The Department of Defense, Science and Technology Proram: An Analysis, FY1998-FY2007

The Department of Defense,
Science and Technology Program:
An Analysis, FY1998-FY2007
September 12, 2008
John D. Moteff
Specialist, Science and Technology Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

Department of Defense, Science and Technology
Program: An Analysis, FY1998-FY2007
Summary
Every year Congress appropriates billions of dollars for the Science and
Technology Program of the Department of Defense. Besides deciding on how much
money to appropriate, Congress must also decide on how best to allocate those
resources. Over the last ten years, the Science and Technology program has grown
to historic levels in inflation-adjusted dollars. However, the funding increases appear
to have peaked. In light of growing federal budget deficits, Congress may re-
examine its investments in DOD’s S&T program. Before doing that, it might be
helpful to understand how the budget increases of the last ten years have been
allocated. That is the purpose of this report.
Between FY1998 and FY2007, the annual budget of the Department of Defense
(DOD) Science and Technology (S&T) program grew from $7.7 billion to $12.8
billion. The cumulative increase, in constant FY2009 dollars, was $22.5 billion.
The increase was distributed broadly across the S&T program. In constant
dollars, the S&T budget of all departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and all
defense agencies increased (except that of the Missile Defense Agency). While there
was some variation in the distribution, no single department, agency, budget activity
or program predominated.
Of the three budget activities that make up the S&T program — basic research,
applied research, and advanced technology development — basic research increased
the least. The increase in basic research varied widely between departments and
agencies. Army, Navy, and Air Force advanced technology development, and
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) applied research received the
highest increases.
Considering individual program elements, the Army’s Combat Vehicle and
Advanced Automotive Technology advanced technology development program
received the single largest increase in constant dollars ($1.7 billion FY2009 dollars).
The mission area that attracted the greatest increases was countering weapons of
mass destruction. Four of the eleven S&T program elements that received the
highest increases were related to this mission.
This report will not be updated.

Contents
In troduction ......................................................1
What Constitutes Defense Science and Technology...................1
Funding Trends in DOD S&T....................................2
Congressional Support for Increased S&T Funding...................3
Analysis .........................................................4
Methodology .................................................4
Results ......................................................6
For DOD S&T as a Whole...................................6
By Department/Agency.....................................7
By Budget Activity........................................7
By Department/Agency and Budget Activity.....................8
By Individual PE.........................................10
Review of Major Findings..........................................13
Issues for Congress...............................................14
Appendix .......................................................15
List of Figures
Figure 1. S&T Budget Profile, FY1962-FY2007..........................2
Figure 2. S&T Funding Requests vs. Appropriations vs. Actual Total
Obligational Authority..........................................3
Figure 3. S&T Funding Above FY1998 Baseline.........................6
Figure 4. S&T Funding Above FY1998 Baseline by
Department/Agencies, Cumulative FY1998-FY2007..................7
Figure 5. S&T Funding Above FY1998 Baseline by Budget Activity,
Cumulative FY1998-FY2007....................................8
List of Tables
Table 1. S&T Funding Above FY1998 Baseline, by
Department/Agencies and Budget Activity, Cumulative FY1998-FY2007.9
Table 2. S&T Funding Above FY1998 Baseline, by
Department/Agencies and Budget Activity, Cumulative FY1998-FY2007 .9
Table 3. Five Individual Program Elements Which Exceeded Their Baseline
Funding the Most.............................................10
Table 4. Five Individual Program Elements Which Exceeded Their
Baseline by the Greatest Percentage..............................12

Department of Defense,
Science and Technology Program:
An Analysis, FY1998-FY2007
Introduction
Between FY1998 and FY2007, the annual budget of the Department of Defense
(DOD) Science and Technology (S&T) Program grew from $7.7 billion to $12.8
billion. In constant FY2009 dollars, the cumulative increase was $22.5 billion. The
purpose of this report is to aid Congressional oversight of DOD’s S&T program by
analyzing this budget increase by department and agency, by budget activity, and by
program element. Specifically, the report examines whether the budget increase
benefitted all programs or focused on certain priority areas. In a period of higher
budget deficits, as sustaining current levels of military spending becomes more of a
fiscal challenge, and as the nation continues to position itself to engage effectively
in a changing strategic environment, policymakers may scrutinize the allocation of
S&T resources more closely.
What Constitutes Defense Science and Technology
This report focuses on DOD’s base Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation Program (RDT&E).¹ As indicated by its name, this program funds
activities that range from fundamental research in the basic sciences to the design,
development, and testing of complex weapon systems ready for the field. The DOD
divides this range of effort into seven budget activities, designated 6.1 through 6.7
(see Appendix). Activities 6.1 through 6.3 (basic research, applied research, and
advanced technology development) constitute what is called the Science and
Technology (S&T) program. Budget activities 6.4 and 6.5 focus on the development
of specific new weapon systems or components (e.g., the Joint Strike Fighter or
missile defense systems).² Budget activity 6.6 provides management support,
including support for test and evaluation facilities. Budget activity 6.7 supports
system improvements in existing operational systems.

¹ The base RDT&E program is funded by Title IV of the annual defense appropriations
legislation. Additional RDT&E funds are also found in other parts of the DOD’s
appropriation, including some RDT&E funding specifically in support of the Global War
on Terror (GWOT). GWOT funds are requested and appropriated separately from the base
program. This report only considers the Title IV base funding.
² Some analysts include select activities within budget activity 6.4 as part of the S&T
program. This report considered only programs in the 6.1 through 6.3 budget activities.

The S&T program is often referred to as DOD’s “seed corn” because it supports
the development of a science and technology base upon which tomorrow’s high
performance military systems will be built. The payoff from S&T investments is
rarely immediate. The value of the knowledge tends to be unpredictable and hard to
measure. The operational capabilities that are developed take time to be incorporated
into fielded systems. Nevertheless, adequate support for S&T activities is seen by
many in Congress and the defense community as imperative to maintaining U.S.
military capabilities and superiority.
Funding Trends in DOD S&T
Figure 1 shows the DOD S&T budget from FY1962 (when the budget activity
designations 6.1-6.7 were first being adopted) through FY2007. During the 1960s
and early 1970s, budgets for S&T remained relatively flat in current dollars, with
inflation eroding their real values in constant dollars. Beginning in the late 1970s
and continuing through much of the 1980s, S&T budgets increased in both current
and constant dollars.
Figure 1. S&T Budget Profile,
FY1962-FY2007

¹⁶⁰⁰⁰
¹⁴⁰⁰⁰
¹²⁰⁰⁰
¹⁰⁰⁰⁰
⁸⁰⁰⁰
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^{current $}^{constant 2009 $}
^Source:^C^R^S^an^aly^s^{is o}^f^{DOD d}^a^{ta p}^r^o^v^id^ed^b^y^Directo^r^o^f^Def^eⁿ^s^{e R}^e^search^an^d
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At the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s, the Cold War began to wind down,
but budget deficits of the federal government continued to grow. Funding for S&T
became more erratic before essentially leveling off in constant dollars.
By the end of the 1990s, sustaining adequate support for S&T in a time of
declining military spending became a particular concern. Congress initially sought

to increase S&T funding by 2% per year after inflation,³ but achieved limited success
toward this goal. During the 2000 election, the Bush presidential campaign
advocated a general increase in military research and development as part of its
proposal to increase military spending. As part of the 2001 Quadrennial Review, the
DOD established a goal of stabilizing its base S&T funding at 3% of DOD’s overall
funding.⁴ Congress embraced this goal.⁵ Following the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, overall defense budgets began to rise quickly. Although not always
achieving the 3% goal, S&T funding rose to historic levels, in both current and
constant dollars.
Congressional Support for Increased S&T Funding
Figure 2 shows the role Congressional appropriations played in the general
increase in S&T funding from FY1998 to FY2007. DOD began seeking increases
to the S&T budget beginning in FY2002. However, Congress appropriated more
than DOD requested throughout this time period.
Figure 2. S&T Funding Requests vs.
Appropriations vs. Actual Total
Obligational Authority

¹⁴⁰⁰⁰
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^R^equest^{Appropriation}
^{Actual T}^O^A
^Source:^C^R^S^an^aly^s^{is of}^{DOD R}^-^{1 data an}^{d con}^f^eren^{ce reports accom}^p^aⁿ^yⁱ^ng
^ap^p^r^o^p^r^iatioⁿ^s^b^ills.
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^ex^pl^aiⁿ^e^{d f}^u^rt^h^e^{r bel}^o^w^.
³ §214, Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY1999, P.L. 105-261.
⁴ Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. September 30, 2001. p. 41.
⁵ Conference report accompanying H.R. 4546, National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003. H.Rept. 107-772. p. 460.

Analysis
This report focuses on the growth in the base S&T budgets between FY1998 and
FY2007. This period of time is interesting to policymakers for several reasons. It
includes the transition in FY2000 to a period of significant and historic growth in the
S&T budget. It includes a change in Administration, as well as the historic strategic
transition from the post-Cold War era to the War-on-Terror era. Picking FY1998 as
the baseline year is somewhat arbitrary, but because S&T funding for the three years
prior to FY1998 was relatively stable, it would appear to represent a valid starting
point. Also, declines in overall defense spending, beginning in FY1986, bottomed
out in FY1998, representing the end of the post-Cold War draw-down. The period
of analysis ends in FY2007, the latest budget year for which “actual” S&T funding
data exist (see below).
Methodology
The analysis in this report is based on data from two primary DOD sources: the
DOD R-1 document, and the RDT&E descriptive summaries of the departments and
agencies.
The R-1 is an annual budget document released by the DOD Comptroller that
summarizes all the Program Elements (PEs) that make up the base Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) program. Program Elements are the
building blocks of DOD’s budget. In the case of the base RDT&E program, each PE
represents an aggregation of research activities in a particular area. These areas could
be related to a discipline (e.g. materials science), or mission (e.g. electronic warfare),
or subsystem (e.g. propulsion technologies). Every RDT&E dollar is associated with
one, and only one, PE. The R-1 document lists all of these PEs, broken out by
department and agency and by budget activity (6.1-6.7). In the FY2009 RDT&E
budget request, there were 712 PEs, of which 157 were considered to be in the S&T
program.
The RDT&E descriptive summaries are released each year by the departments
or agencies, usually a few days after the official release of the DOD budget. They
provide a written description of each PE and include, among other information, goals
and objectives and past and anticipated accomplishments. In many cases, a PE may
be divided into one or more projects. This report does not examine projects below
the PE level.
The funding amounts identified in these documents are total obligational
authority (TOA). TOA is a DOD financial measure. In any given budget request,
TOA equals budget authority (BA), which is what Congress grants in its
appropriations bills (i.e. the authority to incur legally binding obligations). It
expresses the value of the direct program. If changes are made to appropriations
granted by Congress, because of general reductions, rescissions, lapsing unobligated
funds, transfers of unobligated funds, re-appropriations, etc., these changes are
accounted for differently when modifying the TOA and budget authority figures for

prior years.⁶ The R-1 and the RDT&E descriptive summaries list the current year’s
budget request, an estimated TOA for the immediate prior year (which may include
rescissions proposed in the current year’s budget), and the actual TOA for two years
prior (by which time most modifications to the initial appropriation’s Budget
Authority will have been made). The analysis in this report used actual TOA for
FY1998 through FY2007, as shown in the R-1 documents for FY2000 through
FY2009. It includes all S&T PEs listed in the R-1 documents for those years.
The TOA data were recorded in current dollars. These data were converted to
constant FY2009 dollars using TOA deflators for RDT&E taken from the DOD’s
National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2009. Unless stated otherwise, from here
on in this report, all data is given in FY2009 dollars.
The basic analysis compared the cumulative actual funding, from FY1998
through FY2007, in constant FY2009 dollars with what the cumulative funding
would have been if the FY1998 amount had risen only with inflation. This
comparison was done by department and agency, by budget activity, and by
individual PE. The comparisons were calculated both in dollars and as percentages.
Percentage changes take into account the size of the program. Changes in low cost
programs, when measured in absolute dollars, may conceal the relative importance
of the change as might be revealed when looking at the change in terms of
percentages. On the other hand, initial changes in low cost programs could lead to
relatively large percentage changes at first, and perhaps overstate the importance of
those changes. The analysis takes this issue into consideration.
The methodology used in this analysis has a couple limitations. One problem
is how to account for PEs that were initiated after FY1998. In these cases, the
FY1998 baseline funding is zero. That does not present a problem when analyzing
in terms of dollars, but it makes the percentage comparison meaningless. One could
use the first year the PE was established to determine a truncated baseline for
calculating the percentage increase or decrease. This, however, would not allow for
a direct comparison with PEs that were in existence in FY1998. Therefore, the
analysis of percentage changes in individual PEs is restricted to PEs that were in
existence in FY1998 and does not include PEs established after that time.
Another limitation is that some PEs were reorganized during the course of the
10 year period. In some cases, PEs were terminated and their projects distributed to
new or existing PEs. While it is possible in some of these cases to analyze the data
for these PEs in the aggregate, in other cases it is difficult to compare the new PEs

⁶ For more discussion of how TOA and BA differ, refer to the National Defense Budget
Estimates, FY2009, Office of the Undersecretary (Comptroller), March 2008, p. 1. Known
as the Green Book, see [http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/
fy2009_greenbook.pdf].

to the old PEs.⁷ These situations were handled on a case by case basis, based on the
judgement of the author.⁸
Results
For DOD S&T as a Whole. Figure 3 compares actual funding (in FY2009
dollars) with the FY1998 baseline. Baseline funding, in constant FY2009 dollars,
was $9.6 billion dollars per year. Actual funding rose to $14.3 billion in FY2005 (in
FY2009 dollars), before declining to $13.4 billion in FY2007 (in FY2009 dollars).⁹
In total, actual funding exceeded baseline funding by $22.5 billion (in FY2009
dollars), as represented by the area above the baseline line in Figure 3.
Figure 3. S&T Funding Above FY1998
Baseline

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⁰¹⁹⁹⁸²⁰⁰⁰²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰⁶
^Actual^T^O^A^F^Y^{98 Basel}ⁱⁿ^e
^Source:^C^R^S^an^aly^s^is^of^{DOD R}^-^{1 data, F}^Y^2000-^F^Y^2009.
⁷ For example, in its FY2002 budget request, the Navy reorganized nearly half its PEs.
Projects from old PEs were distributed among a number of new PEs, making tracking those
activities difficult across the analysis’s time span. As a result, a number of Navy PEs do not
lend themselves to this analysis. To a lesser extent, in FY2002, some Air Force PEs were
reorganized to align with the newly restructured Air Force Research Laboratory
organization, and again in FY2003 to reflect recommendations from the Space Commission
to segregate space-related research from the more generic aerospace activities. Some of
these changes were later reversed.
⁸ For example, in FY2005, in response to Congressional direction, the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency split a number of PEs in two. In this case, where the integrity
of the original PE was more or less preserved in the two new PEs, the analysis treated the
three (i.e the old baseline PE and the two new ones) as a single PE.
⁹ Note, in current dollars S&T funding peaked in FY2006. In constant FY2009 dollars, it
peaked in FY2005.

By Department/Agency. Figure 4 shows how this extra $22.5 billion was
distributed among the DOD departments and defense agencies.¹⁰ The Army received
the largest dollar increase — $6.6 billion. Defense agencies, as a whole, increased
the least — $5.2 billion.¹¹ In percentage terms, the three departments fared about
equally. The Army’s S&T funding increased 34% above its baseline, the Navy’s
32%, and the Air Force’s 36%. However, the defense agencies, as a whole, increased
only 11%.
Figure 4. S&T Funding Above FY1998
Baseline by Department/Agencies,
Cumulative FY1998-FY2007

Air ForceDefenseAgencies
$5,384
$5,172
Navy
$5,343
Army
$6,566
^Source:^C^R^S^an^aly^s^is^of^{DOD R}^-^{1 docu}^m^en^ts^{, F}^Y^2000-^F^Y^2009.
By Budget Activity. When characterizing the additional $22.5 billion in
terms of budget activity (Figure 5), $2.3 billion went to basic research (budget
activity 6.1), $10.0 billion went to applied research (budget activity 6.2), and $10.1
billion went to advanced technology development (budget activity 6.3). There has
been much concern among some analysts and policymakers about maintaining
adequate basic research (6.1). In absolute dollars, basic research increased noticeably
¹⁰ Defense agencies that support S&T include the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the Chemical and Biological
Defense Program, the Special Operations Command (SOC), the Defense Logistics Agency,
and the DOD Human Resources Activity.
¹¹ Of the individual defense agencies, DARPA’s actual S&T budget exceeded its baseline
by the highest amount ($2.5 billion). The MDA’s actual S&T budget fell short of its
baseline by $2.3 billion. S&T accounts for a very small share of MDA’s RDT&E program.

less than 6.2 or 6.3 funding. However, basic research activity tends to be less
costly.¹² In percentage terms, the additional 6.1 funds were about an 18% increase
above the baseline, while the additional 6.2 and 6.3 funds were respectively 27% and

21% above the baseline.

Figure 5. S&T Funding Above FY1998
Baseline by Budget Activity, Cumulative
FY1998-FY2007

6.3
$10,132
6.1
$2,314
6.2
$10,019
^Source:^C^R^S^an^aly^s^is^of^{DOD R}^-^{1 docu}^m^en^ts^{, F}^Y^2000-^F^Y^2009.
By Department/Agency and Budget Activity. Table 1 provides a
breakdown of the $22.5 billion by both department/agencies and budget activity.
Table 2 gives the same breakdown in percentage terms. While the defense agencies’

6.2 funding accounted for the single largest increase in funding in absolute dollars,

the percentage increase was not as large as those of the departments. The largest
increases, on a percentage basis, were in the departments’ 6.3 funding. The 6.3
programs of the defense agencies, as a whole, received a noticeably lower percentage¹³
increase in funding.
¹² It is not unusual in DOD, other agencies, or the private sector, for basic research budgets
to be lower in absolute dollars than applied research or advanced technology development
budgets. One reason for these differences is the cost of performing each type of activity.
Basic research may involve theoretical work or laboratory experiments involving small
volumes of materials. Advanced development may involve the construction and integration
of large hardware and software, tested in specialized test beds.
¹³ This is due in a large part to net declines in MDA’s and DARPA’s 6.3 activities.

There were some significant differences in the funding gains in basic research
among the department and agencies. The Army and the Air Force basic research
increased 39% and 31%, while the Navy’s increased 14% and the basic research
across all defense agencies increased only 3%.¹⁴
Table 1. S&T Funding Above FY1998 Baseline, by
Department/Agencies and Budget Activity, Cumulative FY1998-
FY2007
(in millions of FY2009 dollars)
Budget ActivityArmyNavyAir ForceDefense AgenciesTotal DOD
6.1 $857 $600 $721 $137 $2,315
6.2 $2,152 $1,970 $2,178 $3,719 $10,019
6.3 $3,557 $2,772 $2,486 $1,317 $10,132
Total S&T$6,566$5,342$5,385$5,173$22,466
^Source:^C^R^S^an^aly^s^is^of^{DOD R}^-^{1 docu}^m^en^ts^{, F}^Y^2000-^F^Y^2009.
^No^te:^Nu^m^b^ersⁱⁿ^T^a^{ble m}^a^yⁿ^o^{t ag}^{ree w}^ith^Fig^u^r^es^abov^{e, du}^{e to rou}ⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^.
Table 2. S&T Funding Above FY1998 Baseline, by
Department/Agencies and Budget Activity, Cumulative FY1998-
FY2007
(as a percentage of FY1998 baseline funding)
Budget ActivityArmyNavyAir ForceDefense AgenciesDODTotal

6.1 39% 14% 31% 3% 18%

6.2 26% 34% 32% 24% 27%

6.3 42% 43% 43% 5% 21%

S&T Total34%32%36%11%23%
^Source:^C^R^S^an^aly^s^is^of^{DOD R}^-^{1 docu}^m^en^ts^{, F}^Y^2000-^F^Y^2009.

¹⁴ While the percentage increase in Navy 6.1 funding is lower than the other departments,
it maintains the highest 6.1 budget of the three department. The relatively small increase
in the Defense Agencies’ 6.1 funding is due in a large part to the transfer of the University
Research Initiative from OSD to the departments.

By Individual PE. Of the 101 PEs, from all departments and agencies, that
were in existence in FY1998 and were continuously funded throughout the 10-year
period of the analysis, 74 exceeded their baseline. As noted above, all PEs that were
established after FY1998 show an increase above their baseline, even if funding did
not keep up with inflation after their initial establishment. Also as noted above, some
PEs were eliminated during the 10 year period. The 101 PEs referred to above do not
include either the newly created PEs or the baseline programs that were eliminated.
The size and distribution of the increases and decreases above and below baseline
funding for individual PEs appear to be distributed more or less evenly throughout
the range. A complete breakdown by PE is beyond the scope of this report.
Table 3 shows the five PEs whose actual funding exceeded their baseline
funding by the greatest amount, as measured in absolute constant FY2009 dollars.¹⁵
Table 4 below shows the five PEs whose actual funding exceeded their baseline by
the greatest percentages. Table 3 considers and includes PEs that were established
after FY1998. Table 4 does not.
Table 3. Five Individual Program Elements Which Exceeded
Their Baseline Funding the Most
(in millions FY2009 dollars)
Budget Activity,PE NumberPE NameExceeded
Dept./AgencyBaseline by
6.3, Army0603005ACombat Vehicle and Automotive$1,736
Advanced Technology
6.3, DARPA0603285EAdvanced Aerospace Systems$1,730
0603286EAdvanced Aerospace Systems
0603287ESpace Programs and Technology
6.2, DARPA0602712EMaterials and Electronics$1,514
0602715EMaterials and Biological
0602716E Electronics
6.3, Air Force0603801FSpecial Programs$1,445
6.2, DTRA0602715BRWMD Related Technologies$913
0602716BRWMD Defeat Technology
0602717BRStrategic Defense Technologies
^Source:^C^R^{S an}^aly^s^{is o}^f^{DOD R}^-¹^d^o^c^u^m^en^ts,^aⁿ^d^d^e^p^a^rtm^eⁿ^t/ag^eⁿ^c^y^d^e^scrip^tiv^{e su}^m^m^a^ries,
^F^Y^2000-^F^Y^2009.

¹⁵ For those interested, the five PEs which experienced the greatest decline in actual funding
when compared to their baselines were: Missile Defense Agency 6.3 Support Technology
(PE0603173C, -$1,330 million); DARPA 6.2 Advanced Electronics (PE0603739E, -
$900,589 million); Army 6.3 Aviation (PE0603003A, -$350,349); Army 6.2 Environmental
Quality (PE0602720A, -$272,971); and, Air Force 6.3 Spacecraft (PE0603401F, -$227,426).
All of these figures are in FY2009 dollars. All of these were in existence throughout the 10
year period, although the Missile Defense Agency PE changed PE number in FY2002. A
more detailed discussion of these PEs is beyond the scope of this report.

The Combat Vehicle and Automotive Advanced Technology PE is one of a
number of PEs that support the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS). The Army has
described the FCS as its top priority S&T effort. Funding for this PE rose from $48
million in FY1998 (in FY2009 dollars), prior to the beginning of the FCS effort, to
$353 million in FY2003 (in FY2009 dollars), when funding peaked. Funding in
FY2007 was $210 million (in FY2009 dollars). As noted below, this PE also
experienced one of the larger percentage increases.
The Advanced Aerospace Systems PE was established FY2000. Funding
increased substantially in FY2002 and again in FY2003 as DARPA expanded work
on unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) and the Orbital Express Space
Operations Architecture, a program to develop and demonstrate the ability to perform
autonomous on-orbit refueling and reconfiguration of satellites. Congress directed
DARPA to split the PE into two separate PEs, Advanced Aerospace Systems and
Space Programs and Technology, beginning in FY2005. For this analysis, the three
PEs were considered as one. Funding for these activities began at $23 million in
FY2000 (in FY2009 dollars) and peaked in FY2004 at $343 million (in FY2009
dollars). Funding for the two new PEs totaled $292 million in FY2007 (in FY2009
dollars).
The Materials and Electronics PE represented a core DARPA program for many
years. In FY1998, funding for the PE was $267 million (in FY2009 dollars). In
FY2005, Congress split this PE into two. The Materials and Biological Technology
PE and the Electronics PE, together, received $554 million in FY2005 (in FY2009
dollars). In FY2007, the two PE received $507 million (in FY2009 dollars). The PE
experienced its largest single-year increase in FY2002, due to increased funding for
the materials processing project and the establishment of the Beyond Silicon project.
The Air Force’s Special Programs PE was established in FY2003. While
funding for the PE appears in the R-1 document, the activities it supports are
classified and are not included in the descriptive summaries. Initially funded at $105
million in FY2003, it jumped to $408 million in FY2004 (both in FY2009 dollars).
Funding in FY2007 was $312 million (in FY2009 dollars).
DTRA’s 6.2 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Related Technologies PE
has undergone a couple of name changes, but has continued to focus on two primary
topics: counter-proliferation and sustainment. The former deals with preparing for
and supporting the military and civil response to WMD events. The latter includes
maintaining the viability and credibility of U.S. deterrent forces. Projects within
these two areas include modeling, simulation, and testing of WMD effects and
environments and the subsequent impact on the ability of U.S. forces to respond
under such conditions. The PE also includes the development of vulnerability
assessment tools and technologies to improve survivability of U.S. weapon systems
and capabilities and those of our allies. It also supports targeting operations of U.S.
deterrent forces. In FY2003, Congress directed that the PE be split into two new
PEs: WMD Defeat Technology and Strategic Defense Technologies. The original
PE received $255 million in FY1998 (in FY2009 dollars) and peaked in FY2002 at
$458 million (in FY2009 dollars). The two new PEs received $338 million in
FY2007 (in FY2009 dollars).

It is interesting to note that the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (both
its 6.2 and 6.3 activities) and DARPA’s 6.2 Biological Warfare Defense program
were three of the next 6 PEs that received high increases. This, along with the
increases allocated to DTRA’s WMD Related Technologies PE, may reveal a slight
emphasis on efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction.
Table 4. Five Individual Program Elements Which Exceeded
Their Baseline by the Greatest Percentage
BudgetExceeded
Activity,PE NumberPE NameBaseline
Dept./Agency by

6.2, Army0602783AComputer and Software484%

Technology

6.3, Army0603005ACombat Vehicle and Advanced358%

Automotive Technology

6.3, Army 0603654ALine of Sight (LOS)343%

6.3, Army0603710ANight Vision209%

6.3, Air Force0603211FAerospace Technologies152%

^S^o^urce:^C^R^S^an^aly^s^{is o}^f^{DOD R}^-¹^d^o^c^u^m^en^{ts an}^d^d^e^p^a^rtm^eⁿ^t/ag^eⁿ^c^{ies d}^e^scrip^tiv^{e su}^m^m^a^ries^,
^F^Y^2000-^F^Y^2009.
The Army’s 6.2 Computer and Software Technology PE exceeded its baseline
funding by nearly five times. However, this is largely because its FY1998 funding
was reduced to $824 thousand (in FY2009 dollars) from approximately $2.8 million
(in FY2009 dollars) the previous year. The descriptive summary for that year
indicated a change in the PE’s priorities. Funding jumped back up to $4.7 million
in FY1999 (in FY2009 dollars). In FY2007 the PE received $6.9 million (in FY2009
dollars). FY1998 appears to have been a transitional year for the PE.
The Army’s 6.3 Combat Vehicle and Advanced Automotive Technology PE is
discussed above.
In FY1998, the Army’s 6.3 PE Line of Sight (Anti-tank) PE became an
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program. The PE focused on
adapting previously developed technology into an air-mobile configuration to support
early entry of U.S. forces into a theater of action. Funding increased from $5.9
million in FY1998 to $85 million in FY2002, then declined to $9.7 million (all in
FY2009 dollars) in FY2004. The PE was not funded after FY2004.
Funding for the Army’s 6.3 Night Vision PE grew steadily from $22.1 million
in FY1998 to $111.7 million in FY2005 before dropping to $77.0 million in FY2007
(all in FY2009 dollars).

Called Aerospace Structures until FY2002, the Air Force’s Aerospace
Technologies Development/Demonstration PE develops and integrates a wide range
of technologies to enhance the performance, cost of operations, and life of current
and future aerospace vehicles. The PE was funded at $12.0 million in FY1998 and
grew steadily until it peaked at $50.5 million in FY2004. It received $47.4 million
in FY2007 (all in FY2009 dollars).
Except for the Army’s Combat Vehicle and Advanced Automotive Technology
program, these PEs contributed little to the overall increase in S&T funding and their
relatively high increases in percentage terms are mainly due to their relatively low
funding levels. However, the Army’s Night Vision program and the Air Force’s
Aerospace Technologies Development/Demonstration program did experience steady
increases that indicate they were areas of sustained interest during this time period.
Review of Major Findings
^!The increase in S&T funding over the 10 years from FY1998 to
FY2007 was distributed broadly across the S&T program.
^!Each department (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and the defense
agencies as a whole shared roughly equally in dollar terms. In
percentage terms, the defense agencies’ increase, taken as a whole,
was noticeably less.
^!Although the total increase in S&T funding, in dollar terms, was
distributed between departments in roughly equal shares, the
increases were distributed variably across their budget activities.
Applied research (budget activity 6.3) of each of the departments
increased the most and by roughly the same amount when taken as
a percentage. Across all of DOD, basic research increased the least
in dollar terms, although in percentage terms this varied
considerably between departments and agencies.
^!Of the PEs that were in existence throughout the 10-year period,
73% exceeded their baseline funding. The increases varied from PE
to PE, but the PEs that increased the most represented a relatively
small share of the total increase.
^!It is difficult to discern any clear “winners” over these 10 years in
terms of particular mission, disciplines, or sub-systems. A possible
exception may be a growing emphasis on countering weapons of
mass destruction. This could reflect a shift away from traditional
force-on-force conflict toward a more unconventional post-Cold
War threat.

Issues for Congress
Congress has three basic approaches to consider when funding S&T going
forward — continue increasing S&T funding, reduce S&T funding, or keep S&T
funding flat in inflation-adjusted dollars. Within each option, Congress may also
decide to adjust the allocation of resources or keep it more or less the same. For
example, the Director of Defense Engineering and Research has advocated more
basic research. In an expanding program, Congress may be able to accommodate an
increase in basic research (or elsewhere within the S&T program) without having to
make other major allocation adjustments. However, in a flat or declining budget,
growth in a particular department, agency, program, or budget activity would have
to be accompanied by decreases somewhere else. Any such decrease could come
from those programs that experienced the greatest increases over the last ten years,
arguing that the past growth has been sufficient to meet perceived needs. If,
however, these areas of past growth are deemed to require yet more growth,
decreases would have to come from elsewhere within the program. In this situation,
the relatively few programs that have already experienced decreases could be further
reduced, indicating their lower priority. However, any such further reductions could
render the program inefficient in trying to meet its goals. Alternatively, decreases
could be spread evenly over all other programs, reducing the impact on any particular
program areas.

Appendix
Budget Activity/NameDefinitions
6.1Systematic study directed toward greater knowledge or
Basic Researchunderstanding of fundamental aspects of phenomena and
of observable facts without specific applications towards
processes or products in mind.
6.2Systematic expansion and application of knowledge to
Applied Researchdevelop useful materials, devices, and systems or
methods...directed toward general non-system specific
military needs.
6.3Development of subsystems and components and efforts
Advanced Technologyto integrate subsystems and components into system
Developmentprototypes for field experiments and/or tests in simulated
environments.
6.4[Evaluation of] integrated technologies...or prototype
Advanced Componentsystems in a high fidelity and realistic operating
Development andenvironment....Emphasis is on proving component and
Prototypessubsystem maturity prior to integration in major and
complex systems. [These activities are taken in the initial
phases of an decision to acquire a specific system to meet
a certified military need.]
6.5Mature system development, integration, and
System Development anddemonstration, including engineering and manufacturing
Demonstrationdevelopment. Prototype performance is near or at
operational levels. These activities must be successfully
completed before the acquisition program can progress to
live fire testing and initial operational testing and
evaluation of production representative articles.
6.6Efforts to sustain and/or modernize the installations or
RDT&E Managementoperations of general research, development, test, and
Supportevaluation. Includes test ranges, maintenance and support
of laboratories, maintenance and operation of test aircraft
and ships, and studies and analysis of the research,
development, test, and evaluation program.
6.7Efforts to upgrade systems that have been fielded or
Operational Systemanticipate production funding in the current or subsequent
Developmentfiscal year.
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⁵^.^Fo^r^{a f}^u^{ll ex}^p^l^an^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^th^{ese activ}^{ities, see [}^h^ttp^://^www.^d^e^f^eⁿ^s^e^lⁱⁿ^k^.^m^il/com^ptroller/f^m^r/02b/
^02b_05.pdf^].