The ADA Amendments Act: P.L. 110-325

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a broad civil rights act prohibiting discrimination
against individuals with disabilities. As stated in the act, its purpose is “to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities.”
The threshold issue in any ADA case is whether the individual alleging discrimination is an
individual with a disability. Several Supreme Court decisions, including those in Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), and Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184
(2004), have interpreted the definition of disability, generally limiting its application. Since these
Supreme Court interpretations, lower court decisions also interpreted the definition of disability
strictly. Congress responded to these decisions by enacting the ADA Amendments Act, P.L. 110-
325, which rejects the Supreme Court and lower court interpretations and amends the ADA to
provide broader coverage.

Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Backgr ound ..................................................................................................................................... 1
The Americans With Disabilities Amendments Act........................................................................3
Legislative Background............................................................................................................3
General Definition of Disability................................................................................................4
Regarded as Having a Disability...............................................................................................5
Employment-Related Provisions...............................................................................................6
Rules of Construction................................................................................................................7
Regulatory Authority.................................................................................................................7
Conforming Amendment...........................................................................................................8
Effective Date............................................................................................................................8
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................8

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)¹ is a broad civil rights act prohibiting discrimination
against individuals with disabilities. As stated in the act, its purpose is “to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with ²
disabilities.”
The threshold issue in any ADA case is whether the individual alleging discrimination is an
individual with a disability. Several Supreme Court decisions have interpreted the definition of ³
disability, generally limiting its application. Since these Supreme Court interpretations, lower
court decisions also interpreted the definition of disability strictly. Congress responded to these
decisions by enacting the ADA Amendments Act, P.L. 110-325, which rejects the Supreme Court
and lower court interpretations and amends the ADA to provide broader coverage. Two of the
major changes made by the ADA Amendments Act are to expand the current interpretation of
when an impairment substantially limits a major life activity (rejecting the Supreme Court’s
interpretation in Toyota), and to require that the determination of whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity must be made without regard to the use of mitigating
measures (rejecting the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg).

The original ADA definition of disability was based on the definition of disability used for ⁴
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The term disability with respect to an individual
was defined as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded ⁵
as having such an impairment.” The ADA Amendments Act essentially keeps the same language
but rejects the interpretation given to the language by the Supreme Court.
Three Supreme Court decisions in 1999 addressed the definition of disability, and specifically
discussed the concept of mitigating measures. Sutton v. United Air Lines involved sisters who
were rejected from employment as pilots with United Air Lines because they wore eyeglasses.
The Supreme Court in Sutton examined the definition of disability used in the original ADA and
found that the determination of whether an individual has a disability should be made with
reference to measures that mitigate the individual’s impairment. The Sutton Court stated, “‘a
disability’ exists only where an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity, not where it
‘might,’ ‘could,’ or ‘would’ be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken.” The
Court also emphasized that the statement of findings in the ADA that some 43,000,000 Americans

¹^{42 U}^.^S.C^.^§^§¹²¹^{01 e}^t^s^e^q^.^F^o^r^a^m^o^r^e^de^ta^ile^{d dis}^c^us^sⁱ^on^of^the^A^D^A^,^s^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t 9}⁸^-⁹²¹^,^T^h^e^Ame^r^ic^ans^with
^Disa^b^ilit^{ies Act (}^A^{DA): S}^t^a^t^u^t^o^r^{y La}ⁿ^g^u^a^g^e^aⁿ^d^Recen^{t Issu}^es^,^by^N^a^ncy^Le^e^J^one^s^.
²⁴²^U^.^S^.^C^.^§1²¹⁰¹⁽^b⁾⁽¹⁾^.
³^Sut^to^{n v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d Air}^Line^s^,^Iⁿ^c^.,⁵²⁷^U^.^S.⁴^{71 (}¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^;^M^u^r^p^hy^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d P}^a^r^c^e^l^Se^r^v^ic^e^{, I}ⁿ^c^.,⁵²⁷^U^.^{S. 5}¹⁶⁽¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^;
^Kⁱ^r^k^ingb^ur^{g v}^.^Albe^r^t^s^o^n’^s^Iⁿ^c^.^,⁵^{27 U}^.^S.⁵⁵^{5 (}¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^;^Toy^o^t^a^M^o^t^o^r^M^anuf^ac^turⁱ^{ng v}^.^W^illiam^s^{, 53}^{4 U}^.^S.¹⁸⁴⁽²⁰⁰²⁾^.
⁴^Sectioⁿ⁵⁰⁴^,²⁹^U.S.C^.^§⁷⁹⁴^,^p^r^o^h^ib^its^dⁱ^scrimⁱⁿ^a^tioⁿ^b^a^se^d^oⁿ^dⁱ^s^a^b^ilityⁱⁿ^an^y^p^r^o^g^ra^m^o^r^activ^it^y^receivⁱⁿ^g^f^e^d^e^ral
^f^unds^or^{in t}^h^e^e^x^e^c^u^tiv^e^braⁿ^c^h^o^r^the^U^.^S^.^Pos^t^a^l^Se^rv^ic^e^.^T^h^e^a^p^p^lic^a^b^le^de^fⁱ^nitio^{n of}^dis^a^b^ility^is^c^odifⁱ^e^d^a^t²⁹
^U^.^S.C^.^§7⁰⁶⁽⁸⁾^.
⁵^P^.^L.¹⁰¹^-³³^6,^§3⁽²⁾^.

have one or more physical or mental disabilities “requires the conclusion that Congress did not
intend to bring under the statute’s protection all those whose uncorrected conditions amount to
disabilities.”
Similarly, in Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the Court held that the fact that an individual
with high blood pressure was unable to meet the Department of Transportation (DOT) safety
standards was not sufficient to create an issue of fact regarding whether an individual is regarded
as unable to utilize a class of jobs. The Court in Murphy found that an employee is regarded as
having a disability if the covered entity mistakenly believes that the employee’s actual,
nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. And in the last of
this trilogy of 1999 cases, the Court in Kirkingburg v. Albertsons held that a trucker with
monocular vision who was able to compensate for this impairment was not a person with a
disability.
In the 2002 case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, the meaning of “substantially
limits” was examined, and Justice O’Connor, writing for the unanimous Court, determined that
the word substantial “clearly precluded impairments that interfere in only a minor way with the
performance of manual tasks.” The Court also found that the term “major life activity” “refers to
those activities that are of central importance to daily life.” Finding that these terms are to be
“interpreted strictly,” the Court held that “to be substantially limited in performing manual tasks,
an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from
doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.”
Since these Supreme Court decisions, lower courts applied these holdings in various factual ⁶
situations. For example, in Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the eighth circuit found that a
pharmacist with diabetes who takes insulin and eats a special diet was not an individual with a
disability because, with the medication and diet, the diabetes did not substantially affect a major ⁷
life activity. Similarly, in McClure v. General Motors Corp., the fifth circuit found that an
electrician with muscular dystrophy who could lift his arms only to shoulder level did not have a ⁸
disability. The eleventh circuit examined what are major life activities in Littleton v. Wal-Mart.
The plaintiff, a 29-year-old man who was diagnosed with mental retardation as a child, was not
hired for a position as a cart-push associate with Wal-Mart. The court found that “[i]t was unclear
whether thinking, communicating and social interaction are ‘major life activities’ under the ADA”
and noted that even if thinking, communicating, and social interaction were found to be major life ⁹
activities, the plaintiff did not show that he was substantially limited in these activities.

⁶²⁹⁷^F.^3d⁷²^{0 (}⁸^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰²⁾^,^c^e^r^{t. de}^nie^d^,⁵⁷^{1 U}^.^S.¹⁰⁷⁰⁽²⁰⁰⁴⁾^.
⁷⁷⁵^Fe^{d. A}^ppx^.⁹⁸^{3 (}⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾^.
⁸²³^{1 Fe}^d^.^A^ppx^{. 8}⁷⁴⁽¹¹^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾^,^c^e^r^{t. de}^nie^d^,¹²^{8 S.C}^t^.³⁰^2,¹^{69 L}^.^Ed^.2^{d 2}⁴⁷⁽^O^c^t^obe^r^1,²⁰⁰⁷⁾^{. For}^a^dis^c^us^sⁱ^oⁿ
^of^othe^{r l}^o^w^e^{r c}^{ourt c}^a^s^e^s^se^e^Na^tⁱ^ona^{l C}^o^uⁿ^c^il^{on Disa}^bi^lity^{, “}^T^he^Im^pa^c^t^of^the^Supre^m^e^{Court’s ADA}^D^e^cⁱ^{sions on}
^the^Rig^h^{ts of}^P^e^rsoⁿ^{s W}^{ith Disa}^bi^litie^s,”^Fe^brua^ry^25,²⁰⁰³^,^ht^tp:/^/^www^.nc^d^.g^ov^/ⁿ^e^w^sroom^/^p^u^b^lic^a^tions/²⁰^03/
^d^eci^si^oⁿ^sⁱ^m^p^act^.^h^t^m^.
⁹²³¹^F^e^d.^A^p^p^x^.⁸⁷^4,⁸⁷^{7 (}¹¹^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁷⁾^,^c^e^r^t.^de^nie^d^,¹²⁸^S.C^t^.³^02,¹⁶^{9 L}^.^Ed^.2^{d 2}⁴⁷⁽^O^c^t^obe^r^1,²⁰⁰⁷⁾^.

On July 26, 2007, the 17^th anniversary of the enactment of the ADA, bills were introduced in both ¹⁰
the House and Senate to amend the ADA to broaden the definition of disability. S. 1881,
introduced by Senator Harkin, was referred to the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions ¹¹
Committee and hearings were held on November 15, 2007. H.R. 3195, introduced by
Representative Hoyer, was referred to the House Committee on Education and Labor, as well as
the House Committees on Judiciary, Transportation and Infrastructure, and Energy and
Commerce for a period to be determined by the Speaker. Hearings were held by the
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the House Judiciary ¹²
Committee on October 4, 2007, and on January 29, 2008, by the House Education and Labor ¹³
Committee.
On June 18, 2008, both the House Judiciary Committee and the House Education and Labor
Committee reported out H.R. 3195, now renamed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. H.R. 3195
as reported out of committee was significantly different from H.R. 3195 and S. 1881 as ¹⁴
introduced. Those bills would have eliminated the phrase “substantially limits” from the
definition thereby broadening the definition of disability to cover the majority of the population.
The House passed H.R. 3195 on June 25, 2008, by a vote of 402 to 17. The House-passed bill
would have kept the term “substantially limits” and defined it as “materially restricts.”
The Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee held a hearing on July 15, 2008,
where testimony was heard on several issues, including the impact of the ADA Amendments Act ¹⁵
on education. On July 31, 2008, Senator Harkin with 55 original cosponsors introduced S. 3406,
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, which tracked much of the House-passed language but made
several significant changes, including deleting the House definition of “substantially limits” as ¹⁶
“materially restricts.” S. 3406 passed the Senate by unanimous consent on September 11, 2008,

¹⁰^In^t^h^{e 1}⁰⁹^th^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^R^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^t^a^tiv^e^s^Se^ns^e^nbr^e^nne^r^,^H^o^y^e^r^,^a^{nd C}^ony^e^r^s^intr^od^uc^e^d^H^.^R^.⁶²⁵⁸^,¹⁰⁹^th^Cong^.,²^d
^Se^{ss., to a}^m^e^{nd the}^de^fⁱ^nitio^{n of}^disa^bility^.
¹¹^“^R^e^s^toring^Cong^re^ssioⁿ^a^l^Inte^nt^a^nd^P^r^ote^c^tio^{ns u}^nde^r^t^h^e^Am^e^r^ic^aⁿ^{s w}^{ith Disa}^bilitie^{s A}^c^t,”^Be^f^o^re^the^Se^na^te
^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on H}^e^a^{lth, Ed}^uc^a^tio^n,^L^a^bor^{, a}ⁿ^d^P^e^nsⁱ^ons^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^15,²⁰⁰⁷^{, h}^ttp:^//he^l^p.s^e^na^te^.g^ov^/H^e^a^r^ing^s^/
²⁰⁰^7_¹¹^_1^5_^b/²⁰⁰⁷^_1^1_¹⁵^_b.^ht^m^l^.
¹²^H^e^a^r^ing^{on H}^.^R^.³¹⁹⁵^{, t}^h^e^A^D^A^R^e^s^t^or^a^{tion A}^c^{t of}²⁰^07,^B^e^f^o^r^e^the^H^ous^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on the}^J^u^dicⁱ^a^r^y^,
^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on the}^Co^ns^tit^utio^{n, Civ}^{il Rig}^h^ts^{, a}ⁿ^d^Civ^{il L}ⁱ^be^rtie^s^,^O^c^tobe^{r 4}^,²⁰⁰⁷^,^htt^p^://j^ud^ic^ia^ry^.hous^e^.^g^o^v^/
^H^e^a^r^ing^s^.a^s^p^x^?^I^D⁼^182.
¹³^“^H^.R^{. 3}¹⁹⁵^{: T}^h^e^A^D^A^R^e^s^t^or^a^tⁱ^{on A}^c^{t of}²⁰⁰^7,”^B^e^f^o^r^e^the^H^o^us^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on Educ}^a^tⁱ^{on a}ⁿ^{d L}^a^bor^{, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^29,
²⁰⁰^{8, htt}^p^://e^d^l^a^bor^.h^ous^e^.^g^o^v^/^he^a^r^ing^s^/f^c^-^2008-0¹^-2^9.s^h^tm^l.
¹⁴^T^h^e^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^s^w^e^re^a^re^{sult of}^e^x^t^e^nsiv^e^ne^g^o^tia^tions^be^tw^e^eⁿ^the^b^u^s^ine^{ss c}^o^m^m^unit^y^a^{nd na}^ti^ona^l^di^sa^bility
^or^g^a^niz^a^tions^.^Se^e^dis^c^us^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^of^this^pr^oc^e^s^s^a^t¹⁵^{3 C}^ong^{. R}^e^c^.^S.⁸³⁵^{0 (}^S^e^p^t.¹¹^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸⁾⁽^S^ta^te^m^e^{nt of}^Se^na^tor^H^a^r^kⁱⁿ⁾^;
¹⁵³^C^ONG^.^R^EC^{. H}^.⁸²^{94 (}^S^e^p^te^m^b^e^r¹⁷^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸⁾⁽^S^ta^te^m^e^{nt of}^R^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^H^o^y^e^r^a^{nd Se}^ns^e^nbr^eⁿ^ne^r⁾^.
¹⁵^“^D^e^t^e^r^mⁱ^ning^the^P^r^ope^{r Sc}^o^p^e^o^f^Cov^e^ra^g^e^f^o^{r the}^Am^e^r^ic^aⁿ^{s w}ⁱ^t^h^Disa^bilit^ie^{s A}^c^t,”^Be^f^o^re^the^Se^na^te^Com^m^itte^e
^{on H}^e^a^lth^{, Ed}^uc^a^tio^{n, L}^a^bor^,^aⁿ^d^P^e^nsⁱ^ons^{, J}^u^ly^15,²⁰⁰⁸^{, h}^ttp:^//he^l^p.s^e^na^te^.g^ov^/H^e^a^r^ing^s^/200^8_⁰⁷^_^15/
²⁰⁰^8_⁰⁷^_1^5.^htm^l^.
¹⁶¹⁵^{3 C}^o^ng^{. R}^e^c^.^S.⁸³⁵⁶⁽^S^e^p^t.¹¹^{, 20}⁰⁸⁾^.^F^o^r^t^h^e^Sta^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^Ma^na^g^e^r^s^{to A}^c^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^y^{S. 340}^{6 s}^e^e¹⁵³^C^o^ng^{. R}^e^c^.
^S^.⁸³⁴⁴⁽^S^e^p^t^.¹¹^,²⁰⁰⁸⁾^.

and passed the House September 17, 2008. P.L. 110-325 was signed into law on September 25,

2008.

The ADA Amendments Act defines the term disability with respect to an individual as “(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an ¹⁷
impairment (as described in paragraph (3)).” Although this is essentially the same statutory
language as was in the original ADA, P.L. 110-325 contains new rules of construction regarding
the definition of disability, which provide that
• the definition of disability shall be construed in favor of broad coverage to the
maximum extent permitted by the terms of the act;
• the term “substantially limits” shall be interpreted consistently with the findings
and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act;
• an impairment that substantially limits one major life activity need not limit other
major life activities to be considered a disability;
• an impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would have
substantially limited a major life activity when active; and
• the determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating
measures, except that the ameliorative effects of ordinary eyeglasses or contact ¹⁸
lenses shall be considered.
The findings of the ADA Amendments Act include statements indicating that the Supreme Court
decisions in Sutton and Toyota as well as lower court cases have narrowed and limited the ADA
from what was intended by Congress. P.L. 110-325 specifically states that the current Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations defining the term “substantially
limits” as “significantly restricted” are “inconsistent with congressional intent, by expressing too
high a standard.” The codified findings in the original ADA are also amended to delete the
finding that “43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities....” This
finding was used in Sutton to support limiting the reach of the definition of disability.
The ADA Amendments Act states that the purposes of the legislation are to carry out the ADA’s
objectives of the elimination of discrimination and the provision of “‘clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination’ by reinstating a broad scope of protection
available under the ADA.” P.L. 110-325 rejected the Supreme Court’s holdings that mitigating
measures are to be used in making a determination of whether an impairment substantially limits
a major life activity as well as holdings defining the “substantially limits” requirements. The
substantially limits requirements of Toyota as well as the EEOC regulations defining substantially
limits as “significantly restricted” are specifically rejected in the new law.

¹⁷^P^.^L.¹¹⁰^-³²^5,^§4⁽^a⁾^,^am^en^dⁱⁿ^g⁴²^U.^S^.^C^.^§1²¹⁰²⁽³⁾^.
¹⁸^L^o^w^vi^si^oⁿ^d^e^vi^{ces are n}^o^tⁱⁿ^cl^ud^edⁱⁿ^t^h^{e o}^r^diⁿ^a^ry^e^y^e^g^l^a^ss^{es an}^d^co^nt^act^l^eⁿ^s^excep^tⁱ^o^n.

The Senate Statement of Managers notes that the courts had not interpreted the term
“substantially limits” in the manner Congress had intended and discussed the methods Congress
had considered in order to express its intent. The House of Representatives had defined the term
“substantially limits” as “materially restricts” in order “to convey that Congress intended to
depart from the strict and demanding standard applied by the Supreme Court in Sutton and ¹⁹
Toyota.” However, the Senate rejected the use of the term “materially restricts,” concluding that
“adopting a new, undefined term that is subject to widely disparate meanings is not the best way ²⁰
to achieve the goal of ensuring consistent and appropriately broad coverage under this Act.” In
passing the Senate bill, House debate indicated that although the term “materially restricts” was
not ultimately adopted, the intent was the same as that of the Senate language. Thus, House
debate stated that the descriptions of the changes intended by the term “materially restricts” in the ²¹
House Committee Reports should be read as what is intended by the language of P.L. 110-325.
The ADA Amendments Act specifically lists examples of major life activities including caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting,
bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and
working. The act also states that a major life activity includes the operation of a major bodily
function. The House Judiciary Committee report indicates that “this clarification was needed to
ensure that the impact of an impairment on the operation of major bodily functions is not
overlooked or wrongly dismissed as falling outside the definition of ‘major life activities’ under ²²
the ADA.” There had been judicial decisions which found that certain bodily functions had not ²³
been covered by the definition of disability. For example, in Furnish v. SVI Sys., Inc. the seventh
circuit held that an individual with cirrhosis of the liver due to infection with Hepatitis B was not
an individual with a disability because liver function was not “integral to one’s daily existence.”
The House debate contains a colloquy between Representatives Pete Stark and George Miller on
the subject of the meaning of “substantially limits” in the context of learning, reading, writing,
thinking, or speaking. The colloquy finds that an individual who has performed well academically
may still be considered an individual with a disability. Representative Stark stated the following:
^Sp^ecifⁱ^{c lear}ⁿⁱⁿ^g^dⁱ^sab^ilitie^{s, su}^c^h^{as d}^y^s^l^ex^{ia, ar}^{e n}^e^u^r^o^l^o^gⁱ^call^y^b^a^sedⁱ^m^p^a^ir^m^eⁿ^t^{s th}^a^t
^su^b^s^taⁿ^tial^l^y^lⁱ^m^{it th}^e^w^a^y^t^h^e^s^{e in}^dⁱ^vⁱ^d^u^al^{s p}^e^r^f^o^r^m^m^a^j^o^r^lif^{e acti}^v^itie^{s, li}^k^e^r^eadⁱⁿ^g^o^r
^learⁿⁱⁿ^g^{, o}^r^th^{e t}ⁱ^m^e^{it ta}^k^e^{s t}^o^p^e^r^f^o^r^m^su^c^h^acti^v^itie^{s o}^f^teⁿ^r^e^f^e^r^r^e^d^to^{as t}^h^{e co}ⁿ^d^itioⁿ^,
^m^aⁿⁿ^{er, or du}^ratⁱ^on^{. T}^hⁱ^s^l^e^gi^s^l^atⁱ^on^wⁱ^l^l^rees^t^a^blⁱ^s^{h cov}^e^r^a^g^e^f^o^{r t}^h^es^eⁱⁿ^di^vⁱ^du^al^s^b^y
^en^s^u^rⁱⁿ^g^th^a^t^th^{e d}^e^fⁱⁿ^itioⁿ^o^f^t^h^{is ab}^ilit^y^{is b}^r^o^a^d^l^y^coⁿ^s^t^r^u^e^d^aⁿ^d^t^h^e^d^e^t^e^r^mⁱⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^d^o^e^sⁿ^o^t²⁴
^con^s^{ider th}^{e us}^{e of}^m^iti^g^a^ti^ng^m^eas^u^r^es^.
The third prong of the definition of disability covers individuals who are “regarded as having
such an impairment (as described in paragraph (3)).” Paragraph 3 states that “[a]n individual

¹⁹¹⁵^{3 C}^o^ng^{. R}^e^c^.^S.⁸³⁴⁵⁽^S^e^p^t.¹¹^{, 20}⁰⁸⁾⁽^S^ta^te^m^e^{nt of}^Ma^na^g^e^r^s^{to A}^c^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^y^{S. 340}^6,^the^A^m^e^r^icaⁿ^s^w^ith
^Disa^bilitie^{s A}^c^t^Am^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^{ts Ac}^{t of}²⁰^08).
²⁰^Id^.
²¹¹⁵^{3 C}^o^ng^{. R}^e^c^.^H^.⁸²⁹⁴⁽^S^e^p^te^m^b^e^r¹⁷^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸⁾^.
²²^H^.^R^e^{pt. 11}^0-⁷^30,^P^a^r^t^2,^a^t¹⁶⁽²⁰⁰⁸⁾^.
²³²⁷⁰^F.^3d⁴⁴^{5 (}⁷^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^.
²⁴¹⁵^{3 C}^o^ng^{. R}^e^c^.^H^.⁸²^{91 (}^S^e^p^te^m^b^e^r¹⁷^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸⁾^.

meets the requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual
establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this Act because of an
actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is
perceived to limit a major life activity.” However, impairments that are transitory and minor are
specifically excluded from the regarded prong. A transitory impairment is one with an actual or
expected duration of six months or less. The ADA Amendments Act also provides in a rule of ²⁵
construction in Title V of the ADA that a covered entity under Title I, a public entity under Title
II, or a person who operates a place of public accommodation under Title III, need not provide a
reasonable accommodation or a reasonable modification to policies, practices, or procedures to an
individual who meets the definition of disability solely under the “regarded as” prong of the ²⁶
definition.
The Senate Statement of Managers notes that there were some reservations about this change but
that it was included “given our strong expectation that ... individuals [who had been given
reasonable accommodations under the ‘regarded as’ prong by courts] would now be covered ²⁷
under the first prong of the definition, properly applied.” The House debate echoed the Senate
interpretation and expanded on congressional intent, stating the following:
^W^e^{, an}^{d th}^{e Se}ⁿ^a^{te, e}^x^pres^s^e^d^ou^{r con}^f^iden^{ce t}^h^{at i}ⁿ^dividu^a^l^s^w^h^oⁿ^{eed acco}^m^m^odations
^wⁱ^l^l^receiv^e^th^e^m^becau^s^e^,^wⁱ^t^h^redu^ctioⁿⁱⁿ^th^{e bu}^rdeⁿ^of^s^h^o^wⁱⁿ^g^{a “}^s^u^b^s^t^aⁿ^tia^l
^lⁱ^mⁱ^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^{” t}^h^os^{e i}ⁿ^di^vⁱ^du^a^l^{s al}^s^o^qu^alⁱ^f^y^f^o^{r cov}^e^rag^e^un^{der pron}^g^s^{1 or 2 (w}^h^e^re
^accom^m^odation^s^til^{l is}^{required). Of}^cou^r^s^e^,^ou^{r c}^l^arifⁱ^cation^h^e^{re does}ⁿ^o^t^s^h^ie^ld
^q^u^alif^icatioⁿ^staⁿ^d^a^r^d^{s, tests, o}^r^o^t^h^e^r^selectioⁿ^cr^iterⁱ^{a f}^r^o^m^ch^alleⁿ^g^e^b^y^aⁿⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vⁱ^d^u^a^l^w^h^o
^is^dis^q^u^a^li^fⁱ^{ed bas}^e^{d on s}^u^ch^s^t^an^{dard, tes}^t^{, or criteria.}^Asⁱ^s^cu^rreⁿ^t^l^y^requ^ired^uⁿ^d^{er t}^h^e
^A^D^A^,^an^y^s^t^an^d^a^r^d^{, test, o}^r^o^t^h^e^r^select^ioⁿ^cr^iterⁱ^{a t}^h^{at r}^e^s^u^ltsⁱⁿ^dⁱ^sq^u^a^li^fⁱ^cat^ioⁿ^o^f^aⁿ
ⁱⁿ^divⁱ^d^u^{al becau}^s^e^of^aⁿⁱ^m^pai^r^m^eⁿ^t^caⁿ^{be ch}^alleng^{ed by}^th^atⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vⁱ^du^a^l^aⁿ^d^m^u^s^t^b^e^s^h^owⁿ
^t^o^be^j^o^b-^rel^a^t^e^{d an}^{d con}^sⁱ^s^t^eⁿ^t^wⁱ^t^h^bu^sⁱⁿ^e^ssⁿ^ece^s^sⁱ^t^y^f^o^{r n}^eces^s^a^r^y^f^o^{r t}^h^{e prog}^ra^m^or²⁸
^s^e^rv^{ice i}ⁿ^qu^es^tⁱ^on^.
The ADA Amendments Act amended Section 102 of the ADA to “mirror the structure of [the] ²⁹
nondiscrimination protection provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” The act
strikes the prohibition of discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability because of
the disability of such individual and substitutes the prohibition of discrimination against a
qualified individual “on the basis of disability.” The Senate Managers’ Statement noted that this
change “ensures that the emphasis in questions of disability discrimination is properly on the
critical inquiry of whether a qualified person has been discriminated against on the basis of

²⁵^T^{itle I o}^f^th^{e A}^D^A^co^v^e^rs^e^m^p^l^o^y^men^t^{, title II co}^v^e^{rs st}^{ates an}^d^l^o^calities,^an^d^ti^{tle III co}^v^e^{rs p}^l^{aces o}^f^p^u^b^lic
^acco^mm^o^d^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^su^c^h^{as gro}^cery^st^o^r^es,^do^ct^o^r^{s’ o}^f^fⁱ^ces,^an^d^m^o^vi^{e t}^h^eat^ers.
²⁶^Un^d^e^r^p^r^ev^io^u^s^law^,^th^{e circu}^its^w^e^r^e^sp^{lit o}ⁿ^w^h^eth^e^{r th}^{ere is a}^d^u^ty^to^acco^mm^o^d^a^{te a “r}^eg^ard^e^d^{as” p}^l^ain^tif^f^.^See
^e^.^g^.,^D^’^Ange^l^o^v^.^C^o^nAgr^{a F}^o^o^d^s^,^Iⁿ^c^.^,⁴²^{2 F.}^3d¹²²⁰⁽¹¹^th^Ci^r.²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^d^u^t^y^t^o^acco^mm^o^d^a^t^e^);^K^aplaⁿ^v^.^C^ity^{of N}^o^r^t^h^th
^L^a^{s Vega}^s,³²^{3 F.}^3d¹²²⁶⁽⁹^Ci^r^.²⁰⁰³^),^cert^.^d^eⁿⁱ^ed^,⁵⁴⁰^U.^S^.¹⁰⁴⁹⁽²⁰⁰³⁾⁽ⁿ^{o du}^t^y^t^o^acco^mm^o^d^a^t^e^).
²⁷¹⁵^{3 C}^o^ng^{. R}^e^c^.^S.⁸³⁴⁷⁽^S^e^p^t.¹¹^{, 20}⁰⁸⁾⁽^S^ta^te^m^e^{nt of}^Ma^na^g^e^r^s^{to A}^c^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^y^{S. 340}^6,^the^A^m^e^r^icaⁿ^s^w^ith
^Disa^bilitie^{s A}^c^t^Am^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^{ts Ac}^{t of}²⁰^08).
²⁸¹⁵^{3 C}^o^ng^{. R}^e^c^.^H^.⁸²^{90 (}^S^e^p^te^m^b^e^r¹⁷^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸⁾^.
²⁹¹⁵^{3 C}^o^ng^{. R}^e^c^.^S.⁸³⁴⁷⁽^S^e^p^t.¹¹^{, 20}⁰⁸⁾⁽^S^ta^te^m^e^{nt of}^Ma^na^g^e^r^s^{to A}^c^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^y^{S. 340}^6,^the^A^m^e^r^icaⁿ^s^w^ith
^Disa^bilitie^{s A}^c^t^Am^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^{ts Ac}^{t of}²⁰^08).

disability, and not unduly focused on the preliminary question of whether a particular person is a ³⁰
‘person with a disability.’”
P.L. 110-325 also provides that covered entities may not use qualification standards based on an
individual’s uncorrected vision unless the standard is shown to be job related and consistent with
business necessity.
The ADA Amendments Act makes several additions to Title V of the ADA. The act states that the
ADA does not alter eligibility standards for benefits under state workers’ compensation laws or
under state or federal disability benefit programs. P.L. 110-325 also states that nothing in the act ³¹
alters the provision of Section 302(b)(2)(A)(ii), specifying that reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures shall be required, unless an entity can demonstrate that making
such modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, including academic requirements in
postsecondary education, would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations involved. The Senate Statement of Managers notes
that this provision was added at the request of the higher education community and “is included
solely to provide assurances that the bill does not alter current law with regard to the obligations
of academic institutions under the ADA, which we believe is already demonstrated in case law on ³²
this topic.” The Managers’ Statement also noted that this provision “is unrelated to the purpose ³³
of this legislation and should be given no meaning in interpreting the definition of disability.”
The ADA Amendments Act specifically prohibits reverse discrimination claims and states that
nothing in the act shall provide the basis for a claim by a person without a disability that he or she
was subject to discrimination because of a lack of a disability. The Senate Statement of Managers
observes that the intent of this provision is “to clarify that a person without a disability does not
have the right under the Act to bring an action against an entity on the grounds that he or she was ³⁴
discriminated against ‘on the basis of disability...’”
As was discussed previously, the rules of construction provide that a covered entity under Title I,
a public entity under Title II, or a person who operates a place of public accommodation under
Title III, need not provide a reasonable accommodation or a reasonable modification to policies,
practices, or procedures to an individual who meets the definition of disability solely under the
“regarded as” prong of the definition.
The Supreme Court in Sutton questioned the authority of regulatory agencies to promulgate
regulations for the definition of disability in the ADA. The definition of disability is contained in
Section 3 of the ADA, and the ADA does not specifically give any agency the authority to

³⁰^Id^.
³¹⁴²^U^.^S.C.^§¹²¹⁸²^(b⁾⁽²^)(A^)(ii).
³²¹⁵^{3 C}^o^ng^{. R}^e^c^.^S.⁸³⁴⁷⁽^S^e^p^t.¹¹^{, 20}⁰⁸⁾⁽^S^ta^te^m^e^{nt of}^Ma^na^g^e^r^s^{to A}^c^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^y^{S. 340}^6,^the^A^m^e^r^icaⁿ^s^w^ith
^Disa^bilitie^{s A}^c^t^Am^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^{ts Ac}^{t of}²⁰^08).
³³^Id^.
³⁴^Id^.

interpret the definitions in Section 3, including the definition of disability. The Supreme Court
declined to address this issue since, as both parties to Sutton accepted the regulation as valid, “we
have no occasion to consider what deference they are due, if any.” The ADA Amendments Act
specifically grants regulatory authority and states that “[t]he authority to issue regulations granted
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of
Transportation under this Act, includes the authority to issue regulations implementing the
definitions contained in sections 3 and 4.”
The Rehabilitation Act is amended by the ADA Amendments Act to reference the definition of
disability in the ADA. The Senate Statement of Managers noted the importance of maintaining
uniform definitions in the two statutes so covered entities “will generally operate under one
consistent standard, and the civil rights of individuals with disabilities will be protected in all ³⁵
settings.” The Senate Statement of Managers also stated the following:
^W^e^ex^p^{ect th}^{at th}^{e Secr}^etar^y^o^f^Ed^u^catioⁿ^w^{ill p}^r^o^m^u^l^g^a^teⁿ^e^w^r^e^g^u^latioⁿ^s^r^e^lated^to^th^e
^d^e^fⁱⁿⁱ^tioⁿ^o^f^dⁱ^sab^ilit^y^to^b^e^coⁿ^sⁱ^s^teⁿ^t^w^ith^t^h^o^s^{e iss}^u^ed^b^y^th^{e A}^tto^rⁿ^e^y^Gen^e^r^a^{l u}ⁿ^d^e^r^th^is
^A^c^{t. W}^e^b^e^liev^e^th^{at o}^t^h^e^r^cu^r^r^en^{t r}^e^g^u^latioⁿ^s^iss^u^ed^b^y^th^{e D}^e^p^a^r^t^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^Ed^u^catioⁿ^O^f^fⁱ^c^e
^of^Cⁱ^v^il^Rⁱ^g^h^t^s^uⁿ^d^{er Sectio}ⁿ^{504 of}^th^{e R}^e^h^a^bilitatioⁿ^A^c^t^{are cu}^rren^tl^y^h^a^r^m^on^io^u^s^wⁱ^th³⁶
^Coⁿ^g^r^e^ssioⁿ^{al i}ⁿ^ten^t^uⁿ^d^e^r^b^o^th^th^e^AD^A^an^d^t^h^{e Re}^h^a^b^ilita^tioⁿ^A^c^t.
The effective date of the ADA Amendments Act is January 1, 2009.
^N^a^nc^y^Le^e^J^o^ne^s
^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e A}^t^torn^e^y
ⁿ^j^on^es^@^c^r^s^.l^oc.g^ov^{, 7-}⁶⁹⁷⁶

³⁵^Id^.
³⁶^Id^.