Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Contours of the Debates..................................................................................................................2
Terms of the Debates.................................................................................................................2
Key Proponents of Change........................................................................................................3
Congressional Actors..........................................................................................................3
Executive Branch................................................................................................................4
Think-Tank Efforts..............................................................................................................5
Identified Problems.........................................................................................................................6
Executive Branch Key Players: “Civilian Agency Capacity is Too Limited”...........................6
Executive Branch Key Players: “DOD Role is Too Large”......................................................7
Interagency Coordination and Integration Mechanisms: “Insufficient”...................................8
National Security Decision-Making: “Not Rigorous”...............................................................9
National Security Strategy-Making: “Insufficient Guidelines”...............................................10
Resource Distribution within the Executive Branch: “Resources and Strategy Do Not
Matc h”......................................................................................................................... .......... 11
Congressional Oversight: “Poorly Structured”........................................................................11
Proposed Reforms.........................................................................................................................12
Executive Branch Key Players: Adjust the Balance of Roles and Responsibilities................12
Interagency Coordination and Integration: Foster Horizontal Integration..............................12
Interagency Coordination and Integration: Create a New Position.........................................13
National Security Decision-Making: Require Greater Rigor..................................................13
National Security Strategy: Strengthen the Guidance.............................................................13
Resources for National Security: Create a National Security Budget.....................................14
Congressional Oversight: Reorganize or Restructure.............................................................14
What the Debates Might Be Missing.............................................................................................14
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................15

A growing community of interest, including Members of Congress, senior officials in the
executive branch, and think-tank analysts, is calling for a reexamination of how well the U.S.
Government, including both the executive branch and Congress, is organized to apply all
instruments of national power to national security activities. The organizations and procedures
used today to formulate strategy, support presidential decision-making, plan and execute
missions, and budget for those activities are based on a framework established just after World
War II. That framework was designed to address a very different global strategic context: a
bipolar world with a single peer competitor state, the Soviet Union, which was driven by an ¹
expansionist ideology and backed by a massive military force.
Six decades later, in the wake of 9/11, many observers and practitioners note, the United States
faces greater uncertainty and a broader array of security challenges than before, including non-
state as well as traditional state-based threats, and transnational challenges such as organized
crime, energy security concerns, cyber attacks, and epidemic disease. The “outdated bureaucratic ²^th^st
superstructure” of the 20 century is an inadequate basis for protecting the nation from 21
century security challenges, critics contend, and the system itself, or alternatively, some of its key ³
components, requires revision.
Doubts about the adequacy of the system to meet 21^st century security challenges have been
catalyzed by recent operational experiences, including Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation
Enduring Freedom, and responses to Hurricane Katrina. In the view of many defense and foreign
affairs analysts, these operations revealed deep flaws in the ability of the U.S. government to
make timely decisions, to develop prioritized strategies and integrated plans, to resource those
efforts, and to effectively coordinate and execute complex missions. Such shortcomings, some
argue, have had a deleterious impact on the success of those missions and on the reputation of the
United States as a reliable partner.

¹^W^{ith the}^N^a^tio^na^{l Se}^c^u^ri^ty^A^c^{t of}¹⁹⁴⁷^a^nd^its¹⁹⁴⁹^A^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t, Cong}^re^s^s^e^x^plic^itly^aⁱ^m^e^{d “}^t^{o pr}^o^vⁱ^de^a
^c^o^m^p^re^he^nsiv^e^prog^ra^m^f^o^{r the}^f^u^ture^se^c^u^rity^of^the^Unite^d^S^t^at^es,^”ⁱⁿ^cl^udⁱⁿ^{g “ .}^.^.^t^h^{e est}^a^b^lⁱ^s^h^m^en^t^o^fⁱⁿ^t^e^grat^ed
^polic^ie^s^aⁿ^{d pr}^oc^e^dur^e^s^f^o^r^t^h^e^de^pa^r^t^m^e^nts^,^a^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^{, a}^{nd f}^unc^tion^s^of^the^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt r}^e^la^ting^{to t}^h^e^na^tiona^l
^s^e^c^u^r^ity^.”^T^h^e^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^{tion la}^{id t}^h^e^f^ounda^ti^on^of^a^ne^w^na^tiona^{l s}^e^c^u^r^ity^r^e^gⁱ^m^e^{, inc}^l^udi^ng^the^c^r^e^a^tion^of^the^N^a^tiona^l
^Se^c^u^rity^Counc^{il, t}^h^e^Ce^ntra^{l I}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^A^g^eⁿ^cy^{, the}^D^e^pa^rt^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^aⁿ^inde^pe^nde^nt^D^e^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^the^Aⁱ^r
^For^c^e^,^aⁿ^d^a^pe^r^m^aⁿ^eⁿ^{t J}^o^int^C^hⁱ^e^f^s^o^f^Sta^f^f^.^N^a^tiona^{l Se}^c^u^r^ity^A^c^{t of}¹⁹^{47 (}^P^.L^{. 8}⁰^-²³⁵⁾^,^a^s^a^m^e^nde^{d in}¹⁹⁴⁹^{, (}^P^.L^.
²¹⁶⁾^aⁿ^d^s^u^bs^e^que^nt^ly^{, Se}^c^{tion 4}^01.
²^S^ecret^ar^y^o^f^De^fen^s^{e Ro}^b^e^rt^G^a^t^e^{s h}^a^{s u}^s^ed^t^h^e^p^h^r^{ase i}ⁿ^{a nu}^m^b^{er o}^f^coⁿ^t^ext^s^,ⁱⁿ^cl^u^dⁱⁿ^g^at^t^h^{e A}^p^rⁱ^l¹⁵^,²⁰⁰⁸^,
^House^A^r^m^e^{d Se}^rv^ic^e^s^Com^m^itte^e^he^a^r^ing^,^“^B^uil^d^ing^P^a^rt^ne^rship^Ca^pa^cⁱ^t^y^a^{nd De}^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t of}^the^Inte^ra^g^e^nc^y
^P^r^o^cess.^”
³^Iⁿ^br^oa^d^te^r^m^s^,^the^de^ba^te^s^c^oul^d^f^o^llow^the^m^ode^{l of}^the^G^o^ldw^a^t^e^r^-^N^ic^hols^pr^oc^e^s^s^of^the¹⁹^80s^,^w^h^ic^{h le}^{d to}^the
^G^o^ldw^a^t^e^r^-^N^ic^hols^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^R^e^or^g^a^niz^a^{tion A}^c^{t of}¹⁹⁸^{6, O}^c^t^obe^r^1,¹⁹^{86 (}^P^.L^{. 9}⁹^-⁴³³⁾^.^T^h^a^t^la^ndm^a^r^k
^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^{tion us}^he^r^e^{d in}^f^unda^m^e^nta^l^de^f^e^ns^e^r^e^or^g^a^niz^a^{tion a}ⁱ^m^e^{d a}^t^dimⁱ^nis^h^ingⁱⁿ^te^r^-^S^e^r^vⁱ^c^e^rⁱ^v^a^lr^ies^a^nd^pr^om^oting
^g^r^e^a^t^e^r^jointne^{ss, t}^h^ro^ug^{h stre}^a^m^lⁱ^ning^t^h^e^c^h^aⁱⁿ^of^c^o^m^m^a^nd,^eⁿ^ha^nc^ing^the^m^ilita^ry^a^d^vⁱ^sor^y^role^of^the^Chaⁱ^rm^aⁿ^of
^the^J^oⁱⁿ^{t C}^h^ie^f^s^of^Staf^f^,^a^{nd a}^d^j^u^s^ting^pe^r^s^on^ne^l^polic^ie^s^aⁿ^{d t}^h^e^b^udg^e^ting^pr^oc^e^s^s^.^For^aⁿ^a^c^c^oun^t^of^tha^t^pr^oc^e^s^s^by
^{a k}^e^y^p^a^rticip^an^{t, see Ja}^m^e^{s R. Lo}^ch^{er III,}^Vⁱ^ct^o^r^{y on}^t^h^{e P}^o^t^o^ma^c^:^T^h^{e Gol}^d^wat^e^r-Ni^ch^o^l^{s A}^c^t^Unⁱ^fⁱ^e^{s t}^h^{e P}^eⁿ^t^a^g^oⁿ^,
^Colle^g^e^Sta^tion^,^T^X^{: T}^e^x^a^s^A^&^M^Univ^e^r^sity^P^r^e^{ss, 200}^{2. I}ⁿ^t^h^e^c^u^rre^{nt de}^ba^te^{s, c}^a^{lls f}^o^{r a}^“^G^oldw^a^t^e^r-Nic^{hols f}^o^{r the}
^Inte^ra^g^e^nc^y^”^t^y^pic^a^l^l^y^re^fe^{r not t}^o^the^c^o^nteⁿ^t^of^the¹⁹⁸⁶^A^c^{t, but}^t^o^a^s^pe^c^t^{s of}^the^pr^oc^e^{ss tha}^t^pr^od^uc^e^d^{it: a}
^co^m^p^reh^eⁿ^sⁱ^v^{e re}^vi^e^w^o^f^cu^rren^t^l^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^oⁿ^an^{d ap}^p^r^o^ach^es;^bⁱ^p^a^rtⁱ^s^an^l^ead^ershⁱ^p^o^f^t^h^{e ref}^o^rm^e^f^f^o^rt^;^rel^a^tⁱ^v^el^y
^s^w^e^e^p^ing^s^o^luti^ons^;^the^us^e^of^le^gis^l^a^tion^to^pr^om^{pt c}^l^os^e^rⁱⁿ^te^g^r^a^tion.

The “national security reform” debates appeared to gain momentum in anticipation of the change ^th
of administration and the convening of the 111 Congress. Congress could choose to weigh in by
holding further hearings to clarify identified problems and to consider the advantages and risks of
proposed solutions; or by developing legislation ranging from a new National Security Act to
specific changes in executive branch organization, authorities, or resourcing; or by considering
adjustments in Congress’s own arrangements for providing holistic oversight of national security
issues.
The purpose of this report, which will be updated as events warrant, is to help frame the emerging
debates by taking note of the leading advocates for change, highlighting identified shortcomings
in key elements of the current system, and describing categories of emerging proposals for
change.

Current national security reform debates are still highly inchoate, with some emerging points of
consensus or disagreement, but without clearly defined schools of thought. They include
participants from across the political spectrum, from a wide variety of leading think-tanks, and ⁴
from key “national security” agencies.
The scope of topics addressed in the debates includes the following:
• the distribution of national security roles and responsibilities among executive
branch key players;
• the capacity of individual agencies on the basis of their current structure,
organization, policies, mandates, and institutional culture to fulfill their national
security responsibilities;
• coordination and integration among agencies with national security
responsibilities, for both planning and execution in the field;
• national security decision-making;
• national security strategy-making;
• the distribution of resources to support national security activities; and
• congressional oversight.
The debates are somewhat unfocused because there is still no clear consensus about the proper ^st⁵
boundaries of “national security” concerns in the 21 century global security context. Some

⁴^In^recen^{t y}^ears,^stu^d^eⁿ^t^{s at con}^tinuⁱⁿ^g^edu^catio^{n p}^r^o^g^ra^m^s^f^o^{r go}^ve^rn^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^fⁱ^cials,^su^ch^{as DOD’s s}^eⁿⁱ^o^r^service
^s^c^hools^,^ha^v^e^m^a^de^s^ubs^ta^ntia^{l c}^o^ntrⁱ^b^u^ti^ons^t^o^t^h^e^de^ba^te^s^,^of^te^{n d}^r^a^w^ing^{on the}ⁱ^r^pe^r^s^ona^l^ope^r^a^tio^na^{l e}^x^pe^rⁱ^eⁿ^c^e^s^.
^S^ee,^f^o^{r exa}^m^p^l^e,^M^a^rtⁱⁿ^J.^G^o^rman^an^d^A^l^exan^d^e^{r Kro}ⁿ^g^ard^,^“A^G^o^l^d^w^a^t^e^r-Ni^c^h^o^l^{s A}^c^t^f^o^{r t}^h^{e U.}^S^.^G^o^vern^m^eⁿ^t^:
^Institutⁱ^oⁿ^a^liz^ing^the^Iⁿ^te^ra^g^e^nc^y^P^r^oc^e^ss,”^Joⁱⁿ^t^F^o^rces^Qu^a^r^t^e^rl^y,ⁿ^o^.³⁹⁽^O^ct^ob^er²⁰⁰⁵⁾^,^p^p^.⁵¹^-^58.^Th^{e au}^t^h^or^{s ar}^{e a}
^De^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^De^fe^nse^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n a}^{nd U.}^{S. Na}^v^y^o^f^fⁱ^c^e^r^,^w^{ho w}^r^ote^duriⁿ^g^theⁱ^{r y}^e^a^r^a^t^the^Na^tiona^l^W^a^{r Colle}^g^e^.
⁵^Natⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^ecu^ri^t^y^P^r^esi^d^en^tⁱ^al^Di^rectⁱ^v^e-1^{(see b}^e^l^o^w⁾^d^e^fⁱ^ne^{s the}^t^e^r^m^“ⁿ^a^tiona^{l se}^c^u^rity^”^{this w}^a^y^:^“^N^a^tiona^l
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

observers, pointing to the vulnerability of U.S. territory to terrorist attacks, argue that “homeland
security” should be considered an integral part of national security. Other observers, stressing that
international partnerships are key to security, include the full array of foreign affairs activities
under the “national security rubric.” Some observers emphasize that energy security and
economic prosperity are essential to the nation’s security and should therefore be considered
“national security” concerns. Still others use the term “national security” in a more narrow sense.
Another point of confusion is that critics of the current system use different starting points for
their analysis. Some take a top-down approach, focused on optimizing the national security
regime at the systemic level, while others begin with a specific issue—such as foreign assistance,
stabilization and reconstruction, or counter-terrorism—and discuss systemic-level reform as it ⁶
relates to that topic.
Arguments vary concerning how sweeping national security reform ought to be. It seems
reasonable to suppose the existence of a constituency for the status quo—that is, observers and
practitioners who prefer the current regime to proposed reforms—but those voices have not yet
joined the debates.
Several major players and organizations are spearheading the debates by calling for fundamental
change.
In 2008, several congressional committees of jurisdiction for the Department of State and the
Department of Defense explored national security-related reform initiatives with the potential to
have an impact on multiple departments and agencies.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^s^e^c^u^r^ity^inc^l^ude^s^the^de^f^e^ns^e^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^of^A^m^e^r^ic^a^,^pr^ote^c^tion^of^our^c^ons^tit^uti^ona^{l s}^y^s^t^em^of^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt,
^an^d^t^h^{e ad}^van^cemen^t^o^f^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es i}ⁿ^t^e^rest^{s aro}^uⁿ^d^t^h^{e gl}^o^b^e^.^N^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^secu^ri^t^y^al^so^d^e^p^e^nd^{s on}^Ameri^ca’s
^opp^or^t^unity^to^pr^os^pe^rⁱⁿ^the^w^o^r^l^{d e}^c^oⁿ^o^m^y^.”^Se^e^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t G}^e^org^e^W^.^{Bush, Na}^tio^na^{l Se}^c^u^rity^Pre^s^ideⁿ^tia^l
^Dⁱ^r^e^c^tiv^e^-^{1, “}^O^r^g^aⁿ^iz^a^{tion of}^the^N^a^tiona^{l Se}^c^u^rⁱ^ty^C^ounc^{il Sy}^s^t^em^,”^Fe^br^ua^r^y^15,²⁰^01.
⁶^For^e^x^a^m^ple^,^Pha^s^e^I^I^of^the^“^B^e^y^{ond G}^o^ldw^a^te^r^-^Nⁱ^c^hols^”^pr^oje^c^t^,^ba^s^e^{d a}^t^the^C^e^nte^r^f^o^r^Str^a^te^gⁱ^c^a^{nd I}ⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tio^na^l
^Stud^ie^s⁽^C^SI^S)^{, s}^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^l^l^y^a^ddr^es^s^e^{d inte}^r^a^g^e^ncy^-^le^ve^{l r}^e^f^o^r^m^s^,ⁱⁿ^c^l^udi^ng^s^hor^tc^om^ing^s^a^nd^pr^o^pos^a^l^s^f^o^r
^polic^y^m^ak^ing^a^{nd e}^x^e^c^u^tion,^a^s^p^a^r^t^of^a^f^our^-^pha^s^e^pr^o^j^e^c^t^on^de^f^e^ns^e^r^e^f^o^r^m^br^oa^dly^de^fⁱ^ne^{d. Se}^e^C^l^a^r^k^Mur^doc^k^aⁿ^d
^Mic^h^e^l^e^Flo^u^rⁿ^oy^{, le}^a^d^inv^e^s^tig^a^t^or^s^,^“^B^e^y^{ond G}^o^ldw^a^te^r^-^N^ic^hols^:^U^.^{S. G}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt a}^{nd D}^e^f^e^ns^e^R^e^f^o^r^m^f^o^r^a^N^e^w
^Str^a^te^gⁱ^c^Er^a^,^Pha^s^e^{2 R}^e^p^o^r^t^,”^C^e^nte^r^f^o^r^Str^a^te^gⁱ^c^a^{nd I}ⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tioⁿ^a^{l Stu}^d^ie^s^,^J^u^ly²⁰⁰^{5. T}^h^e^P^r^oje^c^t^{on N}^a^ti^ona^l
^Secu^rity^Re^f^o^r^m^(P^{NSR), le}^d^b^y^Ja^m^e^s^L^o^ch^{er III, w}^h^ich^rel^eased^{its f}ⁱⁿ^a^{l rep}^o^r^{t “F}^o^r^gⁱⁿ^g^{a New}^Sh^ield^{” i}ⁿ^No^v^e^m^b^er
²⁰⁰⁸^,^al^s^o^f^o^cu^{ses at}^t^h^{e “sy}^s^t^e^mi^c,^{” o}^rⁱⁿ^t^e^r-agen^c^y^,^l^e^v^e^l^.^In^t^u^rn^,^{a CS}^IS^st^ud^y^ad^d^r^essiⁿ^g^f^o^rei^gⁿ^a^ssi^st^an^{ce d}^e^ri^ved
^s^o^m^e^sy^s^t^emⁱ^c^-^l^e^v^e^l^r^e^c^o^m^m^e^nda^tions^f^r^om^its^pr^im^a^r^y^f^o^c^u^s^{on t}^h^r^e^e^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^r^e^a^s^{: c}^ounte^r^-^t^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^{, pos}^t-^c^onf^lic^t
^o^p^e^ratⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^and^h^u^m^anⁱ^t^a^ri^an^assi^st^an^ce.^S^{ee J.}^S^t^eph^eⁿ^Mo^rri^son^aⁿ^d^Kat^h^l^een^Hi^cks,^p^r^o^j^ect^dⁱ^rect^o^r^s,^“In^t^egratⁱⁿ^g^st
²¹^C^e^nt^ur^y^D^e^ve^lopm^eⁿ^{t a}^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^:^Fina^{l R}^e^por^t^of^the^T^a^s^k^For^c^e^{on N}^o^ntr^a^di^tio^na^l^Se^c^u^r^ity
^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^,^”^C^e^nte^r^f^o^r^Str^a^te^gⁱ^c^a^{nd I}ⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tio^na^{l St}^ud^ie^s^,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰^08.^A^{nd the}^C^S^I^S^C^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on on}^Sm^a^r^{t P}^o^w^e^r
^note^d^the^im^por^ta^nc^e^of^s^o^m^e^sy^ste^mⁱ^c^-^l^e^v^e^l^r^e^f^o^r^m^s^w^{ithout of}^f^e^rⁱ^ng^de^ta^ile^{d r}^e^c^o^m^m^e^nda^tions^{, w}^h^ile^f^o^c^u^sⁱ^ng^on
^pr^o^b^le^m^s^a^{nd pr}^o^pos^a^l^sⁱⁿ^fⁱ^v^e^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^is^s^u^e^a^r^e^a^s^{: inte}^rⁿ^a^tiona^l^pa^r^t^ne^r^s^hips^,^g^l^oba^l^de^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t, p}^ublic^dip^l^om^a^c^y^,
^e^c^onom^ic^inte^g^r^a^{tion, a}ⁿ^{d c}^lim^a^t^{e c}^h^aⁿ^g^e^a^{nd e}ⁿ^e^r^g^y^s^e^c^u^r^ity^{. Se}^e^Rⁱ^c^h^a^r^{d L}^.^A^r^m^ita^ge^a^{nd J}^o^s^e^ph^{S. N}^y^e^,^J^r^{., c}^o^-
^ch^ai^rs,^“A^S^m^art^e^r,^M^o^{re S}^ecu^{re Ameri}^ca,^{” Cen}^t^er^f^o^{r S}^t^rat^e^gi^{c an}^d^In^t^e^rⁿ^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^t^u^dⁱ^es,^N^o^vem^b^e^r²⁰⁰⁷^.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) conducted a series of hearings broadly
addressing the integration of military and non-military components of national power. In a March

5, 2008, hearing, Committee Chairman Joseph Biden explicitly stated an interest in a “2009 ⁷

National Security Act.” On April 24, the SFRC held a hearing entitled “Implementing Smart
Power: Setting an Agenda for National Security Reforms,” and on July 31, the committee held a
hearing entitled “Defining the Military’s Role Towards Foreign Policy.”
In March 2008, the House Armed Services Committee’s (HASC) Panel on Roles and Missions
released the final report of its work. That Report, on protecting American security, included
“interagency coordination” as one of three primary lines of inquiry and invited fellow Members ⁸
and citizens “to join us in rethinking national security.” On April 15, the full HASC continued
the dialogue by holding a hearing addressing the Interagency process. There, Ranking Member
Duncan Hunter called for an “updated national security architecture that is adapted to the full ^st⁹
range of 21 century challenges.” On April 17, 2008, following a series of hearings on Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the HASC Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation issued a ¹⁰
study of interagency coordination mechanisms based on PRT “lessons learned.” In September,
the full HASC held two hearings entitled “Considerations for an American Grand Strategy,”
which drew on two July hearings by the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee on the same
subject.
In March 2008, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held the first of a series of three
hearings on foreign assistance reform; those hearings included consideration of the role of the
Department of Defense, and of interagency coordination.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has emerged as one of the leading proponents for national
security reform, reflecting a long-standing view of some Pentagon officials that the Department
of Defense (DOD) cannot meet the nation’s security challenges alone. At the April 15, 2008,
House Armed Services Committee hearing, Secretary Gates urged thinking “... about how to ¹¹
restructure the national security apparatus of this government for the long term.” In September

⁷^Se^na^te^Fore^ig^{n Re}^la^ti^{ons C}^o^m^mⁱ^tte^e^,^“^S^treⁿ^g^t^heⁿⁱ^ng^Na^tiona^l^Se^c^u^rity^throug^h^Sm^a^r^{t P}^o^w^e^r—a^Milita^ry
^P^e^r^s^pe^c^tiv^e^,^”^Ma^r^c^{h 5}^,²⁰⁰⁸^{, w}ⁱ^t^h^G^e^ne^r^a^l^Aⁿ^thoⁿ^y^{Zinni a}ⁿ^{d A}^d^mⁱ^r^a^l^L^e^ig^{hton Sm}^{ith J}^r^{. Se}^na^t^o^r^L^u^g^a^r^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d the}
^f^o^c^u^{s a}^s^“^how^w^e^c^aⁿⁱ^m^prov^e^ou^{r dip}^l^om^a^tic^a^{nd f}^o^re^ig^{n a}^ssistaⁿ^c^e^c^a^p^a^b^ilitie^{s a}ⁿ^d^inte^g^r^a^t^e^the^m^m^o^re^e^f^f^e^c^tiv^e^l^y
^w^{ith the}^m^ilita^r^y^c^o^m^pone^nts^of^na^tiona^l^pow^e^r^.”^T^h^e^c^onc^e^p^{t of}^“^s^m^a^{rt pow}^e^r^”^ref^e^rs^{to a}ⁿ^inte^g^r^a^tion^of^tra^d^itio^na^l
^ha^{rd p}^o^w^e^{r (the}^use^of^m^ilita^r^y^aⁿ^{d e}^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^c^a^{rrots a}^{nd stic}^k^s^{to a}^c^hie^v^e^de^sire^{d e}^{nds) w}^{ith sof}^t^p^o^w^e^r^(“^the^a^b^ility^to
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^Ri^ch^ard^A^r^mⁱ^t^a^{ge an}^d^Jo^sep^h^Nye,^Jr.^,^Co^-C^h^aⁱ^r^s,^“A^S^m^art^e^r,^M^o^{re S}^ecu^{re Ameri}^ca,^{” Cen}^t^{er f}^o^{r S}^t^rat^e^gi^{c an}^d
^Inte^rna^tio^na^{l St}^ud^ie^{s, Nov}^e^m^b^e^r²⁰⁰^7.
⁸^Se^e^H^ous^e^A^r^m^e^{d Se}^rv^ic^e^s^Co^m^m^itte^e^,^P^a^ne^{l o}ⁿ^Ro^le^s^a^nd^Mis^sⁱ^ons^{, “}^I^nitia^l^P^e^rs^pe^c^tiv^e^s^,”^J^a^nua^r^y^2008,^p.^7.
⁹^S^{ee h}^eariⁿ^{g t}^r^an^scri^p^t^,^Hou^s^{e A}^r^med^S^e^rvi^{ces Co}^mmⁱ^t^t^ee,^“Buⁱ^l^dⁱⁿ^g^P^a^rtⁿ^e^rshⁱ^p^Cap^aci^t^y^an^d^Devel^o^p^m^en^t^o^f^t^h^e
^Iⁿ^te^r^a^g^e^ncy^P^r^oc^e^s^s^,^”^A^p^r^{il 15,}²⁰⁰⁸^.
¹⁰^H^ous^e^A^r^m^e^{d Se}^r^v^ic^e^s^C^o^m^m^itt^e^e^,^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on O}^v^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^{t and I}ⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^{tion, “}^A^g^e^ncy^Stov^e^p^ipe^s^v^s^{. Str}^a^te^gⁱ^c
^Ag^ilit^y^:^L^e^s^s^{ons W}^e^Ne^e^d^{to L}^e^a^r^{n f}^r^om^P^r^ov^incⁱ^a^l^Re^c^o^nstruc^ti^oⁿ^T^e^a^m^{s in Ira}^{q a}^{nd A}^f^g^h^aⁿ^ista^n,”^A^p^{ril 200}^8.
¹¹^H^ous^e^A^r^m^e^{d Se}^r^v^ic^e^s^C^o^m^m^itt^e^e^he^a^r^ing^tr^aⁿ^s^c^rⁱ^{pt, “}^B^u^ildiⁿ^g^Pa^r^t^ne^r^s^{hip C}^a^pa^c^ity^a^{nd D}^e^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t of}^the
^In^t^e^ragen^c^y^P^r^o^cess,^{” A}^p^ri^l¹⁵^,²⁰⁰⁸^.^S^ecret^ary^G^a^t^e^{s al}^so^p^o^s^ed^t^h^{e q}^u^e^stⁱ^oⁿ^:^“Ho^w^can^w^eⁱ^m^p^r^o^v^{e an}^dⁱⁿ^t^e^grat^e
^Am^e^r^ic^a^’^{s instrum}^e^{nts of}^na^tiona^l^pow^e^r^{to re}^f^l^e^c^t^the^ne^w^re^a^litie^s^a^{nd re}^q^u^ire^m^eⁿ^{ts of}^{this c}^eⁿ^tury^?^”^{His te}^stim^on^y
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^m^u^{st stre}^ng^theⁿ^othe^{r im}^porta^{nt e}^l^e^m^eⁿ^{ts of}^na^tiona^l^pow^e^r^bot^{h i}ⁿ^stituti^ona^lly^a^{nd f}ⁱ^na^nc^ia^lly^{, a}^{nd c}^r^e^a^t^e^the
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

2008, speaking at National Defense University, he stated, “It seems to me that there needs to be a ^st

new National Security Act ... for the 21 century, to update the institutions and the framework that ¹²
helped us wage and win the Cold War.”
In recent years, a wide variety of think-tanks, ad hoc commissions, and congressionally mandated
studies have put forward proposals to reform part or all of the current national security system.
One of the most comprehensive efforts is the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), led by
James Locher III, who, as a Senate Armed Services Committee staffer in the 1980s, directed the ¹³
development of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. PNSR, self-consciously modeled on
Goldwater-Nichols in the scope of its ambition, aims at “improving the U.S. government’s ability ^st
to effectively provide for the nation’s security in the 21 century” and, more explicitly, at helping ¹⁴
craft a new National Security Act. PNSR, brought together, on its Guiding coalition and on its
working groups, many of the key institutional and individual “thought leaders” on national
security reform in the Washington policy community, as well as representation across the political ¹⁵
spectrum. PNSR issued its final report, entitled “Forging a New Shield,” in late 2008.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has provided a platform for a series of
major projects on national security reform-related issues, incorporating senior practitioners and
outside thought leaders as well as its own experts. These efforts have included the four-phase
“Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” project, which “presents an integrated set of practical and
actionable recommendations for organizing the U.S. defense and national security apparatus to ^st
meet 21 century challenges”; the Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance co-chaired by
Representative Robert Andrews and Representative Mark Kirk; and the Commission on Smart
Power co-chaired by Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Other illustrative major
initiatives with a relatively broad scope have included a two-year collaboration between the
American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimson Center, which produced the report “A Foreign ¹⁶
Affairs Budget for the Future,” and the bipartisan, congressionally mandated “HELP” ¹⁷
Commission, which examined foreign assistance.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
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^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^Def^e^ns^e^R^obe^r^t^G^a^tes^,^L^a^{ndon L}^e^c^t^ur^e^,^Maⁿ^h^a^tta^{n K}^a^ns^a^s^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{26, 20}⁰⁷^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
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¹²^Se^e^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^D^e^f^e^ns^e^R^obe^r^t^G^a^t^e^s^,^Q^u^e^s^{tion a}ⁿ^{d A}ⁿ^s^w^e^r^Se^s^s^{ion f}^o^ll^ow^ing^r^e^m^a^r^k^s^a^t^N^a^tiona^l^D^e^f^e^ns^e
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^c^ontra^c^t^w^{ith a}ⁿⁱ^nde^pe^nde^nt^{, n}^oⁿ^p^a^r^tisaⁿ^,^no^npr^of^{it org}^a^niz^a^tion^f^o^{r u}^p^t^o^$³^m^illion^to^c^oⁿ^duc^{t a}^st^udy^of^the^na^tio^na^l
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¹⁵^A^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^P^N^SR’s^w^e^bsite^{, htt}^p^://w^ww^.pnsr.org^/^.
¹⁶^A^m^ba^s^s^a^dor^T^hom^a^s^B^o^y^a^{tt, e}^t^{.al., A}^For^e^ig^{n A}^f^f^a^ir^s^B^udg^e^t^f^o^{r the}^Fut^u^re^{: Fix}ⁱ^ng^the^{Crisis i}ⁿ^Di^plom^a^tic
^Readⁱⁿ^ess,^Am^eri^can^Acad^e^m^y^o^f^Di^p^l^o^m^a^c^y^an^d^S^tⁱ^m^soⁿ^Cen^t^er,^Oct^o^b^e^{r 20}⁰⁸^.
¹⁷^“^H^EL^P^”^s^t^a^nds^f^o^r^H^e^lpiⁿ^g^to^E^nha^nc^e^t^h^e^Lⁱ^v^e^lihood^of^P^e^op^le^a^r^oun^{d t}^h^e^G^l^obe^{. T}^h^e^C^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on c}^a^r^rⁱ^e^d^out^its
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^fⁱ^na^{l r}^e^por^{t, “}^B^e^y^{ond A}^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^,^”^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^{7, 20}^07,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http:^//w^w^w^.he^l^pc^om^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on.g^o^v^/^por^ta^ls^/⁰^/
^B^e^y^ond%^20A^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^_^H^E^L^P^_C^om^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on_R^e^por^t.^pdf^.

The “national security system” is a descriptive term, rather than a legal one, and includes
individuals, organizations, structures, and processes. In practice, key elements include executive
branch agencies, formal and informal mechanisms for coordinating and integrating national
security planning and execution among those agencies, the process for supporting presidential
decision-making, guidance from national security strategy, resource distribution within the
executive branch, and congressional oversight.
Different debate participants, reviewing these elements, describe the “problem”—and thus the
rationale for change—in different ways. In some cases, this is because they disagree about the
“diagnosis.” In others, it is because they focus on different elements of the system, and in still
others, it is because they use different arguments to point to the same underlying concerns. An
unfortunate tendency throughout the debates is to identify “what’s wrong” primarily in terms of a
proposed “fix”, rather than explaining why a given arrangement is non-optimal. This section
reviews major “problems” identified with each of the key elements of the system.
National security “key players” within the executive branch include both agencies and sub-
agencies, and their relative weight varies over time in accordance with the specific issue in
question, the global context, and presidential direction.
Key players include, for example, those agencies represented on the National Security Council
and Homeland Security Council. Under the George W. Bush Administration, the National
Security Council included the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy as statutory members; the
Secretary of the Treasury; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of ¹⁸
National Intelligence in advisory capacities. The Homeland Security Council included the
Secretaries of Homeland Security, Treasury, Defense, Health and Human Services, and
Transportation, as well as the Directors of National Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of ¹⁹
Investigation.
Some activities of many other agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development ²⁰
(USAID) and the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and Agriculture, also have a bearing on
national security. “Key players” also include agencies’ representatives serving around the world,
such as members of country teams at U.S. embassies, and staff of, or liaisons to, military
Combatant Commands and task forces.

¹⁸^T^h^e^Ene^r^gy^I^nde^pe^nde^nc^e^a^nd^S^e^c^u^r^ity^A^c^{t o}^f²⁰⁰^{7 (}^P^.L^{. 11}^0-¹⁴⁰⁾^{, Se}^c^tio^{n 9}³²^,^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^19,²⁰⁰⁷^{, a}^m^e^nde^{d the}
^N^a^tiona^{l Se}^c^u^rⁱ^ty^A^c^{t of}^{1947 t}^oⁱⁿ^c^l^ude^t^h^e^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^Ene^r^gy^a^s^a^s^t^a^t^utor^y^m^e^m^b^e^r^of^the^N^a^tion^a^{l Se}^c^u^r^ity
^C^ounc^il^{. T}^h^e^N^S^C^w^e^bs^ite^doe^sⁿ^o^{t y}^e^{t r}^e^f^l^e^c^t^this^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^.
¹⁹^T^h^e^H^o^m^e^l^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^il^,^the^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^l^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity⁽^D^H^S⁾^,^a^{nd t}^h^e^of^fⁱ^c^e^of^the^Dⁱ^r^e^c^t^or^of
^Natioⁿ^a^{l In}^tellig^en^{ce w}^e^r^e^create^dⁱⁿ^th^{e w}^a^k^e^o^f⁹^/¹¹^.^T^h^{e creatio}ⁿ^o^f^{DHS, w}^h^ich^b^ecam^{e o}^p^e^ratioⁿ^a^{l in}²⁰⁰³^,
^c^ons^oli^d^a^t^e^d²²^dif^f^e^r^e^{nt a}^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^es^{. Se}^e^the^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^A^c^t^of²⁰^02,^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{25, 2}⁰⁰²⁽^P^.^L^{. 107-}²⁹⁶⁾^{, a}ⁿ^d
^the^Inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^Re^f^o^rm^a^{nd T}^e^rr^oris^m^P^r^e^v^eⁿ^tion^A^c^{t of}²⁰⁰⁴^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^17,²⁰^{04 (}^P^.L^{. 1}^08-⁴⁵^8).
²⁰^Sⁱⁿ^{ce 20}⁰⁶^,^t^h^{e A}^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^rat^o^{r o}^f^US^A^I^{D h}^a^{s ser}^v^ed^coⁿ^c^u^rren^t^l^y^{as t}^h^{e Di}^rect^o^r^o^f^U.^S^.^F^o^rei^{gn A}^s^si^st^an^{ce at}^t^h^e
^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^.

Many debate participants argue that civilian agencies do not have sufficient capacity, or the
necessary capabilities, to support their national security roles and responsibilities. This is due in
part to an overall growth in requirements for civilian engagement—for the flexible use of soft
power—in the post-9/11, globalized world.
Civilian agencies, it is argued, are under-resourced, under-staffed, non-optimally organized and
trained, and/or lack the necessary expeditionary institutional culture. For example, civilian
agencies were not prepared to quickly deploy large numbers of personnel to carry out
reconstruction work in the immediate aftermath of major combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Debate
participants focus primarily on the Department of State and USAID, but also refer to other
agencies, such as Justice and Treasury, that might play roles in complex contingencies.
“Limited civilian capacity” is a problem primarily, it is argued, because it may leave unmet
important requirements that support U.S. national security goals. Alternatively, missions for
which civilian agencies would be best qualified are passed to other entities that are available but
less qualified, such as DOD, or to contractors. Some debate participants, particularly in the
defense community, argue that using DOD as the default solution places additional stress on ²¹
already stretched forces and reduces their ability to train and prepare for other requirements.
Some of the sharpest critiques have come from deployed U.S. Commanders who have wondered, ²²
“Where is the State Department?”
Other critics of the current balance of roles and responsibilities among executive branch key
players identify the same problem from a different angle, arguing that DOD has assumed too
large a role in various foreign affairs activities such as economic reconstruction, the training of
foreign police forces, and humanitarian assistance. Some of the sharpest critiques in this category
suggest that DOD is “encroaching” on the purview of civilian agencies, in terms of both the role
it is playing in the field and the share of resources it is receiving to execute those missions.
Some of these observers argue that an expanded DOD role is a problem primarily because DOD
personnel do not have the expertise for many foreign assistance missions, and that therefore, their
efforts in such areas may do more harm than good. Others stress that a U.S. military lead role on
the ground may send the wrong messages to international partner states and organizations. Still
others stress that, even when DOD’s stop-gap efforts successfully meet short-term needs, this
problem-solving reduces the impetus in Washington for more adequately resourcing and
preparing civilian agencies to do the job.

²¹^F^o^{r a}ⁿⁱⁿ^stⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^on^al^vi^ew^,^see^Geⁿ^e^ral^Ri^ch^ard^C^o^d^y^,^S^t^at^em^en^t^f^o^{r t}^h^{e Reco}^rd,^Hou^s^{e A}^r^m^e^d^S^e^rvi^{ces Co}^mmi^t^t^ee,
^A^p^r^{il 10,}²⁰⁰⁸^{, w}^h^ic^{h n}^o^te^s^:^“^T^oda^y^’^s^A^r^m^y^is^{out of}^ba^la^nc^e^.^T^h^e^c^u^r^r^e^nt^de^m^a^{nd f}^o^r^our^f^o^r^c^e^sⁱⁿ^I^r^a^{q a}^nd
^Afg^h^an^istan^ex^ceed^{s th}^{e su}^stain^a^b^l^{e su}^p^p^ly^an^d^lim^{its o}^u^r^a^b^ility^to^p^r^o^v^id^{e read}^y^f^o^rce^s^f^o^{r o}^t^h^e^{r co}ⁿ^tⁱⁿ^g^eⁿ^c^{ies.” Ho}^w
^br^oa^dly^to^de^fⁱ^ne^the^r^a^ng^e^of^mⁱ^ss^ions^f^o^r^w^h^ic^{h U}^.^S.^s^h^o^u^l^d^pr^e^p^a^r^e^,^a^{nd w}^h^e^t^he^r^t^o^de^dⁱ^c^a^t^e^f^o^r^c^e^s^to^no^n-^tr^a^d^it^io^na^l
^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^{are cu}^rren^t^t^o^pⁱ^{cs o}^f^d^e^b^a^t^e^wⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^t^h^{e Off}ⁱ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e S}^ecr^et^ar^y^o^f^De^fen^s^{e an}^d^t^h^e^S^e^rvi^ces^.
²²^Inf^o^rm^a^{tion f}^r^o^m^U^.^{S. Com}^m^a^nde^rs^{, Mu}^lti-N^a^tio^na^{l F}^o^rc^e^-Ira^{q, J}^a^nua^ry^2008.

In general, interagency coordination for planning and executing national security activities is
based on an array of formal mechanisms and informal practices. Factors that may affect the
effectiveness of any of these methods include the authorities of the coordinating bodies or
individuals, the resources they control, and the access they enjoy to top decision-makers.
In some cases, responsibility for coordination, or oversight of implementation, is assigned to the
White House staff. One example from the George W. Bush Administration is the role of the
Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan,
responsible for coordinating executive branch efforts in these two major complex operations.
Another Bush Administration example is the U.S.A. Freedom Corps, whose leadership Council,
like the NSC, included cabinet members. The Director of the Freedom Corps served as Deputy
Administrator to the President and was responsible, from that White House office, for
coordinating input from all participating agencies and overseeing implementation of Freedom ²³
Corps initiatives.
In other cases, responsibility is assigned to a “lead agency,” a flexible concept that refers to
giving a single department or agency the responsibility, in a given issue area, for coordinating
efforts by multiple agencies. A “lead agency” may be permanent or temporary, and it may or may
not be authorized to give direction to other agencies. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, for
example, the Department of Defense served temporarily as the assigned “lead agency.” At the
Department of State, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)
has been assigned a permanent “lead agency” role in coordinating planning and execution for ²⁴
complex contingencies.
In other cases, to provide coordination among agencies, an “extra-agency” body is created, whose
personnel are drawn from all key concerned agencies. The National Counter-Terrorism Center
follows this model by bringing together experts from various departments and agencies to ²⁵
integrate and analyze counter-terrorism-related intelligence and to conduct joint planning.
In practice, interagency coordination mechanisms often develop more quickly in the field, driven
by operational exigencies. Country teams at U.S. embassies around the world, under the authority ²⁶
of the Chief of Mission (Ambassador), are the long-standing model. Key recent organizational

²³^Se^e^Pr^e^s^ideⁿ^{t G}^e^or^g^e^W^.^B^u^s^h^,^Ex^e^c^u^tiv^e^O^r^de^r¹³²^54,^J^a^nua^r^y^29,²⁰⁰²^{, “}^E^s^t^a^b^lis^hing^t^h^e^U^S^A^Fr^e^e^dom^C^o^r^p^s^,^”
^Fe^de^{ral Re}^giste^r^{, v}^o^l^.^67,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{1, 200}^2,^pp.⁴⁸⁶⁹^-⁴⁸⁷^1.
²⁴^S^{ee Nat}ⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^ecu^rⁱ^t^y^P^r^esi^d^en^tⁱ^al^Di^rectⁱ^v^e/^NS^P^D^-4^4,^“M^an^agemen^t^o^f^In^t^e^ragen^c^y^E^f^f^o^rt^{s Co}ⁿ^cernⁱⁿ^g
^R^e^c^ons^tr^uc^tio^{n a}ⁿ^{d S}^t^a^b^iliz^a^tio^n,^”^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^{7, 20}^05,^w^h^ic^{h de}^s^c^rⁱ^be^s^the^“^l^e^a^d^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^”^r^e^s^pons^ibili^tie^s^of^the^Sta^t^e
^De^pa^rtm^e^{nt to le}^a^d^a^{nd c}^oor^dina^t^e^r^e^c^onstruc^tio^{n a}ⁿ^{d sta}^bⁱ^liz^a^tioⁿ^e^f^f^o^rts,^a^s^w^e^{ll a}^s^the^supp^{ort re}^sp^onsib^ilitie^s^of
^othe^r^de^pa^r^t^m^e^nts^a^{nd a}^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^.
²⁵^T^h^e^N^C^T^C^w^a^s^c^r^e^a^t^e^d^b^y^Ex^e^c^utiv^e^O^r^de^r¹³³^54,^A^u^g^u^s^t^27,²⁰^{04, a}^{nd f}^u^r^t^he^r^c^odifⁱ^e^d^by^C^ong^r^e^s^s^{in the}
^Inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^Re^f^o^r^m^a^{nd T}^e^rrorism^P^r^e^v^eⁿ^{tion A}^c^{t, De}^c^e^m^b^e^r^17,²⁰⁰^{4 (}^P^.L^{. 10}^8-4⁵⁸⁾^{. A}^c^c^o^rding^t^o^the²⁰⁰⁴^A^c^t,
^Se^c^tion¹⁰²¹^{, the}^Dⁱ^r^e^c^t^or^of^the^N^C^T^C^r^e^por^ts^dir^e^c^tly^{to th}^e^P^r^esⁱ^d^en^t^oⁿ^j^oⁱⁿ^t^couⁿ^t^e^rt^erro^ri^sm^o^p^eratⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^and^t^o^t^h^e
^Dire^c^t^{or of}^Na^tiona^{l I}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^{on t}^h^e^a^c^tiv^itie^{s of}^{its Dir}^e^c^t^ora^t^e^of^Inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^,^a^nd^on^bu^dg^e^t^a^r^y^a^{nd pr}^og^ra^m^m^a^tic
^issu^es.
²⁶^S^{ee Nat}ⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^ecu^rⁱ^t^y^Deci^si^oⁿ^Di^rectⁱ^v^{e 3}⁸^(NS^DD-3⁸⁾^,^“S^t^a^f^fⁱⁿ^g^at^Di^p^l^o^m^atⁱ^c^Mⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^s^and^T^h^ei^{r Overseas}
^Posts,”^Ju^ne^2,¹⁹⁸²^{, w}^h^ic^{h c}^o^nf^irm^e^{d c}^e^r^ta^{in a}^u^th^oritie^{s of}^c^h^ie^f^s^of^mⁱ^{ssion ov}^e^r^pe^rso^nne^{l a}^ssigⁿ^e^d^f^r^om^othe^r
^agen^ci^{es t}^o^{serve o}ⁿ^t^h^ei^{r cou}ⁿ^t^ry^t^e^a^m^s.

initiatives include the civil-military Provincial Reconstructions Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan;
Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) at Combatant Commands, which include
representatives of civilian agencies in advisory roles; and U.S. Africa Command, a DOD ²⁷
combatant command in which representatives of civilian agencies hold formal staff positions.
Many debate participants argue that agencies do not coordinate sufficiently, in Washington or the
field, on planning or execution of national security activities. This is a problem, it is argued, for
many reasons: it can leave gaps in planning undetected; it can lead to wasted resources,
duplication of effort, or even working at cross purposes; it can send conflicting messages to
partner states; it can inadvertently demonstrate a lack of national unity; and most of all, it can lead
to failures in execution.
The National Security Council system, established by the National Security Act of 1947, was ²⁸
designed in part to support presidential decision-making on national security issues. It is the
system by which designated leaders of executive branch agencies and presidential advisors
review, clarify, and prepare specific issues for presidential decisions. As a rule, how that decision-²⁹
support function works in practice depends on the discretion of each President.
For example, President Eisenhower, perhaps drawing on his military background, established a
relatively formal NSC system, including a Planning Board, composed of senior officials, to
thoroughly review each issue prior to consideration by the National Security Council itself, and ³⁰
an Operations Coordinating Board to oversee implementation. His immediate successor,
President Kennedy, responding in part to critiques that the Eisenhower system had been too rigid,
began his administration by abolishing the Operations Board and adopting a less formal ³¹
approach.
Under the Administration of President George W. Bush, the decision-making system was based
on National Security Presidential Directive-1, which established a system of Policy Coordination

²⁷^For^f^u^r^t^he^r^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³⁴⁰⁰^3,^Afrⁱ^c^a^C^o^m^m^a^nd:^U^.^S.^Str^a^te^gic^Iⁿ^te^r^e^s^t^s^a^nd^th^e^Role^of^the
^{U.S. M}^ilit^aryⁱⁿ^Afric^a^{, by}^L^a^ur^eⁿ^P^l^oc^h^.
²⁸^T^h^e^N^a^tiona^{l Se}^c^u^r^ity^A^c^{t of}^{1947 (}^P^.L^{. 8}⁰^-²³⁵⁾^,^a^s^a^m^e^nde^{d in}¹⁹^49,⁽^P^.L^{. 2}¹⁶⁾^.^Se^c^tioⁿ⁴⁰²⁽^a⁾^no^t^e^s^:^“^T^he
^f^unc^tion^of^the^Co^unc^{il s}^h^a^{ll be}^t^o^a^d^vⁱ^se^the^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t w}^{ith re}^spe^c^t^{to t}^h^eⁱⁿ^te^g^r^a^tion^of^dom^e^s^tic^{, f}^o^re^ig^{n a}^{nd m}^ilita^ry
^polic^e^s^re^la^ting^t^o^t^h^e^na^ti^ona^{l se}^c^u^rity^{so a}^s^{to e}ⁿ^a^b^le^th^e^m^ilita^r^y^se^rv^ic^e^s^a^{nd othe}^{r de}^pa^rtm^e^{nts a}^{nd a}^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^of^the
^G^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt to c}^o^ope^ra^te^m^o^re^e^f^f^e^c^tiv^e^l^yⁱⁿ^m^a^tte^{rs inv}^o^lv^ing^the^na^tio^na^{l se}^c^u^rity^.”
²⁹^Se^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³⁰⁸⁴⁰^,^T^h^e^Natio^nal^Se^c^u^rity^C^o^uⁿ^c^{il: A}ⁿ^Or^gan^izati^oⁿ^a^{l Asse}^ssmeⁿ^t^,^by^Ric^h^a^r^{d A}^.^Be^s^t^J^r^.
^F^o^{r a l}^e^gal^an^al^y^sⁱ^s^o^f^NS^{C arran}^g^e^m^en^t^s^o^v^{er t}ⁱ^m^e^,^{see Co}^d^y^M^.^Bro^wⁿ^,^The^N^a^tio^na^{l Se}^c^u^rity^C^o^unc^{il: A}^Le^g^a^l
^Histo^r^{y o}^f^t^h^{e Presid}^en^{t’s Mo}^st^P^o^werfu^l^A^d^visers^,^P^r^oje^c^t^{on N}^a^ti^ona^{l Se}^c^u^rⁱ^ty^R^e^f^o^r^m^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r²⁰⁰^8.^For^aⁿ
^ov^e^r^vⁱ^ew^of^N^S^C^a^r^r^a^ngem^e^nts^ov^e^r^ti^m^e^{, inc}^l^udi^ng^pr^im^a^r^y^s^our^c^e^doc^um^eⁿ^ts^{, s}^e^e^K^a^r^l^{F. I}ⁿ^de^r^f^ur^{th a}ⁿ^{d L}^o^c^h^K^.
^J^ohns^on,^Fa^tef^u^{l Decision}^{s: In}^si^{de th}^e^N^a^ti^on^al^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^o^unc^il^,^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: O}^x^f^o^r^d^Uⁿ^iv^e^r^s^ity^P^r^e^s^s^U^S^A^,^2004.
^Citing^the^T^o^w^e^{r Com}^m^is^{sion re}^port,^the^a^u^th^{ors n}^o^te^{: “}^T^he^re^{is n}^o^m^a^gⁱ^c^f^o^r^m^ula^w^h^ic^{h c}^aⁿ^be^a^p^plie^{d t}^o^t^h^e^NSC
^stru^ctu^r^{e an}^d^p^r^o^{cess to}^p^r^o^d^u^{ce an}^o^p^tim^{al s}^y^ste^m^{... it m}^u^{st ad}^ap^{t to}^eachⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vⁱ^d^u^al^P^r^esid^eⁿ^{t’s sty}^l^{e an}^d
^m^a^na^g^e^m^e^{nt phil}^o^s^o^phy^.”^T^h^e^Tow^e^r^C^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on w}^a^s^es^ta^blis^he^{d in}¹⁹⁸⁶^t^o^r^e^vⁱ^e^w^the^I^r^a^n-^C^ont^r^a^a^f^f^a^ir^{, a}^{nd it}
^is^s^u^e^d^r^e^c^o^m^m^e^nda^tions^f^o^r^N^S^C^s^t^a^f^f^r^e^f^o^r^m^{. Se}^e^J^{ohn T}^o^w^e^r^,^Ed^m^{und Mus}^k^ie^{, a}ⁿ^{d B}^r^eⁿ^t^Sc^ow^c^r^of^t,^The^T^o^we^r
^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^{on Re}^por^t,^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: R}^a^ndom^H^ous^e^,¹⁹⁸⁷^.
³⁰^Se^e^Pr^e^s^ideⁿ^{t D}^w^ig^{ht D}^.^Eis^eⁿ^h^o^w^e^r^{, Exe}^c^u^tiv^e^O^r^de^r¹⁰⁴^83,^Se^pt^em^be^r^{2, 1}⁹⁵³^.
³¹^Kenⁿ^e^d^y^{’s ch}^an^g^e^s^w^e^{re p}^r^o^m^p^t^edⁱⁿ^p^a^{rt b}^y^th^{e “J}^ack^soⁿ^Su^b^c^o^{mmittee” rep}^o^r^{t th}^{at criticized}^th^e^Eisen^h^o^w^er
^s^y^st^e^m^a^s^o^v^erl^y^b^u^r^eau^cratⁱ^c^.^S^{ee “Organ}ⁱ^zⁱⁿ^{g f}^o^{r Nat}ⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^ecu^ri^t^y^,^”^S^t^a^f^f^Rep^o^r^t^s^an^d^Reco^mm^en^d^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^,
^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on N}^a^tiona^l^Polic^y^Ma^c^h^ine^r^y^,^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on G}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt O}^p^e^r^a^tions^{, U}^.^{S. Se}^na^te^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^{12, 1}⁹⁶⁰^.

Committees, a Deputies’ Committee, and a Principals’ Committee, composed, respectively, of
departmental Assistant Secretaries or other senior officials, Deputy Secretaries, and Secretaries.
At each level, the interagency body considered issues of cross-cutting concern, weighed options,
and made recommendations to the next higher level, in order to tee up well-considered issues for ³²
decision by the President. That basic structure, with slightly different terminology, was ³³
relatively consistent since the first Bush Administration.
Over time, a number of observers have commented that the U.S. national security decision-
making process—the “NSC process”—is insufficiently rigorous. “Rigor” may refer, for example,
to the timeliness of information- and proposal-sharing among agencies before committee
meetings or to the demonstrated ability of the process to highlight all important sides of an issue.
By failing to ensure what Ambassador James Dobbins has called a “disciplined, adversarial
debate,” it is argued, the system may not fully and effectively take account of input from key
advisors. In addition, important logical gaps may go undetected or unquestioned.

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act required the President to submit an annual “comprehensive
written report on the national security strategy of the United States.” That statement is to include
a “comprehensive discussion of the vital interests, goals and objectives of the United States
throughout the world,” the capabilities needed to implement the strategy, the proposed uses of
political, economic, military and other elements of national power; and a discussion of the ³⁵
adequacy of available capabilities. Each strategy is thus intended to provide guidance for
carrying out national security activities. In practice, strategies have been submitted periodically ³⁶
but not always annually.
Some critics point out that, as a rule, National Security Strategies crafted under this mandate
describe, but do not prioritize, national security challenges and goals, and they do not describe
how the various instruments of national power are to be applied and integrated to achieve each of ³⁷
those goals. The problem, it is argued, is that individual agencies, in developing their own

³²^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t G}^e^org^e^W^.^{Bush, Na}^tio^na^{l Se}^c^u^rity^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^tia^{l Dire}^c^tiv^e^-^{1 (“}^NS^P^D^-1”⁾^{, “}^O^rg^aⁿ^iz^a^tion^o^f^the^Na^tiona^l
^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^{il Sy}^s^t^em^,”^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{15, 2}⁰⁰¹^{. I}ⁿ^N^S^P^D^-¹^,^Pr^e^s^ideⁿ^{t B}^u^s^h^de^s^c^rⁱ^be^s^t^h^e^p^u^r^p^os^e^of^the^N^S^C^th^is^w^a^y^:
^“^T^he^{NSC sha}^{ll a}^d^vⁱ^se^a^{nd a}^ssist^m^e^{in inte}^g^r^a^ting^a^ll^a^s^pe^c^t^{s of}^na^tiona^{l se}^c^u^ri^ty^polic^y^a^s^{it a}^f^f^e^c^t^s^the^Unite^d
^Sta^t^e^s^—dom^e^s^tic^{, f}^o^reⁱ^g^{n, m}^ilita^r^y^{, inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^,^a^{nd e}^c^onom^ic^s⁽ⁱⁿ^c^onj^unc^ti^{on w}^{ith t}^h^e^N^a^tio^na^{l Ec}^onom^ic^Couⁿ^c^il
⁽^N^EC⁾^.^T^h^e^N^a^tiona^{l Se}^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^{il s}^y^s^t^em^is^a^pr^oc^e^s^s^{to c}^oor^dⁱ^na^te^e^x^e^c^u^tiv^e^de^pa^r^t^m^e^nts^a^{nd a}^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^{in the}
^effectⁱ^v^{e d}^e^v^e^l^o^p^m^en^t^an^dⁱ^m^p^l^emen^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^o^s^{e n}^a^tⁱ^on^al^secu^ri^t^y^p^o^lⁱ^cⁱ^e^s.^{” S}^{ee al}^so^Ho^m^e^l^aⁿ^d^S^ecu^ri^t^y
^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^tia^{l D}ⁱ^r^e^c^tiv^e^-^{1, O}^c^to^be^r^29,²⁰⁰¹^{, o}ⁿ^t^h^e^or^g^a^niz^a^tio^{n a}ⁿ^d^f^unc^tion^of^the^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^rⁱ^t^y^C^ounc^il.
³³^Se^e^Pre^s^ideⁿ^{t G}^e^org^e^{H. W}^.^{Bush, Na}^tio^na^{l Se}^c^u^ri^ty^Dire^c^tive^-^{1, a}^nd^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t W}^illia^m^Clinton^,^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^tia^l
^Deci^si^oⁿ^Di^rectⁱ^v^e-1^.
³⁴^For^a^m^o^r^e^de^ta^ile^{d a}ⁿ^a^l^y^s^is^of^na^tiona^{l s}^e^c^u^r^ity^s^t^r^a^te^gy^a^{nd ot}^he^r^g^u^idaⁿ^c^e^d^o^c^u^m^e^nts^,^s^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³⁴⁵⁰^5,
^Na^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^ecu^ri^t^y^S^t^ra^t^e^g^y^{: L}^e^gⁱ^sl^a^tⁱ^{ve Ma}ⁿ^d^a^t^es,^E^xecu^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^D^a^t^e^,^aⁿ^d^Con^sⁱ^d^eratⁱ^oⁿ^s^f^o^{r C}^o^ng^ress^{, by}^Ca^the^r^ine
^Dale.
³⁵^Se^e^the^G^o^ldw^a^te^r^-^N^ic^hols^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^R^e^or^g^a^niz^a^tion^A^c^{t of}^{1986, O}^c^t^obe^r^1,¹⁹^{86 (}^P^.^L^{. 99-}⁴³³⁾^,
^Se^c^{tion 60}^3.
³⁶^T^h^{e cu}^rren^t^Bu^s^h^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^ratⁱ^o^{n i}^ssu^ed^T^h^e^N^a^tⁱ^o^nal^Se^c^u^r^ity^S^t^r^a^te^gy^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^of^Am^e^r^ic^aⁱⁿ^Se^pte^m^be^r
²⁰⁰^{2, a}^{nd a}^doc^um^eⁿ^{t w}^{ith the}^sa^m^e^title^{in Ma}^rc^h²⁰⁰⁶^.
³⁷^A^sⁱ^ng^ula^r^his^t^or^ic^a^l^c^o^ntr^a^s^t^w^a^{s N}^S^C^-⁶⁸^{, “}^U^nite^d^Sta^t^e^s^O^b^je^c^tiv^e^s^a^nd^P^r^og^r^a^m^s^f^o^r^N^a^tiona^l^Se^c^u^r^ity^,”^a⁽^now
^de^-^c^la^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d⁾^top^s^e^c^r^e^t^doc^um^eⁿ^{t pr}^o^duc^e^d^by^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t T}^r^um^aⁿ^’^s^N^a^tiona^l^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^il^{on A}^p^r^{il 1}⁴^,¹⁹^50.^N^S^C^-
⁶⁸^de^sc^ribe^{d i}ⁿ^de^ta^{il the}^(C^old^W^a^{r) stra}^te^gⁱ^c^c^onte^x^{t, note}^d^theⁱⁿ^te^nti^{ons a}ⁿ^{d c}^a^p^a^bⁱ^litie^{s of}^b^o^th^the^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s
^a^{nd t}^h^e^Sovⁱ^e^t^Uⁿ^io^{n, a}ⁿ^d^pr^ov^id^e^d^pos^sⁱ^ble^c^o^ur^s^e^s^of^a^c^{tion t}^o^g^e^the^r^w^{ith a}^s^s^e^s^s^m^e^nts^.

strategies, doctrines, and requirements, receive too little guidance about balancing their own
capabilities with those of other agencies.
The categories of the President’s annual budget request to Congress are based on agencies, such
as the Departments of State and Defense, rather than on functional areas, such as “national
security” or “foreign assistance.” Each agency prepares its own portion of the budget request, on ³⁸
the basis of a working topline provided by the Office of Management and Budget.
Some debate participants stress that within the executive branch, insufficient efforts are made to
match strategy to resources. In the development of the President’s budget request, there is no
regular forum to rigorously debate which resources, or which combinations of resources, to apply
to holistic efforts like “national security” that involve multiple agencies. The problem, it is
argued, is that, absent clearly articulated national priorities or rigorous systemic-level debate, the ³⁹
President’s budget requests tend to reflect individual agency equities and concerns.
In general, Congress’s oversight role includes reviewing, monitoring, and supervising the ⁴⁰
implementation of public policy. That role includes, for example, conducting the budget,
authorization, and appropriations processes; ensuring that execution by the executive branch
matches legislative intent; evaluating program performance; and specifying the organization,
functions, and authorities of federal agencies.
Most oversight is carried out through Congress’s committee structure, including Appropriations
Subcommittee review of fiscal matters and standing and select committee review of activities in
their areas of jurisdiction; these portfolios roughly correspond to those of key national security
departments.
Some debate participants argue that these congressional oversight mechanisms are poorly
designed for holistic consideration of issues such as national security that involve multiple
agencies. Budget requests are considered by agency, rather than functional area. Although full
Appropriations Committees arguably take a “systemic” view when they divide the budget among
their subcommittees, they do not have the time or ability, it is argued, for detailed consideration of
possible areas of overlap or of tradespace among the elements of national power.
In turn, ongoing oversight mechanisms by standing committees do not provide, it is argued, any
regular forum for systemic-level consideration of cross-departmental challenges and possible

³⁸^For^ba^c^k^g^r^ound,^s^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^t^98-⁷²^1,^Iⁿ^tr^o^duc^ti^on^to^the^Fe^de^r^a^{l Bu}^dge^t^Pr^oc^e^s^s^{, by}^Robe^{rt K}^e^ith.
³⁹^For^a^c^r^iti^que^of^U^.^{S. g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt bu}^dg^e^ting^aⁿ^d^r^e^s^our^c^e^p^l^aⁿⁿⁱ^ng^f^o^r^na^tio^na^{l s}^e^c^u^r^ity^{, inc}^l^udi^ng^p^r^op^os^e^d^r^e^f^o^r^m^s^,
^s^e^e⁽^f^or^thc^o^mⁱ^ng⁾^G^o^r^{don A}^d^a^m^s,^Buyⁱ^{ng N}^a^ti^on^{al Se}^c^u^rⁱ^ty^:^H^o^w^Am^e^r^ic^{a Plans}^a^{nd P}^a^y^s^for^I^t^s^G^l^ob^{al R}^o^le^aⁿ^d
^S^a^f^et^{y at}^Ho^me^{, N}^e^w^Y^o^r^k^{: R}^outl^e^dg^e^P^r^e^s^s^,^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁴⁰^For^a^c^o^m^p^r^e^he^ns^iv^e^ov^e^r^vⁱ^ew^{, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³⁰²⁴^0,^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^sⁱ^onal^O^v^e^r^sⁱ^{ght M}^a^nu^al^,^b^y^F^r^ed^eri^c^{k M}^.^Kai^s^er
^et^al^.

solutions. Joint hearings, and some overlap in committee membership, may provide some limited
cross-fertilization.
This arrangement is a problem, it is argued, because it gives agencies an incentive to demonstrate
fulfillment of their individual mandates, but it does not necessarily reward contributions to
systemic-level efforts. Further, the arrangement does not foster development of systemic-level
expertise on the Hill, like the ability, for example, to weigh the use of hard and soft power to
achieve national objectives.

The current debates, informed by a wealth of large-scale studies and individual assessments,
include a broad array of specific proposals for change. Many but not all are theoretically mutually
compatible. These proposals tend to be presented as laundry lists, rather than as carefully crafted
strategies including timing and sequencing of proposed reform measures, together with their
likely ramifications. This section highlights proposals for adjusting the major elements of the
national security system.
A number of participants in the national security reform debates urge adjusting the balance of
roles and responsibilities among executive branch agencies. This group of observers includes
those concerned that DOD is doing “too much” and those worried that the Department of State
(DOS) is doing “too little.” It is frequently noted, for example, that for foreign affairs activities,
DOS has most of the authorities while DOD has most of the resources, including personnel;
adjustments could target either of those categories.
Other debate participants focus on improving “horizontal integration” among executive branch
agencies as a means to improve coordination in planning and execution. This emphasis is distinct
from, but theoretically mutually compatible with, calls to adjust the division of labor among
agencies.
Some proposals follow the Goldwater-Nichols emphasis on human capital. These include calls for
greater opportunities for interagency shared training, exercising, and education, as well as ⁴¹
enhanced exchange programs supporting tours of duty in other agencies.

⁴¹^For^a^de^ta^ile^{d a}ⁿ^a^l^y^s^is^of^the^s^e^is^s^u^e^s^{, a}^nd^of^the^N^a^tio^na^{l Se}^c^u^r^ity^P^r^of^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l D}^e^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t P}^r^og^r^a^m^la^unc^he^d^by
^the^G^e^or^g^e^W^.^B^u^s^h^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^{tion, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^t^R^L³⁴⁵^65,^Bu^ildin^g^{an I}ⁿ^te^r^a^ge^nc^y^C^adr^e^{of N}^a^tio^nal^Se^c^u^r^ity
^P^r^o^f^essi^oⁿ^a^l^{s: P}^r^op^o^s^a^l^s,^R^ecen^t^E^x^p^e^ri^en^ce,^aⁿ^d^Issu^{es f}^o^r^Con^g^r^ess^{, by}^Ca^the^r^ine^Da^le^.

Proponents of such approaches usually note that they would likely require personnel policy
adjustments, ensuring, for example, that such interagency service figures positively in promotion ⁴²
criteria and creating a sufficient personnel “float” in civilian agencies to backfill posts.
Other proposals seek to adjust and synchronize U.S. government agency representation in the
field. These include, for example, giving greater authority to Chiefs of Mission to coordinate or
direct representatives of other agencies serving in their country teams; aligning the definitions of
geographical regions of the world used by various U.S. government agencies; creating and
empowering “regional ambassadors”, with areas of responsibility corresponding to those of
military combatant commands; or strengthening the representation of civilian agencies at regional
combatant commands.
To foster stronger coordination of national security efforts, a number of debate participants have
proposed creating a new position, based at the White House, for example an NSC Senior Director,
or a more senior Assistant to the President. One version of this school of thought suggests a very
senior new post, with responsibility for overseeing the conduct of strategic reviews and the
issuance of guidance. Another version focuses primarily on implementation, proposing a post
responsible for coordination and execution of “national security operations.”
Although many observers note that the national security decision-making process is imperfect,
most add that its dynamics depend greatly on presidential discretion and the personalities of key
participants. Some observers propose that the Senate confirmation process could pay more
attention to how a prospective Department Secretary would play his or her role as a member of
the NSC. Others propose that the position of Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs be subject to Senate confirmation.
Some observers, emphasizing that national security guidance is key to effective national security
efforts, call for the preparation of more focused National Security Strategies, including clear
priorities and timelines. Some suggest that national security strategy would benefit from a more
rigorous—and possibly congressionally mandated—review process, modeled on the Quadrennial ⁴³
Defense Review process at the Department of Defense. In turn, some observers have called for

⁴²^T^h^e^study^“^A^Fore^ig^{n Aff}^a^{irs Budg}^e^t^f^o^{r the}^Fut^u^re^”^,^w^e^{nt a}^ste^p^f^u^rthe^{r, a}^r^g^uⁱⁿ^g^tha^t^t^h^e^c^r^e^a^tion^o^f^a^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n f}^l^oa^t
^is^a^pr^e^r^e^quis^ite^f^o^r^de^v^e^lopingⁱⁿ^te^r^-^a^g^e^ncy^c^oor^di^na^tio^{n a}ⁿ^{d i}ⁿ^te^g^r^a^{tion m}^e^c^h^aⁿ^is^m^s^.^T^o^tha^t^eⁿ^d^,^t^h^e^s^t^udy
^re^c^o^m^m^e^nde^{d e}^nha^ncⁱⁿ^g^De^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n c}^a^p^a^c^ity^b^y^a^tota^l^of^4,7³⁵^ne^w^bille^{ts be}^tw^e^eⁿ²⁰¹⁰^aⁿ^d²⁰¹⁴^,
ⁱⁿ^cl^udⁱⁿ^{g a “f}^l^o^at^{” o}^f¹^,²⁸⁷^f^o^{r t}^r^aiⁿⁱⁿ^g^.^S^{ee Am}^b^a^ssad^o^r^T^h^o^m^as^Bo^y^a^t^t^,^et^al^.^,^{A For}^eⁱ^{gn A}^ffair^s^B^udge^t^for^t^h^e
^Future^{: Fix}ⁱ^ng^the^Crisisⁱⁿ^Dⁱ^plo^m^atic^Re^ad^ine^s^s^{, A}^m^e^r^ic^aⁿ^A^c^a^d^em^y^of^Dⁱ^plom^a^c^y^a^{nd Stim}^s^{on C}^e^nte^r^{, O}^c^tobe^r
²⁰⁰^8.
⁴³^T^h^e^B^e^y^{ond G}^o^ldw^a^te^r^-^N^ic^hols^pr^oje^c^t^a^d^v^o^c^a^t^e^d^a^“^Q^ua^dr^e^nnia^l^N^a^tiona^l^Se^c^u^r^ity^R^e^vⁱ^ew^”^,^inv^o^lv^ing
^pa^r^tic^ipa^tio^{n f}^r^om^a^{ll de}^pa^r^t^m^e^{nts a}^{nd a}^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^c^onc^e^r^ne^{d w}^ith^na^ti^ona^{l s}^e^c^u^r^ity^{, a}^{nd i}ⁿ^c^l^u^d^ing^aⁿ^a^s^s^e^s^s^m^e^{nt of}
^ch^al^l^eⁿ^g^es,^an^artⁱ^c^u^l^atⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^o^b^j^e^c^tⁱ^v^es,^{a st}^rat^e^g^y^f^o^{r ach}ⁱ^e^viⁿ^g^t^h^o^s^{e o}^b^j^ectⁱ^v^es,^an^{d cl}^ari^fⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^of^ro^l^e^{s an}^d
^re^s^ponsⁱ^b^ilitie^sⁱⁿ^im^ple^m^eⁿ^ting^tha^t^s^t^ra^te^gy^{. Se}^e^Cla^r^k^A^.^Murdo^c^k^a^{nd Mic}^h^e^l^e^A^.^Flo^u^rn^oy^{, L}^{ead Inv}^e^s^tig^a^t^ors^,
^Be^y^{ond G}^o^ldw^a^te^r^-^Nⁱ^c^hols^:^U^.^S.^G^o^v^e^r^nm^eⁿ^{t an}^{d D}^e^fe^ns^e^Re^for^m^for^{a N}^e^w^Str^a^te^gic^Er^a^,^Ph^as^e²^Re^por^t,^Ceⁿ^t^{er f}^o^r
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

capturing strategic guidance in a document—National Security Planning Guidance—that would ⁴⁴
convey the President’s intent and direction to departments and agencies. The guidance would set
priorities and assign tasks to specific agencies, and it could also include fiscal guidance.
To foster holistic consideration of national security challenges and solutions, a number of debate
participants propose instituting a “national security” budget request, as a separate section of the
President’s budget request to Congress.
Some debate participants suggest the establishment of House and Senate Select Committees on
National Security. Such committees could play a role in considering budget requests related to
national security (whether or not submitted as a discrete request) and could take a holistic
approach to national security challenges.
Others have suggested appointing some Members to serve on committees of jurisdiction for
multiple key national security agencies, such as Armed Services and Foreign Relations/Affairs, to
provide some over-arching visibility. Still others have proposed the more frequent convening of
joint sessions of committees with related national security interests.

To help sharpen and focus the emerging, multi-faceted debates about national security reform, the
following areas may merit further exploration.
As a rule, reform proposals are based, usually explicitly, on some assumptions about the global
security context, including for how long those identified conditions are likely to persist. In theory,
there might be some advantages in orienting a “national security system” toward the major
challenges of its day, just as the National Security Act of 1947 was designed for the post-WWII
Cold War world. On the other hand, there might be different advantages in building some
flexibility into the system, to allow for both unexpected events and change over time.
Most national security reform proposals to date list specific initiatives but do not bring them
together in a single plan of action. For example, most proposals do not prioritize their
recommendations, and most do not propose a sequence for the introduction of changes. Most do

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^S^t^rat^e^gi^{c an}^d^In^t^e^rⁿ^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^t^u^dⁱ^e^s^,^Ju^l^y²⁰⁰⁵^,^p^.²⁸^.^In^Decem^b^e^r²⁰⁰⁸^,^t^h^e^P^r^o^j^ect^on^Natⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^e^c^u^ri^t^y^Re^f^o^r^m
^(P^NSR)^e^c^hoe^d^the^re^c^o^m^m^e^nda^tion,^c^a^lling^f^o^{r a}^“^N^a^tiona^l^Se^c^u^ri^ty^Re^vⁱ^e^w^”^tha^t^w^{ould “}^p^rⁱ^orit^iz^e^obje^c^tiv^e^s^,
^e^s^ta^blis^{h ris}^k^m^a^na^gem^e^{nt c}^r^ite^ria^,^s^p^e^cⁱ^fy^role^s^a^{nd re}^s^ponsⁱ^b^ilit^ie^s^f^o^{r priority}^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^ons^{, a}^s^s^e^s^s^re^q^u^ire^d^c^a^p^a^bⁱ^litie^s^,
^a^{nd i}^d^eⁿ^tif^y^c^a^pa^bility^g^a^ps”^.
⁴⁴^S^{ee Cl}^{ark A}^.^M^u^rd^o^c^{k an}^d^Mⁱ^chel^{e A}^.^F^l^o^u^r^no^y^,^L^e^ad^In^vestⁱ^g^at^o^r^s,^Be^y^ond^G^o^l^d^w^a^te^r^-^Nⁱ^c^h^ols^:^U^.^{S. G}^o^v^e^r^nm^eⁿ^t
^and^D^e^fe^ns^e^Re^for^m^f^o^r^{a N}^e^w^St^r^a^te^gic^Er^a^,^Ph^as^e²^Re^por^t^,^C^e^nt^e^r^f^o^r^Str^a^te^gⁱ^c^a^{nd I}ⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^ona^l^Stud^ie^s^,^J^u^ly²⁰⁰^5,
^{p. 2}⁹^{, a}^nd^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^Q^uadr^eⁿ^nia^l^D^e^fe^ns^e^Re^vⁱ^e^w^Re^p^o^r^t^{, Fe}^br^ua^r^y^{6, 20}⁰⁶^{, p}^.⁸⁵^.^Se^e^P^r^oje^c^t^oⁿ^N^a^tio^na^l
^Se^c^u^r^ity^R^e^f^o^r^m^{, “}^F^or^gⁱ^ng^a^N^e^w^Shie^l^d^,”^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r²⁰⁰⁸^{, p}^.^x^ii.

not spell out what might be accomplished through presidential directive alone, versus what might
require congressional action.
Almost entirely missing from the debates, to this point, are counter-arguments about the strengths
of the status quo. The nature of such arguments, and the strength of various constituencies in
favor of the status quo, is not yet clear.
Even small-scale or incremental change would affect some current ways of doing business. It
might be useful to consider the possible risks and unintended consequences of various change
proposals, such as whether they might negatively affect some current processes and efforts that
appear to be working effectively.
^C^a^th^eriⁿ^{e Dale} ^P^a^{t T}^o^w^e^ll
^Sp^{ecialist i}ⁿ^Iⁿ^terⁿ^atioⁿ^a^{l Sec}^u^rⁱ^t^y^Sp^{ecialist i}ⁿ^{U.S. De}^f^eⁿ^s^{e P}^o^lic^y^an^d^B^u^d^g^e^t
^cdal^e@^crs^.^l^o^c.g^o^v^,^7-⁸⁹⁸³^pt^o^w^el^l^@^crs^.^l^o^c.g^o^v^,^7-²¹²²
^Niⁿ^a^{M. S}^e^rafiⁿ^o
^Sp^{ecialist i}ⁿ^Iⁿ^terⁿ^atioⁿ^a^{l Sec}^u^rⁱ^t^y^Af^f^a^ir^s
ⁿ^s^era^fⁱⁿ^o^@^crs^.^l^o^c.g^o^v^,^7-⁷⁶⁶⁷