Iraqi opposition organizations.⁷⁵ Some
supporters of this policy approach gained greater access, and in some cases office, under the Bush
Administration after the 2000 presidential elections.
For many U.S. policy makers, the September 11, 2001, attacks catalyzed or heightened general
concerns that WMD might fall into the hands of terrorists. Reflecting those concerns, the first
National Security Strategy issued by the Bush Administration, in September 2002, highlighted the
policy of preemptive, or anticipatory, action, to forestall hostile acts by adversaries, “even if ⁷⁶
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”
Throughout 2002, the stated position of the Administration was to aggressively seek Iraqi
compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions concerning the inspections regime, while ⁷⁷
holding out the possibility of U.N Chapter VII action if Iraq did not comply. In September 2002,
addressing the U.N. General Assembly, President Bush stated: “The Security Council Resolutions
will be enforced ... or action will be unavoidable.” On that occasion, President Bush also
articulated a list of conditions that Iraq must meet if it wanted to avoid retaliatory action: give up
or destroy all WMD and long-range missiles; end all support to terrorism; cease persecution of its
civilian population; account for all missing Gulf War personnel and accept liability for losses; and ⁷⁸
end all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program.
On November 8, 2002, following intensive negotiations among its “Permanent 5” members,⁷⁹ the
U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 1441. In it, the Council decided that Iraq remained in
“material breach” of its obligations; that the Council would afford Iraq “a final opportunity to
comply”; that failure to comply would “constitute a further material breach”; and that in that case, ⁸⁰
Iraq would “face serious consequences.”
This language, though strong by U.N. standards, was not considered by most observers to imply
“automaticity”—that is, that Iraqi non-compliance would automatically trigger a U.N.-authorized
response under Chapter VII.
While the Iraqi government eventually provided a large quantity of written materials, the
Administration deemed Iraqi compliance to be insufficient. The Administration chose not to seek
⁷⁵
^T^h^e^I^r^a^{q L}ⁱ^be^r^a^{tion A}^c^t,^P^.^L^.¹⁰⁵^-³^38,^O^c^tobe^r^31,¹⁹⁹⁸^{, a}^u^th^or^iz^e^d^s^u^p^por^t^to^“^I^r^a^{qi de}^m^o^c^r^a^tic^o^pposⁱ^tioⁿ
^or^g^a^niz^a^tions^”^aⁿ^d^inc^l^ude^d^pr^ov^is^ions^c^o^nc^e^r^ning^how^{to i}^d^eⁿ^tif^y^s^u^c^h^or^g^a^niz^a^tio^ns^.
⁷⁶^The^N^a^tio^nal^Se^c^u^r^ity^Str^a^te^gy^of^the^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^ate^s^{of Am}^e^r^ic^a^,^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰²^{, p}^.¹⁵^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ns^c^/^ns^s^/^pdf^.
⁷⁷^C^h^a^p^te^r^VI^I^of^the^C^h^a^r^te^r^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d N}^a^ti^ons^a^u^th^or^iz^e^s^the^U^.^N^.^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^il^{to “}^d^e^t^e^r^mⁱ^ne^the^e^x^is^te^nc^e^of
^an^y^t^h^reat^t^o^t^h^{e p}^eace,^b^r^each^o^f^t^h^{e p}^eace,^o^r^act^o^f^aggr^essi^oⁿ^”^(A^rtⁱ^c^l^e³⁹⁾^,^an^d^s^h^ou^l^d^t^h^{e C}^o^un^ci^l^coⁿ^sⁱ^d^{er o}^t^h^e^r
^sp^eci^fⁱ^ed^m^e^a^s^u^r^{es i}ⁿ^ad^eq^u^a^t^e^,^t^o^“t^{ake su}^ch^actⁱ^oⁿ^b^y^ai^r,^sea,^o^r^l^aⁿ^d^f^o^{rces as}^m^a^y^b^eⁿ^ecess^a^r^y^t^o^m^aⁱⁿ^t^aⁱⁿ^o^r
^rest^o^r^{e i}ⁿ^t^e^rn^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^p^{eace an}^d^secu^ri^t^y^{” (}^A^rtⁱ^c^l^e⁴²⁾^,^{see Ch}^art^e^{r of}^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^Natⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^avai^l^a^b^l^{e at}^h^t^t^p^:^/^/^www^.^uⁿ^.^o^r^g/
^a^bout^un^/^c^ha^r^t^e^r^/.
⁷⁸^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t B}^u^{sh’s A}^ddre^{ss to}^the^Unite^{d Na}^tio^{ns G}^e^ne^ra^l^A^s^s^e^m^b^l^y^{, Se}^ptem^be^r^{12, 2}⁰⁰²^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{, N}^Y^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^the^W^h^ite^H^ous^e^w^e^bs^ite^htt^p^://w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ne^w^s^/^r^e^l^e^a^s^es^/200^2/^09/²⁰⁰²⁰⁹^12-^1.^htm^l^.
⁷⁹^Chⁱⁿ^a,^F^r^an^ce,^Ru^ssi^{an F}^e^d^e^ratⁱ^oⁿ^,^Unⁱ^t^ed^Kiⁿ^g^d^o^m^,^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es.^E^ach^o^f^t^h^e¹⁵^C^o^un^ci^l^m^e^m^b^ers^h^a^{s on}^{e vo}^t^e^.
^P^r^oc^e^dur^a^l^m^a^tte^r^s^a^r^e^m^a^de^b^y^{an a}^f^fⁱ^r^m^a^tiv^e^v^o^te^of^a^t^le^a^s^{t 9 of}^the¹⁵^{. S}^ubs^ta^ntiv^e^m^a^tte^r^s^r^e^quir^e^nine^v^o^te^s^,
^inc^l^u^d^ing^c^o^nc^urri^ng^v^o^te^{s f}^r^o^m^the⁵^pe^rm^aⁿ^eⁿ^{t m}^e^m^b^e^r^{s. Se}^e^http://w^ww^.un.org^/^sc^/m^e^m^be^rs.a^sp.
⁸⁰^Uⁿ^ite^{d N}^a^ti^ons^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^il^R^e^s^o^lutioⁿ¹⁴^41,^{8 N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^2002,^pa^r^a^g^r^a^phs^1,^2,^4,^aⁿ^d¹³^.

an additional U.N. Resolution explicitly authorizing military action under Chapter VII, reportedly
due to concerns that some Permanent Members of the Council were prepared to veto it.
The Administration’s intent to take military action against Iraq was formally made public on
March 17, 2003, when President Bush issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons to ⁸¹
leave Iraq within 48 hours. “Their refusal to do so,” he said, would “result in military conflict.”

As the Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz wrote, war planning includes articulation of ⁸²
both intended goals and how they will be achieved. In the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Administration goals included both short-term military objectives and longer-term strategic goals.
To meet that intent, the Administration planned—though apparently in unequal measure—for
both combat operations and the broader range of operations that would be required on “the day
after” regime removal.
The Administration’s short-term goal for OIF was regime removal. As President Bush stated in
his March 17, 2003, Address to the Nation, “It is too late for Saddam Hussein to remain in
power.” In that speech, he promised Iraqis, “We will tear down the apparatus of terror ... the ⁸³
tyrant will soon be gone.”
In his March 2003 speech, President Bush declared that in the longer term, the United States
would help Iraqis build “a new Iraq that is prosperous and free.” It would be an Iraq, as he
described it, that would not be at war with its neighbors, and that would not abuse its own ⁸⁴
citizens. Those were the basic “endstate” elements typically used by war planners. The U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) OIF campaign plan, for example, described the strategic
objective this way: “A stable Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact and a broad-based
government that renounces WMD development and use and no longer supports terrorism or ⁸⁵
threatens its neighbors.”
⁸¹
^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t B}^u^s^h^A^ddre^s^s^to^the^N^a^tion,^Ma^rc^h^17,²⁰⁰³^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ne^w^s^/^r^e^l^e^a^s^es^/200^3/
^03/²⁰⁰³⁰³^17-^7.h^t^m^l^.
⁸²^C^l^a^u^s^e^w^itz^m^a^de^the^point^m^o^r^e^f^o^r^c^ef^ull^y^{: “}^N^{o one}^s^t^a^r^ts^a^w^a^r^,^or^r^a^the^r^{, n}^o^oneⁱⁿ^hⁱ^s^s^e^ns^e^s^oug^h^t^to^do^s^o^,
^w^{ithout f}ⁱ^r^s^{t be}^ing^c^l^e^a^rⁱⁿ^his^mⁱ^{nd w}^h^a^t^heⁱⁿ^teⁿ^d^s^to^a^c^h^ie^v^e^by^t^h^a^t^w^a^r^a^{nd how}^heⁱⁿ^te^nds^{to c}^o^nduc^t^it.”^C^a^r^l^v^oⁿ
^Cla^u^se^w^itz^,^On^Wa^r^,^Mⁱ^ch^ael^How^a^rd^an^d^P^e^t^e^r^P^a^ret^,^ed^s.^,^P^rⁱⁿ^cet^oⁿ^NJ:^P^rⁱⁿ^cet^on^Uⁿⁱ^v^ersi^t^y^P^r^ess,¹⁹⁷⁶^.
⁸³^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t B}^u^s^h^A^ddre^s^s^to^the^N^a^tion,^Ma^rc^h^17,²⁰⁰³^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ne^w^s^/^r^e^l^e^a^s^es^/200^3/
^03/²⁰⁰³⁰³^17-^7.h^t^m^l^.
⁸⁴^Ibid^.
⁸⁵^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^C^E^N^T^C^O^{M, C}^F^L^C^C^a^{nd V}^C^o^r^p^s^pla^nne^r^s^,²⁰⁰²^aⁿ^d²⁰⁰³^{. Fr}^om^J^u^ly²⁰⁰²^{to J}^u^ly^2004,^the
^au^t^h^o^r^served^{as t}^h^e^P^o^lⁱ^tⁱ^cal^A^d^vi^so^{r (}^P^OL^A^D^{) t}^o^t^h^{e Co}^mm^an^dⁱ^{ng Gen}^e^ral^(C^G⁾^o^f^U.^S^.^A^r^my^V^Co^rp^s.^T^h^at^servi^ce
^inc^l^u^d^e^d^de^ploy^ing^w^{ith V C}^o^r^p^s^{in e}^a^r^ly²⁰⁰³^{to K}^u^w^a^{it a}^{nd the}ⁿ^I^r^a^{q. I}ⁿ^I^r^a^{q, t}^h^e^a^u^t^hor^s^e^r^v^e^d^a^s^P^O^L^A^D^{to the}^C^G
^o^f^th^e^Co^m^bⁱⁿ^e^d^Joⁱⁿ^{t T}^a^sk^Fo^rc^e^-⁷^(CJT^F-7⁾^{, a}ⁿ^d^t^h^eⁿ^t^h^e^M^u^lti-^Na^tioⁿ^a^{l F}^o^rc^e^-Ira^q^(MNF-I).

Over time, the Administration’s longer-term strategic objectives were fine-tuned. In the
November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, the Administration stated the long-term
goal for Iraq this way: “Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well-integrated into the ⁸⁶
international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.”
In January 2007, at the time the “surge” was announced, the White House released an unclassified
version of the results of its late 2006 internal review of Iraq policy. That document states: “Our
strategic goal in Iraq remains the same: a unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern itself, ⁸⁷
defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the war on terror.”
And in September 2008, in its regular quarterly update to the Congress, the Department of
Defense used the same language almost verbatim: “The strategic goal of the United States in Iraq
remains a unified, democratic and federal Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself and is an ⁸⁸
ally in the war on terror.”
To support the stated U.S. strategic objectives, CENTCOM, as it planned military operations in
Iraq, defined the OIF military objectives this way: “destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi
regime and provide support to a new, broad-based government; destroy Iraqi WMD capability
and infrastructure; protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks; destroy terrorist
networks in Iraq, gather intelligence on global terrorism, detain terrorists and war criminals, and
free individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime; and support international efforts to set ⁸⁹
conditions for long-term stability in Iraq and the region.”
From a military perspective, there are theoretically many different possible ways to remove a
regime—using different capabilities, in different combinations, over different timelines. The 1991
Gulf War, for example, had highlighted the initial use of air power in targeting key regime
infrastructure. The more recent war in Afghanistan had showcased a joint effort, as Special
Operations Forces on the ground called in air strikes on key targets. Key debates in OIF major
combat planning concerned the size of the force, the timelines for action, and the synchronization
of ground and air power.
According to participants, throughout the planning process, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld played an active role, consistently urging the use of a streamlined force and a quick ⁹⁰
timeline. Secretary Rumsfeld reportedly came into office with a vision of defense
⁸⁶
^N^a^ti^on^{al S}^t^r^a^te^gy^f^o^r^Vic^t^or^y^{in I}^r^aq^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^30,²⁰⁰⁵^{, a}^v^a^ila^bl^e^a^t^http^://w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/inf^o^c^u^s^/ira^q^/
^ir^a^q_na^ti^ona^l^_^s^t^r^a^te^gy^_200⁵¹¹³⁰^.^pdf^.
⁸⁷^“^H^ig^hlig^hts^of^the^I^r^a^q^Str^a^te^gy^R^e^vⁱ^ew^”^s^lide^s^{, N}^a^tiona^{l Se}^c^u^r^ity^C^o^uⁿ^c^{il, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^2007,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ns^c^/ir^a^q^/20⁰⁷^/^ir^a^q^-^s^tr^a^t^e^g^y⁰¹¹⁰⁰⁷^.p^df^.
⁸⁸^D^e^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^D^e^fe^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^uring^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^rity^{in Ira}^q,^”^Se^pte^m^be^{r 2008}^{, s}^u^bm^itte^{d in a}^c^c^o^rdaⁿ^c^e^w^ith
^Se^c^tion⁹⁰¹⁰^{, D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^A^ppr^opr^ia^ti^ons^A^c^{t 20}^07,^P^.^L^.^109-²⁸^{9, a}^s^a^m^e^nde^{d by}^Se^c^{tion 1}³⁰⁸^of^P^.^L^.
¹¹⁰^-²^8.
⁸⁹^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^C^E^N^T^C^O^{M, C}^F^L^C^C^a^{nd V}^C^o^r^p^s^pla^nne^r^s^,²⁰⁰²^{, 2}⁰⁰³^{, a}^nd²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁹⁰^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith pla}^nne^r^s^w^ho^pa^r^tic^ipa^t^e^dⁱⁿ^t^h^e^pr^oc^e^s^s^,²⁰^{02 a}^nd²⁰⁰^{3. B}^o^b^W^oodw^a^r^{d c}^ite^s^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^R^u^m^s^f^e^ld
^{as sa}^yⁱⁿ^g^,^at^{a Dec}^e^m^b^e^{r 4}^,²⁰⁰¹^,^p^l^annⁱⁿ^g^sessi^oⁿ^,^“I’mⁿ^o^t^su^{re t}^h^at^t^h^at^m^u^ch^f^o^{rce i}^sⁿ^eed^ed^,^gi^ven^w^h^at^we’ve
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

transformation, both operational and institutional.⁹¹ A basic premise of that vision, captured in the

2002 National Security Strategy, was that “... the threats and enemies we must confront have ⁹²

changed, and so must our force.” In general, that meant transitioning from a military “structured
to deter massive Cold War-era armies,” to a leaner and more agile force. At issue in the OIF
planning debates was not only how to fight the war in Iraq, but also—implicitly—how to
organize, man, train and equip the force for the future.
For military planners, the guidance to use a streamlined force reflected a fundamental shift away
from the Powell Doctrine, named after the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which ⁹³
stressed that force, if used, should be overwhelming.
The planning effort started early. Just before Thanksgiving, 2001, President Bush asked Secretary
Rumsfeld to develop a plan for regime removal in Iraq, and Secretary Rumsfeld immediately
gave that assignment to the commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), General ⁹⁴
Tommy Franks.
The planning effort for combat operations was initially very “close hold,” involving only a few
key leaders and small groups of trusted planners at each level. As the effort progressed, the
number of people involved grew, but key elements of the plans remained compartmentalized, ⁹⁵
such that few people had visibility on all elements of the plans.
The starting point for the planning effort was the existing, “on the shelf” Iraq war plan, known as
1003-98, which had been developed and then refined during the 1990’s. That plan called for a
force of between 400,000 and 500,000 U.S. troops, including three Corps (or Corps equivalents),
with a long timeline for the deployment and build-up of forces beforehand. When General Franks
briefed Secretary Rumsfeld on these plans in late November 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld reportedly ⁹⁶
asked for a completely new version—with fewer troops and a faster deployment timeline.
In early 2002, General Franks briefed Secretary Rumsfeld on the “Generated Start” plan. That
plan called for very early infiltration by CIA teams, to build relationships and gain intelligence,
and then the introduction of Special Operations Forces, particularly in northern Iraq and in Al
Anbar province in the west. The main conventional forces effort would begin with near-

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^le^a^r^ne^{d c}^o^mⁱ^ng^out^of^A^f^g^h^aⁿ^is^ta^n.”^B^o^{b W}^o^o^d^w^a^r^d^,^Plaⁿ^of^Att^a^c^k^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: Si}^m^{on a}^nd^Sc^hus^te^r^,²⁰⁰⁴^.
⁹¹^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^{ith O}^f^fⁱ^c^e^o^f^the^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^Def^e^ns^e^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^{2005 a}ⁿ^d²⁰^06.
⁹²^The^N^a^tio^nal^Se^c^u^r^ity^Str^a^te^gy^of^the^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^ate^s^{of Am}^e^r^ic^a^,^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰²^{, p}^.²⁹^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ns^c^/^ns^s^/^pdf^.
⁹³^T^h^{e “P}^o^w^el^l^Do^ct^riⁿ^e^,^”^gen^e^ral^l^y^ackn^o^w^l^ed^ged^{as t}^h^{e b}^a^si^{s f}^o^{r t}^h^{e f}ⁱ^rst^G^u^l^f^W^a^r,^w^a^{s a co}^l^l^ectⁱ^oⁿ^o^fⁱ^d^eas,^no^t^a
^w^r^itte^{n doc}^um^eⁿ^{t. Othe}^{r k}^e^y^e^l^e^m^eⁿ^{ts inc}^l^u^d^e^d^f^o^rc^e^sho^u^ld^on^ly^be^use^d^a^s^a^la^{st re}^sort^{, w}^h^eⁿ^the^r^e^{is a}^c^l^e^a^r^thre^a^t;
^t^h^{ere m}^u^st^b^e^st^roⁿ^g^pu^blⁱ^c^su^pp^ort^f^o^{r t}^h^{e u}^s^e^o^f^f^o^rce;^t^h^ere^m^u^st^b^e^{a cl}^{ear exi}^t^st^rat^e^g^y^.^T^h^{e P}^o^w^e^l^l^Do^ct^riⁿ^e
^de^rⁱ^v^e^{d in}^pa^r^t^f^r^om^the^W^e^inbe^r^g^e^r^D^o^c^t^rⁱ^ne^{, na}^m^e^{d a}^f^t^e^r^f^o^r^m^e^r^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^Def^e^ns^e^C^a^s^p^a^r^Weⁱ^nbe^r^g^e^r^,^P^o^w^e^ll’^s
^one^-^tim^e^bos^s^,^w^h^ic^{h ha}^d^be^eⁿ^ba^s^e^{d on}^s^o^m^e^Vie^t^na^m^“^l^e^s^s^ons^le^ar^ne^d.”
⁹⁴^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith pla}^nne^r^s^,²⁰^{02 a}^nd²⁰^03.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^B^{ob W}^o^odw^a^r^d,^Pl^an^of^Attac^k^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: Sim}^{on a}ⁿ^{d Sc}^hus^te^r^,
²⁰⁰^4.
⁹⁵^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^C^E^N^T^C^O^{M a}ⁿ^{d C}^F^L^C^C^plaⁿ^ne^r^s^{, a}ⁿ^d^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^of^the^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^D^e^f^e^ns^e^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,²⁰^{02 a}^nd²⁰⁰³^.
⁹⁶^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith pla}^nne^r^s^,²⁰^{02 a}^nd²⁰^03.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^Mⁱ^c^h^a^e^l^R^.^G^o^r^don^aⁿ^d^G^e^ne^r^a^{l B}^e^rⁿ^a^r^{d E. T}^r^aⁱⁿ^o^r^,^Co^b^r^a^II:
^The^Iⁿ^sⁱ^de^St^or^y^a^nd^the^Iⁿ^v^a^sⁱ^oⁿ^an^{d O}^c^c^u^p^a^ti^on^{of I}^r^aq^,^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: Vin}^t^a^g^e^B^ook^s^,²⁰⁰⁶^{; a}ⁿ^{d B}^o^{b W}^oodw^a^r^d,^P^l^aⁿ
^of^A^ttac^k^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: Si}^m^{on a}ⁿ^d^Sc^hus^te^r^,²⁰^04.

simultaneous air and ground attacks. The force would continue to grow up to about 275,000 ⁹⁷
troops.
CENTCOM’s air component—the Combined Force Air Component Command (CFACC)—
reportedly urged modifying the plan to include a 10- to 14-day air campaign at the start, to target
and hit Iraq’s missile, radar, command and control, and other leadership sites, on the model of the ⁹⁸
Gulf War. But the early introduction of ground forces—rather than an extended exclusively air ⁹⁹
campaign—was apparently intended to take Iraqi forces by surprise.
Later in the spring of 2002, CENTCOM and subordinate planners developed an alternative plan
called “Running Start,” which addressed the possibility that the Iraqi regime might choose the
war’s start time through some provocation, such as the use of WMD. “Running start” called for a
smaller overall force and a shorter timeline. It would still begin with infiltration by CIA teams,
followed by the introduction of SOF. Air attacks would go first, and as ground forces flowed into
theater, the ground attacks could begin any time after the first 25 days of air attacks. The ground ¹⁰⁰
war might begin with as few as 18,000 ground forces entering Iraq.
In the summer of 2002, planners developed a so-called “hybrid” version of these two plans,¹⁰¹
which echoed key elements of the “Running Start” plan—beginning with an air campaign, and
launching the ground war while other ground forces still flowed into theater. Specifically, the plan
called for: Presidential notification 5 days in advance; 11 days to flow forces; 16 days for the air
campaign; the start of the ground campaign as ground forces continued to flow into theater; and a
total campaign that would last up to 125 days. This plan, approved for action, continued to be ¹⁰²
known as the “5-11-16-125” plan even after the numbers of days had changed.
By January 2003, at the CENTCOM Component Commanders Conference hosted by General
Franks in Tampa, the plans had coalesced around a modified version of “Generated Start.” They
featured a very short initial air campaign, including bombs and missiles—a couple of days, rather
than a couple of weeks. The ground campaign would begin with two three-star-led
headquarters—U.S. Army V Corps, and the I Marine Expeditionary Force—and some of their
forces crossing the line of departure from Kuwait into Iraq, while additional forces continued to ^th
flow into theater. Meanwhile, the 4 Infantry Division would open a northern front by entering
Iraq from Turkey.
⁹⁷
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith pla}^nne^r^s^aⁿ^{d s}^lⁱ^d^e^r^e^vⁱ^ew^{, 2002}^aⁿ^d²⁰⁰³^{. Se}^e^“^T^{op Se}^c^r^e^t^P^o^lo^Ste^p^”^c^o^lle^c^tⁱ^on,^“^C^om^pa^r^t^m^e^nte^d
^P^l^aⁿⁿⁱ^ng^Ef^f^o^r^t^{, 15 A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰²^”^C^E^N^T^C^O^{M br}^ie^f^,^obtaⁱ^ne^d^thr^o^u^g^h^the^Fr^e^e^d^om^of^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion A}^c^{t a}^nd^pos^te^d^by
^t^h^{e Nat}ⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^ecu^ri^t^y^A^r^chⁱ^v^e,^T^h^{e Geo}^r^{ge W}^a^shⁱⁿ^gt^oⁿ^Uⁿ^iv^e^r^sity^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http:^//www^.gw^u^.e^du/~nsa^rc^hiv^/
^N^S^A^E^B^B^/^N^S^A^E^B^B^214/^inde^x^.^ht^m^.
⁹⁸^G^o^r^{don a}^{nd T}^r^aⁱ^norⁿ^o^te^tha^t^thi^s^is^s^u^e^w^a^s^de^ba^te^{d a}^t^the^Ma^r^c^h²⁰⁰^{2 C}^E^N^T^C^O^{M C}^o^m^pone^{nt C}^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s
^Coⁿ^f^eren^ce.^Mⁱ^ch^ael^R.^G^o^rd^on^aⁿ^d^G^eⁿ^e^ral^Bern^ard^E^.^T^r^ai^no^r,^C^o^b^r^a^{II: T}^h^{e In}^si^d^e^S^t^o^r^{y a}ⁿ^d^t^h^e^In^va^sioⁿ^aⁿ^d
^O^c^c^upati^{on of}^I^r^aq^,^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: Vinta}^g^e^B^ook^s^,²⁰⁰⁶^.
⁹⁹^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^pla^nne^r^s^,²⁰^02,²⁰^03,^aⁿ^d²⁰⁰⁸^.
¹⁰⁰^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith pla}^nne^r^s^aⁿ^{d s}^lⁱ^d^e^r^e^vⁱ^ew^{, 2002}^aⁿ^d²⁰⁰³^{. Se}^e^“^T^{op Se}^c^r^e^t^P^o^lo^Ste^p^”^c^o^lle^c^tⁱ^on,^“^C^om^pa^r^t^m^e^nte^d
^P^l^aⁿⁿⁱ^ng^Ef^f^o^r^t^{, 15 A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰²^”^C^E^N^T^C^O^{M br}^ie^f^,^obtaⁱ^ne^d^thr^o^u^g^h^the^Fr^e^e^d^om^of^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion A}^c^{t a}^nd^pos^te^d^by
^t^h^{e Nat}ⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^ecu^ri^t^y^A^r^chⁱ^v^e,^T^h^{e Geo}^r^{ge W}^a^shⁱⁿ^gt^oⁿ^Uⁿ^iv^e^r^sity^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http:^//www^.gw^u^.e^du/~nsa^rc^hiv^/
^N^S^A^E^B^B^/^N^S^A^E^B^B^214/^inde^x^.^ht^m^.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^Mic^h^a^e^l^R^.^G^o^r^don^a^{nd G}^e^ne^r^a^{l B}^e^rⁿ^a^r^{d E. T}^r^aⁱⁿ^o^r^,^C^o^b^r^a^{II: T}^h^{e In}^si^d^e
^Stor^y^aⁿ^d^the^Iⁿ^v^a^sⁱ^oⁿ^an^{d O}^c^c^u^p^a^tioⁿ^{of I}^r^a^q^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: Vi}^nta^g^e^B^ook^s^,²⁰^06.
¹⁰¹^“^H^y^b^rⁱ^d”^sⁱ^m^p^l^y^r^e^f^e^r^r^e^{d de}^s^c^rⁱ^ptiv^e^l^y^{to the}^p^l^aⁿ^—^{it w}^a^s^not^the^f^o^r^m^a^l^nam^e^of^a^plaⁿ^—^a^lthoug^h^s^o^m^e^se^nior
^l^ead^{ers l}^a^t^e^{r see}^m^ed^t^o^u^s^{e “H}^y^b^ri^d^”^{as a p}^r^op^{er no}^un^.
¹⁰²^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith pla}^nne^r^s^aⁿ^{d s}^lⁱ^d^e^r^e^vⁱ^ew^{, 2002}^{, 2}⁰⁰³^aⁿ^d²⁰^{08; “}^C^om^pa^r^t^m^e^nte^d^P^l^aⁿⁿⁱ^ng^Ef^f^o^r^t^”^;^a^{nd G}^o^r^d^on
^a^{nd T}^r^aⁱ^nor^,^C^o^br^{a I}^I^.

The number of forces that would start the ground campaign continued to be adjusted, generally
downward, in succeeding days. On January 29, 2003, Army commanders learned that they would
enter Iraq with just two Divisions—less than their plans to that point had reflected. At that time, V
Corps and its subordinate commands were at a training site in Grafenwoehr, Germany, rehearsing
the opening of the tactical-level ground campaign at an exercise called “Victory Scrimmage.”
During that exercise, commanders and staff concluded that should they be required to “secure” ¹⁰³
cities in southern Iraq, they would have insufficient forces to do so.
The V Corps Commander at the time, then-Lieutenant General William Scott Wallace, reflected
after the end of major combat in Iraq: “I guess that as summer [arrived] I wasn’t real comfortable ¹⁰⁴
with the troop levels.”
Most observers agree that the Administration’s planning for “post-war” Iraq—for all the activities
and resources that would be required on “the day after,” to help bring about the strategic
objective, a “free and prosperous Iraq”—was not nearly as thorough as the planning for combat
operations.
For the U.S. military, the stakes of the post-war planning efforts were very high. In theory,
civilian agencies would have the responsibility for using political, diplomatic, and economic tools
to help achieve the desired political endstate for Iraq, while the Department of Defense and its
military forces would play only a supporting role after the end of major combat operations. But
by far the greatest number of coalition personnel on the ground in Iraq at the end of major combat
would be U.S. military forces, and the U.S. military was very likely to become the default option
for any unfilled roles and any unanticipated responsibilities.
A number of participants and observers have argued that the Administration should have sent a
larger number of U.S. troops to Iraq, to provide security in the post-major combat period.
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, who served as the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) throughout the formal occupation of Iraq, leveled this criticism after departing
Iraq. Asked what he would have changed about the occupation, he replied: “The single most
important change—the one thing that would have improved the situation—would have been ¹⁰⁵
having more troops in Iraq at the beginning and throughout.”
A logical fallacy in the number-of-troops critique is that “How many troops do you need?” is not
an especially meaningful question, unless what those troops will be expected to do is clarified. By
many accounts, the OIF post-war planning process did not provide commanders, before the start
of combat operations, with a clear picture of the extent of their assigned post-war ¹⁰⁶
responsibilities.
¹⁰³
^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^{V C}^o^r^p^s^le^a^d^e^r^s^a^{nd s}^t^a^f^f^,^2003.
¹⁰⁴^W^illia^m^{S. W}^a^llace,^In^terv^ie^w^,^Froⁿ^tliⁿ^e^,^Pu^b^{lic Bro}^a^d^castiⁿ^g^Sy^s^t^em^{, Feb}^r^u^a^r^y²⁶^,²⁰⁰⁴^,^av^ailab^l^e^at
^http:^//w^w^w^.pbs^.or^g^/^w^g^bh/pa^g^e^s^/^f^r^ontli^ne^/^s^how^s^/^inv^a^sⁱ^on/^inte^r^v^ie^w^s^/W^a^lla^ce^.htm^{l. H}^e^quic^k^l^y^a^dde^d^,^“^B^{ut I}^w^a^s
^c^o^m^f^or^ta^ble^w^{ith the}^de^g^r^e^e^of^tr^aining^of^thos^e^f^o^r^c^e^s^tha^t^w^e^r^e^ava^ila^ble^to^us^.”
¹⁰⁵^Se^e^Robi^{n W}^r^ig^{ht a}ⁿ^{d T}^o^m^Ric^k^s^,^“^B^rem^e^{r Critic}^iz^e^s^T^r^{oop L}^e^v^e^l^s^,”^Wa^shⁱⁿ^gt^on^Po^st^{, O}^c^to^be^r^5,²⁰⁰⁴^.
^A^m^ba^ss^a^dor^B^r^e^m^e^r^’^s^r^e^m^a^r^k^s^w^e^r^e^quote^d^f^r^om^a^nom^ina^l^l^y^of^f^-^t^h^e^-^r^e^c^o^r^d^ta^lk^he^g^a^v^e^a^t^D^e^P^a^uw^Uⁿ^iv^e^r^s^ity^on
^Se^pte^m^be^r^{17, 2}⁰⁰⁴^.
¹⁰⁶^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^C^E^N^T^C^O^{M, C}^F^L^C^C^,^{V C}^o^r^p^s^,^aⁿ^{d D}ⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^C^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, 20}^03,²⁰⁰⁴^aⁿ^d²⁰⁰⁸^,^a^{nd f}^r^om^Of^fⁱ^c^e
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

A primary focus of the interagency post-war-planning debates was who would be in charge in
Iraq, on “the day after.” For the military, decisions by the Administration about who would do
what would help clarify the military’s own roles and responsibilities. Before making such
decisions—in particular, what responsibilities would be carried out by Iraqis—the Administration
cultivated Iraqi contacts.
Based on months of negotiations, in conjunction with the government of the United Kingdom, the
Administration helped sponsor a series of conferences of Iraqi oppositionists, including
expatriates and some Iraqis—notably Iraqi Kurds—who could come and go from their homes.
The events included a major conference in London in December 2002, and a follow-on event in ¹⁰⁷
Salahuddin, Iraq, in February 2003. At these events, Iraqi oppositionists agreed on a political
statement and self-nominated a “leadership council,” but the events did not directly produce U.S. ¹⁰⁸
policy decisions about post-war roles and responsibilities.
During the same time frame, the Departments of State and Defense were locked in debate about
post-war political plans for Iraq. The State Department supported a deliberate political process,
including slowly building new political institutions, based on the rule of law, while, in the
meantime, Iraqis would serve only in advisory capacities. Through the second half of 2002, the
State Department’s “Future of Iraq” project brought together Iraqi oppositionists and experts, in a
series of working groups, to consider an array of potential post-war challenges. While a tacit goal
of the project was to identify some Iraqis who might serve in future leadership positions, it was ¹⁰⁹
not designed to produce a slate of leaders-in-waiting. The project was also not designed to
produce formal plans. However, some of the ideas it generated did reportedly help operational-
level military planners refine their efforts, and the project might have had a greater impact had ¹¹⁰
more of its output reached the planners.
The Department of Defense (DOD)—more specifically and accurately the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD)—favored putting Iraqis in charge of Iraq, in some form, as soon as possible,
based loosely on the model of Afghanistan. A “real” Iraqi leadership with real power, some
officials believed, might find favor with the Iraqi people and with neighboring states, and might ¹¹¹
shorten the length of the U.S. commitment in Iraq. As Secretary Rumsfeld reportedly told

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^of^the^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^D^e^f^e^ns^e^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,²⁰^{03 a}^nd²⁰⁰⁴^.
¹⁰⁷^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith e}^v^eⁿ^{t org}^a^niz^e^r^{s, 20}^{02 a}^nd²⁰⁰³^{. Se}^e^Mic^h^a^e^l^Ho^w^a^{rd, “}^C^onf^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^D^e^le^ga^te^{s V}ⁱ^e^f^o^{r Politic}^a^l
^Role^{in Ne}^w^Ira^q,”^T^h^{e G}^u^a^r^di^an^{, De}^c^e^m^b^e^r^16,²⁰^{02; a}^{nd J}^udi^th^Mille^{r, “}^Eⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^Conf^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^,^Ira^qi^Disside^{nts Insist}
^oⁿ^S^e^l^f^-^G^o^v^ern^m^en^t^,^”^Th^{e New Y}^o^{rk Times}^,^Ma^r^c^{h 3, 20}^03.
¹⁰⁸^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^a^{nd O}^f^fⁱ^c^e^o^f^the^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^D^e^f^e^ns^e^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^{2002 a}ⁿ^d²⁰^03.
¹⁰⁹^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith Sta}^t^e^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^r^e^s^ponsⁱ^b^le^f^o^r^the^pr^oje^c^t^,²⁰⁰²^aⁿ^{d 2}⁰⁰³^{, a}ⁿ^d^pa^r^tic^ipa^tⁱ^on^{in s}^o^m^e^pr^oje^c^t^s^e^s^sⁱ^ons^.
¹¹⁰^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^C^F^L^C^C^pla^nne^r^s^{, 20}⁰³^aⁿ^d²⁰⁰⁸^.
¹¹¹^A^h^m^e^{d C}^h^a^l^a^b^{i, le}^a^d^e^r^of^the^I^r^a^{qi o}^p^p^o^s^iti^on^um^br^e^lla^g^r^{oup I}^r^a^qⁱ^N^a^tiona^{l C}^ong^r^e^s^s^,^w^a^s^one^k^e^y^fⁱ^g^u^r^e^w^ith
^w^h^o^m^{OSD m}^a^inta^ine^d^c^o^nta^c^t^{, a}^{nd s}^o^m^e^pra^c^titione^{rs a}^nd^obs^e^r^v^e^{rs ha}^v^e^m^a^inta^ine^d^tha^t^{OSD s}^o^u^g^h^{t prim}^a^r^il^y^to
^“cro^wⁿ^Ch^al^abⁱ^.^{” Ho}^w^e^ver,^a^cco^rdⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^OS^D^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s,^t^h^{e “t}^h^e^o^r^{y o}^f^t^h^{e case,}^{” t}^h^atⁱ^s^,ⁱⁿ^t^r^od^u^cⁱⁿ^{g a n}^e^w^Iraqⁱ
^le^a^d^e^r^{ship a}^s^so^{on a}^s^possib^l^e^,^w^a^{s m}^o^reⁱ^m^porta^{nt pa}^rt^of^the^a^r^g^u^m^eⁿ^{t tha}ⁿⁱⁿ^divⁱ^dua^l^pe^rsoⁿ^a^litie^{s. Inf}^o^rm^a^{tion f}^r^om
^t^h^{e Off}ⁱ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e S}^ecret^ar^y^o^f^De^fen^s^e,^Joⁱⁿ^t^S^t^af^f^,^an^d^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^S^t^at^{e o}^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s,²⁰⁰²^and²⁰⁰³^.

President Bush in August 2002, “We will want to get Iraqis in charge of Iraq as soon as ¹¹²
possi ble.”
In the fall of 2002, no clear decision emerged about the role of Iraqis in immediate post-war Iraq.
Discussions among senior leaders apparently focused on the concept of a U.S.-led “transitional
civil administration” that would govern, or help govern, Iraq. However, no agreement was
reached at that time about what authority such a body would have, what its responsibilities would ¹¹³
be, how long it would last, or which Iraqis would be involved.
In January 2003, Administration thinking coalesced around a broad post-war political process for
Iraq, captured in what was universally known at the time as the “mega-brief.” The approach
favored the State Department’s preference for a deliberate process that would give Iraqi post-
Saddam political life a chance to develop organically, but it also acknowledged DOD’s concern to
provide a visible Iraqi leadership—though very weakly empowered—as soon as possible. The
“mega-brief” process would include creating a senior-level Iraqi Consultative Council (ICC) to
serve in an advisory capacity; dismissing top Iraqi leaders from the Saddam era but welcoming
most lower-ranking officials to continue to serve; creating an Iraqi judicial council; holding a
national census; conducting municipal elections; holding elections to a constitutional convention
that would draft a constitution; carrying out a constitutional referendum; and then holding ¹¹⁴
national elections. It was envisaged that the process would take years to complete.
The “mega-brief” approach—which gained currency just as U.S. troops were conducting final
rehearsals for the war—implied that many governance tasks would need to be performed by ¹¹⁵
coalition (non-Iraqi) personnel, whether civilian or military, for some time to come.
¹¹²
^T^o^m^m^y^Fraⁿ^k^s^,^Am^e^r^ic^{an Sol}^die^r^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: R}^e^g^a^{n B}^ook^s^,²⁰⁰⁴^,^p.³⁹^3.^Fr^aⁿ^k^s^r^e^por^ts^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^r^e^m^a^r^k^s^w^e^r^e
^m^a^de^a^t^a^{5 A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^{02 s}^e^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^of^the^N^a^tiona^l^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^il.
¹¹³^In^t^e^rvi^e^w^s^wⁱ^t^h^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e NS}^C,^S^t^at^{e Dep}^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^,^Offⁱ^ce^o^f^t^h^{e S}^ecret^ar^y^o^f^De^fen^s^e,^an^d^t^h^{e Jo}ⁱⁿ^t^S^t^af^f^,
²⁰⁰^{2 a}ⁿ^d²⁰^03.
¹¹⁴^In^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^f^r^o^m^NS^{C st}^aff^,^an^d^Dep^a^rt^men^t^o^f^S^t^at^{e an}^d^Of^fⁱ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e S}^ecret^ary^o^f^De^f^eⁿ^s^{e o}^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s^,²⁰⁰³^an^d
²⁰⁰^8.^Iⁿ^te^s^tim^ony^be^f^o^r^e^the^Se^na^te^For^e^ig^{n R}^e^la^tio^ns^C^o^m^m^itte^e^,^on^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{11, 20}⁰³^{, t}^h^eⁿ^-^Uⁿ^d^e^r^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of
^De^fe^nse^f^o^{r P}^o^lic^y^Doug^Fe^ith^{, w}^{ho f}^a^v^o^re^{d “}^puttⁱ^ng^Ira^qis^{in c}^h^a^r^g^e^,”^de^sc^ribing^the^p^o^ssible^post-^Sa^dda^m^politic^a^l
^pr^oc^e^s^s^,^na^m^e^{d the}^k^e^y^e^l^em^eⁿ^ts^of^the^“^m^e^g^a^-^br^ief^,^”^inc^l^uding^t^h^e^I^r^a^{qi C}^o^ns^ul^ta^tiv^e^C^ounc^il^{, t}^h^e^ju^dicⁱ^a^l^c^o^uⁿ^c^il,^the
^dra^f^ting^of^a^c^ons^tituti^on^f^o^llow^e^{d by}^a^re^fe^re^ndum^{, a}^{nd e}^a^r^ly^loc^a^{l e}^l^e^c^tions^.^Se^e^D^oug^la^s^J^.^Fe^it^h,^W^a^r^an^{d D}^e^cⁱ^sⁱ^on:
^Iⁿ^sⁱ^de^t^h^e^Pe^nt^ag^on^{at t}^h^e^D^a^wⁿ^{of t}^h^e^Wa^{r on}^T^e^rro^rism.^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: H}^a^r^p^e^r^{, 20}^08,^p.³⁶^9.
¹¹⁵^D^u^rⁱ^ng^t^h^e^s^p^rⁱ^ng^of²⁰^03,^w^h^ile^c^o^m^b^a^t^ope^r^a^tions^c^o^m^m^e^nce^d^a^{nd U}^.^S.^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{on t}^h^e^g^r^oun^{d w}^e^r^e^w^holly
^oc^c^upie^d^w^{ith the}^fⁱ^g^h^{t, i}ⁿ^te^r^-^a^g^e^nc^y^w^r^aⁿ^g^ling^c^onc^e^r^ning^pos^t-^S^a^dda^m^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^aⁿ^c^e^a^ppa^r^e^ntl^y^c^ontin^ue^d.^For^m^e^r
^Un^d^e^{r S}^ecret^ary^o^f^De^f^eⁿ^s^{e Do}^u^g^F^eⁱ^t^h^w^rⁱ^t^e^{s t}^h^atⁱⁿ^M^a^rch²⁰⁰³^,^hⁱ^{s o}^f^fⁱ^ce,^OS^{D (P}^olⁱ^c^y⁾^,^d^r^af^t^e^d^{a co}ⁿ^cep^t^t^h^at
^c^a^lle^{d f}^o^r^the^e^a^r^ly^a^ppointm^e^{nt o}^f^aⁿ^I^r^a^{qi I}ⁿ^te^rⁱ^m^A^u^thor^ity⁽^I^I^A⁾^tha^t^w^ould^s^h^a^r^e^le^a^d^e^r^s^h^ip^r^e^s^p^oⁿ^sⁱ^bili^tie^s^w^{ith the}
^c^o^a^litio^n—tha^t^is^{, it w}^oul^d^be^le^s^s^thaⁿ^aⁿ^inte^rim^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt, bu}^t^m^o^re^thaⁿ^a^m^e^re^l^y^c^ons^ulta^tiv^e^body^{. Fe}^ith^w^r^ite^s
^t^h^at^t^h^{e IIA}^coⁿ^cep^t^w^a^{s ap}^p^r^o^v^ed^b^y^P^r^esi^d^eⁿ^t^B^u^sh^at^{a sessi}^oⁿ^of^t^h^{e Nat}ⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^ecu^ri^t^y^Co^un^ci^l^on^M^a^rch¹⁰^,²⁰⁰³^.
^(Se^e^Doug^la^{s J. Fe}^ith^,^W^a^r^aⁿ^d^D^e^cⁱ^sⁱ^on:^Iⁿ^sⁱ^de^the^Pe^nta^g^oⁿ^{at t}^h^e^D^a^wⁿ^{of t}^h^e^Wa^{r on}^T^e^rro^rism.^Ne^w^Yo^rk:
^H^a^r^p^e^r^{, 20}⁰⁸^{, p}^.⁴^08.)^D^u^rⁱ^ng^his^br^ie^f^te^nur^e^{in I}^r^a^{q, w}^{ith a}^vⁱ^e^w^{to ide}ⁿ^tif^yⁱ^ng^I^r^a^qis^to^pla^y^inte^rⁱ^m^r^o^le^s^,^J^a^y^G^a^rⁿ^e^r^,
^le^a^d^e^r^of^the^O^r^g^a^niz^a^{tion f}^o^r^R^e^c^ons^tr^uc^ti^{on a}^{nd H}^u^m^a^nita^rⁱ^aⁿ^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e⁽^O^R^H^A⁾^hos^te^{d tw}^{o “}^bⁱ^g^-^t^eⁿ^t”^m^e^e^ting^s^of
^I^r^a^{qi e}^x^pa^ts^a^{nd c}^o^m^m^unity^lea^d^e^r^s^,^on^A^p^r^{il 15}^{, 2}⁰⁰³^,^{in N}^a^s^a^rⁱ^y^a^{h, a}ⁿ^{d o}ⁿ^A^p^r^il^28,²⁰⁰³^{, i}ⁿ^B^a^g^h^d^a^d^{. I}ⁿ^e^a^r^ly^May
²⁰⁰^3,^just^be^f^o^re^P^r^e^sⁱ^d^eⁿ^{t B}^u^sh^a^nno^unc^e^d^tha^t^a^ne^w^Coa^lition^P^r^ov^isiona^{l A}^u^th^ority^{, le}^{d by}^Am^b^a^ssa^{dor L}^.^P^a^u^l
^“Jerr^y^{” Bre}^m^er^w^o^u^l^d^sup^e^rced^{e ORH}^A^,^G^a^rn^{er st}^at^ed^p^u^b^lⁱ^c^l^y^t^h^at^{a “n}^u^c^l^e^u^s^{” o}^f^{a “t}^em^p^o^r^ar^y^”^Ir^aqⁱ^l^ead^ershⁱ^p
^w^{ould e}^m^e^r^g^e^b^y^la^te^r^tha^t^m^onth^.^A^f^te^r^his^a^r^rⁱ^v^a^{l, B}^r^em^e^r^s^l^ow^e^d^the^pr^oc^e^s^s^a^nd,^{in J}^u^ly²⁰⁰³^{, c}^r^e^a^t^e^d^the^I^r^a^qi
^G^o^v^e^rning^Counc^il—aⁿ^inte^rim^b^ody^lik^e^both^the^{ICC a}ⁿ^{d IIA}^c^o^nc^e^p^ts^{, w}^{ith re}^la^tiv^e^l^y^little^a^u^tho^r^ity^{. Brem}^e^r^ha^s
^argu^ed^t^h^at^at^t^h^{e t}ⁱ^m^{e o}^f^hⁱ^{s o}^wⁿ^ap^p^oⁱⁿ^t^m^en^t^t^o^h^ead^C^P^Aⁱⁿ^earl^y^M^a^y^,^t^h^{e P}^r^esi^d^en^t^’^s^dⁱ^rectⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^hⁱ^m^w^a^{s n}^o^t^t^o
^h^u^rry^{, b}^u^t^to^“tak^{e th}^{e tim}^{e n}^eces^sar^y^to^{create a stab}^{le p}^o^liti^{cal en}^vⁱ^roⁿ^m^en^{t.” See L}^.^P^a^u^l^Brem^{er III, “Facts f}^o^{r Feith}^:
^CP^A^Histo^r^y^,^”^Nation^a^{l Re}^vⁱ^e^w^Online^,^Ma^r^c^{h 1}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁸^{. I}^t^is^pos^sⁱ^ble^tha^t^de^s^p^ite^s^o^m^e^br^oa^{d pr}^e^sⁱ^d^eⁿ^tia^l^dir^e^c^tio^n,
^k^e^y^s^eⁿⁱ^o^r^p^r^actiti^oⁿ^e^{rs f}^a^iled^to^r^each^{a sin}^g^{le, sh}^ared^uⁿ^d^e^rs^tan^dⁱⁿ^g^o^f^th^{e ro}^{le t}^h^{at an}ⁱⁿ^terim^Iraqⁱ^b^o^d^y^w^o^u^l^d^p^l^ay
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Military commanders and planners typically base operational plans on policy assumptions and
clearly specify those assumptions at the beginning of any plans briefing. For OIF planners, the
critical policy assumptions concerned who would have which post-war roles and responsibilities.
OIF preparations reversed the usual sequence, in that military planning began long before the key
policy debates, let alone policy conclusions.
During their planning process, military commanders apparently sought to elicit the policy ¹¹⁶
guidance they needed by briefing their policy assumptions and hoping for a response. In
December 2001, in his first OIF brief to President Bush, General Franks included as one element
of the mission: “establish a provisional Iraqi government,” but this measure was neither
confirmed nor rejected. General Franks wrote later that as he briefed this to the President, he had ¹¹⁷
in mind the Bonn Conference for Afghanistan. In August 2002, still without a policy decision
about post-war responsibilities, CENTCOM included in its war plans briefing the assumption:
“DoS [Department of State] will promote creation of a broad-based, credible provisional ¹¹⁸
government prior to D-Day.”
Unable to determine what Iraqi civilian structure they would be asked to support, the military
sought to elicit guidance about the coalition’s own post-war architecture and responsibilities.
According to General Franks, the CENTCOM war plans slides briefed to President Bush and the
National Security Council on August 5, 2002, included the intentionally provocative phrase, ¹¹⁹
“military administration,” but no decision about post-war architecture was made at that time.
Two months later, the OIF plans slides included, for the first time, a full wiring diagram of the
coalition’s post-war structure, describing post-war responsibilities in a “military administration.”
A “Joint Task Force” would be responsible for security, a civilian “High Commissioner” would be
responsible for all other functions; and both would report to CENTCOM. This chart still failed to
prompt a decision, although Office of the Secretary of Defense staff reportedly spent the ensuing ¹²⁰
weeks considering “High Commissioner” candidates, just in case.
By late 2002, in the absence of detailed policy guidance, military commanders at several levels
had launched “Phase IV” planning efforts, to identify and begin to prepare for potential post-war
requirements. In January 2003, based on a recommendation that came out of the “Internal Look”
exercise conducted in Kuwait in December 2002, Brigadier General Steve Hawkins was named to
lead a new “Task Force IV.” TFIV, an ad hoc organization, was tasked to conduct post-war
planning, and to prepare to deploy to Baghdad as the nucleus of a post-war headquarters. TFIV
was dispatched immediately to Kuwait, to work under the operational control of the Combined

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^an^d^t^h^{e au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^t^yⁱ^t^w^o^u^l^d^exerci^se.
¹¹⁶^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^C^E^N^T^C^O^{M pla}^nne^r^s^{, 2}⁰⁰³^aⁿ^{d 2}⁰⁰⁶^.
¹¹⁷^T^o^m^m^y^Fraⁿ^k^s^,^Am^e^r^ic^{an Sol}^die^r^,^New^Yo^r^k^:^R^e^gan^B^o^o^k^s,²⁰^04.
¹¹⁸^“^C^om^pa^r^t^m^e^nte^d^P^l^aⁿⁿⁱ^ng^Ef^f^o^r^t^{, 15}^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^02”^br^ie^f^,^pa^r^t^of^“^T^{op Se}^c^r^e^t^P^o^l^o^Ste^p^”^c^o^lle^c^tio^n,^obtaⁱ^ne^d
^thr^o^ug^{h t}^h^e^Fr^e^e^dom^of^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion A}^c^{t a}^nd^pos^te^d^by^the^N^a^tiona^{l Se}^c^u^r^ity^A^r^c^h^iv^e^,^T^h^e^G^e^or^g^e^W^a^s^h^ing^t^on
^Uⁿ^iv^e^r^sⁱ^t^y^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^w^w^.gw^u^.e^du/~ns^a^rc^hiv^/^N^S^A^E^BB/N^S^A^E^BB214/^T^a^b%^20I.pdf^.
¹¹⁹^T^o^m^m^y^Fraⁿ^k^s^,^Am^e^r^ic^{an Sol}^die^r^,^New^Yo^r^k^:^R^e^gan^B^o^o^k^s,²⁰^04.
¹²⁰^In^t^e^rvi^e^w^s^wⁱ^t^h^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e Off}ⁱ^c^e^o^f^t^h^{e S}^ecret^ar^y^o^f^D^e^f^eⁿ^s^e,^t^h^{e Jo}ⁱⁿ^t^S^t^af^f^,^t^h^{e Dep}^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^S^t^at^e,^an^d
^the^N^S^C^s^t^a^f^f^,^{2002 a}^nd²⁰⁰³^.

Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC)—the ground forces component of CENTCOM—¹²¹
and its commanding general, Lieutenant General David McKiernan. TFIV thus provided skilled
labor, but no connectivity to the still on-going Washington policy debates about the post-war
division of responsibilities.
In March 2003, CFLCC launched a dedicated post-war planning effort of its own, led by Major
General Albert Whitley (UK), who was part of the CFLCC leadership. His more comprehensive
effort—known as Eclipse II—benefitted from close connectivity with its sister-effort, CFLCC’s
combat operations planning, but lacked direct access to the broader Washington policy debates.
In addition to lacking policy guidance about post-war roles and responsibilities, these operational-
level planning efforts lacked insight into key aspects of the current state of affairs in Iraq. For
example, planning assumed that Iraqis, in particular law enforcement personnel, would be
available and willing to resume some civic duties on the “day after.” Also, plans did not recognize
the deeply degraded status of Iraqi infrastructure, such as electricity grids.
On January 20, 2003, by National Security Presidential Directive 24, the President created the
Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), to serve first as the post-
war planning office in the Pentagon, and then to deploy to Iraq. Throughout, ORHA would report
to the Department of Defense. Retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, who had led
Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq after the Gulf War, was appointed to lead ORHA. He
quickly brought on board a team of other retired Army general officers to serve in key leadership ¹²²
positions.
ORHA held its founding conference on February 20 and 21, 2003, at the National Defense
University. Participants included the fledgling ORHA staff, representatives of civilian agencies
that would contribute to the effort, and representatives of the military commands—long since
deployed to Kuwait—that would become ORHA’s partners.
As briefed at NDU, ORHA would be responsible for three pillars of activity in post-war Iraq—
Civil Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs, and Reconstruction—while the military would be responsible
for security. Those ORHA efforts would commence in each area as soon as major combat
operations ended. The most important constraint was time—the civilian agencies were not
organized or resourced to be able to provide substantial resources or personnel by the start of
major combat operations.
ORHA’s command relationships with other Department of Defense bodies were initially a topic
of dispute. During ORHA’s “post-war planning office” days inside the Pentagon, General Garner
reported directly to Secretary Rumsfeld. It was generally agreed that, once in the field, ORHA
¹²¹
^In^t^e^rvi^e^w^s^wⁱ^t^h^T^F^IV^l^ead^{ers an}^d^m^e^m^b^ers,^an^d^wⁱ^t^h^CF^L^{CC st}^a^f^f^,²⁰⁰³^.^S^{ee al}^so^Mⁱ^ch^ael^R.^G^o^rdoⁿ^and^G^eⁿ^e^ral
^B^e^rⁿ^a^r^{d E. T}^r^aⁱ^nor^,^C^o^br^{a I}^I^:^T^h^e^Iⁿ^sⁱ^de^Stor^y^an^{d t}^h^e^Iⁿ^v^a^sⁱ^on^an^{d O}^c^c^upa^tioⁿ^{of I}^r^a^q^,^New^Yo^{rk: V}ⁱ^{ntage Bo}^o^k^s,
²⁰⁰^6.
¹²²^T^h^ey^inc^l^ude^{d L}ⁱ^e^u^te^naⁿ^t^G^e^ne^r^a^{l R}^{on A}^d^a^m^s^,^Lⁱ^e^u^te^na^{nt G}^e^ne^r^a^{l J}^e^r^r^y^B^a^te^s^,^Ma^jor^G^e^ne^r^a^{l B}^r^uc^e^Moor^e^,^a^nd
^Brig^a^d^ie^{r G}^e^ne^r^a^{l Buc}^k^W^a^lte^rs.^T^h^e^initia^{l le}^a^d^e^r^shi^p^te^a^m^a^l^{so inc}^l^ude^d^one^seⁿⁱ^{or le}^a^d^e^r^f^r^om^the^De^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}
^S^t^at^e,^Am^b^a^ssad^o^r^Barb^{ara Bo}^dⁱ^ne,^{a n}^o^t^e^d^A^r^abⁱ^s^t^an^d^regi^on^al^exp^e^rt^.

would fall under CENTCOM. CFLCC insisted that ORHA would also fall under CFLCC, but ¹²³
ORHA resisted that arrangement.
Shortly after the founding conference at NDU, ORHA deployed to Kuwait with a skeleton staff
and limited resources, and set up its headquarters at the Kuwait Hilton.

Major combat operations in Iraq, launched in March 2003, roughly followed the course that had
been outlined at the CENTCOM Component Commanders Conference in January that year. The
coalition force was both joint—with representatives from all the U.S. military services—and ¹²⁴
combined—with participants from coalition partner countries.
As long planned, the effort had actually begun before the full-scale launch, with early infiltration
into Iraq by the CIA, including the so-called Northern and Southern Iraq Liaison Elements (NILE
and SILE), whose task was to gather intelligence, form relationships, and lay the groundwork for ¹²⁵
the early entry of Special Operations Forces (SOF).
SOF, in turn, had also entered Iraq before the formal launch. Among other missions, SOF secured
bases in Al Anbar province in western Iraq, secured suspected WMD sites, pursued some of the
designated “high-value targets,” and worked closely with Iraqi Kurdish forces in northern Iraq—
the pesh merga—to attack a key stronghold of the designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, ¹²⁶
Ansar al-Islam. Special operations forces in OIF, like the conventional forces, were both joint
and combined—including contingents from the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland. Defense
expert Andrew Krepinevich estimated that “nearly 10,000” SOF took part in OIF major ¹²⁷
combat.
The visible public launch of OIF took place on March 20, 2003, shortly after the expiration of
President Bush’s 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons (see above, “Ultimatum to
¹²³
^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^O^R^HA^s^e^nior^l^e^a^d^e^r^s^,^a^{nd C}^E^N^T^C^O^{M a}^{nd C}^F^L^C^C^s^t^a^f^f^,²⁰⁰³^.
¹²⁴^T^h^e^{U.S. Coa}^s^{t G}^u^a^r^{d, t}^h^e^oⁿ^ly^m^ilita^r^y^s^e^rv^ic^e^tha^t^re^ports^{to t}^h^e^De^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^Ho^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^rit^y^r^a^the^r^thaⁿ^t^h^e
^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^c^ontrⁱ^b^u^t^e^{d pe}^r^s^on^ne^{l t}^o^c^o^nd^uc^{t m}^a^r^iti^m^e^-ⁱ^nte^r^c^e^p^tioⁿ^ope^r^a^tio^ns^aⁿ^{d to}^c^o^nduc^t^c^o^a^s^ta^l
^pa^tr^ols^.
¹²⁵^Se^e^B^{ob W}^o^odw^a^r^d,^Pl^{an of}^A^tta^c^k^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: Sim}^{on a}^{nd Sc}^hus^t^e^r^,²⁰^04,^p^p^.2^08-²¹^2;^Mic^h^a^e^l^R^.^G^o^r^{don a}ⁿ^d
^G^e^ne^r^a^{l B}^e^rⁿ^a^r^{d E. T}^r^aⁱ^nor^,^Co^b^r^a^{II: T}^h^{e In}^si^d^e^S^t^o^r^{y a}ⁿ^d^th^{e I}ⁿ^va^sioⁿ^aⁿ^d^Occu^p^a^t^ioⁿ^o^f^Ira^q^,^Ne^w^Yo^{rk: V}ⁱⁿ^t^age
^B^ook^s^,²⁰⁰⁶^,^pp.¹⁵^6-¹⁵^{7, 1}⁸⁸^-¹⁸⁹^{, 3}⁸⁸^;^aⁿ^{d “}^T^{op Se}^c^r^e^t^Polo^Ste^p^”^c^o^lle^c^tion,^“^C^om^pa^r^t^m^e^nte^d^P^l^aⁿⁿⁱ^ng^Ef^f^o^r^t^{, 15}
^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^2”^C^E^N^T^C^O^{M br}^ie^f^,^obtaⁱ^ne^{d t}^h^r^o^ug^{h t}^h^e^Fr^e^e^dom^of^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion A}^c^{t a}^{nd p}^o^s^t^e^d^by^the^N^a^tiona^{l Se}^c^u^r^ity
^A^r^c^h^ive^,^T^h^e^G^e^or^g^e^W^a^s^h^ing^t^on^Uⁿ^iv^e^r^s^ity^{, av}^a^ila^ble^a^t^http:/^/w^w^w^.gw^u^.e^du/~ns^a^r^c^hiv^/^N^S^A^E^B^B^/^N^S^A^E^B^B^214/
^inde^x^.^htm^.
¹²⁶^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^C^E^N^T^C^O^{M, C}^F^L^C^C^a^{nd V}^C^o^r^p^s^pla^nne^r^s^,²⁰⁰³^{. Se}^e^a^l^s^o^A^ndr^e^w^K^r^e^p^ine^v^ic^h,^“^O^pe^r^a^tion
^I^r^a^{qi Fr}^e^e^dom^{: A}^Fir^s^t-^B^l^us^{h A}^s^s^e^s^s^m^e^nt,”^C^e^nte^r^f^o^r^Str^a^te^gⁱ^c^a^{nd B}^u^dg^e^t^a^r^y^A^s^s^e^ssm^eⁿ^ts^{, 200}^3.
¹²⁷^A^ndr^e^w^K^r^e^p^ine^v^ic^{h, “}^O^pe^r^a^tion^I^r^a^{qi Fr}^e^e^d^om^{: A}^Fir^s^t-^B^l^us^{h A}^s^s^e^s^s^m^e^nt,”^C^e^nte^r^f^o^r^Str^a^te^gⁱ^c^aⁿ^{d B}^u^dg^e^t^a^r^y
^A^s^s^e^s^s^m^e^nts^,²⁰^03.

Saddam Hussein”).¹²⁸ After months of debate about the sequencing of the air and ground
campaigns, the planned sequence shifted in two major ways at the last minute.
By early 2003, the plans called for beginning with a short air-only campaign, followed by the
ground invasion. However, late-breaking evidence gave rise to stronger concerns that the Iraqi
regime would deliberately destroy its southern oil wells, so the timing of the ground forces launch
was moved up, ahead of the scheduled air campaign launch.
Then, even closer to launch time, the CIA obtained what seemed to be compelling information
about Saddam Hussein’s location—at Dora Farms near Baghdad. In the early hours of March 20,
just as the ultimatum expired, a pair of F-117 fighters targeted the site. That attack narrowly
followed a barrage of Tomahawk missiles, launched from ships at key leadership sites in
Baghdad.
That night, coalition ground forces crossed the line of departure from the Kuwaiti desert into
southern Iraq. The following day, March 21, 2003, brought the larger-scale “shock and awe”
attacks on Iraqi command and control and other sites, from both Air Force and Navy assets. Early
Iraqi responses included setting a few oil wells on fire, and firing a few poorly directed missiles ¹²⁹
into Kuwait, most of which were successfully intercepted by Patriot missiles.
The ground campaign was led by Army Lieutenant General David McKiernan, the Commanding
General of the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), the ground component
of CENTCOM. The strategy was a quick, two-pronged push from Kuwait up through southern
Iraq to Baghdad.
Under CFLCC, the ground “main effort” was led by U.S. Army V Corps, under Lieutenant
General William Scott Wallace. V Corps was assigned the western route up to Baghdad, west of ¹³⁰^st
the Euphrates River. Meanwhile, the 1 Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF), led by Lieutenant
General James Conway, was assigned the eastern route, closer to the border with Iran. From a
tactical perspective, for both the Army and the Marines this was a very long projection of force—
over 600 kilometers from Kuwait up to Baghdad, and more for those units that pushed further
north to Tikrit or to Mosul. Those long distances reportedly strained capabilities including
logistics and communications.
¹²⁸
^Som^e^dis^c^r^e^pa^nc^ie^s^{in c}^o^nte^m^por^a^r^y^pr^e^s^s^c^o^v^e^r^a^g^e^a^{nd la}^te^r^a^c^c^ounts^a^r^e^d^u^e^t^o^the^eⁱ^g^h^t-^ho^ur^tⁱ^m^e^dif^f^e^r^eⁿ^c^e
^be^tw^e^eⁿ^Wa^shing^t^{on D.C.}^{, w}^h^e^r^e^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t B}^u^sh^issue^d^t^h^e⁴⁸^-h^ou^{r ultim}^a^t^um^{on the}^e^v^eⁿ^ing^of^Ma^rc^{h 17}^{; a}ⁿ^d
^B^a^g^hda^{d, w}^h^e^r^e^tha^t^ultⁱ^m^a^tu^m^ex^pir^e^{d in}^the^e^a^r^ly^m^o^rⁿ^ing^of^Ma^r^c^{h 20}^{. T}^h^e^tim^e^line^of^ope^r^a^tio^ns^{, de}^s^c^rⁱ^be^d^he^r^e^{, is}
^ba^s^e^{d on}^the^tⁱ^m^e^{in B}^a^g^hda^d.
¹²⁹^Inf^o^rm^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^V^Cor^p^s^le^a^d^e^r^s^a^{nd s}^t^a^f^f^,^2003.^T^h^e^ba^sⁱ^c^f^a^c^t^s^of^the^c^a^s^e^,^during^t^h^eⁱⁿ^itia^l^da^y^s^of^O^I^{F, w}^e^re
^e^x^tr^em^e^l^y^w^e^ll-^doc^um^eⁿ^te^{d by}^the^inte^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^ona^l^pr^e^s^s^.^For^oⁿ^e^c^l^e^a^r^a^c^c^ount,^s^e^e^R^o^m^e^s^h^R^a^tne^s^a^r^{, “}^A^w^e^s^t^r^u^c^k^,”
^Tim^e^,^M^a^rch²³^,²⁰⁰³^.^S^{ee al}^so^Mⁱ^ch^ael^R.^G^o^rd^on^and^G^eⁿ^e^ral^Bern^ard^E^.^T^r^aiⁿ^o^r^,^C^o^br^{a I}^I^:^T^h^e^Iⁿ^sⁱ^de^Stor^y^an^{d t}^h^e
^Iⁿ^va^si^on^an^{d Occu}^p^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^of^I^r^aq^,^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: Vin}^t^a^g^e^B^ook^s^,²⁰⁰⁶^.
¹³⁰^{For a}ⁿ^in-^d^e^p^t^h^de^sc^riptio^{n f}^r^om^the^ta^c^tic^a^l^le^v^e^{l of}^the^A^r^m^y^{’s role}^{in OIF}^thr^oug^{h m}^a^{jor c}^o^m^b^a^t^o^p^e^r^a^tions,
^c^o^m^mⁱ^ssione^{d by}^the^A^r^m^y^a^{nd w}^r^itte^{n by}^pa^rtic^ipaⁿ^ts,^se^e^G^r^e^g^ory^Fonte^not,^{E.J. De}^g^e^{n, a}ⁿ^{d Da}^vⁱ^{d T}^ohn^,^On^Poⁱⁿ^t:
^The^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^Ar^m^yⁱⁿ^O^p^e^r^at^{ion I}^r^aqi^Fr^e^e^dom^,^A^nna^p^o^lis,^M^D^{: Na}^v^a^{l Institute}^P^r^e^{ss, 2}⁰⁰⁵^.

The Marines were assigned the eastern route up to Baghdad—with more urban areas than the
Army’s western route. The basic strategy still called for a quick drive to Baghdad. Just across the
border into Iraq, IMEF took the far southern port city of Umm Qasr.
The UK First Armored Division, which fell under IMEF, was tasked to take Basra, Iraq’s second
largest city. The UK Division faced resistance from members of the paramilitary force Saddam
Fedayeen and others still loyal to the Ba’ath Party. To limit casualties in the large urban area,
rather than enter the city immediately in full force, the Division used a more methodical
elimination of opponents, combined with outreach to the population to explain their intentions.
IMEF supported the Division’s use of a slow and deliberate tempo. After several weeks of gradual
attrition, the Division pushed into Basra on April 6, 2003.
The main IMEF force encountered some resistance as they pushed north, in particular at the town
of Nassiriyah, a geographical choke-point. At Nassiriyah, “there were a number of things that
seemed to hit us all about the same time, that dented our momentum,” LtGen Conway later noted.
There, the Marines suffered casualties from a friendly fire incident with Apaches. As widely ^th
reported, the Army’s 507 Maintenance Company lost its way in the area and stumbled into an
ambush, in which some personnel were killed and others, including PFC Jessica Lynch, were
taken hostage. The area was blanketed by fierce desert sandstorms. And the Saddam Fedayeen put
up a determined resistance—“not a shock, but a surprise,” as LtGen Conway later reflected.
Evidence suggested that additional Iraqi fighters, inspired by the ambush carried out by the ¹³¹
Fedayeen, came from Baghdad to Nassiriyah to join the fight. After the defeating the resistance
at Nassiriyah, the Marines pushed up to Baghdad along their eastern route.
In the west, the Army faced a longer distance but a less-populated terrain. V Corps began combat
operations with two divisions under its command, the Third Infantry Division (3ID), under Major ^st^st
General Buford Blount, and the 101 Airborne Division (101), under Major General David
Petraeus.
The 3ID rapidly led the western charge to Baghdad, moving speedily through the south and
reaching Saddam International Airport on April 4. The division launched its first “thunder run”—
a fast, armored strike—into Baghdad on April 5, and the second on April 7. The purpose of the
first, according to the Brigade Commander in charge, Colonel David Perkins, was “to create as
much confusion as I can inside the city.” The purpose of the second was “to make sure, in no ¹³²
uncertain terms, that people knew the city had fallen and we were in charge of it.”
The 101^st followed the 3ID up the western route through southern Iraq, clearing resistance in ^st
southern cities and allowing the 3ID to move as quickly as possible. Soldiers from the 101 faced
fighting in key urban areas—Hillah, Najaf, Karbala. Just after mid-April, the division arrived and ¹³³
set up its headquarters in Mosul, in northern Iraq.
¹³¹
^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith pa}^rtic^ipaⁿ^ts,²⁰⁰³^{. Se}^e^a^l^so^{PBS Fr}^on^tlin^e^,^“^I^nte^r^vⁱ^e^w^:^L^t^.Geⁿ^{. Ja}^m^e^{s Conw}^a^y^,”^Fe^brua^ry^{26, 2}⁰⁰⁴^,
^a^t^http^://w^ww^.pbs.org^/wg^bh/pa^g^e^s/f^r^ontline^/^show^s/^inv^a^sion/^inte^rvⁱ^e^ws/c^onw^a^y^{. ht}^m^l^#^m^a^r^ine^s^.
¹³²^P^B^{S Fr}^on^tline^,^“^I^nte^r^vⁱ^e^w^{: CO}^L^Da^vⁱ^{d P}^e^rk^ins,”^Fe^brua^ry^26,²⁰⁰⁴^{, a}^t^http^://w^ww^.pbs.org^/wg^bh/pa^g^e^s/^f^r^ontline^/
^show^s/inv^a^sion/^inte^rv^ie^w^s^/^p^e^r^kⁱⁿ^s^.htm^l#thu^nde^r.
¹³³^S^{ee P}^r^{ess Co}ⁿ^f^eren^{ce w}ⁱ^t^h^M^a^j^o^{r G}^eⁿ^e^ral^Da^vi^d^P^e^t^r^aeu^s,^Ma^y^{13, 20}^03,^a^t^h^ttp:/^/www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^traⁿ^sc^ripts/
^t^r^an^scri^p^t^.^a^sp^x?t^r^an^scri^p^tⁱ^d⁼²⁶⁰^1.^F^o^r^an^acco^un^t^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e p}^e^rsp^ectⁱ^v^{e o}^f^{a b}^a^t^t^a^lⁱ^oⁿ^c^o^mm^an^d^e^{r i}ⁿ^t^h^{e 1}⁰¹^st^Aⁱ^r^bor^ne
^Dⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on, s}^e^e^C^h^rⁱ^s^t^op^he^r^H^u^g^h^e^s^,^W^a^r^oⁿ^Tw^{o Fr}^oⁿ^ts^:^Aⁿ^Iⁿ^fa^ntr^y^C^o^m^m^aⁿ^d^e^r^’^s^W^a^r^{in I}^r^aq^a^{nd t}^h^e^Pe^nt^agoⁿ^,
^D^r^e^x^e^l^H^{ill, P}^A^{: Ca}^s^e^m^a^te^{, 2007}^.

Like the Marines, the Army was somewhat surprised by the resistance they encountered from the
Saddam Fedayeen. LTG Wallace apparently caused some consternation at higher headquarters
levels with his candid remarks to the press in late March: “The enemy we’re fighting is different
from the one we’d war-gamed against.” He explained, “The attacks we’re seeing are bizarre—¹³⁴
technical vehicles with .50 calibers and every kind of weapon charging tanks and Bradleys.”
Coupled with major sand storms, these attacks posed challenges to the ground forces’ long supply
lines—“lines of communication”—running up from Kuwait over hundreds of miles through ¹³⁵
southern Iraq.
In the north, on March 26, 2003, about 1,000 soldiers from the 173^rd Airborne Brigade, part of the
Army’s Southern European Task Force based in Italy, parachuted into northern Iraq. They began
their mission by securing an airfield so that cargo planes carrying tanks and Bradleys could land. ^rd
Once on the ground, the 173, working closely with air and ground Special Operating Forces and
with Kurdish pesh merga forces, expanded the northern front of OIF.
Initial coalition plans had called for the heavy 4^th Infantry Division (4ID) to open the northern
front by crossing into Iraq from Turkey. The intended primary mission was challenging Iraqi
regular army forces based above Baghdad. A more subtle secondary mission was to place limits
on possible Kurdish ambitions to control more territory in northern Iraq, thus providing some
reassurance to the Government of Turkey and discouraging it from sending Turkish forces into
Iraq to restrain the Kurds.
By early 2003, 4ID equipment was sitting on ships circling in the eastern Mediterranean Sea,
waiting for an outcome of the ongoing negotiations with the Turkish government. But on March
1, 2003, the Turkish parliament rejected a proposal that would have allowed the 4ID to use
Turkish territory.
Iraqi opposition fighters made a very limited contribution to coalition major combat efforts.
Before the war, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had launched an ambitious program to
recruit and train up to 3,000 Iraqi expats, to be known as the “Free Iraqi Forces.” Training, by
U.S. forces, took place in Taszar, Hungary. Ultimately, the number of recruits and graduates was
much lower than originally projected. Most graduates did deploy to Iraq, where they served with
U.S. forces primarily as interpreters or working with local communities on civil affairs ¹³⁶
projects.
Meanwhile, in late March 2003, Iraqi expatriate oppositionist Ahmed Chalabi contacted U.S.
officials with a request to send a group of his own fighters from northern to southern Iraq to join
the fight. After some discussion, agreement was reached and a U.S. military flight was arranged.
In early April, Chalabi and 600 fighters stepped off the plane at Tallil air base in southern Iraq.
¹³⁴
^Ri^{ck A}^t^kiⁿ^s^oⁿ^,^“G^en^eral^:^A^L^oⁿ^g^{er W}^a^{r L}ⁱ^k^e^l^y^,^”^Wa^shⁱⁿ^g^t^on^P^o^st^{, Ma}^r^c^h^28,²⁰⁰³^{. A}^s^k^e^{d w}^h^e^t^her^this^s^u^g^g^e^s^t^e^d
^t^h^{e l}ⁱ^k^elⁱ^h^oo^{d o}^f^{a m}^u^ch^l^oⁿ^g^{er w}^a^{r t}^h^an^f^o^recast^,^L^T^G^W^a^l^l^a^{ce re}^p^lⁱ^e^d^,^“It^’^{s b}^e^giⁿⁿⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^l^o^o^k^t^h^at^w^a^y.^”^A^s^ked^l^a^t^e^r
^t^h^at^d^a^y^f^o^{r h}ⁱ^{s react}ⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^t^h^{ese co}^mm^en^t^s^,^S^ecret^ar^y^Ru^msfel^dⁿ^o^t^ed^,^“W^el^l^,^{I d}ⁱ^dⁿ^’^t^read^t^h^{e art}ⁱ^c^l^e^{—I saw}^t^h^e
^h^ead^lin^{e.” See DOD}^P^r^{ess Brief}ⁱⁿ^g^w^ith^Secretar^y^Ru^m^s^feld^{, March}²⁸^,²⁰⁰³^,^av^ailab^l^e^{at h}^t^t^p^://w^ww^.d^e^f^en^selin^k^.^m^il/
^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tid⁼²¹⁸⁰^s^]^.
¹³⁵^Iⁿ^fo^r^m^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^fr^o^m^V^C^o^rp^s^s^t^a^ff,²⁰⁰³^.
¹³⁶^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^of^the^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^o^f^D^e^f^e^ns^e^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^nd^C^F^L^C^C^a^{nd C}^J^T^F^-⁷^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^2003.

The forces were neither equipped nor well-organized. Accounts from many observers, in ¹³⁷
succeeding months, suggested that some members of the group engaged in lawless behavior.
On April 9, 2003, the statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos square in Baghdad was toppled. Two
days after the second 3ID “thunder run,” this event signaled for many observers, inside and
outside Iraq, that the old Iraqi regime had ended.
Consistent with the war plans from “Generated Start” onward, U.S. forces continued to flow into ^th
Iraq. The 4 Infantry Division (4ID), diverted from its original northern front plans, had re-routed ^st
its troops and equipment to Kuwait. 4ID forces began entering Iraq on April 12, 2003. The 1 ^st
Armored Division (1AD) also began arriving in April 2003. According to the planning, the 1
Cavalry Division (1CD) was scheduled to be next in line. However, in April 2003, Secretary
Rumsfeld, in coordination with General Franks, made the decision that 1CD was not needed in
Iraq at that time—a decision that apparently caused consternation for some ground ¹³⁸
commanders.
As soon as it became apparent that the old regime was no longer exercising control, widespread
looting took place in Baghdad and elsewhere. Targets included government buildings, and the
former houses of regime leaders, but also some private businesses and cultural institutions.
Leaders of the Iraqi National Museum in Baghdad reported, for example, that “looters had taken ¹³⁹
or destroyed 170,000 items of antiquity dating back thousands of years.” Looters and vandals ¹⁴⁰
also targeted unguarded weapons stockpiles largely abandoned by former Iraqi security forces.
Some observers and coalition participants suggested that the coalition simply did not have enough ¹⁴¹
troops to stop all the unlawful behavior.
Meanwhile, U.S. senior leadership attention had turned to Iraq’s political future. In April, the
President’s “Special Envoy for Free Iraqis,” Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, chaired two “big
tent” meetings of Iraqis. The first was held on April 15, 2003, at the ancient city of Ur, near Tallil
air base, and the second was held on April 28, at the Baghdad Convention Center. Participants
include expatriate opposition leaders and Iraqi Kurds, together with a number of in-country
community leaders who had been identified by the CIA and other sources. The sessions focused
¹³⁷
^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^C^E^N^T^C^O^{M a}ⁿ^d^{V C}^o^r^p^s^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,²⁰⁰^{3. C}^u^rⁱ^o^u^s^l^y^{, C}^h^a^l^a^b^{i a}ⁿ^{d t}^h^e^fⁱ^g^h^te^r^s^{, a}^ppa^r^e^ntly^vⁱ^ew^ing
^t^h^em^sel^v^{es a}^s^{a st}^roⁿ^g^{er i}ⁿ^carn^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e T}^a^{szar t}^r^aiⁿⁱ^ng^pr^og^r^a^m^,^a^d^o^p^te^{d t}^h^e^na^m^e^“^F^r^e^e^I^r^a^{qi Fo}^r^c^e^s^.”^T^o
^dⁱ^stⁱⁿ^guⁱ^s^h^t^h^em^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e T}^a^sz^ar-t^raiⁿ^ed^Iraqⁱ^s,^t^h^{e Dep}^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^Defen^s^{e cal}^l^e^d^t^h^em^t^h^{e “F}^{ree Ira}^qⁱ^Fⁱ^ghtⁱⁿ^{g F}^o^rce.^”
¹³⁸^S^{ee M}ⁱ^ch^ael^G^o^rd^on^an^{d Bern}^ar^d^T^r^aiⁿ^o^r^,^“Dash^t^o^Bagh^d^a^{d l}^e^f^t^t^o^p^U.^S^.^G^eⁿ^e^ral^s^Di^vi^d^e^d^,^”^The^Ne^{w Yor}^k^Tim^e^s^,
^Ma^r^c^{h 13}^{, 2}⁰⁰⁶^.
¹³⁹^“^L^oote^r^s^r^a^ns^a^c^k^B^a^g^hda^{d m}^u^s^e^um^,”^{BBC News,}^A^p^r^{il 12,}²⁰⁰³^.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^J^o^hⁿ^B^u^rⁿ^s^,^“^A^N^a^{tion a}^t^W^a^r^:^T^h^e
^Iraqⁱ^s,^L^o^o^tⁱⁿ^{g an}^d^a^S^uⁱ^cⁱ^d^{e A}^t^t^{ack as Ch}^ao^{s G}^r^o^w^{s i}ⁿ^Bagh^d^a^d^,^”^Th^{e New Yo}^{rk T}ⁱ^mes,^A^p^ri^l¹¹^,²⁰⁰³^.^S^ecret^ary^o^f
^D^e^f^e^ns^e^D^ona^{ld R}^u^m^s^f^e^{ld de}^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d t}^h^e^dy^namⁱ^c^a^s^“^untidine^s^s^,^”^a^{nd a}^m^a^nif^e^s^t^a^{tion of}^“^p^eⁿ^t-^up^f^e^e^ling^s^tha^t^m^a^y
^resu^l^t^f^r^o^m^d^ecad^{es o}^f^rep^r^essi^oⁿ^”^dⁱ^rect^ed^agaiⁿ^s^t^t^h^e^o^l^d^regi^me.^S^{ee Dep}^a^rt^men^t^o^f^De^f^eⁿ^s^{e Ne}^w^s^Bri^e^fⁱⁿ^g^,
^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^D^e^f^e^nse^Dona^{ld Ru}^m^s^f^e^{ld, A}^p^{ril 11}^{, 2}⁰⁰³^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^ww^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^traⁿ^sc^ripts/
^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tⁱ^d⁼²³⁶^7.
¹⁴⁰^S^{ee an}^assess^m^eⁿ^t^b^y^an^OIF^p^a^rtⁱ^cⁱ^p^an^t^:^C^o^l^oⁿ^e^l^M^a^rk^Kling^e^lho^e^fe^{r, “}^C^a^p^ture^{d E}ⁿ^e^m^y^Am^m^{unition i}ⁿ^Ope^r^a^tⁱ^on
^I^r^a^{qi Fr}^e^e^dom^a^{nd i}^t^s^Str^a^te^gⁱ^c^I^m^por^ta^nc^eⁱⁿ^P^o^s^t^-^C^onf^lic^{t O}^p^e^r^a^tions^,”^U^.^{S. A}^r^m^y^Wa^r^C^o^lle^g^e^{, Ma}^r^c^{h 18}^{, 2}⁰⁰⁵^,
^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^ww^.stra^t^e^g^ic^s^t^udie^s^inst^itute^.a^rm^y^.^m^il/pdf^f^ile^s/^ksil72.^pdf^.
¹⁴¹^S^{ee Jo}^hn^Bu^rⁿ^s,^“A^Natⁱ^oⁿ^at^W^a^r:^T^h^{e Iraq}ⁱ^s,^L^o^o^tⁱⁿ^{g and}^{a S}^uⁱ^cⁱ^d^{e A}^t^t^{ack a}^s^Ch^ao^{s G}^r^o^w^{s i}ⁿ^Bagh^d^a^d^,^”^T^h^{e New}
^Yor^k^Tim^e^s^,^A^p^r^{il 1}¹^,²⁰^03,^w^ho^quo^te^s^a^Ma^rⁱ^ne^{on g}^u^a^r^dⁱⁿ^B^a^g^hda^{d a}^s^s^a^yⁱ^ng^{, “w}^e^jus^t^don’^t^ha^v^e^e^noug^h^tr^o^ops^.”

on discussion of broad principles for Iraq’s future, rather than specific decisions about Iraqi ¹⁴²
leadership roles.
On May 1, 2003, President Bush, standing aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, declared an end to
major combat operations in Iraq. He stated, “In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies ¹⁴³
have prevailed.” At that point, the old Iraqi regime, though not completely dismantled, was no
longer able to exercise control over Iraq’s territory, resources, or population. Saddam Hussein was
captured later, on December 13, 2003, by units of 4ID, outside his hometown Tikrit.

This Report uses the term “post-major combat” to refer to the period from the President’s
announcement of the end of major combat, on May 1, 2003, to the present. This period has not
been monolithic—it has included evolutions in national and military strategy, and in the specific
“ways and means” used to pursue those strategies on the ground, as described below. From a
political and legal perspective, the major marker after May 1, 2003, was the June 28, 2004,
transition of executive authority from the occupying powers back to Iraqis. From a military
perspective, the period after May 1, 2003, has included a continuation of combat operations as
well as the introduction of many new missions.
From the time of regime removal until June 28, 2004, the coalition was formally an occupying
force. Shortly after the end of major combat, in May 2003, the United Nations Security Council
recognized the United States and the United Kingdom as “occupying powers,” together with all
the “authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under international law” that this designation ¹⁴⁴
entails. Somewhat belatedly, in October 2003, the United Nations authorized a “multi-national
force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of ¹⁴⁵
security and stability in Iraq.” That language referred to the coalition military command in Iraq
at the time—the Combined Joint Task Force-7 (“CJTF-7”).
As the deadline for the “transfer of sovereignty”—June 30, 2004—approached, U.S. and new
interim Iraqi officials negotiated the terms for the presence and activities in Iraq, after that date,
of the newly re-organized multi-national force, now called the Multi-National Force-Iraq (“MNF-
I”).
¹⁴²
^In^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^f^r^o^m^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^S^t^at^e,^Offⁱ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e S}^ecret^ar^y^o^f^Defen^s^{e an}^d^CE^NT^COM^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s^,^an^d^p^a^rtⁱ^cⁱ^p^aⁿ^t
^obs^e^r^v^a^tion,²⁰⁰³^.
¹⁴³^“^P^r^e^sⁱ^de^{nt B}^u^s^h^A^nno^unc^e^s^Ma^j^o^r^C^o^m^b^a^t^O^p^e^r^a^tio^nsⁱⁿ^I^r^a^{q H}^a^v^e^Ende^d,”^Ma^y^{1, 2}⁰⁰³^{, a}^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ne^w^s^/r^e^l^e^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰^3/^05/²⁰⁰³⁰⁵^01-¹⁵^.ht^m^l.
¹⁴⁴^Uⁿ^ite^{d N}^a^ti^ons^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^il^R^e^s^o^lutioⁿ¹⁴^{83 (}²⁰⁰³⁾^{, 2}²^Ma^y²⁰⁰^3,^Pr^e^a^m^bula^r^Se^c^tion.
¹⁴⁵^Uⁿ^ite^{d N}^a^ti^ons^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^il^R^e^s^o^lutioⁿ¹⁵^{11 (}²⁰⁰³⁾^{, 1}⁶^O^c^to^be^r²⁰⁰³^.

Agreement was reached to reflect the terms of that presence in the unusual form of parallel
letters, one from U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, and one from Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad
Allawi, to the President of the UN Security Council. Those letters were appended to U.N. ¹⁴⁶
Security Council Resolution 1546, issued on June 8, 2004.
That U.N. Resolution reaffirmed the authorization for the multi-national force and extended it to
the post-occupation period—on the grounds that it was “at the request of the incoming Interim ¹⁴⁷
Government of Iraq.” It repeated the authorization language used in the October 2003
Resolution, with an important qualifier: the force was now authorized to “take all necessary
measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the ¹⁴⁸
letters annexed to this resolution.”
The U.S. letter spelled out the tasks the multi-national force would undertake, including combat
operations, internment, securing of weapons, training and equipping Iraqi security forces, and
participating in providing humanitarian assistance, civil affairs support, and relief and
reconstruction assistance.
Some of the early U.S.-Iraqi discussions had considered the possibility that Iraqi forces might, in ¹⁴⁹
some cases, fall under the command of the multinational force. However, the U.N. Resolution
and the appended letters made clear that the command-and-control relationship between the Iraqi
government and the multi-national force would be strictly one of coordination, not command. The
Resolution called the relationship a “security partnership between the sovereign Government of ¹⁵⁰
Iraq and the multinational force.”
Both letters described coordination modalities to help ensure unity of effort. Both stated the
intention to make use of “coordination bodies at the national, regional, and local levels,” and
noted that multi-national force and Iraqi officials would “keep each other informed of their
activities.”
Further parameters of the MNF-I presence in Iraq were spelled out in a revised version of Order
17 of the Coalition Provisional Authority, issued on June 27, 2004. The document addressed
issues including legal immunities, communications, transportation, customs, entry and departure,
for government civilians and contractors as well as military forces. Issued by the legal executive
authority of Iraq at the time, the Order was to remain in force “for the duration of U.N.
Resolution mandates including subsequent Resolutions, unless rescinded or amended by Iraqi ¹⁵¹
legi slation.”
¹⁴⁶
^Uⁿ^ite^{d N}^a^ti^ons^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^il^R^e^s^o^lutioⁿ¹⁵^{46 (}²⁰⁰⁴⁾^{, 8}^J^u^ne²⁰⁰⁴⁽^l^e^tte^r^s⁾^.^S^ubs^e^q^ue^ntly^{, the}^U^.^N^.^m^a^nda^te
^w^a^s^e^x^te^nde^{d a}^nnua^lly^.
¹⁴⁷^Ibid^.,^pa^ra^{. 9.}
¹⁴⁸^Ibid^.,^pa^ra^{. 1}⁰^.
¹⁴⁹^T^h^e^c^e^r^e^m^oⁿ^y^m^a^r^kⁱⁿ^g^th^e^e^s^ta^b^lish^m^eⁿ^{t (Fu}^{ll Op}^e^r^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^{l Ca}^p^a^bⁱ^lity^{) o}^f^th^e^Mu^lti-Na^tioⁿ^a^{l F}^o^rc^e^-Ira^q^,ⁱⁿ^Ma^y
²⁰⁰⁴^,ⁱⁿ^cl^u^d^e^d^a^p^a^rad^e^o^f^rep^r^esen^tativ^{es o}^f^each^co^alitioⁿ^p^a^rtⁿ^e^r^co^uⁿ^try^.^Aⁿ^Iraqⁱ^G^eⁿ^e^{ral p}^a^rticip^atedⁱⁿ^th^e^p^a^rad^e
^lik^e^a^{ll the}^ot^he^{r c}^o^a^liti^on^m^e^m^b^e^r^s—a^{nd the}ⁿ^br^oug^h^t^the^ho^use^d^o^wⁿ^w^h^eⁿ^{, unsc}^r^ipte^d,^he^kⁱ^sse^{d t}^h^e^Ira^{qi f}^l^a^g^.
¹⁵⁰^Uⁿ^ite^{d N}^a^ti^ons^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^il^R^e^s^o^lutioⁿ¹⁵^{46 (}²⁰⁰⁴⁾^{, 8}^J^u^ne²⁰⁰⁴⁽^l^e^tte^r^s⁾^.
¹⁵¹^Co^a^liti^oⁿ^Pro^v^isioⁿ^a^{l A}^u^th^o^r^ity^Ord^e^{r 1}⁷^(re^vⁱ^se^d⁾^{, “}^S^ta^tu^s^o^f^th^e^Co^a^litioⁿ^P^r^o^v^isioⁿ^a^l^A^u^th^o^r^ity^{, MNF-Ira}^q^,
^Ce^rtaⁱ^{n Missio}ⁿ^{s a}ⁿ^d^P^e^rso^nne^{l i}ⁿ^Ira^q,”^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^h^ttp:^//www^.ira^qc^oa^litio^n.^org^/^re^g^u^la^tions/
²⁰⁰⁴⁰⁶²^7_C^P^A^ORD_1^7_S^ta^tus_^of^_Coa^litio^n_^_Re^v^__w^ith_A^nne^x^_^A^.^pdf^.

The final U.N. authorization, issued on December 18, 2007, extended through December 31,
2008. In requesting that authorization, in a letter appended to the UN Resolution, Iraqi Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki made clear that it would be the final request by the Government of Iraq
for an extension of the current mandate. The Iraqi Government, he wrote, “expects, in future, that
the Security Council will be able to deal with the situation in Iraq without the need for action ¹⁵²
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.” In November 2008, the U.S. and Iraqi
governments concluded a new status of forces-like agreement, which takes effect on January 1,

2009, and which defines the legal terms of the presence of U.S. military forces, and the civilians ¹⁵³

who support them, in Iraq.
Since the declared end of major combat operations, the formal relationships among U.S. military
and civilian organizations operating in Iraq have shifted several times, in important ways.
The period of formal occupation was characterized by multiple, somewhat confusing ¹⁵⁴
relationships. In late April 2003, LTG McKiernan, Commanding General of the Combined
Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), issued a proclamation stating: “The coalition alone ¹⁵⁵
retains absolute authority within Iraq.” CFLCC, the military face of the coalition in Iraq,
maintained a small headquarters presence in Baghdad, at the Al Faw Palace at Camp Victory,
while the majority of its staff remained in their pre-war location at Camp Doha, Kuwait.
The civilian face of the coalition in Iraq, in that time frame, was the Organization for
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), whose small staff had arrived in Baghdad
in late April. The basic civil-military division of labor was clear—CFLCC was responsible for
security, while ORHA focused on reconstruction and humanitarian issues. The command
relationship between the two, debated before the war, was never clearly resolved during the very
short duration of their partnership on the ground in Iraq.
In early May 2003, President Bush announced his intention to appoint a senior official to serve as
Administrator of a new organization, the Coalition Provisional Authority, which would serve as
the legal executive authority of Iraq—a much more authoritative mandate than ORHA had held.
On May 9, 2003, Ambassador L. Paul “Jerry” Bremer arrived in Baghdad with a small retinue, to
take up the assignment. By mandate, Ambassador Bremer reported through the Secretary of
Defense to the President. Later, in fall 2003, the White House assumed the lead for coordinating
¹⁵²
^U^N^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^{il R}^e^s^o^l^u^ti^on¹⁷⁹^{0 (}²⁰⁰⁷⁾^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^18,²⁰⁰⁷^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http:^//d^accessd^d^s^.^uⁿ^.^o^r^g/^d^o^c^/
^UNDOC/^G^EN/^N⁰⁷^/⁶⁵⁰^/⁷²^/^P^D^F^/^N0⁷⁶⁵⁰⁷²^.^p^d^f^?Op^eⁿ^E^lemen^t^.
¹⁵³^S^{ee “Agree}^men^t^b^e^t^w^een^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es o}^f^Am^eri^c^{a an}^d^t^h^{e Re}^p^u^b^lⁱ^c^o^f^Iraq^oⁿ^t^h^{e W}ⁱ^t^h^d^r^aw^al^o^f^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es
^Forc^e^s^f^r^o^m^Ira^{q a}^{nd t}^h^e^Org^a^niz^a^tion^of^theⁱ^{r A}^c^tiv^itie^{s during}^t^h^eⁱ^{r T}^e^m^pora^r^y^P^r^e^s^eⁿ^c^e^{in Ira}^q”^.
¹⁵⁴^Fo^{r a}ⁿ^acco^uⁿ^{t o}^f^th^{e y}^{ear o}^f^f^o^{rmal o}^ccu^p^a^tioⁿ^f^r^o^m^oⁿ^e^o^f^th^{e k}^e^y^p^r^o^t^ag^oⁿⁱ^{sts, see L}^.^P^a^u^l^Brem^{er III w}^ith
^Ma^lc^olm^Mc^C^onne^ll,^M^y^Ye^arⁱⁿ^I^r^aq:^T^h^e^Str^u^g^g^le^t^o^B^u^ild^a^Fut^u^r^e^{of H}^ope^,^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: Sim}^{on &}^Sc^hus^te^r^,²⁰⁰⁶^.
^For^aⁿ^a^c^c^ount^of^tha^t^y^e^a^r^b^y^a^jour^na^lis^{t w}^{ho s}^p^eⁿ^{t c}^onsⁱ^d^e^r^a^b^le^tim^e^a^t^C^P^A^he^a^dqua^r^t^e^r^s^,^s^e^e^R^a^jiv
^Ch^an^d^r^asekaran^,^Impe^rial^Lifeⁱⁿ^the^Eme^r^ald^City^{, Ne}^w^York^{: V}ⁱⁿ^t^a^g^e^Book^{s, 20}^06.^For^a^ha^rd-^h^itti^ng^c^r^itique^of^bot^h
^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n a}^{nd m}^ilita^ry^mⁱ^sta^k^e^s^during^the^oc^c^upa^tio^{n, se}^e^T^hom^a^s^{E. Ric}^k^s,^Fiasc^o^:^The^Ame^r^ic^an^M^ilitary^Adv^eⁿ^ture
^{in Ira}^q^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: T}^h^e^P^e^ng^uiⁿ^P^r^e^s^s^,²⁰^06.
¹⁵⁵^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^C^F^L^C^C^a^{nd V}^C^o^r^p^s^s^t^a^f^f^,²⁰⁰³^.

efforts in Iraq, and Ambassador Bremer’s direct contacts with the White House became even
more frequent.
On June 15, 2003, the headquarters of U.S. Army V Corps, now led by Lieutenant General
Ricardo Sanchez, assumed the coalition military leadership mantle from CFLCC—and the new ¹⁵⁶
body was named the CJTF-7. CJTF-7 reported directly to CENTCOM, and through it to the ¹⁵⁷
Secretary of Defense. At the same time, CJTF-7 served in “direct support” to CPA. In the view
of many observers, that dual chain of command and accountability was not a recipe for success—
particularly when the CENTCOM Commanding General and the CPA Administrator disagreed
with each other. In May 2004, CJTF-7 separated into a higher, strategically focused headquarters,
the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), still led by LTG Sanchez, and a lower, operationally
focused headquarters, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). MNF-I retained CJTF-7’s “direct
support” relationship with CPA until the end of the formal occupation.
CJTF-7 itself was a combined force, including a UK Deputy Commanding General, and many
key staff members, as well as contingents, from coalition partner countries. As a rule, those
representatives maintained direct communication with their respective capitals. CPA, too, was
“combined,” including a senior UK official who shared the leadership role, though not executive
signing authority, with Ambassador Bremer, and who maintained a regular and full channel of
communication with the UK government in London.
On June 28, 2004, at the “transfer of sovereignty,” the Coalition Provisional Authority ceased to
exist. The new U.S. Embassy, led by Ambassador John Negroponte, inherited none of CPA’s
executive authority for Iraq—like other U.S. Embassies around the world, it simply represented
U.S. interests in Iraq. The relationship between the Embassy and MNF-I—led by General George
Casey beginning on July 1, 2004—was strictly one of coordination.

The Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), like its predecessor CJTF-7, is a joint, combined force.
It includes some Department of Defense civil servants, and it is supported by civilian contractors.
The MNF-I headquarters, located in Baghdad, is the strategic-level headquarters, currently led, as
of September 16, 2008, by U.S. Army General Raymond Odierno. The position of MNF-I Deputy
Commanding General (DCG) has always been filled by a general officer from the United
¹⁵⁶
^T^h^e^pr^e^v^ious^da^y^,^J^une¹⁴^{, T}^h^e^{V C}^o^r^p^s^C^o^m^m^a^nding^G^e^ne^r^a^{l w}^{ho le}^d^{V C}^o^r^p^s^d^u^rⁱ^ng^O^I^{F m}^a^jor^c^o^m^b^a^t^{, LTG}
^W^a^l^l^a^c^e^,^h^aⁿ^d^e^{d co}^mm^an^d^o^f^t^h^{e Co}^rp^{s t}^o^L^T^G^S^aⁿ^c^h^ez.^L^T^G^S^aⁿ^c^h^{ez h}^a^d^co^m^e^t^o^Iraq^several^we^{eks earl}ⁱ^e^{r as t}^h^e^st
^C^o^m^m^a^nding^G^e^ne^r^a^{l of}¹^A^r^m^o^re^{d Div}ⁱ^sioⁿ^{. T}^h^e^f^e^w^CFL^{CC st}^a^f^f^{still re}^m^a^ining^{in Ba}^g^hda^{d re}^d^e^ploy^e^d^{to Kuw}^a^it.
¹⁵⁷^T^h^{e p}^h^r^{ase, b}^o^rro^w^e^d^f^r^o^m^fⁱ^eld^artillery^{, d}^o^e^{s n}^o^tⁿ^ecessa^ril^y^tran^{slate s}^m^o^o^t^h^l^yⁱⁿ^to^b^u^r^eau^{cratic r}^e^latioⁿ^s^hⁱ^p^s^.
^CP^A^te^nde^d^to^a^ssum^e^tha^t^the^mⁱ^lita^ry^c^o^m^m^a^{nd in Ira}^{q sim}^p^ly^w^o^rk^e^d^f^o^{r CP}^A^.^{In Ma}^y²⁰⁰^{3, a}^t^hi^{s f}ⁱ^rst^m^e^e^ting
^w^{ith the}^V^C^o^r^p^s^C^o^m^m^a^nde^r^,^di^s^c^us^sⁱ^ng^w^h^e^t^he^r^theⁱ^r^or^g^a^niz^a^tⁱ^ons^w^oul^{d r}^e^ta^{in s}^e^pa^r^a^te^he^a^d^qu^a^r^te^r^s^{, A}^m^bas^s^a^dor
^Bre^m^{er p}^oⁱⁿ^t^{ed h}ⁱ^{s f}ⁱⁿ^g^{er at}^t^h^e^G^eⁿ^e^r^a^l^’^{s ch}^est^an^d^sai^d^,^“Itⁱ^s^m^y^co^mman^d^e^{r’s i}ⁿ^t^eⁿ^t^t^h^at^y^o^u^co-l^o^cat^{e w}ⁱ^t^h^me.^”
^P^a^rticⁱ^p^aⁿ^{t obse}^r^v^a^tion^,²⁰⁰³^.

Kingdom—since March 2008, Lieutenant General John Cooper has served simultaneously as
MNF-I DCG and Senior British Military Representative to Iraq. The MNF-I staff is an ad hoc
headquarters, including senior leaders and staff provided individually by the U.S. military
services and by coalition partner countries.
The Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), also located in Baghdad, is the operational-level ¹⁵⁸
headquarters, reporting to MNF-I. Its role is synchronizing coalition forces actions throughout
Iraq. MNC-I is built around a U.S. Army Corps. As of February 2008, the nucleus of MNC-I is
the XVIII Airborne Corps, led by Army Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin, which replaced III
Corps, led by then-Lieutenant General Odierno. In each rotation, the Army Corps staff is
augmented by additional U.S. and coalition partner senior leaders and staff.
The structure and staffing of both MNF-I and MNC-I have evolved significantly from the early
days of OIF. When U.S. Army V Corps became the nucleus of CJTF-7, in June 2003, its pre-war
planning and exercising, and its OIF wartime experience, had been focused on the tactical-level
ground campaign. Its senior staff positions were filled by Colonels; those senior positions were
only gradually filled by General Officers over the course of summer and fall 2003.
Under the command of MNC-I, Divisions or their equivalents are responsible for contiguous
areas covering all of Iraq. The boundaries of the divisional areas of responsibility have shifted
somewhat over time, to accommodate both shifting security requirements and major changes in
deployments by coalition partner countries.
The type of coverage varies geographically. In provinces under “Provincial Iraqi Control”
(PIC)—13 of Iraq’s 18 provinces—the Government of Iraq, represented by the Governor, has the
lead responsibility for security. Conventional coalition forces may have little or no continual
presence, and as a rule they are required to seek Iraqi approval to carry out operations.
The PIC designation is the result of a high-level decision process, based on a set of criteria, with
input from Iraqi Government, MNF-I, and U.S. and UK officials, and a final decision by Iraq’s ¹⁵⁹
Ministerial Committee on National Security, which is chaired by the Prime Minister. As DOD
has pointed, out, there is “... no clear, post-PIC assessment process for determining the degree to
which a transitioned province has achieved sustainable security and the conditions necessary for ¹⁶⁰
continued economic growth and stability.” Security conditions on the ground vary among PIC
provinces, for example, between calm Sulaymaniyah province in the north to recently restive
Basra province in the south—so the PIC designation may indicate more about security
responsibilities than security conditions.
¹⁵⁸
^T^h^e²⁰⁰^{4 sp}^lit^of^CJT^F^{-7 into}^a^hig^h^e^r^{, f}^our-sta^{r HQ, a}ⁿ^{d a}^l^o^w^e^r,^thre^e^-^sta^r^{HQ, w}^a^{s strong}^l^y^re^c^o^m^m^e^nde^{d, in}
^orde^{r t}^o^gⁱ^v^e^the^c^o^m^m^a^nde^{rs tim}^e^{to f}^o^c^u^{s f}^u^ll-tim^e^{on tw}^{o v}^e^r^y^la^rg^e^portf^olios—stra^te^gⁱ^c^w^o^rk^wⁱ^t^h^U.S.^aⁿ^d^Ira^qi
^le^a^d^e^r^s^h^{ip, a}ⁿ^{d s}^upe^r^v^is^ing^o^p^e^r^a^tions^thr^oug^h^{out I}^r^a^{q. A}^s^of^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^{, MN}^F-^I^aⁿ^d^MN^C^-^I^s^t^a^f^f^w^e^r^e^r^e^por^te^dly
^b^e^giⁿⁿⁱⁿ^g^t^o^p^l^an^{a re-m}^{erger o}^f^t^h^{e t}^w^o^h^ead^qu^art^e^rs,^p^e^rh^ap^s^t^o^t^a^{ke e}^f^f^e^ct^at^t^h^{e f}^o^l^l^o^wⁱⁿ^g^Co^rp^s^ro^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^t^o^avoⁱ^d
^a^ppa^r^e^nt^du^plic^a^tio^{n of}^e^f^f^o^r^t^by^som^e^s^t^af^f^s^e^c^tions^.
¹⁵⁹^A^s^of^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^,^P^I^C^pr^ovⁱⁿ^c^e^s^a^{nd t}^h^eⁱ^r^da^te^s^of^de^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^tio^{n i}ⁿ^c^l^ude^M^u^thaⁿ^na^{, J}^u^ly²⁰⁰⁶^{; D}^hⁱ^Q^a^r^,^Se^pte^m^be^r
²⁰⁰^{6; A}ⁿ^N^a^ja^f^,^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^2006;^Ma^y^s^aⁿ^{, A}^p^r^{il 200}^{7; I}^r^bil,^Su^la^y^m^aⁿ^iy^a^h^a^{nd D}^a^huk^,^Ma^y^2007;^K^a^r^b^a^l^a^,^O^c^tobe^r
²⁰⁰^{7; B}^a^s^r^a^h^,^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r²⁰⁰^{7; Q}^a^disⁱ^y^a^{h, J}^u^ly^{2008; A}^nba^r^,^Se^pte^m^be^r^2008;^B^a^bil,^O^c^tobe^r²⁰^08;^W^a^s^{it, O}^c^tobe^r
²⁰⁰^8.
¹⁶⁰^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,^”^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^2007,^p.²⁷^.

The total number of U.S. forces in Iraq peaked early, during major combat operations, at about
250,000 troops. Since then, the number has varied greatly over time, in response to events on the
ground, such as Iraqi elections, and to strategic-level decisions, such as the 2007 surge. The peak
surge level of U.S. troops was about 168,000, in October 2007, up from a relative low of 135,000
troops in January 2007 just before surge forces began to arrive.
As of September 2008, the total number of U.S. troops in Iraq was about 145,000.¹⁶¹ The lower
total, compared to October 2007, reflects the redeployment from Iraq without replacement of all ^nd^nd
five of the Army’s “surge” brigades: the 2 brigade combat team (BCT) of the 82 Airborne ^th^st^rd^rd^th
Division; the 4 BCT of the 1 Infantry Division; the 3 BCT of the 3 Infantry Division; the 4 ^nd^nd^rd
BCT of the 2 Infantry Division; and the 2 BCT of the 3 Infantry Division.
In September 2008, President Bush had announced that an additional Army BCT would withdraw
from Iraq, in early 2009, without replacement. In November 2008, DOD announced that that ^nd^st
unit—the 2 BCT of the 101 Airborne Division, based in western Baghdad—would redeploy
about six weeks earlier than planned. Their departure leaves 14 U.S. BCTs or BCT-equivalents in
Iraq.
Well before the surge, by many accounts, the demand for forces in Iraq had placed some stress on
both the active and reserve components. The operational benefits of maintaining continuity, and
keeping forces in place long enough to gain understanding and develop expertise, competed
against institutional requirements to maintain the health of the force as a whole, including the
ability to recruit and retain personnel.
An additional challenge was that pre-war assumptions only very incompletely predicted the scope
and scale of post-war mission requirements, which meant in practice, especially early in OIF, that
individuals and units deployed without certainty about the length of their tours. U.S. Army V
Corps, for example, was not specifically given the mission, before the war, to serve as the post-
war task force headquarters, let alone a timeline for that commitment. As the press widely ^rd
reported after the end of major combat operations, some members of the 3 Infantry Division
(3ID), which had led the Army’s charge to Baghdad, publicly stated their desire to redeploy as
soon as possible. Major General Buford Blount, the 3ID Commanding General, commented:
“You know, a lot of my forces have been over here since September, and fought a great fight and ¹⁶²
[are] doing great work here in the city. But if you ask the soldiers, they’re ready to go home.”
Sometimes, changes in the security situation on the ground—rather than anticipated political
events like Iraqi elections—have prompted decisions to extend deployments. The earliest and
possibly most dramatic example took place in April 2004. The young Shiite cleric Muqtada al-
Sadr and his militia, the Jaish al-Mahdi (Mahdi Army), staged uprisings in cities and towns
throughout Shi’a-populated southern Iraq, just as the volatile, Sunni-populated city of Fallujah, in
Al Anbar province, simmered in the wake of the gruesome murders of four Blackwater ^st
contractors. The 1 Armored Division (1AD), which had served in Baghdad for one year, and was
¹⁶¹
^J^o^int^Sta^f^f^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion pa}^pe^r^,^“^B^oots^on^the^G^r^oun^d,”^Se^pte^m^be^r^{1, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
¹⁶²^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^N^e^w^s^T^r^aⁿ^s^c^rⁱ^{pt, MG}^B^u^f^o^r^d^C^.^B^l^o^unt^I^I^I^f^r^o^m^B^a^g^hda^{d, Ma}^y^{15, 2}⁰⁰³^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tid=2⁶⁰⁸^.

already in the process of redeploying, was extended by 90 days—and then executed a remarkable
series of complex and rapid troop deployments to embattled southern cities.
In early 2007, in an effort to provide greater predictability if not lighter burdens, the Department
of Defense, under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, announced new rotation
policy goals. Active units would deploy for not more than 15 months, and return to home station ¹⁶³
for not less than 12 months. Reserve Component units would mobilize for a maximum of 12
months, including pre- and post-deployment responsibilities, rather than 12 months of “boots on ¹⁶⁴
the ground,” with the goal of five years between deployments.
In April 2008, partly in anticipation of some reduction of stress on the force from the
redeployment of the surge brigades, President Bush announced that active component Army units
deploying after August 1, 2008, would deploy for 12 months, rather than 15. The President also
recommitted to “...ensur[ing] that our Army units will have at least a year at home for every year ¹⁶⁵
in the field.”

Since its inception, OIF has been a multinational effort, but the number, size, and nature of
contributions by coalition partner countries has varied substantially over time. Some of those
contributions have been constrained by national caveats. The expiration of the UN mandate at the
end of 2008 triggered a significant drawdown in contributions.
Four countries provided boots on the ground for major combat—the United Kingdom, Australia,
and Poland, in addition to the United States. Coalition forces contributions then reached their
peak, in terms of the number of both countries and troops contributed, in the early post-major
combat period. After that period, some countries withdrew their forces altogether. A number of
other countries have withdrew the bulk of their contingents, but left a few personnel in Iraq to
serve in headquarters staff positions.
¹⁶³
^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^De^fen^s^{e Ne}^w^s^Bri^e^fⁱⁿ^g^wⁱ^t^h^S^ecret^ar^y^G^a^t^e^{s an}^d^Gen^e^ral^P^{ace f}^r^o^m^t^h^{e P}^eⁿ^t^agon^,^A^p^ri^l¹¹^,²⁰⁰⁷^,
^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^ww^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^traⁿ^sc^ripts/^traⁿ^sc^ript.a^spx^?^traⁿ^sc^riptid=³⁹^28.^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^G^a^te^{s c}^l^a^r^if^ie^{d tha}^t^the
^c^u^r^r^e^{nt e}^x^pe^c^t^a^{tion w}^a^s^tha^t^“ⁿ^ot^m^o^r^e^thaⁿ^{15 m}^ont^hs^”^w^{ould g}^eⁿ^e^r^a^ll^y^m^e^aⁿ^“^{15 m}^onths^.”
¹⁶⁴^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^P^r^e^s^s^R^e^le^a^s^e^,^“^D^oD^A^nnou^nc^e^s^C^h^aⁿ^g^e^s^{to R}^e^s^e^r^v^e^C^o^m^pone^{nt For}^c^e^Maⁿ^a^g^e^m^e^nt
^Polic^y^,^”^J^a^nua^r^y^{11, 2}⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^ht^tp:/^/w^w^w^.de^f^eⁿ^s^e^link^.^m^il/re^l^e^a^s^e^s^/^r^e^l^e^a^s^e^.^a^s^px?^re^le^as^eⁱ^d=¹⁰³⁸^{9. T}^h^e^polic^y
^{is ba}^se^{d o}ⁿ^uⁿ^it^rota^ti^ons;ⁱⁿ^divⁱ^d^u^a^l^{s w}^{ho tra}ⁿ^sf^e^r^be^tw^e^eⁿ^units^m^a^y^fⁱ^{nd the}^m^se^lve^s^{out of}^sy^nc^{h w}^{ith the}^rota^ti^on
^polic^y^g^o^a^l^s^.^Se^e^f^o^{r e}^x^am^ple^J^ohn^V^a^ndiv^e^{r, “}^F^a^m^ilie^s^w^a^{nt a}ⁿ^s^w^e^r^s^a^bout^de^pl^oy^m^e^nts^a^{nd dw}^e^{ll tim}^e^,^”^Star^s^and
^Strⁱ^pe^s^{, Ma}^y^11,²⁰⁰⁷^.
¹⁶⁵^W^h^ite^H^ous^e^,^“^F^a^c^t^S^h^e^e^{t: T}^h^e^W^a^y^For^w^a^r^{d in Ira}^q,”^A^p^ril^10,²⁰⁰^{8, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^w^w^.^w^hi^te^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/
^ne^w^s^/^r^e^l^e^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰^8/^04/²⁰⁰⁸⁰⁴¹⁰^-⁴^.htm^l.
¹⁶⁶^{For m}^o^re^de^ta^ile^{d i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^a^{tion a}^b^{out f}^o^re^ig^{n c}^o^ntri^buti^ons^{to Ira}^{q, i}ⁿ^c^l^ud^ing^c^o^a^liti^on^f^o^rc^e^s^{, se}^e^CR^{S Rep}^o^r^t
^R^L³²¹⁰^5,^Ira^q^{: F}^o^re^ig^{n Co}^ntrib^u^tio^{ns t}^o^St^ab^ilizat^io^{n a}ⁿ^d^Re^c^oⁿ^s^truc^tion^,^b^y^Ch^ri^st^op^h^e^{r M.}^Bl^anch^ard^an^d
^Ca^the^r^ine^Da^le^.

Past decisions to draw down forces may have been shaped, in some cases, by a perception that the
mission had been accomplished. However, far more frequently, decisions seem to have been
informed by domestic political considerations, sometimes coupled with apparent pressure from
extremists seeking to shape those decisions. Most notable was the Spanish troop withdrawal,
catalyzed by the March 11, 2004, commuter train bombings in Madrid, which killed nearly 200
people. The attacks took place just days before scheduled Spanish parliamentary elections, in
which the ruling party of Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar Lopez, who had supported OIF, was
voted out of office. The new Prime Minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, gave orders, within
hours after being sworn into office, for Spanish troops to come home from Iraq.
The expiration of the UN mandate as of December 31, 2008, force all coalition partners either to
negotiate a bilateral status of forces agreement with the Government of Iraq, or to withdraw their
forces. Most partners chose to bring their deployments to a close. In December, a senior MNC-I ^st
official noted that after January 1, the coalition would still include, in addition to the United ¹⁶⁷
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Romania, El Salvador, and Estonia.
As of December 2008, the largest remaining non-U.S. coalition partner was the United Kingdom,
with approximately 4,100 troops. The UK continues to lead Multi-National Division-Southeast,
headquartered in Basra. In July 2008, Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced plans for a ¹⁶⁸
“fundamental change of mission” for UK forces, in “the first months of 2009”. In December

2008, British defense officials reportedly indicated that the UK contingent would draw down to ¹⁶⁹

400 by summer 2009.

Several major contingents redeployed or significantly drew down their forces in 2008. In June,
Australia withdrew its battle group of combat forces, which had been based at Tallil Air Base in
Nasariyah province, in southern Iraq, but other Australian troops continued to serve in and around
Iraq, including providing maritime surveillance, intelligence assistance, and logistics ¹⁷⁰
operations. In August, Georgia withdrew its 2,000-strong contingent, which had been deployed
in Wasit province along the border with Iran, after Russian troops invaded Georgia. In October,
Poland withdrew its remaining contingent of about 900 soldiers from Qadisiyah province in
southern Iraq, where Poland had led the Multi-National Division Center-South. And in December,
the Republic of Korea concluded its deployment in northern Iraq, focused on reconstruction, as
the nucleus of Multi-National Division-North East.
¹⁶⁷
^In^te^rv^ie^w^w^ith^De^p^u^t^y^Co^m^m^aⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^G^eⁿ^e^ra^{l o}^f^Mu^lti-Na^tioⁿ^a^{l C}^o^rp^s-Ira^q^,^Brig^a^d^ie^{r G}^eⁿ^e^ra^{l Nic}^h^o^l^a^s^Ma^te^rn
^(Caⁿ^a^d^a⁾^{, se}^e^“^A^r^m^y^G^e^ne^ra^{l Dis}^c^usse^{s Dra}^w^dow^{n of}^c^o^a^{lition F}^o^rc^e^s^From^Ira^q,”^Na^tiona^l^P^u^blic^Ra^{dio, “}^D^a^y^to
^Da^y^,^{” De}^ce^m^b^{er 1}⁰^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
¹⁶⁸^“Bro^wⁿ^si^gn^al^{s Iraq}^t^r^oo^p^s^wⁱ^t^h^drawal^,^”^The^G^uar^diaⁿ^{, Ju}^ly^{22, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{; a}ⁿ^{d i}ⁿ^te^rv^ie^ws^w^{ith MND-S}^E^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s,
^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^9.
¹⁶⁹^Mic^h^a^e^l^Ev^aⁿ^{s, “}^B^ritish^Forc^e^s^t^o^Sta^r^{t L}^e^a^v^ing^Ira^{q in}^Ma^rc^{h: D}^o^wⁿ^{to 4}⁰⁰^by^Sum^m^e^r^,”^Londo^{n Tim}^e^s^,
^Dece^m^b^{er 1}⁰^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
¹⁷⁰^Se^e^“^A^us^tr^a^lia^w^ithdr^a^w^s^tr^oops^f^r^o^m^I^r^a^q,”^R^e^ute^r^s^,^J^une^1,²⁰⁰⁸^{; a}^{nd “}^A^us^tr^a^lia^e^nds^c^o^m^b^a^t^o^p^e^r^a^tionsⁱⁿ^I^r^a^q,”
^C^N^N^,^J^une²^,²⁰⁰⁸^{; a}ⁿ^{d i}ⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.

In addition to MNF-I, foreign troops serve in several other organizations in Iraq - the NATO
Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I, which falls under the dual supervision of MNF-I and NATO); and
the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). As of December 2008, Hungary, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Turkey were contributing directly to the NTM-I but not to ¹⁷¹
MNF-I, and New Zealand and Fiji had forces in Iraq providing security support to (UNAMI).

The security situation in Iraq is multi-faceted, geographically varied, and constantly evolving. In
a society where the rule of law is not completely established, politics—the struggle for power,
resources and influence—more readily and frequently takes the form of violence. Iraqi people are
often faced with imperfect, pragmatic decisions about who is best suited to protect them and their
interests. As a general trajectory, after a brief period of relative quiet in 2003 following major
combat operations, forms of violent expression grew in variety, intensity, and frequency, hitting
peaks in 2005 and 2006. By 2008, indicators of violence had tapered off to markedly lower
levels.
One major form of violence that has been practiced in post-Saddam Iraq is terrorism carried out
by Sunni Arabs with stated Islamic extremist goals. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has been the most
prominent named organization, but the threat may be better characterized as a loose network of
affiliates, including both Iraqis and foreign fighters. Within the networks, assigned roles range
from financiers, and planners of coordinated attacks, to unskilled labor recruited to emplace
improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Their efforts to recruit primarily young males have
capitalized on Iraq’s widespread under-employment, which can make the prospect of one-time ¹⁷²
payments appealing, and general disaffection spurred by a perceived lack of opportunities in
the new Iraq. The infrastructure used by AQI and its affiliates has included safe houses and lines ¹⁷³
of communication reaching, especially, through central and northern Iraq.
The network has capitalized on Iraq’s porous borders. In early 2008, U.S. military commanders ¹⁷⁴
confirmed that the flow of foreign fighters continued, from Syria into Iraq. In its September
2008 quarterly report to the Congress, the Department of Defense stated, “Syria remains the
primary facilitation gateway for foreign terrorists moving into Iraq. The GoI has implored Syria
to do more to stop the flow of foreign terrorists but is not yet satisfied with Syria’s level of ¹⁷⁵
effort.”
¹⁷¹
^Se^e^NAT^O^T^r^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^Missioⁿ^-Ira^q^w^e^b^s^ite^{, a}^t^h^t^t^p^://w^ww^.^a^fso^u^t^h^.ⁿ^a^to^.iⁿ^t^/^J^FCN_^Missioⁿ^s/^NT^M-I/^NT^MI_^p^a^rt.h^tm^.
¹⁷²^Based^oⁿ^accouⁿ^t^{s f}^r^o^m^d^e^t^aⁱⁿ^{ees an}^d^o^t^h^e^rs,^M^N^F^{-I l}^ead^{ers assess t}^h^at^un^d^e^rem^p^l^o^ymen^t^,^m^o^{re o}^f^t^eⁿ^t^h^an
^uⁿ^e^m^p^l^o^ymen^t^,ⁱ^s^{a p}^rⁱ^m^{e m}^o^tⁱ^v^a^tⁱ^o^{n f}^o^{r t}^h^o^s^{e recru}ⁱ^t^e^d^t^o^pl^{ace an}^IE^{D i}ⁿ^ret^u^rⁿ^f^o^{r a on}^e-tⁱ^m^{e cas}^h^p^a^ym^en^t^.
¹⁷³^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^2008.
¹⁷⁴^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^a^{nd s}^u^bor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
¹⁷⁵^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q”^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰^8,^p.^7.

Over time, the AQI network has demonstrated adaptability, quickly shifting its tactics and its
footprint as circumstances change. Pushed out of urban areas, they typically have sought refuge
and an opportunity to re-group in deep rural settings. As surge operations pushed AQI and its
affiliates out of Baghdad in late 2007, they sought new bases of operation to the east and to the
north, in the Diyala River Valley in Diyala province, and in the northern Tigris River Valley in ¹⁷⁶
Ninewah province. In early 2008, some AQI elements attempted to regroup in Mosul, but ¹⁷⁷
coalition and Iraqi operations pushed AQI elements out of the city and deeper into rural areas.
As of August 2008, U.S. commanders in Iraq assessed that AQI was in disarray but still capable
of conducting spectacular attacks. AQI was making increasing use of “surgical” attacks, such as
sniper attacks, and using intimidation tactics, which may require fewer resources and less
coordination that large-scale catastrophic attacks. In western Anbar province, where significant
security progress was achieved earlier than in the north, commanders note—borrowing from
Mao—that there’s no longer a sea for the AQI fish to swim in; that is, popular support for AQI ¹⁷⁸
has so sharply diminished that they are forced to operate clandestinely.
Some Shi’a militias have been another major source of violence in post-Saddam Iraq. A central
figure since the days of major combat operations has been the young Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-
Sadr, the head of the Office of the Martyr Sadr political organization and its armed militia, the
Jaish al-Mahdi (“JAM”). During the year of formal occupation, al-Sadr frequently delivered
Friday sermons at mosques, using a hardline nationalist message to condemn the coalition and its
Iraqi partners and to call for action against them. In April 2004, his followers staged coordinated,
violent uprisings in cities throughout southern Iraq, which were put down by coalition forces.
While continuing to voice staunch opposition to the U.S. force presence in Iraq, in August 2007,
al-Sadr declared a ceasefire to which most of JAM adhered., and he repeated the call in February
2008. By the summer of 2008, al-Sadr was reportedly making efforts to shift the focus of his base
organization to social, cultural and political activities. At the end of July, he issued a statement
pledging his support and that of his followers to the Government of Iraq, if the GoI would refrain
from signing any security agreement with the United States. He also urged his followers to refrain
from any actions that would harm Iraqi civilians, or disrupt the provision of government ¹⁷⁹
services.
Meanwhile, rogue elements of JAM—known euphemistically as “special groups” or “special
groups criminals”—defied al-Sadr’s August 2007 ceasefire call and continued to practice
violence. The Office of the Martyr Sadr, insisting that JAM itself is an “army of believers,” has
described such elements as criminal infiltrators who find it useful to have the cover of the JAM ¹⁸⁰
name.
¹⁷⁶
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^,^MN^C^-^I^,^a^{nd MN}^D^-^N^o^r^t^h^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^2008.
¹⁷⁷^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^a^{nd s}^u^bo^r^d^ina^t^e^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
¹⁷⁸^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^a^{nd MN}^F-^W^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^a^{nd ot}^he^r^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
¹⁷⁹^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith U}^.^{S. c}ⁱ^v^ilia^{n a}ⁿ^d^m^ilita^r^y^offⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^{. S}^e^e^f^o^{r e}^x^am^ple^Nⁱ^c^hola^s^Spaⁿ^g^l^e^r^a^nd
^Moha^m^m^e^d^a^l^D^u^la^im^y^,^“A^l-^Sa^d^r^w^ould^ba^c^k^I^r^a^{qi g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt f}^o^r^a^pr^ic^e^,^”^Ar^iz^on^{a D}^a^ily^S^t^ar^{, J}^u^l^y^{31, 20}^08.
¹⁸⁰^Se^e^Sa^brina^T^a^v^e^rnise^,^“^A^Shiite^Militiaⁱⁿ^Ba^g^hda^{d se}^e^s^{its p}^o^w^e^{r w}^a^ne^,”^{New Yo}^{rk Times}^{, J}^u^ly^{27, 20}⁰⁸^.

In official reports, the Department of Defense states that some JAM special groups and other ¹⁸¹
Shi’a extremist groups receive funding and support from Iran. The Iranian government has
reportedly pledged to help stop the flow of lethal aid into Iraq, but reports suggest there has been ¹⁸²
no marked diminution. According to officials from the Multi-National Divisions that border
Iran, the cross-border flow varies geographically over time, tending to seek the path of least
resistance. The deployment of the Georgian full brigade to Wasit province, for example, made ¹⁸³
that province harder to traverse and pushed traffic north and south. As of August 2008, a key
locus of cross-border smuggling—not only of lethal aid but also of consumer goods—was the
border along Maysan province, where Marsh Arabs historically have traded goods for ¹⁸⁴
centuries.
Meanwhile, the Iranian government apparently continues to seek influence among Iraqi Shi’a
through the exercise of “soft power,” for example by continuing to foster relationships with
political leaders, by providing social services, and through investments including purchasing a ¹⁸⁵
power plant in the Shi’a-populated Sadr City section of Baghdad.
According to U.S. and Iraqi commanders on the ground, the series of Iraqi-led military operations
in southern Iraq, which began in Basra in March 2008, had the effect of isolating some special
groups members and forcing others to flee across the border into Iran. U.S. and Iraqi commanders
note, however, that in Iran, Quds forces continue to train some Iraqi Shi’a extremists, including
former special groups members. They add that some infiltrations continue, with the goal of
carrying out assassinations or planting improvised explosive devices. They suggest that special
groups may attempt to reassert themselves in Iraq, with help from Iran. As one Iraqi commander
noted, “Sadly, our neighbors are not friendly.” Some U.S. and Iraqi commanders comment that a
special groups re-emergence might take the form of a streamlined, well-trained terrorist network
with a cellular structure, operating under cover, rather than a mass movement with popular ¹⁸⁶
support.
JAM and JAM “special groups” activities in southern Iraq and Baghdad take place against the
backdrop of a deeply rooted intra-Shi’a struggle for power and resources. Some observers assess
¹⁸¹
^In^{a Decem}^b^e^r^{2007 qua}^rte^r^ly^re^port,^{DOD a}^sse^sse^{d tha}^t^{, c}^o^m^p^a^r^e^d^to^Se^pte^m^be^{r 20}^07:^“^T^he^re^ha^{s be}^eⁿⁿ^o
^ideⁿ^tif^ie^{d de}^c^r^e^a^s^e^{in Ira}^niaⁿ^traⁱ^ning^aⁿ^{d f}^und^ing^of^ille^g^a^{l Shi’a}^m^ilitia^{s in Ira}^{q. T}^e^hraⁿ^{’s sup}^por^t^f^o^{r Shi’a}^m^ilita^nt
^g^r^oups^w^{ho a}^tta^c^k^Coa^liti^{on a}^{nd I}^r^a^q^{i f}^o^rc^e^s^rem^a^ins^a^sⁱ^gⁿ^ifⁱ^c^aⁿ^{t im}^pe^di^m^e^{nt to pr}^og^re^s^s^tow^a^rds^s^t^a^b^iliz^a^tion^.^”
^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^ili^ty^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,”^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r²⁰⁰⁷^{. I}ⁿ^its^Se^p^t^e^m^ber²⁰⁰⁸^r^e^por^t^,
^{DOD sta}^t^e^d^{, “}^A^lthoug^{h Ira}^{n’s le}^a^d^e^r^ship^pu^blic^ly^proc^la^im^e^d^{it sto}^ppe^d^provⁱ^d^ing^le^t^h^a^l^aⁱ^{d t}^o^S^h^i’a^m^ilita^{nts, the}
^e^v^ideⁿ^c^e^doe^{s no}^{t su}^pp^{ort t}^h^eⁱ^{r c}^l^aⁱ^m^.^”^Se^e^De^pa^rt^m^e^{nt of}^De^f^e^nse^,^“^M^e^a^s^uring^Sta^bⁱ^lity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^rit^y^{in Ira}^q,”
^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰⁸^{, p}^.^6.
¹⁸²^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^B^a^g^hda^{d, J}^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^{08. D}^u^rⁱ^ng^the^Fe^br^ua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^s^t^a^t^e^vⁱ^s^{it to}
^B^a^g^hda^{d by}^I^r^a^niaⁿ^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t Ma}^hm^{oud A}^h^m^a^dine^ja^{d, I}^r^a^niaⁿ^aⁿ^d^I^r^a^{qi of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^r^e^por^te^dly^sⁱ^gⁿ^e^d^aⁿ^a^g^r^e^em^eⁿ^{t on}
^the^r^e^nov^a^tioⁿ^of^bor^de^r^pos^ts^a^l^oⁿ^g^theⁱ^r^s^h^a^r^e^d^la^nd^aⁿ^d^m^a^r^iti^m^e^bor^de^r^s^{. Se}^e^“^I^r^a^{n, I}^r^a^q^Em^pha^sⁱ^z^e^N^e^e^d^f^o^r
^R^e^nov^a^tion^of^B^o^r^d^e^r^Pos^t^s^,^”^T^e^hr^aⁿ^I^R^N^A^a^g^eⁿ^cy^{in Eng}^lis^h,^Fe^b^r^ua^r^y^{20 20}^08.
¹⁸³^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^s^u^b^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^t^e^c^o^m^m^a^{nd of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
¹⁸⁴^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^a^{nd s}^u^bo^r^d^ina^t^e^c^o^m^m^a^{nd of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^{st 20}⁰⁸^.
¹⁸⁵^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^2008.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^J^o^s^e^p^h^Fe^lte^r^a^{nd B}^r^ia^{n Fis}^h^m^a^{n, “}^I^r^a^niaⁿ^Str^a^te^gy^{in I}^r^a^q:
^Po^{litics an}^d^‘Ot^h^{er M}^ean^{s,’” Co}^m^b^atin^g^Terro^rism^C^eⁿ^t^{er at}^W^e^s^t^P^oⁱⁿ^t,^Occasioⁿ^a^l^P^a^p^e^{r Series,}^Octo^b^e^{r 1}³^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
¹⁸⁶^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^{nd s}^ubor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, a}^{nd w}^{ith I}^r^a^qi^c^o^m^m^ande^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t
²⁰⁰^8.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^“^U^{S: Q}^u^ds^{, H}^e^z^b^o^lla^{h tr}^aⁱⁿⁱ^ng^hi^{t s}^q^ua^dsⁱⁿ^I^r^a^n,”^A^sso^ci^a^t^ed^P^r^ess^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t¹⁶^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.^T^h^e^a^u^thor^,
^c^iting^a^“^s^eⁿ^{ior U.S}^.^m^ilita^r^y^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^offⁱ^c^e^r^{in Ira}^q,”^w^r^ite^{s tha}^t^Ira^{qis a}^r^e^be^ing^traⁱ^ne^{d i}ⁿ^Iraⁿⁱⁿ^re^c^oⁿⁿ^aⁱ^ssa^nc^e^,
^the^us^e^of^s^m^a^{ll a}^r^m^s^a^{nd im}^pr^ovⁱ^s^e^d^e^x^plos^iv^e^de^vⁱ^c^e^s^{, a}^s^s^a^s^sⁱ^na^{tion te}^c^h^niq^u^e^s^{, a}ⁿ^{d te}^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^c^e^{ll o}^p^e^r^a^tions^a^nd
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^.

that, more than the Sunni-based insurgency or any other issue, the struggle for the Shi’a-¹⁸⁷
populated south may shape Iraq’s future. The other main protagonist is the Islamic Supreme
Council in Iraq (ISCI, formerly known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq), which is backed by its Badr militia and which, like JAM, provides people with goods and
services in an effort to extend its influence. The power struggle also includes smaller Shi’a
political parties backed by militias, such as Fadila al-Islamiyah (Islamic Virtue) which is active
in the major southern city and province of Basra.
Relatively new to the power struggle are the ground-up voices of southern tribal leaders, most of
whom stayed in Iraq through the Saddam period, unlike many Iraqi Shi’a political party leaders
who spent years in Iran. Recognizing the largely untapped potential political power of southern
tribal Shi’a, in 2008 Prime Minister Maliki sought to form consultative “tribal support councils,”
first of all in southern provinces, which were supposed to articulate tribal needs to the provincial
councils. In at least one case, Babil province, the governor sought to form a competing provincial ¹⁸⁸
tribal council.
Key political markers, including regionalization and provincial elections, have the potential to
exacerbate the contest for political power and influence in the south. In April 2008, an 18-month
moratorium expired on the implementation of a 2006 law on federalism, which included
provisions for the creation of “regions” based on one or more provinces. “Regional” status could
prove important because it affects the distribution of economic resources and political power.
Major Shi’a groups in the south have called for various approaches to regionalization, based on ¹⁸⁹
their popular bases of support. Iran, too, has reportedly expressed interest in how southern Iraq
might be regionally grouped. As of August 2008, local political parties and organizations in Basra
had taken the first steps to seek regionalization of Basra province, by filing an initial petition; the ¹⁹⁰
full process would include a broader-based collection of signatures, and a popular referendum.
The Provincial Powers Act passed in February 2008 and approved by the Presidency Council,
after some reluctance, in March, named October 1, 2008, the deadline for holding provincial ¹⁹¹
elections. However, in July 2008, work on a new elections law, a prerequisite for holding
provincial elections, foundered over the inability of political leaders to reach agreement on a ¹⁹²
process for resolving the political status of Kirkuk. In October 2008, the Presidency Council
passed the elections law, which called for holding provincial elections in all of Iraq’s provinces
except Kirkuk, by January 31, 2009, although that deadline, some observers note, may be
¹⁸⁷
^Se^e^f^o^{r e}^x^am^ple^,^“^S^hiite^P^o^li^tic^s^{in Ira}^q:^the^R^o^le^of^the^S^upre^m^e^Counc^il^,”^Inte^rⁿ^a^tio^na^{l Cris}^is^G^r^{oup, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r
^15,²⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^w^w^.^c^risⁱ^s^g^roup.org^/^hom^e^/inde^x^.^c^f^m^?^id=⁵¹^58.^T^h^is^vⁱ^e^w^is^s^h^a^r^e^d^by^s^o^m^e^key
^s^t^r^a^te^gⁱ^s^t^s^a^t^MN^F-^I^,^inte^r^v^ie^w^s^{, Ja}^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
¹⁸⁸^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^s^u^b^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^t^e^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^nd^P^R^T^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,²⁰⁰⁸^{. B}^y^la^te²⁰⁰^{8, t}^h^e^r^o^le^of^the^s^e^c^ounc^ils^ha^d
^e^x^pa^nde^{d be}^y^{ond s}^out^he^rⁿ^I^r^a^q^.^S^o^m^e^I^r^a^qis^ha^{d r}^e^por^te^dly^e^x^pr^e^s^se^{d c}^onc^e^r^ns^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^c^o^uⁿ^c^ils^w^e^r^e^de^sⁱ^gⁿ^e^d^to
^s^upp^or^t^Pr^im^e^Minis^t^e^r^Ma^lik^{i. I}ⁿ^r^e^s^pons^e^,^Pr^e^s^ideⁿ^{t T}^a^la^ba^{ni s}^t^a^t^e^d^tha^t^he^w^{ould r}^e^que^s^t^a^r^u^ling^f^r^o^m^the^Fe^de^r^a^l
^Supre^m^e^Court^{on t}^h^e^q^u^e^s^tio^{n of}^the^c^o^unc^{ils’ c}^o^nstit^utio^na^lity^{. Se}^e^A^liss^a^{J. Rubi}^{n, “}^C^la^{sh i}ⁿ^Ira^q^o^v^e^{r a}^plaⁿ^f^o^r
^c^ounc^ilsⁱⁿ^te^ns^if^ie^s^,^”^{New Yo}^{rk Ti}^mes^{, D}^e^c^{4, 20}⁰⁸^.
¹⁸⁹^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith U}^.^{S. Em}^ba^s^s^y^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
¹⁹⁰^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith the}^G^o^v^e^{rnor of}^Ba^sra^,^a^{nd w}^{ith U.S.}^a^{nd UK m}^ilita^r^y^a^{nd c}ⁱ^v^ilia^{n of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s in Ba}^sra^,^A^u^g^u^{st 20}^08.
¹⁹¹^S^{ee Am}ⁱ^t^R.^P^a^l^e^y^,^“Iraqⁱ^L^ead^er^{s V}^e^t^o^L^a^w^oⁿ^E^l^ectⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^”^W^a^s^hⁱ^ngt^{on Pos}^t^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{28, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{. T}^h^e^P^r^ov^incⁱ^a^l
^P^o^w^e^rs^A^c^t^w^a^{s p}^a^ss^ed^{as p}^a^rt^o^f^{a “p}^acka^g^{e d}^eal^,^”^t^o^get^h^{er w}ⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e Nat}ⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^Bud^g^et^an^d^aⁿ^Amⁿ^e^st^y^L^a^w^.^Vⁱ^ce
^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t A}^{bd a}^l^-Me^hdi^init^ia^lly^obje^c^t^e^d^t^o^a^prov^isioⁿ^of^the^Pro^vⁱ^nc^ia^{l Pow}^e^rs^A^c^{t c}^onc^e^r^ning^m^oda^litie^{s f}^o^{r t}^h^e
^r^e^m^o^v^a^{l of}^pr^ov^incⁱ^a^l^g^o^v^e^r^nor^s^.
¹⁹²^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith U.S. Em}^ba^ss^y^offⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s,^w^{ith the}^G^o^v^e^rnor^of^Kirk^uk^{, a}^{nd w}^{ith U.}^{S. c}ⁱ^v^iliaⁿ^a^{nd m}^ilita^ry^o^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s in}
^Kⁱ^r^k^uk^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.

unrealistic for logistical reasons. Some Iraqi provincial political leaders and security forces
commanders in southern Iraq have suggested that the elections carry the potential for violence, in
part because many current office-holders recognize that they may not have enough popular
support to be elected. Others have stressed the importance of those elections, as a safety valve for
popular opinion, but suggested that a postponement of several months was not likely to have ¹⁹³
malign consequences.
Less a source than a type of violence, Iraq has struggled for years with sectarian violence,
particularly along the fault lines between populations predominantly of different sectarian groups.
Those fault lines, some observers suggest, are where local populations are likely to feel most
vulnerable, and might in some cases be most open to assurances of protection from one organized
armed group or another.
Sectarian violence skyrocketed in February 2006, following the bombing of the Golden Mosque
in Samarra, one of Shiite Islam’s holiest shrines. That attack prompted Shi’a reprisals targeting
Sunnis and Sunni mosques in a number of cities. AQI responded in some locations by staging a ¹⁹⁴
series of further attacks.
The sectarian-based displacement of many Iraqis from their homes, and the resulting greater ¹⁹⁵
segregation in urban areas, reduced the number of fault lines somewhat. Displacement and
resettlement are dynamic issues—while the GoI does not yet have a well-resourced,
comprehensive plan for the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, some ¹⁹⁶
resettlement initiatives are underway. In many instances, the usual challenges of displacement
are compounded by both sectarian and class-based differences, between those who have fled, and ¹⁹⁷
those who have moved into the “abandoned” homes.
Another major category of violence is opportunistic criminality, practiced with a view to sheer
material gain rather than political or ideological goals. The inchoate status of Iraq’s judicial
system and law enforcement organizations has left room for opportunists to steal, loot, smuggle,
kidnap and extort.
¹⁹³
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith G}^ove^r^nor^s^of^N^a^ja^f^,^B^a^s^r^a^;^a^{nd I}^r^a^{qi c}^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{in D}ⁱ^w^a^niy^a^{h a}^{nd B}^a^s^r^a^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
¹⁹⁴^Se^e^pr^e^s^s^a^c^c^ountsⁱⁿ^c^l^u^d^ing^El^le^{n K}ⁿ^ic^k^m^ey^e^r^a^{nd K}^.^I^.^I^b^r^a^him^,^“^B^om^bing^Sha^tte^r^s^Mos^queⁱⁿ^I^r^a^q^,^”^Wa^shⁱⁿ^g^t^on
^Post^{, Fe}^br^ua^r^y^23,²⁰^06;^a^{nd R}^o^b^e^r^t^{F. W}^o^r^t^h^,^“^M^us^lim^C^l^e^r^ic^s^C^a^{ll f}^o^r^aⁿ^En^{d t}^o^I^r^a^qⁱ^Rⁱ^o^ting^,^”^T^h^{e New Yo}^{rk Times,}
^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{25, 2}⁰⁰⁶^.
¹⁹⁵^T^o^b^e^cl^ear,^{as h}^u^m^an^ri^gh^t^s^grou^p^s^st^ress,^di^sp^l^acemen^tⁱ^s^no^t^{a “}^s^o^l^u^tⁱ^o^n.^{” A}^s^{a ru}^l^e^,ⁱⁿ^m^o^st^si^t^u^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^p^e^op^l^e^are
^f^a^r^m^o^{re vu}^lⁿ^erab^l^eⁱⁿ^dⁱ^s^p^l^acemen^t^t^h^{an t}^h^ey^{are i}ⁿ^t^h^ei^r^h^o^m^es.
¹⁹⁶^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith Ira}^{qi of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^re^s^ponsⁱ^b^le^f^o^{r re}^s^e^ttle^m^e^{nt in pa}^rts^of^Ba^g^hda^{d, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.
¹⁹⁷^I^b^id^{. F}^o^r^e^x^a^m^ple^,^{in s}^o^m^e^B^a^g^hda^{d ne}^ig^h^bor^ho^ods^,^Sh^i’^a^e^x^tr^emⁱ^s^ts^f^r^o^m^the^J^a^is^{h al-}^M^ah^di^repo^r^t^ed^l^y^f^o^rced
^a^f^f^l^ue^{nt Sun}ⁿ^{i A}^r^a^b^s^{to f}^l^e^e^theⁱ^r^hom^e^s^{, a}^{nd the}ⁿ^of^f^e^r^e^{d thos}^e^“^e^m^pt^y^”^ho^m^e^s^,^f^o^r^a^v^e^r^y^nom^ina^l^r^e^{nt, t}^o^m^u^c^h^le^s^s
^aff^l^u^eⁿ^t^S^hⁱ^’^{a A}^r^ab^s.

In addition to the primary adversaries during major combat operations—the regime’s forces and
security structures—and the primary sources of violence in the period after major combat,
coalition forces in Iraq have had to contend with the presence of two groups, designated by the
Department of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, which are largely unrelated to the rest of
the fight but of deep interest to some of Iraq’s neighbors. Both cases have consumed substantial
time and energy from MNF-I staff in Iraq as well as senior leaders in Washington, D.C., and both
have had the potential to destabilize the broader security environment.
The first group is the Kurdistan Workers Party—the PKK, also known over time as KADEK,
Kongra-Gel, and the KCK. The PKK is based in southeastern Turkey, but maintains a presence in
northern Iraq and reportedly uses that area to rest and re-group from its operations inside Turkey.
The PKK’s stated goal is the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, and it has practiced
terror to that end, targeting Turkish security forces and civilian officials.
Since 2003, the Turkish government has pushed for action against PKK members in northern
Iraq. The U.S. and Iraqi governments have both strongly supported the Turkish government’s
stand against terrorism and the PKK in principle. In the past, both the Iraqi government and
MNF-I reportedly expressed concerns that military action against the PKK in Iraq could open a ¹⁹⁸
new northern front, taxing their already thinly stretched forces.
In 2007, the Government of Turkey received a one-year Turkish parliamentary authorization to
conduct cross-border actions against the PKK, and in October 2008 the Turkish parliament ¹⁹⁹
extended the authorization for one year. In December 2007, the Turkish Air Force launched a
series of air strikes, targeting presumed PKK positions in northern Iraq, followed in February ²⁰⁰
2008 by a week-long series of coordinated air and ground attacks. Initially, Iraqi government
officials objected, stressing the need to respect the sovereignty of its territory and air space. U.S.
senior leaders, reportedly informed in advance of the February attacks about Turkish intentions, ²⁰¹
publicly called on the government of Turkey to keep the operation as short as possible. In July

2008, the Turkish Air Force conducted another series of air strikes on presumed PKK positions in ²⁰²

northern Iraq. In October 2008, following a PKK attack that killed 17 Turkish soldiers, Turkish
forces launched another series of air strikes into northern Iraq. U.S. officials have reportedly
facilitated diplomatic consultations with Iraqi and Turkish officials, aimed at a comprehensive ²⁰³
solution to deal with the PKK issue.
¹⁹⁸
^In^f^o^rm^atioⁿ^f^r^o^m^CJT^F^-7^,^M^N^F^-I,^DOD,^an^d^I^r^aqⁱ^o^f^fⁱ^ci^als,²⁰⁰³^an^d²⁰⁰⁴^.
¹⁹⁹^“^T^urk^e^y^E^x^te^{nds Rig}^h^{t to}^A^tta^c^k^,”^{New Yo}^{rk Times}^{, O}^c^to^be^r^9,²⁰^08.
²⁰⁰^S^{ee f}^o^{r exa}^m^p^l^{e “}^T^u^r^ki^sh^j^e^t^sⁱⁿ^f^r^esh^Iraq^st^ri^ke,^”^{BBC Ame}^r^ic^a^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^{26, 2}⁰⁰⁷^.
²⁰¹^Se^e^A^lis^s^a^J^.^R^{ubin a}ⁿ^{d Sa}^br^ina^T^a^v^e^rⁿ^is^e^,^“^T^ur^kⁱ^s^h^T^r^oops^Ente^r^I^r^a^{q in}^P^u^r^s^uit^of^K^u^r^d^is^h^Mili^ta^nts^,^”^Th^{e New}
^Yor^k^Tim^e^s^{, Fe}^br^ua^ry^{23, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{; L}^o^lita^Ba^ld^{or, “}^G^a^t^e^s^{: T}^u^rk^e^y^Ra^{id W}^{on’t S}^o^lv^e^P^r^o^b^le^m^s^,”^Wa^shⁱⁿ^g^t^on^P^o^st,
^F^e^b^r^u^a^ry²³^,²⁰⁰⁸^;^Y^o^chⁱ^Dreazen^,^“U.^S^.^Kn^ew^o^f^T^u^rk^e^y^{’s P}^l^an^t^o^Hi^t^P^KK,^Di^dn^’t^Obj^ect^,^”^W^a^{ll Str}^e^e^t^J^ourⁿ^a^l^,
^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{26, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
²⁰²^S^{ee “T}^u^r^ke^y^st^ri^{kes P}^{KK h}^ead^quart^{ers i}ⁿ^Kan^dⁱ^l^,^”^Turk^ish^Daily^N^e^ws^{, J}^u^ly^{28, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
²⁰³^Se^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q^,”^J^une²⁰^08,^p^p^.2^9-³⁰^.

During the year of formal occupation, the leadership of CJTF-7 and CPA, and senior officials in
Washington, D.C., spent considerable time focused on the disposition of the Mujahedin-e Khalq
(“MeK”). Formed by students in Iran in the 1960’s, in leftist opposition to the Shah and his
regime, the MeK later stepped into opposition against what it calls the “mullah regime” that took
power after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Over time, the MeK has sought opportunistic alliances,
including moving its operational headquarters to Iraq, and making common cause with the Iraqi
government, during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s.
Although the MeK is a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, some U.S. officials reportedly
have considered the possibility of using the MeK as leverage against Tehran. Several times, some
Members of Congress—reportedly some 200 in the year 2000—signed letters expressing their ²⁰⁴
support for the cause advocated by the MeK.
This awkward policy history was magnified by awkward events on the ground during OIF major
combat operations, when, on April 15, 2003, members of the U.S. Special Operations Forces
signed a ceasefire agreement with MeK leaders. Subsequently, Department of Defense issued
guidance through CENTCOM to forces on the ground to effect a MeK surrender. Following a
series of negotiations with MeK leaders, the several thousand MeK members were separated from
their well-maintained heavy weapons and brought under coalition control. The key operational
concern, in the early stages, was that MeK non-compliance could generate large-scale operational
requirements, effectively opening another front. Efforts have been underway since that time, in
coordination with the Iraqi government and the many countries of citizenship of the MeK
members, to determine appropriate further disposition.
As of fall 2008, the Government of Iraq had initiated steps to transition responsibility for control ²⁰⁵
of the MeK camp from U.S. to Iraqi security forces. In a public statement in September 2008,
Minister of Defense Abdul Qadr noted that the sovereign government of Iraq should be
responsible for any such group inside the country—“The Iraqi government is entitled to be the ²⁰⁶
guard around the borders of the camp.”

Over time, U.S. military strategy for Iraq—and thus also operations on the ground—have been
adapted to support evolving U.S. national strategy. In turn, national strategy has directly drawn
some lessons from OIF operational experience. Given the scope and scale of the mission, and its
lack of precise historical precedents, there has been ample need and opportunity for learning and
adaptation.
²⁰⁴
^Mⁱ^ch^ael^Isi^k^o^f^f^an^d^M^a^{rk Ho}^sen^b^a^l^l^,^“T^erro^{r W}^a^t^c^h^:^S^h^ad^{es o}^f^G^r^a^y^,^”^Newswe^ek^{, O}^c^tobe^r^17,²⁰⁰⁷^.
²⁰⁵^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^{8. Ea}^r^l^y^indic^a^tⁱ^ons^of^G^o^I^inte^{nt w}^e^r^e^r^e^por^te^dly^c^a^u^sⁱ^ng
^an^xi^et^y^f^o^r^m^e^m^b^er^{s o}^f^t^h^{e M}^e^K.
²⁰⁶^Mult^i-N^a^tiona^l^Forc^e^-Ira^q^pre^s^s^c^onf^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^,^{Mr. A}^{bdul Q}^a^{dr a}^l^-^M^uf^{riji, Min}ⁱ^s^t^e^r^of^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^a^{nd LTG}^Fraⁿ^k
^He^l^m^ic^k^,^Co^m^m^aⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^G^eⁿ^e^ra^l,^Mu^lti-Na^ti^oⁿ^a^l^Se^c^u^rity^T^r^aⁿ^sitioⁿ^Co^m^m^aⁿ^d^-Ira^q^,^Se^p^t^e^m^b^e^{r 1}⁰^,²⁰⁰⁸^.

The Administration’s basic national strategic objectives have remained roughly consistent over
time. So have the major categories of activities (or “lines of operation”)—political, economic,
essential services, diplomatic—used to help achieve the objectives. What have evolved greatly
over time are the views of commanders in the field and decision-makers in Washington, D.C.,
about the best ways to achieve “security” and how that line of operation fits with the others.
This section highlights key episodes and turning-points in the theory and practice of OIF military
operations, including early operations during formal occupation, “Fallujah II,” COIN operations
in Tal Afar, Operation Together Forward, the operations associated with the 2007 “New Way
Forward,” and surge follow-on operations in 2008. The review suggests that the application of
counter-insurgency (COIN) theory and practice grew over time, but by no means steadily or
consistently.
Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz argued: “The first, the supreme, the most far-
reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the ²⁰⁷
kind of war on which they are embarking.” In theory, how the “kind of war” is identified helps
shape the tools selected to prosecute it. In the case of OIF after major combat operations, it
proved difficult for senior Bush Administration officials and military leaders to agree on what
“kind of war” OIF was turning out to be.
On July 7, 2003, General John Abizaid, an Arabic speaker who had served during OIF major
combat as the Deputy Commanding General of CENTCOM, replaced General Tommy Franks as
CENTCOM Commander. At his first press conference in the new role, GEN Abizaid referred to
the challenge in Iraq as a “classical guerrilla-type campaign.” Slightly more carefully but leaving
no room for doubt he added, “I think describing it as guerrilla tactics is a proper way to describe it ²⁰⁸
in strictly military terms.”
The Pentagon pointedly did not adopt that terminology. Two weeks later, asked about his
reluctance to use the phrase “guerrilla war,” Secretary Rumsfeld noted: “I guess the reason I don’t
use the phrase ‘guerrilla war’ is because there isn’t one, and it would be a misunderstanding and a
miscommunication to you and to the people of the country and the world.” Instead, he argued, in
Iraq there were “five different things”: “looters, criminals, remnants of the Ba’athist regime, ²⁰⁹
foreign terrorists, and those influenced by Iran.”
In his account of that year, CJTF-7 Commanding General LTG Sanchez wrote that by July 2003, ²¹⁰
he and GEN Abizaid, his boss, had recognized that what they faced was an insurgency. A UK
²⁰⁷
^{Carl v}^oⁿ^Clau^sew^itz,^On^Wa^r^,^Mi^ch^ael^Ho^w^a^rd^an^d^P^e^t^e^r^P^a^ret^,^e^d^s.^,^P^rⁱⁿ^cet^oⁿ^NJ:^P^rⁱⁿ^cet^on^Uⁿⁱ^v^ersi^t^y^P^r^ess,
¹⁹⁷^{6, p.}^88.
²⁰⁸^{See BBC, “US f}^{aces Iraq}^g^u^{errilla war,” Ju}^ly¹⁶^,²⁰⁰³^{, av}^ailab^l^{e at h}^t^t^p^://ⁿ^e^w^s^.b^b^c^.co^.^u^k^/²^/h^i/^mⁱ^d^d^l^e_^east/
³⁰⁷²⁸⁹⁹^.s^tm^.
²⁰⁹^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^N^e^w^s^B^rⁱ^e^fⁱ^ng^w^{ith Se}^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^R^u^m^s^f^e^{ld a}^{nd G}^e^ne^r^a^{l M}^y^e^r^s^,^J^une^30,²⁰⁰³^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^h^ttp^:^//www^.d^efen^selin^k^.^m^il/^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.asp^x^?^tran^scrip^tid⁼²⁷⁶⁷^.^W^h^en^{a re}^p^o^r^{ter read}^th^e^{DOD d}^e^fⁱⁿ^itioⁿ^o^f
^g^u^e^rrilla^w^a^r—^“^m^ilita^r^y^a^{nd pa}^ra^m^ilita^r^y^ope^ra^{tions c}^oⁿ^duc^te^dⁱⁿ^eⁿ^e^m^y^-^he^{ld or h}^o^stile^te^rrit^o^ry^by^irre^g^u^la^r,
^pr^e^dom^inaⁿ^tly^indig^e^no^us^f^o^r^c^e^s^”—^a^{nd a}^s^k^e^{d w}^h^e^t^he^r^tha^t^de^s^c^rⁱ^b^e^{d the}^sⁱ^t^u^a^tio^{n i}ⁿ^I^r^a^q,^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^R^u^m^s^f^e^{ld r}^e^plie^d,
^“It^real^l^y^d^o^e^sn^’t^.^”
²¹⁰^Rⁱ^c^a^r^{do S}^.^Sa^nc^he^z^,^Wⁱ^se^{r in Bat}^tle^{: A S}^o^ld^ie^{r’s Story}^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: H}^a^r^p^e^r^{, 20}⁰⁸^{, p}^p^.²³¹^-²^32.

officer serving as Special Assistant to LTG Sanchez drafted a paper outlining the concepts of
insurgency and counter-insurgency and their possible application to Iraq. The paper’s ideas, and ²¹¹
its nomenclature, gained traction and helped inform the command’s planning.
However, for years afterward, the Pentagon also resisted the terminology of “insurgency.” At a
November 2005 press conference, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace,
speaking about the adversary in Iraq, said, “I have to use the word ‘insurgent’ because I can’t
think of a better word right now.” Secretary Rumsfeld cut in—“enemies of the legitimate Iraqi
government.” He added, “That [using the word “insurgent”] gives them a greater legitimacy than ²¹²
they seem to merit.”
During the formal occupation of Iraq from 2003 to 2004, the military command in Iraq, CJTF-7,
was responsible for “security,” while the civilian leadership, the Coalition Provisional Authority ²¹³
(CPA), was responsible for all other governance functions. In the views of the CJTF-7
leadership, establishing “security” required more than “killing people and breaking things”—it
required simultaneous efforts to achieve popular “buy-in,” for example by rebuilding local ²¹⁴
communities and engaging Iraqis in the process.
Accordingly, CJTF-7 built its plans around four basic lines of operation, or categories of effort—
political (governance), economic, essential services, and security—which differed only slightly
from the categories in use in early 2008. Those lines of operation were echoed in the plans of
CJTF-7’s subordinate commands. CJTF-7 would lead the “security” line, and support CPA efforts
in the other areas.
Beginning in 2003, CJTF-7’s basic theory of the case was that the lines of operation, pursued
simultaneously, would be mutually reinforcing. Major General Peter Chiarelli, who commanded ^st
the 1 Cavalry Division in Baghdad from 2004 to 2005, argued after his tour that it was not
effective to try to achieve security first, and then turn to the other lines of operation. He wrote: “...
if we concentrated solely on establishing a large security force and [conducting] targeted
counterinsurgent combat operations—and only after that was accomplished, worked toward
establishing a sustainable infrastructure supported by a strong government developing a free-²¹⁵
market system—we would have waited too long.”
²¹¹
^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^tha^t^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^a^{nd s}^e^nior^C^J^T^F^-⁷^s^t^a^f^f^,²⁰⁰³^aⁿ^d²⁰^04.
²¹²^{News Brief}ⁱⁿ^g^w^ith^S^ecretar^y^o^f^Defen^s^{e Do}ⁿ^a^ld^Ru^m^s^f^e^ld^an^d^Gen^e^{ral P}^e^ter^P^ace,^No^vem^b^{er 2}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁵^,^DOD
^w^e^bsite^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^ww^.^d^e^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/traⁿ^sc^ripts/traⁿ^sc^ript.a^spx^?^traⁿ^sc^ripti^d⁼¹⁴⁹²^.
²¹³^N^e^ithe^r^C^P^A^nor^C^J^T^F^-⁷^w^a^s^r^e^sponsⁱ^b^le^f^o^r^t^h^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^f^o^r^pos^sⁱ^bl^e^w^e^a^pons^of^m^a^s^s^de^s^t^r^u^c^{tion. T}^h^a^t^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^{on w}^a^s
^a^ssigⁿ^e^d^{to t}^h^e^Ira^{q S}^u^rv^e^y^G^r^{oup, w}^h^ic^{h re}^p^o^rte^d^j^oⁱⁿ^tly^{to the}^C^e^ntra^{l Inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^A^g^eⁿ^c^y^(CI^A⁾^a^{nd DOD’s}
^D^e^fe^ns^e^Inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^A^g^eⁿ^cy^(D^I^A^{), a}^{nd w}^h^ic^{h c}^a^rrie^d^out^its^w^o^rk^f^r^o^m^J^une²⁰⁰^{3 t}^o^Se^pte^m^be^{r 2004}^{. T}^h^e^g^r^ou^p’s
^fⁱ^na^{l R}^e^por^{t, “}^C^om^pr^e^h^eⁿ^sⁱ^v^e^R^e^por^t^of^the^S^p^e^cⁱ^a^l^A^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^{to the}^D^C^I^{on I}^r^a^q’^s^W^M^D^,^”^a^{nd c}^o^m^m^only^k^now^{n a}^s^the
^Due^l^f^e^{r Re}^{port, w}^a^{s publishe}^d^oⁿ^Se^pte^m^be^{r 30,}²⁰^04,^aⁿ^d^is^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^s://w^ww^.cⁱ^a^.g^ov^/^libra^r^y^/^r^e^ports/^g^eⁿ^e^r^a^l^-
^r^e^por^ts^-¹^/ⁱ^r^a^q_w^m^d_200^4/^inde^x^.^htm^l^.
²¹⁴^Inf^o^rm^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^CJT^F^{-7 le}^a^d^e^r^s^,^a^nd^pa^rtic^ipaⁿ^{t o}^b^se^rv^a^tion,²⁰⁰³^aⁿ^d²⁰⁰⁴^.
²¹⁵^M^a^jo^{r G}^eⁿ^e^{ral P}^e^{ter W}^.^Ch^{iarelli a}ⁿ^d^M^a^jo^r^P^a^trick^Mⁱ^c^h^{aelis, “W}ⁱⁿⁿⁱⁿ^g^th^e^P^{eace: T}^h^{e Req}^uⁱ^rem^eⁿ^t^f^o^{r Fu}^ll-
^S^p^ect^ru^m^Op^eratⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^”^M^ilit^ary^R^e^vⁱ^e^w^{, J}^u^ly^-^A^ug^us^{t 2005}^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://us^acac.army^.^m^il/C^A^C^/^m^ilre^v^ie^w^/
^dow^nloa^d/^Eng^lish/^JulA^ug^05/^c^h^ia^re^lli.pdf^{. T}^h^e^a^u^th^{ors c}^h^a^r^a^c^t^e^rⁱ^z^e^d^the^line^s^of^o^p^e^r^a^tion^a^s^“^c^o^m^b^a^t^ope^ra^tio^{ns, tra}ⁱⁿ
^a^{nd e}^m^ploy^s^e^c^u^r^ity^f^o^r^c^e^s^{, e}^s^se^ntia^{l s}^e^r^v^ic^e^s^{, pr}^om^ote^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^aⁿ^c^e^{, a}^{nd e}^c^o^nom^ic^plur^a^lis^m^.^”^Ec^hoi^ng^the^vⁱ^e^w^s^of
^CJT^F^-7^l^ead^ers,^t^h^{e au}^t^h^o^r^{s add}^e^d^,^“F^urt^h^er,^t^h^o^s^{e w}^h^o^vi^ewed^t^h^{e at}^t^aⁱⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^secu^ri^t^y^so^l^e^l^y^{as a}^f^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

In the “security” line of operation, military operations under CJTF-7 included combat operations
focused on “killing or capturing” the adversary. Aggressive operations yielded large numbers of
Iraqis detained by the coalition—the large numbers, and frequent difficulties determining whether
and where individuals were being held, were an early and growing source of popular frustration.
In April 2004, the unofficial release of graphic photos of apparent detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib
generated shock and horror among people inside and outside Iraq. Some observers have ²¹⁶
suggested that these developments may have helped fuel the insurgency.
CJTF-7 military operations also included early counter-insurgency (COIN) practices for
population control. Those practices included creating “gated communities”—including Saddam’s
home town of al-Awja—by fencing off a town or area and strictly controlling access through the
use of check-points and ID cards. To make military operations less antagonistic, when possible, to
local residents, units substituted “cordon and knock” approaches for the standard “cordon and ²¹⁷
search.”
The security line of operation also included early partnerships with nascent Iraqi security forces,
including mentoring as well as formal training. Where troop strength so permitted, for example in
Baghdad and in Mosul, Army Military Police were assigned to local police stations as de facto ²¹⁸
advisors. GEN Abizaid’s theory was that the very presence of U.S. forces in Iraq was an ²¹⁹
“antibody” in Iraqi society. Therefore, to remove the possibility that insurgents could leverage
the presence of an occupation force to win popular support, a key goal was to move quickly to an
“overwatch” posture. Doing so would require an accelerated stand-up of Iraqi security forces.
That approach shared with later COIN approaches the premise that U.S. forces alone could not
“win”—that success in the security sphere would require acting by, with and through Iraqis. It
differed sharply from later COIN approaches, however, in terms of implications for the U.S.
forces footprint, size of presence, and many activities.
While the military command did not have the lead role for the non-security lines of operation, it
made contributions to those efforts. To address the most pressing “essential services” concerns,
the military command created Task Force Restore Iraqi Electricity, and Task Force Restore Iraqi
Oil, which were later consolidated into the Gulf Region Division, under the Army Corps of
Engineers.
To help jumpstart local economies—and to provide Iraqis with some visible signs of post-war
“progress”—the military command launched the Commanders Emergency Response Program

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^m^ilita^r^y^a^c^{tion a}^l^oⁿ^e^w^e^re^mⁱ^sta^k^eⁿ^.”
²¹⁶^Iⁿ^J^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{2004, w}^h^eⁿ^a^b^us^e^a^lle^g^a^tions^w^e^r^e^br^oug^{ht f}^o^r^w^a^r^{d, C}^J^T^F^-⁷^is^s^u^e^d^a^pr^e^s^s^r^e^le^a^s^e^notiⁿ^g^tha^t^t^h^e
^c^o^m^m^a^{nd ha}^d^or^de^r^e^d^aⁿⁱⁿ^q^u^ir^y^into^a^lle^g^e^{d de}^ta^ine^e^a^bus^e^s^{. A}^b^u^G^h^r^a^{ib e}^v^eⁿ^ts^pr^om^pte^d^aⁿ^u^m^b^er^of^inv^e^s^tig^a^tions
^an^d^repo^rt^s.^F^o^r^oⁿ^e^acco^un^t^o^f^even^t^s^an^d^t^h^{e p}^o^lⁱ^cⁱ^e^{s t}^h^at^s^h^ap^{ed t}^h^em^,^{see t}^h^{e F}ⁱⁿ^a^l^Repo^rt^o^f^t^h^{e In}^d^e^p^e^nd^en^t^P^aⁿ^e^l
^{to R}^e^vⁱ^e^w^D^o^D^D^e^te^{ntion O}^p^e^r^a^t^ions^{, c}^h^aⁱ^r^e^d^by^f^o^r^m^e^r^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^D^e^f^e^ns^e^J^a^m^e^s^Sc^hle^s^ing^e^r^,^a^{nd c}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^one^d
^by^theⁿ^-^S^e^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^D^e^f^e^ns^e^D^ona^{ld R}^u^m^s^f^e^{ld “}^t^{o pr}^ov^ideⁱⁿ^de^pe^nde^nt^pr^of^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l a}^d^vⁱ^c^e^on^de^ta^ine^e^a^bus^e^s^{, w}^h^a^t
^c^a^u^se^{d the}^m^{, a}^{nd w}^h^a^t^a^c^{tions sh}^oul^{d be}^ta^k^e^{n to}^pre^c^l^ude^t^h^eⁱ^{r re}^pe^titio^n,”^a^v^a^ila^bleⁱⁿ^b^ook^f^o^rm^,^De^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}
^Defen^s^e,^The^Sc^hle^sⁱ^nge^r^Re^p^o^r^t^:^{An I}ⁿ^v^e^s^tigat^io^{n of}^Ab^{u G}^h^r^a^ib^,^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: C}^o^sⁱ^m^o^R^e^por^ts^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^15,²⁰⁰⁵^.
^F^o^{r a}^d^e^t^aⁱ^l^e^d^,^cri^tⁱ^cal^acco^un^t^o^f^A^b^u^G^h^rai^b^even^t^s^an^d^t^h^ei^{r a}ⁿ^t^e^ced^en^t^s^an^dⁱ^m^p^act^,^{see S}^e^ym^o^u^r^Hersch^,^C^hai^{n o}^f
^C^o^m^m^aⁿ^d^:^T^h^e^Ro^ad^fr^om^9/1¹^t^o^Ab^{u G}^h^r^a^ib^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: H}^a^r^p^e^r^P^e^r^e^nnia^l^,²⁰⁰⁵^.
²¹⁷^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^C^J^T^F^-⁷^a^{nd D}ⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on le}^a^d^e^r^s^,²⁰⁰³^aⁿ^d²⁰^04.
²¹⁸^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^C^J^T^F^-⁷^{, 1A}^D^,^a^{nd 1}⁰¹^st^l^ead^er^s,^an^d^p^a^r^tⁱ^cⁱ^p^aⁿ^t^o^b^s^er^vatⁱ^oⁿ^,²⁰⁰³^an^{d 20}⁰⁴^.
²¹⁹^Rⁱ^c^a^r^{do S}^.^Sa^nc^he^z^,^Wⁱ^se^{r in Bat}^tle^{: A S}^o^ld^ie^{r’s Story}^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: H}^a^r^p^e^r^{, 20}⁰⁸^{, p}^.²^32.

(CERP). As initially crafted, CERP provided commanders with readily available discretionary
funds to support small-scale projects, usually initiated at the request of local community leaders.
In the “governance” field, commanders needed Iraqi interlocutors to provide bridges into local
communities, and advice concerning the most urgent reconstruction and humanitarian priorities.
Since official Iraqi agencies were no longer intact, and since the CPA did not yet have a sufficient
regional presence to help build local governments, commanders helped select provincial and local ²²⁰
councils to serve in temporary advisory capacities.
By most accounts, by the end of the year of formal occupation, in June 2004, the security
situation had worsened—catalyzed in April by the simultaneous unrest in Fallujah and al-Sadr-led
uprisings throughout the south. Many observers have suggested that none of the lines of
operation—whether civilian-led or military-led—was fully implemented during the year of
formal occupation, due to a lack of personnel and resources. In particular, GEN Abizaid’s goal of
diminishing the presence of U.S. “antibodies” in Iraq society was not realized, since highly
inchoate Iraqi security forces training efforts, led by CPA, had not had time to yield results. The
basic assumption of CJTF-7—that establishing security required simultaneous application of all
the lines of operation—may never have been fully put to the test.
One of the first very high-profile military operations after major combat was Operation Phantom
Fury, designed to “take back” the restive city of Fallujah in the Al Anbar province. In November
2004, Phantom Fury—or “Fallujah II”—highlighted the intransigence of the emerging Sunni
Arab insurgency, early coalition military efforts to counter it, and the complex intersection of ²²¹
political considerations and “best military advice” in operational decision-making.
During major combat operations and the early part of the formal occupation, the military
command practiced first an “economy of force” approach to Al Anbar province, and then a quick
shuffling of responsible military units, which left little opportunity to establish local relationships ²²²
or build expertise. Building relationships with the population is critical in any counter-
insurgency, and it may have been particularly important in Al Anbar, where social structure is
based largely on complex and powerful tribal affiliations.
Coalition forces in Al Anbar during major combat were primarily limited to Special Operations
Forces. After CJTF-7 was established, the first unit assigned responsibility for the large province ^rd
was the 3 Armored Cavalry Regiment—essentially a brigade-sized formation. In fall 2003, the ^nd
much larger 82 Airborne Division and subordinate units arrived in Iraq and were assigned to Al ^st
Anbar, but their tenure was brief—after six months they handed off responsibility to the 1 ²²³
Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF).
²²⁰
^T^h^e^s^e^eff^o^rts^c^ontin^ue^{d a}ⁿⁱⁿ^itia^tⁱ^v^e^{to he}^lp^f^o^rm^dis^t^ric^t^a^{nd ne}^ig^h^bor^ho^{od a}^d^vⁱ^s^o^ry^c^ounc^ils^{in Ba}^g^hda^d,^la^uⁿ^c^h^e^d
^by^O^R^HA^{but dis}^c^oⁿ^tin^ue^d^by^C^P^A^.
²²¹^Fo^{r a}^d^e^tailed^acco^uⁿ^t^o^f^th^{e m}^ilitar^y^o^p^e^ratioⁿ^s^,^an^d^th^e^p^o^l^{itical an}^d^m^ilitary^e^v^en^{ts th}^{at led}^u^p^t^o^t^h^em^{, see Bin}^g
^We^s^t^,^{No Tr}^ue^G^l^or^y^:^A^Fr^on^tlin^e^Ac^c^ount^of^the^B^a^ttle^f^o^r^Fa^lluj^a^h^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: B}^a^nta^m^B^ook^s^,²⁰^05.
²²²^A^l^A^nba^r^pr^ov^inc^e^,^{in w}^e^s^t^e^r^{n I}^r^a^{q, c}^o^v^e^r^s^a^bou^{t o}ⁿ^e^-^thir^d^of^I^r^a^q’^s^te^r^r^itor^y^{but is}^r^e^la^tiv^e^l^y^lig^htl^y^po^pula^t^e^d^.
²²³^IM^E^F^h^ead^qu^art^e^{rs an}^d^t^h^{e 1}^st^M^a^rin^e^Divⁱ^sioⁿ^ret^u^rn^ed^to^Iraqⁱⁿ^sp^rin^g²⁰⁰⁴^{, af}^{ter a sh}^o^r^{t stay}^{at h}^o^m^{e a}^f^ter^majo^r
^c^o^m^b^a^t^ope^r^a^tions^.

The city of Fallujah, like the rest of Al Anbar, is populated largely by Sunni Arabs. Under the old
Iraqi regime, Fallujah had enjoyed some special prerogatives and had produced a number of
senior leaders in Iraq’s various security forces. Many residents therefore had some reason to be
concerned about their place in the post-Saddam Iraq.
On March 31, 2004, four American contractors working for Blackwater, who were driving
through Fallujah, were ambushed and killed—and then their bodies were mutilated and hung
from a bridge. Photos of that grisly aftermath were rapidly transmitted around the world—
riveting the attention of leaders in Baghdad, Washington, and other coalition country capitals.
What followed, in April 2004, was a series of highest-level deliberations in Baghdad and
Washington concerning the appropriate response. Some key participants in the debates initially
favored immediate, overwhelming military action, but those views were quickly tempered by
concerns about the reactions that massive military action—and casualties—might produce.
Several key Sunni Arab members of the Iraqi leadership body, the Iraqi Governing Council—²²⁴
threatened to resign in the event of an attack on Fallujah. And some senior U.S. officials
expressed concerns about the reactions of other governments in the region, and of Sunni Arabs ²²⁵
elsewhere in Iraq.
The Administration’s guidance, after the initial debates, was to respect the concerns of Iraqi
leaders and to avoid sending U.S. military forces into Fallujah. What followed, instead, was a
series of “negotiations” by CPA and CJTF-7 leaders with separate sets of Fallujah community
representatives, some of them brokered by Iraqi national-level political leaders. And what
emerged was a “deal” initiated by IMEF with a local retired Iraqi Army General and a group of
locally recruited fighters, who formed the “Fallujah Brigade” and pledged to restore and maintain ²²⁶
order.
When the Fallujah Brigade collapsed that summer, the city of Fallujah had not been “cleared” by
either the Brigade or IMEF. Over the summer, insurgents reportedly strengthened their hold on
the city.
Decisive military action—Operation Phantom Fury—was launched by IMEF in November 2004.
Several factors may have shaped the timing of the Operation. By November, the new interim Iraqi
government, led by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, had had some time to establish its credibility—
perhaps enough to help quell citizens’ concerns in the event of large-scale military action. Key
Iraqi elections were scheduled for January 2005, and eliminating a hotbed of insurgency
beforehand might increase voter participation. And earlier in November, President Bush had been
re-elected, which may have reassured some Iraqi leaders that if they agreed to the military
operation, the U.S. government—and coalition forces—would be likely to continue to provide
support to deal with any aftermath.
²²⁴
^T^h^e^Ira^{q G}^o^v^e^rning^Counc^il^(IG^{C) w}^a^s^a^c^r^itica^l^pa^{rt of}^the^U^.^S.^s^t^ra^te^gy^f^o^{r tra}ⁿ^s^itionⁱ^ng^re^s^p^oⁿ^sⁱ^b^ility^a^nd
^a^u^thor^ity^{to Ira}^{qi le}^a^d^e^r^{s. T}^h^e^plaⁿ^{s, a}^r^tic^ula^t^e^dⁱⁿ^the^T^r^aⁿ^sitio^na^l^A^d^mⁱ^nistra^tiv^e^L^a^w^a^pprov^e^dⁱⁿ^Ma^rc^{h 20}⁰⁴^{, c}^a^lle^d
^f^o^{r the}^IG^{C to re}^linq^u^ish^{its a}^d^vⁱ^s^o^ry^ro^le^{to a}^ne^w^,^a^p^p^o^inte^{d Ira}^qi^Inte^rim^G^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt, to w}^h^ic^{h C}^P^A^,^{in turn}^{, w}^ould
^r^e^turⁿ^f^u^{ll g}^o^v^e^rⁿⁱⁿ^g^a^u^th^or^ity^by^J^une^30,²⁰⁰⁴^{. A}ⁿ^I^G^C^c^o^lla^ps^e^,^{it w}^a^s^c^ons^ide^r^e^d^{, c}^o^u^l^d^dis^r^u^p^t^o^r^de^la^y^the^plaⁿ^s^.
²²⁵^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^C^P^A^a^{nd C}^J^T^F^-⁷^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^{nd pa}^r^tic^ipaⁿ^{t o}^b^s^e^r^v^a^tion,²⁰^04.
²²⁶^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^C^J^T^F^-⁷^a^{nd I}^M^{EF le}^a^d^e^r^s^,²⁰^04.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^Bⁱ^ng^W^e^s^t^,^N^o^Tr^ue^G^l^or^y^:^A^Fr^oⁿ^tliⁿ^e^Ac^c^ount^of^the
^Battle^f^o^{r F}^a^lluj^a^h^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: B}^a^nta^m^B^ook^s^,²⁰⁰^5.

The Marines began the Fallujah operations by setting conditions—turning off electrical power,
and urging the civilians of Fallujah to leave the city. The vast majority of residents did depart—
leaving about 500 hardcore fighters, who employed asymmetrical tactics against a far larger,
stronger force. That coalition force included one UK battalion, three Iraqi battalions, six U.S.
Marine battalions and three U.S. Army battalions. The operation reportedly included 540 air
strikes, 14,000 artillery and mortar shells fired, and 2,500 tank main gun rounds fired. Some 70
U.S. personnel were killed, and 609 wounded. In Fallujah, of the city’s 39,000 buildings, 18,000 ²²⁷
were damaged or destroyed.
In the aftermath, coalition and Iraqi forces established a tight security cordon around the city,
with a system of vehicle searches and security passes for residents, to control movement and
access. Fingerprints and retinal scans were taken from male residents. Observers noted that by
spring 2005, about half the original population, of 250,000, had returned home—many of them to ²²⁸
find essential services disrupted and their property damaged. The scale of destruction was
criticized by some observers inside Iraq and in the Middle East region more broadly.
The effects of the comprehensive “clearing” were not lasting. Al Qaeda affiliates gradually
returned and made Fallujah a strong-hold and base of operations.
Military operations in the town of Tal Afar, in 2005, marked an early, multi-faceted, and
successful application of counter-insurgency (COIN) approaches, and successful results, in OIF.
In Washington, “Tal Afar” gave birth to a new Iraq policy lexicon, and in Iraq—though not
immediately—to the expanded use of COIN practices.
Tal Afar is located in Ninewah province, along the route from the provincial capital of Mosul to
Syria. Its mixed population of about 290,000 includes Sunni Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and Yezidis. ^st
From April 2003 until early 2004, the 101 Airborne Division had responsibility for Ninewah and
Iraq’s three northern, largely Kurdish-populated provinces. Because the north was relatively ^st
quiet, due in part to the effectiveness of the Kurdish pesh merga forces, the 101 was able to
concentrate primarily on Ninewah—a relatively high troops-to-population ratio. In early 2004, ^st
when the 101 redeployed, responsibility for the area passed to a much smaller Stryker brigade.
That brigade, in turn, was periodically asked to provide forces for operations elsewhere in Iraq, so
the coalition force footprint in Ninewah was substantially reduced. Tal Afar—with a convenient
trade route location, and a mixed population “perfect” for fomenting sectarian strife—become a
base of operations for former regime elements and Sunni extremists, including suicide bombers.
In May 2005, the 3^rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3ACR), now commanded by Colonel H.R.
McMaster, arrived in Tal Afar. COL McMaster was familiar with OIF issues from his previous ²²⁹
service as the Director of GEN Abizaid’s Commander’s Action Group at CENTCOM. At
CENTCOM, he had helped the command to think through the nature of the Iraqi insurgency, and
to craft appropriate responses including targeted engagements with key leaders. As the author of a
²²⁷
^Bing^W^e^s^t^,^{No True}^Gl^ory^:^{A Fr}^ontli^ne^Ac^c^o^unt^of^the^B^a^ttle^f^o^r^Fallu^ja^h^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: B}^a^nta^m^B^o^ok^s^,²⁰⁰⁵^.
²²⁸^S^{ee f}^o^{r exa}^m^p^l^{e Ri}^ch^ard^Beest^oⁿ^,^“A^t^h^o^m^{e i}ⁿ^t^h^{e rub}^b^l^e:^si^{ege ci}^t^y^r^e^b^o^rⁿ^{as gi}^an^t^gat^e^d^co^m^m^uⁿⁱ^t^y^,^”^The^Tim^e^s
^Online^,^Ma^y^{19, 2}⁰⁰⁵^.
²²⁹^A^C^o^m^m^a^nde^r^’^s^A^c^tion—^or^Iⁿ^iti^a^tiv^e^s^—^G^r^{oup, is}^s^m^a^{ll g}^r^oup^of^sm^a^r^{t think}^e^r^s^{, ha}ⁿ^d^-^s^e^l^e^c^t^e^d^by^the^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r
^{to s}^e^r^v^e^a^s^his^pe^r^s^ona^l^,^in-^h^o^u^s^e^“^t^hink^-^t^aⁿ^k^.^”

well-known account of Vietnam decision-making, COL McMaster could also readily draw key ²³⁰
lessons from that earlier complex engagement.
In early 2005, the 3ACR began their deployment preparations at home in Fort Carson,
Colorado—studying COIN approaches, training and exercising those approaches, and learning
conversational Arabic. Later, in Iraq, COL McMaster described the Regiment’s mission in the
classical COIN lexicon of “population security”: “...the whole purpose of the operation is to
secure the population so that we can lift the enemy’s campaign of intimidation and coercion over
the population and allow economic and political development to proceed here and to return to ²³¹
normal life.”
In practice, that meant taking “a very deliberate approach to the problem,” beginning with months
of preparatory moves. Those preparatory steps included beefing up security along the Syrian
border to the west, and targeting and eliminating enemy safe havens out in the desert. They also
included constructing a dirt berm ringing Tal Afar, and establishing check points to control
movement in and out of the city.
Before the launch of full-scale operations in September 2005, the Regiment urged civilians to
leave Tal Afar. Then 3ACR cleared the city deliberately—block by block. After the clearing
operations, 3ACR had sufficient forces to hold the city, setting up 29 patrol bases around town, ²³²
every few blocks.
Basing coalition forces among the population was an unusual approach at the time. Though
common in the early days of OIF, by 2005, most coalition forces in Iraq had been pulled back to
relatively large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), secure and separate from the local population.
That strategy was driven in part by the theory that the visible presence of coalition forces—and ²³³
their weapons and their heavy vehicles—could antagonize local communities.

3ACR’s COIN approaches also included working closely with their Iraqi security forces ^rd

counterparts—the 3 Iraqi Army Division. COL McMaster credited that partnership as essential
to the strategy: “What gives us the ability to ... clear and hold as a counterinsurgency strategy is ²³⁴
the capability of Iraqi security forces.” The key to the success in Fallujah, he added—and the
major difference from “Fallujah II”—was popular support: “we had the active cooperation of
such a large percentage of the population.”
²³⁰
^Hⁱ^s^bo^ok^D^e^r^e^lic^tion^{of D}^u^ty^:^J^o^hns^oⁿ^{, M}^c^N^a^m^a^r^a^{, t}^h^e^J^oⁱⁿ^{t C}^h^ie^fs^of^Staf^f,^an^{d the}^Lie^s^th^{at le}^{d t}^o^Vie^t^nam
^(pu^b^lishe^d^by^Ha^rpe^r^P^e^reⁿⁿ^ia^l,¹⁹⁹⁸^{) is w}ⁱ^de^ly^re^a^d^{in U.S. m}^ilita^ry^e^duc^a^tiona^l^prog^ra^m^s^a^{nd e}^l^se^w^h^e^r^e^.
²³¹^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^P^r^e^s^s^B^rⁱ^e^fⁱ^ng^{, H}^.^R^.^Mc^Ma^s^t^e^r^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r^13,²⁰⁰⁵^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tid=2¹⁰⁶^.
²³²^Se^e^T^hom^a^s^{E. R}ⁱ^c^k^s^,^“T^he^Le^s^s^ons^of^C^ounte^rⁱⁿ^s^u^r^g^eⁿ^c^y^,”^W^a^s^h^ingt^on^Pos^t^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{16, 2}⁰⁰⁶^{; “}^T^he^Iⁿ^s^u^r^g^eⁿ^cy^:
^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith COL}^{H.R. Mc}^Ma^s^t^e^r^,”^Fr^ontlⁱ^ne^,^PBS,^Fe^brua^ry²¹^{, 20}⁰⁶^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^ww^.pbs.org^/w^g^bh/pa^g^e^s/
^f^r^ontline^/^insurg^eⁿ^c^y^/ⁱ^nte^r^vⁱ^e^w^s/^m^c^m^a^ste^r^/^h^tm^{l; a}^{nd G}^e^org^e^P^a^c^k^e^r^,^“^L^e^tte^r^f^r^o^m^Ira^{q: T}^h^e^L^e^s^s^{on of}^T^a^l^Af^a^r^,”^The
^{New Yo}^rker^{, A}^p^{ril 10,}²⁰⁰⁶^.
²³³^In^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^f^r^o^m^CE^NT^COM^an^d^CJT^F^-7^l^ead^ers,²⁰⁰⁴^.
²³⁴^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^P^r^e^s^s^B^rⁱ^e^fⁱ^ng^{, H}^.^R^.^Mc^Ma^s^t^e^r^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r^13,²⁰⁰⁵^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tid=2¹⁰⁶^.

COL McMaster’s use of the phrase “clear and hold” was not accidental—it had been the name of
the counter-insurgency approach introduced in Vietnam by General Creighton Abrams, following ²³⁵
years of General William Westmoreland’s “search and destroy” approach.
A short time later, the Administration adopted and expanded on the “clear, hold” lexicon to ²³⁶
describe the overall strategy in Iraq. In October 2005, in testimony about Iraq before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice began by stating: “Our
political-military strategy has to be clear, hold, and build: to clear areas from insurgent control, to ²³⁷
hold them securely, and to build durable, national Iraqi institutions.” About three weeks later, in
a major Veterans Day speech, President Bush echoed Secretary Rice’s “clear, hold, build” ²³⁸
language almost verbatim.
The following month, November 2005, the Administration issued a new National Strategy for
Victory in Iraq. The Strategy argued—roughly consistent with the military’s long-standing lines
of operation—that success required three major tracks, security, political and economic.
Consistent with the basic theory of the case since 2003, these tracks were to be pursued
simultaneously, and would be “mutually reinforcing.” As the Strategy states, “Progress in each of ²³⁹
the political, security, and economic tracks reinforces progress in the other tracks.”
The new Strategy prominently adopted the “clear hold build” lexicon, with a twist. “Clear, hold,
build” was now the prescribed set of approaches for the security track alone. The political and
economic tracks were also each based on a trinitarian set of approaches. In the security track,
“build” now referred specifically to the Iraqi security forces and local institutions. “Build” also
appeared in the other two tracks—capturing the focus on national-level institutions from the ²⁴⁰
earlier public statements by President Bush and Secretary Rice.
²³⁵
^Ibid^.
²³⁶^D^a^vⁱ^{d I}^g^na^tius^w^r^ote^{in t}^h^e^Wa^s^hⁱⁿ^g^t^on^Po^st^t^h^a^tⁱⁿ²⁰⁰⁵^{, a}^num^be^{r of}^k^e^y^Ir^a^q^de^cⁱ^sion-m^a^k^e^{rs a}ⁿ^{d pra}^c^titi^one^rs,
^inc^l^u^d^ing^C^O^L^Mc^Ma^s^t^e^r^s^’^f^o^r^m^e^r^bos^s^a^t^C^E^N^T^C^O^{M G}^e^ne^r^a^l^A^b^iz^aⁱ^{d, w}^e^r^e^r^e^a^d^ing^L^e^wⁱ^s^Sor^l^e^y^’^s^book^,^{A Be}^tte^r
^W^a^r^:^The^Uⁿ^e^x^a^mⁱ^ne^{d Vic}^t^or^ie^s^and^the^Fin^a^{l Tr}^age^dy^{of Am}^e^r^ic^a^’^s^Las^t^Ye^ar^sⁱⁿ^Vie^tⁿ^a^m^(New^Y^o^rk^{: Harco}^u^r^t,
¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^,^w^h^ic^{h f}^a^v^o^r^a^bl^y^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^s^G^e^ne^r^a^{l A}^b^r^a^m^s^’^“^c^l^e^a^r^a^{nd hol}^d^”^a^ppr^oa^c^h^.^Se^e^D^a^vⁱ^{d I}^g^na^tius^,^“^A^B^e^tte^r^Str^a^te^gy
^f^o^{r Iraq}^,^”^Wa^sh^ing^t^on^P^o^st,^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{4, 20}^05.
²³⁷^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^C^ondol^{eezza Rice, Op}^enⁱⁿ^g^Rem^a^r^k^{s b}^e^f^o^{re th}^{e Sen}^a^te^Fo^reigⁿ^Relatioⁿ^s^Co^m^m^{ittee, Oc}^to^b^e^r¹⁹^,²⁰⁰⁵^,
^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^w^w^.s^ta^te^.g^ov^/^s^e^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^/^r^m^/²⁰⁰⁵^/⁵⁵³⁰^3.^htm^.^T^o^be^c^l^e^a^r^{, “}^s^tra^t^e^g^y^”^ref^e^rs^{in g}^e^ne^ra^{l to a}^s^e^{t of}
^“wa^y^{s an}^d^m^ean^s,^{” l}ⁱⁿ^ked^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e “en}^d^s^{” t}^h^ey^{are i}ⁿ^t^eⁿ^d^e^d^t^o^achⁱ^e^ve.^“Cl^ear,^h^o^l^d^,^b^uⁱ^l^d^{” ref}^e^rred^t^o^{a n}^e^w^set^o^f
^a^ppr^oa^c^h^e^s^—^o^f^“^w^ay^s^a^{nd m}^e^aⁿ^s^”^—^{but t}^h^e^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tion’^s^br^oa^{d s}^t^a^t^e^d^g^o^a^l^s^ha^{d n}^o^{t c}^h^aⁿ^g^e^d.
²³⁸^H^e^s^a^{id, “}^O^ur^s^t^r^a^te^g^y^is^{to c}^l^e^a^r^{, hol}^{d, a}^nd^bu^ild.^W^e^’^r^e^w^o^rk^ing^{to c}^l^e^a^r^a^r^e^a^s^f^r^o^m^te^{rrorist c}^ontro^{l, to}^h^o^ld^th^ose
^a^r^e^a^s^se^c^u^re^l^y^{, a}^{nd to}^b^u^ild^la^stin^g^,^de^m^o^c^r^a^tic^Ira^{qi ins}^titutⁱ^ons^thr^oug^{h a}ⁿ^inc^r^e^a^s^ing^l^y^inc^l^usiv^e^po^litic^a^l^proc^e^ss.”
^Se^e^“^P^r^e^sⁱ^deⁿ^t^c^o^m^m^em^or^a^t^e^s^Vete^r^a^ns^D^a^y^,^Dⁱ^s^c^us^s^e^s^W^a^r^{on T}^e^r^r^or^,”^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{11, 2}⁰⁰⁵^{, T}^o^by^hanna^,
^P^eⁿⁿ^s^y^lv^aⁿ^ia^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://^w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ne^w^s^/^r^e^l^e^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰⁵^/^11/^pr^int/²⁰⁰⁵¹¹^11-^1.^ht^m^l^.
²³⁹^T^h^{e S}^t^rat^e^g^y^d^e^scri^b^e^{s t}^h^{e secu}^ri^t^y^man^d^a^t^e^t^o^“cl^ear,^ho^l^d^,^buⁱ^l^d^”^t^hⁱ^s^w^a^y^:^“Cl^{ear ar}^{eas o}^f^en^e^m^{y c}^oⁿ^t^r^o^l^b^y
^re^m^a^ining^on^the^of^fe^nsiv^e^,^k^illing^a^{nd c}^a^p^turi^ng^eⁿ^e^m^y^fⁱ^g^h^te^{rs a}ⁿ^{d de}^ny^ing^the^m^sa^f^e^ha^v^e^{n; hold}^a^r^e^a^s^f^r^e^e^d^f^r^om
^en^{emy i}ⁿ^f^l^u^eⁿ^{ce b}^y^en^su^riⁿ^g^t^h^at^t^h^ey^re^maiⁿ^uⁿ^d^e^{r t}^h^{e con}^t^r^o^l^o^f^t^h^{e Iraq}ⁱ^go^vern^m^eⁿ^t^wⁱ^t^h^an^ad^equ^a^t^e^Iraqⁱ^secu^ri^t^y
^f^o^{rce p}^r^esen^ce;^an^d^b^uⁱ^l^d^Ira^qⁱ^S^e^cu^ri^t^y^F^o^{rces an}^d^t^h^{e cap}^aci^t^y^o^f^l^o^calⁱⁿ^stⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^t^o^d^e^lⁱ^v^{er servi}^c^e^s^,^ad^van^{ce t}^h^e
^ru^l^e^o^f^l^a^w^,^an^d^nu^rt^u^r^{e ci}^vi^l^so^ci^et^y^.^{” S}^ee^Nation^a^l^Strate^gy^{for V}ⁱ^c^t^ory^{in Ira}^q^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{30, 2}⁰⁰⁵^,^p.^{2, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^W^h^ite^House^w^e^bsite^{, http:}^//www.w^h^ite^house^.^g^o^v^/ⁱⁿ^f^o^c^u^s/ira^q^/ira^q^_na^ti^ona^l_stra^te^g^y^_2005¹¹³⁰^.p^df^.
²⁴⁰^I^b^id^.,^pp.^1-^2.

By March 2006, a complete, official narrative had emerged, in which Tal Afar operations had
tested and confirmed both the “clear, hold, build” strategy, and the interdependence of the three
major tracks. As a White House Fact Sheet, titled “Clear, Hold, Build,” stated, “Tal Afar shows
how the three elements of the strategy for victory in Iraq—political, security, and economic—²⁴¹
depend on and reinforce one another.”
In June 2006, Iraqi and Coalition forces launched “Operation Together Forward,” officially based
on “clear, hold, build” and aimed at reducing violence and increasing security in Baghdad.
Baghdad was chosen as the focus because it was “the center that everybody [was] fighting for—²⁴²
the insurgents, the death squads ... the government of Iraq.” The Operation was predicated on ²⁴³
basic counter-insurgency principles—“to secure the citizens’ lives here in Baghdad.”
Together Forward included some 48 battalions of Iraqi and coalition forces—about 51,000 troops
altogether, including roughly 21,000 Iraqi police, 13,000 Iraqi National Police, 8,500 Iraqi Army, ²⁴⁴
and 7,200 coalition forces. Iraqi forces were in the lead, supported by the coalition. The effort
included clearing operations, as well as a series of new security measures including extended
curfews, tighter restrictions on carrying weapons, new tips hotlines, more checkpoints, and more ²⁴⁵
police patrols.
Together Forward theoretically included the other major tracks of the November 2005 National
Strategy—political and economic efforts, as well as security, although the coalition’s primary
focus was security. As MNF-I spokesman Major General William Caldwell noted in July 2006,
“It’s obviously a multi-pronged approach ... but those [other tracks] are mostly the government of ²⁴⁶
Iraq side of the house.”
MNF-I stated publicly from the start that Together Forward was expected to take months, not
weeks. For several months after the operation was launched, the levels of violence in the capital
rose. As MG Caldwell explained in October 2006, “the insurgent elements, the extremists, are in
fact punching back hard.” Once the Iraqi and coalition forces cleared an area, the insurgents tried
to regain that territory, so the Iraqi and coalition forces were “constantly going back in and doing ²⁴⁷
clearing operations again.”
²⁴¹
^W^hⁱ^t^e^Ho^u^s^{e F}^act^S^h^eet^:^“S^t^r^at^eg^y^f^o^{r V}ⁱ^ct^o^r^y^—^Cl^ear,^Ho^l^d^,^B^uⁱ^l^d^,^{” M}^a^rch²⁰^,²⁰⁰⁶^.
²⁴²^Op^e^r^a^tioⁿ^s^U^p^d^a^te^w^ith^Ma^j^o^{r G}^eⁿ^e^ra^{l W}^illia^m^{B. Ca}^ld^w^e^{ll, Mu}^lt^i-Na^tioⁿ^a^{l F}^o^rc^e^s^-Ira^q^,^Ju^ly²⁴^,²⁰⁰⁶^{, a}^v^a^ila^b^l^e^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.^m^nf^-ⁱ^r^a^q.c^o^m^/ⁱⁿ^de^x^.^p^hp?^o^p^ti^on=^c^o^m^_^c^onteⁿ^t&^ta^s^k⁼^vⁱ^e^w^&^id=¹²⁰^1&^I^t^e^m^id=^131.
²⁴³^M^N^F^{-I spo}^k^es^m^aⁿ^M^G^Cal^d^w^e^l^l^at^t^rⁱ^b^ut^ed^t^h^at^ph^{rase t}^o^Iraqi^P^rⁱ^m^{e M}ⁱⁿⁱ^st^{er Nu}^ri^al^-^M^alⁱ^kⁱ^,^{see Op}^eratⁱ^oⁿ^s
^Up^d^a^te^w^ith^Ma^jo^r^G^eⁿ^e^ra^{l W}^illi^a^m^{B. Ca}^ld^w^e^{ll, Mu}^lti-Na^tioⁿ^a^{l F}^o^rc^e^s^-Ira^q^,^Ju^ly²⁰^,²⁰⁰⁶^,^a^v^a^ila^b^l^e^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.^m^nf^-ⁱ^r^a^q.c^o^m^/ⁱⁿ^de^x^.^p^hp?^o^p^ti^on=^c^o^m^_^c^onteⁿ^t&^ta^s^k⁼^vⁱ^e^w^&^id=¹⁰²^7&^I^t^e^m^id=^30.
²⁴⁴^Op^e^r^a^tioⁿ^s^U^p^d^a^te^w^ith^Ma^j^o^{r G}^eⁿ^e^ra^{l W}^illia^m^{B. Ca}^ld^w^e^{ll, Mu}^lt^i-Na^tioⁿ^a^{l F}^o^rc^e^s^-Ira^q^,^Ju^ly²⁰^,²⁰⁰⁶^{, a}^v^a^ila^b^l^e^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.^m^nf^-ⁱ^r^a^q.c^o^m^/ⁱⁿ^de^x^.^p^hp?^o^p^ti^on=^c^o^m^_^c^onteⁿ^t&^ta^s^k⁼^vⁱ^e^w^&^id=¹⁰²^7&^I^t^e^m^id=^30.
²⁴⁵^P^r^e^s^s^Conf^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^of^the^P^r^e^sⁱ^d^eⁿ^{t, the}^R^o^s^e^G^a^rdeⁿ^{, J}^une^14,²⁰⁰⁶^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ne^w^s^/
^r^e^le^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰^6/^06/²⁰⁰⁶⁰⁶^14.^htm^l^.
²⁴⁶^Op^e^r^a^tioⁿ^s^U^p^d^a^te^w^ith^Ma^j^o^{r G}^eⁿ^e^ra^{l W}^illia^m^{B. Ca}^ld^w^e^{ll, Mu}^lt^i-Na^tioⁿ^a^{l F}^o^rc^e^s^-Ira^q^,^Ju^ly²⁰^,²⁰⁰⁶^{, a}^v^a^ila^b^l^e^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.^m^nf^-ⁱ^r^a^q.c^o^m^/ⁱⁿ^de^x^.^p^hp?^o^p^ti^on=^c^o^m^_^c^onteⁿ^t&^ta^s^k⁼^vⁱ^e^w^&^id=¹⁰²^7&^I^t^e^m^id=^30.
²⁴⁷^P^r^e^{ss Brie}^fⁱⁿ^g^b^y^Ma^jo^{r G}^eⁿ^e^ra^{l W}^illia^m^{B. Ca}^ld^w^e^{ll, Mu}^lti-Na^tioⁿ^a^{l Fo}^rc^e^-Ira^q^,^Oc^to^b^e^r¹⁹^{, 2}⁰⁰⁶^,^a^v^a^ila^b^l^e^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.^m^nf^-ⁱ^r^a^q.c^o^m^/ⁱⁿ^de^x^.^p^hp?^o^p^ti^on=^c^o^m^_^c^onteⁿ^t&^ta^s^k⁼^vⁱ^e^w^&^id=⁶⁵⁸^5&^I^t^e^m^id=^131.

Many observers attributed that circle of violence to a lack of sufficient forces—whether coalition
or Iraqi—to “hold” an area once it was “cleared.” The vast majority of participating forces were
Iraqi, and at that juncture, some observers suggest, their capabilities were limited. MNF-I
Spokesman MG Caldwell noted in July 2006: “We are by no means at the end state, at the place ²⁴⁸
where the Iraqi security forces are able to assume complete control of this situation.”
By October 2006, MNF-I admitted that Together Forward had not achieved the expected
results—it had “not met our overall expectations of sustaining a reduction in the levels of ²⁴⁹
violence.” In the event, from the experiences of Tal Afar, Operation Together Forward had
applied the principle of close collaboration with host-nation forces, but only the “clear” element
of the “clear, hold, build” mandate.
By late 2006, senior diplomats and commanders in Iraq had concluded that the approaches in use
were not achieving the intended results—indeed, levels of violence were continuing to climb.
Several strategic reviews were conducted in parallel, some input from key observers was
solicited, options were considered, and a decision was made and announced by the ²⁵⁰
Administration—to pursue a “New Way Forward” in Iraq.
While the Administration’s basic long-term objectives for Iraq did not change, the New Way
Forward introduced a fundamentally new theory of the case. Until that time, Iraq strategy had
assumed that the major tracks of effort—security, political, economic—were mutually
reinforcing, and should therefore be implemented simultaneously.
The New Way Forward agreed that all of the tracks—plus a new “regional” track—were ²⁵¹
important, but argued that security was a prerequisite for progress in the other areas. As a
White House summary of the results of the strategy review stated, “While political progress,
economic gains and security are all intertwined, political and economic progress are unlikely ²⁵²
absent a basic level of security.” And as President Bush stated in his address to the nation on ²⁵³
this topic, in January 2007, “The most urgent priority for success in Iraq is security.”
This thinking, though new as the premise for U.S. Iraq strategy, was not new to practitioners on
the ground. As early as 2003, some U.S. practitioners in Iraq had suggested that substantial
²⁴⁸
^Op^e^r^a^tioⁿ^s^U^p^d^a^te^w^ith^Ma^j^o^{r G}^eⁿ^e^ra^{l W}^illia^m^{B. Ca}^ld^w^e^{ll, Mu}^lt^i-Na^tioⁿ^a^{l F}^o^rc^e^s^-Ira^q^,^Ju^ly²⁰^,²⁰⁰⁶^{, a}^v^a^ila^b^l^e^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.^m^nf^-ⁱ^r^a^q.c^o^m^/ⁱⁿ^de^x^.^p^hp?^o^p^ti^on=^c^o^m^_^c^onteⁿ^t&^ta^s^k⁼^vⁱ^e^w^&^id=¹⁰²^7&^I^t^e^m^id=^30.
²⁴⁹^P^r^e^{ss Brie}^fⁱⁿ^g^b^y^Ma^jo^{r G}^eⁿ^e^ra^{l W}^illia^m^{B. Ca}^ld^w^e^{ll, Mu}^lti-Na^tioⁿ^a^{l Fo}^rc^e^-Ira^q^,^Oc^to^b^e^r¹⁹^{, 2}⁰⁰⁶^,^a^v^a^ila^b^l^e^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.^m^nf^-ⁱ^r^a^q.c^o^m^/ⁱⁿ^de^x^.^p^hp?^o^p^ti^on=^c^o^m^_^c^onteⁿ^t&^ta^s^k⁼^vⁱ^e^w^&^id=⁶⁵⁸^5&^I^t^e^m^id=^131.
²⁵⁰^F^o^{r a}^d^e^t^aⁱ^l^e^d^acco^un^t^o^f^t^h^eo^ry^an^d^p^r^actⁱ^{ce un}^d^e^r^t^h^{e New}^W^a^y^F^o^rw^ard^st^rat^e^g^y^,^se^{e L}ⁱⁿ^d^a^Ro^bⁱⁿ^s^oⁿ^,^Te^{ll M}^e
^H^o^w^This^En^ds^:^G^e^ne^r^a^{l D}^a^vⁱ^{d P}^e^tr^ae^us^an^{d t}^h^e^Se^ar^c^h^for^{a W}^a^y^O^u^{t of}^I^r^aq^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: Public}^A^f^f^a^ir^s^,^2008.
²⁵¹^Se^e^“^F^a^c^t^She^e^{t: T}^h^e^N^e^w^W^a^y^Forw^a^r^{d in Ira}^q^,^”^J^a^nua^ry^{10, 2}⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ne^w^s^/
^r^e^le^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰^7/^01/^pr^int^/²⁰⁰⁷⁰¹¹^0-^3.htm^l^.
²⁵²^“^H^ig^hlig^hts^of^the^I^r^a^q^Str^a^te^gy^R^e^vⁱ^ew^,”^N^a^tiona^{l Se}^c^u^r^ity^C^oun^c^{il, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^{7, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ns^c^/ir^a^q^/20⁰⁷^/^ir^a^q^-^s^tr^a^t^e^g^y⁰¹¹⁰⁰⁷^.p^df^.
²⁵³^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t’s A}^ddre^{ss to}^the^Na^tio^{n, Ja}ⁿ^u^a^r^y^{10, 20}⁰⁷^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^W^h^ite^House^w^e^bsite^{, http:}^//www.w^h^ite^house^.^g^o^v^/
^ne^w^s^/^r^e^l^e^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰^7/^01/^pr^int^/²⁰⁰⁷⁰¹¹^0-^7.htm^l^.

political and economic progress could not be expected, absent basic security conditions that
allowed Iraqis to leave their homes, and civilian coalition personnel to engage with local ²⁵⁴
communities. The New Way Forward institutionalized that view.
The theory of the case was that security improvements would open up space and opportunities for
the Iraqi government to make improvements in other areas. As General David Petraeus described
it in March 2007, one month into his tour as the MNF-I Commander, if security improves,
“commerce will return and local economies will grow.” And at the same time, “the Iraqi ²⁵⁵
government will have the chance it needs to resolve some of the difficult issues it faces.”
By early 2008, the basic premise had met with broad if not universal support among practitioners
and observers. For example, in October 2007, Commandant of the Marine Corps General James
Conway told a think-tank audience, “Certainly you have to have a level of security before you ²⁵⁶
can have governance.” Retired Marine Corps General James Jones, who led a congressionally
mandated review of Iraqi Security Forces in 2007, described it differently. He suggested that the
relationship between two major components of politics and security—national reconciliation and
sectarian violence—is more complex: “It’s a little bit of a chicken-and-egg question.... The real
overall conclusion is that the government of Iraq is the one that has to find a way to achieve ²⁵⁷
political reconciliation, in order to enable a reduction in sectarian violence.”
In his January 10, 2007, address to the nation, President Bush announced that to help implement
the New Way Forward, the United States would deploy additional military units to Iraq, primarily
to Baghdad. Their mission, a paraphrase of the “clear, hold, build” language, would be “to help
Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help
ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad ²⁵⁸
needs.”
The surge forces would grow to include five Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), an Army combat
aviation brigade, a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), two Marine infantry battalions, a Division
headquarters, and other support troops. The number of U.S. forces in Iraq reached a peak of about

168,000 U.S. troops in October 2007.

²⁵⁴
^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^{ith O}^R^H^A^{, C}^P^A^a^{nd C}^J^T^F^-⁷^s^t^a^f^f^,²⁰⁰³^aⁿ^d²⁰⁰⁴^.
²⁵⁵^P^r^e^{ss Brie}^fⁱ^ng^b^y^G^E^{N D}^a^vⁱ^{d P}^e^tra^e^u^{s, Ma}^rc^{h 8}^,²⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^ww^.^mⁿ^f^-ira^q.c^o^m^/
^inde^x^.^p^hp?^o^p^ti^on=^c^o^m^_^c^onteⁿ^t&^ta^s^k^=v^iew^&^id=¹⁰⁴⁷^5&^I^t^e^m^id=^131.
²⁵⁶^H^e^a^dde^{d, “}^I^thiⁿ^k^y^{ou ha}^v^e^{to h}^a^v^e^g^ove^rⁿ^aⁿ^c^e^a^{nd s}^e^c^u^r^ity^be^f^o^r^e^y^{ou c}^aⁿ^ha^v^e^a^vⁱ^a^b^le^e^c^onom^ic^s^plaⁿ^.”^Se^e
^“Re^m^ar^{ks b}^y^G^eⁿ^e^ral^Ja^{mes T}^.^C^oⁿ^w^a^y^,^Co^mman^d^aⁿ^t^o^f^t^h^{e M}^a^riⁿ^e^Co^rp^s^,^{” Cen}^t^{er f}^o^{r a New}^Ame^rⁱ^can^S^ecu^ri^t^y^,
^O^c^tobe^r¹⁵^,²⁰^07.
²⁵⁷^Re^m^a^rk^{s b}^y^G^e^ne^ra^{l Ja}^m^e^{s Jone}^s^,^Me^e^ting^of^the^A^tla^ntic^Co^unc^il^of^the^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, W}^a^shing^t^on^,^D.C.,
^Se^pte^m^be^r^{12, 2}⁰⁰⁷^{. G}^e^ne^r^a^{l J}^oⁿ^e^s^le^{d the}^I^nde^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^t^C^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^on^on^the^Se^c^u^rⁱ^ty^For^c^e^s^of^I^r^a^{q, r}^e^quir^e^d^by^U^.^S.
^T^r^{oop Re}^a^d^ine^s^s^,^V^e^te^ra^ns^{’ Ca}^re^,^K^a^trina^Re^c^o^v^e^r^y^{, a}^{nd Ira}^{q A}^c^c^ounta^b^ility^A^ppropria^tio^ns^A^c^{t of}²⁰⁰^7,^Pu^blic^L^a^w
¹¹⁰^-2^{8, Se}^c^tⁱ^on¹³¹⁴^{. T}^h^e^Re^port^{is a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^ww^.^c^sis.org^/^m^e^dia^/^c^s^is/^p^u^b^s/^isf^.^pdf^{, a}^{nd dis}^c^usse^{d be}^low^.
²⁵⁸^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t’s A}^ddre^{ss to}^the^Na^tio^{n, Ja}ⁿ^u^a^r^y^{10, 20}⁰⁷^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^W^h^ite^House^w^e^bsite^{, http:}^//www.w^h^ite^house^.^g^o^v^/
^ne^w^s^/^r^e^l^e^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰^7/^01/^pr^int^/²⁰⁰⁷⁰¹¹^0-^7.htm^l^.

The surge effort also included a civilian component—increasing the number of civilian-led
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the size of their staffs. A White House Fact Sheet ²⁵⁹
stated, “PRTs are a key element of the President’s ‘New Way Forward’ Strategy.”
The fundamental premise of the Iraqi and coalition surge operations was population security. This
marked an important shift from previous years, when the top imperative was transitioning ²⁶⁰
responsibility to Iraqis. The two efforts were not considered mutually exclusive—during the
surge, efforts would continue to train, mentor and equip Iraqi security forces to prepare for
transitioning increasing responsibilities to them. But the relative priority of the “population
security” and “transition” efforts was adjusted.
In early 2008, close to the height of the surge, some Division Commanders commented that their
guidance from their higher headquarters—MNC-I—was to practice patience, not to be in too
much of a hurry to move to an overwatch posture or to transition responsibility to Iraqi security ²⁶¹
forces. The January 2008 mission statement of one division provides a good illustration of the
new priorities—population security first, with a view to laying the groundwork for future
transition. The division, “in participation with Iraqi security forces and the provincial
government, secures the population, neutralizes insurgents and militia groups, and defeats
terrorists and irreconcilable extremists, to establish sustainable security and set conditions for ²⁶²
transition to tactical overwatch and Iraqi security self-reliance.”
The surge aimed to provide “population security” not merely with greater troop strength, but also
by changing some of the approaches those troops used. One major emphasis was population
control—including the extensive use of concrete barriers, checkpoints, curfews, and biometric
technologies for identification including fingerprinting and retinal scans.
In April 2007, some key Baghdad neighborhoods were entirely sealed off using these approaches,
prompting the use of the moniker “gated communities.” In an Op-Ed piece, Multi-National
Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray Odierno explained that the gated communities
were “being put up to protect the Iraqi population by hindering the ability of terrorists to carry out ²⁶³
the car bombings and suicide attacks.” As counter-insurgency expert Dave Kilcullen described
it, “once an area is cleared and secured, with troops on the ground, controls make it hard to ²⁶⁴
infiltrate or intimidate ... and thus [they] also protect the population.”
²⁵⁹
^Se^e^“^F^a^c^t^She^e^{t: H}^e^lpiⁿ^g^Ira^{q A}^c^hie^v^e^Ec^onom^ic^a^nd^Politic^a^l^S^t^a^b^iliz^a^tio^n,”^J^a^nua^ry^{8, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{, a}^v^aⁱ^l^a^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ne^w^s^/r^e^l^e^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰^8/^01/²⁰⁰⁸⁰¹^08-^4.^ht^m^l^.
²⁶⁰^A^f^a^m^ous^quote^by^T^.^{E. L}^a^w^r^eⁿ^ce^—^“^Law^r^eⁿ^c^e^of^A^r^a^b^ia^”^—^a^ppe^a^r^s^f^r^e^que^ntly^{in br}^ie^fⁱ^ng^s^a^{nd on}^of^fⁱ^c^e^w^a^lls^{, of}
^c^o^a^litio^{n f}^o^rc^e^s^{in Ira}^{q: “}^D^oⁿ^o^{t t}^r^y^{to do t}^{oo m}^u^c^h^w^{ith y}^{our ow}ⁿ^ha^nds.^Be^tte^{r the}^A^r^a^b^{s do}^{it t}^o^le^r^a^bly^thaⁿ^tha^t^y^ou
^{do i}^t^pe^r^f^e^c^t^l^y^{. I}^t^is^theⁱ^r^w^a^r^,^aⁿ^d^y^{ou a}^r^e^the^r^e^{to he}^l^p^t^h^e^m^{, not t}^o^wⁱ^{n it f}^o^r^the^m^.”^T^h^e^quote^,^a^l^t^h^oug^{h s}^tⁱ^{ll p}^o^p^u^la^r^,
^m^o^re^c^l^ose^l^y^re^f^l^e^c^{ts a}ⁿ^e^m^pha^{sis on “}^t^ra^nsitio^n”^thaⁿ^oⁿ^“^p^op^ula^tⁱ^{on se}^c^u^rity^.”
²⁶¹^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^{ith D}ⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^C^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^2008.
²⁶²^Mis^sⁱ^on^s^t^a^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^one^Mult^i-^N^a^tiona^{l D}ⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^{, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^2008.
²⁶³^R^a^y^O^d^ie^r^{no, “}^I^{n D}^e^f^e^ns^e^of^B^a^ghda^d’^s^W^a^lls^,”^L^o^{s Ang}^e^les^Tⁱ^mes^{, A}^p^{ril 25,}²⁰⁰⁷^.
²⁶⁴^Da^v^e^Kilc^ulle^{n, “}^T^he^Urba^{n T}^o^u^r^niq^u^e^t^—G^a^t^e^d^Com^m^unitie^{s in}^Ba^g^hda^d,”^A^p^{ril 2}⁷^{, 2}⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^t^Sm^a^{ll W}^a^r^s^J^ourⁿ^a^l^,
^http:^//w^w^w^.sm^a^ll^w^a^r^s^jour^na^l.c^o^m^/^blog^/²⁰⁰^7/^04/^the^-^ur^ba^n-^to^urⁿⁱ^que^t-^g^a^te^d-^c^o^m^/^{. D}^r^{. K}^ilc^ulleⁿ^ha^s^s^e^r^v^e^d^a^t^MN^F-^Iⁱⁿ
^Bagh^d^a^d^{as an}^ad^vi^so^{r t}^o^G^E^N^P^e^t^r^aeu^s.

Some initial press coverage took note of some citizens’ dismay at the tighter controls that gated ²⁶⁵
communities brought. By early 2008, coalition and Iraqi leaders reported anecdotally that Iraqi
residents were pleased at the added protection the “gated community” measures provided them—²⁶⁶
by “keeping the bad guys out.”
Another key set of population security approaches involved troop presence—including not only
increasing the number of troops but also changing their footprint. From late in the formal
occupation through 2006—including Operation Together Forward—coalition forces in Iraq had
been consolidated at relatively large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). Surge strategy called for
getting troops off of the FOBs and out into local communities, to live and work among the
population.
As Major General James Simmons, III Corps and MNC-I Deputy Commanding General until ²⁶⁷
February 2008, stated, “You have to get out and live with the people.” Multi-National Force-
West leaders agreed that the key is “living with the population,” because “it makes Iraqis see us ²⁶⁸
as partners in the fighting and rebuilding.” As MNF-I Commanding General David Petraeus
commented in July 2008, explaining surge approaches: “The only way to secure a population is to ²⁶⁹
live with it—you can’t commute to this fight.”
Accordingly, coalition forces established scores of small combat outposts (COPs) and joint
security stations (JSSs) in populated areas. A JSS includes co-located units from coalition forces,
the Iraqi police, and the Iraqi Army. Each component continues to report to its own chain of
command, but they share space—and information. A COP is coalition-only, usually manned by a
“company-minus.” As of January 2008, for example, Multi-National Division-Center had
established 53 such bases in their restive area south of Baghdad.
Senior commanders at all levels have stressed the critical role JSSs and COPs played during the
surge. General Petraeus noted in March 2007 that they allowed the development of relationships ²⁷⁰
with local populations. Multi-National Division-Baghdad leaders called the creation of these ²⁷¹
outposts the “biggest change over time” in coalition operations in Iraq.
Surge strategy still called on Iraqi and coalition forces to “clear, hold, build.” Administration and
coalition leaders admitted that in the past—in Operation Together Forward in 2006—insufficient
forces had been available to “hold” an area once it was cleared. The surge was designed to correct
that.
²⁶⁵
^Se^e^f^o^{r e}^x^a^m^ple^Ka^{rin Brullia}^rd,^“^‘^Ga^te^{d Com}^m^unitie^{s’ f}^o^{r the}^W^a^r-Ra^v^a^g^e^d^,”^W^a^s^h^ingt^{on Pos}^t^,^Ap^rⁱ^l²³^,²⁰⁰⁷^.
^S^{ee al}^so^Tⁱ^m^Ki^l^b^ri^d^e^,^“Co^a^lⁱ^tⁱ^on^P^o^si^tⁱ^oⁿ^e^d^t^o^{Break Iraq}^’^{s Cycl}^e^o^f^Vⁱ^o^l^eⁿ^ce,^”^A^m^eri^c^aⁿ^F^o^{rces P}^r^{ess S}^e^rvi^c^e^{, Ma}^y
^25,²⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^ww^.^d^e^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/ne^w^s/^ne^w^s^a^r^tic^le^.^a^spx^?^id=⁴⁶¹^84).
²⁶⁶^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^Dⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on a}ⁿ^d^B^r^ig^a^d^e^C^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^8.
²⁶⁷^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^{, B}^a^g^hda^{d. MG}^Sim^m^ons^br^o^u^g^h^{t t}^o^be^a^r^c^ons^ide^r^a^b^le^c^o^m^p^a^r^a^tiv^e^pe^r^s^pe^c^tiv^e^.^H^e^he^{ld t}^h^e
^p^o^s^t^o^f^{III Co}^rp^{s DCG}^f^o^{r o}^v^{er f}^o^u^r^an^d^{a h}^a^lf^y^e^{ars, an}^d^th^u^s^also^serv^ed^{as MNC-I DC}^G^oⁿ^th^{e C}^o^rp^{s’ f}ⁱ^{rst to}^u^rⁱⁿ
^I^r^a^{q a}^s^theⁿ^u^c^l^e^u^s^of^MN^C^-^I^,^f^r^om^{2004 t}^o²⁰^05.
²⁶⁸^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tion^w^{ith MN}^F-^W^e^s^t^le^a^d^e^r^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^2008.
²⁶⁹^Da^vⁱ^{d P}^e^tra^e^u^s,^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith Cha}^r^le^{s G}ⁱ^bson,^W^o^rld^News^{, A}^B^C^,^J^u^ly^28,²⁰^08.
²⁷⁰^P^r^e^{ss Brie}^fⁱ^ng^b^y^G^E^{N D}^a^vⁱ^{d P}^e^tra^e^u^{s, Ma}^rc^{h 8}^,²⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^ww^.^mⁿ^f^-ira^q.c^o^m^/
^inde^x^.^p^hp?^o^p^ti^on=^c^o^m^_^c^onteⁿ^t&^ta^s^k^=v^iew^&^id=¹⁰⁴⁷^5&^I^t^e^m^id=^131.
²⁷¹^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^s^u^b^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^t^e^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^2008.

As the President noted in his January 10, 2007, address to the nation, “In earlier operations, Iraqi
and American forces cleared many neighborhoods of terrorists and insurgents, but when our
forces moved on to other targets, the killers returned. This time,” he added, “we’ll have the force ²⁷²
levels we need to hold the areas that have been cleared.” General Petraeus confirmed the
approach, and the contrast with past operations, in March 2007: “Importantly, Iraqi and coalition
forces will not just clear neighborhoods, they will also hold them to facilitate the build phase of ²⁷³
the operation.” Key outside observers agreed. Retired General Jack Keane, a strong surge
advocate, noted, “We’re going to secure the population for the first time. What we’ve never been
able to do in the past is have enough forces to stay in those neighborhoods and protect the ²⁷⁴
people.”
President Bush announced one other major change which would make surge military operations
different from those of the past—the lifting of political restrictions on operations, which had been
imposed in the past by an Iraqi leadership concerned about its own fragility. In the past, President
Bush noted, “political and sectarian interference prevented Iraqi and American forces from going
into neighborhoods that are home to those fueling the sectarian violence.” But this time, Iraqi
leaders had signaled that Iraqi and coalition forces would have “a green light” to enter those ²⁷⁵
neighborhoods.
Enabled by the greater availability of U.S. and Iraqi forces in 2007, U.S. military commanders
launched a series of major “combined” operations with their Iraqi security forces counterparts.
In February 2007, just as surge forces began to flow into Iraq, U.S. and Iraqi forces launched
Operation Fardh al-Qanoon, often referred to as the Baghdad Security Plan. Its primary emphasis
was population security, and the primary geographical focal point was Baghdad, broadly ²⁷⁶
defined. As then-MNC-I Commander LTG Odierno put it, “The population and the government ²⁷⁷
are the center of gravity.”
The basic theory of the case was another paraphrase of “clear, hold, build.” At the outset of ^st
operations, Major General Joseph Fil, Commander of 1 Cavalry Division and the Multi-National
Division-Baghdad, described the plan as “clear, control, and retain.” That meant, he explained,
clearing out extremists, neighborhood by neighborhood; controlling those neighborhoods with a
²⁷²
^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t’s A}^ddre^{ss to}^the^Na^tio^{n, Ja}ⁿ^u^a^r^y^{10, 20}⁰⁷^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^W^h^ite^House^w^e^bsite^{, http:}^//www.w^h^ite^house^.^g^o^v^/
^ne^w^s^/^r^e^l^e^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰^7/^01/^pr^int^/²⁰⁰⁷⁰¹¹^0-^7.htm^l^.
²⁷³^P^r^e^{ss Brie}^fⁱ^ng^b^y^Ge^ne^ra^{l Da}^vⁱ^{d P}^e^tra^e^u^s,^Ma^rc^{h 8}^,²⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^bl^e^a^t^http^://w^ww^.^mⁿ^f^-ira^q.c^o^m^/
^inde^x^.^p^hp?^o^p^ti^on=^c^o^m^_^c^onteⁿ^t&^ta^s^k^=v^iew^&^id=¹⁰⁴⁷^5&^I^t^e^m^id=^131.
²⁷⁴^A^d^a^m^Bro^o^k^es,^“Bu^s^h^Iraq^pl^an^lⁱ^kel^y^t^o^co^st^d^ear,^”^{BBC ne}^ws^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^{11, 2}⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//ne^w^s^.^bbc^.c^o.^uk^/2/^h^i/^am^e^r^ica^s^/625⁰⁶^57.s^t^m^.
²⁷⁵^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t’s A}^ddre^{ss to}^the^Na^tio^{n, Ja}ⁿ^u^a^r^y^{10, 20}⁰⁷^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^W^h^ite^House^w^e^bsite^{, http:}^//www.w^h^ite^house^.^g^o^v^/
^ne^w^s^/^r^e^l^e^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰^7/^01/^pr^int^/²⁰⁰⁷⁰¹¹^0-^7.htm^l^.
²⁷⁶^“Bagh^d^a^d^”ⁱ^s^t^h^eⁿ^a^m^e^o^f^b^o^t^{h t}^h^{e cap}ⁱ^t^a^l^ci^t^y^an^d^t^h^{e p}^r^o^vⁱⁿ^{ce w}^h^{ere i}^tⁱ^s^l^o^cat^ed^.
²⁷⁷^Se^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^P^r^e^s^s^B^r^ie^fⁱ^ng^w^{ith L}ⁱ^e^u^te^na^{nt G}^e^ne^r^a^{l O}^d^ie^rⁿ^o^,^Ma^y^31,²⁰^07,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tid=3⁹⁷³^.

“full-time presence on the streets” by coalition and Iraqi forces; and retaining the neighborhoods ²⁷⁸
with Iraqi security forces “fully responsible for the day-to-day security mission.”
The specific targets of the Operation included Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its affiliates, and rogue
Shi’a militia elements including the Jaish al-Mahdi “special groups.”
“Baghdad” was defined to include the surrounding areas, or “belts,” which had been providing
bases of operation and transit points, with access into the capital, for both Sunni and Shi’a
extremists. LTG Odierno’s guidance to his subordinate commanders was to stop the flow of ²⁷⁹
“accelerants of the violence” through those areas into Baghdad.
Operating in the “belts” required shifting the footprint of coalition forces to cover all the major
supply lines leading into Baghdad. Coalition presence in many of the belt areas had previously
been very light. During the spring of 2007, incoming surge brigades were deployed into Baghdad
and its belts. April 1, 2007, a new division headquarters was added—the Multi-National Division-^rd
Center, initially led by 3 Infantry Division—to cover parts of Baghdad province and other ²⁸⁰
provinces just south of Baghdad.
Beginning in June 2007, once all the coalition surge forces had arrived in Iraq, coalition forces, in
coordination with Iraqi counterparts, launched a series of operations: Phantom Thunder, followed
by Phantom Strike, and then Phantom Phoenix. As “Corps-level operations,” these were sets of
division- and brigade-level actions coordinated and integrated across Iraq by MNC-I. They
included close coordination with U.S. Special Operations Forces as well as with Iraqi military and
police forces.
The city of Baghdad was the most complex battle space in Iraq, due to the strong presence of both
AQI and JAM special groups, the many potential fault lines among different neighborhoods, and
a security “temperature” that can vary on a block-by-block basis. In the series of Corps-level ^th
operations, the Multi-National Division-Baghdad, led by the 4 Infantry Division since December

2007, focused first on clearing the city, and then on establishing a strong presence to hold each ²⁸¹

neighborhood.
The area just south of Baghdad and along the Tigris River, with its mixed Shi’a/ Sunni
population, had long provided safe havens and a gateway to Baghdad for AQI and its affiliates
from Al Anbar and Iraq’s western borders, and for Shi’a extremists coming from southern Iraq or
from Iraq’s border with Iran. As part of the Corps-level operations, Multi-National Division-
Center, led by 3ID, focused on clearing these restive areas, narrowing down to more specific
pockets of resistance, including Salman Pak and Arab Jabour, as progress is made.
²⁷⁸
^Se^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^pr^e^s^s^br^ie^fⁱ^ng^{, Ma}^jor^G^e^ne^r^a^{l J}^o^s^e^ph^F^{il, Fe}^br^ua^r^y^{16, 2}⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tid=3⁸⁹¹^.
²⁷⁹^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^Dⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on C}^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^a^{nd s}^t^a^f^f^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
²⁸⁰^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^C^-^I^a^{nd D}ⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^{8. Se}^e^a^l^s^o^Kⁱ^m^b^e^r^l^y^K^a^g^a^{n, “}^T^he^R^e^{al Sur}^g^e^:
^P^r^e^p^a^r^ing^f^o^r^O^p^e^r^a^tioⁿ^Phaⁿ^tom^T^hunde^r^,^”^I^r^a^q^Re^por^t,^T^h^e^Iⁿ^s^tit^ute^f^o^r^the^St^udy^of^W^a^r^a^{nd T}^h^e^W^e^ek^l^y^Sta^nda^r^d^,
^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{14, 2}⁰⁰⁷^-^J^uⁿ^e¹⁵^,²⁰^07,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http:^//w^w^w^.unde^r^s^ta^ndi^ng^w^a^r^.^or^g^/^I^r^a^qR^e^por^t/^I^r^a^qR^e^p^or^t0^5.p^d^f^.
²⁸¹^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^D^-^B^a^g^hda^{d, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^2008.

To the north, Multi-National Division-North, led by 1^st Armored Division, focused on clearing
and then holding those areas where AQI affiliates sought refuge as they were pushed out of ²⁸²
Baghdad. Many AQI affiliates, pushed out of Baghdad by surge operations, initially relocated
to Baquba, the capital city of Diyala province east of Baghdad. Reports suggested they had ²⁸³
renamed it the new “capital of the Islamic State of Iraq.” As operations by MND-North and
Iraqi security forces pushed AQI out of that city, some AQI moved east up the Diyala River
Valley, into the so-called “breadbasket” of Iraq near the city of Muqtadiyah—a focal point for the ^th
Division’s operations in January 2008. Working in Diyala in partnership with the Iraqi 5 Army
Division, the combined forces uncovered a number of major weapons caches, and had “some very ²⁸⁴
tough fights.”
In Al Anbar province to the west, the Multi-National Force-West, led by II Marine Expeditionary
Force (Forward), working closely with Iraqi counterparts, focused its operations on a pocket of
AQI concentration around Lake Thar Thar, northwest of Baghdad. As AQI was pushed out of
major population centers including Ramadi and Fallujah, they tended to attempt to regroup in the
desert, so another major coalition and Iraqi focus in Al Anbar has been targeting the AQI ²⁸⁵
remnants in rural areas.
Coalition and Iraqi military operations in 2008 have been characterized by growing ISF
capabilities, and growing assertiveness of the GoI in employing the ISF. Operations have been
carried out against both Al Qaeda in Iraq affiliates in north-central Iraq, and against extremist
Shi’a militia members in the south and Baghdad.
By the beginning of 2008, Corps-level operations had pushed AQI out of Anbar and Baghdad to
the east and north. Operations by Multi-National Division-North in January 2008, in Diyala
province, pushed AQI out of Diyala’s capital city Baqubah and further up the Diyala River Valley.
Some members of AQI sought to establish the northern city of Mosul as their last stronghold—²⁸⁶
their “center of gravity.”
In 2007, through the height of the surge, Ninewah province and its capital city Mosul had been an
“economy of force” area for both U.S. and Iraqi forces, as additional forces were sent south to ²⁸⁷
Baghdad and nearby areas. Ninewah province offered AQI affiliates some geographic
advantages, including land routes out to Iraq’s porous western border. It also offered a volatile
²⁸²
^R^e^tir^e^d^A^r^m^y^Ma^jor^G^e^ne^r^a^{l Sc}^a^l^e^s^pr^ov^ide^s^a^c^l^e^a^r^de^s^c^rⁱ^pti^on^of^the^e^a^r^ly^s^t^ag^e^s^of^the^s^e^ope^r^a^tions^{, ba}^s^e^d^on^a
^vi^si^t^t^o^Iraqⁱⁿ^R^o^b^e^rt^H^.^S^cal^{es M}^G^(ret⁾^,^“P^et^raeu^{s’s Iraq}^,^”^W^a^ll^Str^e^e^t^J^ourⁿ^a^l,^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{21, 2}⁰^07.
²⁸³^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^D^-^N^o^r^t^{h, J}^a^nua^r^y^2008.
²⁸⁴^Se^e^De^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^De^fe^nse^Ne^{ws Brie}^fⁱ^ng^{, Ma}^{jor G}^e^ne^ra^{l Ma}^rk^He^rtling^,^Ja^nua^ry^22,²⁰^08,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tid=4¹²⁴^.
²⁸⁵^S^{ee Dep}^a^rt^men^t^o^f^Defen^s^{e Ne}^{ws Bri}^e^fⁱⁿ^g^,^M^a^j^.^G^eⁿ^.^W^a^l^t^e^{r Gask}ⁱⁿ^,^Decem^b^e^{r 1}⁰^,²⁰⁰⁷^,
^http:^//www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tid=4¹⁰³^.
²⁸⁶^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^a^{nd MN}^D^-^N^o^r^t^h^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.
²⁸⁷^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^a^{nd MN}^D^-^N^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t^2008.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^So^lom^{on M}^oor^e^,^“^I^{n M}^o^s^u^l^,^N^e^w^T^e^s^t^of
^Re^{built Ira}^{qi A}^r^m^y^,”^{New Yo}^{rk Times}^{, Ma}^r^c^{h 20}^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸^;^Mo^or^e^r^e^po^r^t^s^tha^t^a^t^one^poi^nt,^the^de^m^a^nds^of^the^s^u^r^g^eⁱⁿ
^B^a^g^hda^{d le}^f^t^only⁷⁵⁰^U^.^S.^Sol^dⁱ^e^r^s^{in M}^o^s^u^{l, a}^nd^2,⁰⁰^{0 i}ⁿ^Nⁱ^ne^w^a^{h a}^ltog^e^the^r^.

mixed population, including governing structures largely controlled by Kurds, a sizable Sunni
Arab population that felt disenfranchised, and Christian, Yazidi, and other minority groups.
On January 25, 2008, Prime Minister Maliki announced that there would be a major new Iraqi ²⁸⁸
and coalition offensive against AQI in Mosul and stated that it would be “decisive.” The Prime
Minister established a new Ninewah Operations Command (NOC), designed to coordinate
operations by all ISF. The NOC was scheduled to reach full operating capacity in May 2008, but
as one senior U.S. commander noted, “they just weren’t ready.” Nevertheless, ISF did launch
some clearing operations and took steps to secure Mosul including setting up check points and ²⁸⁹
maintaining a presence at combat outposts. MNC-I noted its intent, once progress in Diyala
province allows, to go back and complete the effort in Mosul, to “get it set.”
In October 2008, U.S. and Iraqi forces struck a major blow against AQI in Mosul by killing Abu
Qaswarah, the senior AQI emir of northern Iraq. According to U.S. commanders on the ground,
that successful operation was made possible by a series of actions and information-gathering by
U.S. and Iraqi forces over preceding months, and his death was expected to disrupt the AQI ²⁹⁰
network significantly.
According to U.S. commanders, operations in Mosul in 2008 benefitted from an initiative by
Multi-National Corp-Iraq (MNC-I) in the Jazeera desert, west of Mosul. MNC-I formed a task
force around a military intelligence brigade headquarters, based it in the desert, and tasked it to
coordinate intelligence fusion, drawing on sources from the U.S. Marines in the west, and U.S.
and Iraqi SOF, in addition to its own assets. Commanders note that the approach has facilitated ²⁹¹
identifying and interdicting fighters coming across the desert toward Mosul.
Meanwhile, in January 2008, operations in Diyala province, east of Baghdad, had driven AQI
affiliates out of major population centers into rural areas. One U.S. military commander,
emphasizing AQI’s lack of cohesive structure, described them as “a bunch of gangs under the Al ²⁹²
Qaeda rubric.”
In late July 2008, ISF, supported by coalition forces, launched operations against AQI in Diyala.
Before the operations began, Prime Minister Maliki publicly stated the intention to launch
operations, and as a result, according to U.S. commanders, many of the “bad guys” simply ran ²⁹³
away. In the view of one U.S. commander, that approach may have “pushed the problem down
the road,” but on the other hand, he added, it might allow time for ISF capabilities to develop
further. U.S. support to the operations included conducting blocking operations, to try to catch
²⁸⁸
^S^{ee f}^o^{r exa}^m^p^l^{e “Iraq}^t^o^G^o^Af^t^e^{r A}^l^-Qaed^{a i}ⁿ^M^o^su^l^,^{” A}^sso^ci^at^ed^P^r^ess,^W^a^s^hⁱⁿ^gt^{on P}^o^s^t^{, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^25,²⁰⁰⁸^.
²⁸⁹^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MND-N off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.^Se^e^De^pa^rtm^e^nt^of^De^f^e^nse^,^“^M^e^a^s^uring^Sta^b^ility^a^{nd Se}^c^u^rityⁱⁿ
^I^r^a^q,”^J^une²⁰^08,^p.²⁰^.
²⁹⁰^In^f^o^rm^atioⁿ^f^r^o^m^{MNF-I su}^b^o^rdⁱⁿ^{ate co}^mm^an^d^e^{rs, Octo}^b^e^{r 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
²⁹¹^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^a^{nd s}^u^bor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.^T^h^e^C^o^r^p^s^-^le^v^e^{l o}^p^e^r^a^tion^{in t}^h^is
^regi^oⁿⁱ^s^cal^l^e^d^Op^eratⁱ^oⁿ^DA^{N (Defeat}^A^l^-Qaed^{a i}ⁿ^t^h^{e No}^rt^h⁾^.
²⁹²^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^s^u^bor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.
²⁹³^{See Mu}^lti^-Natioⁿ^a^l^Fo^rce-Iraq^p^r^{ess c}^oⁿ^f^eren^{ce, Majo}^{r G}^eⁿ^e^{ral M}^o^h^a^mm^ed^al-^A^sk^{ari, Iraq}ⁱ^Miⁿⁱ^str^y^o^f^De^f^eⁿ^s^e
^Spok^e^s^m^a^{n, a}^{nd B}^r^ig^a^d^ie^r^G^e^ne^r^a^{l D}^a^vⁱ^{d P}^e^r^k^ins^,^MN^F-^I^Sp^ok^e^s^m^a^{n, J}^u^ly^30,²⁰^08.

AQI affiliates attempting to flee,²⁹⁴ as well as providing air support, some logistics, and ²⁹⁵
engineering support.
According to U.S. commanders, the Diyala operations were the first to include rehearsals by the
ISF and joint planning with Multi-National Corps-Iraq. Iraqi officials noted that the Diyala
operations more than two Iraqi Army divisions, and more than one division from the Ministry of ²⁹⁶
Interior. U.S. commanders add that while the Iraqi Army demonstrated some proficiency in
“clearing,” it has been harder for the Iraqis to figure out how to “hold” cleared areas—Iraqi
planning for the “hold” portion of the operations was insufficient and hampered by a lack of Iraqi ²⁹⁷
police.
On March 25, 2008, based on direction from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Iraqi security forces
launched a major operation, Sawlat al-Fursan (Charge of the Knights) in Basra, with the stated ²⁹⁸
aim of targeting criminals operating under religious or political cover. Some Muqtada al-Sadr
loyalists apparently viewed the matter differently, and accused the government of using its armed
forces, many of which are strongly influenced by the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI), to
attack a political rival. International Crisis Group expert Joost Hiltermann characterized the
operations as “a fairly transparent partisan effort by the Supreme Council [ISCI] dressed in ²⁹⁹
government uniforms to fight the Sadrists and Fadila.”
Prior to the operations, by many accounts, key militias in Basra controlled local councils and ³⁰⁰
much of the flow of daily life on the streets of the city. In 2007, the UK-led Multi-National
Division-Southeast (MND-SE), responsible for Basra, had determined that “the UK presence in
Basra was a catalyst for violence.” In August of that year, UK forces consolidated at the airport, ³⁰¹
outside the city, and assumed an overwatch posture. In an apparent attempt at reconciliation,
the division reportedly made an accommodation with the Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM), agreeing to limit ³⁰²
its own presence in the city.
The launch of the “Charge” was, by many accounts, precipitate. In March 2008, Iraqi forces in
Basra, assisted by UK advisors, had been preparing a staged plan to take back Basra, including
²⁹⁴
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^{nd s}^ubor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
²⁹⁵^{See Mu}^lti^-Natioⁿ^a^l^Fo^rce-Iraq^p^r^{ess c}^oⁿ^f^eren^{ce, Majo}^{r G}^eⁿ^e^{ral M}^o^h^a^mm^ed^al-^A^sk^{ari, Iraq}ⁱ^Miⁿⁱ^str^y^o^f^De^f^eⁿ^s^e
^Spok^e^s^m^a^{n, a}^{nd B}^r^ig^a^d^ie^r^G^e^ne^r^a^{l D}^a^vⁱ^{d P}^e^r^k^ins^,^MN^F-^I^Sp^ok^e^s^m^a^{n, J}^u^ly^30,²⁰^08.
²⁹⁶^{See Mu}^lti^-Natioⁿ^a^l^Fo^rce-Iraq^p^r^{ess c}^oⁿ^f^eren^{ce, Majo}^{r G}^eⁿ^e^{ral M}^o^h^a^mm^ed^al-^A^sk^{ari, Iraq}ⁱ^Miⁿⁱ^str^y^o^f^De^f^eⁿ^s^e
^Spok^e^s^m^a^{n, a}^{nd B}^r^ig^a^d^ie^r^G^e^ne^r^a^{l D}^a^vⁱ^{d P}^e^r^k^ins^,^MN^F-^I^Sp^ok^e^s^m^a^{n, J}^u^ly^30,²⁰^08.
²⁹⁷^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^a^{nd s}^u^bor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.
²⁹⁸^Ma^lik^{i sta}^t^e^d^p^ubl^ic^ly^tha^t^the^o^p^e^ra^{tion w}^a^{s g}^o^ing^a^f^te^{r “}^c^ri^mⁱ^na^ls^{, te}^{rrorist f}^o^rc^e^s^{, a}ⁿ^d^o^u^tla^w^s^.”^Se^e^A^l^e^x^a^ndra
^Za^vⁱ^{s, “}^Ira^{qi Shiite}^{s Cla}^s^hⁱⁿ^Ba^sra^,^”^L^o^{s Ang}^e^{les T}ⁱ^mes^{, Ma}^r^c^h²⁶^{, 20}⁰⁸^.
²⁹⁹^Quote^d^by^A^l^e^x^a^ndra^Za^vⁱ^{s, “}^Ira^{qi S}^h^iite^{s Cla}^s^{h i}ⁿ^Ba^sra^,^”^Los^An^ge^le^s^Tim^e^s^,^Ma^r^c^{h 2}⁶^,²⁰⁰⁸^{. Se}^e^a^l^s^o^“^I^r^a^{q: A}^l^-
^B^a^s^r^a^h^C^l^a^s^he^s^C^oul^d^P^r^ov^e^O^mⁱ^nous^,”^R^a^dio^Fr^e^e^Eur^ope^{/ R}^a^dio^Lⁱ^be^r^t^y^,^Ma^r^c^{h 26,}²⁰⁰⁸^{; S}^h^o^lⁿⁿ^Fr^e^e^m^a^{n a}^nd
^S^u^d^a^rsan^Ragh^avan^,^“In^t^en^se^Fⁱ^gh^tⁱⁿ^{g E}^r^u^p^t^sⁱⁿ^Ira^q^,^”^W^a^s^hⁱ^ngt^on^Pos^t^,^Ma^r^c^{h 2}⁶^,²⁰⁰⁸^{; Mic}^h^a^e^l^K^a^m^b^e^r^a^{nd J}^a^m^e^s
^G^l^aⁿ^z^,^“^Ira^{qi a}^{nd U.S.}^Forc^e^s^Ba^t^tle^Shii^te^Milit^ia^,”^Th^{e New Y}^o^rk^Times^{, Ma}^r^c^{h 2}⁶^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁰⁰^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^s^u^b^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^t^e^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, a}^{nd w}^{ith C}^o^m^m^a^nding^G^e^ne^r^a^{l of}^the^B^a^s^r^a^O^p^e^r^a^tions
^C^o^m^m^a^{nd, Ma}^j^o^r^G^e^ne^r^a^{l Moha}^m^m^e^{d H}^a^m^e^{idi, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
³⁰¹^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MND-SE of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 20}^08.
³⁰²^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith UK}^m^ilita^r^y^offⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.

setting conditions first, and then launching operations in June. According to Iraqi civilian and
military officials in Basra, and U.S. and UK military officials, the Iraqi operation was not well-
planned. Some officials, who were directly involved, note that when the Prime Minister arrived in
Basra in March, he had been prepared only for a “limited operation” and was surprised by the ³⁰³
magnitude of the challenge. Some observers suggest that Maliki was emboldened by progress
against AQI in the north, and somewhat over-confident in the abilities of the ISF.
The ISF applied considerable forces to the effort, including 21 Iraqi Army battalions and 8
National Police battalions—reportedly some 30,000 Iraqi forces altogether, including special ³⁰⁴
operations and conventional army forces, as well as police. Extremists in Basra mounted fierce ³⁰⁵
resistance—including simultaneous attacks on 25 Iraqi police stations by JAM-affiliated forces.
Iraqi Minister of Defense Abdel Qadr Jassim was quoted as saying, “We supposed that this
operation would be a normal operation, but we were surprised by this resistance and have been ³⁰⁶
obliged to change our plans and our tactics.”
U.S. military officials report that without substantial assistance from the coalition, the operation
would have been in jeopardy. As one senior U.S. commander explained it, Prime Minister Maliki
had staked his reputation on the operation—if the operation failed, the government might ³⁰⁷
collapse, so, he added, “We made sure that it would be successful.” Coalition support included ³⁰⁸
the advice and support of embedded transition teams, air strikes, and air lift.
According to coalition officials, while many of the ISF performed competently, some—as widely ^nd
reported—did not. One newly formed Iraq Army brigade, the 52, which had no combat
experience, seemingly collapsed under the pressure. In April 2008, the GoI noted that more than

1,000 members of the ISF had laid down their weapons during the fight. Accordingly, some 500 ³⁰⁹

Iraqi Army Soldiers, and 421 members of the Iraqi Police in Basra, were fired.
In the aftermath of the Basra operations, coalition and Iraqi commanders reported that the
security situation had improved markedly. Accordingly to MND-SE, the ISF regained freedom of ³¹⁰
movement throughout the city. According to an Iraqi Army commander, security was much ³¹¹
better, and the main challenge now was to act against criminals and outlaws.
In March 2008, as operations in Basra commenced, some JAM elements stepped up attacks
targeting coalition and Iraqi forces in Baghdad. The attacks included significant targeting of the
³⁰³
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith U}^K^a^{nd I}^r^a^qi^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^B^a^s^r^a^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁰⁴^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith U}^K^m^ilita^r^y^offⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^Ba^s^r^a^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁰⁵^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith UK m}^ilita^r^y^o^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{, Ba}^sra^,^A^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
³⁰⁶^S^{ee “U.}^S^.^F^o^{rces Dra}^wⁿ^Deep^{er In}^t^o^Ira^q^Crackd^o^wⁿ^,^”^Re^ute^r^s^,^Ma^rc^{h 28}^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁰⁷^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith MNC-I of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^,^A^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
³⁰⁸^In^t^e^rvi^e^w^s^wⁱ^t^h^M^N^{C-I o}^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s,^A^u^gu^st²⁰⁰⁸^.^S^{ee al}^so^MNF-I^Pr^{ess Co}ⁿ^f^eren^{ce, Majo}^{r G}^eⁿ^e^{ral K}^e^vⁱⁿ^Bergⁿ^e^r,
^Ma^r^c^{h 26}^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{. I}ⁿ^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^,^r^e^por^ts^e^m^e^r^ge^{d tha}^t^U^K^g^r^ou^{nd f}^o^r^c^e^s^did^no^{t e}ⁿ^te^r^t^h^e^c^ity^dur^ing^the^he^a^v^y
^fⁱ^gh^tⁱⁿ^g,^d^u^e^t^o^t^h^{e p}^rⁱ^o^{r acco}^mmo^d^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^wⁱ^t^h^Mo^qt^ad^{a al}^-S^ad^r,^w^hⁱ^c^h^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^{ed t}^h^at^{UK co}^m^b^at^f^o^r^{ces co}^u^l^dⁿ^o^t^eⁿ^t^e^r
^B^a^s^r^a^w^ithout^pe^r^m^is^sⁱ^{on f}^r^om^the^U^K^Minis^t^e^r^of^D^e^f^e^nc^e^.^Se^e^De^bor^a^h^H^a^yⁿ^e^s^a^{nd Mic}^h^a^e^l^Ev^aⁿ^s^,^“^S^e^c^r^e^t^D^e^a^l
^Ke^{pt British A}^r^m^y^{Out O}^f^Ba^ttle^f^o^{r Ba}^sra^,^”^Londo^{n Tim}^e^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t^5,²⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁰⁹^Se^e^Ste^phe^{n Fa}^r^r^e^{ll a}ⁿ^{d Q}^a^is^Mi^z^h^e^r^{, “}^I^r^a^{q D}ⁱ^s^m^is^s^e^s^1,30^{0 A}^f^te^r^B^a^s^r^a^O^f^f^e^ns^iv^e^,^”^{New Yo}^{rk Times}^{, A}^p^{ril 14,}
²⁰⁰^8.
³¹⁰^In^t^e^rvi^e^w^wⁱ^t^h^M^ND-S^E^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s,^A^u^gu^st²⁰⁰⁸^.^T^h^{e o}^f^fⁱ^ci^al^{s n}^o^t^ed^t^h^at^t^h^{e si}^t^u^atⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^Basra,^po^st^-^o^p^e^ratⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^w^a^s
^“^a^{lot lik}^e^Ca^iro.”
³¹¹^In^terv^iew^w^ith^Iraqⁱ^A^r^my^co^mm^an^d^e^{r, A}^u^g^u^{st 2}⁰⁰⁸^.

International Zone, primarily from the direction of Sadr City, a stronghold of supporters of
Moqtada al-Sadr and the Sadr family.
To quell the attacks, U.S. and Iraqi forces launched operations, first of all targeting the southern
part of Sadr City where many rocket attacks were originating. According to a senior U.S. military
official, the Iraqi security forces, perhaps focused on the ongoing Basra operations, were reluctant ³¹²
to engage—he added, “We had to drag them to the fight.” U.S. forces, while largely remaining ³¹³
outside Sadr City itself, brought to the fight air weapons teams and substantial layered ISR.
After simmering for nearly two months, with continual pressure applied by coalition and Iraqi
forces, the fight in Sadr City ended in May 2008 with a deal struck between Moqtada al-Sadr and
the GoI. The arrangements reportedly allowed the ISF full access to the area. They called for an
end to the launching of rockets and mortars from Sadr City, and for the removal of any explosives
that had been laid down. They did not require the disbanding or disarming of JAM forces—and ³¹⁴
JAM affirmed that it did not possess any medium or heavy weapons. In the aftermath of the
fighting in Sadr City, U.S. officials confirmed that ISF freedom of movement had been restored,
and local residents reportedly confirmed that the grip of control by Shi’a militias over the local ³¹⁵
economy and public services had relaxed.
In June 2008, the ISF launched clearing operations in Amarah, capital city of Maysan province
just north of Basra. While little resistance was encountered, ISF found a number of weapons
caches, assisted by information from the local population. The ISF followed by providing
humanitarian assistance in the form of hot meals, and coalition forces introduced a temporary
employment program, hiring local residents to remove trash and debris from city streets. U.S.
commanders noted that the Amarah operations may have been the first that the ISF carefully ³¹⁶
planned.
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are the enemy’s “weapon of choice” in Iraq. Usually made
with technologically simple, off-the-shelf materials, they generally do not require deep expertise
to construct. As of early 2008, over 78% of those detained by coalition forces were interned based ³¹⁷
on suspicion of some IED-related activity. IEDs are the leading cause of coalition casualties in
Iraq—and over time, they have driven changes in coalition operations, including an increased
reliance on air lift for transportation of personnel and cargo.
³¹²
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith s}^e^nior^U^.^S^.^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.
³¹³^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNF-I a}^nd^MN^{C-I of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s,^A^u^g^u^{st 200}^{8. Se}^e^a^l^{so De}^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^De^f^e^nse^,^“^M^e^a^s^uring^Sta^b^ility
^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q^,^”^J^une²⁰⁰⁸^,^p.2²^.
³¹⁴^S^{ee Ho}^w^a^rd^L^a^f^r^an^chⁱ^,^“Hast^y^t^r^u^{ce w}ⁱ^t^h^M^o^qt^ad^{a al}^-S^ad^r^t^e^st^{s h}ⁱ^{s swa}^yⁱⁿ^Bagh^d^a^d^st^ron^g^h^o^l^d^,^”^Christia^{n Sc}^ie^nc^e
^M^onitor^,^Ma^y^{12, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.^Se^e^a^l^so^“^T^e^x^{t of}^Sa^{dr Ce}^a^s^e^f^ire^Ag^re^e^m^eⁿ^t,”^p^o^ste^d^by^the^Institu^te^f^o^{r the}^Stu^d^y^of^W^a^r,
^tr^aⁿ^s^l^a^t^e^d^by^N^a^thaⁿ^ie^{l R}^a^bk^{in, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http:^//w^w^w^.unde^r^s^ta^nd^ing^w^a^r^.or^g^/^t^e^x^t-^s^a^dr^-^ceas^e-^fⁱ^re-ag^r^ee^m^eⁿ^t^.
³¹⁵^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNF-I a}^nd^MN^{C-I of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s,^A^u^g^u^{st 200}^{8. Se}^e^S^a^brina^T^a^v^e^rnise^,^“^A^Shiite^Mi^lit^ia^{in Ba}^g^hda^d
^Se^e^s^its^Pow^e^{r W}^a^ne^,”^{New Yo}^{rk Times}^{, J}^u^ly^{27, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
³¹⁶^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^N^e^w^s^B^r^ie^fⁱ^ng^{, C}^o^lone^{l C}^h^a^r^lie
^Fly^{nn (U}^SA^{), 1}^st^Bri^g^ad^e,⁸²^nd^Aⁱ^r^bor^ne^Dⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^on,^J^une²⁶^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
³¹⁷^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith T}^a^sk^For^c^e^-¹³⁴^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^B^a^g^hda^{d, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^8.

Recognizing the threat from these asymmetric weapons, both the Department of Defense and the ³¹⁸
military command on the ground in Iraq have made countering IEDs a top priority. At DOD,
the Joint IED Defeat Organization, based in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and led since
December 2007 by Lieutenant General Tom Metz, is mandated to facilitate the rapid
development, production and fielding of new technologies and approaches.
In the field, the premise of the counter-IED efforts has been to “attack the network.” That
involves not just capturing the IED emplacers, usually hired for a one-time payment, but also, in ³¹⁹
the words of one Division Commander, “influencing the decisions of those who place IEDs.”
More broadly, it includes mapping the relationships among emplacers, financiers, and overall
strategists, including the support they receive from outside Iraq.
To help execute those efforts, Multi-National Corps-Iraq and its subordinate multi-national
divisions created dedicated counter-IED cells, reinforced by experts provided by JIEDDO. Their
efforts include information-sharing about the latest enemy tactics, techniques and procedures,
distributing and providing training for the latest counter-IED technology, training the force to
recognize how the network operates, and integrating all available intelligence assets to better ³²⁰
define—and target—the networks. MNC-I also includes a task force of technical experts who ³²¹
collect and analyze all found IEDs.
MNF-I and MNC-I officials point to a dramatic decrease in enemy IED use, from September
2007 to September 2008, from about 110 incidents per day to about 26 incidents per day. Most of
those incidents involved relatively unsophisticated devices, with key exceptions. According to ³²²
U.S. officials, enemy IED use seems to follow cycles of innovation. In late 2007, a key IED
concern was the explosively formed penetrator (EFP), able to target vehicles with a particularly
powerful blast, but EFP trend lines diminished markedly after January 2008. In late 2007, another
worrisome form of IED appeared, the improvised rocket-assisted mortar (IRAM)—a rocket with
a propane tank and ball bearings. IRAMs take a long time to build, and they have indiscriminate
and catastrophic effects. The first two IRAM incidents took place in November 2007, and a total
of 13 incidents had taken place by August 2008. In mid-2008, the use of “building-borne IEDs”—³²³
houses wired to explode—became more common.
Carrying out IED attack requires, to some extent, the ability to operate within a local population.
U.S. commanders note that the most fundamental factor in explaining the successes to date in the ³²⁴
counter-IED effort is that “the Iraqi population has turned against the IED effort.”
³¹⁸
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith LTG}^O^d^ie^r^{no, a}^nd^MN^C^-^I^s^t^a^f^f^,^J^a^nua^r^y^2008.
³¹⁹^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith D}ⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on C}^o^m^m^ande^r^,^J^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^2008.
³²⁰^A^t^the^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^o^f^the^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^the^J^oⁱⁿ^{t I}^E^D^D^e^f^e^a^t^O^r^g^a^niz^a^{tion, le}^d^sⁱ^nc^e^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r²⁰⁰⁷^by
^Lⁱ^e^u^te^na^{nt G}^e^ne^ra^{l T}^o^m^Me^tz^{, is m}^a^nda^te^{d to}^f^a^c^ilita^te^the^ra^pid^de^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t, prod}^uc^tio^{n a}ⁿ^{d f}ⁱ^e^l^din^g^of^ne^w
^te^c^hnol^og^ie^s^a^{nd a}^p^pr^oa^c^h^e^s^.
³²¹^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNC-I of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
³²²^A^s^oⁿ^e^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^o^b^s^erved^,^“It^’^{s l}ⁱ^k^{e R&D,}^{” i}ⁿ^t^e^rvi^e^w^wⁱ^t^h^M^N^{C-I off}ⁱ^ci^al^,^A^u^gu^st²⁰⁰⁸^.
³²³^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNC-I of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
³²⁴^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.

U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have played an integral role throughout Operation Iraqi
Freedom, including targeting key enemy leaders. MNF-I leaders note that as of 2008, SOF and
conventional forces work in a much more closely integrated way than they did earlier in OIF.
SOF is particularly well-suited to infiltrate difficult areas to reach key individual targets. But
according to MNF-I and MNC-I leaders, SOF often rely, for targeting information, on
conventional units’ detailed, daily familiarity with their battle space, based on their long-standing
relationships with local Iraqi counterparts. Further, commanders stress, after a SOF action, it is ³²⁵
the conventional forces—in partnership with Iraqi forces—that stay to “hold” the area.
Most press coverage of the counter-insurgency effort in Iraq has focused on the role of ground
forces—the Army and the Marine Corps—including the number of troops on the ground, the ³²⁶
approaches they have used, and the stress on those two Military Services. Air power has also
been an integral element of the OIF counter-insurgency (COIN) effort—providing critical
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and facilitating mobility—³²⁷
particularly given the lack of mass transit of troops by ground. Importantly from an analytical
perspective, the role of air power in Iraq has evolved over time.
One major shift over the course of OIF has been in the kinetic use of air power. Defense expert ³²⁸
Anthony Cordesman has pointed to its “steadily more important role over time.” In November
2007, Major General Dave Edgington, then the MNF-I Air Component Coordination Element
(ACCE) Director, confirmed a sharp spike, once all the surge troops had arrived in Iraq, in the ³²⁹
number of weapons dropped from fighters and bombers.
Statistics released in January 2008 by the Combined Force Air Component Command (CFACC),
the air component of CENTCOM, provided further detail about the upswing in the use of
weapons. The yearly number of close air support (CAS) strikes, with munitions dropped, in OIF,
rose from 86 in 2004, to 176 in 2005, to 1,770 in 2006, to 3,030 in 2007. During 2007, the
³²⁵
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
³²⁶^I^nde^e^d^,^the^g^r^o^uⁿ^d^Se^r^v^ic^e^s^the^m^s^e^lv^es^m^a^y^te^{nd to v}ⁱ^e^w^c^ounte^r^-ⁱ^ns^ur^g^e^nc^y^pr^im^a^r^il^y^a^s^a^g^r^ound^f^o^r^c^e^s^ef^f^o^r^t^{. I}ⁿ
^his^pr^ov^oc^a^tiv^e^m^onog^r^a^{ph, “}^S^h^o^r^tc^ha^ng^ing^the^J^o^int^Fig^h^t?^,”^Aⁱ^r^For^c^e^Ma^jor^G^e^ne^r^a^{l C}^h^a^r^le^s^D^u^nla^p^note^d^tha^t^the
^ne^w^A^r^m^y^a^{nd Ma}^rⁱ^ne^C^o^r^p^s^C^O^I^N^doc^trⁱⁿ^e^,^FM^3-^24,^de^v^o^te^s^oⁿ^l^y^a^5-^pa^g^e^a^ppe^ndix^{to t}^h^e^r^o^le^o^f^aⁱ^r^pow^e^rⁱⁿ
^C^O^I^N^{, a}^{nd a}^r^g^u^e^d^f^o^r^a^“^g^e^nui^ne^ly^{joint a}^ppr^oa^c^h^”^tha^t^ta^k^e^s^a^c^c^{ount of}^“^t^he^f^u^ll^poteⁿ^tia^{l of}^to^da^y^’^{s a}ⁱ^r^pow^e^r
^c^a^p^a^b^ilitie^s.”^Se^e^Ma^{j. G}^e^{n. Cha}^r^le^{s Dunla}^p^,^“^S^h^o^rtc^h^aⁿ^gⁱ^ng^t^h^e^J^o^int^Fig^h^t?^Aⁿ^Aⁱ^r^m^aⁿ^’s^A^sse^s^s^m^eⁿ^{t of}^FM^3-2⁴^aⁿ^d
^the^C^a^s^e^f^o^r^D^e^v^e^loping^T^r^uly^J^oⁱⁿ^{t C}^O^I^N^D^o^c^t^rⁱ^ne^,”^Aⁱ^r^Uⁿ^iv^e^r^s^ity^m^onog^r^a^{ph, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r²⁰⁰^{7, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//a^u^p^r^e^s^s^.^m^a^xw^e^ll.af^.^m^il/¹²¹⁰⁰⁷^du^nla^p^.p^df^.
³²⁷^For^a^dis^c^us^sⁱ^oⁿ^of^aⁱ^r^o^p^e^r^a^tio^ns^{in s}^u^pp^or^t^of^O^I^{F a}^{nd O}^p^e^r^a^tioⁿ^End^u^rⁱ^ng^Fr^e^e^d^om^{in A}^f^g^h^aⁿ^is^ta^{n, i}ⁿ^c^l^u^d^ing^t^h^e
^wⁱ^de^spre^a^d^use^of^Unm^a^nne^{d A}^e^rⁱ^a^l^V^e^hic^l^e^s^{, se}^e^Ma^rk^Be^nja^m^{in, “}^K^illing^‘Bub^ba^{’ f}^r^om^the^Sk^ie^s,”^S^l^at^e.^co^m,
^Fe^brua^ry^{15, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^ht^tp://w^ww^.s^a^l^on.c^o^m^/^ne^w^s^/^f^e^a^ture^/20^08/^02/¹⁵^/^a^ir_w^a^r^/.
³²⁸^Aⁿ^thony^H^.^C^o^r^d^e^s^m^a^{n, “}^U^{S A}ⁱ^r^pow^e^r^{in I}^r^a^{q a}ⁿ^{d A}^f^g^h^aⁿ^is^ta^{n: 2004}^-²⁰⁰^7,”^C^e^nte^r^f^o^r^Str^a^te^gⁱ^c^a^{nd I}ⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^ona^l
^Stud^ie^s^,^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^13,²⁰^07.
³²⁹^MN^F-^I^pr^e^s^s^br^ie^fⁱ^ng^{, Ma}^jor^G^e^ne^r^a^{l D}^a^v^e^Edgⁱ^ng^ton,^MN^F-^I^Aⁱ^r^C^o^m^pone^nt^C^oor^di^na^tio^{n Ele}^m^{ent D}ⁱ^r^e^c^t^or^,
^Nov^e^m^b^e^r^{4, 2}⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^ht^tp://w^ww^.^mⁿ^f^-ira^q.c^o^m^/
^inde^x^.^p^hp?^o^p^ti^on=^c^o^m^_^c^onteⁿ^t&^ta^s^k^=v^iew^&^id=¹⁵⁰³^3&^I^t^e^m^id=^128.

monthly number of CAS strikes rose from 89 in January, then 36 in February, to 171 in June, 303 ³³⁰
in July, and 166 in August, before dropping back to double-digits for the rest of the year.
In January 2008, Maj. Gen. Edgington explained that close air support—or “on-call” support—is
the type of kinetic air power that has been most in demand in Iraq. Coordinated air/ground
operations during the first several months after the arrival of the full surge force produced the
heaviest CAS requirements, but afterward the demand tapered off. The significantly higher
demand for CAS, he noted, was less a reflection of a deliberate strategy to use more air power,
than a natural result of a significantly larger number of U.S. troops, working significantly more
closely with Iraqi counterparts and in local neighborhoods, and getting better information that
made target identification much easier. As of January 2008, in a shift from mid-2007, the majority ³³¹
of weapons dropped were targeting deeply buried IEDs.
Some counter-insurgency specialists have questioned the use of kinetic air power in counter-
insurgency operations because it risks civilian casualties that could fuel the insurgency. For
example, Kalev Sepp has written, “These killings drive family and community members into the ³³²
insurgency and create lifelong antagonisms toward the United States.”
Commanders stress, in turn, that although there is always a chance of accidental civilian
casualties, the likelihood has greatly diminished with the development of precision capabilities.
Further, the decision cycle before a weapon is dropped includes a series of decision points that
give commanders the opportunity to stop an action if new and better information becomes ³³³
available about a civilian presence in the target area. In his December 2007 assessment of the
use of air power in Iraq and Afghanistan, Anthony Cordesman concludes that “considerable ³³⁴
restraint was used in both wars.”
Another major shift in the use of air in OIF, according to U.S. commanders, has been the growing ³³⁵
availability of greater air assets—for example, significantly more full-motion video assets. In
2008, U.S. air assets—ISR, kinetic, and mobility—proved essential to the increasingly
“combined” coalition and Iraqi operations on the ground. In the Basra operations in March 2008,
U.S. transition teams embedded with Iraqi units relied on ISR and some kinetic air as key
enablers, and the coalition also provided some essential airlift.
U.S. and Iraqi military operations in the Sadr City section of Baghdad, in spring 2008, presented
some specific challenges—a geographic area largely denied to legitimate Iraqi security forces but
densely populated by civilians, serving as a launching pad for frequent attacks on Iraqi and
coalition targets, in the middle of the nation’s capital. In the judgment of some U.S. commanders,
what helped make the U.S.-Iraqi Sadr City operations a success was pushing the control of air
³³⁰
^“²⁰⁰^4-²⁰⁰⁷^C^o^m^b^ine^d^F^o^r^c^e^s^Aⁱ^r^C^o^m^pone^nt^C^o^m^m^a^nde^r^Aⁱ^r^pow^e^r^Sta^tis^tic^s^,^”^U^.^{S. C}^E^N^T^A^F^C^o^m^b^ine^d^Aⁱ^r^a^nd
^S^p^{ace Op}^eratⁱ^oⁿ^s^Cent^er,^Jan^u^a^ry³^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
³³¹^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith Ma}^{j. G}^e^{n. Edg}ⁱ^ng^{ton, B}^a^g^h^d^a^d^{, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
³³²^S^{ee “T}^h^e^In^su^rgen^c^y^:^Canⁱ^t^b^e^Defeat^ed^{?” In}^t^e^rvi^e^w^wⁱ^t^h^Kal^e^v^S^e^p^p^,^PBS^Froⁿ^tli^ne^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{21, 20}⁰⁶^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble
^a^t^http^://w^ww^/^pbs.org^/^w^g^bh.pa^g^e^s/f^r^ontlin^e^/^insurg^eⁿ^c^y^/^c^aⁿ^{/. Othe}^r^obse^r^v^e^{rs que}^stio^{n t}^h^e^use^of^kⁱ^ne^tic^aⁱ^{r pow}^e^r
^sim^p^l^y^oⁿ^th^{e g}^r^o^uⁿ^d^s^th^{at an}^y^risk^o^fⁱⁿ^ad^v^e^rten^{t civ}^ilian^lo^ss^o^f^{life is u}ⁿ^accep^tab^l^e.
³³³^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^le^a^d^e^r^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
³³⁴^Aⁿ^thony^H^.^C^o^r^d^e^s^m^a^{n, “}^U^{S A}ⁱ^r^pow^e^r^{in I}^r^a^{q a}ⁿ^{d A}^f^g^h^aⁿ^is^ta^{n: 2004}^-²⁰⁰^7”^{, C}^e^nte^r^f^o^r^Str^a^te^gⁱ^c^a^{nd I}ⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^ona^l
^Stud^ie^s^,^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^13,²⁰^07.
³³⁵^In^terv^iew^s^w^ith^{MNF-I an}^d^MN^{C-I o}^f^fⁱ^cials,^A^u^g^u^{st 2}⁰⁰⁸^.

assets to lower levels in the U.S. chain of command.³³⁶ Commanders on the ground had access to
layered inputs from manned and unmanned sensors, and multiple options—both ground- and air-
based—for taking out targets, if the decision was to “kill” rather than “follow and exploit.”

As of 2008, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) consisted of three major groups: the Army, Navy and
Air Force under the Ministry of Defense (MoD); the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police, and
the Department of Border Enforcement under the Ministry of Interior (MoI), as well as the
Facilities Protection Service that was still being consolidated under the MoI; and the Iraqi Special
Operations Forces that report to the Counter-Terrorism Bureau, under the office of the Prime
Minister.
Developing the ISF and the security Ministries that oversee them is a critical component of the
role of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq—a role that has evolved over time in response to events
on the ground and changes in U.S. strategy.
The scope of the challenge has been extensive, since none of Iraq’s pre-war security forces or
structures were left intact or available for duty after major combat operations.
U.S. pre-war planning had foreseen an immediate and practical need for law enforcement, and for
security more broadly, after major combat—particularly since some challenges to law and order
might reasonably be expected after the collapse of the old regime. Planning had also stressed the
need for security providers to have an “Iraqi face,” to calm and reassure the Iraqi people.
However, pre-war planning had erroneously assumed that Iraqi local police forces would be
available, as needed, to help provide security for the Iraqi people. Instead, in the immediate
aftermath of major combat, coalition forces found that civilian law enforcement bodies had
effectively disappeared.
Meanwhile, military pre-war planning had also assumed that Iraqi military units would be
available for recall and reassignment after the war, as needed. Military plans counted on the
“capitulation” of Iraqi forces, and included options for using some of those forces to guard ³³⁷
borders or perform other tasks.
Instead, on May 23, 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) issued CPA Order Number
2, which dissolved all Iraqi military services including the Army. That decision foreclosed the
option of unit recall to support security or reconstruction activities, or to serve as building blocks ³³⁸
for a new, post-Saddam army.
³³⁶
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^{nd s}^ubor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
³³⁷^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^C^F^L^C^C^a^{nd V}^C^o^r^p^s^pla^nne^r^s^,²⁰⁰²^aⁿ^d²⁰⁰³^{. S}^e^e^a^l^s^o^Mic^h^a^e^l^R^.^G^o^r^d^oⁿ^aⁿ^{d G}^e^ne^r^a^{l B}^e^rⁿ^a^r^d
^{E. T}^r^aⁱ^nor^,^C^o^b^r^a^{II: T}^h^{e In}^si^d^e^S^t^o^r^{y a}ⁿ^d^t^h^{e In}^v^a^sioⁿ^aⁿ^d^Occu^p^a^tioⁿ^o^f^Ir^a^q^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: Vinta}^g^e^B^ook^s^,²⁰⁰⁶^.)
³³⁸^Se^e^CP^A^Orde^{r 2}^,^“^D^issolu^tio^{n o}^f^Entitie^s,”^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http:^//www^.ira^qc^oa^lition.^org^/^re^g^u^la^tions/
²⁰⁰³⁰⁸²^3_C^P^A^ORD_2^_^Dissolu^tⁱ^on^_of^_En^titie^s_w^ith_A^nne^x^_^A^.^pdf^{. Note}^tha^t^t^h^e^da^te^of^the^Orde^r^{is g}ⁱ^v^eⁿ
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Post-war Iraq was not, however, a blank slate in terms of trained and organized fighters. The
Kurds in northern Iraq had long maintained well-trained and well-equipped forces—the pesh
merga—which had worked closely with coalition forces during major combat. Somewhat more
equivocally, a major Shi’a Arab political party, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in ³³⁹
Iraq (SCIRI, later ISCI), maintained its own militia, the Badr Corps, which had been trained in
Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. Like the pesh merga, Badr members were trained and equipped, but
unlike them, they had no history of cooperation with coalition forces in Iraq. In the early days of
the formal occupation, in various contexts, both militias offered their services to help provide
security. The coalition—then the executive authority of Iraq—thus faced the additional challenge
of whether and how to incorporate these militias into official Iraqi security structures.
During the year of formal occupation, Iraqi security forces training was led and primarily
executed by the Coalition Provisional Authority. Particularly in the earliest days, the efforts were
characterized by limited long-term strategic planning, and by resources too limited for the scope
and scale of the tasks.
Police training began as a function of the CPA “Ministry of the Interior” office, initially under the
leadership of former New York Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik. He was supported by a
skeleton staff in Baghdad, and by some resources from the State Department’s Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). Based on priorities articulated by
Washington, the team focused initially on the capital city, including rebuilding the Baghdad
Police Academy. The office also launched a limited call-back and re-training effort for former
Iraqi police officers, but the effort was constrained by limited resources and staff—including a ³⁴⁰
very limited presence outside Baghdad.
Meanwhile, military units throughout Iraq had recognized an immediate need for some Iraqi law
enforcement presence on the ground in their areas of responsibility. To the frustration of some ³⁴¹
CPA officials, military commanders launched police re-training initiatives in their areas,
initially in the form of three-week courses, with the goal of quickly fielding at least temporary
Iraqi security providers. Ambassador Bremer eventually instructed CJTF-7 to cease police ³⁴²
recruiting.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^inc^o^rre^c^tly^{on the}^C^P^A^w^e^bsite^ta^ble^of^c^onteⁿ^ts,^b^u^{t is}^c^o^rre^c^tly^printe^d^on^the^Orde^r^itse^l^f^.
³³⁹^P^r^evi^o^u^s^l^y^t^h^{e “Bad}^{r Bri}^g^ad^e,^{” su}^b^s^eq^u^eⁿ^t^l^y^t^h^{e “Bad}^{r Organ}ⁱ^zatⁱ^oⁿ^.^”
³⁴⁰^Re^g^a^rding^f^unding^f^o^{r the}^Ira^{qi c}ⁱ^v^ilia^{n la}^w^eⁿ^f^o^rc^em^eⁿ^{t s}^y^s^t^em^,^A^m^ba^s^s^a^{dor Bre}^m^e^r^w^r^ite^s^tha^t^CP^A^be^g^a^{n w}^ith
^$25^m^{illion f}^r^om^the^Sta^t^e^De^pa^rt^m^e^{nt to a}^sse^{ss the}^Ira^{qi c}^r^im^ina^l^j^u^stic^e^sy^ste^m^{, a}^{nd Am}^ba^ss^a^{dor B}^r^e^m^e^r^a^lloc^a^t^e^d^aⁿ
^a^dditi^ona^l^$1²⁰^m^{illion f}^r^om^Ira^{qi g}^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt f}^unds^f^o^{r tra}ⁱⁿⁱ^ng^a^{nd e}^q^ui^ppi^ng^Ira^qi^polic^e^.^Se^e^A^m^ba^s^s^a^{dor L}^.^P^a^ul
^Bre^m^{er III,}^M^y^Ye^ar^{in I}^r^a^q^:^T^h^e^Str^u^g^g^le^t^o^B^u^ild^a^Fut^u^r^e^{of H}^o^p^e^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: Si}^m^{on a}^nd^Sc^hus^te^r^,²⁰⁰⁶^.
³⁴¹^P^e^r^s^ona^{l c}^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^f^r^om^C^P^A^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^2003.^A^l^s^o^{, in}^his^I^r^a^q^m^e^m^o^ir^{, A}^m^b^a^s^s^a^dor^B^r^em^e^r^mⁱ^nc^e^s^no
^w^o^rd^s.^{He q}^u^o^t^e^{s Do}^u^g^Brand^,^t^h^{e U.}^K.^Coⁿ^s^t^a^b^l^{e w}^h^o^rep^l^aced^K^e^ri^k,^{as sa}^yⁱⁿ^g^,^“^T^h^e^A^r^{my i}^s^s^w^e^e^pⁱⁿ^g^up^h^a^l^f^-
^e^duc^a^t^e^d^m^e^{n off}^the^stre^e^t^{s, run}ⁿⁱ^ng^th^e^m^throug^h^a^thre^e^-^w^e^e^k^traⁱ^ning^c^o^urse^{, a}^r^mⁱ^ng^the^m^{, a}^{nd th}^eⁿ^c^a^lling^the^m
^p^o^{lice. It’s a scan}^d^a^l,^p^u^r^{e an}^d^si^m^p^le.”^See^Am^b^a^ss^ad^o^r^L^.^P^a^u^l^Bre^m^{er III,}^M^y^Ye^{ar in Ira}^q^{: T}^h^e^Strug^g^le^t^o^B^u^ild^a
^Futur^e^of^H^o^pe^,^New^Yo^r^k^:^Sⁱ^m^oⁿ^an^{d S}^c^hu^st^er^,²⁰⁰⁶^,^p^a^{ge 1}⁸³^.
³⁴²^Iⁿ^his^m^e^m^o^ir^{, A}^m^bas^s^a^dor^B^r^e^m^e^r^r^e^c^a^lls^aⁿ^O^c^tobe^r²⁰⁰³^m^e^e^t^ing^w^{ith C}^J^T^F^-⁷^C^o^m^m^a^nde^r^LTG^Sa^nc^he^z^,^w^h^eⁿ
^he^instr^u^c^t^e^d^CJT^F^{-7 t}^o^sto^p^re^c^r^uiting^pol^ic^e^.^T^h^e^incⁱ^de^nt^u^nde^rs^c^o^re^{d the}^dif^fⁱ^c^u^{lt positi}^onⁱⁿ^the^c^h^aⁱ^{n of}^c^o^m^m^a^nd
^of^C^J^T^F^-⁷⁽^s^e^e^a^bov^e⁾^{, w}^h^ic^h^w^a^s^{in d}ⁱ^r^e^c^t^s^u^p^por^t^of^C^P^A^,^{but s}^tⁱ^{ll r}^e^por^te^{d t}^o^C^E^N^T^C^O^M—^w^h^{ich ha}^d^ins^t^r^u^c^t^e^d
^CJ^T^F^{-7 to re}^c^r^{uit a}^nd^traⁱⁿ^pol^ic^e^.^Com^m^unic^a^tions^f^r^om^CJ^T^F^{-7 off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^2003,^aⁿ^d^A^m^ba^s^s^a^{dor L}^.^P^a^{ul Bre}^m^e^r^III,
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

CPA also initially had responsibility for rebuilding Iraq’s Army, under the supervision of Walt
Slocombe, the CPA Senior Advisor for National Security, and a former Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy. In an August 2003 Order, CPA directed the creation of the New Iraqi Army ³⁴³
(NIA). The training effort, led day-to-day by Major General Paul Eaton, focused on recruiting
and training Iraqi soldiers, battalion-by-battalion. The plan was to create higher headquarters later
on—and in particular, once an Iraqi civilian leadership was in place to provide civilian control of
the military. The initial, ambitious goal was the creation of 27 battalions in two years, which was ³⁴⁴
adjusted to the even more ambitious goal of 27 battalions in one year.
In early September 2003, as a stop-gap measure, at the urging of CJTF-7 with backing from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, CPA announced the establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense
Corps (ICDC). The ICDC would be a trained, uniformed, armed “security and emergency service ³⁴⁵
agency for Iraq.” In accordance with the Order he signed, establishing the ICDC, Ambassador
Bremer delegated responsibility for its development to the senior military commander in Iraq—
LTG Sanchez. Under CJTF-7’s authority, Division Commanders launched ICDC recruiting and
training programs, supporting the efforts in part with their own organic assets, and in part with
CERP funding.
In 2003 and early 2004, the various ISF training efforts—for the police, the NIA and the ICDC—
proceeded in parallel, led by separate entities within the coalition, with little opportunity for
integrated strategic planning and resourcing.
The military command in Iraq had sought for some time to be assigned responsibility for the
entire ISF training mission, based on the view that CPA did not have the capacity to accomplish
all of it, or to coordinate its many elements in a single strategy. Ambassador Bremer resisted this ³⁴⁶
design, based on the view that the military was not trained to train police forces.
On May 11, 2004, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36,
which assigned the mission of organizing, training and equipping all Iraqi security forces (ISF) to

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^M^y^Ye^ar^{in I}^r^a^q^:^T^h^e^Str^u^g^g^le^t^o^Build^a^Fut^u^r^e^of^H^ope^,^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: Sim}^{on a}^{nd Sc}^hus^te^r^,²⁰⁰⁶^.
³⁴³^Coa^liti^on^Prov^isio^na^{l A}^u^thor^ity^Orde^{r 22}^{, “}^C^re^a^tion^of^a^Ne^w^Ira^{qi A}^r^m^y^,”^{18 A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^{3, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.ira^qc^oa^lition^.^org^/^re^g^u^la^tions^/²⁰⁰³⁰⁸¹⁸^_^C^P^A^O^RD^_22_^Cre^a^tion_^of^_a^_N^e^w^_Ira^qi_A^r^m^y^.^pdf^.
³⁴⁴^{See Am}^b^a^ss^ad^o^r^L^.^P^a^u^l^Brem^er^III,^M^y^Ye^arⁱⁿ^I^r^aq:^The^Str^u^ggle^{to B}^u^il^{d a}^Fut^u^r^e^of^H^ope^,^New^Yo^{rk: S}ⁱ^m^oⁿ
^a^{nd Sc}^h^u^s^t^e^r^,²⁰^06.
³⁴⁵^Se^e^Coa^liti^on^Prov^is^io^na^{l A}^u^thor^ity^O^r^de^{r 28, “}^E^s^t^a^b^lis^hm^eⁿ^{t of}^the^Ira^{qi Civ}^{il D}^e^f^e^ns^e^Corps^,^”^{3 S}^e^pte^m^be^{r 2003,}
^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^ww^.ira^qc^oa^lition.^org^/^re^g^u^la^tions/
²⁰⁰³⁰⁹⁰^3_C^P^A^O^R^D^_²^8_Es^t^_of^_the^_I^r^a^qi_C^iv^il^_D^e^f^eⁿ^s^e^_C^or^ps^.^pdf^.
³⁴⁶^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^{ith C}^P^A^aⁿ^d^C^J^T^F^-⁷^le^a^d^e^r^s^,²⁰⁰³^aⁿ^d²⁰⁰⁴^{. I}ⁿ^hⁱ^s^m^e^m^o^ir^,^A^m^ba^s^s^a^dor^B^r^e^m^e^r^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^s^a
^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰³^m^e^e^ting^a^t^w^h^ic^{h G}^E^N^A^b^iz^aⁱ^{d a}^{nd L}^T^G^Sa^nc^hez^pr^op^os^e^d^t^h^a^t^C^J^T^F^-⁷^ta^k^e^ov^e^r^the^p^o^lic^e^tr^aⁱⁿⁱ^ng
^mⁱ^s^s^{ion. H}^e^o^b^s^e^rv^e^s^{in his}^m^e^m^o^{ir: “}^I^didⁿ^{’t lik}^e^it^{.... A}^lth^oug^h^o^u^{r s}^o^l^d^ie^rs^w^e^re^the^be^s^t^c^o^m^b^a^t^troo^psⁱⁿ^the^w^o^rld,
^the^y^ha^{d be}^eⁿ^traⁱ^ne^d^aⁿ^d^e^q^uⁱ^p^p^e^{d f}^o^{r f}^a^st-^m^ov^ing^ope^ra^{tions w}^h^e^r^e^the^y^k^ille^{d the}^eⁿ^e^m^y^,^{not f}^o^r^c^o^m^m^unit^y
^p^o^liciⁿ^g^an^d^crimⁱⁿ^{al in}^v^e^stig^atioⁿ^s^{.” See Am}^b^a^ss^ad^o^r^L^.^P^a^u^l^Bre^m^{er III,}^M^y^Ye^ar^{in I}^r^a^q^:^The^S^t^r^ugg^le^to^Bui^l^d^a
^Futur^e^of^H^o^pe^,^New^Yo^r^k^:^Sⁱ^m^oⁿ^an^{d S}^c^hu^st^er^,²⁰⁰⁶^,^p^p^.¹⁶⁸^-¹^69.

CENTCOM. This included both directing all U.S. efforts, and coordinating all supporting ³⁴⁷
international efforts. It explicitly included Iraq’s civilian police as well as its military forces.
CENTCOM, in turn, created the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I),
a new three-star headquarters that would fall under the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), to ³⁴⁸
bring together all Iraqi security forces training under a single lead in Iraq.
Since December 2004, in keeping with the original NSPD mandate concerning international
contributions, the MNSTC-I Commanding General has been dual-hatted as the Commander of the
NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I). NTM-I provides training, both inside and outside Iraq, to
Iraqi security forces; assistance with equipping; and technical advice and assistance. As of August
2008, its permanent mission in Iraq included 133 personnel from 15 countries. Major initiatives
have included helping the Iraqi Army build a Non-Commissioned Officer Corps; helping
establish and structure Iraqi military educational institutions; and—with a strong contribution ³⁴⁹
from Italy’s Carabinieri—helping update the skills and training of Iraq’s National Police.
On October 1, 2005, MNSTC-I was given the additional responsibility of mentoring and helping ³⁵⁰
build capacity in the Ministries of Defense and Interior.
At the heart of the ISF training mission is the practice of embedding coalition forces and other
advisors and experts—now called “transition teams”—with Iraqi military or civilian units, to
train, mentor and advise them.
That practice, though it has grown over time, is not new. In early 2004, under CJTF-7, some
Army units embedded teams with the newly generated New Iraqi Army battalions. Under
Commanding General George Casey, MNF-I initiated a more aggressive embedding strategy, and
the effort expanded still further in scope when GEN Petraeus assumed command of MNF-I in ³⁵¹
February 2007.
³⁴⁷
^S^{ee Nat}ⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^ecu^rⁱ^t^y^P^r^esi^d^en^tⁱ^al^Di^rectⁱ^v^{e 3}⁶^,^“Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^{es G}^o^vern^m^eⁿ^t^Op^eratⁱ^oⁿ^sⁱⁿ^Iraq^,^{” Ma}^y¹¹^,²⁰⁰⁴^,
^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^Fe^de^ra^tion^of^Am^e^r^ic^aⁿ^Sc^ie^{ntists w}^e^bs^ite^{, htt}^p^://w^ww^.^f^a^s^.org^/ⁱ^rp/^o^ff^doc^s/nspd/^nsp^d⁰⁵¹¹⁰⁴^.p^df^.
³⁴⁸^T^h^e^fⁱ^r^s^{t MN}^ST^C^-^I^C^o^m^m^a^nding^G^e^ne^r^a^l^w^a^s^theⁿ^-^LTG^D^a^vⁱ^{d Pe}^tr^a^e^u^s^.^Iⁿ^Ma^y²⁰⁰^{4, C}^J^T^F^-⁷^s^p^l^{it int}^o^a^hig^h^e^r^,
^f^our^-^s^ta^r^he^a^dqua^r^t^e^r^s^,^MN^F-^I^,^aⁿ^{d a}^low^e^r^,^thr^e^e^-^s^t^a^r^he^a^d^q^u^a^r^te^r^s^,^MN^C^-^I^,⁽^s^e^e^a^bov^e⁾^.
³⁴⁹^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.^Se^e^http^://w^ww^.a^f^s^outh.na^t^o^.in^t^/^J^{FCN_Missions/}^N^T^M^-I/NT^M-
^I.h^t^m^.
³⁵⁰^Se^e^f^o^{r e}^x^a^m^ple^L^T^G^Ma^{rtin De}^m^p^se^y^,^Sta^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t be}^f^o^re^the^Hou^s^e^A^r^m^e^{d Se}^rv^ic^e^s^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on Ov}^e^r^sig^h^t
^a^{nd I}ⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^tions^,^J^une¹²^{, 2}⁰⁰⁷^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^H^A^SC^w^e^bs^ite^{, http:}^//a^r^m^e^d^s^e^r^v^ic^es^.hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^pdf^s^/^O^I⁰⁶¹²^07/
^D^e^m^p^s^e^y^_^T^e^s^tⁱ^m^on^y⁰⁶¹²⁰⁷^.p^df^{. T}^h^e^U^S^A^g^eⁿ^cy^f^o^r^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tio^na^l^D^e^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t, a}^nd^the^U^.^S^.^Em^ba^s^s^y^’^s^I^r^a^q
^T^r^aⁿ^s^{ition A}^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^,^s^h^a^r^e^re^s^pons^ib^ility^f^o^{r fa}^c^ilita^ting^the^de^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t of}^a^{ll othe}^{r Ira}^{qi Mi}^nis^t^rie^s^.
³⁵¹^{See Majo}^{r G}^eⁿ^e^{ral Carter F. Ham}^,^“^T^ra^{nsition T}^e^a^m^{’s Role}^{in Ira}^q,”^M^ilitary^Tr^ainⁱⁿ^g^Te^c^hⁿ^o^l^ogy^,^Vo^l.¹²^,^Issu^{e 1}^,
^A^p^{ril 10,}²⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://^w^w^w^.^m^ilita^r^y^-tra^ining^-^te^c^hnol^og^y^.^c^o^m^/^a^r^tic^le^.cfm^?^D^oc^ID⁼¹⁹⁷²^{. I}ⁿ^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r²⁰⁰^6,
^the^I^r^a^{q S}^t^u^d^y^G^r^{oup ha}^{d r}^e^c^o^m^m^e^nde^{d s}^h^a^r^p^l^y^e^nha^nc^ing^the^e^m^be^dding^pr^og^r^a^m^—^dow^{n to the}^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^y^le^ve^{l in the}
^I^r^a^{qi A}^r^m^y^—^a^{nd “}^p^a^y^ing^”^f^o^r^thi^s^inc^r^e^a^s^e^{in e}^m^be^dde^{d tr}^o^ops^w^{ith r}^e^duc^tⁱ^onsⁱⁿ^the^num^be^r^of^tr^o^ops^a^s^sⁱ^gⁿ^e^d^t^o
^co^m^b^at^b^rⁱ^g^ad^es.^S^ee^The^I^r^aq^St^udy^G^r^o^up^Re^por^t^,^Ja^m^e^s^A^.^Ba^k^e^{r, III, a}ⁿ^d^L^e^e^{H. Ha}^m^iltoⁿ^,^C^o^-^C^h^a^{irs, De}^c^e^m^b^e^r
^{6, 2}⁰⁰⁶^{, Re}^c^o^m^m^e^nda^tion⁴⁴^,^p.^{51, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^ww^.usip.org^/isg^/^ira^q_st^udy^_g^roup^_re^por^t/^re^port/¹²^06/
^ir^a^q_s^tu^dy^_g^r^oup_^r^e^por^t.p^d^f^.

One thing that has changed over time is the strategic intent of the training mission. As the word
“transition” in MNSTC-I’s name suggests, the initial stated goal of MNSTC-I and the ISF
training effort in general was to transition security responsibility to Iraqis. The sooner the Iraqis
were capable of providing security for themselves, the sooner U.S. and other coalition forces ³⁵²
could go home. Accordingly, embedded teams worked with their Iraqi counterparts with a view
to the earliest possible independence of those Iraqi units.
In early 2007, in keeping with the Administration’s New Way Forward strategy and the surge
emphasis on “population security” as a prerequisite for complete transition, the emphasis of the
training and embedding mission shifted. The ultimate goal was still to transition security
responsibility to Iraqis, but the timeline was relaxed. The primary focus, in the near term, would
be working with Iraqi units to help them better provide population security. Working closely with
U.S. counterparts on real-world missions, Iraqi units would be practicing the skills they would ³⁵³
need to operate independently.
Under MNF-I, several key subordinate bodies share responsibilities for training and advising
Iraqi Security Forces and their respective headquarters institutions.
MNSTC-I’s broad mandate is to generate and replenish the ISF, improve their quality, and
support the institutional capacity development of the security ministries—the Ministry of
Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Counter-Terrorism Bureau. Looking forward, U.S.
military officials and outside experts project that MNSTC-I may evolve into a large version of a
typical Office of Security Cooperation, focused on mil-to-mil partnership activities, capacity-³⁵⁴
building in the security ministries, and foreign military sales.
In practice, MNSTC-I shares some of these responsibilities with the Multi-National Corps-Iraq
(MNC-I), the three-star operational command that also reports directly to MNF-I. In working
with the ISF, MNC-I’s focus is operational, managing transition teams that embed with the Iraqi
Army, the Department of Border Enforcement and the National Police, while MNSTC-I’s focus
includes both operational and institutional issues.
Under MNC-I, the Iraq Assistance Group (IAG), a one-star command created in February 2005,
is the “principal coordinating agency for the Iraqi Security Forces” within MNC-I. Originally, the
IAG “owned” the transition teams that embed with Iraqi units, but a major change was made in
mid-2007. At that time, transition teams, while still assigned to the IAG, were attached to the
brigade combat teams, also under MNC-I, which were responsible, respectively, for the areas in
which the teams were working. As previous IAG commander Brigadier General Dana Pittard
³⁵²
^In^{his m}^e^m^o^{ir, Am}^ba^ssa^{dor Bre}^m^e^r^prov^ide^s^a^c^l^e^a^r^e^x^a^m^ple^of^t^h^e^e^a^r^ly^f^o^c^u^{s of}^{ISF tra}ⁱ^ning^on^t^r^aⁿ^sitio^{n, c}^iti^ng
^v^e^r^b^a^tⁱ^m^a^m^e^m^o^r^a^ndum^f^r^o^m^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^R^u^m^s^f^e^{ld to him}^s^e^l^f^a^{nd G}^e^ne^r^a^{l A}^b^iz^aⁱ^{d: “}^O^ur^g^o^a^l^s^h^o^u^l^d^be^t^o^r^a^m^p^up^the
^Ira^{qi n}^u^m^b^e^r^{s, try}^{to g}^e^{t so}^m^e^a^d^ditio^na^{l i}ⁿ^te^rna^tⁱ^ona^{l f}^o^rc^e^s^a^{nd f}ⁱ^{nd w}^a^y^s^{to put}^le^{ss stre}^{ss on}^{our f}^o^rc^e^s^{, e}ⁿ^a^b^ling^us
^{to re}^d^u^c^e^the^U.S^.^role^.^T^h^e^f^a^ste^r^the^Ira^qi^f^o^rc^e^s^g^r^o^w^{, the}^low^e^{r the}^pe^rc^eⁿ^ta^g^e^w^{ill be}^of^{U.S. f}^o^rc^e^s^out^of^the^tota^l
^f^o^rces.”^Am^b^a^ssad^o^r^L^.^P^a^u^l^Bre^m^{er III,}^M^y^Ye^ar^{in I}^r^a^q^:^The^S^t^r^ugg^le^to^Bui^l^d^{a F}^u^tur^e^{of H}^o^pe^,^Ne^w^Yo^{rk: S}ⁱ^m^oⁿ
^a^{nd Sc}^h^u^s^t^e^r^,²⁰^06,^p^p^.¹⁶^2.
³⁵³^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^f^r^om^MN^F-^I^,^MN^C^-^I^,^a^nd^MN^ST^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^B^a^ghda^d,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^8.
³⁵⁴^In^terv^iew^s^w^ith^{MNF-I, MNST}^C-I,^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.

explained, the change provided “unity of effort and unity of command in a brigade combat team’s ³⁵⁵
area of operations.”
The IAG continues to serve as the executive agent for transition teams throughout Iraq, ensuring
they have the training and support they need. This includes synchronizing the curricula at the
transition team training sites inside and outside Iraq, providing the teams with equipment and
related training, and supporting the teams’ Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and
Integration (RSOI) as they arrive in Iraq. The IAG also directly supports transition teams working
with three Iraqi headquarters staffs: the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, the National Police
headquarters, and the Department of Border Enforcement headquarters. And the IAG is helping
spearhead the creation of an Iraqi Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps—including training ³⁵⁶
Iraqi NCOs to run a new NCO training course.
Transition teams have been called the “linchpin of the training and mentoring effort.”³⁵⁷ The
teams vary in size, composition and focus, based on the needs of the Iraqi forces they partner with
and the specific local circumstances, but the theory of the case is consistent: the teams
simultaneously “advise, teach, and mentor,” and “provide direct access to Coalition capabilities ³⁵⁸
such as air support, artillery, medical evacuation and intelligence-gathering.” They also provide
continual situational awareness to coalition forces about the status of the ISF.
Transition teams work with units in each of the Iraqi military and police services, with key
operational headquarters, and with the security ministries. Due to resource constraints, coverage
of Iraqi units by training teams has not been one-to-one.
In 2008, as ISF capabilities grew, several shifts were underway, if unevenly across Iraq, in the
focus of the embedded transition teams: from basic skills to more sophisticated capabilities, from ³⁵⁹
lower-level units to higher-level headquarters, and from training to advising.
In general, the embedded advisory effort is highly dynamic—work with any Iraqi unit is expected
to be temporary. According to U.S. military officials, as of fall 2008, the embedded training effort
was far from completed—while many Iraqi units had already “graduated” from the need for
embedded advisors, others Iraqi units had just entered that form of partnership, and other units ³⁶⁰
were still being generated by the Government of Iraq.
³⁵⁵
^U^.^{S. C}^e^ntr^a^l^C^o^m^m^a^nd^P^r^e^s^s^R^e^le^a^s^e^,^“^I^r^a^q^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^G^r^{oup Su}^p^por^ts^t^h^e^Fe^a^t^ur^e^P^e^r^f^or^m^a^nc^e^,^”^Ma^y^{17, 20}^07,
^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^ww^2.c^eⁿ^tc^om^.m^il/^site^s/usc^eⁿ^tc^om^2/Fron^t^P^a^g^e^%^20Storⁱ^e^s^/^th
^I^r^a^q%^20A^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^%^20G^r^oup%²⁰^Su^pp^or^ts^%²⁰^e%2⁰^F^eat^u^r^e%2⁰^P^e^rf^o^r^m^aⁿ^ce.^asp^x^.^T^h^{e IAG}^h^a^{s b}^een^l^e^d^siⁿ^{ce Jun}^e^st
²⁰⁰⁸^by^B^r^ig^a^d^ie^r^G^e^ne^r^a^{l K}^e^{ith W}^a^lke^r^{, A}^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^{t D}^e^puty^C^o^m^m^a^nde^r⁽^O^pe^r^a^tio^ns⁾^f^o^r^the¹^Iⁿ^f^a^ntr^y^Dⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^on.
³⁵⁶^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith I}^A^G^o^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁵⁷^{See Majo}^{r G}^eⁿ^e^{ral Carter Ha}^m^,^“^T^ra^{nsition T}^e^a^m^{’s Role}^{in Ira}^q,”^M^ilitary^Traiⁿⁱ^ng^Te^c^hⁿ^o^lo^gy^,^V^o^l.1²^{, Is}^s^u^e^1,
^A^p^{ril 10,}²⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://^w^w^w^.^m^ilita^r^y^-tra^ining^-^te^c^hnol^og^y^.^c^o^m^/^a^r^tic^le^.cfm^?^D^oc^ID⁼¹⁹⁷²^.^T^h^eⁿ^-MG^H^a^m^st
^w^r^o^t^{e t}^hⁱ^s^pⁱ^{ece w}^hⁱ^l^e^serviⁿ^{g as t}^h^{e Co}^mm^an^dⁱⁿ^g^G^eⁿ^e^ral^,¹^Inf^a^ntry^Divⁱ^{sion, w}^h^ic^{h w}^a^{s a}^s^sigⁿ^e^d^re^spoⁿ^sibi^lity^f^o^r
^p^r^ep^ariⁿ^{g t}^r^an^si^tⁱ^on^t^eam^{s t}^o^serv^{e i}ⁿ^Iraq^aⁿ^d^A^f^gh^anⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^.^L^T^G^H^a^mⁿ^o^w^serv^{es as t}^h^{e Jo}ⁱⁿ^t^S^t^aff^Di^rect^o^r^f^o^r
^O^p^e^r^a^tions⁽^J³⁾^.
³⁵⁸^Ibid^.
³⁵⁹^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^a^{nd s}^u^bor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.
³⁶⁰^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^,^MN^ST^C^-^I^,^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^{nd s}^u^b^o^r^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.

For Ministry of Interior forces, the Department of Defense reported that as of August 2008, there
were 27 border transition teams (BTTs) working with about two-thirds of Department of Border
Enforcement units at battalion-level or above; and 41 National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs)
which were partnering with about 80% of National Police units at battalion-level or above. For
the Iraqi Police, there were 223 of 266 required Police Transition Teams (PTTs) working with ³⁶¹
Iraqi police at local, district and provincial levels.
The Police Training Team mission is supported by a U.S. Military Police brigade, complemented
by civilian International Police Advisors (IPAs) who provide expertise in criminal investigation
and police station management. The IPA contracts are funded by DOD and managed by the
Department of State. As of August 2008, MNSTC-I noted that about 400 IPAs were deployed in
Iraq, at academies and with some units. Some contemporary observers have suggested—echoing
the CPA’s Ambassador Bremer—that military forces, including MPs, are not optimally suited to ³⁶²
train civilian law enforcement personnel, and have urged the expansion of the IPA program.
Some U.S. military officials, while strongly supporting the IPA program, caution that some IPAs
have more relevant backgrounds than others—a police officer from a relatively quiet U.S. town
with a 30-member police force may not have the background to train and mentor “big city cops” ³⁶³
preparing for a counter-insurgency fight.
Approaches to police training have varied over time, and by U.S. battle space in Iraq. In Anbar
province, for example, Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W), led by the Marines, decided early
in the effort to triple or quadruple the normal size of the embedded PTTs. As one commander
noted, “You need to be able to leave Marines at the police station while others are out on patrol.”
But by mid-2008, based on analysis of 109 police stations, MNF-W concluded that around-the-³⁶⁴
clock PTT presence at the level of the local station was no longer necessary.
In general, by mid-2008, the focus of the police training effort had shifted, in many locations,
from basic policing to the professionalization of the force. As local police mastered basic skills
such as carrying out patrols, PTTs increasingly emphasized higher-end skills, including police
intelligence and forensics. To help with this new focus, for example, in summer 2008, MNF-W ³⁶⁵
brought in experts from the Royal Irish Constabulary.
For Ministry of Defense forces, the Iraqi Navy is supported by a Maritime Strategic Transition
Team (MaSTT) advising the headquarters, and a Naval Transition Team (NaTT) embedded with
³⁶¹
^Se^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q^,”^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰^8,^p.^42.
³⁶²^Se^e^f^o^r^e^x^am^ple^the^R^e^por^{t of}^th^e^I^nde^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^{t C}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on on}^th^e^Se^c^u^r^ity^For^c^e^s^of^I^r^a^{q, Se}^pte^m^be^r^6,²⁰⁰⁷^{, p}^.¹⁸^,
^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^w^w^.c^sⁱ^s^.^org^/^m^e^dia^/^c^s^is^/pubs^/ⁱ^s^f^.pdf^{. T}^h^e^Com^m^is^sⁱ^{on n}^o^te^d:^“^U^{.S. m}^ilita^ry^o^f^fⁱ^c^e^r^s^ra^the^r^thaⁿ
^s^e^{nior c}ⁱ^v^ilia^{n la}^w^eⁿ^f^o^rc^em^eⁿ^{t pe}^rs^onne^{l le}^a^d^the^C^o^a^litio^{n tra}ⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^eff^o^{rt f}^o^{r the}^Ira^qi^Polⁱ^c^e^Se^rv^ic^e^;^this
^a^rra^ng^e^m^eⁿ^{t ha}^{s ina}^d^v^e^rteⁿ^tly^m^a^rg^ina^liz^e^d^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n p}^o^lic^e^a^d^vⁱ^sors^a^{nd l}ⁱ^m^ite^{d the}^ov^e^r^a^{ll e}^f^f^e^c^tiveⁿ^e^{ss of}^the^traⁱ^ning
^an^d^ad^vⁱ^so^ry^eff^o^{rt.” “... T}^h^{e n}^u^m^b^e^{r o}^f^civ^ilianⁱⁿ^terⁿ^atioⁿ^a^{l p}^o^{lice ad}^vⁱ^so^rs^{is in}^s^u^f^fⁱ^ci^en^{t.” DOD ap}^p^a^ren^tly^ag^r^ees—
^a^{nd re}^f^e^{rs to the}^l^o^w^le^v^e^{l of}^f^und^ing^f^o^{r, a}^{nd a}^v^a^ila^bility^of^{, I}^P^A^s^.
³⁶³^Inte^rv^ie^{ws w}^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 20}^08.
³⁶⁴^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^W^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
³⁶⁵^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^ST^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^{nd MN}^F-^I^s^u^bor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.

sailors at the Umm Qasr Naval Base. The Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT) provides
advisory teams to the Iraqi Air Staff, Air Operations Center, and individual squadrons.
For the Iraqi Army, as of September 2008 there were 183 Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) ³⁶⁶
working with Iraqi units from battalion to division level. At the Iraqi division level, the
standard pattern calls a 15-member team led by a Colonel (or equivalent); at the brigade level—a
10-member team led by a Lieutenant Colonel; and at the battalion level—an 11-member team led
by a Major. The teams, though small, include a wide array of specializations—including ³⁶⁷
intelligence, logistics, maneuver trainers, effects, communications, and medical expertise.
The MiTTs—like the PTTs—have varied, over time and by battle space, in number and ³⁶⁸
composition. MNF-W consistently chose to use larger MiTTs—with 30 to 40 people. In some
instances, U.S. Army MiTTs have also been augmented to form larger teams.
In 2008, one major transition in the Iraqi Army training effort was a shift of focus from basic
skills to enablers. MNC-I Commanding General LTG Austin made ISF logistics a top priority. To
that end, MNC-I created Logistics Transition Assistance Teams (LTATs), drawing on Corps
assets, to help jumpstart the development of Iraqi Army logistics capabilities. In mid-2008, U.S.
commanders also stressed the Iraqi Army’s continuing need for combat enablers, such as ISR, and ³⁶⁹
the ability to call forward and adjust fires.
A second major transition was a shift of focus from lower-level to higher-level Iraqi headquarters.
Both U.S. Army- and Marine-led multi-national divisions are shifting some of their advisory ³⁷⁰
efforts to the Iraqi brigade and division level, focusing on leadership and staff organization.
A third transition was the shift, in the rhetoric of U.S. commanders, from “training” to “advising.”
In practice, that can mean decreasing the rank of the members of the embedded U.S. teams, and ³⁷¹
assigning them “liaison” rather than structured training functions.
The methodology for forming the MiTTs and preparing them for their assignments has evolved
significantly over the short duration of the program. Initially, in the push to field trainers quickly,
teams were pulled together from individual volunteers and trained at seven different locations in
the United States, without specific standards.
Subsequently, the Army consolidated a training program for Army, Navy, and Air Force transition ^st
team members, under the auspices of the 1 Infantry Division at Ft. Riley, Kansas. The program
³⁶⁶
^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,^”^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰⁸^{, p}^.⁵¹^.
³⁶⁷^IAG^an^d^o^t^h^e^r^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^{s n}^o^t^{e t}^h^atⁱ^t^w^o^u^l^d^b^e^dⁱ^f^fⁱ^cu^l^t^t^o^st^ream^lⁱⁿ^{e t}^h^{e t}^eam^{s an}^y^f^u^rt^h^e^r,^gi^ven^t^h^ei^r^smal^l^si^{ze an}^d
^the^a^rra^y^o^f^e^x^pe^rtise^the^y^inc^l^ude^.
³⁶⁸^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^W^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^{8. T}^h^e^Ma^rⁱ^ne^s^a^r^g^u^e^tha^t^t^h^is^a^p^pr^oa^c^h^t^o^tr^aⁱⁿⁱ^ng^he^l^p^s
^e^x^plaⁱ^{n the}^s^u^c^c^e^s^s^to^da^te^of^the^“^t^w^o^be^s^t^I^r^a^{qi A}^r^m^y^divⁱ^sⁱ^ons^”^—^the¹^st^and^t^h^{e 7}^th^{, w}^h^ic^{h w}^e^r^e^e^s^ta^blis^he^{d i}ⁿ^A^nba^r
^pr^ov^inc^e^.
³⁶⁹^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^a^{nd s}^u^bor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.
³⁷⁰^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^s^u^b^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^t^e^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^{8. M}^N^F-^W^note^d^t^h^a^t^a^s^e^a^r^ly^a^s^Fe^br^ua^r^y^or^Ma^r^c^h
²⁰⁰^8,^ba^se^{d o}ⁿ^t^h^e^im^prov^e^d^c^a^p^a^b^ilitie^{s of}^the^Ira^qⁱ^A^r^m^y^{, the}^y^wa^nte^d^to^“^d^e^-^MiT^T^,^”^tha^t^{is, w}^ith^dra^w^theⁱ^{r te}^a^m^s,
^f^r^o^m^the^ba^tta^lio^{n a}ⁿ^{d brig}^a^d^e^le^v^e^{l. One}^c^o^m^m^a^nde^{r sa}^{id, “}^I^{t’s tim}^e^{to ta}^k^e^the^traⁱⁿⁱ^ng^w^h^e^e^l^{s off}^of^e^v^e^r^y^t^hing^Ira^qi,
^t^o^get^t^h^em^o^f^f^o^f^t^h^{e d}^rⁱ^v^ewa^y^an^d^on^t^o^t^h^{e st}^reet^.^”
³⁷¹^For^e^x^a^m^ple^,^MN^F-^W^,^le^{d by}^the^Ma^rⁱ^ne^s^,^ha^d^pr^e^v^io^us^ly^a^s^sⁱ^gⁿ^{ed C}^o^l^one^ls^t^o^le^a^d^te^a^m^s^em^b^e^dde^{d w}^{ith I}^r^a^qi
^divⁱ^sⁱ^ons^,^b^u^{t d}^r^o^ppe^d^the^s^eⁿⁱ^or^it^y^{to L}ⁱ^e^u^te^na^{nt C}^o^lo^ne^l.

included 72 days at Ft. Riley, including 12 days of inprocessing and 60 days of training, followed
by a theater orientation at Camp Buehring, Kuwait, and then by further counter-insurgency
training and hands-on equipment training at the Phoenix Academy at Camp Taji, Iraq. The
program sent new team leaders out to the field for a brief visit, at the very beginning of their
training at Ft. Riley, and it solicited “lessons learned” from Transition Team members both mid-
tour and at the end of their tours in Iraq.
While the program of preparation improved markedly, the participants were still individual
volunteers, who could come from any occupational specialty. As one program leader commented,
the curriculum at Ft. Riley includes a measure of “move, shoot, and communicate” skills, as a ³⁷²
refresher for all the “professors and protocol specialists” who volunteer.
The Marine Corps created a separate program to prepare trainers—the Marine Corps Training and
Advisory Group (MCTAG). Its mission is to “coordinate, form, train and equip Marine Corps ³⁷³
advisor and training teams for current and projected operations.” According to a senior Marine
commander in Iraq, the individuals selected for the program are the “first team,” with recent ³⁷⁴
experience in command or in combat jobs such as battalion operations officer.
The majority of MiTTs in Iraq are “external” teams—that is, they come out of the Ft. Riley and
MCTAG systems. However, to help meet demand, about 20% of the MiTTs are “taken out of ³⁷⁵
hide,” or “internal”—that is, their members are pulled from U.S. units already serving in Iraq.
The experiences with providing large-scale training to indigenous security forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan prompted debates within the Department of the Army and DOD more broadly about
likely future requirements to provide such training in general, and, more specifically, the best ³⁷⁶
ways to continue to source the Transition Team mission in Iraq.
In 2008, in addition to the work of embedded transition teams, the practice of “unit partnering”—
that is, a one-to-one matching between a U.S. unit and an ISF unit of similar larger size—grew
substantially. Unit partnering is an opportunity for U.S. units to provide an example of how a
headquarters functions, how decisions are made, and how efforts are coordinated. The “lessons”
are provided by fellow combat units that, like their Iraqi partners, practice the “curriculum” daily.
³⁷²
^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tion^w^{ith tr}^aⁱⁿⁱ^ng^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁷³^Se^e^C^o^r^p^or^a^l^Ma^r^g^a^r^e^t^H^u^g^h^e^s^,^“^U^SMC^For^m^s^MC^TA^G^,^C^ons^oli^d^a^t^e^s^R^e^c^onna^is^s^a^nc^e^T^r^aⁱ^ning^,”^Ma^rin^e^Co^rp^s
^News^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^14,²⁰^07,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^ht^tp:/^/w^w^w^.^m^a^r^ine^s^.^m^il/^m^a^rⁱ^ne^link^/^m^cⁿ²⁰⁰^0.ns^f^/
^a^d98³¹⁵⁶³³^2a⁸¹⁹¹⁸⁵²⁵^6c^b⁶⁰⁰⁶^77a^f³^/2e²^e^e⁹¹^65e^ba^c^f^9a⁸⁵²⁵⁷³⁹⁵⁰⁰⁶⁸^59a^2?^O^p^eⁿ^D^o^c^u^m^e^nt.
³⁷⁴^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith MNF-W}^offⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
³⁷⁵^T^h^e^ba^la^nc^e^v^a^rⁱ^e^s^both^by^a^r^e^a^and^ov^e^r^tim^e^—^f^o^r^e^x^am^ple^,^{in J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^{, i}ⁿ^MN^D^-^C^e^nte^r^{, a}^m^u^c^h^hⁱ^g^h^e^r
^pe^rc^eⁿ^ta^g^e^of^traⁱ^ning^te^am^s^ha^{d be}^eⁿ^“^t^a^k^eⁿ^out^of^hi^de^.”^{In A}^u^g^u^s^{t, in}^its^a^r^e^a^of^re^s^pons^ib^ility^{, MN}^D^-^{B ha}^{d 8}³
^traⁿ^sitio^{n te}^a^m^{s, of}^w^h^ic^{h 53 w}^e^re^e^x^te^rna^l^a^{nd 3}⁰^w^e^re^inte^rna^l^.
³⁷⁶^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^{2008. T}^h^e^“^I^r^a^q”^tr^aⁱ^ning^de^ba^te^ha^s^he^lpe^d^f^u^e^l^a^la^r^g^e^r^{, o}ⁿ^-^g^oing^de^ba^te
^a^bout^s^our^cⁱ^ng^the^f^u^{ll a}^r^r^a^y^of^f^u^tur^e^tr^aⁱⁿⁱ^ng^r^e^qui^r^e^m^e^nts^.^Mos^t^pr^ov^oc^a^tiv^e^l^y^,^A^r^m^y^Lⁱ^e^u^te^na^nt^C^o^lo^ne^{l J}^o^{hn N}^a^g^l
^ha^s^pr^o^pos^e^d^tha^t^t^h^e^A^r^m^y^c^r^ea^te^a^pe^r^m^aⁿ^eⁿ^{t, s}^t^a^nding^A^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^C^o^r^p^s^,^of^20,⁰⁰^{0 c}^o^m^b^a^t^a^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^s^{, to}^de^v^e^{lop t}^h^e
^s^e^c^u^r^ity^f^o^r^c^e^s^o^f^inte^rⁿ^a^tio^na^{l pa}^r^t^ne^r^s^{. T}^h^e^thr^e^e^-^s^t^a^r^-^l^e^d^C^o^r^p^s^w^oul^{d be}^r^e^s^p^onsⁱ^b^le^f^o^r^d^o^c^t^rⁱ^ne^,^t^r^aⁱ^ning^{, a}ⁿ^d
^e^m^ploy^m^e^{nt, a}^{nd w}^oul^d^be^pre^p^a^r^e^d^to^de^pl^oy^a^s^ne^e^d^e^d^.^Se^e^Johⁿ^A^.^Na^g^l^{, “}^I^nstitutio^na^liz^ing^A^d^a^p^ta^tion:^{It’s T}ⁱ^m^e
^f^o^{r a P}^e^rm^an^en^t^A^r^my^A^d^vi^so^{r Co}^rp^s,^{” T}^h^{e F}^u^t^u^re^o^f^t^h^{e U.}^S^.^Mⁱ^lⁱ^t^a^r^y^S^e^ri^es,^Cen^t^{er f}^o^{r a Ne}^w^Ameri^can^S^ecu^ri^t^y^,
^CNA^S^w^e^bsite^http://w^ww^.c^na^s.o^r^g^/^eⁿ^/c^m^s^/^?¹⁴^5.

Many U.S. commanders in Iraq describe unit partnering as the opportunity to “show,” not just ³⁷⁷
“tell.” In August 2008, one commander observed that there was “greater energy from ³⁷⁸
partnering, than from the transition teams.”
While unit partnering became much more widely institutionalized in 2008, the practice had been
used by some U.S. units in the past. In 2007, for example, in the turbulent area of Mahmudiyah ^nd^th
and Yusufiyah south of Baghdad, Colonel Mike Kershaw, Commander of the 2 Brigade of 10 ^th
Mountain Division, tasked his entire field artillery battalion to embed with the 4 Brigade of the ^th
6 Iraqi Army Division and its battalions. The de facto transition team—350 soldiers, staff, and
all of their enablers—was far more robust than a MiTT, and had the added value of providing a
visible example of how a U.S. battalion is organized and functions. The results in terms of Iraqi
operational capabilities were apparently positive. Near the end of the brigade’s tour, COL
Kershaw reported, “We really conduct almost no operations where we do not have Iraqi forces ³⁷⁹
either embedded with us, or where they are in the lead.”
Unit partnering is most common—and the closest “fit”—with the Iraqi Army. In mid-2008, for
example, both Multi-National Division-Center and Multi-National Division-North assigned a ³⁸⁰
brigade to partner with each Iraqi Army division in their respective battle spaces. Some ^st^th
brigades, in turn, such as the 1 BCT of 10 Mountain Division in Kirkuk, assigned one battalion ³⁸¹
to partner with each Iraqi Army brigade. As of mid-2008, across Iraq, some U.S. units were
also partnering with units from other Iraqi security forces—a brigade in Baghdad, for example, ³⁸²
described a growing partnership with the Iraqi police. However, unit partnering is both time-
and personnel-intensive, and in some cases operational requirements have not permitted U.S. ³⁸³
forces to unit-partner with all of the ISF in their battle space.
Like ISF training in general, unit partnering is a dynamic endeavor—it is designed to boost the
capabilities of Iraqi units, and at some stage of improvement a unit’s need for a close partnership
diminishes. As of fall 2008, ISF units had reached quite varied stages of development—some, in
the views of U.S. commanders, were very proficient, while others had just been formed, and the
Government of Iraq has stated the intention to form still others.
More so than the use of embedded teams, unit partnership requires a robust U.S. forces presence,
and it will become more difficult to practice as U.S. forces in Iraq draw down. It seems that U.S.
commanders, in more widely institutionalizing unit partnerships in 2008, decided to make
maximum use of time and presence remaining in Iraq—whatever that might be. As one senior
³⁷⁷
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^a^{nd s}^u^bor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.
³⁷⁸^In^terv^iew^w^ith^{MNC-I su}^b^o^rdⁱⁿ^a^t^{e co}^mman^d^e^{r, A}^u^g^u^{st 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁷⁹^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^P^r^e^s^s^B^rⁱ^e^fⁱ^ng^{, C}^o^lone^{l M}ⁱ^k^e^K^e^r^s^haw^,^P^e^nta^g^{on, O}^c^t^obe^r^5,²⁰^07,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tid=4⁰⁵³^.
³⁸⁰^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^a^{nd s}^u^bor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.^Fo^r^a^de^s^c^rⁱ^pti^oⁿ^of^a^unit^pa^r^t^ne^r^s^hⁱ^p
^w^{ith the}^I^r^a^{qi A}^r^m^y^{, s}^e^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^New^s^B^r^iefⁱ^ng^{, C}^o^lone^{l T}^o^m^J^a^m^e^s^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^22,²⁰⁰⁸^{. C}^O^L^J^a^m^e^s^’^th^rd
^b^rⁱ^g^ad^e,^t^h^e⁴^BCT^o^f^th^{e 3}^Iⁿ^f^a^ntr^y^Dⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on, in}^nor^t^h^e^r^{n B}^a^b^il^pr^ov^inc^e^u^nde^r^MN^D^-^C^e^nte^r^{, e}^s^t^a^blis^he^{d a}^r^o^b^u^s^t^th
^pa^r^t^ne^r^s^hi^{p w}^{ith the}⁸^Iraqⁱ^A^r^my^Di^vi^si^oⁿ^,^wⁱ^t^h^regu^l^a^{r l}^ead^ershⁱ^p^co^nt^act^{s at}^b^rⁱ^g^ad^{e an}^{d d}ⁱ^vi^si^{on l}^e^vel^,ⁱⁿ^addⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ
^{to t}^h^e^w^o^r^k^of^the^em^be^dde^{d MiT}^T^te^am^s^.
³⁸¹^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith 1}^st^BCT^/1⁰^th^M^o^untaⁱ^{n of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.
³⁸²^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith 2}^nd^BCT^/1⁰¹^st^Aⁱ^r^bor^ne^Dⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^on^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
³⁸³^For^e^x^a^m^ple^,^{in A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08,^M^N^D^-^N^o^r^t^{h n}^o^te^d^tha^tⁱ^t^w^ould^be^us^e^f^{ul to e}^x^te^nd^unit^pa^r^t^ne^rⁱ^ng^to^f^o^r^c^e^s^f^r^o^m^the
^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^B^o^r^d^e^r^Eⁿ^f^o^r^c^em^ent,^but^tha^t^ope^r^a^ti^ona^{l r}^e^q^u^ir^e^m^ents^—ⁱ^nc^lu^di^ng^ong^oⁱ^ng^c^o^m^b^a^t^o^p^e^r^a^tionsⁱⁿ^Dⁱ^y^a^la
^a^{nd N}ⁱ^ne^w^a^{h pr}^ovⁱⁿ^c^e^s^—^h^a^d^s^o^f^a^r^m^a^de^tha^t^dif^fⁱ^c^u^lt.

commander noted, “If we partner with the Iraqis for the next six to nine months, then maybe they ³⁸⁴
will be good enough.”
MNF-I noted that as of August 2008, there were about 592,000 assigned members of the Iraqi ³⁸⁵
Security Forces. The Department of Defense reported that as of March 19, 2008, the following
numbers of Iraqi Security Forces, by category, had been “authorized” by the Government of Iraq, ³⁸⁶
“assigned” based on payroll data, and “trained.”
Table 1. Iraqi Security Forces as of September, 2008
^Compo^{nent Authorized}^Assigned^Trained
^{Ministry of the Interior}
^Pol^{ice 327,}³⁸⁰^305,⁷¹³^204,⁴⁰⁴
^{National Pol}^ice^46,7⁰⁷^41,3⁰⁵^52,3⁸²
^{Border Enforce}^ment^47,7⁵⁰^39,2⁹⁴^35,8⁸⁶
^{Total MoI}^421,⁸³⁷^386,³¹²^292,⁶⁷²
^{Ministry of Defense}
^{Army 171,}²²⁵^186,⁹⁵⁷^235,⁶⁰⁶
^{Support Forces}^15,5⁸³^20,0⁶⁶^21,1⁴⁴
^{Air Force}^3,60³^1,98⁸^2,79⁹
^{Navy 3,54}^1,89^1,49⁴
^{Total MoD}^193,⁹⁵⁴^210,⁹⁰⁹^261,⁰⁴³
^Counter-Terr^{orism Bureau}
^{Special Operations}^4,73³^4,15⁹^4,56⁴
^{Total ISF}^620,⁵²⁴^601,³⁸⁰^558,²⁷⁹
^Source:^Depart^{ment of State, “I}^{raq Weekly Status Re}^{port,” December}^{3, 20}^08.
The three categories—authorized, assigned, and trained—are not a continuum. Some of those
“trained” may not currently be “assigned”—on the payroll—for example due to casualties, or
having left the service for other reasons. Further, in some cases the numbers “assigned” have
outstripped the numbers “authorized.” In some cases, this due to hirings at the provincial level not
yet approved at the national level.
The overall numbers of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue to grow, driven by revised estimates
by the Government of Iraq of the forces required to provide security; by provincial-level requests
³⁸⁴
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith U}^.^{S. c}^o^m^m^a^nde^r^unde^r^MN^F-^I^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁸⁵^In^f^o^rm^atioⁿ^f^r^o^m^{MNF-I, A}^u^g^u^{st 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁸⁶^T^h^e^c^h^a^r^{t doe}^{s n}^o^t^inc^l^u^d^e^Mi^nis^t^ry^sta^f^f^.^T^h^e^c^h^a^r^{t a}^l^{so d}^o^e^s^not^r^e^f^l^e^c^{t the}^Fa^c^ilitie^s^P^r^o^t^e^c^tion^Se^r^v^ic^e^(FP^S^),^aⁿ
^a^r^m^e^{d, unif}^o^rm^e^d^s^e^rv^ic^e^w^{ith a}^bout¹⁰^0,⁰⁰^{0 m}^e^m^b^e^r^s^tha^t^pr^ov^id^e^s^c^r^itic^a^l^inf^r^a^s^truc^ture^prote^c^tio^{n f}^o^{r m}ⁱ^nis^t^rie^s^a^nd
^o^t^h^e^{r go}^vern^m^eⁿ^t^o^r^ganⁱ^zatⁱ^oⁿ^s^.^Aⁿ^an^tⁱ^cⁱ^p^at^ed^F^P^S^Ref^o^rm^L^a^wⁱ^s^exp^ect^ed^t^o^dⁱ^rect^t^h^{e con}^s^o^lⁱ^d^atⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e F}^P^S
^unde^r^the^Iⁿ^te^rⁱ^or^Minⁱ^s^t^r^y^,^but^acco^rdⁱⁿ^gl^y^t^o^M^N^S^T^C-I,^t^h^{e c}^oⁿ^s^olⁱ^d^atⁱ^oⁿ^p^r^o^{cess w}^a^{s i}ⁿ^co^m^p^l^e^t^e^a^s^o^f^A^u^gu^st²⁰⁰⁸^.

for more police forces; and by the consolidation of forces from other ministries under the Defense
and Interior Ministries.
MNSTC-I and MNF-I estimate that the ISF numbers are likely to grow further in the future.
According to MNSTC-I in August 2008, the GoI’s target size for the ISF is between 600,000 and ³⁸⁷

650,000, by the end of 2010.

The total numbers of ISF alone provide only a partial gauge of progress toward the broadly
recognized ultimate goal of independent and self-sustaining Iraqi security forces. Recent
qualitative assessments of capabilities and gaps, by current officials and outside experts, provide
a more complete picture.
Both internal and external assessments of the ISF point to growing evidence of demonstrated
operational capabilities, but raise some questions about some institutional capabilities, and thus
about how close Iraqi forces and their oversight ministries are to completely independent and
competent functioning.
Over a year ago, one of the most comprehensive external assessments of the ISF was carried out
by the congressionally mandated Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, led by retired ³⁸⁸
Marine Corps General James Jones (the “Jones Commission”). The commission benefitted
from the participation of many senior leaders with years of experience in policing as well as
military matters, and from spending considerable time in Iraq with the ISF. In its September 2007
Report, the commission concluded, somewhat pessimistically, that “... in the next 12 to 18
months, there will be continued improvement in their [ISF] readiness and capability, but not the ³⁸⁹
ability to operate independently.”
Later that year, retired General Barry McCaffrey concluded that the picture had improved
somewhat, and that the ISF were making operational contributions. He wrote after the trip that
while the Iraqi police were “a mixed bag,” and “much remains to be done” in the Iraqi Army,
³⁸⁷
^In^terview^s^w^ith^M^N^S^T^{C-I o}^f^fⁱ^ci^als,^A^u^gu^{st 2}⁰⁰⁸^.^Iⁿ^its^S^e^p^t^em^b^e^{r 2}⁰⁰⁸^rep^o^r^t^,^{DOD rep}^o^r^ted^t^h^at^th^{e IS}^F^w^a^s
^proje^c^t^e^d^t^o^g^r^ow^to^be^tw^e^eⁿ⁶⁰¹^,00⁰^aⁿ^{d 6}⁴⁶^,⁰⁰⁰^by²⁰¹^{0, se}^e^De^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^De^f^e^nse^,^“^M^e^a^suring^Sta^b^ility^a^nd
^S^ecu^ri^t^yⁱⁿ^Iraq^,^{” S}^e^p^t^em^b^e^{r 2}⁰⁰⁸^,^p.³⁴^.
³⁸⁸^S^ee^The^Re^p^o^r^t^{of t}^h^e^Iⁿ^de^pe^nde^{nt C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^on^the^Se^c^u^r^ity^Fo^r^c^e^s^{of I}^r^aq^,^Se^pte^m^be^r^6,²⁰⁰^{7, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.c^sⁱ^s^.^or^g^/^m^e^dia^/^c^s^is^/p^ubs^/ⁱ^s^f^.pdf^{. T}^h^e^R^e^por^{t w}^a^s^r^e^quir^e^{d by}^the^U^.^{S. T}^r^oo^{p R}^e^a^dⁱⁿ^e^s^s^,^Ve^te^r^a^ns^’^C^a^r^e^,
^K^a^trina^Re^c^o^v^e^r^y^{, a}^{nd Ira}^{q A}^c^c^ounta^b^ility^A^ppropria^tio^ns^A^c^{t of}²⁰⁰^7,^Pu^blic^L^a^w^110-2⁸^{. Se}^c^tⁱ^o^{n 1}³¹⁴^(e^)(2)(A⁾
^man^d^a^ted^{DOD to}^c^o^mm^issioⁿ^an^“in^d^e^p^eⁿ^d^eⁿ^t^p^r^{ivate secto}^r^en^tit^{y” to}^{assess th}^{ree th}ⁱⁿ^{gs: (i) t}^h^{e read}ⁱⁿ^{ess o}^f^th^{e IS}^F
^{to a}^s^s^u^m^e^re^s^pons^ibility^f^o^{r m}^a^inta^ining^th^e^te^rritoria^l^inte^g^r^ity^of^Ir^a^q^{, de}^ny^ing^inte^rna^tⁱ^ona^l^te^rroris^t^s^a^s^a^fe^ha^v^e^n,
^a^{nd br}^ingⁱ^ng^g^r^e^a^t^e^r^s^e^c^u^r^ity^{to I}^r^a^q’^s¹⁸^pr^ov^inc^e^s^{in t}^h^e^ne^x^t¹²^t^o¹⁸^m^onths^,^aⁿ^d^brⁱⁿ^gⁱ^ng^aⁿ^eⁿ^d^{to s}^e^c^t^a^r^iaⁿ
^vⁱ^oleⁿ^c^e^{to a}^c^h^ie^v^e^na^tio^na^{l re}^c^o^nc^ilia^tio^{n; (ii)}^the^traⁱⁿⁱ^ng^{, e}^qui^pp^ing^,^c^o^m^m^a^{nd c}^ontr^o^{l a}ⁿ^{d i}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^c^a^p^a^b^ilitie^s,
^a^{nd l}^o^gⁱ^stic^{s c}^a^p^a^cⁱ^t^y^of^the^ISF;^a^{nd (iii)}^the^lik^e^liho^od^tha^t^{, g}ⁱ^v^eⁿ^the^ISF’s^re^c^o^rd^of^pre^p^a^r^e^dne^ss^{to da}^te^{, f}^o^ll^ow^ing
^y^e^a^r^s^of^tr^aⁱ^ning^a^{nd e}^q^uⁱ^p^p^ing^b^y^U^.^{S. f}^o^r^c^es^{, the}^c^ontⁱⁿ^ue^{d s}^u^pp^or^{t of}^U^.^S.^tr^o^ops^w^oul^{d c}^o^ntrⁱ^but^e^{to t}^h^e^r^e^a^d^ine^s^s
^of^the^{ISF t}^o^f^u^lf^{ill the}^mⁱ^{ssions o}^u^tline^dⁱⁿ^c^l^a^u^se^(i).
³⁸⁹^Ibid^{, p}^.¹²^.

overall, the Iraqi Security Forces were “now beginning to take a major and independent ³⁹⁰
successful role in the war.”
By early 2008, U.S. commanders on the ground in Iraq were describing an operationally
increasingly competent Iraqi force. As one leader with multiple tours in Iraq noted, improved ISF ³⁹¹
capabilities were the single biggest difference between January 2008 and several years earlier.
Operationally, another leader observed, “The Iraqis are holding their ground, responsible for their ³⁹²
own turf.” Every day, at MNC-I’s Battle Update Assessment, Division Commanders described
to the MNC-I Commander operations carried out unilaterally, or with coalition tactical overwatch,
by Iraqi forces.
By fall 2008, U.S. commanders on the ground in Iraq were consistently praising the tactical-level ³⁹³
capabilities of their Iraqi counterparts. The Department of Defense argued in June 2008 that in
operations in Basra, Mosul and Sadr City, the ISF “demonstrated their capability to conduct ³⁹⁴
simultaneous extensive operations in three parts of the country.” One senior commander noted, ³⁹⁵
“They can move themselves around the battlefield.”
Among Iraqis themselves, there appeared to be a range of views concerning the readiness of the
ISF to operate independently. According to MNC-I, Iraqi operational commanders stress that they ³⁹⁶
still want a close partnership with U.S. forces. In August 2008, one Iraqi Army division
commander asserted that the United States should maintain combat forces in Iraq for another five ³⁹⁷
years, to work with Iraqi counterparts. In contrast, according to some U.S. officials, the
perception of some senior Iraqi civilian officials is that the ISF are ready, or very nearly ready, to
maintain security independently. At a press conference in September 2008, seemingly striking a
middle path, Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir noted that the Government of Iraq expects to have
a security force completely able to provide security to the Iraqi people on its own, by 2011 or the ³⁹⁸
beginning of 2012.
In the views of many coalition advisors, the biggest long-term challenges faced by the Iraqi
Security Forces as a whole may be institutional, rather than operational. These include improving
ministerial capacity and effectiveness; clarifying chains of command; and crafting long-term,
integrated force modernization plans for personnel and equipment.
In early fall 2008, MNF-I and MNSTC-I officials stressed the critical importance of civilian
ministerial capacity. The practical challenges of growing and developing the Iraqi force are likely
to continue for many years, they noted. But if the right, able civilian leadership is in place, they ³⁹⁹
will be able to make needed decisions and solve problems as they arise.
³⁹⁰
^G^eⁿ^e^ral^Barr^y^R.^M^c^Ca^ff^re^y,^US^A^(ret⁾^,^“Vⁱ^sⁱ^t^t^o^Iraq^and^Ku^w^aⁱ^t^,⁵^-¹¹^Decem^b^e^r^2007,^A^f^te^r^A^c^ti^{on R}^e^p^o^r^t^,”
^Dece^m^b^{er 1}⁸^,²⁰⁰⁷^.
³⁹¹^C^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion f}^r^om^aⁿ^MN^C^-^I^le^a^d^e^r^{, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁹²^C^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion f}^r^om^aⁿ^MN^C^-^I^le^a^d^e^r^{, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁹³^In^t^e^rvi^e^w^s^wⁱ^t^h^M^N^{C-I o}^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s,^an^d^s^u^bo^rdⁱⁿ^at^{e co}^mm^an^d^e^rs,^Au^gu^st²⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁹⁴^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,^”^J^une²⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁹⁵^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith MNC-I of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^,^A^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
³⁹⁶^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNC-I of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
³⁹⁷^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith I}^r^a^{qi A}^r^m^y^Dⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on C}^o^m^m^a^nde^r^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁹⁸^Minⁱ^ster^o^f^Defen^s^e^A^b^d^al-Qadⁱ^r^{, Mu}^l^ti-Natioⁿ^a^{l F}^o^rce-Iraq^p^r^{ess co}ⁿ^f^eren^{ce, Sep}^t^em^b^e^{r 1}⁰^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
³⁹⁹^In^terv^iew^s^w^ith^{MNF-I an}^d^MN^ST^{C-I o}^f^fⁱ^cials,^A^u^g^u^{st 2}⁰⁰⁸^.

Current de facto chains of command within and among the Iraqi Security Forces reflect the
exigencies of the GoI’s ongoing counter-insurgency (COIN) efforts. To help coordinate the efforts
of the various ISF in given geographical areas, the GoI created regional operations commands ⁴⁰⁰
that report up directly to the office of the Prime Minister. For some observers, the Prime
Minister’s direct access to the operations commands has raised concerns about potential misuse
of the ISF for personal or even sectarian purposes.
In some cases, the operations command arrangements have created tensions with provincial-level
officials, who would ordinarily exercise greater control over some provincial-level security ⁴⁰¹
forces. The arrangements have also created some tensions with parent ministries in Baghdad—
and in particular with the Interior Ministry, which apparently views the operations commands as ⁴⁰²
“MoD-centric.” The commands also create some practical confusion, since units still rely on
their parent organizations for supplies and logistical support. For example, Baghdad is divided
into two area commands: “Karkh” and “Rusafa.” Under each are two Iraqi Army (IA) divisions
and one National Police (NP) division. Each division staff includes representative of the IA, NPs,
and the Iraqi Police. Both IA and NP brigades fall under both IA and NP division headquarters.
U.S. commanders who work closely with these Iraqi units report that this Iraqi experiment with
jointness works well at the tactical level, but becomes complicated when units turn to their ⁴⁰³
respective ministries for support.
Long-term force modernization planning and execution is another challenge for the ISF. The
current force continues to train and prepare for the ongoing counter-insurgency fight against
Sunni and Shi’a extremists. Eventually, it is envisaged that the force will shift into a more typical
division of labor—and train and equip themselves accordingly—in which MoD forces focus
externally, and the Iraqi police, backed up by the National Police, provide domestic security.
For civilian and military leaders of the ISF, one major challenge is balancing near-term security
challenges with long-term requirements. In August 2008, Iraqi ground commanders were focused
completely on the current fight, while senior civilian ministry officials were looking out toward ⁴⁰⁴
the future division of labor. At a press conference in September 2008, Minister of Defense Abd
al-Qadir, speaking about the Iraqi police, stated that “it is their job to protect the citizen and our ⁴⁰⁵
job to protect the frontier.”
⁴⁰⁰
^A^s^{a ru}^l^e^,^t^h^{e op}^eratⁱ^oⁿ^s^c^o^mm^aⁿ^d^s^co^{ver a si}ⁿ^g^l^e^p^r^o^vⁱⁿ^ce.^Aⁿ^excep^tⁱ^oⁿⁱ^s^t^h^{e S}^a^m^a^{rra Op}^eratⁱ^oⁿ^s^Co^mm^an^d^,
^r^e^s^ponsⁱ^b^le^oⁿ^ly^f^o^r^the^cⁱ^t^y^of^Sam^a^r^r^a^{in Sa}^la^{h a}^d^Dⁱⁿ^pr^ov^inc^e^,^w^h^ic^{h w}^a^s^c^r^e^a^t^e^d^{in the}^w^a^k^e^o^f^the^G^o^ldeⁿ
^M^o^squ^e^bo^m^bⁱⁿ^g.
⁴⁰¹^Iⁿ^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^{, MN}^F-^W^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^note^d^tha^t^{in a}^l^A^nba^r^pr^ov^inc^e^,^bot^{h t}^h^e^G^o^v^e^r^nor^a^{nd m}^e^m^b^e^r^s^of^the
^P^r^ov^incⁱ^a^l^C^o^unc^il^w^e^r^e^f^r^us^tr^a^t^{ed by}^theⁱ^r^los^s^of^dir^e^c^t^inf^l^ue^nc^e^,^a^f^te^r^the^A^nba^r^O^p^e^r^a^tions^C^o^m^m^a^{nd w}^a^s
^e^s^ta^blishe^d.^{MND-N re}^porte^d^sim^ila^{r te}^nsio^{ns w}^{ith n}^o^rthe^rⁿ^pr^ovⁱⁿ^c^e^G^o^v^e^r^nor^s^.^A^l^s^o^{in A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08—^a^f^te^r^the
^s^e^em^ing^l^y^s^u^c^c^e^s^sf^{ul ope}^r^a^tio^nsⁱⁿ^Ma^r^c^h^of^tha^t^y^e^a^r^—^t^he^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^or^of^B^a^s^r^a^e^x^pr^e^s^s^e^{d f}^r^us^tr^a^{tion tha}^t^s^e^c^u^r^ity
^c^ontr^o^{l ha}^d^be^eⁿ^ta^k^e^{n a}^w^ay^f^r^o^m^pr^ov^incⁱ^a^l^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^.^Iⁿ^te^r^v^iew^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁴⁰²^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^a^{nd s}^u^bor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.^Iⁿ^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08,^MN^D^-^N^,^f^o^r^e^x^am^ple^,
^note^d^tha^tⁱⁿ^pr^a^c^tic^e^,^the^Nⁱ^ne^w^a^{h O}^p^e^r^a^tio^ns^C^o^m^m^a^{nd de}^fⁱ^nite^ly^c^o^m^m^a^nde^{d I}^r^a^qi^A^r^m^y^f^o^r^c^e^s^{in the}^pr^ov^inc^e^,^b^u^t
^t^h^atⁱ^t^s^rel^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^hi^p^wⁱ^t^h^Mo^{I f}^o^rc^{es was “l}^{ess cl}^ear.^”^In^Bagh^d^a^d^,^sⁱⁿ^{ce t}^h^{e est}^a^b^lⁱ^s^h^m^en^t^o^f^t^h^{e Bagh}^d^a^d^O^p^eratⁱ^oⁿ^s
^C^o^m^m^a^{nd, w}^h^ic^{h f}^o^r^m^a^l^l^y^ha^s^c^o^m^m^a^{nd ov}^e^r^Iⁿ^te^rⁱ^or^Mi^nis^t^r^y^f^o^r^c^e^s^{in B}^a^g^hda^{d, U}^.^{S. c}^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^ha^v^e^r^e^por^te^d
^te^ns^ions^be^tw^e^eⁿ^the^B^O^C^a^nd^th^e^MoI^.
⁴⁰³^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MND-B of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^{st 20}^08.
⁴⁰⁴^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith I}^r^a^{qi A}^r^m^y^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁴⁰⁵^Minⁱ^ster^o^f^Defen^s^e^A^b^d^al-Qadⁱ^r^{, Mu}^l^ti-Natioⁿ^a^{l F}^o^rce-Iraq^p^r^{ess co}ⁿ^f^eren^{ce, Sep}^t^em^b^e^{r 1}⁰^,²⁰⁰⁸^.

By mid-2008, the Iraqi MoD had demonstrated keen interested in buying equipment for a future,
outward-looking force—including tanks and fighter aircraft. Senior U.S. advisors have expressed
concerns about still-nascent Iraqi abilities to effectively identify, fund, and contract for future
requirements. Some add that the approach of some Iraqi officials appears to be based on
traditional “bazaar culture,” in which the goal is getting the lowest price, with little consideration ⁴⁰⁶
for long-term maintenance or interoperability.
Some coalition advisors have noted that one of the greatest challenges for the ISF may be
overcoming lingering sectarianism. The ISF as a whole is one of the most powerful national-level
Iraqi institutions. A resurgence of sectarianism in the ranks could potentially turn key tools of the
Iraqi government—the capabilities of its security forces—into potential threats to the unified ⁴⁰⁷
whole state.
Some Iraqi government officials, in turn, have expressed concerns about the size and scope of the
ISF compared to other Iraqi government institutions. The more resources dedicated to the ISF, the
more powerful the ISF will become, and the fewer resources that will be available for other
government institutions. One provincial Governor added, “I fear the ISF. They are recruiting too ⁴⁰⁸
many people. They are a big draw on the state budget and they have too much power.”
Both the size and the overall capabilities of the Iraqi Army (IA) continue to grow. The
Department of Defense reported that as of August 1, 2008, the Iraqi Army had 153 combat
battalions conducting operations, with an additional 18 battalions currently planned or in force ⁴⁰⁹
generation. MNSTC-I noted that as of August 2008, altogether, the IA had 12 division ⁴¹⁰
headquarters, 49 brigades, and 170 battalions.
In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group provided a very cautious overall assessment of the
Army’s capabilities, noting: “The Iraqi Army is making fitful progress toward becoming a reliable ⁴¹¹
and disciplined fighting force loyal to the national government.” Nine months later, in
September 2007, the Jones Commission noted more positively that the Iraqi Army was
increasingly effective at COIN, and increasingly reliable in general, but that progress among units ⁴¹²
was uneven.
By the end of 2007, coalition commanders in Iraq pointed to further improvements Iraqi Army
operational capabilities. In December 2007, Major General Joseph Fil, the out-going commander
of Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B), commented on the status of the Baghdad
Operational Command, which has responsibility for Baghdad province and the two Iraqi Army
⁴⁰⁶
^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁴⁰⁷^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^{ith c}^o^a^lⁱ^tio^{n a}^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^8.^Se^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^S²²⁰^93,^T^h^{e Ir}^a^qⁱ^S^ecu^ri^t^y^F^o^{rces: T}^h^e
^C^h^a^l^l^e^ng^{e of}^S^ect^a^r^ia^{n an}^d^E^t^hn^{ic I}ⁿ^f^l^u^eⁿ^ces^{, by}^J^e^re^m^y^{M. Sha}^r^p^.
⁴⁰⁸^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith Ira}^{qi pr}^ov^incⁱ^a^l^G^o^v^e^{rnor, A}^u^g^u^{st 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁴⁰⁹^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,^”^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰⁸^{, p}^.³⁶^.
⁴¹⁰^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁴¹¹^Se^e^Ja^m^e^s^A^.^Ba^k^e^{r, III, a}ⁿ^d^L^e^e^{H. Ha}^m^iltoⁿ^,^Co^-C^h^a^irs,^Th^{e I}^r^aq^S^t^u^d^y^Grou^{p R}^e^po^rt^,^Decem^b^e^r⁶^,²⁰⁰⁶^,^p^.¹²^,
^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^ww^.usip.org^/^isg^/^ira^q_st^udy^_g^r^oup^_re^p^ort/^re^por^t/12^06/^ira^q_s^t^udy^_g^roup^_re^p^ort.p^d^f^.
⁴¹²^T^h^{e R}^e^po^rt^o^f^t^h^{e Ind}^e^p^e^nd^en^t^C^o^mmi^ssi^oⁿ^oⁿ^t^h^e^S^ecu^ri^t^y^F^o^{rces o}^f^Iraq^,^Se^pte^m^be^r^{6, 2}⁰⁰⁷^,^p.¹⁴^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.c^sⁱ^s^.^or^g^/^m^e^dia^/^c^s^is^/p^ubs^/ⁱ^s^f^.pdf^.

divisions then under its command. MG Fil noted, “They are making good tactical decisions. They
are planning true operations that involve multiple forces, combined operations that are frequently ⁴¹³
intelligence-driven.” In January 2008, the Commanding General of Multi-National Division-
North (MND-N), noted that the four different Iraqi Army divisions he partnered with were
“growing in size and capacity every day.” He commented, “Where we can’t be, they can be, and ⁴¹⁴
in many cases we’re conducting operations with them.”
By early 2008, some IA units had also developed the ability to move themselves across Iraq. As ^rd^st
part of Operation Phantom Phoenix, the 3 Brigade of the 1 Iraqi Army Division deployed
independently, with less than a week’s notice, from Al Anbar province in the west to Diyala in the ⁴¹⁵
east to support combat operations in the Diyala River Valley. According to MNF-I leaders,
while not as attention-grabbing as combat operations, the move demonstrated a different but very
important set of capabilities that Iraqi units will need to master, to operate independently in the ⁴¹⁶
future.
In August 2008, U.S. commanders noted that most of the IA units that had participated in
operations in Basra, Sadr City, Amarah, Diyala, and Mosul had performed very well at the tactical ⁴¹⁷
level. The Commanding General of Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W), in Anbar province,
using a phrase common among U.S. forces, stated that the IA was not just “Iraqi good enough”—⁴¹⁸
it was “Iraqi very good.”
The list of the major developmental challenges faced by the Iraqi Army—building a strong
leadership cadre, and developing key enablers such as logistics—has remained relatively
consistent over time, although commanders and advisors on the ground point to specific ⁴¹⁹
incremental marks of progress in each area.
Like all the other Iraqi security forces, the Iraqi Army has faced the challenge of quickly
developing a capable leadership cadre. As many U.S. military commanders in Iraq point out, a
basic problem is that leadership abilities depend in part on experience—their production cannot
easily be “accelerated.” The IA’s leadership challenge may be more acute than that faced by the
other security forces, since it is both large and, unlike the Iraqi Police, a nationally based service
whose leaders must be able to command diverse mixes of soldiers in all regions of Iraq.
⁴¹³
^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^N^e^w^s^B^rⁱ^e^fⁱ^ng^{, Ma}^jor^G^e^ne^r^a^{l J}^o^s^e^{ph Fil,}^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^{17, 2}⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tid=4¹⁰⁷^.
⁴¹⁴^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^N^e^w^s^B^rⁱ^e^fⁱ^ng^{, Ma}^jor^G^e^ne^r^a^{l Ma}^r^k^H^e^r^tli^ng^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^{22, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tid=4¹²⁴^.
⁴¹⁵^Se^e^Pre^{ss Brie}^fⁱ^ng^{, L}ⁱ^e^u^te^na^{nt Ge}^ne^ra^{l Ra}^y^Odie^{rno, Ja}ⁿ^u^a^r^y^17,²⁰⁰^{8, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^ww^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/
^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tid⁼⁴¹²²^.
⁴¹⁶^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^ith^MN^F-^I^le^a^d^e^r^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁴¹⁷^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^{nd s}^ubor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁴¹⁸^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith MNF-W}^,^A^u^g^u^{st, 20}^08.
⁴¹⁹^C^onc^e^rⁿⁱ^ng^the^c^o^ns^is^te^nc^y^of^the^c^h^a^lle^ng^e^s^{, s}^e^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^P^r^e^s^s^B^r^ie^fⁱ^ng^{, C}^o^lo^ne^l^H^.^R^.^Mc^Ma^s^t^e^r^,
^S^e^p^t^em^b^e^{r 1}³^,²⁰⁰⁵^,^avai^l^a^b^l^{e at}^h^t^t^p^:^/^/^www^.^d^efen^selⁱⁿ^k.^m^il/^traⁿ^sc^ripts/^traⁿ^sc^ript.a^spx^?^traⁿ^sc^riptid⁼²¹⁰^{6. COL}
^Mc^Ma^s^t^e^r^{, de}^s^c^rⁱ^bing^his^pa^r^t^ne^r^s^{hip w}^{ith I}^r^a^q^A^r^m^y^units^{in T}^a^{l A}^f^a^r^{in Se}^pte^m^be^r^2005,^c^o^m^m^eⁿ^te^{d tha}^t^the^I^r^a^qi
^a^r^m^y^ne^e^d^e^d^“^{... the}^a^b^ility^{to c}^o^m^m^a^{nd a}^{nd c}^o^ntr^o^l^ope^ra^tio^{ns ov}^e^r^wⁱ^de^a^r^e^a^{s ... g}^r^e^a^t^e^r^logⁱ^stic^a^l^c^a^p^a^b^ilitie^{s ...}^m^o^re
^e^x^pe^rieⁿ^c^e^d^a^{nd e}^f^fe^c^tiv^e^le^a^d^e^r^s^h^ip.^...”

In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group pointed out simply that the Iraqi Security Forces lacked ⁴²⁰
leadership. In September 2007, the Jones Commission also noted that the Army was “short of
seasoned leadership at all levels,” and pointed in particular to “marginal leadership at senior
military and civilian positions both in the Ministry of Defense and in the operational ⁴²¹
commands.” In congressional testimony in January 2008, Deputy Assistant Secretary of ⁴²²
Defense Mark Kimmitt indicated that the most important gap was in mid-level leadership—
non-commissioned officers and field grade officers, who are required in far greater numbers than
senior leaders. To help redress the situation, the Iraqi Army launched several initiatives, including
accelerated officer commissioning for university graduates, waivers to time-in-grade or time-in-
service promotion requirements, and recruitment of former Army officers and Non-⁴²³
Commissioned Officers (NCOs). It is possible that it will prove easier to generate leaders “on
paper,” than to accelerate generation of leadership qualities.
In practice, the quality of IA leadership varies somewhat. MND-N noted in August 2008 that the ⁴²⁴
Commanding Generals of the four IA divisions in their area of responsibility were “very good.”
One of the more impressive IA leaders, according to U.S. officials, is Major General Oothman, ^th
the Commanding General of the 8 IA Division, headquartered in Diwaniyah, in Qadisiyah
province. In August 2008, echoing U.S. military counter-insurgency thinking—and helping
institutionalize it in the IA—MG Oothman stated, “Today’s fight is a 360-degree battlefield,” and
explained that “once you clear an area, you have to put in Iraqi Police, the Iraqi Army and ⁴²⁵
coalition forces to hold it.”
On the other hand, MND-B officials noted that leadership selection processes varied in quality. In ^th
August 2008, the newly selected commanding general of the newly formed 17 IA division was a
well-regarded, competent brigade commander—a good choice. But in some other cases, MND-B
officials noted, the choices have been “terrible”—reflections not of competence but of political ⁴²⁶
connections that make the selected leaders “untouchable” by their military chains of command.
Another major challenge to the continued progress of the Iraqi Army is developing key enablers,
ranging from intelligence to logistics—which are absolutely essential to an Army’s ability to ⁴²⁷
operate independently.
In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group pointed out that the Iraqi Army lacked logistics and ⁴²⁸
support to sustain their own operations. Later, in September 2007, the Jones Commission called
⁴²⁰
^Ja^m^e^s^A^.^Ba^k^e^{r, III, a}ⁿ^d^L^e^e^H.^Ha^m^iltoⁿ^,^C^o^-Ch^a^irs,^The^I^r^a^q^St^udy^G^r^o^up^Re^por^t,^Dece^m^b^{er 6}^,²⁰⁰⁶^,^avai^l^a^b^l^{e at}
^http:^//w^w^w^.usⁱ^p.or^g^/^is^g^/ir^a^q_s^tud^y^_^g^r^oup^_r^e^por^t^/^r^e^por^t/¹²⁰^6/^ir^a^q_s^tudy^_g^r^oup^_r^e^p^or^t.^pdf^.
⁴²¹^R^e^por^t^of^the^Iⁿ^de^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^{t C}^o^m^m^issⁱ^{on o}ⁿ^t^h^e^Se^c^u^r^ity^For^c^e^s^of^I^r^a^{q, Se}^p^t^e^m^be^r^{6, 20}⁰⁷^{, p}^.¹⁴^aⁿ^{d p.}^{9, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.c^sⁱ^s^.^or^g^/^m^e^dia^/^c^s^is^/p^ubs^/ⁱ^s^f^.pdf^.
⁴²²^Ma^rk^Kim^m^{itt, Te}^sti^m^on^y^{to the}^House^A^r^m^e^{d Se}^rv^ic^e^s^Com^m^itte^e^,^Ja^nua^ry^{17, 2}⁰⁰⁷^.
⁴²³^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,^”^J^une²⁰⁰⁸^,^p.5¹^.
⁴²⁴^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith MND-N, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁴²⁵^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith MG}^Oothm^a^{n, Aug}^u^{st 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁴²⁶^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith MND-B of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁴²⁷^Vⁱ^rt^ua^lly^e^v^e^r^y^f^a^m^ous^m^ilita^r^y^c^o^m^m^a^nde^{r in hist}^ory^ha^s^m^a^de^note^of^the^c^r^uc^ia^{l role}^of^logⁱ^stic^s—som^e^o^f^the^m
^quite^m^e^m^o^ra^bly^.^A^l^e^x^a^nde^{r the}^G^r^e^a^{t is c}^r^e^d^ite^{d w}^{ith o}^b^se^rv^ing^,^“^M^y^logⁱ^stic^ia^{ns a}^r^e^a^hum^or^ous^lot—^the^y^k^now^tha^t
^if^m^y^c^a^m^pa^ig^{n fa}^{ils, the}^y^a^r^e^the^fⁱ^{rst one}^{s I w}^{ill sla}^y^.”
⁴²⁸^Ja^m^e^s^A^.^Ba^k^e^{r, III, a}ⁿ^d^L^e^e^H.^Ha^m^iltoⁿ^,^C^o^-Ch^a^irs,^The^I^r^a^q^St^udy^G^r^o^up^Re^por^t,^Dece^m^b^{er 6}^,²⁰⁰⁶^,^avai^l^a^b^l^{e at}
^http:^//w^w^w^.usⁱ^p.or^g^/^is^g^/ir^a^q_s^tud^y^_^g^r^oup^_r^e^por^t^/^r^e^por^t/¹²⁰^6/^ir^a^q^_^s^tudy^_g^r^oup_^r^e^por^t.p^d^f^.

logistics the Army’s “Achilles’ heel,” and observed: “The lack of logistics experience and
expertise within the Iraqi armed forces is substantial and hampers their readiness and ⁴²⁹
capability.” The Commission further concluded that the Army would continue to rely on
coalition forces for combat support and combat service support—though the Commission did not
estimate for how long that reliance would continue.
Testifying before Congress in January 2008, then-MNSTC-I Commander LTG Dubik agreed that ⁴³⁰
the Army “... cannot fix, supply, arm or fuel themselves completely enough at this point.” As of
March 2008, the Army was able to feed itself—a key component of life support. As of June 2008,
the Army’s maintenance backlog continued, but the backlog had been “stabilized” and the IA had ⁴³¹
better visibility than previously on what needs to be repaired. As of August 2008, the IA was
continuing to develop a national-level maintenance and supply system, including the new
National Depot at Taji, to serve as the “centerpiece” for national supply and maintenance
services. The Depot is scheduled to be completed by mid-2009—a target date that has slipped ⁴³²
several times.
In June 2008, MNC-I Commanding General Lieutenant General Austin confirmed that the IA still
had substantial room for improvement:
^T^h^er^{e ar}^e^{still so}^m^e^thⁱⁿ^g^s^t^h^{at n}^eed^to^b^e^d^oⁿ^{e, an}^d^th^o^s^{e th}ⁱⁿ^g^sⁱⁿ^clu^d^{e d}^e^v^e^lo^pⁱⁿ^g^co^m^b^a^t
^en^ab^ler^s^th^a^t^w^{ill e}ⁿ^ab^{le th}^e^m^to^d^o^thⁱⁿ^g^s^li^k^e^{call f}^o^r^an^d^a^d^j^u^{st f}ⁱ^r^e^{s a}ⁿ^dⁱⁿ^te^g^r^{ate th}^o^s^e
^fⁱ^resⁱⁿ^t^o^t^h^ei^r^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^support^t^h^e^m^s^e^l^v^{es l}^o^gⁱ^s^tⁱ^cal^l^y^,^u^s^e^t^h^ei^{r o}^w^{n i}ⁿ^t^e^l^lⁱ^g^eⁿ^ce,
^su^r^v^eillaⁿ^{ce a}ⁿ^d^r^ecoⁿⁿ^ais^s^an^{ce asset}^s^to^cr^{eate i}ⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^c^{e an}^d^t^h^eⁿ^b^e^ab^le^to^u^s^{e t}^h^at⁴³³
ⁱⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^{ce to}^p^l^an^o^p^e^r^a^tioⁿ^s^{. So}^th^er^e’^s^so^m^e^w^o^r^k^to^b^e^d^oⁿ^e^y^e^t.
Iraqi counterparts agree with this assessment. In August 2008, MG Oothman stated flatly, “I see
no progress in logistics.” He explained that the Iraqi Army started building its forces by
concentrating first on operations, not on logistics or other enablers, such as repairing ⁴³⁴
HMMWVVs, or providing spare parts, or building military hospitals.
As of August 31, 2008, the Iraqi Air Force had 1,971 personnel on its payrolls, up from 1,300 in ⁴³⁵
March 2008, out of 3,433 authorized personnel. According to MNSTC-I, the plan is for the Air ⁴³⁶
Force to grow to 6,000 personnel by December 2009.
⁴²⁹
^R^e^por^t^of^the^Iⁿ^de^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^{t C}^o^m^m^issⁱ^{on o}ⁿ^t^h^e^Se^c^u^r^ity^For^c^e^s^of^I^r^a^{q, Se}^p^t^e^m^be^r^{6, 20}⁰⁷^{, p}^.¹⁴^aⁿ^{d p.}¹³^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble
^a^t^http^://w^w^w^.^c^sⁱ^s^.^org^/^m^e^dia^/^c^s^is^/pubs^/ⁱ^s^f^.pdf^.
⁴³⁰^Lⁱ^e^u^te^na^{nt G}^e^ne^ra^{l Ja}^m^e^{s Dubik}^,^te^stim^on^y^be^f^o^re^the^House^A^r^m^e^{d Se}^rv^ic^e^s^Com^m^itte^e^,^W^a^shing^t^{on, D}^.^C.,
^J^a^nua^r^y^{17, 20}⁰⁸^.
⁴³¹^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,^”^J^une²⁰⁰⁸^,^p.5¹^.
⁴³²^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,^”^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰⁸^{, p}^.³⁸^.
⁴³³^{See DOD Ne}^w^s^Brie^fⁱⁿ^g^{, LTG}^Au^stin^,^Juⁿ^e²³^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸^,^h^t^t^p^://w^ww^.^d^ef^en^selin^k^.^m^il/tran^scrip^t^s/
^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tⁱ^d⁼⁴²⁴^8.
⁴³⁴^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith MG}^O^o^thm^a^{n, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.^MG^O^o^thm^a^{n te}^lls^a^s^t^or^y^a^{bout t}^h^e^c^ons^e^q^ue^nc^e^s^of^the^la^c^k^of
^m^ilita^r^y^hos^pita^ls^{: D}^u^ri^ng^m^ilita^r^y^ope^ra^tions^{in a}^l^K^u^t,^a^g^aⁱ^ns^{t Shi}^’^a^e^x^trem^is^t^m^ilitia^s^,^a^y^oung^A^r^m^y^Lⁱ^e^u^te^na^{nt w}^a^s
^w^ounde^{d i}ⁿ^t^h^e^fⁱ^g^h^{t. H}^e^w^a^s^s^e^nt^{to t}^h^e^loc^a^l^c^o^m^m^unity^hos^pita^{l i}ⁿ^a^l^K^u^t^.^But^the^loy^a^ltie^s^of^tha^t^hos^pi^ta^{l s}^t^a^f^f^w^e^re
^a^ppa^r^e^ntly^{not w}^{ith t}^h^e^na^ti^ona^{l g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt. T}^h^ey^pic^k^e^d^up^the^Lⁱ^e^u^te^na^{nt a}ⁿ^d^put^him^on^the^f^l^oor^,^w^{ithout tr}^e^a^tⁱⁿ^g
^him^,^s^o^tha^t^t^h^e^y^c^{ould te}ⁿ^d^t^o^a^w^ounde^{d m}^ilitia^m^e^m^b^e^r^{. T}^h^e^Lⁱ^e^u^te^na^nt^die^d^.
⁴³⁵^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^,^“^I^r^a^{q W}^e^ekly^Sta^t^us^R^e^por^t,”^Se^pte^m^be^r¹⁷^,²⁰⁰^8.

As of August 2008, the small Iraqi fleet included 74 aircraft: 16 UH-1HP “Huey-II” helicopters
and 15 Ukrainian Mi-17 helicopters for battlefield mobility; 3 C-130E “Hercules” aircraft and 1
King Air 350 light transport aircraft, for airlift; 3 Cessna Grand Caravans, 8 CH-2000 aircraft,
and 2 King Air 350’s for ISR; and 8 Cessna 172’s, 3 Cessna 208’s, 5 Bell Jet Rangers and 10 OH-

58A/C’s for training. The Iraqi Air Force plans to have a fleet of 123 aircraft by December ⁴³⁷

2009.

By any measure, the Iraqi Air Force is still a fledgling institution in the early stages of recruiting,
training, and development. The effort to develop the Iraqi Air Force in earnest began at the start
of 2007, and coalition advisors note that it takes three to five years to train pilots, air traffic
controllers, and maintenance personnel—longer than it takes to train ground forces.
The initial—and exclusive—focus of Iraqi Air Force training was counter-insurgency, including
first of all battlefield mobility. In September 2007, the Jones Commission assessed that the Air
Force was “well designed as the air component to the existing counterinsurgency effort, but not ⁴³⁸
for the future needs of a fully capable air force.” By August 2008, MNSTC-I noted that Air
Force training had expanded to include “kinetic air to ground attack capability,” and ISR ⁴³⁹
capabilities.
In August 2008, the Iraqi Air Force was flying about 230 sorties per week, up from about 150
sorties per week one year earlier. The number had fallen slightly from a peak of over 300 sorties
per week, in April and May of 2008, due to a combination of weather, sustainment challenges, ⁴⁴⁰
and the grounding of Cessna 172s used for training.
In 2008, regular Air Force training was augmented by real-world experience supporting Iraqi
Army operations. During the Basra operations in March 2008, the Iraqi Air Force flew 353
missions, transporting personnel and cargo, dropping leaflets providing information to the local ⁴⁴¹
population, and helping provide ISR.
An open question for the future is what sort of air force—with what capabilities, personnel, and
equipment—the Iraqi Ministry of Defense will determine it needs, to meet its full spectrum of
security requirements. In February 2008, then-Commander of the Coalition Air Force Transition
Team, Air Force Major General Robert Allardice, noted that like all of Iraq’s MoD forces, the
Iraqi Air Force is eventually expected to turn its attention to external threats. The final stage of
development would include the use of jet aircraft to defend Iraq’s air space. He estimated that
Iraqis could have a self-sustaining Air Force with that capability “in about the 2011 or 2012 ⁴⁴²
timeframe,” depending on the investments they make.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
⁴³⁶^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁴³⁷^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I, A}^u^g^u^{st 20}^08.
⁴³⁸^R^e^por^t^of^the^Iⁿ^de^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^{t C}^o^m^m^issⁱ^{on o}ⁿ^t^h^e^Se^c^u^r^ity^For^c^e^s^of^I^r^a^{q, Se}^p^t^e^m^be^r^{6, 20}⁰⁷^{, p}^.^9,¹⁵^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.c^sⁱ^s^.^or^g^/^m^e^dia^/^c^s^is^/p^ubs^/ⁱ^s^f^.pdf^.
⁴³⁹^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁴⁴⁰^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁴⁴¹^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,^”^J^une²⁰⁰⁸^,^pp.^56-^7.
⁴⁴²^B^r^ig^{. G}^e^{n. R}^obe^r^t^R^.^A^lla^r^d^ic^e^,^C^ounc^il^oⁿ^F^o^r^e^ig^{n R}^e^la^tio^ns^{, i}ⁿ^t^e^r^v^iew^b^y^G^r^eg^B^r^uno,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{5, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{, a}^udi^o
^ta^pe^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http:^//w^w^w^.cf^r^.or^g^/public^a^tⁱ^on/¹⁵⁴²^1/^a^lla^r^d^ic^e^.^ht^m^l^?^b^r^e^a^d^c^r^um^b=^%²^Fr^e^g^ion%^2F405%^2Fir^a^q^.

Other senior U.S. officials have raised questions about the capabilities that a future, externally
focused Iraqi Air Force might really need. One official suggested that air defense capabilities may
be more important than fighter aircraft. One challenge, he added, is that Iraqi Air Force senior ⁴⁴³
leaders are former fighter pilots eager to have a fleet of fighter aircraft.
A number of senior U.S. officials point out that most senior Ministry of Defense officials have an
Army background—the Minister of Defense himself is a former tanker. That background,
officials argue, together with the exigencies of the ongoing COIN fight, leaves them with
relatively little time and attention for guiding the long-term development of their air and maritime ⁴⁴⁴
services.
Like the Iraqi Air Force, the Iraqi Navy is still in the early stages of development. As of August ⁴⁴⁵

31, 2008, the Iraqi Navy included 1,907 assigned personnel, of 2,708 authorized. That number ^nd

includes 499 former Iraqi Army soldiers, who joined the Iraqi Navy to form the 2 Iraqi Navy
Marine Battalion. The small Navy is based primarily in the southern port city of Umm Qasr, and
includes an operational headquarters, one squadron afloat, one support squadron, and two ⁴⁴⁶
battalions of Marines.
The missions of the Iraqi Navy as a whole include protecting Iraq’s coastline and offshore assets.
One of the Marine battalions provides port security at Um Qasr and Az Zubayr. The other Marine
battalion provides oil platform security and conducts vessel boarding and search and seizure. As
of July 2008, the Iraqi Navy was conducting a total of 42 patrols per week. As of August 2008,
the fleet included 15 vessels—5 small patrol boats, and 10 fast assault boats. The Iraqi Navy ⁴⁴⁷
expects to acquire an additional 21 vessels in 2009-2010.
In December 2008, the Iraqi Navy spearheaded an early mil-to-mil partnership with one of Iraq’s ⁴⁴⁸
neighbors—joint patrols with counterparts from Kuwait.
One challenge the Iraqi Navy faces, according to MNSTC-I officials, is conducting the
preparations required to more than double its fleet—ensuring that the infrastructure is in place,
and the proper training conducted.
A longer-term challenge for the Iraqi Navy, and the MoD, is crafting a realistic and appropriate
“future force vision” for the Navy. U.S. advisors note that, like the Air Force, the Navy faces the
challenge of working for a Ministry that does not see their Service as a high priority, and that may
not be “sophisticated enough” to define requirements and build a Navy. Iraqi Navy officials
⁴⁴³
^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith MNF-I of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{, Aug}^u^{st 2}⁰⁰⁸^{. T}^h^eⁱⁿ^itia^{l i}ⁿ^te^re^{st e}^x^pre^sse^{d by}^Ira^{qi MoD}^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s in}^F-16’s,ⁱⁿ
^su^{mmer 2}⁰⁰⁸^,^seem^ed^t^o^ref^l^ect^t^hⁱ^s^p^e^rsp^ectⁱ^v^e.
⁴⁴⁴^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁴⁴⁵^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^,^“^I^r^a^{q W}^e^ekly^Sta^t^us^R^e^por^t,”^Se^pte^m^be^r¹⁷^,²⁰⁰^8.
⁴⁴⁶^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,^”^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰⁸^{, p}^.⁵⁴^.
⁴⁴⁷^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁴⁴⁸^“^Ira^{q, Kuw}^a^{it on J}^oⁱⁿ^t^P^a^tro^l^s,”^Wa^shⁱⁿ^gt^on^Po^st^,^Decem^b^e^{r 3}^,²⁰⁰⁸^.

themselves are reportedly eager to continue working with coalition advisors, and do not want to ⁴⁴⁹
build a force that would be likely to lead them into conflict.
Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) were an early priority for Iraqi and coalition forces ⁴⁵⁰
leaders. As of August 31, 2008, ISOF included 4,043 assigned personnel, of 4,733 authorized.
As of August 2008, the single ISOF brigade included one counter-terrorism battalion and five
commando battalions, as well as support units. Four regional commando battalions are currently ⁴⁵¹
in generation, to be based in Basra, Mosul, Diyala, and Al Asad.
According to both U.S. commanders in Iraq and outside assessments, the ISOF are extremely ⁴⁵²
competent. Since ISOF’s inception, the selection process has reportedly been very competitive, ⁴⁵³
and training—conducted by U.S. SOF—highly demanding. In September 2007, the Jones
Commission reported, “The Special Operations brigade is highly capable and extremely ⁴⁵⁴
effective.” In August 2008, a senior MNSTC-I official confirmed, “ISOF is very capable, and ⁴⁵⁵
increasingly so.”
ISOF has its own chain of command, separate from the Ministry of Defense. It reports to the
Counter-Terrorism Command (CTC), an operational-level command that reports, in turn, to the
Counter-Terrorism Bureau (CTB), the ministerial-level body under the Prime Minister that sets
policy. Although this is not an uncommon arrangement in the region, one possible issue for Iraqi
leaders in the future will be ensuring adequate integration of the ISOF and Iraqi conventional
forces. Other observers have expressed concern that the ISOF, despite its several layers of
headquarters, might be used by the Prime Minister for personal or political ends.
Looking ahead, the next practical challenges for the ISOF include continuing to improve its
capabilities. U.S. advisors note that the ISOF is eager to have access to the assets they have seen
U.S. SOF counterparts employ, including specialized rotary air assets, ISR, and signals
intelligence (SIGINT). One official noted in August 2008, “They’re more conscious than others ⁴⁵⁶
of how much they need US enablers.”
The Iraqi Police Service includes three categories—patrol police, station police, and traffic police.
All are based on the principle of local recruitment and local service. The GoI’s broad future
vision is that the Iraqi Police (IPs) will eventually assume responsibility for providing internal
⁴⁴⁹
^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁴⁵⁰^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^,^I^r^a^{q W}^e^ek^ly^Sta^t^us^R^e^por^{t, Se}^p^t^e^m^be^r^{17, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁴⁵¹^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁴⁵²^C^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^f^r^om^MN^C^-^I^le^a^d^e^r^s^a^{nd D}ⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^C^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^2008.
⁴⁵³^Se^e^f^o^r^e^x^am^ple^Monte^Morⁱ^n,^“^T^ur^ning^I^r^a^{qi R}^e^c^r^uits^int^o^C^o^m^m^a^ndos^,”^St^a^{rs an}^{d S}^t^rip^e^s^{, Ma}^r^c^{h 1}⁴^,²⁰^06.
⁴⁵⁴^R^e^por^t^of^the^Iⁿ^de^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^{t C}^o^m^m^issⁱ^{on o}ⁿ^t^h^e^Se^c^u^r^ity^For^c^e^s^of^I^r^a^{q, Se}^p^t^e^m^be^r^{6, 20}⁰⁷^{, p}^.¹⁶^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.c^sⁱ^s^.^or^g^/^m^e^dia^/^c^s^is^/p^ubs^/ⁱ^s^f^.pdf^.
⁴⁵⁵^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{, A}^u^g^u^{st 20}^08.
⁴⁵⁶^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.

security, backed up by the National Police, while the Iraqi Army turns its focus toward external
security challenges.
As of August 31, 2008, 298,369 Iraqi Police (IPs) were assigned, of 330,880 authorized. At that ⁴⁵⁷
date, 196,781 personnel had been trained, leaving a training backlog of over 100,000. (The
backlog could be greater, since not all of those trained are necessarily still serving as IPs.) The
backlog has real-world implications—for example, a shortage of IPs, in August 2008, to help
“hold” areas of Diyala province that had been cleared by Iraqi and coalition forces. As one senior ⁴⁵⁸
U.S. official noted, “We’ve overwhelmed the system.”
According to MNSTC-I, the GoI intent is to catch up on the training backlog by July 2009. One
approach has been to condense required training into a shorter period—the 240 hours of IP
training usually take eight weeks but have been compressed into four weeks. In addition, recruits ⁴⁵⁹
who already have a degree in another field are offered an accelerated process.
In terms of IP capabilities, in September 2007, the Jones Commission concluded that the IPs were
improving at the local level, particularly when the IPs were locally recruited from relatively ⁴⁶⁰
ethnically homogenous neighborhoods. In December 2007, General McCaffrey similarly
observed that “many local units are now effectively providing security and intelligence ⁴⁶¹
penetration of their neighborhoods.”
In early 2008, a number of U.S. military commanders in Iraq described recent examples of
specific operations planned and carried out in their areas of responsibility by Iraqi Police,
stressing that these capabilities to plan and act independently—and successfully—had emerged
relatively recently. Commanders also stressed the importance of the visible presence of the IPs at
police stations and on patrol in local neighborhoods, and together with Iraqi Army and coalition ⁴⁶²
forces at joint security stations, in helping provide population security.
By early fall 2008, U.S. commanders noted that in general, the IPs were competent in basic
skills—enough that the focus of embedded training and advisory efforts, and unit partnering, was ⁴⁶³
shifting from basic policing skills to the professionalization of the force. In Baghdad, the GoI
and MND-B were in the process of handing over security responsibility, neighborhood by
neighborhood, to the IPs. As one U.S. commander observed in August 2008, using common ⁴⁶⁴
coalition parlance, the IPs are “Iraqi good enough.”
⁴⁵⁷
^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^,^I^r^a^{q W}^e^ek^ly^Sta^t^us^R^e^por^{t, Se}^p^t^e^m^be^r^{17, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁴⁵⁸^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁴⁵⁹^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁴⁶⁰^R^e^por^t^of^the^Iⁿ^de^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^{t C}^o^m^m^issⁱ^{on o}ⁿ^t^h^e^Se^c^u^r^ity^For^c^e^s^of^I^r^a^{q, Se}^p^t^e^m^be^r^{6, 20}⁰⁷^{, p}^.^9,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.c^sⁱ^s^.^or^g^/^m^e^dia^/^c^s^is^/p^ubs^/ⁱ^s^f^.pdf^.
⁴⁶¹^G^eⁿ^e^ral^Barr^y^R.^M^c^Ca^ff^re^y,^US^A^(ret⁾^,^“Vⁱ^sⁱ^t^t^o^Iraq^and^Ku^w^aⁱ^t^,⁵^-¹¹^Decem^b^e^r^2007,^A^f^te^r^A^c^ti^{on R}^e^p^o^r^t^,”
^Dece^m^b^{er 1}⁸^,²⁰⁰⁷^.
⁴⁶²^Inf^o^rm^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^U^.^{S. c}^o^m^m^a^nde^rs^{, J}^a^nua^ry^2008.^In^one^e^x^a^m^pl^e^,^the^loc^a^l^I^P^c^o^m^m^a^nde^{r brie}^f^e^{d the}^m^u^lti-
^na^tio^na^{l div}ⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^c^o^m^m^a^nde^rⁱⁿ^d^e^ta^{il on}^the^I^P^s^’^plaⁿ^s^f^o^r^t^h^e^u^p^c^o^mⁱ^ng^A^s^hur^a^holi^d^a^y^{. T}^h^e^plaⁿ^s^inc^l^u^d^e^d^s^o^m^e
^c^o^a^litio^{n ISR a}^sse^ts—re^que^ste^d^a^t^theⁱⁿ^itia^te^of^the^I^P^s^.
⁴⁶³^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^,^MN^C^-^I^,^a^{nd MN}^ST^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^{nd s}^u^b^o^r^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁴⁶⁴^In^terv^iew^w^ith^{MNC-I su}^b^o^rdⁱⁿ^a^t^{e co}^mman^d^e^{r, A}^u^g^u^{st 2}⁰⁰⁸^.

For their part, in early fall 2008, Iraqi Army commanders recognized the importance of the IPs as
part of the total effort, but still had some doubts about their capabilities. As one IA commander
observed, “Without coordination between the IA and the IPs, there would be no security. But,” he ⁴⁶⁵
added, “the soldiers are more effective than the police.”
One long-standing concern of practitioners and observers, still unresolved, is infiltration of the
IPs. In September 2007, the Jones Commission noted that the IPs were “... incapable today of
providing security at a level sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and
sectarian violence,” in part because they were “compromised by militia and insurgent ⁴⁶⁶
infiltration.” In June 2008, DOD stated that “militia and criminal intimidation and influences” ⁴⁶⁷
were among the serious challenges still faced by the IPs. In August 2008, U.S. military officials ⁴⁶⁸
confirmed that “there’s some terrorist and some nationalist infiltration” of the IPs.
The Iraqi National Police (NPs), unlike the IPs, are intended to be a national asset, not a
regionally based one. While they initially focused on Baghdad, the Interior Ministry’s plan is that
the NPs will “regionalize,” eventually establishing a presence in every province, where they will ⁴⁶⁹
provide backup for the IPs. DOD reported in June 2008 that Prime Minister Maliki had ⁴⁷⁰
directed the formation of a new, third NP division, to be based in Salah ad Din province. As of
early fall 2008, the NPs were still generally based in Baghdad, under the Baghdad Operations
Command.
The Department of Defense reported that as of July 31, 2008, 44 NP battalions were operational,
of which 13 were judged to be “capable of planning, executing, and sustaining operations with ⁴⁷¹
coalition support.” As of August 31, 2008, there were 41,829 National Police assigned, of

46,707 authorized. Somewhat confusingly, 52,382 National Police had been trained—this number ⁴⁷²

may include some who were removed from service or are no longer serving for other reasons.
Particularly in their early days, the NPs more consistently prompted concerns about competence,
corruption, and sectarian bias, than any other Iraqi security force. In June 2007, out-going
MNSTC-I Commander Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey testified to Congress that the NPs ⁴⁷³
were “the single organization in Iraq with the most sectarian influence and sectarian problems.”
In September 2007, the Jones Commission stated flatly: “The National Police have proven
⁴⁶⁵
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith I}^r^a^{qi div}ⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁴⁶⁶^R^e^por^t^of^the^Iⁿ^de^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^{t C}^o^m^m^issⁱ^{on o}ⁿ^t^h^e^Se^c^u^r^ity^For^c^e^s^of^I^r^a^{q, Se}^p^t^e^m^be^r^{6, 20}⁰⁷^{, p}^.¹⁸^,1^0,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.c^sⁱ^s^.^or^g^/^m^e^dia^/^c^s^is^/p^ubs^/ⁱ^s^f^.pdf^.
⁴⁶⁷^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,^”^J^une²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁴⁶⁸^In^terv^iew^w^ith^{MNC-I su}^b^o^rdⁱⁿ^a^t^{e co}^mman^d^e^{r, A}^u^g^u^{st 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁴⁶⁹^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^ST^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁴⁷⁰^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,^”^J^une²⁰⁰⁸^,^p.4⁵^.
⁴⁷¹^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,^”^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰⁸^{, p}^.⁴⁴^.
⁴⁷²^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^,^“^I^r^a^{q W}^e^ekly^Sta^t^us^R^e^por^t,”^Se^pte^m^be^r¹⁷^,²⁰⁰^8.
⁴⁷³^Lⁱ^e^u^te^na^{nt G}^e^ne^r^a^{l Ma}^r^{tin D}^e^m^p^s^e^y^,^te^s^tⁱ^m^ony^{to the}^H^ous^e^A^r^m^e^{d Se}^r^v^ic^e^s^C^o^m^m^itte^e^,^Subc^om^m^itte^e^on
^O^v^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^{t a}^{nd I}ⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^tions^{, J}^uⁿ^e^12,²⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^u^dio^tr^aⁿ^s^c^rⁱ^pt^a^v^a^ilable^a^t^ht^tp:/^/w^w^w^.hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ha^s^c^/
^he^a^r^ing^_^inf^o^rm^a^tion.shtm^l.

operationally ineffective. Sectarianism in its units undermines its ability to provide security; the ⁴⁷⁴
force is not viable in its current form.”
Outside experts suggested several possible remedies. The Iraq Study Group recommended
moving the NPs from the Interior Ministry to the Ministry of Defense, and giving them closer ⁴⁷⁵⁴⁷⁶
supervision. The Jones Commission recommended disbanding the NPs altogether.
The Iraqi leadership opted for a different approach. One step was replacing NP senior leaders.
Between late 2006 and January 2008, both of the NP division commanders, all 9 brigade ⁴⁷⁷
commanders, and about 18 of 28 battalion commanders were replaced. The other major step
was retraining—or “re-bluing”—both leaders and ranks, with the help of Italy’s Carabinieri,
under the rubric of the NATO Training Mission-Iraq.
In early 2008, some U.S. commanders in Iraq confirmed that there had been serious problems
with the NPs, and suggested that the leadership changes and re-education had so far produced ⁴⁷⁸
mixed results. As one Brigade Commander noted, “The National Police have been terrible!”
One Division Commander praised the work of one NP brigade in solving problems in his area of ⁴⁷⁹
responsibility, while noting that another NP brigade actually is the problem. One coalition
leader credits Iraqi National Police Commander Major General Hussein with recognizing the
challenges the NPs faced and with making this remark: “The National Police has two enemies—⁴⁸⁰
the insurgency, and our own reputation.”
In August 2008, MNSTC-I noted that the re-bluing process had been accelerated by boosting
capacity from 450 to 900 students at a time. MNSTC-I added that the new NP commander is a ⁴⁸¹
“tremendous officer.” U.S. commanders in Baghdad added that the NPs were being used very ⁴⁸²
much like the Iraqi Army forces. One official added that the NPs were “pretty damned good!”
Looking ahead, one future challenge for the Iraqi National Police will be transitioning from an
Army-like counter-insurgency role to a high-end policing function.
The Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) faces the daunting task of protecting Iraq’s 3,650
kilometers of land borders, some of it rugged and mountainous, against apparent infiltration by
⁴⁷⁴
^R^e^por^t^of^the^Iⁿ^de^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^{t C}^o^m^m^issⁱ^{on o}ⁿ^t^h^e^Se^c^u^r^ity^For^c^e^s^of^I^r^a^{q, Se}^p^t^e^m^be^r^{6, 20}⁰⁷^{, p}^.²⁰^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.c^sⁱ^s^.^or^g^/^m^e^dia^/^c^s^is^/p^ubs^/ⁱ^s^f^.pdf^.
⁴⁷⁵^Se^e^Ja^m^e^s^A^.^Ba^k^e^{r, III, a}ⁿ^d^L^e^e^{H. Ha}^m^iltoⁿ^,^Co^-C^h^a^irs,^Th^{e I}^r^aq^S^t^u^d^y^Grou^{p R}^e^po^rt^,^Decem^b^e^r⁶^,²⁰⁰⁶^,
^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^ww^.usip.org^/^isg^/^ira^q_st^udy^_g^r^oup^_re^p^ort/^re^por^t/12^06/^ira^q_s^t^udy^_g^roup^{_ re}^p^o^rt.^pdf^.
⁴⁷⁶^Se^e^R^e^por^t^of^the^Iⁿ^de^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^{t C}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on on t}^h^e^Se^c^u^r^ity^For^c^e^s^of^I^r^a^{q, Se}^pte^m^be^r^6,²⁰^07,^p.²⁰^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.c^sⁱ^s^.^or^g^/^m^e^dia^/^c^s^is^/p^ubs^/ⁱ^s^f^.pdf^.
⁴⁷⁷^Lⁱ^e^u^te^na^{nt G}^e^ne^ra^{l Ja}^m^e^{s Dubik}^,^te^stim^on^y^be^f^o^re^the^House^A^r^m^e^{d Se}^rv^ic^e^s^Com^m^itte^e^,^W^a^shing^t^{on, D}^.^C.,
^Jan^u^a^ry¹⁷^,²⁰⁰⁸^.^L^T^G^Du^bⁱ^{k p}^oⁱⁿ^t^ed^o^u^t^t^h^at^“t^{en ou}^t^o^fⁿⁱⁿ^{e” b}^rⁱ^g^ad^{e co}^mman^d^e^{rs were rep}^l^aced^,^siⁿ^{ce t}^w^o^ch^an^ges
^w^e^r^e^m^a^de^{to one}^br^ig^a^d^e^’^s^c^o^m^m^a^nd.
⁴⁷⁸^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^om^B^r^ig^a^d^e^C^o^m^m^a^nde^r^,^B^a^g^hda^d^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^8.
⁴⁷⁹^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^Dⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on C}^o^m^m^a^nde^r^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^8.
⁴⁸⁰^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^F-^I^s^t^a^f^f^,^Ja^nua^r^y^2008.
⁴⁸¹^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁴⁸²^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MND-B of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^{st 20}^08.

extremists from some neighbor countries, as well as controlling the usual flow of cross-border
traffic.
As of August 31, 2008, the DBE had 41,408 assigned personnel, of 47,750 authorized, and of ⁴⁸³
whom only 34,475 had been trained. They were organized into 12 brigades with 44 total
battalions. The training gap—and the relatively low level of training in general—impinge on the ⁴⁸⁴
DBE’s effectiveness. Given the ratio of distances to personnel, and the current capabilities of ⁴⁸⁵
those personnel, the DBE—as DOD put it in December 2007—is “stretched thin.” The Jones ⁴⁸⁶
Commission stated it more flatly in September 2007: “Iraq’s borders are porous.” The numbers
and capabilities of the DBE do not appear to have progressed substantially since that time.
The Iraqi Government’s proposed way forward, over three years, includes constructing up to 712
border forts and annexes, to establish a line-of-sight perimeter, and increasing the use of ⁴⁸⁷
biometric scan systems and personal information databases.
Some U.S. officials complain that the MoI does very little to support the DBE and that, in the
words of one U.S. commander, the DBE is “grossly under-funded.” For example, in al Anbar
province, instead of giving the DBE fuel, the MoI provided money to buy fuel. But at the long,
remote border, the only fuel available for purchase was from the black market, which cost double ⁴⁸⁸
the market price.
Both coalition advisors and outside assessments have pointed out that the DBE continues to face
additional challenges from corruption. In early 2008, coalition officials in Iraq agreed with the
assessments by the Jones Commission that the DBE is infiltrated by outside interests, and that ⁴⁸⁹
some members are apparently involved in cross-border smuggling.
Both coalition advisors and outside assessments have consistently pointed to two serious
shortcomings in the Ministry of Interior (MoI) itself: a lack of capacity and corruption.
Capacity challenges apparently plague most of the Ministry’s activities. The Department of
Defense reported in June 2008: “Coalition advisors continue to report steady but uneven
improvement in the MoI’s ability to perform key ministry functions, such as force management,
personnel management, acquisition, training, logistics and sustainment, and the development and ⁴⁹⁰
implementation of plans and policies.”
⁴⁸³
^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^,^I^r^a^{q W}^e^ek^ly^Sta^t^us^R^e^por^{t, Se}^p^t^e^m^be^r^{17, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁴⁸⁴^Inf^o^rm^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^c^o^a^{lition a}^d^vⁱ^{sors, Ja}^nua^ry²⁰⁰^8.
⁴⁸⁵^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,^”^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^2007.
⁴⁸⁶^R^e^por^t^of^the^Iⁿ^de^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^{t C}^o^m^m^issⁱ^{on o}ⁿ^t^h^e^Se^c^u^r^ity^For^c^e^s^of^I^r^a^{q, Se}^p^t^e^m^be^r^{6, 20}⁰⁷^{, p}^.²⁰^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.c^sⁱ^s^.^or^g^/^m^e^dia^/^c^s^is^/p^ubs^/ⁱ^s^f^.pdf^.
⁴⁸⁷^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,^”^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰⁸^{, p}^.⁴⁵^.
⁴⁸⁸^In^t^e^rvi^e^w^s^wⁱ^t^h^M^N^{C-I o}^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s,^su^bo^rdⁱⁿ^at^{e co}^mm^an^d^e^rs,^A^u^gu^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁴⁸⁹^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^F-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^{, a}ⁿ^d^R^e^por^{t of}^th^e^I^nde^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^{t C}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on on}^th^e^Se^c^u^r^ity^For^c^e^s
^of^Ira^{q, Se}^pte^m^be^{r 6,}²⁰⁰^7,^p.^20,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^w^w^.c^sⁱ^s^.^org^/^m^e^dia^/^c^s^is^/pubs^/ⁱ^s^f^.pdf^.
⁴⁹⁰^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,^”^J^une²⁰⁰⁸^,^p.4⁰^.

One particularly serious constraint, according to coalition officials, is that the Ministry of Interior
lacks sufficient capacity to process the large and growing demand for personnel—to screen ⁴⁹¹
recruits, to train them, and to continue to account for them. To address this shortcoming, the
Ministry is expanding the capacity of its training base to include 12 new training centers and the
expansion of 6 existing ones; and rapidly generating officers through a recall and training ⁴⁹²
program for former army and police officers. According to MNSTC-I, an additional pressure
on the MoI training system was the absorption, in early 2008, of the “oil police,” whose training ⁴⁹³
to guard pipelines did not, in the words of one official, turn them into “LA cops.”
Corruption—and the perception of corruption—may be the even more difficult challenge for the
MoI to eradicate. In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group concluded flatly that the MoI was
corrupt. In September 2007, the Jones Commission assessed that “... sectarianism and corruption
are pervasive in the MoI,” and that the Ministry is “... widely regarded as being dysfunctional and ⁴⁹⁴
sectarian.” In January 2008, one coalition advisor stated bluntly that the MoI is filled with ⁴⁹⁵
“card-carrying gangsters.”
The MoI has apparently taken some steps to battle internal corruption. The Department of
Defense reported that in 2007, the MoI had opened 6,652 investigations of ministry personnel. Of
these, 6,159 were closed during 2007, including 1,112 that resulted in firings, 438 in disciplinary ⁴⁹⁶
actions, and 23 in forced retirement.
In September 2007, the Jones Commission concluded that the Ministry of Defense (MoD) ⁴⁹⁷
suffered from “bureaucratic inexperience, excessive layering, and over-centralization.” In
September 2008, DOD noted some progress but observed that “significant challenges remain,”
and that “logistics and the sustainment of ISF personnel, equipment, and infrastructure post the ⁴⁹⁸
biggest problems for the force.”
In early 2008, MNF-I officials suggested that compared to other Iraqi ministries, the MoD is a
model of progress—it has not faced the magnitude of corruption endemic at the MoI, and with
⁴⁹¹
^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith c}^o^a^lition^a^d^vⁱ^sor^s^{, Ja}^nua^ry^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁴⁹²^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,^”^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰⁸^{, p}^.⁴¹^.
⁴⁹³^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{, A}^u^g^u^{st 20}^08.
⁴⁹⁴^Se^e^Ja^m^e^s^A^.^Ba^k^e^{r, III, a}ⁿ^d^L^e^e^{H. Ha}^m^iltoⁿ^,^Co^-C^h^a^irs,^Th^{e I}^r^aq^S^t^u^d^y^Grou^{p R}^e^po^rt^,^Decem^b^e^r⁶^,²⁰⁰⁶^,
^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^ww^.usip.org^/^isg^/^ira^q_st^udy^_g^roup^_re^p^ort/^re^por^t/1²^06/^ira^q_st^udy^_g^r^oup^_re^p^ort.p^d^f^,^a^{nd Re}^p^o^rt^of
^the^In^de^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^{t C}^o^m^m^{ission on}^t^h^e^Se^c^u^rity^Forc^e^s^of^Ira^{q, Se}^pte^m^be^{r 6, 20}^07,^p.¹⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^h^ttp://w^ww^.c^sis.org^/
^m^e^dia^/^c^s^is^/pubs^/ⁱ^s^f^.pdf^.
⁴⁹⁵^Com^m^eⁿ^{t by}^c^o^a^{lition a}^d^vⁱ^s^o^{r, J}^a^nua^ry^2008.
⁴⁹⁶^Dep^a^rtm^eⁿ^t^o^f^De^fen^s^e,^“M^easu^rⁱⁿ^{g S}^t^ab^il^ity^an^d^S^ecu^rityⁱⁿ^Iraq^,^{” M}^a^rch²⁰⁰⁸^.^T^h^rou^g^h^A^u^gu^{st 20}⁰⁸^,^DOD
^r^e^por^te^d,^the^MoI^Dⁱ^r^e^c^t^or^a^t^e^of^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^l^A^f^f^a^ir^s^ope^ne^{d 4,}³¹^{8 c}^a^s^e^s^{. O}^f^the^s^e^,^{it c}^l^os^e^d⁴^,¹^{98 c}^a^s^e^s^,^f^r^o^m^w^h^ic^{h 37}⁷
^e^m^p^l^o^y^e^e^s^w^e^re^fⁱ^red^,^an^d²⁹⁷^{were d}ⁱ^scip^lin^e^d^{, see DOD,}^“Measu^rⁱⁿ^g^Sta^b^ility^an^d^Secu^rityⁱⁿ^Ira^q^,^{” Sep}^t^em^b^e^r
²⁰⁰^{8, p.}^42.
⁴⁹⁷^R^e^por^t^of^the^Iⁿ^de^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^{t C}^o^m^m^issⁱ^{on o}ⁿ^t^h^e^Se^c^u^r^ity^For^c^e^s^of^I^r^a^{q, Se}^p^t^e^m^be^r^{6, 20}⁰⁷^{, p}^p^.⁹^,1^2,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.c^sⁱ^s^.^or^g^/^m^e^dia^/^c^s^is^/p^ubs^/ⁱ^s^f^.pdf^.
⁴⁹⁸^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q,^”^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰⁸^{, p}^.⁴⁷^.

close advisory support from the coalition, it has made substantial progress in both management ⁴⁹⁹
and strategic planning.
One major future challenge for the Ministry of Defense is likely to be clarifying and rationalizing
the chain of command. As the Jones Commission stated in September 2007: “Parallel lines of
direct communication to military units have been established under the control of the Prime
Minister. He is perceived by many as having created a second, and politically motivated, chain of ⁵⁰⁰
command.” U.S. military officials confirmed this assessment in August 2008, and DOD noted
in September 2008 that “MoD performance is hampered by ineffective coordination and unclear ⁵⁰¹
lines of authority, hampering unity of command.”
As of early fall 2008, Iraqi Army divisions reported to the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, which
reported to the Joint Headquarters, which reported in turn to the MoD. However, some forces,
from both the MoD and the MoI, fall under provincial Operations Commands, usually led by a
General Officer from the Iraqi Army, which may report in practice directly to the office of the
Prime Minister. Both ministries and uniformed operational headquarters, according to U.S.
commanders in Iraq, are sometimes left out of the de facto chain of command.
Operations Commands are in theory a temporary measure, designed to closely integrate the
counter-insurgency efforts by all of the ISF in a given geographical area. Commands have been
established in the provinces of Baghdad, Basrah, Karbala, Anbar, Ninewah, Diyala, and (as an ⁵⁰²
exception) in the city of Samarra. Some U.S. and Iraqi commanders have suggested the
possibility that Operations Commands might evolve into three-star Army Corps headquarters, ⁵⁰³
perhaps with a geographic reach wider than a single province. As of early fall 2008, no plans
were in place for such a transition. Further, while the “Corps” concept might be appropriate to the
current internal counter-insurgency fight, an externally focused Army would not ordinarily “own
battle space” domestically.
Another challenge for the MoD to resolve, according to MNSTC-I officials, is centralized
decision-making. As of August 2008, the vast majority of decisions were channeled personally to
the Minister, which hinders efficient functioning. A MNSTC-I official noted that the premise ⁵⁰⁴
seems to be, “If you don’t make a decision, you can’t get in trouble.”
One further challenge, according to MNSTC-I officials, is the MoD’s difficulty in identifying
requirements, budgeting for them, and obligating and spending the required funds. In 2006 and
2007, GoI spending on the ISF exceeded spending by the Iraqi Security Forces Fund, and that
⁴⁹⁹
^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^ith^MN^F-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^2008.
⁵⁰⁰^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^ith^MN^F-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^2008,^aⁿ^d^R^e^por^t^of^t^h^e^I^nde^pe^nde^{nt C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^{on on t}^h^e^Se^c^u^r^ity
^For^c^e^s^of^I^r^a^{q, Se}^pte^m^be^r^6,²⁰⁰⁷^{, pp}^.1^{3, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^h^ttp:^//w^w^w^.csⁱ^s^.^or^g^/^m^e^dia^/^c^s^is^/pubs^/ⁱ^s^f^.pdf^.
⁵⁰¹^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^ST^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^{nd s}^u^b^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^t^e^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08,^aⁿ^d^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}
^De^fe^nse^,^“^M^e^a^s^uring^Sta^b^ility^a^{nd Se}^c^u^rity^{in Ira}^q,”^Se^pte^m^be^{r 20}^08,^p.^47.
⁵⁰²^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^a^{nd s}^u^bor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.
⁵⁰³^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith U}^.^{S. a}ⁿ^d^Ira^{qi m}^ilita^ry^offⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^{. T}^h^e^c^o^m^m^a^nde^{r of}^the^Ba^s^r^a^O^p^e^r^a^tions^C^o^m^m^a^nd
^m^u^sed^t^h^at^t^h^{e BaOC m}ⁱ^gh^t^evo^l^v^eⁱⁿ^t^o^{a Co}^rp^s^h^ead^qu^art^e^{rs f}^o^{r t}^h^{e ad}^j^oⁱⁿⁱⁿ^{g p}^r^o^vⁱⁿ^{ces o}^f^M^u^t^h^an^{na an}^d^M^a^y^s^an^as
^w^e^{ll a}^s^Ba^sra^{but n}^o^te^d^tha^t^t^h^is^w^a^{s just a}ⁿⁱ^d^e^a^.
⁵⁰⁴^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.

trend is projected to continue. The MoD remains hampered, according to MNSTC-I, by the fact ⁵⁰⁵
that their “direct contracting capability is not fully developed.”

A central tenet of counter-insurgency is reaching out to the local population and securing at least
their acceptance, if not their active support.
In Iraq, a number of U.S. military commanders have pointed to changes in the attitudes and
behavior of the Iraqi population as the most important difference between 2008 and earlier
periods. In December 2007, for example, the out-going commander of Multi-National Division-
Baghdad, Major General Joseph Fil, noted: “I attribute a great deal of the security progress to the
willingness of the population to step forward and band together against terrorist and criminal ⁵⁰⁶
militia.”
Coalition and Iraqi government efforts to reach out to the Iraqi population have increasingly
fallen under the broad semantic rubric of “reconciliation.” As of 2008, the term is very broadly
used—from U.S. national strategy, to congressional legislation, to the names of Iraqi government ⁵⁰⁷
structures and of offices and job titles in coalition headquarters. The term is variously used, but
in the broadest sense, it refers to a multi-lateral reconciliation among all sub-groups and members
of Iraqi society, except the self-designated truly “irreconcilables” and those who may have
disqualified themselves by some egregious action.
In practice, “reconciliation” in Iraq has taken a number of forms, several of which, discussed
below, have played critical roles in shaping the security climate.
Early in OIF, coalition forces recognized the importance of reaching out to disaffected Iraqi
communities, but coalition efforts were constrained by lack of expertise, limited resources, and—
initially—policy decisions.
In 2003, some CPA and CJTF-7 leaders recognized the importance and the complexity of tribal ⁵⁰⁸
dynamics in Iraq. As coalition forces commanders on the ground throughout Iraq frequently
engaged with local tribal leaders, it rapidly became apparent that the coalition lacked detailed
expertise in tribal history and dynamics. The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)—the first national-
⁵⁰⁵
^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNST}^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁵⁰⁶^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^De^fen^s^{e Ne}^w^s^Bri^e^fⁱⁿ^g^,^M^a^j^o^{r G}^eⁿ^e^ral^Jo^sep^h^Fⁱ^l^,^P^e^nt^agoⁿ^,^Decem^b^e^{r 1}⁷^,²⁰⁰⁷^,^av^ai^l^a^b^l^{e at}
^http:^//www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^tr^aⁿ^s^c^rⁱ^pts^/^tr^aⁿ^s^c^rⁱ^pt.a^s^p^x^?^tr^aⁿ^s^c^rⁱ^ptid⁼⁴¹⁰^{7. H}ⁱ^s^c^o^m^m^eⁿ^ts^e^c^hoe^{d H}^.^R^.^Mc^Ma^s^t^e^r^’^s
^assess^men^t^o^f^t^h^{e ro}^l^e^o^f^l^o^cal^p^o^p^u^l^atⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ³^A^{CR’s su}^ccess^f^u^l^{COIN o}^p^e^ratⁱ^oⁿ^sⁱⁿ^T^a^l^Af^{ar i}ⁿ²⁰⁰⁵^.
⁵⁰⁷^A^t^the^na^tio^na^{l le}^v^e^{l in Ira}^q^,^t^h^e^k^e^y^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^{is the}^I^m^ple^m^eⁿ^ta^tion^a^{nd F}^o^ll^ow^{-up Com}^m^itte^e^f^o^{r Na}^tiona^l
^Re^c^onc^ilia^tio^{n (IFCNR), a}^p^p^o^inte^{d by}^P^r^im^e^Ministe^r^Ma^lik^i.
⁵⁰⁸^Forⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion a}^b^o^u^{t I}^r^a^qi^trⁱ^b^e^s^{, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^S²²⁶^26,^Iraq^{: Trib}^{al S}^t^ruc^t^ure^,^Socⁱ^a^l,^an^{d P}^o^litic^{al Ac}^tivⁱ^tie^s^,
^b^y^Hu^ssein^D.^Hassan^.

level advisory body, established by CPA in July 2003—included very little tribal ⁵⁰⁹
representation.
In summer 2003, coalition forces launched a concerted outreach effort to Sunni Arab
communities in the restive “Sunni Triangle” in central and north-central Iraq. On August 7, 2003,
CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid convened community leaders from throughout the
region to urge them to cease all tacit support for insurgents, in exchange for future assistance with ⁵¹⁰
reconstruction needs, political representation, and other concerns. However, for most of the rest
of that year, the very limited presence of coalition civilian experts in these provinces, and limited
resources for reconstruction, made it difficult to fully implement the proposed “bargain.”
By early 2004, CPA established an outreach office, to engage directly with both tribal leaders and
leaders of other disaffected groups, including some religious extremists. Also in early 2004, U.S.
national leadership crafted a series of “Sunni engagement strategies” that included “carrots” such
as greater political representation, economic assistance, and detainee releases.
By 2005, coalition leaders in Iraq began to pursue more direct contacts with insurgents and their
supporters—in coordination with, and often brokered by, Iraqi leaders. As a rule, those talks were
reportedly based on a familiar theme—a cessation of violent action against Iraqis and the
coalition, in exchange for benefits that might include amnesty for some detainees, and improved ⁵¹¹
opportunities to participate politically or economically in Iraqi society.
Some critics have suggested that “negotiating” with known or suspected perpetrators of violence
is an ethically ambiguous practice that, moreover, is unlikely to succeed because it depends for its
success on commitments by those who have violated the rule of law.
Coalition leaders confirm that they understand who these interlocutors are. In December 2007,
MNF-I official Major General Paul Newton, a UK officer leading the outreach effort, commented,
“Do we talk to people with blood on their hands? I certainly hope so. There is no point in us ⁵¹²
talking to people who haven’t.” As an MNC-I senior official with considerable experience in ⁵¹³
Iraq described it in early 2008, “You reconcile with your enemy, not with your friend.”
In the view of some participants and observers, what may have distinguished the 2007 outreach
from earlier efforts was a change in the perceptions of insurgents and would-be insurgents about
their own prospects. As the MNC-I senior official added, “You can only reconcile with an enemy ⁵¹⁴
when he feels a sense of hopelessness.” As MNF-I officials described it in 2008, “At some
point, fatigue sets in, and expediency brings them to the table.”
⁵⁰⁹
^Som^e^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^o^f^CP^A^a^d^m^itte^{d tha}^t^g^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^a^c^o^m^p^le^te^unde^rs^ta^ndi^ng^of^triba^l^dy^namⁱ^c^s^a^{nd c}^a^p^turing^t^h^e^m
^a^d^e^qua^te^ly^{in the}^IG^{C, in a}^v^e^ry^s^hort^tim^e^f^r^a^m^e^,^w^a^{s si}^m^p^l^y^{too c}^o^m^p^le^x^,^a^{nd the}^risk^{s of}^e^{rror t}^oo^g^r^e^a^t^.
^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^{ith C}^P^A^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, 20}⁰³^.
⁵¹⁰^S^{ee Ri}^card^o^S^.^S^aⁿ^c^h^ez,^Wⁱ^se^{r in}^Battle^:^{A S}^o^ld^ie^{r’s Story}^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^rk^{: H}^a^rpe^r^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{, s}^e^e^p^p^.2^38-^9.^Sa^nc^he^z
^d^e^scri^b^e^{s j}^oⁱⁿⁱⁿ^{g A}^bⁱ^zai^d^t^o^m^eet^wⁱ^t^h^t^rⁱ^b^al^l^ead^{ers and}^ot^h^e^{r co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^t^y^l^ead^ers,^p^r^o^vⁱⁿ^{ce b}^y^p^r^o^vⁱⁿ^ce.
⁵¹¹^S^{ee f}^o^{r exa}^m^p^l^{e Ro}^r^y^Carro^l^l^,^“US^{in ta}^lk^{s w}^{ith Ira}^qi^insurg^eⁿ^ts,^”^The^G^u^ar^diaⁿ^,^J^une^10,²⁰⁰⁵^{; N}^e^{d P}^a^r^k^e^r^a^nd
^T^o^m^Bal^d^wⁱⁿ^,^“P^{eace d}^eal^o^f^f^e^r^s^Iraqⁱⁿ^su^rgen^t^s^aⁿ^amⁿ^e^st^y^,^”^The^Tim^e^s^{, June}^23,²⁰⁰⁶^{; a}ⁿ^{d Co}^lin^Fre^e^m^a^{n, “}^B^ritish
^g^e^ne^ra^{l to ta}^lk^{to Ira}^qⁱ^ins^u^rg^eⁿ^ts,^”^Te^le^gr^ap^h^,^Decem^b^e^{r 1}¹^,²⁰⁰⁷^.
⁵¹²^Se^e^Colin^Fre^e^m^aⁿ^{, “}^B^{ritish g}^e^ne^ra^{l to ta}^lk^{to Ira}^{qi i}ⁿ^surg^eⁿ^ts”^,^T^e^le^gr^aph^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^11,²⁰⁰⁷^.
⁵¹³^C^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion f}^r^om^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵¹⁴^C^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion f}^r^om^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.

By 2008, as described by senior MNF-I officials, the outreach effort included not only Sunni
insurgents, the main focus, but also Shi’a extremists. The levers available to the coalition to offer
included possible restoration of stipends, possible restoration of a post in the ISF, or agreements
that the person agreeing to “reconcile” will not be killed. The GoI is “part of the management” of
the reconciliation initiatives. One of the challenges to the effort, MNF-I officials note, is the
possibility that some members of the Iraqi population will misinterpret the initiatives as signs of
sectarian favoritism. Another challenge, officials report, is that coalition influence is simply ⁵¹⁵
diminishing—“Iraqis listen much less than in the past.”
Meanwhile, MND-North launched a similar but apparently separate reconciliation initiative,
which started in the Sunni insurgent stronghold town of Hawija, in At Ta’amin province. The
program’s key targets were “economic insurgents”—those who were in it to make money, rather
than ideologues. The program offers them “negotiated surrender,” including being moved to a
“no-target list,” and participants must clear a Board that includes representatives of GoI civilian
leadership, the ISF, and coalition forces. U.S. forces and PRT counterparts have used several
funding sources to try to find civilian jobs for the program’s “graduates.” As of August 2008, the
program had had over 2,100 participants across MND-North. MND-North officials have
described participants as coming forward and saying effectively, “I don’t want to fight anymore. ⁵¹⁶
I’m tired of running. I want to sleep in my own home at night.”
In the views of many practitioners and observers, “awakening” movements have powerfully
reshaped the security climate as well as the political climate in many parts of Iraq. While they all
have “ground-up” origins—and borrow from one another’s experiences—they vary greatly in
character, and in likely impact, by region.
The movements got their start in Al Anbar province. As described by Multi-National Force-West
leaders, in the aftermath of regime removal, Al Anbar was a “perfect storm”: The region was
traditionally independent-minded, and relatively secular, but dependent on the central government
for key resources. After the old regime collapsed, the province’s big state-owned enterprises
closed, state pensions were not being paid, De-Ba’athification policies meant lost jobs, and many ⁵¹⁷
Anbaris felt disenfranchised and left out of national-level politics.
That context provided fertile ground for Al Qaeda affiliates to infiltrate the region with promises
to “rescue” the population, but their actions proved to be absolutely brutal—including swift and
violent punishment, or even death, for perceived infractions. One observer has called it a
⁵¹⁵
^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNF-I of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s,^A^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁵¹⁶^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^D^-^N^a^{nd s}^u^b^o^rdiⁿ^a^t^e^un^it^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t^2008.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^M^u^lti-N^a^ti^ona^{l F}^o^rc^e^-Ira^{q pre}^s^s
^c^onf^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^traⁿ^sc^{ript, Ma}^jor^G^e^ne^ra^{l Ma}^rk^He^rtling^,^Com^m^a^nding^G^e^ne^ra^{l, Multi-Na}^tio^na^{l Div}ⁱ^sion^-North,^July^27,
²⁰⁰^8.
⁵¹⁷^Inf^o^rm^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MNF-W^e^{st le}^a^d^e^r^ship,^Ja^nua^ry²⁰⁰^{8. I}ⁿ^f^o^rm^a^tio^{n f}^r^om^c^o^a^{lition of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, a}^{nd A}^l^A^nba^r
^p^r^o^vⁱⁿ^ci^al^and^co^m^m^uⁿⁱ^t^y^l^ead^ers^,²⁰⁰³^an^{d 20}⁰⁴^.

“campaign of murder and intimidation,” including the murders of prominent local tribal ⁵¹⁸
leaders.
The first rising in Al Anbar took place in 2005—a movement that became known as the “Desert
Protectors.” Members of local tribes in al Qaim and Haditha volunteered to begin working with ⁵¹⁹
some U.S. Special Operations Forces and later with the Marines.
The movement that became known as the “awakening” developed later, in Al Anbar’s capital
Ramadi, drawing on the model of the Desert Protectors—including the premise of an alliance
among several key tribes. The initial leading figure of the awakening was Sheikh Abdul Sattar
Buzaigh al-Rishawi, of the Albu Risha tribe, who was killed on September 13, 2007, by a
roadside bomb. In late 2006, he had spearheaded the signing of a manifesto denouncing Al Qaeda
and pledging support to coalition forces. According to MNF-West, by January 2008, of the eleven ⁵²⁰
sheikhs who initially stood up to challenge Al Qaeda, six were dead. The movement, initially
known as Sahawa al Anbar when it formed around a core from the Albu Risha tribe, changed its ⁵²¹
name to Sahawa al Iraq as more tribes joined the cause.
According to MNF-West, leading sheikhs in the awakening movement describe their relationship
with Al Qaeda as a “blood feud.” The tribal leaders do not want coalition forces to stay forever—⁵²²
they simply want help killing Al Qaeda.
During 2007, awakenings began to “spread” through the provinces of north-central Iraq—
Ninewah, Salah ad Din, Kirkuk (At Ta’amin), and Diyala—drawing on the Al Anbar example.
Several aspects of the northern “climate” may have encouraged some Sunni Arabs to self-
organize to protect their interests.
As in Al Anbar, there was an Al Qaeda affiliate presence in the north-central provinces. In the
wake of successful surge operations in Baghdad, Al Qaeda affiliates took up residence in several ⁵²³
parts of the region, including Mosul and the upper Diyala River Valley.
Sunni Arabs in northern provinces, like those in Al Anbar, already had some grounds for feeling
politically disenfranchised. In Ninewah, for example, Sunni Arabs, who constitute about 75% of
the province’s population, generally did not vote in provincial elections and were thus under-⁵²⁴
represented on the current Provincial Council.
Across the north (and unique to the region), according to Multi-National Division-North leaders,
de facto Kurdish expansion has extended across the Green Line that separates the Kurdistan
⁵¹⁸
^{Bill Rog}^gⁱ^o,^“^A^nba^{r Rising}^,”^L^ong^W^a^{r Journa}^{l, Ma}^y^11,²⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http:^//www^.long^w^a^rjo^u^rna^l^.^o^rg^/
^archⁱ^v^es/²⁰⁰⁷^/⁰⁵^/^aⁿ^b^a^r_^ri^siⁿ^g^.^php^.^S^{ee al}^so^M^a^ri^o^L^o^y^o^l^a^,^“Ret^u^rⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e S}^h^ei^k,^”^Na^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^R^evi^ew^{, Oct}^o^b^e^r^8,²⁰⁰⁷^.
⁵¹⁹^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^F-^W^e^s^t^s^t^af^f^,²⁰⁰^7.
⁵²⁰^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^F-^W^e^s^t^le^ade^r^s^h^ip,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^8.
⁵²¹^Se^e^W^illia^m^{S. Mc}^Ca^lliste^{r, “}^Ira^{qi Isla}^mⁱ^c^P^a^rty^,^Kurds,^aⁿ^d^the^T^r^iba^l^Aw^a^k^eⁿ^ing^,^”^Ja^nua^ry^{18, 2}⁰^08,^un^pu^blis^he^d
^pa^pe^r^.
⁵²²^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^F-^W^e^s^t^le^ade^r^s^h^ip,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^8.
⁵²³^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^F-^I^,^MN^C^-^I^,^a^nd^MN^D^-^N^o^r^t^h^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵²⁴^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^F-^I^a^nd^M^N^D^-^N^o^r^t^{h of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.

Regional Government from the rest of Iraq, into parts of Mosul and oil-rich Kirkuk. In Kirkuk, in
particular, many Kurds have taken up residence—or returned to live—in anticipation of a popular ⁵²⁵
referendum that will decide Kirkuk’s political future. Coalition officials judge that some Sunni ⁵²⁶
Arabs in the region find this dynamic threatening.
Both security conditions on the ground, and direct exposure to “awakenings” elsewhere in Iraq,
helped generate nascent “awakening” movements among some tribal leaders in largely Shi’a-
populated southern Iraq. These incipient initiatives shared with their Sunni Arab counterparts
their ground-up impetus, based on a desire for security and opportunity for their families, and a
disinclination to be imposed on by outsiders.
The character of the southern movements, however, was distinctly different from those in north-
central Iraq, due to a quite different political and religious backdrop, and thus quite different ⁵²⁷
“targets” of frustration. The most prominent feature of politics in southern Iraq remains the
power struggle between two major political groupings and the militias that back them: on one
hand, the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI, formerly SCIRI) and its Badr militia; and on the
other hand, the Office of the Martyr Sadr, led by Muqtada al-Sadr, and its militia, the Jaish al-
Mahdi (JAM). Schisms in the Jaish al-Mahdi, in the wake of al-Sadr’s declared ceasefire,
produced violent splinter groups—“special groups”—apparently acting independently of al-Sadr ⁵²⁸
but with reported ties to Iran.
MNF-I leaders suggested that the southern “awakening” movements were motivated primarily by
growing popular impatience with both of the leading contenders for political power in the south,
and in particular, with their past or current Iranian connections. ISCI’s Badr forces were trained in
Iran, during the Iran-Iraq War. Muqtada al-Sadr has maintained personal ties with clerics in Iran, ⁵²⁹
and JAM “special groups” reportedly enjoy Iranian training and support.
Military commanders in Iraq have credited the “Sons of Iraq” (SoIs)—originally known as
“concerned local citizens”—with playing an essential and substantial role in the improvement of ⁵³⁰
security in Iraq, beginning in late 2007. One commander noted in August 2008 that the ⁵³¹
program was “a cost-effective way to buy security.” While terminology and specific
characteristics have varied geographically and over time, in general, SoIs were local residents
⁵²⁵
^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith Multi-Na}^tio^na^l^Divⁱ^si^on-Nort^{h of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, Ja}^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^{st 20}⁰⁸^{, a}ⁿ^{d i}ⁿ^te^rv^ie^{ws w}^{ith U.S.}
^Em^ba^s^s^y^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁵²⁶^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^{nd s}^ubor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵²⁷^For^a^dditi^ona^l^aⁿ^d^s^lig^htly^dif^f^e^r^eⁿ^{t v}ⁱ^e^w^s^a^{bout the}^dif^f^e^r^e^nc^e^s^am^ong^aw^ak^eⁿ^ing^m^o^v^e^m^e^nts^,^s^e^e^Mo^ha^m^m^e^d
^Fa^dhil^,^“^W^hy^Southe^{rn Ira}^{q W}^oⁿ^’^{t Aw}^a^k^eⁿ^Lⁱ^ke^A^nba^r,”^Nov^e^m^b^e^r^{7, 2}⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://pa^j^a^m^a^s^m^e^dia^.^c^o^m^/
²⁰⁰^7/^11/^pos^t^_²⁵²^.^p^hp.
⁵²⁸^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁵²⁹^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.^MN^F-^I^note^s^t^h^a^t^be^f^o^r^e^r^e^gⁱ^m^e^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^,
⁷⁰^%^o^f^t^h^{e m}^e^m^b^{ers o}^f^t^h^{e Ba’at}^h^P^a^rt^y^{were S}^hⁱ^’^a.
⁵³⁰^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^{nd s}^ubor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵³¹^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith U}^.^{S. br}^ig^a^d^e^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.

who stepped forward, in some organized way, to help protect and defend their communities. In
late 2008, the SoI program entered a major transition phase, after the Government of Iraq, as a
first step, assumed responsibility for the Sons of Iraq in Baghdad province.
MNF-I noted that as of August, 2008, before the transition to Iraqi Government control began,
there were 99,374 SoIs in Iraq altogether; 4,060 on 14 contracts in MNF-West’s area, Al Anbar
province; 29,177 on 275 contracts in MND-North’s area, which includes the four provinces north
and east of Baghdad; 28,754 on 182 contracts in MND-Baghdad’s area; 35,381 on 267 contracts
in MND-Center’s area, which then included four provinces immediately south of Baghdad; 2,002
on 41 contracts in MND-Center South’s area, which then included Qadisiyah province and has
since been incorporated into MND-Center; and none in MND-Southeast’s area, which includes ⁵³²
the four southernmost provinces.
The majority of SoIs, but not all of them, were Sunni Arabs. The Department of Defense reported ⁵³³
that as of March 2008, about 71,500 were Sunni and about 19,500 Shi’a. Most groups of
SoIs—who typically worked in the communities they live in—were relatively homogenous but
some are mixed. For example, in January 2008, in the area of Multi-National Division-Center, a
mixed region south of Baghdad, 60% of the SOI groups were Sunni Arab, 20% were Shi’a Arab, ⁵³⁴
and 20% were mixed.
U.S. commanders readily admitted that the SoIs include former insurgents. One Brigade
Commander commented, “There’s no doubt that some of these concerned citizens were at least
tacitly participating in the insurgency before us,” and one Division Commander stated more ⁵³⁵
boldly: “80% of these guys are former insurgents.” Other commanders noted, in early 2008,
that the SoIs included not only “reformed” insurgents, but also some infiltrators currently ⁵³⁶
affiliated with extremist groups.
ISF commanders, too, harbored no illusions about the backgrounds of many SoIs, and they share
with their U.S. counterparts a concern about current infiltration. In August 2008, Major General ^th
Oothman, the Commanding General of the 8 Iraqi Army Division, expressed concern that AQI
could corrupt the SoIs. He noted that AQI had already infiltrated the SoIs or, he added, it could be ⁵³⁷
the case that some SoIs may simply be “playing both sides.”
⁵³²
^In^f^o^rm^atioⁿ^f^r^o^m^{MNF-I staff}^,^Au^g^u^{st 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵³³^De^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^De^fe^nse^,^“^M^e^a^s^uring^Se^c^u^rity^a^{nd Sta}^bⁱ^lity^{in Ira}^q,^”^Ma^rc^{h 20}⁰⁸^.
⁵³⁴^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^D^-^C^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵³⁵^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^pr^e^s^s^brⁱ^e^fⁱ^ng^w^{ith C}^o^lo^ne^{l Mik}^e^K^e^r^s^ha^w^,^P^e^nta^g^on,^O^c^tobe^r^5,²⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^traⁿ^sc^ript^s^/^tr^aⁿ^s^c^rⁱ^pt.a^s^p^x^?^tr^aⁿ^s^c^rⁱ^ptid⁼⁴⁰⁵^{3; a}ⁿ^{d c}^o^nv^e^r^s^a^{tion w}^{ith a}^Dⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^on
^C^o^m^m^a^nde^r^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^8.
⁵³⁶^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^N^e^w^s^B^rⁱ^e^fⁱ^ng^{, Ma}^jor^G^e^ne^r^a^{l Ma}^r^k^H^e^r^tli^ng^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^{22, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tid=4¹²⁴^.
⁵³⁷^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith MG}^Oothm^a^{n, Aug}^u^{st 2}⁰⁰⁸^.

The SoI movement was not the product of a carefully crafted strategy by the Government of Iraq
or by coalition forces. Instead, like the “awakenings,” it began from the ground up—in this case,
as a series of ad hoc, neighborhood watch-like initiatives by Iraqis who self-organized and
“deployed” to key locations in their own communities, to dissuade potential trouble-makers. The
response by coalition forces to the dynamic was also initially ad hoc, as some coalition units
provided volunteers in their areas with equipment, or payments in kind for information, or other
forms of support. Frequently, coalition forces named their new partners—with heroic-sounding
names like the “Ghazaliyah Guardians,” or with NFL team names.
MNF-I leaders and commanders on the ground observed that SoIs initially came forward only
after Al Qaeda affiliates and other threats were eliminated from an area. Some commanders also
pointed out that SoIs volunteered to serve once a coalition forces presence had been established—
they had to be convinced that coalition forces would actually remain in the area and not pull back ⁵³⁸
to their FOBs.
After its ad hoc beginnings, the SoI system was loosely standardized by coalition forces, in
coordination with Iraqi security forces counterparts.
Coalition forces paid the SoIs, with funding from the Commanders Emergency Response
Program (CERP), based on 90-day renewable contracts. The money was paid to a single
contractor, often a tribal sheikh or other community leader, who was then responsible for paying
the SoIs’ salaries and providing any uniforms, vehicles or other equipment that might be required.
In practice, most SoIs earned about $300 per month, roughly equivalent to about two-thirds of the
total income of a member of the Iraqi Police. The GoI reportedly agreed to continue to pay ⁵³⁹
roughly the same salary as it assumes responsibility for the SoIs.
SoI salaries varied somewhat by region. In August 2008, for example, Multi-National Division-
Center noted that SoIs in their area each earned about $240 per month. In some cases, U.S. units
established pay-for-performance systems. For example, in Kirkuk, SoI performance was reviewed
daily. If they performed well, they received a bonus. If they did poorly—such as the SoI team that
propped up a scarecrow at a checkpoint they were supposed to be manning—their collective ⁵⁴⁰
contract was docked by $2,000.
In many cases, U.S. division and brigade commanders on the ground reinforced the message that
the SoIs “work for” the ISF, while the coalition forces paid them. In other cases, the ⁵⁴¹
understanding on the ground was that the SoIs work “with” the ISF. In practice, however, SoIs
⁵³⁸
^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^F-^I^a^nd^M^N^C^-^I^le^a^d^e^r^s^,^a^nd^divⁱ^sⁱ^on^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^8.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}
^De^fe^nse^Ne^w^s^Brie^fⁱ^ng^w^{ith Ma}^{jor G}^e^ne^ra^{l W}^a^lte^r^Ga^sk^{in, C}^o^m^m^a^nding^G^e^ne^r^a^{l, MN}^D^-^W^,^I^I^M^EF^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^10,
²⁰⁰^{7, htt}^p^://w^ww^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/traⁿ^sc^ripts/^traⁿ^sc^ript.a^spx^?^tr^aⁿ^sc^riptid=⁴¹^03,^w^h^e^r^e^Ma^{j. G}^e^{n. Ga}^sk^{in note}^d^tha^t
^c^o^a^litio^{n f}^o^rc^e^s^{’ e}^lim^ina^{tion of}^{Al Qa}^e^d^a^pla^y^s^a^role^{in pr}^om^pting^loc^a^l^Ira^{qis t}^o^se^rv^e^.
⁵³⁹^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^,^A^u^g^u^s^t^a^{nd Se}^p^t^e^m^be^r²⁰⁰^8.
⁵⁴⁰^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith U.S. f}^o^rc^e^s^{in Ki}^rk^uk^{, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁵⁴¹^{U.S. m}^ilita^ry^o^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s in Kirk}^uk^{, f}^o^{r e}^x^a^m^ple^,^note^d^tha^t^the^{SoIs i}ⁿ^the^a^r^e^a^c^e^r^ta^inly^did^{not w}^o^rk^f^o^{r the}^I^SF.
^M^o^reo^v^er,^p^e^ri^o^dⁱ^{c t}^eⁿ^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^h^a^{d ari}^s^en^b^e^t^w^een^t^h^{e l}^o^cal^IS^F^,^w^h^o^s^{e l}^ead^ershⁱ^pⁱ^s^p^rⁱ^m^ari^l^y^Ku^rdⁱ^s^h^,^an^d^t^h^{e l}^a^rgel^y
^Sunⁿ^{i A}^r^a^b^SoI^s^.^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^,^A^ugus^{t 2}⁰⁰⁸^.

were intended to fill the gaps—to “thicken the ranks”—where ISF presence was limited, so they ⁵⁴²
were more likely to have regular interaction with coalition forces counterparts.
Most SoIs were hired to man check points or to protect critical infrastructure, and to provide
information about suspicious activity. In August 2008, for example, Multi-National Division-
Center noted that the SoIs in its area maintained 2,159 check points, and had turned in 668 IEDs ⁵⁴³
between June 2007 and August 2008. MNF-I leaders and commanders on the ground have
stressed that SoI contributions have directly saved lives and equipment—as a rule, the level of ⁵⁴⁴
IED attacks in a given area went down after an SoI group was established there. Some
commanders have wryly admitted that part of the reason may be that some SoIs themselves were
formerly IED emplacers.
One new development in 2008 was the formation of some groups of “Daughters of Iraq.” Like the
SoIs, they were security volunteers from local neighborhoods. Their job, after receiving training,
was to work with the ISF to screen female Iraqis, to show respect for Iraqi culture and ⁵⁴⁵
traditions.
Multi-National Force-West leaders noted in the past that “‘concerned local citizen’ was not a term
of art in Al Anbar province,” where security volunteers were organized in several alternative
ways.
In Al Anbar, early tribal offers to provide volunteers were channeled into the formation of
“provincial security forces” (PSF)—a gateway step to joining the Iraqi security forces in a more
permanent capacity. Members of the PSF, who received 80 hours of training from the Marines, ⁵⁴⁶
formally became personnel of the Ministry of Interior, and the MoI pays their salaries. Other ⁵⁴⁷
local residents in Al Anbar have self-organized into neighborhood watch-style organizations.
From its inception, the SoI movement raised some concerns among both Iraqis and some outside
observers.
Some Iraqi Government officials, and representatives of official and unofficial groups in Iraq,
who might otherwise have extraordinarily little in common, shared a concern that the SoIs could
⁵⁴²
^P^a^r^tic^ipaⁿ^t^o^b^s^e^r^v^a^{tion, a}ⁿ^{d i}ⁿ^te^r^v^iew^s^w^{ith div}ⁱ^sⁱ^on^aⁿ^d^br^ig^a^d^e^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^8.
⁵⁴³^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MND-C of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^{st 20}^08.
⁵⁴⁴^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^ith^MN^F-^I^,^MN^D^-^B^a^g^hda^{d, MN}^D^-^C^e^nte^r^aⁿ^{d M}^N^D^-^N^o^r^t^{h le}^a^d^e^r^s^,^J^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^{. Se}^e
^a^l^s^o^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^P^r^e^s^s^B^r^ie^fⁱ^ng^w^{ith C}^O^L^Mik^e^K^e^r^s^haw^,^O^c^tobe^r^{5, 2}⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^h^ttp^:^//www^.d^efen^selin^k^.^m^il/^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.asp^x^?^tran^sc^rip^tid⁼⁴⁰⁵³^.^COL^Kersh^a^wⁿ^o^t^{es th}^{at i}ⁿ^hⁱ^s^b^a^{ttle sp}^ace,
^SO^I^s^ha^{d e}^s^ta^blis^he^{d t}^h^eⁱ^r^ow^{n c}^h^e^c^k^points^aⁿ^{d s}^e^c^u^r^e^{d t}^hos^e^r^o^a^d^s^.^H^e^a^dds^t^h^a^t^{, s}ⁱ^nc^e^t^h^e^SO^I^s^be^g^a^{n w}^o^r^k^ing^,^I^E^D
^a^tta^c^k^s^w^e^r^e^dow^{n, a}^{nd t}^h^e^SO^I^s^ha^{d t}^u^rⁿ^e^d^in,^or^gⁱ^v^e^{n inf}^o^r^m^a^{tion a}^b^o^u^t,^“^o^v^e^r⁸⁵^te^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^s^.^”
⁵⁴⁵^{See Mu}^lti^-Natioⁿ^a^l^Fo^rce-Iraq^p^r^{ess c}^oⁿ^f^eren^{ce tran}^scrip^t^{, Brig}^ad^{ier G}^eⁿ^e^r^a^{l Dav}ⁱ^d^P^e^rkⁱⁿ^s,^MNF-I^Sp^o^k^es^m^aⁿ^an^d
^MG^Moha^m^m^e^{d a}^l^A^s^k^a^rⁱ^{, MoD}^Spok^e^s^m^a^{n, J}^u^ly^{30, 20}⁰⁸^.
⁵⁴⁶^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^F-^W^e^s^t^s^t^af^f^,²⁰⁰^7.
⁵⁴⁷^Se^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^N^e^w^s^B^r^ie^fⁱ^ng^{, Ma}^jor^G^e^ne^r^a^{l Wa}^lte^r^G^a^s^k^{in, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^{10, 2}⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tid=4¹⁰³^.

return to violence, form new militias, or otherwise pose a threat to the authority or influence they ⁵⁴⁸
currently enjoy.
Key Shi’a leaders of the Government of Iraq apparently had concerns about a potential ground-up
challenge to their leadership, based on Shi’a tribal organizations, which could theoretically grow
out of SoI groups in the south. Prime Minister Maliki named a very close associate, a Shi’a Arab,
to head the Implementation and Follow-up Committee on National Reconciliation (IFCNR), the
body responsible, among other matters, for facilitating the integration of SoIs into Iraqi ⁵⁴⁹
government structures. In turn, neither supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr nor members of the
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq—or the militias that support them—were apparently eager to
face competition for influence in Shi’a-populated southern Iraq.
Meanwhile, a leading Sunni Arab political party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, reportedly viewed the
SoIs and related awakening movements as potential organized competitors for support among
Sunni Arab Iraqis. Some observers suggested that northern Kurds, in turn, might be reluctant to
see the rise of more organized Sunni Arab constituencies, including armed potential fighters, in
politically contested cities such as Kirkuk.
In December 2007, at a session of the Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS), Iraqi
government and coalition leaders reached an agreement confirming the ground rules for the SoI
program. Those rules included a cap on the total number of SoIs nationwide, of 103,000, as well
as a complete prohibition against SoI recruitment and hiring in Multi-National Division-
Southeast’s area—Iraq’s four southernmost, largely Shi’a-inhabited, provinces. The rules also
stipulated, for example, that SoIs could not represent political parties, that SoI groups must reflect ⁵⁵⁰
the demographic balance in their area, and that coalition forces could not arm the SoIs.
Following the December MCNS session, key Iraqi leaders—including Prime Minister Maliki, his
National Security Advisor Mowaffaq al-Rubbaie, and ISCI leader Abdul Aziz Hakim—all
publicly expressed support for the SOI program.
Meanwhile, outside observers expressed concerns that the SoI movement might create an
alternative—and a potential future challenge—to the national government’s monopoly on the
legitimate use of violence, by empowering new forces that may or may not support the central
government in the future. “At worst,” one observer commented, “it will perpetuate a fractured ⁵⁵¹
and fractious Iraq.”
From the outset, the Government of Iraq (GoI) and coalition forces shared the view that the SoI
program would be temporary. The “way forward” agreed to in December 2007 included, in
⁵⁴⁸
^A^s^s^e^ss^m^e^{nts by}^{MNF-I a}^{nd MN}^{C-I le}^a^d^e^r^{s a}^{nd sta}^f^f^,^Ja^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^{8. Se}^e^a^l^{so W}^illia^m^{S. Mc}^Ca^lliste^{r, “}^Ira^{qi Isla}^mⁱ^c
^P^a^r^t^y^,^K^u^r^d^s^,^a^{nd t}^h^e^T^r^iba^l^A^w^ak^eⁿ^ing^,^”^J^a^nua^r^y^{18, 2}⁰⁰⁸^,^un^pu^b^lis^he^d^pa^pe^r^.
⁵⁴⁹^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^F-^I^a^nd^M^N^C^-^I^le^a^d^e^r^s^a^{nd s}^t^a^f^f^,^inc^l^uding^s^o^m^e^w^{ho ha}^v^e^w^o^r^k^e^d^pe^r^s^ona^ll^y^w^{ith I}^F^C^N^R^,
^J^a^nua^r^y^2008.
⁵⁵⁰^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^F-^I^a^nd^M^N^C^-^I^s^t^a^f^f^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵⁵¹^Aⁿ^thony^B^uba^lo^{, “}^L^aw^r^e^nc^e^of^A^r^a^b^ia^is^{out of}^pl^{ace i}ⁿ^Iraq^,^”^Fi^nancⁱ^a^{l Tim}^e^s^,^No^vem^b^{er 1}¹^,²⁰⁰⁷^.^S^{ee al}^so^,^f^o^r
^e^x^am^ple^,^Iⁿ^te^r^v^iew^w^{ith T}^oby^D^o^dg^e^,^For^e^igⁿ^Polic^y^Oⁿ^line^,^Se^pte^m^be^r^2007,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.f^or^eⁱ^g^npolic^y^.^c^o^m^/^s^t^or^y^/^cm^s^.^php?^s^t^or^y^_^id=³⁹^82.

principle, integrating some SoIs—roughly 20%—into the Iraqi security forces, and facilitating
employment for the rest in the public or private sector. In either case, the plans included getting ⁵⁵²
the SoIs off of the CERP payroll; the initial goal was July 2008. As the GoI began to assume
direct responsibility for the SoIs in late 2008, the basic goal of integration remained in force.
By any measure, the transition of SoIs into permanent jobs proceeded slowly. Accurately
recording the data has sometimes proven difficult, since the SoI population has not been static—
new members were being recruited as some old members were “transitioned.” MNF-I noted that
between December 2, 2007, and August 16, 2008, 5,189 SoIs transitioned to the Iraqi Police, 53
SoIs transitioned into other Iraqi security forces, and 2,515 SoIs transitioned into “non-security”
jobs. During that time, an additional 3,547 SoIs quit, were killed in action, went missing, or were
dismissed for disciplinary reasons. Previously, in 2007 before the December 2 decision, ⁵⁵³
approximately 3,900 “concerned local citizens” were hired by the Iraqi Police.
For most of the SoIs interested in joining the ISF, the top choice has been the Iraqi Police, which ⁵⁵⁴
would allow them to continue to serve in their local communities. An application process is in
place for SoIs seeking to become IPs, but it is cumbersome. After the SoI declares his interest,
local-level screenings are carried out by coalition forces, local civilian officials, local tribal
sheikhs, and appropriate ISF representatives. The review process considers, among other issues,
an applicant’s background, proof of residency, and any special skills the applicant may have, as
well as the area’s demographic balance. Formal ISF requirements also include literacy, a physical
fitness test, and a medical check. Those candidates who pass through these reviews are referred to
the Implementation and Follow-up Committee on National Reconciliation (IFCNR), attached to
the office of the Prime Minister, for approval. Candidates approved by IFCNR are forwarded to
the Ministry of Interior for vetting, selection and—if successful—the issuing of hiring orders. ⁵⁵⁵
Applications do not specifically state that a candidate is a SoI. One major constraint on the
incorporation of SoIs into the Iraqi Police is that the MoI’s personnel and training systems are
overloaded and cannot easily absorb a large influx of new personnel. Another constraint is the ⁵⁵⁶
reported continuing reluctance on the part of some MoI officials to bring SoIs on board.
For those SoIs not incorporated into the ISF, the broad intent is to facilitate their transition into ⁵⁵⁷
civilian jobs—ideally, jobs that are both sustainable and actually productive. One major
constraint remains the absence of a thriving and diverse private sector, so most proposals and
programs to date have focused on potential state sector jobs.
In 2008, the Coalition worked with several Iraqi ministries to establish the Joint Technical
Education and Reintegration Program (JTERP), which was launched in two pilot locations on
⁵⁵²
^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^F-^I^a^nd^M^N^C^-^I^s^t^a^f^f^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵⁵³^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNF-I of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s,^A^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.
⁵⁵⁴^Iⁿ^J^u^ne²⁰⁰⁸^{, s}^o^m^e^w^h^a^t^unus^ua^ll^y^,^a^br^ig^a^d^e^{in Multi}^-^N^a^tiona^{l D}ⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^on-^C^e^nte^r^r^e^p^o^r^t^e^d^t^h^a^t^it^w^a^s^g^o^ing^thr^oug^{h a}
^“^r^e^c^r^uiting^driv^e^”^{to g}^e^{t S}^o^{Is to}^j^oⁱⁿ^the^Ira^qi^A^r^m^y^{, a}^{nd ha}^{d m}^e^{t w}^{ith som}^e^suc^c^e^{ss. Se}^e^De^pa^rt^m^e^{nt of}^De^f^e^nse^Ne^ws^nd^rd
^Brie^fⁱ^ng^{, Colone}^{l T}^e^rry^Fe^rre^{ll, 2}^Bri^g^ad^e,³^Iⁿ^f^a^ntr^y^Dⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on, J}^une¹⁹^,²⁰^08,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//www^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tid=4²⁴⁷^.
⁵⁵⁵^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^F-^I^,^MN^C^-^I^,^a^{nd c}^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵⁵⁶^In^terv^iew^s^w^ith^{MNF-I, MNC-I,}^a^{nd MN}^ST^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵⁵⁷^T^h^e^{U.S. A}^g^eⁿ^c^y^f^o^{r Inte}^rna^tion^a^{l De}^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t, f}^o^r^e^x^am^ple^,^r^uⁿ^s^a^C^o^m^m^unity^Sta^b^iliz^a^tion^P^r^og^r^a^m^,^w^h^ic^h
^ty^pic^a^l^l^y^pay^s^r^e^la^tiv^e^l^y^lo^w^s^a^la^rⁱ^e^s^—^a^ppr^ox^im^a^t^e^l^y^{$90 pe}^r^m^ont^h—^{in e}^x^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^f^o^r^ta^s^k^s^s^u^c^h^a^s^g^a^r^b^a^g^e^c^o^lle^c^tion.
^{For SO}^Is^{’ tra}ⁿ^s^itio^{n i}ⁿ^t^o^the^cⁱ^v^ili^aⁿ^w^o^{rld, t}^h^e^g^o^a^l^is^t^o^fⁱ^{nd, w}^h^e^r^e^pos^sⁱ^ble^,^m^o^re^dire^c^tly^produc^ti^v^e^em^plo^y^m^e^nt.

March 23, 2008.⁵⁵⁸ The program was designed to include vocational training, on-the-job training, ⁵⁵⁹
and job placement, with priority to SoIs and recently released detainees. In August 2008, U.S.
commanders on the ground reported that little progress had been made—that the program, in the ⁵⁶⁰
words of one commander, had “stalled.”
Another initiative in 2008, launched by MNC-I based on the recommendation of commanders on
the ground, proposed the creation of “Civil Service Departments” (CSDs), as part of a new Civil ⁵⁶¹
Services Corps, modeled loosely on the New Deal-era Civilian Conservation Corps. As
planned, the CSDs would provide essential services such as electricity, sewage, and sports, to
complement, not replace, those already provided by existing Iraqi government bodies. In early
2008, MNC-I launched a pilot CSD project in the Ar Rashid district of Baghdad, including 390
employees drawn in part from former SoIs, and in August 2008, a CSD with about 500 employees
opened in Kirkuk.
MNC-I planned to provide some initial funding for the project with the goal of transferring full
funding responsibility to the Iraqi government during calendar year 2009. The theory, explained
one Brigade Commander, was “build it and they will come”—that is, once the new structure ⁵⁶²
demonstrated its worth, the Iraqi government would fully embrace the initiative. For its part,
IFCNR expressed initial support, encouraging increasing both the size and number of the
proposed CSDs, and reportedly agreeing to pay the salaries of CSD employees, while the ⁵⁶³
coalition provided equipment and training costs.
As of August 2008, however, MNC-I officials noted that progress on establishing the CSDs was
very slow. One commander on the ground stated, “Frankly, we’re not getting anywhere—there’s ⁵⁶⁴
no apparent way forward for the program.” By late summer 2008, MNC-I officials began to
consider alternatives, including a “rapid employment initiative,” a temporary measure that would
put people back to work—for example, cleaning the streets—and provide them with some ⁵⁶⁵
income.
In September 2008, the Government of Iraq announced that it planned to assume responsibility
for the Sons of Iraq as of October 2008, far ahead of the long-standing rough timeline. At a press
conference that month, Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir explained that the Sons of Iraq were
“our sons, our citizens,” so it was perfectly natural for the GoI to assume responsibility for them.
He noted that the SoIs had contributed to security, and the GoI would be “loyal” to them. He
added, however, that all Iraqi citizens are subject to the law, and so “the government might arrest
or detain some elements” of the SoIs. In that case, he noted, Iraqi ministries would be responsible
⁵⁵⁸
^T^h^e^tw^{o pilots}^a^r^e^l^o^c^a^t^e^d^{in T}ⁱ^k^r^{it a}ⁿ^d^Ma^hm^udiy^a^{h. T}^h^e^s^e^c^ond^pha^s^e^is^s^c^he^du^le^{d t}^oⁱⁿ^c^l^ude^tw^{o la}^r^g^e^r^pilots^,ⁱⁿ
^Kⁱ^r^k^uk^a^{nd Fa}^ll^uja^h^{. I}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^F-^I^,^Ma^r^c^{h 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵⁵⁹^Se^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“^M^e^a^s^ur^ing^Sta^b^il^ity^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{in I}^r^a^q^,”^Ma^r^c^{h 2}⁰⁰⁸^{; a}^{nd i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^om^MN^F-^I^,
^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd Ma}^r^c^{h 20}⁰⁸^.
⁵⁶⁰^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^a^{nd s}^u^bor^dina^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.
⁵⁶¹^Inf^o^rm^a^{tion a}^bou^{t t}^h^e^CSDⁱⁿ^itia^tiv^e^,^inc^l^u^d^ing^t^h^e^Jⁱ^ha^d^pil^o^{t, f}^r^o^m^MN^{C-I off}ⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^2008.
⁵⁶²^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith B}^r^ig^a^d^e^C^o^m^m^a^nde^r^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^8.
⁵⁶³^In^f^o^rm^atioⁿ^f^r^o^m^MNF-I^an^d^M^N^{C-I, March}²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵⁶⁴^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^nd^MN^D^-^B^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁵⁶⁵^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith MNC-I of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}^8.

for protecting the detained SoIs from attack or harassment by elements of AQI or the former ⁵⁶⁶
ruling Ba’ath Party. U.S. civilian and military officials in Iraq expressed concerns about the
GoI initiative, including the possibility that the GoI might use the assumption of responsibility to ⁵⁶⁷
disband the SoIs without providing adequate follow-on employment.
On October 1, 2008, the GoI assumed responsibility for the approximately 54,000 SoIs in
Baghdad province. Reportedly there were no immediate mass desertions of their posts by SoIs, or ⁵⁶⁸
a higher level than usual of detentions of SoIs by Iraqi security forces. In mid-November, the
GoI, through the Baghdad Operations Command, paid monthly salaries to those SoIs. The GoI
was scheduled to assume responsibility for SoIs in Diyala province in December 2009, and for all
remaining SoIs by mid-2009.
By 2008, the broad “reconciliation” intent had extended to an additional subset of the Iraqi
population—those who had been detained by coalition forces. Coalition detainee operations were
adjusted substantially at the end of 2008, as the new U.S.-Iraqi “SOFA” went into effect.
By the beginning of 2008, coalition detainee operations had evolved markedly from the days of
the formal occupation, when they were characterized by under-staffing, limited facilities, and—
due to ongoing aggressive military operations—a large and quickly growing detainee population.
In the early days, it was common to find local communities frustrated first by detentions they
perceived to be groundless, and then by the difficulty of determining the location and status of ⁵⁶⁹
those detained.
One important, gradual change, according to coalition officials, was much better accountability,
based on the introduction of biometrics, better information-sharing throughout the detention
system, and simply better cultural familiarity with the multi-part names commonly used in the ⁵⁷⁰
region.
A second major change, introduced by MNF-I beginning in late 2007, was a set of “COIN inside
the wire” practices, designed to identify and separate the true “irreconcilables” from the rest of ⁵⁷¹
the detainees.
⁵⁶⁶
^{See Mu}^lti^-Natioⁿ^a^l^Fo^rce-Iraq^p^r^{ess c}^oⁿ^f^eren^{ce tran}^scrip^t^{, Min}ⁱ^ste^r^o^f^Defen^s^e^A^b^d^al-Qad^ir,^Sep^t^e^m^b^e^{r 1}⁰^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
^On^{e can}ⁱ^m^a^gⁱⁿ^{e t}^h^at^no^t^al^l^S^oⁿ^s^o^f^Iraq^w^o^u^l^dⁿ^ecessari^l^y^fⁱⁿ^d^t^h^{e M}ⁱⁿⁱ^st^{er’s w}^o^rd^{s reassu}^riⁿ^g^.
⁵⁶⁷^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith U}^.^{S. Em}^ba^s^s^y^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^{nd MN}^F-^I^aⁿ^{d MN}^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^{nd w}^{ith s}^ubor^di^na^te^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t
²⁰⁰^8.
⁵⁶⁸^In^f^o^rm^atioⁿ^f^r^o^m^{MNC-I o}^f^fⁱ^ci^{als, Octo}^b^e^{r 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵⁶⁹^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^C^P^A^a^{nd C}^J^T^F^-⁷^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,²⁰⁰^{3 a}ⁿ^d²⁰⁰⁴^.
⁵⁷⁰^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^om^MN^F-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵⁷¹^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^F-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.

These approaches were based partly on a better understanding of the detainee population, which
apparently includes far more opportunists than ring-leaders—for example, under-employed young
men who agree to emplace an IED in exchange for a one-time payment. The pervasiveness of
“opportunism” as a motive seems to be corroborated by the low recidivism rate—about 9 out of ⁵⁷²

100, as of January 2008.

According to coalition officials, in the past, the coalition used its theater internment facilities
simply to “warehouse” detainees. Those facilities effectively served as “jihadist universities”
where detainees with extremist agendas could recruit and train followers.
As part of “COIN inside the wire,” the coalition isolated the hard-core cases in higher-security
compounds, removing their influence. Meanwhile, the coalition cultivated the majority of the
detainee population by providing detainees with voluntary literacy programs, to the grammar
school level, for illiterate detainees. Vocational training programs, including wood working,
sewing and masonry, and opportunities to earn a small income during detention were introduced.
These included a brick factory at Camp Bucca where detainees earn money by making bricks,
which are stamped with the inscription, in Arabic, “rebuilding the nation brick by brick.” Imams
visit the facilities to provide detainees, on a voluntary basis, with religious education. A family ⁵⁷³
visitation program has allowed about 1,600 visits per week. According to a senior coalition ⁵⁷⁴
official, “Now detainees themselves point out the trouble-makers.”
A third initiative is a series of detainee releases, an effort given additional impetus by ongoing
U.S.-Iraqi negotiations over a Status of Forces Agreement-like document, which is expected to
establish new rules and procedures for detention operations. According to Task Force-134, the
organization under MNF-I that is responsible for detainee operations, after January 1, 2009, there
will be no more “security internees.” There may be conditions under which U.S. forces may ⁵⁷⁵
retain physical custody of Iraqis, but the Government of Iraq will have legal custody.
TF-134 officials noted in August 2008 that for about 9% of detainees at that time, U.S. forces had
“releasable evidence with legal sufficiency in Iraqi courts.” Of concern to U.S. civilian and
military officials are the members of the rest of the “legacy” population” of detainees, for whom
no such evidence exists, but who may pose security risks to the Iraqi population or to U.S. forces ⁵⁷⁶
in Iraq.
To help streamline the problem—and to further the cause of reconciliation—MNF-I, through TF-
134, launched an accelerated, targeted detainee release program. Releases are based on reviews
by the MNF-I Review Committee. Detainees themselves are given the opportunity to present their
side of the story, and good behavior during detention is taken into consideration. TF-134 noted in
⁵⁷²
^Ov^e^r^78%^of^those^de^ta^ine^d^by^c^o^a^litio^{n f}^o^rc^e^s^a^r^e^inte^rne^d^ba^se^d^{on s}^u^spic^ioⁿ^of^som^e^IED-re^l^a^te^{d a}^c^tiv^it^y^.^T^h^e
^r^e^cⁱ^divⁱ^sm^r^a^te^is^ba^s^e^{d on}^num^e^r^ic^a^l^da^ta^{. T}^h^e^un^de^r^-^e^m^p^lo^y^m^eⁿ^{t a}^s^s^e^s^s^m^e^{nt is}^ba^s^e^{d o}ⁿ^a^c^c^oun^ts^f^r^om^de^ta^ine^e^s^.
^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^om^Ta^s^k^For^c^e^-¹³⁴^{, B}^a^g^hda^{d, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵⁷³^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^F-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^p^r^{il 20}^08,^aⁿ^d^s^e^e^D^onna^Mile^s^,^“^A^nti-^Iⁿ^s^u^r^g^eⁿ^c^y^T^a^c^tics
^Su^cceedⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^Ira^qⁱ^Deten^tⁱ^oⁿ^Fa^{cilities,” Ameri}^can^Fo^{rces P}^r^{ess S}^e^rv^{ice, M}^a^rch¹²^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵⁷⁴^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^T^a^s^k^For^c^e^-^{134, B}^a^g^hda^d^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^8.
⁵⁷⁵^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith T}^F^-¹³⁴^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁵⁷⁶^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith U}^.^{S. Em}^ba^s^s^y^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^MN^F-^I^a^{nd MN}^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^als^,^a^{nd T}^F^-¹³⁴^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.

August 2008 that word had apparently got back to detainees that good behavior counts, and can
accelerate the parole date.
In the past, some U.S. ground commanders had expressed concerns about the practical
implications of the program, wondering in particular how jobs would be found for the released
detainees, and what would restrain them from low-level, opportunistic criminality if full-⁵⁷⁷
employment jobs were not found. Partly to help allay such concerns, representatives of the
“battle space owners” were included as participants in the board deliberations and decisions.
The release program makes use of a guarantor system, in which tribal sheikhs and other local
leaders may vouch for, and accept responsibility for, the future good conduct of detainees ⁵⁷⁸
released back to their communities. Release ceremonies are formal events, and former
detainees swear an oath to Iraq.
During 2007, the detainee population grew from about 14,000 at the start of the year to a peak of

26,000 in November, due to surge operations and better incoming information from Iraqi sources.

As of September 2008, there were about 19,000 detainees in coalition theater internment
facilities. During the month of Ramadan, which coincided with September 2008, the coalition ⁵⁷⁹
scheduled 3,000 releases.

From the earliest days after major combat operations, civilian and military coalition leaders in
Iraq recognized the central importance of the governance and economics “lines of operation”—
indeed, military commanders have consistently viewed them as essential counterparts to security.
The 2007 surge “theory of the case” adjusted the sequencing—improved security would now lay
the groundwork for progress in governance and economics—but all three lines of operation
remained essential to long-term success. The Iraqi government would have the lead role in
governance and economics, but the coalition, including civilian and military personnel, would
support their efforts.
The key tension over time has centered on the balance of civilian and military roles and
responsibilities in these areas. While all practitioners agreed that civilian agencies are best placed,
by training and experience, to lead the governance and economics lines of operation, civilian
efforts have been hampered by the relatively limited resources of their agencies, and by delayed
and limited staffing. Military forces, with far greater numbers of “boots on the ground,” have
sometimes stepped in to spearhead these efforts, and have consistently played at least a
supporting role.
⁵⁷⁷
^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^{ith g}^r^o^uⁿ^d^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^{. O}ⁿ^e^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^,^a^s^k^e^{d f}^o^r^his^vⁱ^e^w^s^a^{bout the}^pr^oc^e^s^s^,
^si^m^p^l^y^e^x^cl^ai^med^,^“Doⁿ^’^t^{go t}^h^er^e!”
⁵⁷⁸^T^h^e^use^of^a^“^g^ua^ra^{ntor sy}^st^e^m^”^f^o^{r ta}^rg^e^t^e^d^de^ta^ine^e^re^le^a^s^e^s^wa^s^initia^lly^a^pplie^dⁱⁿ^Ira^{q i}ⁿ²⁰⁰⁴^{, I}ⁿ^f^o^rm^a^tion
^f^r^o^m^CJ^T^F^{-7, 2}⁰⁰⁴^.
⁵⁷⁹^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^T^a^s^k^For^c^e^-^{134, B}^a^g^hda^d^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^{8, a}^{nd f}^r^om^MN^F-^I^,^Ma^r^c^{h a}ⁿ^{d A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.^Se^e^a^l^s^o
^Multi-N^a^ti^ona^l^Forc^e^-Ira^q^P^r^e^s^s^Re^le^a^s^e⁰⁸⁰⁹^08,^“⁴³³^D^e^ta^ine^e^s^Re^le^a^s^e^d^by^Coa^{lition F}^o^rc^e^s^D^u^ring^Ra^m^a^da^n,”
^Se^pte^m^be^r^{8, 20}⁰⁸^.

The 2007 surge included a revitalization of the civilian/military Provincial Reconstruction Team
effort. At the same time, as security conditions on the ground improved, in 2007 and 2008,
military units turned a greater share of their own attention to governance and economic activities.
The idea to apply coordinated civilian and military capabilities at the provincial level in Iraq dates
from before the start of the formal occupation. Throughout, that “coordination” has had two
important aspects: coordination within civil/military teams assigned to the provinces, and
coordination between those teams and their military unit counterparts.
Early military operational-level post-war plans called for provincial-level “Governorate Support
Teams,” led by State Department personnel and including military Civil Affairs officers and ⁵⁸⁰
representatives of the U.S. Agency for International Development.
Under the Coalition Provisional Authority, those plans began to be realized, with some delays and
in slightly modified form. The State Department (and some coalition partner countries) provided
Foreign Service Officers to serve as “Governorate Coordinators,” who were eventually supported
by small, civil/military staffs. In August 2003—before most provinces were staffed—CPA and
CJTF-7 launched what became a regular series of regional meetings, bringing Division
Commanders and CPA Coordinators from Iraq’s provinces to Baghdad, to share concerns and ⁵⁸¹
lessons learned.
At the end of the formal occupation—and thus the tenure of the CPA—the new U.S. Embassy
established several Regional Embassy Offices to provide consular services, but the provincially
based “GC” system was disestablished.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), per se, were established in Iraq in 2005, as provincially
based offices led by State Department officials, with mixed civilian/military staffs. The term
“PRT” was borrowed from Afghanistan, where PRTs, primarily military-staffed, take a wide
variety of forms, depending in part on which coalition country leads them. As of 2008, the stated
purpose of the PRTs in Iraq was as follows: “To assist Iraq’s provincial and local governments’
capacity to develop a transparent and sustained capability to govern, while supporting economic, ⁵⁸²
political, and social development and respect for the rule of law.”
In 2007, as part of the surge, the PRT effort was expanded in scale, on the premise that increased
security would create growing opportunities for meaningful economic and governance work at
the provincial level. In June 2007, President Bush praised the effort, noting: “Much of the
progress we are seeing is the result of the work of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These
⁵⁸⁰
^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^C^F^L^C^C^a^{nd V}^C^o^r^p^s^pla^nne^r^s^,²⁰⁰³^.
⁵⁸¹^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^C^P^A^a^{nd C}^J^T^F^-⁷^s^t^a^f^f^,^a^{nd pa}^r^ticⁱ^p^aⁿ^t^obs^e^r^v^a^ti^on,²⁰⁰³^.
⁵⁸²^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^the^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^of^P^r^ov^incⁱ^a^l^A^f^f^a^ir^s^,^U^.^{S. Em}^ba^s^s^y^B^a^g^hda^{d, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^8.

teams bring together military and civilian experts to help local Iraqi communities pursue ⁵⁸³
reconciliation, strengthen moderates, and speed the transition to Iraqi self-reliance.”
PRTs are based on a Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of State and the
Department of Defense, signed on February 22, 2007, and retroactively applicable to previously
established PRTs. The Memorandum named PRTs “a joint DoS-DoD mission,” which falls “under
joint policy guidance from the Chief of Mission and the Commander of MNF-I.” By mandate, the
Department of State leads the PRTs, the PRTs report to the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) at
the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, and the Chief of Mission “provides political and economic
guidance and direction to all PRTs.” Brigade Combat Team commanders partnered with PRTs ⁵⁸⁴
exercise authority only for “security and movement of personnel.”
As of August 2008, there were 31 PRT-like structures in Iraq, with about 800 total staff. These
teams “cover” all of Iraq—but that coverage is uneven. The 31 teams included 14 full PRTs; 13
smaller “embedded PRTs” (ePRTs) partnered with Brigade Combat Teams; and 4 non-self-
sustaining “provincial support teams” which are based with a full PRT but cover another
location—that is, personnel based in Irbil cover Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk in northern Iraq, and ⁵⁸⁵
personnel based in Dhi Qar cover Muthanna and Maysan in southern Iraq.
The size and composition of the various forms of PRTs varies substantially. The embedded PRTs
may be as small as a four- or six-person core staff. Full PRTs may range from the streamlined ⁵⁸⁶
staff of 16 in Najaf, to 53 in Mosul and about 70 in Kirkuk. While PRTs typically work closely
with U.S. military Civil Affairs teams, those CA are not typically counted as working “for” the
PRTs. Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) may also work closely with—but not for—PRTs; HTTs
include highly trained social scientists recruited to help maneuver units map the cultural
environment.
In January 2008, the single largest group of PRT personnel was “locally engaged staff.” Of the
798 personnel on duty, 73 were State Department Foreign Service Officers, and 25 were USAID
Foreign Service Officers. The U.S. Departments of Agriculture and Justice provided specific,
critical expertise in small numbers—16 and 6, respectively. Contractors and Department of ⁵⁸⁷
Defense personnel—civilian and military—filled many of the remaining slots.
By August 2008, OPA noted that about “85% of the DoD civilians” who were sent in, in 2007, to
backfill vacant positions, had been replaced by “Department of State hires”—either “3161’s” or ⁵⁸⁸
outside contractors. Some of those hires provided highly specialized skills. For example, the
ePRT that covers the part of Baghdad that includes the zoo includes an epidemiologist. The PRT
⁵⁸³
^C^ite^{d i}ⁿ^“^I^r^a^q^P^R^T^s^”^br^oc^hur^e^,^U^.^{S. A}^g^eⁿ^cy^f^o^r^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tio^na^{l D}^e^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t, Se}^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰⁷^.
⁵⁸⁴^“^M^e^m^or^a^ndum^of^A^g^r^e^em^eⁿ^t,”^d^a^te^{d Fe}^br^ua^r^y^22,²⁰⁰⁷^{, s}ⁱ^gⁿ^e^d^by^D^e^puty^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^o^f^Sta^t^e^N^e^g^r^o^pon^te^aⁿ^d
^D^e^puty^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^o^f^D^e^f^e^ns^e^Engla^nd.
⁵⁸⁵^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^of^P^r^ovⁱⁿ^cⁱ^a^l^A^f^f^a^ir^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.^A^s^of^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^{8, t}^h^e^e^P^R^T^s^inc^l^ude^d^{8 i}ⁿ^B^a^g^hda^d^,
^{3 in}^A^nba^r^,¹^{in D}ⁱ^y^a^la^{, a}^{nd 1}ⁱⁿ^nor^t^h^e^r^{n B}^a^bi^{l. I}ⁿ^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^,^MN^D^-^C^e^nte^r^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^note^d^theⁱ^r^inte^nt^to^p^u^s^h^a^f^u^ll
^P^R^T^o^u^{t t}^o^Ma^y^s^aⁿ^pr^ov^inc^e^,^t^o^c^o^-^l^oc^a^t^e^w^{ith a}^U^.^S.^ba^tta^lio^n;^PR^T^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^ha^{d be}^eⁿ^ope^r^a^ti^ng^a^s^a^PST^out^of^D^hⁱ
^Q^a^r^pr^ov^inc^e^,^a⁴⁵^-^m^inute^f^lig^ht^a^w^ay^.
⁵⁸⁶^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith O}^P^A^a^nd^P^R^T^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁵⁸⁷^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith O}^P^A^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁵⁸⁸^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith OP}^A^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, Aug}^u^{st 2}⁰⁰⁸^.

in Najaf, where a new commercial airport opened in 2008, includes a retired Air Force pilot who ⁵⁸⁹
ran a commercial airport in Arizona.
Also in August 2008, in addition to military individual augmentees provided by DOD, some
maneuver units on the ground in Iraq had contributed personnel directly to their partner PRTs, to
help shore up their efforts. MND-Baghdad officials noted that they had provided 20 personnel to
the Baghdad PRT. An MNF-West official noted that, as of October 15, MNF-West itself was
“getting out of the civil-military operations business,” and would instead contribute 30 or 40
Marines to work directly for the PRT. “The time is right,” an MNF-West official noted, “to ⁵⁹⁰
transition the whole effort” to the PRT.
Within PRTs, the civil/military balance of responsibilities varies by location. At the Baghdad PRT,
for example, as of January 2008, members of the U.S. military had the lead responsibility for PRT
operations, and for all infrastructure projects and half of the rule of law efforts (including police,
detainees, and prisons). They shared responsibility with civilian counterparts for economics and ⁵⁹¹
governance initiatives.
Perhaps more important in terms of current impact than civil/military coordination within PRTs,
is civil/military coordination between PRTs and the military units they partner with. In Iraq in
August 2008, these relationships varied a great deal.
Each ePRT is co-located and partnered with a Brigade Combat Team (BCT). Some ePRTs have
their own transportation and force protection assets, and thus are able to operate independently.
Others—including some of the smallest ePRTs in Baghdad—rely on their partner BCT to support
their operations. In August 2008, the head of one particularly small ePRT noted that his usual ⁵⁹²
practice is to accompany the BCT commander on his daily movements around the battle space.
In August 2008, OPA confirmed that the ePRTs formally report up through their respective
provincial PRTs to the Office of Provincial Affairs at the U.S. Embassy. The ePRTs have a
“coordination” relationship with their partner BCTs. For example, members of one ePRT noted
that when they write a cable, they show it to the BCT commander, not for “clearance” but simply
for input. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in some cases, BCT commanders request information
and point out areas where ePRTs could help. In August 2008, officials at one multi-national
division noted that in practice, ePRT members “take direction from the BCT commander.” Some ⁵⁹³
ePRTs may thus function more like a BCT staff section than a partner organization.
The much-larger full PRTs typically operate much more independently. There is great variation in
the type of military units PRTs are partnered with, which range from a BCT that has responsibility
for the same province, as in north central Iraq; to a single two-star headquarters, as in the
partnership with MNF-West in Al Anbar province; to, in the case of the Baghdad PRT, two
⁵⁸⁹
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith B}^a^g^hda^{d e}^P^R^T^a^{nd N}^a^ja^f^P^R^T^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵⁹⁰^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^D^-^B^a^g^hda^{d of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^a^{nd MN}^F-^W^e^s^t^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁵⁹¹^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^of^P^r^ovⁱⁿ^cⁱ^a^l^A^f^f^a^ir^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰^8.
⁵⁹²^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith e}^P^R^T^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁵⁹³^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^D^,^B^C^T^a^nd^P^R^T^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.

Division headquarters (MND-Baghdad, responsible for the city, and MND-Center, responsible for
other parts of the province).
U.S. military commanders on the ground typically praise their collaboration with the ePRTs. The
staff of one BCT in Baghdad, pleased with their ePRT, reportedly praise them by saying, “You
can’t tell they’re civilians!” U.S. military attitudes toward, and patterns of cooperation with, the ^st^th
full PRTs are more varied. In August 2008 in Kirkuk, leaders of the 1 brigade of 10 Mountain
Division and its partner PRT unanimously underscored the closeness of their working
relationship—their integrated organization and regular collaboration were evident in their
descriptions of the shared challenges they faced and initiatives to meet those challenges. In
another region in August 2008, a multi-national division official, asked about their relationship ⁵⁹⁴
with PRT partners, replied with emphasis, “We like our ePRTs....”
In general, military commanders in Iraq have stressed the need for far more of the PRTs’ expertise
and presence, particularly once the security climate began to improve. Some commanders have
asked, “Where’s the civilian surge?” while some officials at MNF-I put it more bluntly: “Get ⁵⁹⁵
State out here!”
Looking ahead, one division commander noted in August 2008, “This is a window of opportunity
with the lowest attack rates ever. Embassy people should be out more every day now, like we
are.” Another senior commander on the ground suggested that “ePRTs could become the main
effort,”and that even as some BCTs redeploy, their partner ePRTs could remain to continue their ⁵⁹⁶
work.
OPA officials, in turn, stressed in early 2008 that the current PRT presence was the civilian ⁵⁹⁷
surge. In August 2008, U.S. Embassy officials noted that the current PRT footprint would likely
be the “high-water mark,” and that—based in part on congressional direction—the Embassy had
already begun a “PRT strategic drawdown plan.” Some Embassy officials commented that in
some locations, the PRT presence might already be too heavy and cumbersome—as one official
observed, with 53 people in Mosul, “it’s not clear there’s a full day’s work for everyone.” Some
suggested that for the future, as the number of civilian personnel diminishes, it would be helpful
to target PRT efforts on particular areas of need, such as agriculture, public health, and local ⁵⁹⁸
governance capacity.
Some civilian officials have expressed concern that as U.S. military forces in Iraq draw down,
there might not be sufficient military resources to provide movement and force protection for
PRTs. As of mid-2008, PRTs relied variously on military forces or private security contractors for
such support; the contractor teams were reportedly quite costly, and should the forthcoming new
SOFA regime fail to provide legal immunity for contractors, as expected, the contractors’
availability and cost could change. In August 2008, one division commander noted that if the
⁵⁹⁴
^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith BCT}^a^{nd P}^R^T^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, Kirk}^uk^{, a}^{nd w}^{ith a}^m^u^lti-na^tiona^l^divⁱ^sion^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^,^A^u^g^u^{st 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵⁹⁵^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith D}ⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on a}ⁿ^d^B^C^T^C^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, a}^{nd MN}^F-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^2008.^I^t^ha^s^be^eⁿ^a^c^o^m^m^on
^pra^c^tic^e^,^thro^ug^ho^{ut OIF}^,^f^o^{r m}^ilita^r^y^c^o^m^m^a^nde^{rs to use}^“^S^ta^te^”^a^s^a^som^e^w^h^a^t^mⁱ^sle^a^ding^short^h^a^{nd t}^o^re^f^e^{r to}
^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n e}^x^pe^rtise^f^r^o^m^m^u^ltiple^a^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^.
⁵⁹⁶^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^ith^m^u^lti-na^ti^ona^l^di^vⁱ^{sion c}^o^m^m^a^nde^{rs, A}^u^g^u^{st 200}⁸^.
⁵⁹⁷^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith O}^P^A^,^J^a^nua^r^y^2008.
⁵⁹⁸^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith U.S. Em}^ba^ss^y^offⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s,^A^u^g^u^{st 200}^{8. T}^h^e^U.S^.^Re^gⁱ^ona^{l Em}^ba^ss^y^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^{in Ba}^sra^r^a^ise^d^sim^ila^r
^c^onc^e^r^ns^—^its²⁰⁰^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^,^ba^s^e^{d a}^t^t^h^e^B^a^s^r^a^aⁱ^r^por^t,^r^a^r^e^ly^lea^v^{e the}^of^fⁱ^c^e^c^o^m^poun^{d, I}ⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith U}^.^S.
^Em^ba^s^s^y^a^{nd R}^E^O^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^ugus^{t 2}⁰⁰⁸^.

security climate continued to improve, it would be possible to dedicate more military assets to ⁵⁹⁹
directly supporting the PRTs—perhaps providing each one with a full Company.
Some OPA and PRT officials, meanwhile, have expressed frustration with the military in Iraq for
trying to do too much governance and economic work, instead of leaving those missions to far
better qualified civilian experts. As one civilian official expressed in early 2008: “The military ⁶⁰⁰
needs to start transitioning governance and economics to other agencies.” Apparently most
military commanders would agree—many have noted that they would readily transition
responsibilities whenever civilians are available to receive them. As one division commander ⁶⁰¹
noted in August 2008, “We don’t have thee right expertise.”
Many practitioners and outside observers have noted that institutional cultural differences help
shape the PRT/military relationships. One civilian official in Iraq commented, only partly tongue ⁶⁰²
in cheek, that it is a case of “sit back and reflect” versus “take that hill!” For example, in 2007,
one Division, frustrated by delays in the arrival of ePRTs, launched a campaign to “recruit” ePRT
members from its own staff and subordinate units. Officials of OPA, to which PRTs and ePRTs ⁶⁰³
report, viewed that initiative as stepping on their prerogatives.
Other practitioners stress that individual personalities play the key role. As one civilian official
commented in early 2008: “It’s mostly about personalities—it’s not something you can just ⁶⁰⁴
fix.”
Some civilian and military officials have suggested that more appropriately targeted training
might better prepare civilians for PRT service, particularly those scheduled to work closely with
military units. Some current civilian PRT members note that their pre-deployment visit to Ft.
Bragg, and their counter-insurgency training at the Phoenix Academy at Camp Taji, Iraq, were ⁶⁰⁵
invaluable, primarily for the exposure they provided to military culture and organization.
While civilian and military officials generally agree that governance and economics-related tasks
might in theory be better performed by civilian experts, as of early fall 2008, coalition forces in
Iraq continued to play significant roles in those fields.
The Office of Provincial Affairs briefing materials state: “PRTs serve as the primary U.S.
government interface between U.S., coalition partners, and provincial and local governments ⁶⁰⁶
throughout all of Iraq’s 18 provinces.” It might be more accurate to say that PRTs play the
⁵⁹⁹
^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith m}^u^lti-na^tiona^l^divⁱ^sⁱ^{on c}^o^m^m^a^nde^{r, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶⁰⁰^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith P}^R^T^m^e^m^b^e^r^{, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^2008.
⁶⁰¹^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith D}ⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on a}ⁿ^d^B^rⁱ^g^a^d^e^C^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^2008.
⁶⁰²^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith O}^P^A^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^2008.
⁶⁰³^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith D}ⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on s}^t^a^f^f^,^a^{nd w}^{ith O}^P^A^a^nd^PR^T^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^2008.
⁶⁰⁴^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith P}^R^T^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^2008.
⁶⁰⁵^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith P}^R^T^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁶⁰⁶^“^P^r^o^vⁱ^nc^ia^{l R}^e^c^ons^tr^uc^tio^{n T}^e^am^s^”^br^ie^f^,^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^of^P^r^ov^incⁱ^a^l^A^f^f^a^ir^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.

“lead” role in governance, rather than the “primary” one, given the sheer magnitude of ongoing ⁶⁰⁷
interaction by coalition forces with Iraqi provincial and local officials.
In Baghdad, for example, the full Baghdad PRT interacts with the Governor, the Mayor, and the
Provincial Council Chair, while ePRTs are tasked to work with the district- and neighborhood-
level councils. A small ePRT, with responsibility for a given district, might work closely with that
district council, but due to personnel and resource constraints, the ePRT might have difficulty
working equally closely and frequently with all of the subordinate neighborhood councils within
that district.
Military units are likely to have far more frequent interactions with Iraqi officials. Battalion
commanders meet regularly with neighborhood councils, Civil Affairs units and other military
staff work continually with local officials on essential services and other public works projects,
and Captains and their staffs at Joint Security Stations—and their ISF counterparts—meet often ⁶⁰⁸
with local officials who use the JSSs as community meeting sites.
In August 2008, for example, PRT and BCT officials described their division of labor: the BCT
commander engages the provincial governor, battalion commanders engage the district councils,
and company commanders engage sub-district councils and groups of local mukhtars. The PRT,
in turn, focuses on the provincial government, helping tie it more closely into the national ⁶⁰⁹
government. The PRT also mentors young military officers in governance work.
A central and long-standing focus of coalition governance efforts is helping Iraqis achieve
connectivity between the top-down national ministries and their appointed representatives for
each province, on one hand, and the ground-up provincial and local governments chosen by local
populations, on the other. Military commanders in every region have attested that provincial
officials have no authority over—and little relationship with—the ministerially appointed ⁶¹⁰
representatives for their province. In August 2008, one division commander explained, “Where
the military can help is in building informal bridges among tribal councils, the Iraqi Security ⁶¹¹
Forces, and local government—and it still needs a forcing function at the national level.”
As described by Colonel Tom James, commander of the 4^th BCT of 3^rd Infantry Division,
stationed south of Baghdad in early 2008, “One of the things we really focused on is linkages,
making sure that local governments are representative of the people, and they they’re linked to
higher governments so that we can process, prioritize, and resource the people that need ⁶¹²
things.”
⁶⁰⁷
^Co^aliti^oⁿ^m^ilitary^“^g^o^v^ern^aⁿ^ce”^eff^o^{rts in}²⁰⁰⁸^{are v}^e^r^y^si^m^{ilar to}^th^o^s^{e i}ⁿ²⁰⁰³^.^In²⁰⁰³^{, f}^aced^wⁱ^t^h^{a v}^e^r^y^lim^ited
^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n pre}^s^eⁿ^c^e^,^c^o^m^m^a^nde^{rs “}^l^e^aⁿ^e^d^f^o^rwa^r^d”^a^{nd w}^o^rk^e^d^w^{ith Ira}^{qis to f}^o^rm^prov^incⁱ^a^l^aⁿ^{d l}^o^c^a^l^c^o^uⁿ^c^{ils, t}^o^he^l^p
^Iraqⁱ^{s art}ⁱ^c^u^l^at^e,^p^rⁱ^o^ri^tⁱ^ze,^an^{d rep}^r^esen^t^t^h^ei^{r c}^oⁿ^cern^s^.
⁶⁰⁸^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith B}^C^T^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, B}^N^c^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, C}^A^pe^r^s^onn^e^l^{, a}^nd^PR^T^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁶⁰⁹^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith B}^C^T^a^{nd P}^R^T^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^Kⁱ^r^k^uk^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁶¹⁰^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith c}^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^aⁿ^d^s^t^a^f^f^{in MN}^F-^W^e^s^t^{, MN}^D^-^N^o^r^t^h,^MN^D^-^B^a^g^hda^{d, a}ⁿ^{d MN}^D^-^C^e^nt^e^r^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^a^nd
^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^{8. T}^h^e^pr^oble^m^s^w^e^r^e^{in pa}^r^t^le^g^a^cⁱ^e^s^of^the^c^eⁿ^tr^a^l^l^y^c^ontr^o^lle^{d o}^l^{d r}^e^gⁱ^m^e^{, inc}^l^udi^ng^I^r^a^q’^s¹⁹⁶⁹^L^a^w^o^f
^G^o^v^e^rnora^t^e^s^{, ba}^se^{d on a}^“^s^troⁿ^g^c^eⁿ^te^r”^m^ode^{l, w}^h^ic^{h na}^m^e^{d spe}^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^u^thoritie^{s t}^h^a^t^pr^ov^incⁱ^a^l^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nts c}^ould
^e^x^e^r^cⁱ^se^—^f^or^e^x^am^ple^,^“^c^ons^ulti^ng^{on m}ⁱ^nis^t^e^r^ia^{l r}^e^gⁱ^ona^{l a}^p^p^o^int^m^eⁿ^ts^,”^a^{nd “}^p^r^o^m^o^ting^s^a^nita^tio^{n a}ⁿ^d^p^ubl^ic
^he^a^lth.”
⁶¹¹^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith m}^u^lti-na^tiona^l^divⁱ^sⁱ^{on c}^o^m^m^a^nde^{r, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶¹²^Se^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^N^e^w^s^B^r^ie^fⁱ^ng^{, C}^o^lone^{l T}^o^m^J^a^m^e^s^,^F^e^br^ua^r^y^{22, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.

Current governance efforts by coalition forces include fostering connectivity among the levels of
government by mentoring Iraqi interlocutors at each level. For example, in one town south of
Baghdad, community leaders were apparently frustrated because they felt disconnected from the
deliberations of the nearest local council. The Army Captain leading the JSS in the city started
bringing local community leaders together regularly, helping them to articulate and prioritize their
concerns. Coalition forces then connected that informal body with the Iraqi officials formally
chosen to represent that area. That mentoring was then backed up by higher levels of the ⁶¹³
Captain’s chain of command, on their frequent visits.
In one area of Baghdad, a Brigade Commander and representatives of his subordinate units
regularly reviewed the membership of all the local councils, based on the units’ frequent
interactions with them, checking for vacancies, for the presence of “outsiders” from outside a
given neighborhood, and for roughly accurate reflections of the demographic balance. Where
local councils fell short, the units that regularly engaged them pointed out the concerns to them ⁶¹⁴
and urged improvement.
In the views of many commanders, PRTs and ePRTs are simply not robust enough to conduct the
governance mission comprehensively. As one Division staff member framed the issue, in early ⁶¹⁵

2008, “The Division needs to help the PRTs help establish governance.”

Military commanders in Iraq confirm that for U.S. personnel, economic policy guidance is
provided by the U.S. Embassy, and that PRTs have the lead role in the economic line of operation.
As in the field of governance, since the earliest post-major combat days, the U.S. military has
played a role in the economic reconstruction of Iraq.
The military role in economic reconstruction has typically focused on local-level initiatives. In
2008, one economic focus for the military was neighborhood economic revitalization—usually
measured in terms of the number of small shops opened. The first shops to reopen in a
neighborhood, as security improves, typically included fruit and vegetable stands, and shops
selling convenience foods like bottles of soda. To facilitate that process, commanders sometimes
sought a local Iraqi partner to serve as the primary contractor for reconstruction in a ⁶¹⁶
neighborhood, and to encourage other local entrepreneurs to come onboard. By January 2008,
in addition, military commanders, were tasked to keep an eye open for potential “medium-sized ⁶¹⁷
businesses” to support.
Commanders have also been able to make available micro-grants, through a Department of
Defense program, which allowed them to provide fledgling Iraqi businesses with start-up funds
⁶¹³
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith D}ⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on, B}^r^ig^a^d^e^,^B^a^tta^{lion a}^{nd C}^o^m^p^aⁿ^y^C^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, a}ⁿ^d^pa^r^ticⁱ^p^aⁿ^t^obs^e^r^v^a^tio^{n, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^2008.
⁶¹⁴^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^{ith B}^r^ig^a^d^e^s^t^a^f^f^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶¹⁵^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tion^w^{ith D}ⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on s}^t^a^f^f^,^J^a^nua^r^y^2008.
⁶¹⁶^{In J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{2008, c}^o^a^liti^{on f}^o^rc^e^s^{in t}^h^e^A^r^Ra^s^h^{id dis}^t^ric^t^of^s^out^h^w^es^{t Ba}^g^hda^{d w}^e^re^w^o^rk^ing^c^l^os^e^l^y^w^{ith Ira}^qi
^c^a^r^dia^c^s^u^r^g^e^{on a}^nd^loc^a^l^r^e^sⁱ^deⁿ^t^{, D}^r^{. M}^o^y^a^{d, on t}^h^e^r^e^v^ita^liz^a^tion^of^the⁶⁰^th^S^t^reet^m^a^rket^ar^ea.^Dr.^M^o^y^a^d^h^a^d
^alread^y^su^ccess^f^u^l^l^y^f^acilitated^re^v^italiza^tioⁿ^o^f^an^o^t^h^e^{r n}^earb^y^mark^{et area.}
⁶¹⁷^{In t}^h^e^mⁱ^ds^{t of}^a^dis^c^us^sⁱ^on^w^{ith s}^ubor^dina^te^s^a^b^out^p^o^s^sⁱ^ble^m^e^dium^-s^iz^e^d^bus^ine^s^s^op^por^tu^nitie^sⁱⁿ^theⁱ^r^a^r^e^a^,^one
^Brig^a^d^e^Com^m^a^nde^{r s}^e^ns^ibly^inte^rrupte^d^{, “}^S^om^e^body^te^{ll m}^e^w^h^a^t^a^m^e^dium^-s^iz^e^d^bus^ine^s^s^is^!^”^Som^e^cⁱ^v^iliaⁿ
^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s que}^stion^the^r^o^le^of^the^m^ilita^r^y^{in de}^v^e^loping^m^e^dium^-si^z^e^d^busiⁿ^e^sse^s.

ranging from several hundred to several thousand dollars, to purchase equipment or raw
materials. For example, in early 2008, a micro-grant enabled one man in Baghdad to buy power ⁶¹⁸
saws and raw wood to jumpstart his furniture-making business.
In August 2008, one BCT commander noted, “We’ve had great success reopening small
businesses!” But both civilian and military officials in Iraq note that the number of open shops
may be a better gauge of the security climate in a community—how safe the local population
feels—than of economic revitalization. Longer-term, sustainable development, civilian and
military officials note, requires not just local shops but also production—which in turn requires
sustainable and secure systems of supply and distribution, as well as a customer base. Civilian ⁶¹⁹
development experts in Iraq caution that this will simply take time.
In August 2008, U.S. Embassy officials explained that imposing economic policy discipline in the ⁶²⁰
regions—among PRTs as well as military units—is a challenge. This may help explain what
some called the “great poultry debate” of 2008. In mid-2008, as part of the search for sustainable
economic activity, some military and PRT officials proposed supporting the development of
domestic poultry and egg farming. Some argued that such a business required relatively low start-
up costs, and would provide both employment and income for local families. Officials at the U.S.
Embassy, and some civilian and military practitioners in the field, countered that such efforts
stood little chance of being profitable—it cost $2 to buy a chicken to eat from Brazil, while a
domestic Iraqi chicken would cost much more than that, given the costs of importing feed and
cooling the chickens and their eggs. One BCT commander noted, “poultry farming is a big deal ⁶²¹
for us,” while a senior Embassy official countered, “There’s no business plan.”
Meanwhile, military commanders have continued to make use of the Commanders Emergency
Response Program (CERP), which provides brigade commanders with discretionary funding for a
wide array of projects. As of mid-2008, the majority of CERP funding was being used to support
essential services, and other sustained initiatives such as the Sons of Iraq program. Anecdotally,
in some instances, CERP may have lost some of its initial flexibility—in the accounts of several
BCT commanders, who earlier had been free to spend CERP funds at their own discretion, they
had recently been required to seek approval from their Division headquarters to spend CERP
money.
As of August 2008, there was no formal requirement for military units to coordinate CERP
spending with Iraqi officials or with PRT or ePRT counterparts, and some OPA and PRT officials
have raised concerns about insufficient civil/military coordination. Division, Brigade and
Battalion Commanders have noted that most projects nominated for CERP support are initially
put forward by local Iraqi officials and residents. Further, although it is not mandated, the military ⁶²²
typically cross-walks proposed initiatives with the existing plans of local Iraqi councils. In
⁶¹⁸
^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^ith^br^ig^a^d^e^aⁿ^d^ba^tta^lio^{n c}^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶¹⁹^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^,^B^C^T^a^nd^P^R^T^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^ugus^{t 2}⁰⁰⁸^{. T}^h^e^he^a^d^of^one^e^P^R^T^s^t^a^t^e^d^bl^untly^,
^“^T^he^r^e^’^s^{no m}^a^nuf^a^c^t^ur^ing^.^”
⁶²⁰^In^t^e^rvi^e^w^s^wⁱ^t^h^U.^S^.^E^m^b^a^ss^y^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s,^A^u^gu^st²⁰⁰⁸^.^Oⁿ^{e o}^f^fⁱ^ci^alⁿ^o^t^ed:^“It^’^{s h}^a^{rd en}^ou^gh^t^o^keep^t^h^{e E}^m^b^a^ss^y^oⁿ
^the^s^a^m^e^pa^g^e^{, on e}^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^polic^y^,^{but it’s}^re^a^lly^ha^{rd to im}^pos^e^th^a^t^on^PRT^s^...a^{nd t}^h^eⁿ^the^Dⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^!^”
⁶²¹^In^t^e^rvi^e^w^s^wⁱ^t^h^U.^S^.^E^m^b^a^ss^y^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s,^BC^T^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s,^P^R^T^o^f^fⁱ^ci^a^l^s,^A^u^gu^st²⁰⁰⁸^.^Oⁿ^{e can}ⁱ^m^agiⁿ^e^t^h^at^m^a^rket
^f^o^rces^ma^y^e^v^en^t^u^al^l^y^reso^l^v^ed^t^hⁱ^s^“great^d^e^b^a^t^e”.
⁶²²^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith B}^r^ig^a^d^e^a^{nd B}^a^tt^a^{lion C}^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^a^nd^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^{8. F}^o^r^e^x^a^m^ple^,^r^e^sⁱ^dents^of^one^towⁿ
^a^pproa^c^h^e^d^c^o^a^liti^{on f}^o^rc^e^s^a^t^a^{JSS w}^{ith a}^re^que^{st f}^o^{r a}ⁿ^a^m^bulaⁿ^c^e^.^Che^c^k^ing^w^{ith the}^loc^a^l^c^o^uⁿ^c^{il, the}^un^{it f}^o^u^nd
^t^h^{ere w}^e^{re n}^oⁱ^mmedⁱ^at^{e p}^l^an^{s t}^o^meet^t^h^atⁿ^eed^,^{so t}^h^e^uⁿⁱ^t^sou^g^h^t^CE^R^P^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^sup^p^o^r^t^t^h^{e requ}^est^.^On^t^h^{e ot}^h^e^r
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Kirkuk, BCT and PRT officials noted that they share all project information and coordinate with
Iraqis “at stage one of any project.” In Baghdad, one PRT and its ePRT partner noted that they
coordinate on all projects and select the most expedient source of funding, and that they
coordinate all projects with the appropriate Iraqi body—the right Ministry, district council, or ⁶²³
neighborhood council.
In 2008, some Members of Congress expressed frustration with the extensive use of CERP on
projects either that might not be necessary, or that the Iraqis might be able to pay for themselves.
Some civilian officials in Baghdad shared the concern about the use of CERP. Too-liberal use of
CERP funding, some have argued, could counteract the broad policy goal of encouraging Iraqis to
solve as many problems as possible by themselves. As an example, one official, pointing to a
summer 2008 proposal by one division to spend $62 million on an electrification project, noted,
“We’re getting out of that kind of business.” The big problem, one official observed in August
2008, is that “we’re not giving Iraqis the freedom to fail.” Some military commanders on the
ground shared that concern—one noted in August 2008, “We’ve wasted a lot of CERP money in ⁶²⁴
the past.” In September 10, 2008, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee,
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman noted that DOD was in the process of ⁶²⁵
reviewing and refining the criteria for the use of CERP.
Meanwhile, in 2008, some transitions in the use of CERP were underway, due in part to the GoI’s
introduction of Iraqi CERP (I-CERP)—GoI funds that U.S. forces may help Iraqi counterparts
spend. Multi-National Force-West officials noted in August 2008 that they were “giving CERP
money back,” a conscious decision to help make the Iraqi system work. Instead of CERP, the
Marines were spending I-CERP. MND-Baghdad officials suggested, meanwhile, that using I-
CERP might be “teaching the Iraqis bad habits,” that is, that when civilian channels are not fast ⁶²⁶
enough, the military takes charge.

Strategically based decision-making about the United States’ next steps in Iraq and its future
relations with that country requires a clear assessment of trends to date in security conditions, and
a clear evaluation of the factors that produced those changes.
Multi-National Force-Iraq leaders use a series of quantitative metrics to track and describe both
snapshots of the security situation and trajectories over time. The qualitative significance of the

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^ha^nd,^w^h^eⁿ^the^s^a^m^e^loc^a^l^r^e^sⁱ^de^nts^s^o^ug^{ht f}^und^ing^t^o^r^e^nov^a^t^e^loc^a^{l s}^c^hools^,^the^uni^{t dis}^c^ov^e^r^e^d^t^h^a^t^the^r^e^s^p^onsⁱ^b^le
^I^r^a^{qi c}^o^uⁿ^c^il^ha^{d a}^l^r^e^a^d^y^f^o^r^m^ulate^d^—^t^h^oug^h^not^y^e^{t i}^m^plem^eⁿ^te^d—^pr^iorⁱ^tiz^e^d^s^c^ho^{ol r}^eⁿ^o^v^a^tio^{n pl}^aⁿ^s^,^s^o^t^h^e
^c^o^a^litio^{n u}ⁿ^it^di^{d n}^o^{t se}^e^k^CER^P^supp^{ort f}^o^{r t}^h^e^sc^ho^ols.
⁶²³^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith B}^C^T^a^{nd P}^R^T^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁶²⁴^Inte^rv^ie^w^s^w^{ith U}^.^{S. Em}^ba^s^s^y^,^m^ilita^r^y^{, O}^P^A^a^{nd P}^R^T^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^ry^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶²⁵^Un^d^e^{r S}^ecret^ary^o^f^D^e^f^eⁿ^s^e^f^o^r^P^o^lⁱ^c^y^E^rⁱ^c^E^d^el^m^aⁿ^,^t^e^stⁱ^m^oⁿ^y^b^e^f^o^{re t}^h^{e Ho}^u^s^{e A}^r^m^e^d^S^e^rvi^{ces C}^o^mmⁱ^t^t^ee,
^Se^pte^m^be^r^{10, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶²⁶^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^W^a^{nd M}^N^D^-^B^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^08.

metrics is open to some interpretation, but overall, as of early fall 2008, the metrics suggested a
marked though not steady improvement in the security situation.
The metric usually described first is “overall attacks”—including attacks against Iraqi
infrastructure and government facilities; bombs found and exploded; small arms attacks including
snipers, ambushes, and grenades; and mortar, rocket and surface-to-air attacks.
According to MNF-I, overall attacks grew from a low point in early 2004, when records begin, to
a peak of over 1,500 weekly attacks in June and July 2007, just as the final surge units arrived in
Iraq and Operation Phantom Thunder was launched. That gradual growth was punctuated by
sharp upward spikes at key Iraqi political junctures, including the January 2005 elections and the
October 2005 constitutional referendum, and, less sharply, during Ramadan each year. After July
2007, the overall level of attacks declined sharply, punctuated by a spike during Iraqi and
coalition operations in Basra and Sadr City, in March 2008. By December 2008, the level of ⁶²⁷
attacks had fallen to close to 200 per week, levels last witnessed at the beginning of 2004.
Commanders on the ground point out that a low level of attacks in a given geographical area does
not necessarily mean that no adversaries remain there. It could also indicate that a place—such as ⁶²⁸
Arab Jabour south of Baghdad, in late 2007—was being used as a sanctuary. In turn, a high
level of attacks is generally expected, at least temporarily, during major operations in an area, as ⁶²⁹
extremist groups attempt to push back.
Another key metric tracked by MNF-I is the number of Iraqi civilian deaths due to the actions of ⁶³⁰
extremists. The number of monthly deaths peaked in late 2006—at just over 1,500 per month
according to coalition data, and about 3,750 per month according to combined Iraqi and coalition
data. MNF-I reports that beginning in July and August 2007, after all the “surge” forces had
arrived in Iraq, the level of civilian deaths fell sharply and then continued to decline through
January 2008, a decline of over 72%, before rising slightly in February 2008. Iraqi sources record
a spike in civilian deaths in late March 2008, during the military operations in Basra and Sadr
City. Both coalition, and combined Iraqi and coalition data indicate a continued reduction to ⁶³¹
between 200 and 400 by November 2008.
⁶²⁷
^Mu^lt^i-Natioⁿ^a^l^Fo^rce-Iraq^s^u^mmar^y^s^lid^{es, “Secu}^rity^In^cid^eⁿ^t^{s,” p}^r^o^v^id^ed^b^y^{MNF-I, No}^v^e^m^b^{er 2}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶²⁸^O^b^s^e^r^v^a^{tion f}^r^om^MN^D^-^C^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶²⁹^MN^F-^I^aⁿ^{d MN}^C^-^I^obs^e^r^v^a^tions^,^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁶³⁰^{MNF-I tra}^c^k^{s Ira}^{qi c}ⁱ^v^iliaⁿ^de^a^t^h^s^by^c^o^m^p^iling^c^o^a^litio^{n f}^o^rc^e^s^{’ re}^{ports of}^“^s^ig^nifⁱ^c^aⁿ^{t a}^c^t^s”^{; by}^re^vⁱ^e^w^ing^Ira^qi
^re^{ports f}^r^om^the^Coa^litio^{n I}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^Ope^r^a^{tions Ce}^nte^r^w^h^ic^{h m}^a^y^be^unv^e^r^ifⁱ^e^{d; a}^{nd t}^h^eⁿ^by^c^h^e^c^kⁱ^ng^w^h^e^r^e
^p^o^ssib^l^{e f}^o^{r red}^uⁿ^d^an^{cies. Rep}^o^rtⁱⁿ^g^d^e^p^eⁿ^d^{s o}ⁿ^co^v^e^rag^e^oⁿ^acco^uⁿ^t^{s receiv}^e^d^b^y^co^alitioⁿ^o^r^Ira^qⁱ^p^e^rsoⁿⁿ^e^l—an^d
^m^a^y^{not be}^c^o^m^p^r^e^he^ns^iv^e^.
⁶³¹^Mu^lt^i-Na^tioⁿ^a^l^Fo^rc^e^-Ira^q^s^u^m^m^a^r^y^slid^e^s^{, “}^C^iv^iliaⁿ^De^a^t^h^s^,”^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^e^d^b^y^{MNF-I, No}^v^e^m^b^e^r²⁹^,²⁰⁰⁸^.

A further metric regularly recorded and tracked is the number of weapons caches found and
cleared. That number skyrocketed from 1,834 in 2004 (the first year of full, available records), to ⁶³²

6,957 in 2007, and 8,601 in 2008 as of the end of November 2008.

The cache numbers alone, however, tell an incomplete story, first of all because the size and
contents of the caches are not indicated. In addition, there is no way to confirm the discovery
success rate by comparing the number of caches found with the total number of weapons caches
in Iraq at any given point. Larger numbers of found caches could indicate that the problem is
growing—for example, that more weapons are coming into Iraq. Larger numbers could also
simply reflect more aggressive—and more successful—operations, based on better information
from Iraqi sources about cache locations.
MNF-I also tracks the category of “high profile attacks”—including explosions involving the use
of car bombs, suicide car bombs, and individuals wearing suicide vests. In 2007, the monthly
total reached a peak of about 130 in March before falling, unevenly, to about 40 in December

2007. MNF-I noted that erecting barriers and hardening sites, as well as kinetic operations against ⁶³³

would-be perpetrators, had helped lower the total of vehicular attacks. After a gradual rise
during the first two months of 2008, high-profile attacks spiked in March, during military
operations in Basra and Sadr City. By late 2008, the number had fallen considerably, to about 20 ⁶³⁴
in October.
MNF-I tracks improvised explosive devices (IEDs) based on two metrics—the number of IED
explosions, and the total number of IED incidents including explosions, IEDs found and
disarmed, and IED hoaxes. The second metric can be viewed as a broader measure of adversary
intent.
MNF-I reports that the total number of IED explosions reached a high point of in June 2007, just
before the start of the series of Corps-level offensives, and fell to a low point in November 2007,
before rising slightly in December. The number of total IED incidents followed a similar ⁶³⁵
trajectory over that time period. The incidence of IED explosions, relatively level at the
beginning of 2008, spiked in late spring during offensive operation in Basra and Sadr City, and in ⁶³⁶
Diyala and Ninewah provinces in the north, and then fell off toward the end of the year. As of
August 2008, MNC-I noted that there were about 26 IED incidents per day.
⁶³²
^Mu^lt^i-Natioⁿ^a^l^Fo^rce-Iraq^s^u^mmar^y^slid^{es, “Cach}^{es Fo}^uⁿ^d^an^d^Cl^eared^{,” p}^r^o^v^id^ed^b^y^{MNF-I, No}^v^e^m^b^{er 2}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶³³^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^2008.
⁶³⁴^Mu^lt^i-Natioⁿ^a^l^Fo^rce-Iraq^s^u^mmar^y^slid^es^{, “Hig}^h^P^r^o^f^{ile A}^ttac^k^{s (}^E^x^p^lo^sioⁿ^{s),” p}^r^o^v^id^ed^b^y^{MNF-I, No}^v^e^m^b^{er 2}⁹^,
²⁰⁰^8.
⁶³⁵^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^MN^F-^I^a^nd^M^N^C^-^I^s^t^a^f^f^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶³⁶^Mu^lt^i-Natioⁿ^a^l^Fo^rce-Iraq^s^u^mmar^y^slid^{es, “IED Ex}^p^l^o^s^ioⁿ^s^In^ci^d^eⁿ^{ce,” p}^r^o^v^id^ed^b^y^{MNF-I, No}^v^e^m^b^{er 2}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁸^.

IED use can also be evaluated qualitatively, as well as quantitatively. In late 2007, one of the
deadliest forms of IEDs in use was the explosively formed penetrator (EFP), supplied as a rule
from Iran. EFP use declined in late 2007 but experienced a brief upsurge in early 2008, before
declining again. In November 2007, a new and very deadly threat appeared—improvised rocket-
assisted mortars (IRAMs). Built from a rocket, a propane tank, and ball bearings, IRAMs are
indiscriminate and powerful in their effects. In August 2008, MNC-I reported 13 attacks
altogether, most recently in July 2008.
By the end of 2007, less sophisticated forms of IEDs—such as command wire- and pressure
plate-detonated devices—had become the most common, possibly indicating a degradation in the
supply networks or ability to coordinate and operate of the adversary. In August 2008, the most
recent IED “innovation” was the use of building-borne IEDs, that is, buildings wired to ⁶³⁷
explode. Late 2008 saw the rise of “sticky IEDs”—small bombs attached magnetically to the ⁶³⁸
under-sides of vehicles, and set off by remote control or timer.
In 2008, as consensus grew that security gains had been achieved on the ground in Iraq, some
debates developed concerning which factors, or combination of factors, had contributed, or
contributed most, to those improvements. From a social science perspective, the results are “un-
testable”—the “experiment” cannot be repeated holding one or more variables constant.
MNF-I leaders and commanders on the ground attributed the improvements in the security
situation not just to one or two key factors, but to a compendium of factors. Moreover,
commanders noted, those factors were made particularly effective by their interaction effects—
for example, coalition personnel with previous service in Iraq, making use of more sophisticated
technologies.
The most fundamental factor may have been what former MNF-I Commanding General, General
David Petraeus, has called a shift in the “intellectual construct” from an emphasis on transition—
a quick hand-over to Iraqis—to a counter-insurgency (COIN) focus on achieving population
security. Another key COIN component of that intellectual construct was recognizing the need to
separate the irreconcilables from the reconcilables—as GEN Petraeus observed, “You’re not ⁶³⁹
going to kill your way out of an insurgency.”
Additional key factors frequently cited by commanders in Iraq include targeted operations by
special operations forces; operations and much greater presence by conventional coalition forces;
operations, presence, and greatly improved capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces; the rejection of
extremists by the “awakening” movements; efforts by the Sons of Iraq and other security
⁶³⁷
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
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^Y^o^r^k^:^P^u^blic^A^f^f^a^ir^s^,²⁰⁰^{8. A}^l^s^o^,^pe^r^s^ona^{l c}^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^f^r^om^G^E^N^P^e^tr^a^e^u^s^,²⁰⁰⁸^.

volunteers, and Muqtada al-Sadr’s ceasefire and separation from the violent “special groups” ⁶⁴⁰
wings of his organization.
In addition, according to commanders, in recent years, far more intelligence assets became
available in-country, and at lower levels of command, greatly improving commanders’ ability to
make decisions and respond in a timely way. New technologies—particularly rapidly fielded
counter-IED equipment and approaches—helped coalition forces against the adversaries’ ⁶⁴¹
deadliest weapons and saved lives.
Not only did various components of force contribute to the fight, their efforts were far better
integrated than they were several years ago, and that integration also helps explain security
improvements to date. For example, commanders note that the air component increased the
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets available to ground commanders, to
support and inform their operations. The greater ground forces presence, and the better
information from Iraqis that it generated, in turn, made possible the more frequent and more
effective use of air strikes.
Commanders on the ground have noted that the increasingly sophisticated technologies available
to SOF have strengthened their efforts to kill or capture high-value targets. Commanders have
stressed, however, that “you can’t get Al Qaeda by just using SOF.” MNF-I officials have noted
that coalition forces tried the SOF-only approach in Ramadi for four years, but it ultimately
proved insufficient. They add that SOF is most effective when it draws on conventional forces’
intimate knowledge of local communities, based on the close contacts conventional forces have
with ISF, SOIs, and local tribes. Then, following SOF actions, conventional forces play the ⁶⁴²
essential role of “holding” the area, with a strong, visible presence.
Finally, as many practitioners on the ground have pointed out, by the time of the surge, force
leaders, staff, commanders, and troops in the field typically brought significant previous Iraq
experience to the mission. Most leaders and commanders have served at least one previous tour in
Iraq, and their familiarity with Iraqi governing structures, basic laws, and customs, is markedly ⁶⁴³
greater than the limited knowledge the first coalition teams brought to Iraq. Leaders also point
out that they have had time to absorb the lessons from their earlier tours, including absorbing the ⁶⁴⁴

2006 COIN manual that captured lessons from recent operational experience.

For further information about Iraq-related issues, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam
Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction
Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff; CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other
Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco; CRS Report RL34568, U.S.-Iraq
Strategic Framework and Status of Forces Agreement: Congressional Response, by Matthew C.
⁶⁴⁰
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^le^a^d^e^r^s^,^MN^C^-^I^le^a^d^e^r^s^,^a^{nd D}ⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on C}^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁶⁴¹^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^s^w^{ith MN}^F-^I^a^nd^MN^C^-^I^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^,^a^{nd D}ⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on a}ⁿ^{d B}^r^ig^a^d^e^C^o^m^m^a^nde^r^s^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^a^{nd A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰⁰^8.
⁶⁴²^C^onv^e^r^s^a^tions^w^ith^MN^F-^I^le^a^d^e^r^s^a^{nd s}^t^a^f^f^,^J^a^nua^r^y^2008.
⁶⁴³^P^a^rtic^ipaⁿ^t^o^b^se^rv^a^{tion 2}⁰⁰³^aⁿ^d²⁰^04,^aⁿ^d^c^onv^e^r^sa^tions^w^{ith c}^o^a^litio^{n le}^a^d^e^r^{s, sta}^f^f^,^a^{nd c}^o^m^m^a^nde^{rs, 20}^08.
⁶⁴⁴^FM^3-2⁴^,^C^o^uⁿ^te^rⁱ^ns^ur^ge^nc^y^,^Dece^m^b^{er 2}⁰⁰⁶^,^avai^l^a^b^l^{e at}^h^t^t^p^:^/^/^u^sacac.^ar^my.^mⁱ^l^/^CA^C/^Rep^o^sⁱ^t^o^ry^/^M^at^eri^a^l^s^/
^COIN-FM3^-2⁴^.^p^d^f^.

Weed; CRS Report RL34064, Iraq: Oil and Gas Legislation, Revenue Sharing, and U.S. Policy,
by Christopher M. Blanchard; CRS Report RL33834, Defense Contracting in Iraq: Issues and
Options for Congress, by Valerie Bailey Grasso; CRS Report RL34278, FY2008 Supplemental
Appropriations for Global War on Terror Military Operations, International Affairs, and Other
Purposes; by Stephen Daggett et al.; and CRS Report RL34362, Congressional Oversight and
Related Issues Concerning the Prospective Security Agreement Between the United States and
Iraq, by Michael John Garcia, R. Chuck Mason, and Jennifer K. Elsea.
Figure 1.Map of Iraq
^Source:^Ma^p^{Resources. Adapt}^e^d^{by CRS.}

^C^a^th^eriⁿ^{e Dale}
^Sp^{ecialist i}ⁿ^Iⁿ^terⁿ^atioⁿ^a^{l Sec}^u^rⁱ^t^y
^cdal^e@^crs^.^l^o^c.g^o^v^,^7-⁸⁹⁸³